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  • Ad Hominem Fallacy | Definition & Examples

Ad Hominem Fallacy | Definition & Examples

Published on April 21, 2023 by Kassiani Nikolopoulou . Revised on October 9, 2023.

Ad hominem fallacy (or ad hominem ) is an attempt to discredit someone’s argument by personally attacking them. Instead of discussing the argument itself, criticism is directed toward the opponent’s character, which is irrelevant to the discussion.

Ad hominem fallacy is often used as a diversion tactic to shift attention to an unrelated point like a person’s character or motives and avoid addressing the actual issue. It is common in both formal and informal contexts, ranging from political debates to online discussions.

Table of contents

What is the ad hominem fallacy, when is an ad hominem argument valid, different types of ad hominem arguments, ad hominem examples, other interesting articles, frequently asked questions about the ad hominem fallacy.

Ad hominem fallacy is a group of argumentation strategies that focus on the person making an argument rather than their viewpoint. This involves an attack on any aspect of the opponent’s personality, like their intelligence, reputation, or group affiliations. The attack can be subtle, such as casting doubt on a person’s character, or overt, like insulting someone.

Ad hominem fallacy

The ad hominem fallacy is a logical fallacy , specifically a fallacy of relevance, i.e, the argument raised is irrelevant to the discussion. An ad hominem fallacy appeals to our emotions and prejudices rather than facts.

Ad hominem literally means “to the person” as in being “directed at the person.” An ad hominem argument is therefore an attack directed against the person who makes a statement rather than the validity of their statement. In everyday language, this is known as a personal attack.

The goal of an ad hominem argument or ad hominem attack is to refute an opposing view indirectly, without ever engaging with it. The target of the attack usually feels the need to defend themself and thus digress from the discussion topic, which shows just how powerful ad hominem arguments are.

An ad hominem argument is not always fallacious. Because ad hominem arguments have been associated with dirty tricks and name-calling, they are usually considered as hits below the belt that do not advance a healthy debate.

However, an ad hominem argument can sometimes be used as a legitimate rhetorical strategy. When the claims made about a person’s character are relevant to the discussion or the conclusions being drawn, and they are properly justified, the ad hominem argument is valid.

For example, attacks on a person who has cheated on their partner are irrelevant to the quality of their mathematical reasoning, but they are relevant to deciding whether this person should be the leader of an association that emphasizes family values.

Ad hominem arguments can take various forms. In some cases, they are almost always a fallacy, while in other cases they can be valid depending on how they are used. Here are the most common types of ad hominem arguments:

  • Abusive ad hominem is a direct attack on the other person’s character, targeting their age, character, gender identity, appearance, etc. Abusive ad hominem arguments are usually fallacious because the attack is irrelevant to the discussion. For example, “who is going to vote for a person looking like this?” is a fallacy because appearance has nothing to do with one’s leadership abilities.
  • Circumstantial ad hominem (or appeal to motive) argues that a person’s circumstances, such as their job, political affiliation, or other vested interests, motivate their argument and thus it must be biased and false. For example, a salesperson may tell you that the pair of jeans you’re trying on looks good on you, and you may half-jokingly point out that of course they think so since they want to make a sale.
  • Tu quoque (“you too”) ad hominem is an attempt to refute an argument by attacking its proponent and accusing them of hypocrisy (i.e , pointing to a contradiction between their words and their deeds). For example, a doctor suggests that a patient should lose weight, and the patient dismisses the advice on the grounds that the doctor has a few extra pounds too.
  • Guilt by association ad hominem is a variant in which someone is attacked because of their alleged connection with a person or group that has an unfavorable reputation. For example, “Stalin was evil and against religion. All people against religion are evil.”
  • Poisoning the well is a type of ad hominem where (irrelevant) negative information is preemptively presented to an audience to discredit whatever the opponent is about to say. For example, “before you listen to her, I should remind you that she has been charged with embezzlement.”

The ad hominem argument or personal attack is very common in public discourse, especially in the run-up to elections.

President Trump claimed Biden is “against God” and on the “wrong side of history,” while Democrats were attacked for viewing America as “a wicked nation that must be punished for its sins.”

On the other side, Joe Biden used a similar approach and claimed “the fact is this man has no idea what he’s talking about,” accusing his opponent of receiving payment from foreign countries.

An argument contains an ad hominem fallacy when you make an irrelevant attack on a person and suggest that this attack proves that what the person says cannot be trusted.

If you want to know more about fallacies , research bias , or AI tools , make sure to check out some of our other articles with explanations and examples.

  • ChatGPT vs human editor
  • ChatGPT citations
  • Is ChatGPT trustworthy?
  • Using ChatGPT for your studies
  • Appeal to emotion
  • Straw man fallacy
  • Slippery slope fallacy
  • Red herring fallacy
  • Ecological fallacy
  • Logical fallacy

Research bias

  • Implicit bias
  • Framing effect
  • Cognitive bias
  • Optimism bias
  • Hawthorne effect
  • Unconscious bias

Ad hominem is a persuasive technique where someone tries to undermine the opponent’s argument by personally attacking them.

In this way, one can redirect the discussion away from the main topic and to the opponent’s personality without engaging with their viewpoint. When the opponent’s personality is irrelevant to the discussion, we call it an ad hominem fallacy .

Ad hominem tu quoque (‘you too”) is an attempt to rebut a claim by attacking its proponent on the grounds that they uphold a double standard or that they don’t practice what they preach. For example, someone is telling you that you should drive slowly otherwise you’ll get a speeding ticket one of these days, and you reply “but you used to get them all the time!”

Argumentum ad hominem means “argument to the person” in Latin and it is commonly referred to as ad hominem argument or personal attack. Ad hominem arguments are used in debates to refute an argument by attacking the character of the person making it, instead of the logic or premise of the argument itself.

Sources in this article

We strongly encourage students to use sources in their work. You can cite our article (APA Style) or take a deep dive into the articles below.

Nikolopoulou, K. (2023, October 09). Ad Hominem Fallacy | Definition & Examples. Scribbr. Retrieved February 15, 2024, from https://www.scribbr.com/fallacies/ad-hominem-fallacy/
Lillo-Unglaube, M., Canales-Johnson, A., Navarrete, G., & Bravo, C. (2014). Toward an experimental account of argumentation: the case of the slippery slope and the ad hominem arguments. Frontiers in Psychology , 5 . https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01420

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Effectiviology

Ad Hominem: When People Use Personal Attacks in Arguments

Ad Hominem Fallacy

An ad hominem argument is a personal attack against the source of an argument, rather than against the argument itself. Essentially, this means that ad hominem arguments are used to attack opposing views indirectly, by attacking the individuals or groups that support these views.

Ad hominem arguments can take many forms, from basic name-calling to more complex rhetoric. For example, an ad hominem argument can involve simply insulting a person instead of properly replying to a point that they raised, or it can involve questioning their motives in response to their criticism of the current state of things.

Ad hominem arguments are common in both formal and informal discussions on various topics, so it’s important to understand them. As such, in the following article you will learn more about ad hominem arguments, see what types of them exist, and understand what you can do to respond to them properly.

Fallacious and reasonable ad hominem arguments

In everyday language, the term ‘ad hominem argument’ is primarily used to refer to a fallacious personal attack against the source of an argument, that is unsound from a logical perspective.

This type of argument can be fallacious for a number of reasons, including, most notably, the following:

  • The ad hominem attack is irrelevant to the discussion.
  • The ad hominem attack is used as primarily as a diversion tactic, either to unjustifiably shift the burden of proof to someone else in the discussion or to change the topic .
  • The ad hominem attack involves the faulty premise that an attack against the source of an argument necessarily constitutes a successful refutation of that argument.

However, attacks against the source of an argument are not always fallacious, since they are not inherently flawed from a logical perspective . As such, attacks against the source of an argument can be reasonable , as long as they’re relevant to the discussion , properly justified, and involve no faulty reasoning.

For example, consider a situation where a scientist presents an argument about the effectiveness of a new medical treatment. In general, in such situation, an ad hominem argument attacking the scientist’s physical looks will be fallacious, since this isn’t relevant to the discussion, while an ad hominem argument attacking the scientist’s source of funding will be reasonable, since this is relevant to the discussion.

Because of the different ways that ad hominem arguments can be used and the different forms that they can take, there have been many philosophical debates on the nature and classification of such arguments. However, from a practical perspective, the distinctions discussed in these debates aren’t important. Rather, what is important is to recognize that personal attacks can be fallacious, but whether or not they are fallacious depends on the argument, the way the argument was presented, and the context in which it was used.

Overall, in everyday language, the term ‘ad hominem argument’ is used primarily to refer to a fallacious attack, that is flawed for some reason, such as because it’s irrelevant to the discussion, but ad hominem arguments can also be reasonable and logically sound.

Note : the concept of ad hominem arguments is sometimes referred to as argumentum ad hominem, and, when viewed as a fallacy, it’s sometimes referred to as the ad hominem fallacy or the personal attack fallacy . Furthermore, when viewed as a fallacy, it can be categorized in various ways, including as a fallacy of relevance, since it contains information that is not directly relevant to the discussion at hand, and as a genetic fallacy , since it involves an attack against the source of an argument.

Examples of ad hominem arguments

A basic example of an ad hominem argument is a person telling someone “you’re stupid, so I don’t care what you have to say”, in response to hearing them present a well-thought position. This is the simplest type of fallacious ad hominem argument, which is nothing more than an abusive personal attack, and which has little to do with the topic being discussed.

An example of a more complex ad hominem argument appears in the following dialogue:

Alex: I think that we should reconsider the way that the government distributes the federal budget. Bob: if you can’t be loyal and support the way your government chooses to use taxes, then you should just leave the country and move somewhere else.

In this example, Bob is using a fallacious ad hominem argument, since he simply dismisses Alex’s claim with a personal attack, instead of presenting a valid stance of his own or discussing what Alex said.

Similarly, another example of a fallacious ad hominem argument appears in the following discussion:

Alex: I just saw a new study that explicitly claims that this theory is wrong. Bob: well, you don’t know anything about this field, so why should anyone listen to you?

This ad hominem attack is fallacious for a number of reasons, including, most notably, the fact that it attacks the person mentioning the study in question, rather than addressing the study itself.

However, a similar, better-phrased ad hominem argument could be reasonable under similar circumstances. Consider, for example, the following discussion:

Alex: I read a lot about this theory, and I think that it’s definitely wrong. Bob: how much expertise do you have with this field, though? As far as I know, you have no formal credentials, which makes me wary about trusting your opinion as opposed to the opinion of the experts who proposed this theory in the first place.

Unlike the previous example, this ad hominem argument is reasonable, rather than fallacious, since the person using the ad hominem argument targets it at the actual source of the opposing argument, and phrases the ad hominem argument in a way that clearly demonstrates why it’s relevant to the discussion.

Note: a rhetorical technique that is often used in conjunction with ad hominem arguments is the appeal to the stone , which is a logical fallacy that occurs when a person dismisses their opponent’s argument as absurd, without actually addressing it, or without providing sufficient evidence in order to prove its absurdity.

Types of ad hominem arguments

There are various types of ad hominem arguments, each of which involves a different way of attacking the source of an opposing argument. These include, most notably, poisoning the well , the  credentials fallacy , the  appeal to motive , the  appeal to hypocrisy ,  tone policing , the traitorous critic fallacy , the  association fallacy , and the  abusive fallacy .

In the sub-sections below, you will learn more about each of these types of ad hominem arguments, and see examples of their use.

Credentials fallacy

The  credentials fallacy is a logical fallacy that occurs when someone dismisses an argument because the person who made that argument doesn’t appear to have sufficient formal credentials in the relevant field.

An example of the credentials fallacy is the following:

Alex: studies have overwhelmingly shown that we should increase the federal spending on education. Bob: you’re not an economics professor, so there’s not reason for me to listen to you.

Poisoning the well

Poisoning the well is a rhetorical technique where someone presents irrelevant negative information about their opponent, with the goal of discrediting their opponent’s arguments.

An example of poisoning the well is the following:

Alex: I think that we should increase the federal spending on education. Bob: you’re a fascist, so clearly we shouldn’t listen to what you have to say about education.

Appeal to motive (circumstantial ad hominem)

An appeal to motive (the main type of circumstantial ad hominem ) is an argument that dismisses a certain stance, by questioning the motives of the person who supports it.

An example of an appeal to motive is the following:

Alex: I think that we should increase the federal spending on education. Bob: you’re only saying that because you want to show support for the president that you voted for.

Appeal to hypocrisy (tu quoque)

An appeal to hypocrisy (also known as tu quoque , meaning you too or you also ) is an argument that attempts to discredit a person, by suggesting that their argument is inconsistent with their previous acts.

An example of an appeal to hypocrisy is the following:

Alex: I think that we should increase the federal spending on education. Bob: you clearly don’t even care about public education, since you sent your own kids to a private school.

Association fallacy

The association fallacy is a logical fallacy that occurs when someone is attacked based on their supposed connection to something that is unrelated to the discussion at hand.

An example of an association fallacy is the following:

Alex: I think that we should increase the federal spending on education. Bob: well, the Nazis also thought that, so you’re like the Nazis.

Traitorous critic fallacy (argumentum ergo decedo)

The traitorous critic fallacy (also known as argumentum ergo decedo ) is a logical fallacy that involves telling a person who criticized something that they should stay away from whatever it is they are criticizing, if they don’t approve of the current situation.

An example of the traitorous critic fallacy is the following:

Alex: I think that as a country, we’re not spending enough on education. Bob: well if you don’t like it here, then you should just leave and go somewhere where they have the kind of education that you want.

Tone policing

Tone policing is an attack that focuses on the manner in which someone makes an argument, rather than on the argument itself.

An example of tone policing is the following:

Alex: I think that we should increase the federal spending on education. The current situation is unacceptable in many of the poorer areas of the country, and children are suffering because of it. What do you think? Bob: okay, okay, no need to get so worked up over these things. Alex: but what do you think about the situation? Bob: I think that you shouldn’t be so emotional about it.

Abusive fallacy (abusive ad hominem)

The abusive fallacy is a logical fallacy that occurs when an argument attacks a person in a direct and abusive manner, instead of addressing the point that they are trying to make.

An example of the abusive fallacy is the following:

Alex: I think that we should increase the federal spending on education. Bob: I think that you’re stupid and that nobody cares about your opinion.

Other types of ad hominem arguments

Though the types of ad hominem arguments listed above represent the most common types of ad hominem arguments, ad hominem arguments can potentially also take other forms. Essentially, any argument that targets the source of an opposing argument, rather than addressing the opposing argument itself, is an ad hominem argument, regardless of its exact structure.

Some of these arguments are almost always fallacious, while others can be reasonable, depending on how they’re used. For example, abusive ad hominems are almost always fallacious, while appeals to motive can be reasonable in some cases, if they’re relevant to the discussion and presented properly.

Note that it can often be difficult to decide which specific category an ad hominem argument belongs to, and certain ad hominem arguments may fit in more than one of the above category, or in none of them.

However, from a practical perspective, the exact categorization of the different types of ad hominem arguments isn’t important in most cases. That is, if someone is using an ad hominem argument to attack you in a debate, it usually doesn’t matter whether that argument is a case of poisoning the well or of the abusive fallacy. Rather, what is important is to identify the fact that the argument in question is an ad hominem argument, to determine whether it’s fallacious or not, and to find the best way to respond to it, based on its structure and on the circumstances at hand.

How to counter ad hominem arguments

How you should respond to an ad hominem argument depends, first and foremost, on whether the argument is reasonable or fallacious.

If an ad hominem argument is reasonable, then you should respond to it properly, as you would to any other type of reasonable argument. For example, if an ad hominem argument raises a reasonable concern with regard to the motivation behind your stance, the proper response should be to address that concern.

However, if an ad hominem argument is fallacious, there are various ways you can respond to it, including, most notably, the following:

  • Point out the irrelevance of the attack. You can do this by pointing out that the personal attack has nothing to do with the discussion at hand, and by calling out your opponent on their fallacious reasoning. It’s best to not become defensive when doing this, and if necessary, you should go on the offense and ask your opponent to justify why their personal attack is relevant to the discussion.
  • Respond to the attack directly. In some cases, you might want to fully address the ad hominem attack, even if it’s fallacious, because it could affect the outcome of the discussion in some way. You can do this by responding to the attack as you would to a reasonable ad hominem argument, or in a similar manner.
  • Ignore the attack. You can choose to keep the discussion going, while refusing to engage with the personal attack that your opponent made. This can work in some cases, and especially when ignoring the personal attacks makes you appear more credible, by showing that you refuse to stoop to your opponent’s level. However, in some cases this isn’t a viable option, and especially when you feel that not responding will hurt you in some way, even if the attack itself is entirely fallacious and irrelevant to the discussion.
  • Acknowledge the attack and move on. This is similar to ignoring the ad hominem attack, except that you first acknowledge it explicitly before moving on with the discussion. This doesn’t necessarily mean that you have to agree with the attack; rather, it means that you have to show that you’re aware of it, which might look better than ignoring it entirely. To do this, you can use language such as “I get it that you think that I’m X, but that doesn’t have anything to do with what we’re discussing here, so I’m not going to address it”.

Different options will work better in different situations, and you can choose your preferred approach based on factors such as the nature of the ad hominem attack, the context in which it was used, and your goals for the discussion in which it was used.

In some cases, you can counterattack an ad hominem argument with a personal attack of your own. However, it’s important to avoid using fallacious reasoning when doing this, not only because of the general desire to avoid fallacious reasoning, but also because stooping to your opponent’s level and responding to personal attacks with personal attacks of your own can reflect badly on you in the eyes of others, and significantly reduce the chances that your discussion will be productive.

The main situation where it can potentially be acceptable to respond to a fallacious ad hominem attack with a similar attack is if you want to show illustrate the issues involved with such an attack. For example:

Alex: I think that we should increase the federal spending on education. Bob: you’re only saying that because you want to show support for the president that you voted for. Alex: not really, just as I hope you’re not arguing against it only because you want to support the president that you voted for.

Note that, when doing this, you should generally make sure to explain the reasoning behind your use of such argument, in order to reduce the potential issues associated with using fallacious reasoning in general, and fallacious ad hominem arguments in particular.

Finally, when responding to ad hominem arguments, it’s important to remember that while such attacks are personal, you should do your best to avoid letting them get to you. Though this can be difficult, it will help you to respond to the argument more effectively, and will negate one of the main reasons why people use such attacks in the first place.

Overall, you should respond to reasonable ad hominem arguments by addressing them properly, and counter fallacious ad hominem arguments by pointing out their irrelevance, responding to them directly, ignoring them, or acknowledging them and moving on. You can also respond to an ad hominem argument with a similar attack of your own, primarily in order to demonstrate the issues with such arguments, though you should make sure to avoid using fallacious reasoning when you do so.

Note : when responding to ad hominem arguments, there are two useful principles that you should keep in mind. The first is the  principle of charity , which denotes that, when interpreting someone’s statement, you should assume that the best possible interpretation of that statement is the one that the speaker meant to convey. The second is  Hanlon’s razor , which suggests that when someone does something that leads to a negative outcome, you should avoid assuming that they acted out of an intentional desire to cause harm, as long as there is a different plausible explanation for their behavior.

How to avoid using fallacious ad hominem arguments

To avoid using fallacious ad hominem arguments yourself, you should make sure to avoid attacking the source of an argument instead of attacking the argument itself, unless you can properly justify the relevance of such an attack. Furthermore, you will often benefit from explicitly justifying your use of the ad hominem argument, since doing so can help you ensure that its use is reasonable, and can help others understand the rationale behind it.

For example, consider a situation where you are debating a scientist whose stance might be biased due to the source of his funding.

Simply calling the scientist a “greedy liar” is an abusive ad hominem attack, and doesn’t contribute to the discussion, which is why it should be avoided. Conversely, pointing out the conflict of interest that the scientist has, while also providing examples of how such conflicts of interest affected people in the past and explaining how this conflict of interest could be affecting the scientist’s opinion in the present, can be a perfectly reasonable argument to include in the discussion.

Summary and conclusions

  • An ad hominem argument is a personal attack against the source of an argument, rather than against the argument itself.
  • In everyday language, the term ‘ad hominem argument’ is used primarily to refer to a fallacious attack, that is flawed for some reason, such as because it’s irrelevant to the discussion, but ad hominem arguments can also be reasonable and logically sound.
  • There are various types of ad hominem arguments, and each of them attacks people in a different way, such as by calling them hypocrites, by questioning their motives, by telling them to stay away from an issue if they disagree with the current state of things, or by simply insulting them in an abusive manner.
  • You should respond to reasonable ad hominem arguments by addressing them properly, and counter fallacious ad hominem arguments by pointing out their irrelevance, responding to them directly, ignoring them, or acknowledging them and moving on.
  • To avoid using fallacious ad hominem arguments yourself, you should make sure to avoid attacking the source of an argument instead of attacking the argument itself, unless you can properly justify the relevance of such an attack.

Other articles you may find interesting:

  • The Credentials Fallacy: What It Is and How to Respond to It
  • The Fallacy Fallacy: Why Fallacious Arguments Can Have True Conclusions
  • The Appeal to the Stone Fallacy: When People Are Dismissive During Discussions

Definition of Ad Hominem

Ad hominem  is a Latin word that means “against the man.” As the name suggests, it is a literary term that involves commenting on or against an opponent, to undermine him instead of his arguments.

There are cases in which, whether consciously or unconsciously, people start to question the opponent or his personal associations, rather than evaluating the soundness and validity of the argument that he presents. These types of arguments are usually mistaken for personal insults, but they are somehow different in nature, and the distinction is very subtle.

Arguers who are not familiar with the principles of making logical arguments commonly end up saying something that would draw the audience ’s attention to the distasteful characteristics of the individual. Such people use this fallacy as a tool to deceive their audiences. Making such a blatant personal comment against somebody makes it hard for people to believe it isn’t true. Typically, even the arguer himself believes that such personal traits or circumstances are not enough to dispose of an individual’s opinion or argument. However, if looked at rationally, such arguments – even if true – never provide a valid reason to disregard someone’s criticism.

Ethos and Ad Hominem

Using ad hominem in an argumentive text or rhetoric is not a good idea; and that it becomes a logical fallacy and connects to ethos . It means that the person must use ethos to avoid ad hominem in his arguments or writing. Ethos is based on the argument with reference to an authority whereby an appeal to authority is made. However, this appeal to authority could be false or could be to an anonymous authority with inflation of conflict whereby two authorities are synthesized.

Types of Ad Hominem

As a logical fallacy, it is of four basic types.

  • Abusive: When you abuse a person or use invectives to attack his/her argument, it is abusive ad hominem.
  • Circumstantial: It means when you attack a person’s situation or circumstances that might have motivated the argument.
  • Guilt by Association: It means to associate the person with something negative.
  • Tu Quoque: It means to evoke the past actions of somebody to attack his argument.

Use of Ad Hominem in Sentences

  • You are utterly hopeless. Can’t you just make a simple tea for the guests?
  • Yeah seriously! His wealth does not support his credentials to be a good orator.
  • We must not credit somebody being a good mechanic because he has been with good mechanics during childhood.
  • If you seriously want to be her friend, don’t talk to me and just look at her face. How can you be her friend?
  • Do you remember the time you took my glasses? I know you told me that you didn’t steal it but what’s to say it won’t happen again, eh?

Examples of Ad Hominem

Example #1:.

“How can you argue your case for vegetarianism when you are enjoying that steak?”

This clearly shows how a person is attacked instead of being addressed for or against his argument.

Example #2:

A classic example of ad hominem fallacy is given below:

A: “All murderers are criminals, but a thief isn’t a murderer, and so can’t be a criminal.” B: “Well, you’re a thief and a criminal, so there goes your argument.”

Example #3: VeloNews: The Journal of Competitive Cycling

After an article about the retirement of Lance Armstrong, the VeloNews webpage shared a post with its readers. A commenter posted a comment saying how great an athlete Armstrong was, and that people should be proud of his achievements.

Another commenter wrote in response to the first commenter:

“He’s not a great athlete; he’s a fraud, a cheat and a liar. That’s why not everybody is ‘happy for Lance.'”

The reasons given by the arguer may very well be true, but he does not support his argument with reason and logic. He rather takes the disregarding approach. He does not say anything to prove that the premises he proposes are problematic. Instead, he goes on attacking the person who proposed to them.

Function of Ad Hominem

A writer’s background is considered to be a very important factor when it comes to judging his work. A book written on a particular subject in history will be perceived differently, keeping in mind the background of the author. Therefore, it is important to understand that a writer’s traits and circumstances have a pivotal role to play in his feelings, thinking and the construction of his arguments.

To put it simply, the considerations regarding the use of ad hominem can explain certain arguments and the motives behind them better. Nevertheless, such considerations are not enough on their own to evaluate an individual’s opinion and are certainly not sufficient to disregard them as false or invalid.

The fact is that ad hominem is a kind of fallacy that leaves a great impression on the audience’s mind. It is an argumentative flaw that is hard to spot in our daily lives. Although the personal attack that has been made on the opponent might not have even a speck of truth in it, it somehow makes the audience biased. Ironically, despite being flawed, ad hominem has an amazing power of persuasion .

The worst thing about using ad hominem purposely is that an opponent insults you publicly. Whenever this happens to you, you must recover from the humiliation and then point out the false connection in the argument, which was used as a trap for the audience. Moreover, the dilemma with ad hominem is that, once it has been used against a person, it smears his reputation. Once somebody makes such a judgmental argument about someone, the audience instead of evaluating it on logical grounds takes it to be true.

Synonyms of Ad Hominem

There are several words that come very close to it in meanings but they are not substitutes. For example, blackening, dirty pool, dirty tricks, muckraking, name-calling, and mudslinging show the same meanings.

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Two competing conceptions of fallacies are that they are false but popular beliefs and that they are deceptively bad arguments. These we may distinguish as the belief and argument conceptions of fallacies. Academic writers who have given the most attention to the subject of fallacies insist on, or at least prefer, the argument conception of fallacies, but the belief conception is prevalent in popular and non-scholarly discourse. As we shall see, there are yet other conceptions of what fallacies are, but the present inquiry focuses on the argument conception of fallacies.

Being able to detect and avoid fallacies has been viewed as a supplement to criteria of good reasoning. The knowledge of fallacies is needed to arm us against the most enticing missteps we might take with arguments—so thought not only Aristotle but also the early nineteenth century logicians Richard Whately and John Stuart Mill. But as the course of logical theory from the late nineteenth-century forward turned more and more to axiomatic systems and formal languages, the study of reasoning and natural language argumentation received much less attention, and hence developments in the study of fallacies almost came to a standstill. Until well past the middle of the twentieth century, discussions of fallacies were for the most part relegated to introductory level textbooks. It was only when philosophers realized the ill fit between formal logic, on the one hand, and natural language reasoning and argumentation, on the other, that the interest in fallacies has returned. Since the 1970s the utility of knowing about fallacies has been acknowledged (Johnson and Blair 1993), and the way in which fallacies are incorporated into theories of argumentation has been taken as a sign of a theory’s level of adequacy (Biro and Siegel 2007, van Eemeren 2010).

In modern fallacy studies it is common to distinguish formal and informal fallacies. Formal fallacies are those readily seen to be instances of identifiable invalid logical forms such as undistributed middle and denying the antecedent. Although many of the informal fallacies are also invalid arguments, it is generally thought to be more profitable, from the points of view of both recognition and understanding, to bring their weaknesses to light through analyses that do not involve appeal to formal languages. For this reason it has become the practice to eschew the symbolic language of formal logic in the analysis of these fallacies; hence the term ‘informal fallacy’ has gained wide currency. In the following essay, which is in four parts, it is what is considered the informal-fallacy literature that will be reviewed. Part 1 is an introduction to the core fallacies as brought to us by the tradition of the textbooks. Part 2 reviews the history of the development of the conceptions of fallacies as it is found from Aristotle to Copi. Part 3 surveys some of the most recent innovative research on fallacies, and Part 4 considers some of the current research topics in fallacy theory.

1. The core fallacies

2.1 aristotle, 2.3 arnauld and nicole, 2.6 bentham, 2.7 whately, 3.1 renewed interest, 3.2 doubts about fallacies, 3.3 the informal logic approach to fallacies, 3.4 the formal approach to informal fallacies, 3.5 the epistemic approach to fallacies, 3.6 dialectical/dialogical approaches to fallacies, 4.1 the nature of fallacies, 4.2 the appearance condition, 4.3 teaching, other internet resources, related entries.

Irving Copi’s 1961 Introduction to Logic gives a brief explanation of eighteen informal fallacies. Although there is some variation in competing textbooks, Copi’s selection captured what for many was the traditional central, core fallacies. [ 1 ] In the main, these fallacies spring from two fountainheads: Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations and John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). By way of introduction, a brief review of the core fallacies, especially as they appear in introductory level textbooks, will be given. Only very general definitions and illustrations of the fallacies can be given. This proviso is necessary first, because, the definitions (or identity conditions) of each of the fallacies is often a matter of contention and so no complete or final definition can be given in an introductory survey; secondly, some researchers wish that only plausible and realistic instances of each fallacy be used for illustration. This also is not possible at this stage. The advantage of the stock examples of fallacies is that they are designed to highlight what the mistake associated with each kind of fallacy is supposed to be. Additional details about some of the fallacies are found in Sections 2 and 3. As an initial working definition of the subject matter, we may take a fallacy to be an argument that seems to be better than it really is.

1. The fallacy of equivocation is an argument which exploits the ambiguity of a term or phrase which has occurred at least twice in an argument, such that on the first occurrence it has one meaning and on the second another meaning. A familiar example is:

The end of life is death. Happiness is the end of life. So, death is happiness.

‘The end of life’ first means ceasing to live, then it means purpose. That the same set of words is used twice conceals the fact that the two distinct meanings undermine the continuity of the reasoning, resulting in a non-sequitur .

2. The fallacy of amphiboly is, like the fallacy of equivocation, a fallacy of ambiguity; but here the ambiguity is due to indeterminate syntactic structure. In the argument:

The police were told to stop drinking on campus after midnight. So, now they are able to respond to emergencies much better than before

there are several interpretations that can be given to the premise because it is grammatically ambiguous. On one reading it can be taken to mean that it is the police who have been drinking and are now to stop it; this makes for a plausible argument. On another reading what is meant is that the police were told to stop others (e.g., students) from drinking after midnight. If that is the sense in which the premise is intended, then the argument can be said to be a fallacy because despite initial appearances, it affords no support for the conclusion.

3 & 4. The fallacies of composition and division occur when the properties of parts and composites are mistakenly thought to be transferable from one to the other. Consider the two sentences:

  • Every member of the investigative team was an excellent researcher.
  • It was an excellent investigative team.

Here it is ‘excellence’ that is the property in question. The fallacy of composition is the inference from (a) to (b) but it need not hold if members of the team cannot work cooperatively with each other. The reverse inference from (b) to (a)—the fallacy of division—may also fail if some essential members of the team have a supportive or administrative role rather than a research role.

5. The fallacy of begging the question ( petitio principii ) can occur in a number of ways. One of them is nicely illustrated with Whately’s (1875 III §13) example: “to allow everyman an unbounded freedom of speech must always be, on the whole, advantageous to the State; for it is highly conducive to the interest of the Community, that each individual should enjoy a liberty perfectly unlimited, of expressing his sentiments.” This argument begs the question because the premise and conclusion are the very same proposition, albeit expressed in different words. It is a disguised instance of repetition which gives no reason for its apparent conclusion.

Another version of begging the question can occur in contexts of argumentation where there are unsettled questions about key terms. Suppose, for example, that everyone agrees that to murder someone requires doing something that is wrong, but not everyone agrees that capital punishment is a form of ‘murder’; some think it is justified killing. Then, should an arguer gives this argument:

Capital punishment requires an act of murdering human beings. So, capital punishment is wrong.

one could say that this is question-begging because in this context of argumentation, the arguer is smuggling in as settled a question that remains open. That is, if the premise is accepted without further justification, the arguer is assuming the answer to a controversial question without argument.

Neither of these versions of begging the question are faulted for their invalidity, so they are not charged with being non-sequitors like most of the core fallacies; they are, however, attempted proofs that do not transparently display their weakness. This consideration, plus its ancient lineage back to Aristotle, might explain begging the question’s persistent inclusion among fallacies. But, given our allegiance to the modern conception of logic as being solely concerned with the following-from relation, forms of begging the question should be thought of as epistemic rather than logical fallacies.

Some versions of begging the question are more involved and are called circular reasoning. They include more than one inference. Descartes illustrated this kind of fallacy with the example of our belief in the Bible being justified because it is the word of God, and our belief in God’s existence being justified because it is written in the Bible. [ 2 ] The two propositions lead back and forth to each other, in a circle, each having only the support of the other.

6. The fallacy known as complex question or many questions is usually explained as a fallacy associated with questioning. For example, in a context where a Yes or No answer must be given, the question, “Are you still a member of the Ku Klux Klan?” is a fallacy because either response implies that one has in the past been a member of the Klan, a proposition that may not have been established as true. Some say that this kind of mistake is not really a fallacy because to ask a question is not to make an argument.

7. There are a number of fallacies associated with causation, the most frequently discussed is post hoc ergo propter hoc , (after this, therefore because of this). This fallacy ascribes a causal relationship between two states or events on the basis of temporal succession. For example,

Unemployment decreased in the fourth quarter because the government eliminated the gasoline tax in the second quarter.

The decrease in unemployment that took place after the elimination of the tax may have been due to other causes; perhaps new industrial machinery or increased international demand for products. Other fallacies involve confusing the cause and the effect, and overlooking the possibility that two events are not directly related to each other but are both the effect of a third factor, a common cause. These fallacies are perhaps better understood as faults of explanation than faults of arguments.

8. The fallacy of ignoratio elenchi , or irrelevant conclusion, is indicative of misdirection in argumentation rather than a weak inference. The claim that Calgary is the fastest growing city in Canada, for example, is not defeated by a sound argument showing that it is not the biggest city in Canada. A variation of ignoratio elenchi , known under the name of the straw man fallacy, occurs when an opponent’s point of view is distorted in order to make it easier to refute. For example, in opposition to a proponent’s view that (a) industrialization is the cause of global warming, an opponent might substitute the proposition that (b) all ills that beset mankind are due to industrialization and then, having easily shown that (b) is false, leave the impression that (a), too, is false. Two things went wrong: the proponent does not hold (b), and even if she did, the falsity of (b) does not imply the falsity of (a).

There are a number of common fallacies that begin with the Latin prefix ‘ ad ’ (‘to’ or ‘toward’) and the most common of these will be described next.

9. The ad verecundiam fallacy concerns appeals to authority or expertise. Fundamentally, the fallacy involves accepting as evidence for a proposition the pronouncement of someone who is taken to be an authority but is not really an authority. This can happen when non-experts parade as experts in fields in which they have no special competence—when, for example, celebrities endorse commercial products or social movements. Similarly, when there is controversy, and authorities are divided, it is an error to base one’s view on the authority of just some of them. (See also 2.4 below.)

10. The fallacy ad populum is similar to the ad verecundiam , the difference being that the source appealed to is popular opinion, or common knowledge, rather than a specified authority. So, for example:

These days everyone (except you) has a car and knows how to drive; So, you too should have a car and know how to drive.

Often in arguments like this the premises aren’t true, but even if they are generally true they may provide only scant support for their conclusions because that something is widely practised or believed is not compelling evidence that it is true or that it should be done. There are few subjects on which the general public can be said to hold authoritative opinions. Another version of the ad populum fallacy is known as “playing to the gallery” in which a speaker seeks acceptance for his view by arousing relevant prejudices and emotions in his audience in lieu of presenting it with good evidence.

11. The ad baculum fallacy is one of the most controversial because it is hard to see that it is a fallacy or even that it involves bad reasoning. Ad baculum means “appeal to the stick” and is generally taken to involve a threat of injury of harm to the person addressed. So, for example,

If you don’t join our demonstration against the expansion of the park, we will evict you from your apartment; So, you should join our demonstration against the expansion of the park.

Such threats do give us reasons to act and, unpleasant as the interlocutor may be, there seems to be no fallacy here. In labour disputes, and perhaps in international relations, using threats such as going on strike, or cutting off trade routes, are not normally considered fallacies, even though they do involve intimidation and the threat of harm. However, if we change to doxastic considerations, then the argument that you should believe that candidate \(X\) is the one best suited for public office because if you do not believe this you will be evicted from your apartment, certainly is a good instance of irrelevant evidence.

12. The fallacy ad misericordiam is a companion to the ad baculum fallacy: it occurs not when threats are out of place but when appeals for sympathy or pity are mistakenly thought to be evidence. To what extent our sympathy for others should influence our actions depends on many factors, including circumstances and our ethical views. However, sympathy alone is generally not evidence for believing any proposition. Hence,

You should believe that he is not guilty of embezzling those paintings; think of how much his family suffered during the Depression.

Ad misericordiam arguments, like ad baculum arguments, have their natural home in practical reasoning; it is when they are used in theoretical (doxastic) argumentation that the possibility of fallacy is more likely.

13. The ad hominem fallacy involves bringing negative aspects of an arguer, or their situation, to bear on the view they are advancing. There are three commonly recognized versions of the fallacy. The abusive ad hominem fallacy involves saying that someone’s view should not be accepted because they have some unfavorable property.

Thompson’s proposal for the wetlands may safely be rejected because last year she was arrested for hunting without a license.

The hunter Thompson, although she broke the law, may nevertheless have a very good plan for the wetlands.

Another, more subtle version of the fallacy is the circumstantial ad hominem in which, given the circumstances in which the arguer finds him or herself, it is alleged that their position is supported by self-interest rather than by good evidence. Hence, the scientific studies produced by industrialists to show that the levels of pollution at their factories are within the law may be undeservedly rejected because they are thought to be self-serving. Yet it is possible that the studies are sound: just because what someone says is in their self-interest, does not mean it should be rejected.

The third version of the ad hominem fallacy is the tu quoque . It involves not accepting a view or a recommendation because the espouser him- or herself does not follow it. Thus, if our neighbor advises us to exercise regularly and we reject her advice on the basis that she does not exercise regularly, we commit the tu quoque fallacy: the value of advice is not wholly dependent on the integrity of the advisor.

We may finish our survey of the core fallacies by considering just two more.

14. The fallacy of faulty analogy occurs when analogies are used as arguments or explanations and the similarities between the two things compared are too remote to support the conclusion.

If a child gets a new toy he or she will want to play with it; So, if a nation gets new weapons, it will want to use them.

In this example (due to Churchill 1986, 349) there is a great difference between using (playing with) toys and using (discharging) weapons. The former is done for amusement, the latter is done to inflict harm on others. Playing with toys is a benign activity that requires little justification; using weapons against others nations is something that is usually only done after extensive deliberation and as a last resort. Hence, there is too much of a difference between using toys and using weapons to conclude that a nation, if it acquires weapons, will want to use them as readily as children will want to play with their toys.

15. The fallacy of the slippery slope generally takes the form that from a given starting point one can by a series of incremental inferences arrive at an undesirable conclusion, and because of this unwanted result, the initial starting point should be rejected. The kinds of inferences involved in the step-by-step argument can be causal, as in:

You have decided not to go to college; If you don’t go to college, you won’t get a degree; If you don’t get a degree, you won’t get a good job; If you don’t get a good job, you won’t be able to enjoy life; But you should be able to enjoy life; So, you should go to college.

The weakness in this argument, the reason why it is a fallacy, lies in the second and third causal claims. The series of small steps that lead from an acceptable starting point to an unacceptable conclusion may also depend on vague terms rather than causal relations. Lack of clear boundaries is what enables the puzzling slippery slope arguments known as “the beard” and “the heap.” In the former, a person with a full beard eventually becomes beardless as hairs of the beard are removed one-by-one; but because the term ‘beard’ is vague it is unclear at which intermediate point we are to say that the man is now beardless. Hence, at each step in the argument until the final hair-plucking, we should continue to conclude that the man is bearded. In the second case, because ‘heap’ is vague, it is unclear at what point piling scattered stones together makes them a heap of stones: if it is not a heap to begin with, adding one more stone will not make it a heap, etc. In both these cases apparently good reasoning leads to a false conclusion.

Many other fallacies have been named and discussed, some of them quite different from the ones mentioned above, others interesting and novel variations of the above. Some of these will be mentioned in the review of historical and contemporary sources that follows.

2. History of Fallacy Theory

The history of the study of fallacies begins with Aristotle’s work, On Sophistical Refutations . It is among his earlier writings and the work appears to be a continuation of the Topics , his treatise on dialectical argumentation. Although his most extensive and theoretically detailed discussion of fallacies is in the Sophistical Refutations , Aristotle also discusses fallacies in the Prior Analytics and On Rhetoric . Here we will concentrate on summarizing the account given in the Sophistical Refutations . In that work, four things are worth noting: (a) the different conceptions of fallacy; (b) the basic concepts used to explain fallacies; (c) Aristotle’s explanation of why fallacies can be deceptive; and (d) his enumeration and classification of fallacies.

2.1.1 Definitions

At the beginning of Topics (I, i), Aristotle distinguishes several kinds of deductions (syllogisms). They are distinguished first on the basis of the status of their premises. (1) Those that begin from true and primary premises, or are owed to such, are demonstrations. (2) Those which have dialectical premises—propositions acceptable to most people, or to the wise—are dialectical deductions. (3) Deductions that start from premises which only appear to be dialectical, are fallacious deductions because of their starting points, as are (4) those “deductions” that do have dialectical premises but do not really necessitate their conclusions. Other fallacies mentioned and associated with demonstrations are (5) those which only appear to start from what is true and primary ( Top ., I, i 101a5). What this classification leaves out are (6) the arguments that do start from true and primary premises but then fail to necessitate their conclusions; two of these, begging the question and non-cause are discussed in Prior Analytics (II, 16, 17). It is the “fallacious deductions” characterized in (4), however, that come closest to the focus of the Sophistical Refutations . Nevertheless, in many of the examples given what stands out is that the premises are given as answers in dialogue and are to be maintained by the answerer, not necessarily that they are dialectical in the sense of being common opinions. This variation on dialectical deductions Aristotle calls examination arguments ( SR 2 165b4).

2.1.2 The basic concepts

There are three closely related concepts needed to understand sophistical refutations. By a deduction (a syllogism [ 3 ] ) Aristotle meant an argument which satisfies three conditions: it “is based on certain statements made in such a way as necessarily to cause the assertion of things other than those statements and as a result of those statements” ( SR 1 165a1–2). Thus an argument may fail to be a syllogism in three different ways. The premises may fail to necessitate the conclusion, the conclusion may be the same as one of the premises, and the conclusion may not be caused by (grounded in) the premises. The concept of a proof underlying Sophistical Refutations is similar to what is demanded of demonstrative knowledge in Posterior Analytics (I ii 71b20), viz., that the premises must be “true, primary, immediate, better known than, prior to, and causative of the conclusion,” except that the first three conditions do not apply to deductions in which the premises are obtained through questioning. A refutation , Aristotle says, is “a proof of the contradictory” ( SR 6, 168a37)—a proof of the proposition which is the contradictory of the thesis maintained by the answerer. In a context of someone, S , maintaining a thesis, T , a dialectical refutation will consist in asking questions of S , and then taking S ’s answers and using them as the premises of a proof via a deduction of not-T : this will be a refutation of T relative to the answerer ( SR 8 170a13). The concept of contradiction can be found in Categories : it is those contraries which are related such that “one opposite needs must be true, while the other must always be false” (13b2–3). A refutation will be sophistical if either the proof is only an apparent proof or the contradiction is only an apparent contradiction. Either way, according to Aristotle, there is a fallacy. Hence, the opening of his treatise: “Let us now treat of sophistical refutations, that is, arguments which appear to be refutations but are really fallacies and not refutations” ( SR 1 164a20).

2.1.3 The appearance condition

Aristotle observed that “reasoning and refutation are sometimes real and sometimes not, but appear to be real owing to men’s inexperience; for the inexperienced are like those who view things from a distance” ( SR , 1 164b25). The ideas here are first that there are arguments that appear to be better than they really are; and second that people inexperienced in arguments may mistake the appearance for the reality and thus be taken in by a bad argument or refutation. Apparent refutations are primarily explained in terms of apparent deductions: thus, with one exception, Aristotle’s fallacies are in the main a catalogue of bad deductions that appear to be good deductions. The exception is ignoratio elenchi in which, in one of its guises, the deduction contains no fallacy but the conclusion proved only appears to contradict the answerer’s thesis.

Aristotle devotes considerable space to explaining how the appearance condition may arise. At the outset he mentions the argument that turns upon names ( SR 1 165a6), saying that it is the most prolific and usual explanation: because there are more things than names, some names will have to denote more than one thing, thereby creating the possibility of ambiguous terms and expressions. That the ambiguous use of a term goes unnoticed allows the illusion that an argument is a real deduction. The explanation of how the false appearance can arise is in the similarity of words or expressions with different meanings, and the smallness of differences in meaning between some expressions ( SR 7 169a23–169b17).

2.1.4 List and classification

Aristotle discusses thirteen ways in which refutations can be sophistical and divides them into two groups. The first group, introduced in Chapter 4 of On Sophistical Refutations , includes those Aristotle considers dependent on language ( in dictione ), and the second group, introduced in Chapter 5, includes those characterized as not being dependent on language ( extra dictionem ). Chapter 6 reviews all the fallacies from the view point of failed refutations, and Chapter 7 explains how the appearance of correctness is made possible for each fallacy. Chapters 19–30 advise answerers on how to avoid being taken in by sophistical refutations.

The fallacies dependent on language are equivocation, amphiboly, combination of words, division of words, accent and form of expression. Of these the first two have survived pretty much as Aristotle thought of them. Equivocation results from the exploitation of a term’s ambiguity and amphiboly comes about through indefinite grammatical structure. The one has to do with semantical ambiguity, the other with syntactical ambiguity. However, the way that Aristotle thought of the combination and division fallacies differs significantly from modern treatments of composition and division. Aristotle’s fallacies are the combinations and divisions of words which alter meanings, e.g., “walk while sitting” vs. “walk-while-sitting,” (i.e., to have the ability to walk while seated vs. being able to walk and sit at the same time). For division, Aristotle gives the example of the number 5: it is 2 and 3. But 2 is even and 3 is odd, so 5 is even and odd. Double meaning is also possible with those words whose meanings depend on how they are pronounced, this is the fallacy of accent, but there were no accents in written Greek in Aristotle’s day; accordingly, this fallacy would be more likely in written work. What Aristotle had in mind is something similar to the double meanings that can be given to ‘unionized’ and ‘invalid’ depending on how they are pronounced. Finally, the fallacy that Aristotle calls form of expression exploits the kind of ambiguity made possible by what we have come to call category mistakes, in this case, fitting words to the wrong categories. Aristotle’s example is the word ‘flourishing’ which may appear to be a verb because of its ‘ing’ ending (as in ‘cutting’ or ‘running’) and so belongs to the category of actions, whereas it really belongs in the category of quality. Category confusion was, for Aristotle, the key cause of metaphysical mistakes.

There are seven kinds of sophistical refutation that can occur in the category of refutations not dependent on language: accident, secundum quid , consequent, non-cause, begging the question, ignoratio elenchi and many questions.

The fallacy of accident is the most elusive of the fallacies on Aristotle’s list. It turns on his distinction between two kinds of predication, unique properties and accidents ( Top . I 5). The fallacy is defined as occurring when “it is claimed that some attribute belongs similarly to the thing and to its accident” ( SR 5 166b28). What belongs to a thing are its unique properties which are counterpredicable (Smith 1997, 60), i.e., if \(A\) is an attribute of \(B\), \(B\) is an attribute of \(A\). However, attributes that are accidents are not counterpredicates and to treat them as such is false reasoning, and can lead to paradoxical results; for example, if it is a property of triangles that they are equal to two right angles, and a triangle is accidentally a first principle, it does not follow that all first principles have two right angles (see Schreiber 2001, ch. 7).

Aristotle considers the fallacy of consequent to be a special case of the fallacy of accident, observing that consequence is not convertible, i.e., “if \(A\) is, \(B\) necessarily is, men also fancy that, if \(B\) is, \(A\) necessarily is” ( SR 5 169b3). One of Aristotle’s examples is that it does not follow that “a man who is hot must be in a fever because a man who is in a fever is hot” ( SR 5 169b19). This fallacy is sometimes claimed as being an early statement of the formal fallacy of affirming the consequent.

The fallacy of secundum quid comes about from failing to appreciate the distinction between using words absolutely and using them with qualification. Spruce trees, for example, are green with respect to their foliage (they are ‘green’ with qualification); it would be a mistake to infer that they are green absolutely because they have brown trunks and branches. It is because the difference between using words absolutely and with qualification can be minute that this fallacy is possible, thinks Aristotle.

Begging the question is explained as asking for the answer (the proposition) which one is supposed to prove, in order to avoid having to make a proof of it. Some subtlety is needed to bring about this fallacy such as a clever use of synonymy or an intermixing of particular and universal propositions ( Top . VIII, 13). If the fallacy succeeds the result is that there will be no deduction: begging the question and non-cause are directly prohibited by the second and third conditions respectively of being a deduction ( SR 6 168b23).

The fallacy of non-cause occurs in contexts of ad impossibile arguments when one of the assumed premises is superfluous for deducing the conclusion. The superfluous premise will then not be a factor in deducing the conclusion and it will be a mistake to infer that it is false since it is a non-cause of the impossibility. This is not the same fallacy mentioned by Aristotle in the Rhetoric (II 24) which is more akin to a fallacy of empirical causation and is better called false cause (see Woods and Hansen 2001).

Aristotle’s fallacy of many questions occurs when two questions are asked as if they are one proposition. A proposition is “a single predication about a single subject” ( SR 6 169a8). Thus with a single answer to two questions one has two premises for a refutation , and one of them may turn out to be idle, thus invalidating the deduction (it becomes a non-cause fallacy). Also possible is that extra-linguistic part-whole mistakes may happen when, for example, given that something is partly good and partly not-good, the double question is asked whether it is all good or all not-good? Either answer will lead to a contradiction (see Schreiber 2000, 156–59). Despite its name, this fallacy consists in the ensuing deduction, not in the question which merely triggers the fallacy.

On one interpretation ignoratio elenchi is considered to be Aristotle’s thirteenth fallacy, in which an otherwise successful deduction fails to end with the required contradictory of the answerer’s thesis. Seen this way, ignoratio elenchi is unlike all the other fallacies in that it is not an argument that fails to meet one of the criteria of a good deduction, but a genuine deduction that turns out to be irrelevant to the point at issue. On another reading, ignoratio elenchi is not a separate fallacy but an alternative to the language dependent / language independent way of classifying the other twelve fallacies: they all fail to meet, in one way or another, the requirements of a sound refutation.

[A] refutation is a contradiction of one and the same predicate, not of a name but of a thing, and not of a synonymous name but of an identical name, based on the given premises and following necessarily from them (the original point at issue not being included) in the same respect, manner and time. ( SR 5 167a23–27)

Each of the other twelve fallacies is analysed as failing to meet one of the conditions in this definition of refutation ( SR 6). Aristotle seems to favour this second reading, but it leaves the problem of explaining how refutations that miss their mark can seem like successful refutations. A possible explanation is that a failure to contradict a given thesis can be made explicit by adding the negation of the thesis as a last step of the deduction, thereby insuring the contradiction of the thesis, but only at the cost (by the last step) of introducing one of the other twelve fallacies in the deduction.

2.1.5 Different interpretations

I have given only the briefest possible explanation of Aristotle’s fallacies. To really understand them a much longer engagement with the original text and the secondary sources is necessary. The second chapter of Hamblin’s (1970) book is a useful introduction to the Sophistical Refutations , and a defence of the dialectical nature of the fallacies. Hamblin thinks that a dialectical framework is indispensable for an understanding of Aristotle’s fallacies and that part of the poverty of contemporary accounts of fallacies is due to a failure to understand their assumed dialectical setting. This approach to the fallacies is continued in contemporary research by some argumentation theorists, most notably Douglas Walton (1995) who also follows Aristotle in recognizing a number of different kinds of dialogues in which argumentation can occur; Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (2004) who combine dialectical and pragmatic insights with an ideal model of a critical discussion; and Jaakko Hintikka who analyses the Aristotelian fallacies as mistakes in question-dialogues (Hintikka 1987; Bachman 1995.) According to Hintikka (1997) it is an outright mistake to think of Aristotle’s fallacies primarily as mistaken inferences, either deductive or inductive. A non-dialogue oriented interpretation of Aristotle fallacies is found in Woods and Hansen (1997 and 2001) who argue that the fallacies (apparent deductions) are basic to apparent refutations, and that Aristotle’s interest in the fallacies extended beyond dialectical contests, as is shown by his interest in them in the Prior Analytics and the Rhetoric (II 24). What gives unity to Aristotle’s different fallacies on this view is not a dialogue structure but rather their dependence on the concepts of deduction and proof. The most thorough recent study of these questions is in Schreiber (2003), who emphasizes Aristotle’s concern with resolving (exposing) fallacies and argues that it is Aristotelian epistemology and metaphysics that is needed for a full understanding of the fallacies in the Sophistical Refutations .

Francis Bacon deserves a brief mention in the history of fallacy theory, not because he made any direct contribution to our knowledge of the fallacies but because of his attention to prejudice and bias in scientific investigation, and the effect they could have on our beliefs. He spoke of false idols (1620, aphorisms 40–44) as having the same relation to the interpretation of nature that fallacies have to logic. The idol of the tribe is human nature which distorts our view of the natural world (it is a false mirror). The idol of the cave is the peculiarity of each individual man, our different abilities and education that affect how we interpret nature. The idols of the theatre are the acquired false philosophies, systems and methods, both new and ancient, that rule men’s minds. These three idols all fall into the category of explanations of why we may misperceive the world. A fourth of Bacon’s idols, the idol of the market place, is the one that comes closest to the Aristotelian tradition as it points to language as the source of our mistaken ideas: “words plainly force and overrule the understanding, and throw all into confusion, and lead men away into numberless empty controversies and idle fancies” (1620, aphorism 43). Although Bacon identifies no particular fallacies in Aristotle’s sense, he opens the door to the possibility that there may be false assumptions associated with the investigation of the natural world. The view of The New Organon is that just as logic is the cure for fallacies, so will the true method of induction be a cure for the false idols.

Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole were the authors of Logic, or the Art of Thinking (1662), commonly known as the Port-Royal Logic. According to Benson Mates (1965, 214) it “is an outstanding early example of the ‘how to think straight’ genre.” The work includes chapters on sophisms, with the justification that “examples of mistakes to be avoided are often more striking than the examples to be imitated” (Bk. III, xix). The Port-Royal Logic does not continue Aristotle’s distinction between fallacies that are dependent on language and those that are not; instead there is a division between sophisms associated with scientific subjects (ibid.)—these are nearly all from the Sophistical Refutations —and those committed in everyday life and ordinary discourse (Bk III, xx). The division is not exclusive, with some of the sophisms fitting both classes.

The Port-Royal Logic includes eight of Aristotle’s original thirteen fallacies, several of them modified to fit the bent to natural philosophy rather than dialectical argumentation. Several kinds of causal errors are considered under the broad heading, non causa pro causa and they are illustrated with reference to scientific explanations that have assigned false causes for empirical phenomena. Also identified as a common fallacy of the human mind is post hoc, ergo propter hoc : “This happened following a certain thing, hence that thing must be its cause” (Bk. III, xix 3). Begging the questions is included and illustrated, interestingly, with examples drawn from Aristotelian science. Two new sophisms are included: one is imperfect enumeration, the error of overlooking an alternative, the other is a faulty (incomplete) induction, what we might call hasty generalization. Although the discussions here are brief, they mark the entry of inductive fallacies into the pool of present day recognized fallacies. Ignoratio elenchi retains its dialogical setting but is extended beyond the mere failure to contradict a thesis, “to attribut[ing] to our adversaries something remote from their views to gain an advantage over them, or to impute to them consequences we imagine can be drawn from their doctrines, although they disavow and deny them” (Bk. III, xix 1). The other Aristotelian fallacies included are accident, combination and division, secundum quid and ambiguity.

The sophisms of everyday life and ordinary discourse are eight in number and two of them, the sophisms of authority and manner, should be noticed. In these sophisms, external marks of speakers contribute to the persuasiveness of their arguments. Although authority is not to be doubted in church doctrines, in matters that God has left to the discernment of humans we can be led away from the truth by being too deferential. Here we find one of the earliest statements of the modern appeal to false authority: people are often persuaded by certain qualities that are irrelevant to the truth of the issue being discussed. Thus there are a number of people who unquestioningly believe those who are the oldest and most experienced, even in matters that depend neither on age nor experience, but only on mental insight (Bk. III, xx 6). To age and experience Arnauld and Nicole add noble birth as an unwarranted source of deference in matters intellectual (Bk. III, xx 7), and towards the end of their discussion they add the sophism of manner, cautioning that “grace, fluency, seriousness, moderation and gentleness” is not necessarily a mark of truth (Bk. III, xx 8). The authors seem to have the rhetorical flourishes of royal courtiers especially in mind.

It is John Locke who is credited with intentionally creating a class of ad -arguments, and inadvertently giving birth to the class of ad -fallacies. In An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690), he identified three kinds of arguments, the ad verecundiam , ad ignorantiam , and ad hominem arguments, each of which he contrasted with ad judicium arguments which are arguments based on “the foundations of knowledge and probability” and are reliable routes to truth and knowledge. Locke did not speak of ad -arguments as fallacies—that was left to others to do later—but rather as kinds of arguments “that men, in their reasoning with others, do ordinarily make use of to prevail on their assent; or at least so to awe them as to silence their opposition.” (Bk IV, xvii, 19–22).

Two of the ad arguments have developed beyond how Locke originally conceived them. His characterization of the ad verecundiam is considered the locus classicus of appeal-to-authority arguments. When it is a fallacy it is either on the ground that authorities (experts) are fallible or for the reason that appealing to authority is an abandonment of an individual’s epistemic responsibility. It seems unlikely, however, that Locke thought we should never rely on the expertise and superior knowledge of others when engaged in knowledge-gathering and argumentation. This leads us to consider what kind of authority Locke might have had in mind. In addition to epistemic and legal (command) authority there is also what might be called social authority, demanding respect and deference from others due to one’s higher social standing, something much more a part of seventeenth-century society than it is a part of ours. The language that Locke used in connection with the ad verecundiam , words like ‘eminency’, ‘dignity’, ‘breach of modesty’, and ‘having too much pride’ suggests that what he had in mind was the kind of authority that demands respect for the social standing of sources rather than for their expertise; hence, by this kind of authority a person could be led to accept a conclusion because of their modesty or shame, more so than for the value of the argument (see Goodwin 1998, Hansen 2006). Hence, we understand Locke better when we translate ad verecundiam literally, as “appeal to modesty.”

The argumentum ad hominem , as Locke defined it, has subsequently developed into three different fallacies. His original description was that it was a way “to press a man with consequences drawn from his own principles or concessions.” That is, to argue that an opponent’s view is inconsistent, logically or pragmatically, with other things he has said or to which he is committed. Locke’s observation was that such arguments do not advance us towards truth, but that they can serve to promote agreement or stall disagreement. To argue that way is not a fallacy but an acceptable mode of argumentation. Henry Johnstone (1952) thought it captured the essential character of philosophical argumentation. The modern descendants of the Lockean ad hominem are the abusive ad hominem which is an argument to the effect that a position should not be accepted because of some telling negative property of its espouser; the circumstantial ad hominem , an argument to the effect that someone’s position should be rejected because circumstances suggest that their view is the result of self-interested bias; and finally, the tu quoque ad hominem argument which attempts to deflect a criticism by pointing out that it applies equally to the accuser. Recent scholarship suggests that these post-Lockean kinds of ad hominem arguments are sometimes used fairly, and sometimes fallaciously; but none of them is what Locke described as the argumentum ad hominem .

Ad ignorantiam translates as “appeal to ignorance.” Locke’s characterization of this kind of argument is that it demands “the adversary to admit what they allege as a proof, or to assign a better.” The ignorance in question is comparative, it is not that the opponent has no evidence, it is that s/he has no better evidence. However, the inability of an opponent to produce a better argument is not sufficient reason to think the proponent’s argument must be accepted. Modern versions of this kind of argument take it as a fallacy to infer a proposition to be true because there is no evidence against it (see Krabbe, 1995).

The introduction and discussion of the ad -arguments appears almost as an afterthought in Locke’s Essay . It is found at the end of the chapter, “Of Reason,” in which Locke devotes considerable effort to criticizing syllogistic logic. Reasoning by syllogisms, he maintained, was neither necessary nor useful for knowledge. Locke clearly thought that the three ad -arguments were inferior to ad judicium arguments, but he never used the term ‘fallacy’ in connection with them, although he did use it in connection with errors of syllogistic reasoning.

Was Locke the first to discuss these kinds of arguments? Hamblin (1970, 161–62) and Nuchelmans (1993) trace the idea of ad hominem arguments back to Aristotle, and Locke’s remark that the name argumentum ad hominem was already known has been investigated by Finocchiaro (1974) who finds the term and the argument kind in Galileo’s writings more than a half-century before the Essay Concerning Human Understanding . And Arnauld and Nicole’s discussion of the sophism of authority, that “people speak the truth because they are of noble birth or wealthy or in high office,” which seems to be part of Locke’s ad verecundiam , was most likely known to him. Subsequently more ad -arguments were added to the four that Locke identified (see Watts, and Copi, below).

Isaac Watts in his Logick; or, The Right Use of Reason (1724), furthered the ad -argument tradition by adding three more arguments: argumentum ad fidem (appeal to faith), argumentum ad passiones (appeal to passion), and argumentum ad populum (a public appeal to passions). Like Locke, Watts does not consider these arguments as fallacies but as kinds of arguments. However, the Logick does consider sophisms and introduces “false cause” as an alternative name for non causa pro causa which here, as in the Port-Royal Logic, is understood as a fallacy associated with empirical causation. According to Watts it occurs whenever anyone assigns “the reasons of natural appearances, without sufficient experiments to prove them” (1796, Pt. III, 3 i 4). Another sophism included by Watts is imperfect enumeration or false induction, the mistake of generalizing on insufficient evidence. Also, the term ‘strawman fallacy’ may have its origins in Watts’s discussion of ignoratio elenchi : after having dressed up the opinions and sentiments of their adversaries as they please to make “images of straw”, disputers “triumph over their adversary as though they had utterly confuted his opinions” (1796, Pt. III 3 i 1).

Jeremy Bentham’s Handbook of Political Fallacies (1824) was written in the years leading up to the first Reform Bill (1832). His interest was in political argumentation, particularly in exposing the different means used by parliamentarians and law makers to defeat or delay reform legislation. Hence, it was not philosophy or science that interested him, but political debate. Fallacies he took to be arguments or topics that would through the use of deception produce erroneous beliefs in people (1824, 3). These tactics he (or his editor) divided into four classes: fallacies of authority, danger, delay and confusion. Bentham was aware of the developing ad -fallacies tradition since each of the thirty or so fallacies he described is also labelled as belonging either to the kind ad verecundiam (appeal to shame or modesty), ad odium (appeal to hate or contempt), ad metum (appeal to fear or threats), ad quietem (appeal to rest or inaction), ad judicium , and ad socordiam (appeal to postponement or delay). Most of Bentham’s fallacies have not become staples of fallacy theory but many of them show interesting insights into the motives and techniques of debaters (see e.g., Rudanko’s (2005, 2009) analyses of the ad socordiam ).

Bentham’s Handbook has not taken a central place in the history of fallacy studies (Hamblin 1970, 165–69); nevertheless, it is historically interesting in several respects. It discusses authority at length, identifying four conditions for reliable appeals to authority and maintaining that the failure of any one of them cancels the strength of the appeal. Fallacies of authority in political debate occur when authority “is employed in the place of such relevant arguments as might have been brought forward” (1824, 25). Bentham’s fear is that debaters will resort to “the authority” of traditional beliefs and principles instead of considering the advantages of the reform measures under discussion.

Under the heading “fallacies of danger” Bentham named a number of what he called vituperative fallacies—imputations of bad character, bad motive, inconsistency, and suspicious connections—which have as their common characteristic, “the endeavour to draw aside attention from the measure to the man , in such a way as to cause the latter’s badness to be imputed to the measure he supports, or his goodness to his opposition” (1824, 83). This characterization fits well with the way we have come to think of the ad hominem fallacy as a view disparaged by putting forth a negative characterization of its supporter or his circumstances.

Bentham places the fallacies in the immediate context of debate, identifying ways in which arguers frustrate the eventual resolution of disagreements by using insinuations of danger, delaying tactics, appeals to questionable authorities and, generally, confusing issues. Modern argumentation theorists who hold that any impediment to the successful completion of dialogical discussions is a fallacy, may find that their most immediate precursor was Bentham (see Grootendorst 1997).

Book III of Richard Whately’s Elements of Logic (1826) is devoted to giving an account of fallacies based on “logical principles,”. Whately was instrumental in the revival of interest in logic at the beginning of the nineteenth century and, being committed to deductivism, he maintained that only valid deductive inferences counted as reasoning. Thus, he took every fallacy to belong to either the class of deductive failures (logical fallacies) or the class of non-logical failures (material fallacies).

By ‘fallacy’ Whately meant “any unsound mode of arguing, which appears to demand our conviction, and to be decisive of the question at hand, when in fairness it is not”’ (Bk. III, intro.). The logical fallacies divide into the purely logical and the semi-logical fallacies. The purely logical fallacies are plain violations of syllogistic rules like undistributed middle and illicit process. The semi-logical fallacies mostly trade on ambiguous middle terms and are therefore also logical fallacies, but their detection requires extra-logical knowledge including that of the senses of terms [ 4 ] and knowledge of the subject matter (Bk. III, §2); they include, among others, the fallacies of ambiguity, and division and composition. The non-logical, material fallacies are also divided into two classes: fallacies with premises ‘unduly assumed,’ and fallacies of irrelevant conclusions. Begging the question fits under the heading of a non-logical, material fallacy in which a premise has been unduly assumed, and ignoratio elenchi is a non-logical, material fallacy in which an irrelevant conclusion has been reached. The ad -arguments are all placed under the last division as variants of ignoratio elenchi , but they are said to be fallacies only when they are used unfairly. Whately’s version of the ad hominem argument resembles Locke’s in that it is an ex concessis kind of argument: one that depends on the concessions of the person with whom one is arguing. From the concessions, one might prove that one’s opponent is ‘committed to p, ’ but an attempt to make it seem as if this constitutes a proof of the absolute (non-relative) proposition ‘ p ’ would be a fallacy. This kind of ad hominem fallacy can be seen as falling under the broader ignoratio elenchi category because what is proved is not what is needed.

The creation of the category of non-logical fallacies was not really a break with Aristotle as much as it was a break with what had become the Aristotelian tradition. Aristotle thought that some fallacies were due to unacceptable premises although these are not elaborated in Sophistical Refutations (see section 2.1.1 above). Whately’s creation of the category of non-logical fallacies solved the problem of what to do with begging the question which is not an invalid form of argument, and it also created a place in fallacy taxonomy for the ad -fallacies.

John Stuart Mill’s contribution to the study of fallacies is found in Book V of his comprehensive A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive , first published in 1843. It stands out most strikingly for placing the study of fallacies within his framework of inductive reasoning, a direct rejection of Whately’s deductivist approach to reasoning and fallacies. Mill held that only inductive reasoning counts as inferring and accordingly he introduces new categories as well as a new classification scheme for fallacies.

Mill drew a division between the moral and the intellectual causes of fallacies. The former are aspects of human nature such as biases and indifference to truth which incline us to make intellectual mistakes. These dispositions are not themselves fallacies. It is the intellectual errors, the actual taking of insufficient evidence as sufficient, that are fallacious. The various ways in which this can happen are what Mill took as the basis for classifying fallacies. “A catalogue of the varieties of evidence which are not real evidence,” he wrote, “is an enumeration of fallacies” (1891, Bk.V iii §1).

Mill divided the broad category of argument fallacies into two groups: those in which the evidence is distinctly conceived and those in which it is indistinctly conceived. Fallacies falling under evidence indistinctly conceived (Bk. V, vii) were further described as fallacies of confusion. These result from an indistinct conception of the evidence leading to a mistaking of its significance and thereby to an unsupported conclusion. Some of the traditional Aristotelian fallacies such as ambiguity, composition and division, petitio principii , and ignoratio elenchi , are placed in this category. Although Mill followed Whately closely in his exposition of the fallacies of confusion, he does not mention any ad -arguments in connection with ignoratio elenchi .

As for the category of fallacies of evidence distinctly conceived, it too is divided. The two sub-classes are fallacies of ratiocination (deduction) and fallacies of induction. The deductive fallacies (Bk.V, vi) are those that explicitly break a rule of the syllogism, such as the three-term rule. But also included are the conversion of universal affirmatives and particular negatives (“All PS” does not follow from “All SP,” and “Some P not S” does not follow from “Some S not P”). Also included in this category is the secundum quid fallacy.

The other sub-class of fallacies distinctly conceived bring out what is distinctive about Mill’s work on the fallacies: that it is the first extensive attempt to deal with fallacies of induction. He divided inductive fallacies into two further groups: fallacies of observation (V, iv) and fallacies of generalization (Bk. V, v). Fallacies of observation can occur either negatively or positively. Their negative occurrence consists in non-observation in which one has overlooked negatively relevant evidence. This is similar to what the Port-Royal Logic considered a faulty enumeration, and one of Mill’s examples is the continued faith that farmers put in the weather forecasts found in almanacs despite their long history of false predictions. Observation fallacies occur positively when the mistake is based on something that is seen wrongly, i.e., taken to be something that it is not. Such mal-observations occur when we mistake our inferences for facts, as in our inference that the sun rises and sets (Bk. V, iv, 5).

Fallacies of generalization, the other branch of inductive fallacies, result from mistakes in the inductive process which can happen in several ways. As one example, Mill pointed to making generalizations about what lies beyond our experience: we cannot infer that the laws that operate in remote parts of the universe are the same as those in our solar system (Bk. V, v, 2). Another example is mistaking empirical laws stating regularities for causal laws—his example was because women as a class have not hitherto equalled men as a class, they will never be able to do so (Bk. V, v, 4). Also placed in the category of fallacies of generalization is post hoc ergo propter hoc , which tends to single out a single cause when there are in reality many contributing causes (Bk. V, v, 5). Analogical arguments are identified as a false basis for generalizations; they are “at best only admissible as an inconclusive presumption, where real proof is unattainable” (Bk. V, v, 6).

Mill also included what he calls fallacies of inspection, or a priori fallacies (Bk. V, iii) in his survey of fallacies. These consist of non-inferentially held beliefs, so they fit the belief conception of fallacies rather than the argument conception. Among Mill’s examples of a priori fallacies are metaphysical assumptions such as that distinctions of language correspond to distinctions in nature, and that objects cannot affect each other at a distance. Even the belief in souls or ghosts is considered an a priori fallacy. Such beliefs will not withstand scrutiny, thought Mill, by the inductive method strictly applied.

A System of Logic is the most extensive work on fallacies since Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations . Mill’s examples are taken from a wide range of examples in science, politics, economics, religion and philosophy. His classificatory scheme is original and comprehensive. Frederick Rosen (2006) argues that Mill’s pre-occupation with the detection and prevention of fallacies is part of what motivates the celebrated second chapter of On Liberty . Despite these considerations, the Logic is not much referenced by fallacy theorists.

Irving Copi’s Introduction to Logic —an influential text book from the mid-twentieth century—defines a fallacy as “a form of argument that seems to be correct but which proves, upon examination, not to be so.” (1961, 52) The term ‘correct’ is sufficiently broad to allow for both deductive invalidity, inductive weakness, as well as some other kinds of argument failure. Of the eighteen informal fallacies Copi discusses, eleven can be traced back to the Aristotelian tradition, and the other seven to the burgeoning post-Lockean ad -fallacy tradition.

The first division in Copi’s classification is between formal and informal fallacies. Formal fallacies are invalid inferences which “bear a superficial resemblance” to valid forms of inference, so these we may think of as deductive fallacies. They include affirming the consequent, denying the antecedent, the fallacy of four terms, undistributed middle, and illicit major. Informal fallacies are not characterized as resembling formally valid arguments; they gain their allure some other way. One division of informal fallacies is the fallacies of relevance which are “errors in reasoning into which we may fall because of carelessness and inattention to our subject matter” (1961, 53). This large class of fallacies includes accident, converse accident, false cause, petitio principii , complex question, ignoratio elenchi , ad baculum , ad hominem abusive, ad hominem circumstantial, ad ignorantiam , ad misericordiam , ad populum , and ad verecundiam . The other division of informal fallacies is called fallacies of ambiguity and it includes equivocation, amphiboly, accent, composition and division.

It seems that Copi took Whately’s category of semi-logical fallacies and moved them under a new heading of ‘informal fallacies,’ presumably for the reason that extra-logical knowledge is needed to uncover their invalidity. This has the result that the new wide category of informal fallacies is a mixed bag: some of them are at bottom logical failures (equivocation, composition, ad misericordiam ) and some are logically correct but frustrate proof (begging the question, ignoratio elenchi ). [ 5 ] Copi’s classification, unlike Whately’s which sought to make a distinction on logical grounds, may be seen as based on three ways that fallacies resemble good arguments: formal fallacies have invalid forms that resemble valid forms, fallacies of ambiguity resemble good arguments through the ambiguity of terms, and fallacies of relevance exploit psychological (non-logical) associations. Hence, we may think of Copi’s divisions as between logical, semantic and psychological fallacies.

Copi’s treatment of the fallacies is a fair overview of the traditional list of fallacies, albeit he did not pretend to do any more than give an introduction to existing fallacy-lore for beginning logic students. Hamblin (1970, ch. 1) criticized Copi’s work, along with that of several others, and gave it the pejorative name, “the standard treatment of fallacies.” His criticisms rang true with many of his readers, thereby provoking contempt for the traditional treatment of fallacies as well as stimulating research in what we may call the new, or post-Hamblin, era, of fallacy studies. Let us next consider some of these developments.

3. New approaches to fallacies

A common complaint since Whately’s Elements of Logic is that our theory and teaching of fallacies are in want of improvement—he thought they should be put on a more logical footing to overcome the loose and vague treatments others had proffered.

It is on Logical principles therefore that I propose to discuss the subject of Fallacies. … the generality of Logical writers have usually followed so opposite a plan. Whenever they have to treat of anything that is beyond the mere elements of Logic, they totally lay aside all reference to the principles they have been occupied in establishing and explaining, and have recourse to a loose, vague, and popular kind of language … [which is] … strangely incongruous in a professional Logical treatise. (1875, III, intro.)

Charles Hamblin’s 1970 book, Fallacies , revives Whately’s complaint. We may view Fallacies as the dividing line between traditional approaches to the study of fallacies and new, contemporary approaches. At the time of its publication it was the first book-length work devoted to fallacies in modern times. The work opens with a critique of the standard treatment of fallacies as it was found in mid-twentieth century textbooks; then, in subsequent chapters, it takes a historical turn reviewing Aristotle’s approach to fallacies and exploring the tradition it fostered (as in the previous section of this entry). Other historically-oriented chapters include one on the Indian tradition, and one on formal fallacies. Hamblin’s more positive contributions to fallacy studies are concentrated in the book’s later chapters on the concept of argument, formal dialectics, and equivocation.

What Hamblin meant by “the standard treatment of fallacies” was:

The typical or average account as it appears in the typical short chapter or appendix of the average modern textbook. And what we find in most cases, I think it should be admitted, is as debased, worn-out and dogmatic a treatment as could be imagined—incredibly tradition bound, yet lacking in logic and in historical sense alike, and almost without connection to anything else in modern Logic at all. (1970, 12)

Let us consider what came before Hamblin as the traditional approach to fallacies and what comes after him as new approaches. The new approaches (since the 1970’s) show a concern to overcome Hamblin’s criticisms, and they also vie with each to produce the most defensible alternative to the traditional approach. One thing that nearly all the new approaches have in common is that they reject what Hamblin presents as the nearly universally accepted definition of “fallacy” as an argument “that seems to be valid but is not so” (1970, 12). Although this definition of fallacy is not nearly as widely accepted as Hamblin intimated (see Hansen 2002), others have taken to calling it “the standard definition of fallacies” and for convenience we can refer to it as SDF. SDF has three necessary conditions: a fallacy (i) is an argument, (ii) that is invalid, and (iii) appears to be valid. These can be thought of as the argument condition, the invalidity condition and the appearance condition. All three conditions have been brought into question.

Maurice Finocchiaro continued Hamblin’s criticism of the modern textbook treatment of fallacies, observing that they contain very few examples of actual fallacies, leading him to doubt the validity of ‘fallacy’ as a genuine logical category. Although he allows that errors in reasoning are common in real life, he thinks that “types of logically incorrect arguments”—fallacies—are probably not common (1981, 113). For that reason Finocchiaro prefers to speak of fallacious arguments —by which he means arguments in which the conclusion fails to follow from the premises—rather than fallacies (1987, 133). He further distances himself from SDF by not considering the appearance condition.

Finocchiaro distinguishes six ways in which arguments can be fallacious. (1) Formal fallaciousness is simply the case where the conclusion does not follow validly from the premises; this type of error can be demonstrated by producing a suitable analogous counter-example in which the premises are true and the conclusion is false. (2) Explanatory fallaciousness occurs when a specified conclusion follows with no more certainty from the given premises than does a rival conclusion; it occurs most often in the context of proposing explanatory hypotheses. (3) Presuppositional fallaciousness occurs in those cases where an argument depends on a false presupposition; this kind of fallaciousness is demonstrated by making a sound argument showing the presupposition to be false. (4) Positive fallaciousness occurs when the given premises, complemented by other propositions taken as true, are shown to support a conclusion inconsistent with the given conclusion. (5) Semantical fallaciousness results from the ambiguity of terms; the conclusion will follow if the sense given to the term in the premises makes the premises false, but if the other sense is ascribed to the term, making the premises true, the conclusion does not follow (it becomes an instance of formal fallaciousness). (6) Finally, Finocchiaro singles out persuasive fallaciousness , in which the conclusion does not follow from the premises because it is the same as one of the premises. As a test of completeness of this six-fold division of fallaciousness, Finocchiaro (1987) observes that it is adequate to classify all the kinds of errors which Galileo found in the arguments of the defenders of the geocentric view of the solar system.

Gerald Massey (1981) has voiced a strong objection to fallacy theory and the teaching of fallacies. He argues that there is no theory of invalidity—no systematic way to show that an argument is invalid other than to show that it has true premises and a false conclusion (1981, 164). Hence, there is an asymmetry between proving arguments valid and proving them invalid: they are valid if they can be shown to be an instance of a valid form, but they are not proved invalid by showing that they are an instance of an invalid form, because both valid and invalid arguments instantiate invalid forms. Thus, showing that a natural language argument is an instance of an invalid form does not preclude the possibility that it is also an instance of a valid form, and therefore valid. Since upholders of SDF maintain that fallacies are invalid arguments, Massey’s asymmetry thesis has the consequence that no argument can be convicted of being a fallacy on logical grounds. [ 6 ]

The informal logic approach to fallacies is taken in Johnson and Blair’s Logical Self-Defence , a textbook first published in 1977. It was prompted in part by Hamblin’s indictment of the standard treatment and it further develops an initiative taken by Kahane (1971) to develop university courses that were geared to everyday reasoning. Johnson and Blair’s emphasis is on arming students to defend themselves against fallacies in everyday discourse, and a fundamental innovation is in their conception of a good argument. In place of a sound argument—a deductively valid argument with true premises—Johnson and Blair posit an alternative ideal of a cogent argument , one whose premises are acceptable, relevant to and sufficient for its conclusion. Acceptability replaces truth as a premise requirement, and the validity condition is split in to two different conditions, premise relevance and premise sufficiency. Acceptability is defined relative to audiences—the ones for whom arguments are intended—but the other basic concepts, relevance and sufficiency, although illustrated by examples, remain as intuitive, undefined concepts (see Tindale, 2007). Premise sufficiency (strength) is akin to probability in that it is a matter of degree but Johnson and Blair do not pursue giving it numerical expression.

The three criteria of a cogent argument, individually necessary and jointly sufficient, lead to a conception of fallacy as “any argument that violates one of the criteria of good argument … and is committed frequently in argumentative discourse” (1993, 317–18). This shares only one condition with SDF: that a fallacy is an argument. (Deductive) validity is replaced with the broader concept sufficiency, and the appearance condition is not included. Johnson (1987) argued that the appearance condition makes the occurrence of fallacies too subjective since how things appear may vary from perceiver to perceiver, and it should therefore be replaced by a frequency requirement. To be a fallacy, a mistake must occur with sufficient frequency to be worth our attention.

The adoption of the concept of a cogent argument as an ideal has several consequences. The category of fallacies with problematic premises (reminiscent of Whately’s “premises unduly assumed”) shows a concern with argument evaluation over and beyond logical or inference evaluation, drawing the informal logic approach away from purely logical concerns towards an epistemic conception of fallacies. Having both sufficiency and relevance as criteria (instead of the single validity criterion) has the benefit of allowing the making of nuanced judgments about the level of premise support: for example, we might say that an argument’s premises, although insufficient, are nevertheless positively relevant to the conclusion. Irrelevant premise fallacies are those with no premise support at all, whereas insufficient premise fallacies are those in which there is some support, but not enough of it. The informal logicians’ conception of fallacies is meant to be broader and more suitable to natural language argumentation than would be a conception tied only to deductive invalidity.

Johnson and Blair concern themselves exclusively with informal fallacies. Many of the familiar Aristotelian fallacies that are part of the standard treatment are missing from their inventory (e.g., accident, composition and division) and the ones retained find themselves in new categories: begging the question and ambiguity are together under the heading of Problematic Premise; appeals to authority and popularity are placed under the heading of Hasty Conclusion fallacies; ad hominem is among the fallacies that belong in the third category, Fallacies of Irrelevant Reason. This new list of fallacies has a different bent than many earlier lists, being more geared to deal with arguments in popular, everyday communication than philosophical or scientific discourse; this is evident both by the omission of some of the traditional fallacies as well as by the introduction of new ones, such as dubious assumption, two wrongs, slippery slope, and faulty analogy.

The kinds of mistakes one can make in reasoning are generally thought to be beyond enumeration and, hence, it has been maintained that there can be no complete stock of fallacies that will guard against every kind of mistake. Johnson and Blair’s approach is responsive to this problem in that it allows the names of the classes of fallacies — ‘unacceptable premise,’ ‘irrelevant reason’ and ‘hasty conclusion’ — to stand for fallacies themselves, fallacies broad-in-scope; i.e., to serve “both as general principles of organization, and as back-ups to fill in any gaps between specific labels belonging within each genus” (1993, 52). Hence, any violation of one of the criteria of a cogent argument can be considered a fallacy.

In addition to this alternative theoretical approach to fallacies built on the three criteria of a cogent argument—an approach also taken up by others [ 7 ] —informal logic’s contribution to fallacy studies lies in its attempts to provide better analyses of fallacies, a programme pursued by a large number of researchers, including Govier (1982) on the slippery slope, Wreen (1989) on the ad baculum , Walton (1991) on begging the question, Brinton (1995) on the ad hominem , Freeman (1995) on the appeal to popularity, and Pinto (1995) on post hoc ergo propter hoc .

John Woods also despairs of the standard treatment but he sees in it something of importance; namely that the fallacies most often reviewed in introductory level logic textbooks “are a kind of caricature of their associated improprieties, which lie deeply imbedded in human practice” (Woods 1992, 25). The fallacies are then behavioural symptoms of kinds of irrationality to which humans are highly susceptible, and that makes them an important subject for study because they say something about human nature. Therefore, the problem with the standard treatment, according to Woods, is not that it is a misdirected research programme, but rather that it has been poorly carried out, partly because logicians have failed to appreciate that a multi-logical approach is necessary to understand the variety of fallacies. This idea, pursued jointly by Woods and Douglas Walton (1989), is that, for many of the fallacies standard formal logic is inadequate to uncover the unique kind of logical mistakes in question—it is too coarse conceptually to reveal the unique character of many of the fallacies. To get a satisfactory analysis of each of the fallacies they must be matched with a fitting logical system, one that has the facility to uncover the particular logical weakness in question. Inductive logic can be employed for analysis of hasty generalization and post hoc ergo propter hoc ; relatedness logic is appropriate for ignoratio elenchi ; plausible reasoning theory for the ad verecundiam , and dialectical game theory for begging the question and many questions. Woods (1992, 43) refers to this approach to studying the fallacies as methodological pluralism. Thus, like the informal logicians, there is here an interest in getting the analyses of each of the fallacies right, but the Woods and Walton approach involves embracing formal methods, not putting them aside.

Woods (2013) has continued his research on fallacies, most recently considering them in the context of what he calls a naturalized logic (modelled on Quine’s naturalized epistemology). The main point of this naturalizing move is that a theory of reasoning should take into account the abilities and motivations of reasoners. Past work on the fallacies has identified them as failing to satisfy the rules of either deductive or inductive logic, but Woods now wants to consider the core fallacies in light of what he calls third-way reasoning (comparable to non-monotonic reasoning), an account of the cognitive practices that closely resemble our common inferential practices. From the perspective of third-way reasoning the “rules” implicit in the fallacies present themselves as heuristic directives to reasoners rather than as fallacies; hence, it may be that learning from feedback (having errors corrected) is less trouble than learning the rules to avoid fallacies in the first place (Woods 2013, p. 215). Woods illustrates his point by recalling many of the fallacies he originally identified in his 1992 paper, and subjecting them to this revised model of analysis thereby overturning the view that these types of argument are always to be spurned.

SDF may be seen as closely tied to the logical approach to fallacies—the fault in arguments it singles out is their deductive invalidity. But this conception of fallacies turns out to be inadequate to cover the variety of the core fallacies in two ways: it is too narrow because it excludes begging the question which is not invalid, and it is too wide because it condemns good but non-deductive arguments as fallacies (given that they also satisfy the appearance condition) because they are invalid. Even if we replace the invalidity condition in SDF with some less stringent standard of logical weakness which could overcome the “too wide” problem, it would still leave the difficulty of accounting for the fallacy of begging the question unsolved.

Siegel and Biro (1992, 1995) hold an epistemic account of fallacies, contrasting their view with dialectical/rhetorical approaches, because matters extraneous to arguments, such as being a practice that leads to false beliefs or not being persuasive, are not in their view a sufficient condition to make an argument a fallacy. They take the position that “it is a conceptual truth about arguments that their central … purpose is to provide a bridge from known truths or justified beliefs to as yet unknown … truths or as yet unjustified beliefs” (1992, 92). Only arguments that are “epistemically serious” can accomplish this; that is, only arguments that satisfy the extra-formal requirement that premises are knowable independently of their conclusions, and are more acceptable epistemically than their conclusions, can fulfill this function. A purely logical approach to argument will not capture this requirement because arguments of the same valid form, but with different contents, may or may not be epistemically serious, depending on whether the premises are epistemically acceptable relative to the conclusion.

Modifying Biro’s (1977, 265–66) examples we can demonstrate how the requirement of epistemic seriousness plays out with begging the question. Consider these two arguments:

All men are mortal; Obama is a man; So, Obama is mortal.

All members of the committee are old Etonians; Fortesque is a member of the committee; Fortesque is an old Etonian.

In the first argument the premises are knowable independently of the conclusion. The major premise can be deduced from other universal premises about animals, and the minor premise, unlike the conclusion which must be inferred, can be known by observation. Hence, this argument does not beg the question. However, in the second argument (due to Biro, 1977) given the minor premise, the major cannot be known to be true unless the conclusion is known to be true. Consequently, on the epistemic approach to fallacies taken by Biro and Siegel, the second argument, despite the fact that it is valid, is non-serious, it begs the question, and it is a fallacy. If there was some independent way of knowing whether the major premise was true, such as that it was a bylaw that only old Etonians could be committee members, the argument would be a serious one, and not beg the question.

Biro and Siegel’s epistemic account of fallacies is distinguishable in at least three ways. First, it insists that the function of arguments is epistemic, and therefore anything that counts as a fallacy must be an epistemic fault, a breaking of a rule of epistemic justification. But since logical faults are also epistemic faults, the epistemic approach to fallacies will include logical fallacies, although these must also be explicable in terms of epistemic seriousness. Second, since the epistemological approach does not insist that all justification must be deductive, it allows the possibility of their being fallacies (as well as good arguments) by non-deductive standards, something precluded by SDF. Finally, we notice that the appearance condition is not considered a factor in this discussion of fallacies.

Ulrike Hahn and Mike Oaksford (2006a, 2006b) see themselves as contributing to the epistemic approach to fallacy analysis by developing a probabilistic analysis of the fallacies. It is part of their programme for a normative theory of natural language argumentation. They are motivated by what they perceive as the shortcomings in other approaches. The logical (deductive) approach falls short in that it simply divides arguments into valid and invalid arguments thereby failing to appreciate that natural language arguments come in various degrees of strength. The alternative approaches to fallacies, given by procedural (dialectical) and consensual accounts, they criticize on the basis that they fail to address the central problem raised by the fallacies: that of the strength of the reason-claim complex. In Hahn and Oaksford’s view the strength or weakness of the classical fallacies (they are concerned mostly with the post-Aristotelian ones) is not a result of their structure or their context of use. It is instead a matter of the relationship between the evidence and the claim (the contents of the premises and the conclusion). Evaluation of this relationship is thought to be best captured by a probabilistic Bayesian account; accordingly, they adapt Bayes’ theorem to arguments evaluation with the proviso that the probabilities are subjective degrees of belief, not frequencies. “An argument’s strength,” they write, “is a function of an individual’s initial level of belief in the claim, the availability and observation of confirmatory (or disconfirmatory) evidence, and the existence and perceived strength of competing hypotheses” (Corner, et al. 1145). With Korb (2003) they view a fallacy as an argument with a low probability on the Bayesian model.

Since the variance in input probabilities will result in a range of outputs in argument strength, this probabilistic approach has the potential to assign argument strengths anywhere between 0 and 1, thereby allowing that different tokens of one argument type can vary greatly in strength, i.e., some will be fallacies and others not. Also, and this seems to concur with our experience, different arguers may disagree on the strength of the same arguments since they can differ in the assignments of the initial probabilities. Hahn and Oaksford also claim as advantages for their normative theory that it gives guidance for persuasion since it takes into account the initial beliefs of audiences. Moreover, their approach contributes to the study of belief change; that is, to what extent our confidence in the conclusion changes with the availability of new evidence.

Some of the most active new researchers on fallacies take a dialectical and/or dialogical approach. This can be traced back to Hamblin (1970, ch. 8) and Lorenzen’s (1969) dialogue theory. The panacea for fallacies that Whately recommended was more logic; Hamblin, however, proposed a shift from the logical to the dialectical perspective.

[W]e need to extend the bounds of Formal Logic; to include features of dialectical contexts within which arguments are put forward. To begin with, there are criteria of validity of argument that are additional to formal ones: for example, those that serve to proscribe question-begging. To go on with, there are prevalent but false conceptions of the rules of dialogue, which are capable of making certain argumentative moves seem satisfactory and unobjectionable when, in fact, they conceal and facilitate dialectical malpractice. (Hamblin 1970, 254)

The proposal here is to shift the study of fallacies from the contexts of arguments to the contexts of dialogues (argumentation), formulate rules for reasonable dialogue activity, and then connect fallacies to failures of rule-following. Barth and Martens’s paper (1977), which studied the argumentum ad hominem by extending Lorenzen’s dialogue tableaux method to include the definitions of the concepts “line of attack” and “winning strategy,” leads to a conception of fallacies as either failures to meet one of the necessary conditions of rational dialogical argumentation, or failures to satisfy sufficient conditions as specified by production rules of the dialogical method (1977, 96).

The Barth and Martens paper is a bridge between the earlier (quasi-) formal and subsequent informal dialectical theories, and is explicitly acknowledged as a major influence by the Pragma-dialectical theory, the brainchild of Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1984). Rather than beginning from a logical or epistemological perspective they start with the role of argumentation in overcoming interpersonal disagreements. The Pragma-dialecticians propose that inter-personal argumentation can be analysed as two-party-discussions having four analytical stages: a confrontation stage in which the participants become aware of the content of their disagreement; an opening stage in which the parties agree (most likely implicitly) to shared starting points and a set of rules to govern the ensuing discussion; an argumentation stage wherein arguments and doubts about arguments are expressed and recognized; and a final stage in which a decision about the initial disagreement is made, if possible, based on what happened in the argumentation stage.

The Pragma-dialectical theory stipulates a normative ideal of a critical discussion which serves both as a guide to the reconstruction of natural language argumentation, as well as a standard for the evaluation of the analysed product of reconstruction. A set of ten rules has been proposed as constitutive of the critical-discussion ideal, and the proponents of the theory believe that rational arguers would accept them. If followed by both parties to the disagreement, the rules constrain the argumentation decision procedure such that any resolution reached will be deemed reasonable, and “every violation of any of the rules of the discussion procedure for conducting a critical discussion” will be a fallacy (2004, 175). The rules range over all the four stages of argumentation: at the confrontation stage there is a rule which says one may not prevent the other party from expressing their view; for the argumentation stage there is a rule which requires argumentation to be logically strong and in accord with one or another of three general argumentation schemes; at the closing stage there is a rule that the participants themselves are to decide which party was successful based on the quality of the argumentation they have made: if the proponent carries the day, the opponent should acknowledge it, and vice versa .

The Pragma-dialectical theory proposes that each of the core fallacies can be assigned a place as a violation of one of the rules of a critical discussion. For example, the ad baculum fallacy is a form of intimidation that violates the rule that one may not attempt to prevent one’s discussion partner from expressing their views; equivocation is a violation of the rule that formulations in arguments must be clear and unambiguous; post hoc ergo propter hoc violates the rule that arguments must be instances of schemes correctly applied. Moreover, on this theory, since any rule violation is to count as a fallacy this allows for the possibility that there may be hitherto unrecognized “new fallacies.” Among those proposed are declaring a standpoint sacrosanct because that breaks the rule against the freedom to criticize points of view, and evading the burden of proof which breaks the rule that you must defend your standpoint if asked to do so (see van Eemeren 2010, 194).

Clearly not all the rules of critical discussions apply directly to arguments. Some govern other goal-frustrating moves which arguers can make in the course of settling a difference of opinion, such as mis-allocating the burden of proof, asking irrelevant questions, suppressing a point of view, or failing to clarify the meaning of one’s argumentation. In short, the Pragma-dialectical rules of a critical discussion are not just rules of logic or epistemology, but rules of conduct for rational discussants, making the theory more like a moral code than a set of logical principles. Accordingly, this approach to fallacies rejects all three of the necessary conditions of SDF: a fallacy need not be an argument, thus the invalidity condition will not apply either, and the appearance condition is excluded because of its subjective character (Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004, 175).

The Pragma-dialectical analysis of fallacies as rule-breakings in a procedure for overcoming disagreements has recently been expanded to take account of the rhetorical dimension of argumentation. Pragma-dialectics takes the rhetorical dimension to stem from an arguer’s wish to have their view accepted which leads dialoguers to engage in strategic maneuvering vis-à-vis their dialogue partners. However, this desire must be put in balance with the dialectical requirement of being reasonable; that is, staying within the bounds of the normative demands of critical discussions. The ways of strategic maneuvering identified are basically three: topic selection, audience orientation, and the selection of presentational devices, and these can be effectively deployed at each stage of argumentation (Van Eemeren 2010, 94). “All derailments of strategic maneuvering are fallacies,” writes van Eemeren (2010, 198), “in the sense that they violate one or more of the rules for critical discussion and all fallacies can be viewed as derailments of strategic maneuvering.” This means that all fallacies are ultimately attributable to the rhetorical dimension of argumentation since, in this model, strategic maneuvering is the entry of rhetoric into argumentation discussions. “Because each fallacy has, in principle, sound counterparts that are manifestations of the same mode of strategic maneuvering” it may not appear to be a fallacy and it “may pass unnoticed” (Van Eemeren 2010, 199). Nevertheless, Pragma-dialectics prefers to keep the appearance condition outside the definition of ‘fallacy’, treating the seeming goodness of fallacies as a sometime co-incidental property, rather than an essential one.

Argumentation evaluation on the Pragma-dialectical approach is done with an eye to a single ideal model of argumentation. This approach has been challenged by Douglas Walton who has written more about fallacies and fallacy theory than anyone else. He has published individual monographs on many of the well-known fallacies, among them, Begging the Question (1991), Slippery Slope Arguments (1992), Ad Hominem Arguments (1998), and a comprehensive work on fallacy theory, A Pragmatic Theory of Fallacy (1995). Over the years his views have evolved. He has referred to his theory as “the Pragmatic theory,” and like the Pragma-dialectical theory it has a dialectical/dialogical basis; however, Walton envisions a number of distinct normative dialectical frameworks (persuasion dialogue, inquiry dialogue, negotiation dialogue, etc.) rather than the single model of a critical discussion proposed by Pragma-dialectics. Postulating different kinds of dialogues with different starting points and different goals, thinks Walton, will bring argumentation into closer contact with argumentation reality. At one point Walton had the idea that fallacies happened when there was an illicit shift from one kind of a dialogue to another (1995, 118–23), for example, using arguments appropriate for a negotiation dialogue in a persuasion dialogue, but more recently he has turned to other ways of explicating fallacies.

Although Walton recognizes the class of formal fallacies, his main interest is in informal fallacies, especially the ones associated with argumentation schemes. The idea of an argumentation scheme is central to Walton’s theory. Schemes are patterns of commonly used kinds of defeasible reasoning/argumentation such as appeals to expert opinion and ad hominem arguments. Schemes do not identify fallacies but rather argument kinds that are sometimes used fairly, and, other times, fallaciously. With each kind of scheme is associated a set of critical questions which guide us in deciding whether a given use of an argument is correct, weak or fallacious. So, if we consider:

\(E\) is an expert in subject area \(S\); \(E\) asserts \(p\) based on \(E\)’s knowledge of \(S\); So, \(p\).

to be the scheme for the appeal-to-expertise kind of argument, [ 8 ] then there will be a question for each premise: Is \(E\) really an expert in \(S\)? Did \(E\) say \(p\) when s/he was acting in her/his professional capacity? (… or did s/he blurt it out while drunk at an association party?). If the answer to both questions is Yes, then the argument creates a presumption for the conclusion—but not a guarantee, for the reasoning is defeasible: other information may come to light that will override the presumption. If one of the questions cannot be answered clearly this is an indication that the argument is weak, and answering No to either of the two questions cancels the presumption for the conclusion, i.e., makes the argument into a bad argument from expert opinion. If the bad argument has “a semblance of correctness about it in [the] context, and poses a serious obstacle to the realization of the goal of the dialog,” then it is a fallacy (2011, 380). [ 9 ]

The definition of fallacy Walton proposes (1995, 255) has five parts. A fallacy:

  • an argument (or at least something that purports to be an argument) that
  • falls short of some standard of correctness;
  • is used in a context of dialogue;
  • has a semblance of correctness about it; and
  • poses a serious problem to the realization of the goal of the dialogue.

Here we find that Walton has relaxed two of the necessary conditions of SDF. Purporting to be an argument is enough (it doesn’t really have to be an argument), while falling short of a standard (one that will vary with the kind of dialogue under consideration) replaces the invalidity condition. However, the appearance condition, here expressed as fallacies having a semblance of correctness about them, remains in full force. The two extra conditions added to fallacy are that they occur only in contexts of dialogue and that they frustrate the realization of the goal of the kind of dialogue in which they occur. In insisting on this dialogical dimension, Walton is in full sympathy with those who think that fallacies can only be rightly analysed within a dialectical framework similar to the ones Aristotle originally studied, and later better defined by Hamblin and Lorenzen. Walton volunteers a shorter version of the definition of a fallacy as “a deceptively bad argument that impedes the progress of a dialogue” (1995, 256).

Walton divides fallacies into two kinds: paralogisms and sophisms. A paralogism is “the type of fallacy in which an error of reasoning is typically committed by failing to meet some necessary requirement of an argumentation scheme” whereas “the sophism type of fallacy is a sophistical tactic used to try to unfairly get the best of a speech partner in an exchange of arguments” (2010, 171; see also 1995, 254). Paralogisms are instances of identifiable argumentation schemes, but sophisms are not. The latter are associated more with infringing a reasonable expectation of dialogue than with failing some standard of argument, (2011, 385; 2010, 175). A further distinction is drawn between arguments used intentionally to deceive and arguments that merely break a maxim of argumentation unintentionally. The former count as fallacies; the latter, less condemnable, are blunders (1995, 235).

Among the informal paralogisms Walton includes: ad hominem , ad populum , ad misericordiam , ad ignorantiam , ad verecundiam , slippery slope, false cause, straw man, argument from consequences, faulty analogy, composition and division. In the category of sophisms he places ad baculum , complex question, begging the question, hasty generalization, ignoratio elenchi , equivocation, amphiboly, accent, and secundum quid . He also has a class of formal fallacies very much the same as those identified by Whately and Copi. The largest class in Walton’s classification is the one associated with argumentation schemes and ad -arguments, and these are the ones that he considers to be the most central fallacies. Nearly all the Aristotelian fallacies included find themselves relegated to the less studied categories of sophisms. Taking a long look at the history of fallacies, then, we find that the Aristotelian fallacies are no longer of central importance. They have been replaced by the fallacies associated with the ad -arguments.

Another recent approach comes from virtue argumentation theory (modelled on virtue epistemology). Virtue argumentation theory is characterized by a distinct set of virtues thought to be essential to good argumentation: willingness to engage in argumentation, willingness to listen to others and willingness to modify one’s own position (see, e.g., Cohen 2009). These may be supplemented with epistemic virtues and even in some cases moral virtues. Although virtues and vices are dispositions of arguers and fallacies are arguments, it is claimed that good argumentation generally results from the influence of argumentation virtues and bad argumentation (including the fallacies) arise because of the vices of arguers.

Taking the Aristotelian view that virtues are a mean between opposite kinds of vices, fallacious arguments can be seen as resulting from arguers moving in one or another direction away from a mean of good argumentation. Aberdein (2013, 2016) especially has developed this model for understanding many of the fallacies. We can illustrate the view by considering appeals to expertise: the associated vices might be too little respect for reliable authorities at one extreme and too much deference to authorities at the other extreme. Aberdein develops the fallacies-as-argumentation-vices analysis in some detail for other of the ad-arguments and sketches how it might be applied to the other core fallacies, suggesting it can profitably be extended to all of them.

All the fallacies, it is claimed, can be fitted in somewhere in the classification of argumentational vices, but the converse is not true although it is possible to bring to light other shortcomings to which we may fall prey in argumentation. Another aspect of the theory is that it distributes argumentation vices among both senders and audiences. Speakers may infect their arguments with vices when they are, for example, closed minded or lack respect for persons, and audiences can contribute to fallaciousness by letting their receptivity be influenced by naïvety, an over-reliance on common sense, or an unfounded bias against a speaker. Perhaps the development of the virtue argumentation theory approach to fallacies provides a supplement to Mill’s theory of fallacies. He distinguished (1891, V, i, 3) what he called the moral (dispositional) and intellectual causes of fallacy. The study of the argumentative vices envisioned above seems best included under the moral study of fallacies as the vices can be taken to be the presdisposing causes to commit intellectual mistakes, i.e., misevaluations of the weight of evidence.

4. Current issues in fallacy theory

A question that continues to dog fallacy theory is how we are to conceive of fallacies. There would be advantages to having a unified theory of fallacies. It would give us a systematic way of demarcating fallacies and other kinds of mistakes; it would give us a framework for justifying fallacy judgments, and it would give us a sense of the place of fallacies in our larger conceptual schemes. Some general definition of ‘fallacy’ is wanted but the desire is frustrated because there is disagreement about the identity of fallacies. Are they inferential, logical, epistemic or dialectical mistakes? Some authors insist that they are all of one kind: Biro and Siegel, for example, that they are epistemic, and Pragma-dialectics that they are dialectical. There are reasons to think that all fallacies do not easily fit into one category.

Together the Sophistical Refutations and Locke’s Essay are the dual sources of our inheritance of fallacies. However, for four reasons they make for uneasy bedfellows. First, the ad fallacies seem to have a built-in dialectical character, which, it can be argued, Aristotle’s fallacies do not have (they are not sophistical refutations but are in sophistical refutations). Second, Aristotle’s fallacies are logical mistakes: they have no appropriate employment outside eristic argumentation whereas the ad -fallacies are instances of ad -arguments, often appropriately used in dialogues. Third, the appearance condition is part of the Aristotelian inheritance but it is not intimately connected with the ad -fallacies tradition. A fourth reason that contributes to the tension between the Aristotelian and Lockean traditions in fallacies is that the former grew out of philosophical problems, largely what are logical and metaphysical puzzles (consider the many examples in Sophistical Refutations ), whereas the ad -fallacies are more geared to social and political topics of popular concern, the subject matter that most intrigues modern researchers on fallacy theory.

As we look back over our survey we cannot help but observe that fallacies have been identified in relation to some ideal or model of good arguments, good argumentation, or rationality. Aristotle’s fallacies are shortcomings of his ideal of deduction and proof, extended to contexts of refutation. The fallacies listed by Mill are errors of reasoning in a comprehensive model that includes both deduction and induction. Those who have defended SDF as the correct definition of ‘fallacy’ [ 10 ] take logic simpliciter or deductive validity as the ideal of rationality. Informal logicians view fallacies as failures to satisfy the criteria of what they consider to be a cogent argument. Defenders of the epistemic approach to fallacies see them as shortfalls of the standards of knowledge-generating arguments. Finally, those who are concerned with how we are to overcome our disagreements in a reasonable way will see fallacies as failures in relation to ideals of debate or critical discussions.

The standard treatment of the core fallacies has not emerged from a single conception of good argument or reasonableness but rather, like much of our unsystematic knowledge, has grown as a hodgepodge collection of items, proposed at various time and from different perspectives, that continues to draw our attention, even as the standards that originally brought a given fallacy to light are abandoned or absorbed into newer models of rationality. Hence, there is no single conception of good argument or argumentation to be discovered behind the core fallacies, and any attempt to force them all into a single framework, must take efforts to avoid distorting the character originally attributed to each of them.

From Aristotle to Mill the appearance condition was an essential part of the conception of fallacies. However, some of the new, post-Hamblin, scholars have either ignored it (Finocchiaro, Biro and Siegel) or rejected it because appearances can vary from person to person, thus making the same argument a fallacy for the one who is taken in by the appearance, and not a fallacy for the one who sees past the appearances. This is unsatisfactory for those who think that arguments are either fallacies or not. Appearances, it is also argued, have no place in logical or scientific theories because they belong to psychology (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004). But Walton (e.g., 2010) continues to consider appearances an essential part of fallacies as does Powers (1995, 300) who insists that fallacies must “have an appearance, however quickly seen through, of being valid.” If the mistake in an argument is not masked by an ambiguity that makes it appear to be a better argument than it really is, Powers denies it is a fallacy.

The appearance condition of fallacies serves at least two purposes. First, it can be part of explanations of why reasonable people make mistakes in arguments or argumentation: it may be due in part to an argument’s appearing to be better than it really is. Second, it serves to divide mistakes into two groups: those which are trivial or the result of carelessness (for which there is no cure other than paying better attention), and those which we need to learn to detect through an increased awareness of their seductive nature. Without the appearance condition, it can be argued, no division can be made between these two kinds of errors: either there are no fallacies or all mistakes in argument and/or argumentation are fallacies; a conclusion that some are willing to accept, but which runs contrary to tradition. One can also respond that there is an alternative to using the appearance condition as the demarcation property between fallacies and casual mistakes, namely, frequency. Fallacies are those mistakes we must learn to guard against because they occur with noticeable frequency. To this it may be answered that ‘noticeable frequency’ is vague, and is perhaps best explained by the appearance condition.

On the more practical level, there continues to be discussion about the value of teaching the fallacies to students. Is it an effective way for them to learn to reason well and to avoid bad arguments? One reason to think that it is not effective is that the list of fallacies is not complete, and that even if the group of core fallacies was extended to incorporate other fallacies we thought worth including, we could still not be sure that we had a complete prophylactic against bad arguments. Hence, we are better off teaching the positive criteria for good arguments/ argumentation which give us a fuller set of guidelines for good reasoning. But some (Pragma-dialectics and Johnson and Blair) do think that their stock of fallacies is a complete guard against errors because they have specified a full set of necessary conditions for good arguments/argumentation and they hold that fallacies are just failures to meet one of these conditions.

Another consideration about the value of the fallacies approach to teaching good reasoning is that it tends to make students overly critical and lead them to see fallacies where there are not any; hence, it is maintained we could better advance the instilling of critical thinking skills by teaching the positive criteria of good reasoning and arguments (Hitchcock, 1995). In response to this view, it is argued that, if the fallacies are taught in a non-perfunctory way which includes the explanations of why they are fallacies—which normative standards they transgress—then a course taught around the core fallacies can be effective in instilling good reasoning skills (Blair 1995).

Recently there has been renewed interest in how biases are related to fallacies. Correia (2011) has taken Mill’s insight that biases are predisposing causes of fallacies a step further by connecting identifiable biases with particular fallacies. Biases can influence the unintentional committing of fallacies even where there is no intent to be deceptive, he observes. Taking biases to be “systematic errors that invariably distort the subject’s reasoning and judgment,” the picture drawn is that particular biases are activated by desires and emotions (motivated reasoning) and once they are in play, they negatively affect the fair evaluation of evidence. Thus, for example, the “focussing illusion” bias inclines a person to focus on just a part of the evidence available, ignoring or denying evidence that might lead in another direction. Correia (2011, 118) links this bias to the fallacies of hasty generalization and straw man, suggesting that it is our desire to be right that activates the bias to focus more on positive or negative evidence, as the case may be. Other biases he links to other fallacies.

Thagard (2011) is more concerned to stress the differences between fallacies and biases than to find connections between them. He claims that the model of reasoning articulated by informal logic is not a good fit with the way that people actually reason and that only a few of the fallacies are relevant to the kinds of mistakes people actually make. Thagard’s argument depends on his distinction between argument and inference. Arguments, and fallacies, he takes to be serial and linguistic, but inferences are brain activities and are characterized as parallel and multi-modal. By “parallel” is meant that the brain carries out different processes simultaneously, and by “multi-modal” that the brain uses non-linguistic and emotional, as well as linguistic representations in inferring. Biases (inferential error tendencies) can unconsciously affect inferring. “Motivated inference,” for example, “involves selective recruitment and assessment of evidence based on unconscious processes that are driven by emotional considerations of goals rather than purely cognitive reasoning” (2011, 156). Thagard volunteers a list of more than fifty of these inferential error tendencies. Because motivated inferences result from unconscious mental processes rather than explicit reasoning, the errors in inferences cannot be exposed simply by identifying a fallacy in a reconstructed argument. Dealing with biases requires identification of both conscious and unconscious goals of arguers, goals that can figure in explanations of why they incline to particular biases. “Overcoming people’s motivated inferences,” Thagard concludes, “is therefore more akin to psychotherapy than informal logic” (157), and the importance of fallacies is accordingly marginalized.

In response to these findings, one can admit their relevance to the pedagogy of critical thinking but still recall the distinction between what causes mistakes and what the mistakes are. The analysis of fallacies belongs to the normative study of arguments and argumentation, and to give an account of what the fallacy in a given argument is will involve making reference to some norm of argumentation. It will be an explanation of what the mistake in the argument is. Biases are relevant to understanding why people commit fallacies, and how we are to help them get past them, but they do not help us understand what the fallacy-mistakes are in the first place—this is not a question of psychology. Continued research at this intersection of interests will hopefully shed more light on both biases and fallacies.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.
  • Curtis, Gary N., Fallacy Files
  • Dowden, Bradley, Fallacies , entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
  • Hansen, H.V., and C. Fioret, 2016. A searchable bibliography of fallacies—2016 , Informal Logic , 36: 432–72.
  • Informal Logic , an open-access journal.
  • Labossiere, Michael C., Fallacies , hosted by The Nizkor Project.
  • RAIL , a blog about Reasoning, Argumentation, and Informal Logic.

logic: informal | relativism

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thank the executive and subject editors who suggested a way to improve the discussion of begging the question .

Copyright © 2020 by Hans Hansen < hhansen @ uwindsor . ca >

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Jeremy E. Sherman Ph.D., MPP

Wising Up About Ad Hominem Arguments

And buddhism's speech test: is it honest necessary and kind.

Posted August 22, 2020 | Reviewed by Kaja Perina

If you’ve been in on any online debates, you’ve probably heard of the ad hominem argument, an “argument against the person” in other words, attacks on someone’s character. Here’s one formal definition of it:

Argumentum Ad Hominem: Fallacious argument that attacks not an opponent's beliefs but his motives or character.

It’s often misunderstood. Here’s an example of what it really means. Suppose it’s your partner’s responsibility to take the garbage out. You remind them. They say they’ll do it later because it’s raining. You say it’s not raining and they say, “you just like bossing me around.” That’s an attack on your motives for saying it’s not raining.

Whether you do or don’t have that motive has no bearing on whether it’s raining outside. Your motives are red herrings, irrelevant to rainfall. That’s what’s meant by it being a “fallacious argument.” Fallacious is not a great word for it. I’d call it an un-dicator, not indicating one way or another. A fallacy is basically a lame argument for something else, like whether it’s raining.

The ad hominem fallacy is one of the first nuggets one gets in a logic course and it’s the one students are most likely to remember. Why? Well, for one thing, it has a Latin name, so using it can make us sound like logic masters. We can flash it in conversation the way the police flash their badges. “Stand back! I’m a logician! I’ve got logic. I’ll handle this!”

For another, this logical argument is easily confused with a dubious strategic argument that one should never attack people’s character because of the “backfire effect,” the way that people get defensive when their character is threatened, so your criticism will backfire.

It’s dubious because backfiring isn’t the only effect. We all tend to get defensive when our character has been attacked. Criticism backfires at first, but who among us hasn’t been influenced by attacks on their character? We brush it away but some of the criticism gets through anyway. I've learned lots from critical feedback I rejected at first.

And perhaps most importantly, the ad hominem argument can be misinterpreted as a way to shut up anyone who threatens our character. As such it becomes the equivalent of saying “Hey, be kind,” whenever anyone challenges you. It’s just another noping-strategy. A way to say “Nope, back off” when we’re threatened.

So I count three reasons why citing ad hominem arguments is so popular. We get to dismiss challenges as illogical, counterproductive, and unkind.

Now maybe you’ve heard this popular distillation of the Buddhist notion of “right speech:”

“If you propose to speak, always ask yourself, is it true, is it necessary, is it kind.” It maps nicely to these three distinct arguments against attacking character from logic, strategy, and kindness.

“Honesty” is often confused with truth. They are not the same thing. Many people honestly believe untrue things. Logic is about finding out what’s true but for that you’ve got your badge.

“Kindness” is very popular these days, though in a naive way. In practice, kindness is the question, not the answer. Is it unkind to fight someone who is hurting others? “Just be kind” doesn’t resolve that question any more than “Hate hate”

“Necessary” is about whether it will solve problems and if you assume the backfire effect is the only effect, then no, it’s not necessary, it’s counterproductive.

Though the Buddhist formula may help keep the peace among friends, I doubt it’s the last word on when to speak.

Combining the authority of that logic badge, the backfire effect and the moralizing of “be nice” we get to act like authorities on why no one should ever be allowed to challenge our character, which is pretty handy. That, I’d argue is why accusing people of the ad hominem fallacy is so popular.

an argument ad hominem

Still, we do talk about people’s motives. We do identify people of bad character. We have to. And the ad hominem fallacy is grossly misunderstood when it’s treated as a ban on attacking character. The ad hominem fallacy’s only relevant guidance is that you can’t conclude that everything a person of bad character claims is wrong. A broken clock is right twice a day. An ingnoranus will be right sometimes too.

In a heated debate, accusing someone of the ad hominem fallacy is a way to attack their character. That’s ironic. Hypocritical too: “Because you accused me of bad character you're of bad character and therefore with the powers vested in me by my thimbleful of misunderstood logic class, I declare you wrong about everything.”

Notice that you can collapse that whole hypocrisy down to dismissing someone as “just playing politics.” Politics is about power. It’s especially amusing to hear politicians trying to overpower each other by accusing them of wanting to overpower.

“Overpower everyone who tries to overpowers” is an interesting and important dilemma often posed as a principle, which it is not. It can’t be. Like “be intolerant of the intolerant” and “say no to negativity,” it’s self-negating.

“Wrong about everything” becomes the thrust of heated debates, which tend to turn into infallibility battles, win-takes-all fights over who is right about everything, and who is wrong about everything. I count three main ways we try to discredit and disqualify each other completely:

1. On facts: “You think there are 150k COVID deaths? There are 170k, you idiot. You’re discredited and disqualified!”

2. On method: “You attacked my character! I call ad hominem! You’re discredited and disqualified!”

3. On motives: “You’re just trying to do X. You’re discredited and disqualified!”

I’d say anyone who relies on any or all of these will tend to be of bad character. That doesn’t mean they’re wrong about everything. Just that you’ve got keep an eye on people like that.

And what does the ad hominem fallacy say about you keeping an eye on them or even calling them out as bad characters?

Jeremy E. Sherman Ph.D., MPP

Jeremy Sherman, Ph.D., MPP, has a wide research agenda — psychology from cradle to grave, life’s origins to our grave situation, grounded in a 25-year close collaboration with Berkeley neuroscientist, biological anthropologist Terrence Deacon.

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Definition of ad hominem

 (Entry 1 of 2)

Definition of ad hominem  (Entry 2 of 2)

Did you know?

Ad hominem literally means "to the person" in New Latin (Latin as first used in post-medieval texts). In centuries past, this adjective typically modified argument . An "argument ad hominem" (or argumentum ad hominem , to use the full New Latin phrase) was a valid method of persuasion by which one took advantage of an opponent's interests or feelings in a debate, instead of just sticking to general principles. Ad hominem later came to be used to describe an attack aimed at an opponent's character, and this is the sense more often heard today. The hostile nature of such attacks has led to an understanding of the term as meaning "against the person," rather than its original Latin meaning of "to the person."

Examples of ad hominem in a Sentence

These examples are programmatically compiled from various online sources to illustrate current usage of the word 'ad hominem.' Any opinions expressed in the examples do not represent those of Merriam-Webster or its editors. Send us feedback about these examples.

Word History

borrowed from New Latin, literally, "to the person"

derivative of ad hominem entry 1

1598, in the meaning defined at sense 1

1588, in the meaning defined above

Dictionary Entries Near ad hominem

Cite this entry.

“Ad hominem.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary , Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ad%20hominem. Accessed 17 Feb. 2024.

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Ad Hominem Fallacy (18 Examples + Definition)

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You've probably stumbled across people arguing by attacking someone's character instead of their ideas. Maybe you've even been guilty of this yourself. The bottom line is, attacking the other person's character instead of their argument is often unproductive, and it's known as an ad hominem fallacy.

An ad hominem fallacy occurs when someone rejects or undermines an argument by attacking the character, credentials, or other personal traits of the person presenting it, instead of addressing the issue at hand.

Whether you're a student aiming to excel in debate, or simply someone looking to fortify their communication skills, learning about the ad hominem fallacy is crucial.

What is an Ad Hominem Fallacy?

two people arguing

Imagine you're in a debate about climate change. You present facts and figures, but your opponent simply says, "Why should we listen to you? You drive a gas-guzzling car!"

That's an ad hominem fallacy right there. Instead of talking about the data or the logic of the issue at hand, your opponent has shifted focus to you as a person.

An ad hominem fallacy happens when someone tries to discredit an argument by attacking the individual presenting it. They're not taking on the argument itself.

It's crucial to differentiate an ad hominem argument from genuine critique or feedback. Criticism is focused on the argument or the idea, not the person making it. Ad hominem shortcuts through rational discussion, making it a disruptive and often misleading tactic in debates and dialogues.

Ad hominem arguments are an example of a type of logical fallacy. Fallacies are logical errors, usually in arguments, that people make which lead to inconsistent reasoning.

Other Names for Ad Hominem Fallacy

  • Personal Attack Fallacy
  • Poisoning the Well
  • Abusive Fallacy
  • Circumstantial Ad Hominem
  • Argumentum ad hominem
  • Circumstantial ad hominem argument

Similar Logical Fallacies

  • Straw Man : Misrepresenting an opponent's argument to make it easier to attack
  • Tu quoque: Claiming that an opponent is guilty of the same fault they are being accused of.
  • Genetic fallacy: Judging the value of an idea based on its origin .
  • Slippery Slope : Arguing that one event will inevitably trigger a series of bad events
  • Red Herring: Introducing an unrelated topic to divert attention from the subject under discussion

The term "ad hominem" comes from Latin, and it literally means "to the person." The concept has been studied since ancient times but became more formally recognized during the Renaissance period.

Philosophers like Aristotle discussed the fallacy, though not under the "ad hominem" label, as an undesirable form of argumentation. This concept remains relevant today because it so frequently appears in conversations, especially in the realm of politics and social issues.

19 Examples

1) politics.

"My opponent can't possibly make good decisions about the economy; he has filed for bankruptcy before."

Here, the speaker is targeting the opponent's past financial history instead of addressing their policies or proposals for the economy.

soccer game

"Why should we listen to the coach's strategy? He was never even a good player!"

In this claim, the quality of the coach's strategy is dismissed based on his past performance as a player, which is irrelevant.

3) Environment

"You can't talk about conservation if you're not a vegan."

Here, the person is discrediting the argument for conservation based on dietary choices, which doesn't directly relate to the argument at hand.

4) Social Media

"Your opinion on the matter doesn't count; you only have 50 followers."

The number of social media followers doesn't make someone's argument more or less valid.

5) In School

"Why should we listen to your ideas for the group project? You got a C in the last assignment."

Grades on past assignments don't necessarily reflect the quality of one's current ideas for a project.

6) Religion

christian church

"You're not a good Christian, so your points about morality are invalid."

Personal religious standing doesn't negate the validity of a position in an argument about morality. The opponent's character is not what's at issue, so this is a fallacious attack.

7) Workplace

"We shouldn't take her suggestions seriously. She's new here."

Being new to a workplace doesn't make one's suggestions less valuable.

8) Diet and Health

"How can you give me health advice? You're overweight."

Someone's weight doesn't invalidate their understanding of health or nutrition.

science icon cell structure

"He doesn't have a Ph.D., so his findings on climate change are worthless."

The worth of scientific findings is based on evidence, not on the degrees held by the person presenting them. It should be about the logical perspective, not the person presenting the evidence.

"He can't be a good musician; he was trained as an engineer."

Training in a different field doesn't automatically negate someone's musical ability. Such an attack is an informal fallacy.

"Her movie reviews can't be trusted; she liked that film everyone hates."

Personal preferences for films don't dictate the quality of one's movie reviews.

12) Literature

"You didn't even finish high school, so what would you know about literature?"

Educational background doesn't necessarily determine one's understanding or appreciation of literature.

13) Animal Rights

"You own a leather jacket, so you can't argue for animal rights."

Owning a leather item doesn't make one's argument for animal rights less valid.

"A man can't have an opinion on women's rights."

Gender doesn't dictate the validity of an opinion on human rights issues.

15) Relationships

"He's single; what does he know about relationships?"

Being single doesn't invalidate one's understanding of relationship dynamics.

16) Parenting

"You don't have kids, so your ideas about parenting are irrelevant."

Not having children doesn't make someone's perspectives on parenting meaningless.

17) Technology

"She's old, so what would she know about smartphones?"

Age doesn't necessarily dictate one's understanding of technology.

"He's not even a lawyer; why would we listen to him about the legal system?"

Not being a professional in a field doesn't mean one can't have a valid opinion about it.

19) History

"He dropped out of college, so he can't be trusted to talk about history."

Educational attainment isn't the sole measure of one's understanding of history.

The Psychological Mechanisms Behind It

When someone uses an ad hominem fallacy, what's going on inside their head? Often, this tactic is a defense mechanism . People tend to resort to ad hominem when they feel backed into a corner or threatened in some way.

Instead of tackling the issue or the argument being discussed, it's easier—and emotionally safer—to attack the person making the argument. This is often an unconscious response fueled by cognitive biases like the " confirmation bias ," which makes us more likely to believe things that align with our existing opinions.

Another psychological driver is the need for cognitive ease ; our brains prefer paths of least resistance. Properly debating an issue requires intellectual engagement, logical reasoning, and critical thinking—all of which require mental effort.

Launching an ad hominem attack, on the other hand, is quick and easy. It’s a low-effort way to feel like you're winning an argument, even if you're not actually engaging with the issue at hand. It's a psychological shortcut that undermines rational discussion.

The Impact of the Ad Hominem Argument

The use of ad hominem fallacies can have a corrosive effect on public and private discourse.

First and foremost, it distracts from the real issues. When someone uses an ad hominem attack, it diverts the conversation away from the subject matter, making it difficult to resolve the actual point of contention. This kind of diversion tactic is not just unproductive; it also fosters an environment where emotional manipulation trumps reason and evidence.

Additionally, ad hominem attacks can damage reputations. The focus shifts from debating ideas to smearing individuals, which can have long-lasting impacts on how people are viewed, both professionally and socially. This is often used in political debates or against a political opponent's argument as a way to create an unfavorable reputation.

In some cases, a direct attack can lead to individuals being hesitant to speak out or share their opinions for fear of personal or abusive ad hominem attack, stifling open debate and the free exchange of ideas. While this may occasionally be properly justified, such attacks are most often just dirty tricks used against the opponent's character in such a way that they feel the need to defend themselves. It's rarely directly relevant to the discussion topic.

How to Identify and Counter It

Spotting an ad hominem fallacy requires active listening and a keen eye for detail. Remember, an ad hominem attack will target the person making the argument rather than the argument itself.

When you notice that the conversation has shifted from the topic at hand to personal attributes or actions, you're likely dealing with an ad hominem fallacy.

Countering this fallacy involves steering the conversation back to the issue. Politely point out that the attack on the individual doesn't address the argument being made.

You can say something like, "I think we've strayed from the main point. Can we focus on the argument itself?" By doing this, you invite a return to rational dialogue. It's not always easy, especially when emotions run high, but it's a crucial skill for fostering constructive conversations.

Related posts:

  • Logical Fallacies (Common List + 21 Examples)
  • Ad Hoc Fallacy (29 Examples + Other Names)
  • Genetic Fallacy (28 Examples + Definition)
  • Hasty Generalization Fallacy (31 Examples + Similar Names)
  • Fallacy of Composition (27 Examples + Definition)

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Legal Argumentation Theory: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives pp 57–70 Cite as

Fallacies in Ad Hominem Arguments

  • Christian Dahlman 3 ,
  • David Reidhav 3 &
  • Lena Wahlberg 3  
  • First Online: 01 January 2012

1783 Accesses

4 Citations

Part of the Law and Philosophy Library book series (LAPS,volume 102)

Arguments ad hominem are common in political debates, legal argumentation and everyday conversations. In this article, we propose a general definition of ad hominem arguments. An argument ad hominem is an argument that makes a claim about the reliability of a person in the performance of a certain function, based on some attribute relating to the person in question. On the basis of this definition, we examine the different ways that ad hominem arguments can go wrong, and classify them as seven different ad hominem fallacies: false attribution, irrelevant attribute, overrated effect, reliability irrelevance, irrelevant person, insufficient degree and irrelevant function. The various fallacies are illustrated with examples from politics, law and everyday life.

  • Extended Form
  • Irrelevant Attribute
  • Personal Attack
  • False Premise
  • Insurance Fraud

These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

The research presented in this article was funded by Torsten och Ragnar Söderbergs Stiftelser. We owe thanks to Niklas Arvidsson, Roberta Colonna Dahlman, Eveline Feteris, Åke Frändberg, Tobias Hansson Wahlberg, Patricia Mindus, Antonino Rotolo, Stefan Schubert, Torben Spaak, Lennart Åqvist and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

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That the arguments we are interested in are fundamentally about reliability was detected by Bentham. He does not use the term ad hominem at all. Instead he speaks of arguments that commit this kind of fallacy as modifications of the “fallacy of distrust” ( 1824/1952 , 83–92, 100–102).

According to Brinton arguments directed at functions which are merely accidentally associated with human beings are not ad hominem . He concludes ( 1995 , 213–214) that only arguments directed at advocacy qualify as ad hominem arguments. Given the structural similarities of arguments about reliability in the performance of functions of all kinds, an account which is applicable to any of these functions is in our view methodologically preferable. Besides, we are not convinced that advocacy is an essential attribute for being a person, as Brinton assumes.

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Walton, Douglas. 2006. Poisoning the well. Argumentation 20(3): 273–307.

Woods, John. 2007. Lightening up on the Ad Hominem . Informal Logic 27(1): 109–134.

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Yee, Sienho. 2004. The Tu Quoque argument as a defence to international crimes, prosecution or punishment. Chinese Journal of International Law 3(1): 87–134.

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Dahlman, C., Reidhav, D., Wahlberg, L. (2013). Fallacies in Ad Hominem Arguments. In: Dahlman, C., Feteris, E. (eds) Legal Argumentation Theory: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 102. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-4670-1_4

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Philosopy Homepage » Logic Homepage » Informal Fallacies » ad Hominem

an argument ad hominem

Ad Hominem and Related Fallacies

Abstract : The ad hominem fallacy occurs whenever the character or circumstances of an individual who is advancing an argument is criticized instead of seeking to disprove the argument provided. Ad hominem and related argument types including ad personam , tu quoque , ex concessis , ex aliquem , poisoning the well, guilt by association, ad feminam , and genetic fallacies are also studied, and examples are described in both their fallacious and nonfallacious uses.

  • The Argumentum ad Hominem Abusive and Circumstantial Fallacies Described
  • The Question of Logical Relevance in ad Hominem Arguments
  • Ad Personam
  • Two Wrongs Fallacy
  • ex Concessis
  • Personal Attack
  • Name Calling
  • Poisoning the Well
  • Guilt by Association
  • Genetic Fallacy

Evaluating Ad Hominem Arguments for Relevance

Non-fallacious uses of ad hominem arguments.

  • Rhetorical Ad Hominem
  • Ad Hominem Explained Examples
  • Links to Ad Hominem Online Quizzes with Solutions

The Ad Hominem Abusive and Circumstantial Fallacies Described

Informal Guide to Ad Hominem Fallacy

Person L proffers claim p .

Person L 's circumstances or character is unsatisfactory or L does not act in accordance with p .

Claim p is implausible or unlikely.

“After a 35-year career in agriculture, which took me to all corners of the world in segments ranging from animal productivity to plant protection, genetics, and biotechnology, I … reviewed Prince Charles' speech. I found foolishness and arrogant condescension.” [2]
“[Alger] Hiss still has a ragtag remnant of defenders, historical illiterates who are disproportionately academics. They often are the last to learn things because they have gone to earth in the groves of academe in order to live in an alternative reality. [3]
“Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen of the Committee: I am the father of this bill, and I have listened with a great deal of attention to all that has been said against it. … The gentleman who last spoke has too good a reputation as a lawyer in Hudson County to lead me to believe that he believes what he has just stated.” [5]
”The Democrats have no right to attack a Republican protective tariff measure on the ground that it would increase the cost of living, for … [u]nder a recent Democratic administration the living cost was higher than at any other time during the history of the country.” [6]
[T]he stronger or more coherent the character portrait that develops from consideration of these virtues and traits, the more compelling the ad hominem appeal, and the less the objection of ad hominem fallacy, in making a decision between arguments.” [9]
  • Indeed, often such arguments as these are non-fallacious since the premises of a reliable source of information provides evidence for the truth of conclusion.
Most of what person L states about subject S is true. Person L states claim c on subject S . Claim c is probably true.
  • Informal logic is characterized by its lack of formal structure and can be viewed as an activity of discourse where an arguer's character or circumstances lend credibility to that individual's claims. So, on this point of view, informal logic is concerned with pragmatic analysis of dialectical interaction in discourse rather than the textual analysis of the logic of statements as is realized in deductive logic. Argumentative discourse, oral or written, is meant to resolve a difference of opinion, but when an ad hominem fallacy is used as a tactic to disqualify an opponent's arguments, the discussion is derailed.

Ngram graph showing historical frequency of ad hominem and argumentum ad hominem in Google books

The Question of Relevance in Ad Hominem Arguments

  • When an examination of issues is logically benefited by reference to the character or circumstances of an individual, no informal fallacy occurs — such as impeaching the testimony of a visually impaired eye witness to a felony.
  • Note that for the argumentum ad hominem fallacy to occur, (1) an irrelevant appeal is fabricated and (2) a logical argument must have been submitted.
  • The commonsensical assumptions upon which the argumentum ad hominem is based generally include (1) the belief that flawed persons are not credible or logical or, as well, in a different case, (2) the belief that decent persons are trustworthy and reasonable.
“Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible. … [T]his is … absolutely true where exact certainty is impossible and opinions are divided.” Rh. 1.2.1356a (trans. Roberts)
  • If the grounds for the claim about character or circumstances are logically independent of the antagonist's argument itself, then the claim, not being relevant, can be to be assessed in accordance with other (relevant) reasons. But that would be to miss the point.
  • But, with regard to monotonic reasoning, as James Cargile writes, “[E]vidence that the source of a claim is likely to be wrong is not evidence against the claim. The tendency to overlook this is the essential feature of the ad hominem fallacy. [15]
  • What is relevant to a particular argument depends upon the context within which the argument is proposed. Currently, difficult cases are hashed out in reasoned dialogue, although, it must be admitted, the fallaciousness of many individual occurrences of argumentum ad hominem is in dispute in the current informal fallacy literature.

Defeasible Reasoning

  • Simply criticizing an adversary as a digression from a controversy is not necessarily an ad hominem fallacy unless the personal attack is intended to dismiss the arguments which are unrelated to the adversary's character. [17] Stephen Toulmin states, ”[R]elevance is a substantive matter, to be discussed in science by scientists, in law by lawyers, and so on. There are very few ‘conditions of relevance’ of an entirely general kind that hold good in all fields and forums and apply to apply types of arguments.” [18]

Some Varieties of Ad Hominem : Ad Personam , Ad Feminam , Tu Quoque , Two Wrongs Fallacy, Ex Concessis , and Ex Aliquem

Ngram graph showing historical frequency of argumentum ad hominem and argumentum ad personam in Google books 1700-2008

  • This latter translation may well be part of the reason some recent writers have added the separate fallacy of ad feminam to their list of informal fallacies [20] , a fallacy sometimes defined as an attack on a woman's character or circumstances in order to cast doubt on her claims.
“Secretary of State John Kerry says that there is less violence than usual in the world right now. Meanwhile the Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, says the opposite, that terrorism is more violent and dangerous than ever. Since Clapper is Director of National Intelligence, maybe Kerry should have the title Director of National Stupidity.“ [21]
“Excessive pride and envy have destroyed Jean-Jacques, my illustrious philosopher. That monster dares speak of education! He abandoned his children and the tramp with whom he made them.” [22]
  • Unfortunately, the ad personam fallacy has not been consistently used and defined from an historical point of view. The ad personam is often defined as an abandonment of the object of argument for an appeal to personal interest or the interest of interested observers.
  • Schopenhauer designates our contemporary sense of the “ ad hominem ” abusive informal fallacy, where the object of a dispute is cast aside and its proponent is attacked, an “ad personam.” [23] And James H. Hyslop defines the ad personam as any argument not directed correctly to the issue ( i.e. , it's not an argumentum ad rem , an argument directed to the point in dispute). Thus, Hyslop defines the ad personam as including these five types of traditional fallacies: the ad judicium , ad populum , ad hominem , ad verecundiam , and ad ignorantiam . [24]

Informal Guide to Tu Quoque

Person L proffers negative claim y against person M .

Person M retorts the same negative claim y applies against person L .

Person M is exonerated.

Ngram graph showing historical frequency of argumentum ad hominem and tu quoque in Google books 1700-2008

  • In cross examination or in debate, the tu quoque fallacy is sometimes depicted as “My argument might be bad, but yours is worse.” Thus, the conversational implication is my argument is good by way of comparison. Note that this fallacy is usually only rhetorically effective in the presence of a third party. [26]
  • If the basis of dispute is the criticism of a someone's argument, the fallacy can be summarized as “O.K., I understand your criticism of my contention, but the same criticism you point out applies to your thinking as well.” As Aristotle wrote, “[F]or it is the absurdity of impudence to arraign others for the very same things of which we ourselves have been guilty,” [27] and again, “The second way is, when a defender discredits his accuser, by retorting his own accusations.” [28]
“In the discussion after a Forum lecture in Boston, an address on some aspect of the Woman question, a man in the gallery, who evidently took exception to a dull rose fillet I wore in my hair, demanded to know how women could expect to equal men ‘so long as they took so much time fixing up their hair and putting ribbons in it’? There was some commotion, and cries of ‘Put him out!’ but I grinned up at him cheerfully and replied, ‘I do not think it has been yet established whether it takes a woman longer to do her hair than it does a man to shave.’ This was not an answer at all, but it seemed to please every one but the inquirer.” [29]
  • The imputation of tu quoque can be defended by pointing out essential differences between the accusation of the arguer and the accusation of the critic. However, the supposed difference of transgressions can only be determined individually by sorting out the transgressions.
  • Since the relationships among the ad hominem circumstantial, the tu quoque and the two wrongs fallacy are classified differently in the current logic literature, it's perhaps prudent not to insist upon distinct definitions.
  • Usually, however, in the two wrongs fallacy, the first wrong is not taken as an ad hominem recrimination, whereas in the tu quoque fallacy, the initial wrong is taken as an ad hominem attack. [30]
“His excuse, such as it was, had not even the merit of novelty, although he pleaded that he sold pirated music on principle and not for profit! He said that there was a music right in London, which certainly paid royalties to authors who could command their prices, but they said nothing of the small authors, whom they bled for all they were worth. The charge for music was extortionate and exorbitant, but he had no wish to rob an author, who had a right to the value of his work. [31]

Informal Guide to Ex Concessis

Person L proffers claim c .

Person L previously held view d inconsistent with claim c

Claims c and d cannot both be true.

Moreover, as in rhetorical arguments, so likewise also in refutations, you ought to look for contradictions between the answerer's views and either his own statements or the views of those whose words and actions he admits to be right, or of those who are generally held to bear a like character and to resemble them, or of the majority or of all mankind. [32]
“[An] octogenarian professor from the University of Texas named Lino Graglia … dutifully informed the committee that ‘a law ending birthright citizenship should and likely would survive constitutional challenge.’ But consider the source: [he is] a man who by his own account takes ‘a very limited view of the power of the Supreme Court‘ and breezily dismisses contrary precedents.” [34]
“When it [ i.e. an argument] is built upon the profest [ i.e. , professed] Principles or Opinions of the Person with whom we argue, whether these Opinions be true or false, it is named Argumentum ad Hominem , an Address to our profest Principles .” [36]
“[T]he conclusion which actually is established, is not the absolute and general one in question, but relative and particular; … that ‘ this man is bound to admit it, in conformity to his principles of Reasoning, or in consistency with his own conduct, situation,’ &c.” [37]
“Ye shall keep the sabbath therefore: for it is holy unto you: every one that defileth it shall surely be put to death: for whosoever doeth any work therein, that soul shall be cut off from among his people.” [39]
“ 2 And, behold there was a certain man before him which had the dropsy. 3 And Jesus answering spake unto the lawyers and Pharisees, saying, Is it lawful to heal on the sabbath day? 4 And they held their peace. And he took him , and healed him, and let him go; 5 And answered them, saying, Which of you shall have an ass or an ox fallen into a pit, and will not straightaway pull him out on the sabbath day? 6 And they could not answer him again to these things.” [40]
  • So, in this use of ex concessis argumentum ad hominem , Moses Stuart points out in 1829, “[W]hat is called the argumentum ad hominem or the argumentum ex concessis … the argument is not conclusive in itself, its conclusiveness would be admitted by those who admitted what is implied in the premises.” [41]
  • The ex concessis form of the fallacy is committed when an interlocutor states that his opponent's argument must be mistaken because his opponent has previously given an argument or taken a position which is inconsistent with the present argument or position. But the fact that the opponent might, at one time, have believed something different from what the present argument provides, does not necessarily imply the present argument or claim is mistaken as a matter of fact.
  • Schopenhauer clarifies another variant of this form of fallacious reasoning: “Should your opponent be in the right, but luckily for your contention, choose a faulty proof, you can easily manage to refute it, and then claim you have refuted his whole position. This trick … is, at bottom, an expedient by which an argumentum ad hominem is put forward … ” [42]
  • Obviously, even if the opponent concedes the view, the view has not been proved to be the case. In this form ex concessis , the argument is directed to the opponent, but the opponent is not being attacked.
  • For example, W.E. Taylor notes Bishop Joseph Butler's analogies are an “ argumentum ad hominem in defense of miracles and Biblical inconsistencies as they “show indeed that his own conclusions are capable of valid proofs even on the principles laid down by his [naturalistic] opponents.” [43]

Fallacies Related to ad Hominem : Personal, Attack, Name Calling, Poisoning the Well, Guilt by Association, Genetic Fallacy

“We hold that the deceitful and vacuous writings presented by Lyotard, and by many of his fellow postmodernists, are texts that purposely lead their readers to stray into errancy. … Often, they reject all and any truth, and merely spread ignorance and mendacity. Hence, these deceitful vacuous writings belong in the dustbin of history!” [44]
  • For the name-calling fallacy to occur, the critic must have used irrelevant name calling as a reason for doubting the advocate's argument or conclusion. Thus, any evidence of the name's propriety is not necessarily evidence against the argument or conclusion itself.
“Justice Antonin Scalia was right. Not about gay marriage, of course. Scalia is so antediluvian he has trouble forcing himself to call it by its proper name.” [45]
“Politicians and lawyers pretend they are important people doing important work, but often they're important because they are parasites. They feed off others, while creating no wealth of their own. [46]

Poisoning the Well Informal Guide

Person L proclaims person M has an objectionable standpoint or associations.

Person M 's claims are implausible or unlikely.

“The poisonous rancour of Norman Tebbit is nothing new, but even their lordships gasped at his complaint about ‘looking after foreigners and not the British.’” [49]
“Michael closed his eyes as if to shut out the world around him. ‘You'll never understand what it means to swear allegiance to the flag and to your country. You'll never understand what it means to be a soldier.’ [Samantha] ‘You're right, Michael, I don't understand, and I will never understand why men have to kill each other. It is beyond my comprehension why you had to fight in this useless war. A war that is so wrong and should have never happened.’” [50]
Mary : Your views on limited government can have no possible standing because you're a Republican, and it's a view all Republicans are necessarily possessed by. John : Well, of course, you cannot understand the need for a limited government since that wouldn't support your own interests as a Democrat.

Informal Guide to Guilt (or Honor) By Association

Person L has qualities in common with disreputable (or reputable, if by honor) group G .

Person L 's character is disreputable (or reputable, if by honor) or claim c is implausible (or plausible, if by honor).

Communists are in favor of government housing. Sen. Taft is in favor of government housing. Therefore Sen. Taft is a Communist.
“[Rep. Michele] Bachmann has raised questions about Huma Abedin, a Muslim-American, who is deputy chief of staff to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Bachmann's concern is Abedin's relatives in the Middle East some of whom — such as Abedin's mother — she claims ‘are connected to Muslim Brotherhood operatives and/or organizations.’ Abedin's job, according to Bachmann, ‘affords her routine access to the secretary and to policy making.’ And, as a result of that access, says Bachmann, ‘the State Department, and in several cases, the specific direction of the secretary of state, have taken actions recently that have been enormously favorable to the Muslim Brotherhood and its interests.’” [54]

Informal Structure of Genetic Fallacy

Standpoint or circumstance x is the historical source of conception or claim y .

Standpoint or circumstance x is unsatisfactory in some way.

[Standpoint or circumstance x or its aspects are irrelevant to understanding the conception or claim y .]

“Would one regard a theorem in mathematics less praiseworthy because its discoverer was uneducated, or otherwise disreputably credentialed?” [56]
“Alfred Russell Wallace reportedly conceived the principle of natural selection while in a delirium; to dismiss the theory of evolution of that basis would be to commit the genetic fallacy. Postmodernists who reject scientific claims to knowledge on the grounds that those claims emerged from the hegemonic discourse of a powerful elite are likewise guilty of the genetic fallacy.” [57]
“[C]onsciousness is constituted by neural events and does not have to intervene in neural processes because consciousness is a neural process.” [58]
“The classic mind-brain identity theory, according to which pain is necessarily C-fiber stimulation, does not allow for pain to be anything other than C-fiber stimulation.” [59]
“Nagel does not merely ask for an explanation of how our powers of reasoning come to exist, and how they came to work as well as they do, but also asks that the evolutionary story give us ‘grounds for trusting’ them. This is a demand, though, that no evolutionary account needs to meet. [60]
“The act of discovery escapes logical analysis; there are no logical rules in terms of which a ‘discovery machine’ could be constructed that would take over the creative function of the genius. But it is not the logician's task to account for scientific discoveries; all he can do is to analyze the relation between given facts and a theory presented to him with the claim that it explains these facts. In other words, logic is concerned only with the context of justification.” [61]
“The question how it happens that a new idea occurs to a man … may be of great interest to empirical psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical analysis of scientific knowledge. This latter is concerned not with question of fact … but on with questions of justification or validity .” [62]
  • Reichenbach and Popper, notwithstanding, in some arguments factors in the context of discovery are relevant to the import of the conclusion. Often discoveries are made solely by logical reasoning in mathematics and the theoretical sciences. As well, justification in various modes of inquiry often evolves as addition data is adduced. Falsification by means of further discovery can alter theoretical conclusions. In such cases, a premise stating a relationship between discovery and theory can be correctly part of the context of justification. Obviously, such genetic arguments as these require valuation on a case-by-case basis.
  • E.g. , the evolutionary and historical origins of some psychological, religious, political, or ethical metaphysical doctrines can be rendered less likely since they are satisfactorily accounted for on empirical principles and the principle of simplicity. This includes using the historical origins of fields of inquiry such as the varieties of conflicting religious beliefs, and interpretation of doctrines; altered states of consciousness and mystical, out-of-body, and deja vu experiences; varieties of conflicting political systems; as well as biological origins of some ethical and epistemological intuition. [63]
(1) the fact–norm distinction, (2) the discovery–justification distinction, (3) the conceptual–empirical distinction, and, following Quine [64] , (4) the analytic–synthetic distinction.
“ Genetic Fallacy : The misapplication of the genetic method resulting in the depreciatory appraisal of the product of a historical or evolutionary process because of its lowly origin. Genetic Method : Explanation of things in terms of their origin or genesis.” [66]
  • Kim Sterelny concludes: “[T]he so-called ‘genetic fallacy’ (the erroneous supposition that a defect in the genesis of something is evidence that discredits the thing itself) need be no fallacy. A causal account of the origins and maintenance of belief can undermine that belief's rational warrant.” [67]
  • The structure or correctness of a conception or argument is not necessarily logically independent of the prevailing conditions under which it came to be discovered. Sometimes the understanding of a conception is constitutively reliant on the circumstances of its discovery and development. Thus, a historically descriptive account of how a judgment commences is sometimes essentially relevant to the epistemological status of that judgment. In general, if the argument involves a justification for a person's belief, then how that person arrived at that belief can be relevant. However, if the argument is about the truth of the belief, then how that person arrived at that belief is unlikely to be relevant.
“John Stacy … made the connection between the radical power of Byron's poetics and his Satanic as well as melancholic genius. Accusing Byron of a ‘misanthropy run mad,’ of trying ‘to make the world believe he is miserable, and to persuade it to be as miserable as himself’, the author writes ‘I grant him genius …, an eloquence of poetry …’” 68]
“From the start the reactions to Orientalism , ranging from the ad hoc to the ad hominem , read into Said the critic as well and as poorly as into what the critic was saying. Said's origins and political activism as an Arab-American intellectual can hardly be left out of analysis.” [69]
  • A fallacy might occur in passages such as these if the work were to be considered misguided and discredited solely because of the degenerate character and circumstances of the author. The essential question in judging whether or not an ad hominem argument is a fallacy is whether or not the author's character and circumstances are logically relevant to the assertions or the arguments in the work itself.
“If [Thomas] Jefferson's relationship with [Sally] Hemings began in the late 1780's, it would mean that he began to back away from a leadership position in the anti-slavery movement just around the time that his affair with Sally Hemings started. Jefferson's stated reservations about ending slavery included a fear that emancipation would lead to racial mixing and amalgamation. His own interracial affair now personalizes this issue, while adding a dimension of hypocrisy.” [70]
“Turning attention away from the facts in argument to the people participating in them is characteristic not only of everyday discussions but of many of our political debates as well. Rather than discuss political issues soberly, rivals may find it easier to discuss personalities and engage in mudslinging.” [71]
“The implication is clear. Attacking one's opponent is by definition a fallacy.” [72]
“BLONDEL ( indignantly ).—You are not one of my century, or you would not be so discourteous. Sir, you are an anachronism. TELL.—Sir, you are another.” [73]
“The history of philosophy is a clash of human temperaments. … Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries, when philosophizing, to sink the fact of his temperament. … Yet his temperament really gives him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective premises. …I think you will practically recognize the two types of mental make-up that I mean … by the titles ‘tender-minded’ and ‘tough-minded’ respectively.” [74]
  • Bias, interest, and motive
  • Prior inconsistent statements
  • Contradictory facts
  • Prior convictions
  • Character for untruthfulness
  • Conduct probative of untruthfulness
  • Learned Treatises (other admissible statements, e.g. testimony of an expert witness) [75]
  • In brief, if the characteristics of a person constitute a disconfirming instance of what that person claims, then an argumentum ad hominem is not a fallacious. If the person making a claim individually embodies a counterexample which disproves that person's own claim, then it is not a fallacy to point out this fact to that person. At the same time, many ad hominem arguments provide some evidence and in those cases cannot be considered completely irrelevant arguments.

The Ad Hominem Argument in Rhetoric

  • On this view, in most everyday contexts of reasoning, validity or formal inductive plausibility is thought out of place. Nevertheless, ad hominem considerations, it is argued, do render some evidence, however weak, and so should not be thereby presupposed to be impertinent. [76] This standpoint serves to emphasize the constitutive contextual nature of informal fallacy identifications.
An inquiry that assumes a hierarchical structure, in which reasoning proceeds linearly from propositions that are well known to propositions that are less well known, is ill-equipped to accommodate the reasoning strategies that occur in contexts of knowledge deprivation and epistemic uncertainty. [78]
“[T]he most appropriate occurrences (and probably most actual occurrences) of the ad hominem — especially in the public sphere — are to be found in contexts which are in the appropriate ways analogous to the contexts of classical oratory. It is most obviously (although not exclusively) in deliberative contexts that the ad hominem has a place and should be regarded as an acceptable form of argument. These are contexts in which there is a concern with matters of policy and practice.” [79]

Ad Hominem Examples with Explanation

The following examples of the argumentum ad hominem are fairly straight-forward and suggested answers are explained. In each case, note whether or not the character and/or circumstances of the individual being depicted are germane to the claims made.

Ad Hominem Examples

  • “Condoleezza Rice, former U.S. Secretary of State, responding to a question about former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's criticism of her in his memoir: ‘Don can be a grumpy guy. We all know that.’” [80] Comment : Rather than addressing Mr. Rumsfeld's criticism, Ms. Rice ignores the question, imputes ill-temper to him, and thereby commits the ad hominem fallacy.
  • “[W]hen consultant/pundit/Democrat Hilary Rosen commented on CNN that Ann Romney had never held a job (and therefore was ill-suited to advise her husband on women's employment concerns), … the Catholic League … tweeted: ‘Lesbian Dem Hilary Rosen tells Ann Romney she never worked a day in her life. Unlike Rosen, who had to adopt kids, Ann raised 5 of her own.’” [81] Comment : The allusion as to whether reared children are adopted or not is not directly relevant in the context provided for the purpose of deliberating women's employment concerns; thus, the ad hominem fallacy occurs.
  • “In America, the go-to guy on ADHD is Dr. Russell Barkley … Barkley is on record saying that although behavior therapy (behavior modification) can be a useful supplementary treatment, no approach to ADHD has ever or is probably ever going to completely replace pharmaceutical therapy. In this regard it is significant to note that Barkley has had ties to … the developer of the popular ADHD drug Strattera.” [82] Comment : Normally the evidence for the truth or falsity of the claim would be, strictly speaking, independent of Dr. Barkley's past connections. However, Dr. Barkley's expertise cannot be entirely disregarded since his testimony and experience is relevant to the issue being discussed. Although biased innuendo is expressed against Dr. Barkley in the original dialogue, this does not necessarily result in an informal fallacy being committed since the fact of much of Dr. Barkley's background is relevant. Nevertheless, this consideration does not entirely justify Dr. Barkley assessment. The best that can be said is that calling attention to Dr. Barkley's association with the developer of an ADHD drug is uncharitable without explaining what those ties are.
  • ”President Trump is apparently convinced that his son-in-law, who serves officially as a senior adviser, can fix anything. Make that everything . … Kushner is supposed to bring the mindset and practices of the business world to the public sector. Given that his father went to jail for crimes including tax evasion, and that his boss declared four businesses bankruptcies, we can only hope Kushner looks far afield for role models.” [83] Comment : The implicit argument is that Jared Kushner is unlikely to be successful in his duties by the reasons that his father is a felon and Donald Trump declared bankruptcies. Hence, the ad hominem circumstantial fallacy (guilt by association) is committed.
  • “Once he [Benjamin F. Butler] was cross-questioning a witness in his characteristic manner (with him politeness, or even humanity, was out of the question). The judge interrupted to remind him that the witness was a Harvard professor. ‘I know it, your Honor,’ replied Butler; ‘we hanged one of them the other day.’” [84] Comment : Mr. Butler argues that his rude cross examination of a Harvard professor is unexceptional since a Harvard professor was hanged recently — implying the witness' character is determinable by association with other Harvard professors. Again, the ad hominem circumstantial fallacy (guilt by association) is committed.
  • ”[ The New York Times ] chronicled the enormous benefits French citizens receive. Paid child care, free higher education, free health care, a mandatory five weeks of paid vacation, monthly government payments for each child … There comes a point when ideology has to be put aside and what's good for the country must be embraced. France is a selfish nation that is going down the drain economically because the folks there want stuff and economics be damned.” [85] Comment : Although the author of this passage, Mr. O'Reilly, provides cogent reasons that government regulation and high taxes are part of an unsustainable economy, assessing reasons for this conclusion by attacking the character of the French people as wanting stuff, not caring about economics, and being selfish, is not directly relevant: ad hominem abusive.
  • “Marvin Greenberg … spent many painful years in the garment business. As he sees it, consumers willing to pay more for better — and American — made clothes will remain a definite minority. The vast shopping public demands basement-scraping prices on two-for-one deals. Patriotism ends at the cash register. He's seen it happen. ‘Back in the '50's there was a union protest in Fall River (Mass.) about saving jobs, stopping imports,’ Greenberg recalls. ‘People carrying signs were wearing imported clothes.’” [86] Comment : Assuming an implicit argument, the conversational implication is that Americans will not pay more for American apparel good because even American garment workers themselves do not do so. Also the reasoning is based on one group of workers to a conclusion about all Americans and the fallacy of converse accident is suggested. Nevertheless, the implicit argument qualifies as a weak inductive argument rather than a clear fallacy.
  • “The recent hype about global warming comes from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Most of its members are serious scientists. But reporters don't realize that those scientists, like bird flu specialists, have every incentive to hype the risk. If their computer models (which so far have been wrong) predict disaster, they get attention and money. If they say, “I'm not sure,” they get nothing.” [87] Comment : The ad hominem fallacy occurs since Mr. Stossel ignores the empirical issues relating to global warming by claiming that the conclusions of the scientists on the Intergovermental Panel are not as much based on empirical evidence as they are based upon scientists attempting to secure recognition and government funding.
  • “Actress Salma Hayek has just been honoured at Equality Now's ‘Make Equality Reality’ event, for co-founding ‘Chime for Change’, which fights for women's rights around the world. At the ceremony, which also honoured Gloria Steinem, Hayek said: ’I am not a feminist. If men were going through the things women are going through today, I would be fighting for them with just as much passion. I believe in equality.‘ … This is about the astonishing persistence of what I'd term small-f feminist-woman. … The kind of woman, such as Hayek, who accepts an award for helping women at an event also honouring Gloria Steinem (Gloria Steinem!) and then has the graceless gall to use it as an opportunity to announce that she isn't a feminist … You have to wonder — what's with these women and their seemingly all-consuming need to distance themselves from feminism? An unworthy thought crawls through my brain: is this a man-pleasing exercise … Or does it go yet deeper, darker, than that, into the realms of female self-hatred? … While some may view this as an overreaction to some red carpet waffling, to me, this is about small-f feminist-woman and how her unique brand of self-hatred is taking far too long to die out.” [88] Comment : In addition to the verbal disagreement concerning the meaning of feminism, Ms. Hayek is accused of either “man pleasing” behavior or “female self-hatred” for her statement that she is not a feminist. That restriction, in itself, poses a false dilemma . The journalist commits an ad hominem abusive attack decorated with a persuasive definition and the fallacy of complex question .
  • “Norman Vincent Peale, a broadcast preacher and author of The Power of Positive Thinking … said [Adlai] Stevenson was unfit to be president because he was divorced. Stevenson said: “I find the Apostle Paul appealing and the Apostle Peale appalling.” [89] Comment : Mr. Peale and Mr. Stevenson both commit the fallacy of ad hominem . Mr. Peale's personal attack turns on a non causa pro causa (that being divorced is a cause a being unfit for the presidency), and Mr. Stevenson's attack turns on name-calling.
  • Huey Long (Louisiana senator, 1935): “[L]et us take a look at this NRA [Roosevelt's 1933 National Recovery Administration] that they opened up around here two years ago. They had parades and Fascist signs just as Hitler, and Mussolini. They started the dictatorship here to regiment business and labor much more than anyone did in Germany or Italy. The only difference was in the sign. Italy's sign of he Fascist was a black shirt. Germany's sign of the Fascist was a swastika. So in America they sidetracked the Stars and Stripes, and the sign of the Blue Eagle was used instead. And they proceeded with the NRA.‘ [90] Comment : Huey Long, politician and populist, poisons the well by associating the Roosevelt administration with Fascists Hitler and Mussolini in order to castigate the National Recovery Administration, a New Deal agency. However, Long's analogue is not totally misguided as in the same year this speech was broadcast, the Supreme Court ruled the NRA unconstitutional since it violated the Constitution's separation of powers.
  • “Traditional empiricism insists that the social identity of the observer is irrelevant to the ‘goodness’ of the results of research. It is not supposed to make a difference to the explanatory power, objectivity, and so on of the research's results if the researcher or the community of scientists are white or black, Chinese or British, rich or poor in social origin. But feminist empiricism argues that women (or feminists, male and female) as a group are more likely than men (non-feminists) as a group to produce claims unbiased by androcentrism, and in that sense objective results of inquiry. It argues that the authors of the favored social theories are not anonymous at all: they are clearly men, and usually men of the dominant classes, races, and cultures. The people who identify and define scientific problems leave their social fingerprints on the problems and their favored solutions to them.” [91] Comment : Certainly the claim that feminists as a group are more likely than nonfeminists to be unbiased by androcentrism ( i.e. , taking a masculine point of view) is trivially true. Nonetheless, the conclusion drawn that feminists are more likely to produce objective claims of inquiry than those produced by traditional empiricism does not logically follow from this tautology. Further evaluation of this argumentative passage depends to a great extent on the context of the presentation and the background assumptions upon which the argument is based. Nevertheless, the author argues that feminists, unlike nonfeminists, are not androcentric and thus produce claims which are objective results of inquiry. Since the adequacy of scientific theories is measured in part by comparison of observed results to expected results (an independent confirmation whose veracity is not dependent upon whether or not the originators of the hypotheses in question happen to be androcentric or gynocentric), the genetic fallacy occurs in this quoted selected passage. Note that biased selections of empirical observations in order to present specific points of view, whether complied intentionally or unintentionally, are precluded by traditional empiricism as improper scientific method. Additionally, scientific theories and hypotheses are repeatedly experimentally tested in accordance with procedural methods in observation and experiment as part of the normal course of scientific development. Thus, there is a justifiable “logical distinction between the psychological processes which occur when a scientist thinks of new ideas and the logical argument which exhibits the degree to which those ideas are supported by the facts and other evidential considerations.” [92]

Links to Ad Hominem Online Quizzes with Suggested Solutions

Test your understanding of ad hominem arguments with one of the the following quizzes: Ad Hominem Examples Exercise Fallacies of Relevance I Fallacies of Relevance II Fallacies of Relevance III

Note : Most text hyperlinks below reference exact page

1. Many textbooks state the argumentum ad hominem fallacy as concluding the opponent's case is false, but the non-deductive intent of such arguments makes the ad hominem “an inferential failure” whether the opponent's claim is called unproved or thought to be false. John Woods, ” Lightening Up on the Ad Hominem ,” Informal Logic 27 no. 1 (2007), 124-125. doi: 10.22329/il.v27i1.467 ↩

2. Alan Koepcke, “ Aristocratic Agriculture ,” Baron's 92 no. 43 (October 22, 2012), 54. ↩

3. George F. Will, “ The Man Who helped Kill the Soviet Union with Information ,” The Index-Journal 98 no. 164 (August 10, 2015), 6A. ↩

4. E.g. , see Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen, Introduction to Logic , 13th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2009), 130-131. ↩

5. Charles W. Fuller, “ Argument of Col. Charles W. Fuller ,” Arguments on Assembly Bill No. 366 Before the Committee on Municipal Corporations Transcript of Stenographer's Notes 66. (New York: Burgoyne, 1888), 66. ↩

6. Warren Choate Shaw, The Art of Debate (Boston: Allyn and Bacon 1922), 116. ↩

7. E.g. , see Patrick Bondy, “ Virtues, Evidence, and Ad Hominem Arguments, ” Informal Logic 35 no. 4 (2015), 450-466. doi: 10.22329/il.v35i4.4330 ↩

8. Douglas Walton, Witness Testimony Evidence: Argumentation, Artificial Intelligence, and Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 23-4. doi: 10.1017/cbo9780511619533.002 ↩

9. Christopher Johnson, “ Reconsidering the Ad Hominem, ” Philosophy 84 no. 2 (April 2009), 265. (via registration access) doi: 10.1017/S0031819109000217 ↩

10. Merilee Salmon, Introduction to Logic and Critical Thinking , 5th ed. (Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth, 2007), 121. (preview) ↩

11. Christian Dahlman, David Reidhav, and Lena Wahlberg, “ Fallacies in Ad Hominem Arguments ” Cogency 3 no. 2 (Summer 2011), 105-124. Also in C. Dahlman, E. Feteris, eds, Legal Argumentation Theory: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives Law and Philosophy Library vol. 102 (Dordrecht, Netherlands: 2013), 57-70. doi: 10.1007/978-94-007-4670-1_4 ↩

12. See, for example, David M. Godden, “ Deductivism as an Interpretive Strategy: A Reply to Groarke's Recent Defense of Reconstructive Deductivism ,” Argumentation and Advocacy 41 (Winter 2005), 168-183. doi: 10.1080/00028533.2005.11821627 ↩

13. Note that this definition of argumentum ad hominem departs from most current logic and critical thinking textbooks which still follow Roy Wood Sellars' influential and originating definition: “In this fallacy the argument is directed against the character of the man who is the opponent instead of adhering to its proper task of proving the point at issue.” Sellars insightfully points out, “[S]uch arguments … are more non-logical than illogical.” Roy Wood Sellars, Essentials of Logic (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1917), 153. ↩

14. Douglas Walton, “ The Ad Hominem Argument as an Informal Fallacy ,” Argumentation 1 no. 3 (1987), 320. doi: 10.1007/bf00136781 ↩

15. James Cargile, “ Two Fallacies .” Logos & Episteme 1 no. 2 (2010), 267. doi: 10.5840/logos-episteme2010124 . Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst rightly point out that in the standard treatment of fallacies, “[T]he notion of logical relevance is left undefined and its connection with logical validity remains unexplained.” [Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, “ Argumentum Ad Hominem: A Pragma-Dialectical Case in Point ,” Fallacies: Classical and Contemporary Reading eds. Hans V. Hansen and Robert C. Pinto (University Park: Penn State Press, 1995), 223]. Argumentum ad hominem examples are not deductive arguments, and logical validity needs no explanation. Even so, an adequate explanation of relevancy remains a genuine problem for the standard treatment of informal fallacies. Eemeren and Grootendorst also distinguish ad hominem arguments as being rhetorical rather than dialectical since their effectiveness depends upon the presence of an audience “in order to silence the other party.” [Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Foris Publications,1984), 191. doi: 10.1515/9783110846089.177 ] ↩

16. A number of approaches for a theory of relevance in informal logic is discussed in the Derek Allan's section “Assessing Arguments” in New Essays in Informal Logic , eds. Ralph H. Johnson and J. Anthony Blair (Windsor, ON: Informal Logic, 1994), 51ff. And Frans H. van Eemeren and Bob Gootendorst develop an understanding of argumentative relevance within a pragma-dialectical approach to the argumentum ad hominem in “ Relevance Reviewed: The Case of Argumentum ad Hominem .” Argumentation 6 no. 2 (May 1992), 141-159. doi: 10.1007/BF00154322 . Here, relevance in oral or written discourse is described as a functional relation of elements among the interactional intention of disputants as is evident in interrelated speech acts, rather than as a relation among the statements in the discourse, itself, as is normally regarded in the traditional logo-centric view of informal logic. ↩

17. E.g. , Douglas Watson writes,“It is a requirement of an argument being an ad hominem argument, that it be a personal attack used to undermine the argument of the other party … Attacking someone's integrity, or even calling that person a liar or a hypocrite, for example, is not necessarily an ad hominem argument.” Douglas Walton, Character Evidence: an Abductive Theory (Dordecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2006), 99. doi: 10.1007/1-4020-4943-9 ↩

18. Stephen Toulmin, Richard Reike and Allan Janik. An Introduction to Reasoning (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.: 1997), 117. ↩

19. The characterization of the argumentum ad personam has a checkered history: (1) In this example use from a parliamentary debate in 1884, the phrase is employed as a synonym for argumentum ad hominem : “… the speech of the honourable member for Selwyn, which was nothing but a constant application of the principle of the argumentum ad hominem , or the argumentum ad personam . It is nothing but a tissue of sneers and jeers and ridicule …” [J. Holmes, “Supply: Resumed Debate,” New Zealand Parliamentary Debates: Legislative Council and House of Representatives 48 (Wellington: New Zealand: G. Didsbury, 1884), 502.] (2) Schopenhauer states in reference to the ad personam , “[I]n becoming personal you leave the subject altogether, and turn your attack to his person, by remarks of an offensive and spiteful character.” [Arthur Schopenhauer, The Art of Controversy and Other Posthumous Papers (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1896), 46.] (3) Schopenhauer, however, regards the Ad personam and the ad hominem as different fallacies. Few logicians and rhetoricians today follow his separation of these two fallacies. He restricts the ad personam to the personal attack and the ad hominem to the ex concessis . Schopenhauer, “ Art of Controversy ,” 46.] Bentham terms this version of the argumentum ad personam the argumentum ad odium . [Jeremy Bentham, Plan of Parlimentary Reform in The Works of Jeremy Bentham ed. John Bowring III (Edinburgh: William Tait, 1838), 499.] (4) The ad personam fallacy also has been occasionally defined as appealing to the personal interests of someone in order persuade someone to accept an argumentative claim. I.e. , rather than directing an argument towards the issue at hand ( argumentum ad rem ), the argument is directed toward an issue which might influence a particular opponent ( argumentum ad personam. In this regard, as stated in the text above, J.H. Hyslop includes the ad judicium , ad populum , ad hominem , ad verecundiam and ad ignorantiam arguments as five forms of the argumentum ad personam [James Hervey Hyslop, Logic and Argument New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1907), 176]. J.L Mackies simply defines ad personam as “an appeal to personal interest.” [J. L. Mackie, “Fallacies,” The Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 3: 178]. In general use, today, however, ad hominem and ad personam are used synonymously. See for example Douglas N. Watson, Informal Fallacies: Towards a Theory of Argument Criticisms (Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins Publishing, 1987), 6. Writers citing ad personam for this reason include Richard Fulkerson, Teaching the Argument in Writing (National Council of Teachers of English: 1996) 119; Elmar Waibl and Philip Herdina, Dictionary of Philosophical Terms (K.G. Saur—Routledge, 1997), I:21; and Oxford Latin Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 800. ↩

Ngram graph showing historical frequency of ad feminam and argumentum ad feminam in Google books

“ argumentum ad hominem , ad feminam , lit. ‘the argument to a man, to a woman,’ refutation of a man's argument by an example drawn from his own conduct.” Sir Walter Scott, Redgauntlet (London: Oxford University Press, 1912), 501.

In accordance with the proliferation of fallacies in the last fifty years, the argumentum ad feminam in the sense of attempting to discredit a woman's claim by appeal to her character or circumstances may well become mainstream. If so, then recognition might follow, as it has recently with the ad hominem , that the ad feminam argument would not be necessarily fallacious by definition. ↩

21. Thomas Sowell, “Random Thoughts on the Passing Scene,” Index-Journal 97 no. 14 (March 5. 2015), 6A. This example of the abusive ad hominem is sometimes called the name calling fallacy. ↩

22. T. Besterman, “Voltaire to d'Alembert, 17 June 1762,” Voltaire's Correspondence XLIX (Geneva: Institute et Musée Voltaire, 1953-1977), 34. ↩

23. Schopenhauer, Art of Controversy , 27-8. ↩

24. James H. Hyslop, Logic and Argument (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899), 174. ↩

25. Although tu quoque is normally classified as a version of the ad hominem , Douglas Walton points out that not all tu quoque arguments are subspecies of ad hominem arguments. [Douglas Walton, The Place of Emotion in Argument (University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1992), 212.] However the niceties of sharp distinctions and subtypes existing between informal fallacies cannot be maintained. The content of arguments is not subject to precise distinction, and intrinsically some degree of vagueness and open texture of expression always persists. ↩

26. Tu quoque arguments are intrinsically rhetorical rather than dialectical since their effectiveness depends on the presence of spectators. F.H. van Eemeren and R. Grootendorst, Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions (Dordrecht; Cinnaminson, N.J., Foris Publications: 1984), 191. ↩

27. Aristotle, A New Translation of Aristotle's Rhetoric , trans. John Gillies (London: T. Cadell, 1823), 339. ↩

28. Aristotle, Rhetoric , 339. ↩

29. Charlotte Perkins Gilman, The Living of Charlotte Perkins Gilman: An Autobiography (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1935), 328. ↩

30. For more on the distinction between the two wrongs fallacy and tu quoque see Douglas Walton's illuminating discussion: Douglas Walton, Ad Hominem Arguments (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1998), 17-20, 26, 61, 69-70, 90-91, 230-237. ↩

31. “Comments on Events,” Music News , 32 no. 846 (18 May 1907), 486. ↩

32. Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations: On Coming-to-Be and Passing-Away 174b19-23 (trans. Loeb). Aristotle also anticipates the consistency aspect of ex concessis arguments in several places in his discussion of examination arguments, dialectical disputation (later termed disputatio temptativa in the Medieval thought). [ Sophistical Refutations 165a39-165b8 (trans. Loeb) and Topics 101a25-7; 161a1-5 (trans. Robin Smith)] The adversary infers an objectionable consequence from a proponent's claim. Douglas Walton has termed this argument “the argument from commmitment” and is, essentially, a purported proof relative to a specific person's previous behavior or beliefs. [Douglas Walton, Ad Hominem Arguments (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1998), 23. Schopenhauer, for example, writes, “Another trick is to use arguments ad hominem or ex concessis . When your opponent makes a proposition, you must try to see whether it is not in some way — it needs be, only apparently — inconsistent with some other proposition which he has made or admitted …” For Schopenhauer “ Ad hominem ” and “ Ad concessis ” are interchangeable terms. Art of Controversy , 27-8. Recently Stéphane Muras explains the justified use of ex concessis showing, “there is an incompatibility between the thesis the adversary is now defending and the thesis he was able to defend previously [in] his words or in his concrete acts.” Stéphane Muras, Manuel de Polémique (Paris: Editions du Relief, 2013), 314. ↩

33. E.g. , see George R. Noyes, ed., A New Translation of he Book of Psalms and of the Proverbs 5th ed. (Boston, American Unitarian Assoc., 1874), 10. ↩

34. Dana Milbank, “ House Republicans Want to Gut Key American Principle,” Index-Journal 97 no. 69 (1 May 2015), 9A. ↩

35. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Vol. 2 (London: Printed for A. Bettesworth …, 1735), IV, Chap. 17, 306. ↩

36. Isaac Watts, Logick: or, The Right Use of Reason in the Enquiry After Truth 3rd. ed.(London: Bible and Crown, 1729), 311. By 1743, Isaac Watts describes this type of ad hominem as follows: “[Y]et if from the principles and concessions of your opponent, you can support your argument … this has been always counted a fair treatment of an adversary, and is called argumentum ad hominem , or ratio ex concessis .” Isaac Watts, The Improvement of the Mind , 2nd. ed. (London: J. Brackstone, 1743), 165-6. Gabriël Nuchelmans in his otherwise very useful early history of the ad hominem notes that David Hartley views the argumentum ad hominem as being “built upon the professed principles of opinions of the person which whom we are arguing” [Nuchelmans, “On the Fourfold Root of the Argumentum Ad Hominem ,” in Empirical Logic and Public Debate: Essays in Honour of Else M. Barth eds. Erik C.S. Krabbe et al. (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1993], 42]; however, this is quite a stretch from Hartley's brief mention of the terms. Hartley describes two arguments depending upon the nature of a human being and “not the natural way of treating the subject” and not a “real argument.” These explicitly named ad hominem arguments are offered in terms of in terms of the generalization of logic from other sciences [David Hartley, Observations on Man , Part 1 (London: J. Johnson, 1749), 359] and in terms of the consistency of national belief from historical writings [David Hartley, Observations on Man , Part 2 (London: J. Johnson, 1749, 85]. Other philosophers describing the ad hominem in terms of the consistency or inconsistency of a person's statements as ex concessis include the following: (1) Augustus De Morgan broadly describes “ argumenta ad hominem ” recrimination of a person advancing an argument and a charge of inconsistency. [Augustus De Morgan, Formal Logic: Or, The Calculus of Inference, Necessary and Probable (London: Taylor and Walton, 1847), 265.] (2) Jeremy Bentham regards the proposition “that men are bound by contracts” and “if one performs not his part, the other is released from his” as an argumentum ad hominem. Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government (London: W. Pickering, 1823, 36.] (3) John Stuart Mill describes an “argument [which] … proves directly the reverse” [John Stuart Mill, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1877), 56] and argues the inconsistency of reasons provided by the Southern white slave-owners in their rebellion against the North with respect to the thirteen colonies in their rebellion against England as ad hominem arguments [John Stuart Mill, The Contest in America, (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1862), 21]. (4) Alexander Bain defines the ad hominem in terms of ex concessis :

It is sometimes shown that an opponent is precluded, by something in his own special position, from the benefit of a principle appealed to by him; a special mode of Refutation by Inconsistency, called the Argumentum ad hominem .

Alexander Bain, English Composition and Rhetoric (New York: D. Appleton, 1867) 240]. And, yet, for Bain, an argumentum ad hominem in this sense can hold good but be fallacious because it relies on presumptive assumption [Alexander Bain, The Minor Works of George Grote (London: J. Murray, 1873), 357]. (6) Charles Sanders Pierce points out, “[An] argumentum ad hominem [is] merely something a man is obliged by his personal interest to admit” [Charles Saunders Peirce, “James's Psychology,” in Writings of Charles S. Peirce vol. 8 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 231]. So, for example, when discussing true continuity in pure mathematics when he assumes a hypothesis independently of its accordance with fact and attempts to avoid the argumentum ad hominem that a conception of true continuity is not, for that reason, a definite conception [Charles S. Pierce, “Topical Geometry,” in The New Elements of Mathematics vol. 2, ed. Carolyn Eisele (The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1976), 483]. (7) Bertrand Russell defines the ad hominem argument as not necessarily being fallacious since one “assume[s] premisses granted by … opponents, and to show that, granting these premisses, it is possible to deduce consequences which … opponents must deny.” He gives the example of Zeno's arguments manifesting contradictions from the supposition of change as ad hominem arguments which might be valid or sophistic depending on “the tacit premissses” and the person “at whom they were aimed” [Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World (Chicago: Open Court, 1914), 168)]. (8)Jean-Jacques Robrieux who describes an “ argumentum ad hominem as argumentum ad concessis ” as:

“á raisonner avec un interlocuteur ou un auditoire sur la base de ses convictions propres, de ses préjugés, et non sur celle des jugements universels,” [ I.e. , “reasoning with an interlocutor or an audience on the basis of his own convictions, his prejudices, and not on that of universal judgments.”]

Jean-Jacques Robrieus, Éléments de Rhétorique et d'Argumentation (Dunod, 1993), 143. ↩

37. Richard Whately, Elements of Logic 2nd. ed (London: W. Clowes, 1827), 191-2. ↩

38. For example, “Upon reading this book [the Pentateuch ], we find it full of prodigies and miracles. … I desire anyone to lay his hand upon his heart, and, after a serious consideration, declare, whether he thinks that the falsehood of such a book, supported by such a testimony, would be more extraordinary and miraculous that all the miracles it relates: which is, however, necessary to make it be received according to the measure of probability above established.” David Hume, An Essay on Miracles (London: J.B. Bebbington, 1861), 19-20. ↩

40. St. Luke 14:2-6 Scofield Reference Bible . The example appears in William and Robert Chambers, Chamber's Information for the People 5th ed. (Philadelphia: Jas. L. Gihon, 1858), 371. This sense of an argumentum ad hominem not as a personal attack but as an argument tailored to another person's own beliefs was used not only as a criticism but also as a support for that other person's contentions in the 17th and 18th century. On the one hand, for example, James Jurin criticizes Sir Isaac Newton's notion in the calculus that infinitesimally small increments initially exist but after forming mathematical expressions they vanish and later do not exist when he concludes:

”[I]t will surely furnish a fair argumentum ad hominem against men, who reject that very thing in Geometry which they admit in Logick. It will be a proper way to abate the pride, and discredit the pretensions of these Logicians and Metaphysicians, who insist upon clear ideas in points of Mathematicks, if it be shewn that they do without them in their own science.“ [italics deleted] The Minute Mathematician: or, the Free-Thinker No Just-Thinker , by Philalethes Cantabrigiensis(London: Printed for T. Cooper, at the Globe in Pater-Nolter-Row, 1735), 95. Also here: Trinity College, Maths ]

So the argumentum ad hominem alleged here is that the method of Newton's calculation where the increments vanish is inconsistent with his original assumption of the existence of increments in the first place. On the other hand, an example of argumentum ad hominem as support for a consistency of belief is shown in this letter to Lord Mansfied by Henry Home:

“[I]f a purchaser from an heir of provision, for example, be secure, why not a purchaser from a gratuitous disponee [the person to whom any property is legally conveyed]? What objection should lie against the purchaser is not obvious, considering that a purchaser even from a notour bankrupt is, in the practice of the court of session, held to be secure; which is at least a good argumentum ad hominem .” [Henry Home, Principles of Equity (Edinburgh: Printed for A. Millar, London, and A. Kincaid & J. Bell, Edinburgh, 1760), 322.]

Henry Home here is arguing that since a purchaser from legitimate heir is just as secure as a purchaser from a bankrupt person who failed to discharge his debt, so likewise a purchaser from a receiver of a gift of the subject of a deed should be just as secure as if he purchased from a person whose property was legally conveyed. The reasoning is consistent with past decisions of the course of sessions and so for this reason, Home concludes, is a “good argumentum ad hominem . (italics in original)” ↩

41. Moses Stuart, “ Review of Stuart on the Epistle to the Hebrews ,” in The Quarterly Christian Spectator 1 no. 1 (New Haven: A.H. Maltby, 1829), 137. ↩

42. Schopenhauer, The Art of Controversy , 45. This mode of argumentation emerged from a different form of ex concessis where one uses the self-same prejudices of an individual in order to convince him something else is true even though one does not recognize the truth of that individual's assumptions. ↩

43. W.E. Taylor, The Ethical and Religious Theories of Bishop Butler (Toronto: Bryant Press, 1908), 59. ↩

44. Hayim Gordon and Rivca Gordon, Heidegger on Truth and Myth: A Rejection of Postmodernism (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 2006), 42. (no access) ↩

45. Eugene Robinson, “Surrender to the Inevitable,” Index-Journal 96 no. 132 (8 Oct. 2014), 8A. ↩

46. John Stossel, “On Parasites: Or, About Lawyers and Politicians,” Index-Journal 95 no. 354 (February 7, 2015), 9A. ↩

47. Just as in all fallacies of relevance, there are times when the recognition of an opponent's deeply rooted prejudice would be a relevant factor in discontinuing an open dialogue. E.g., there would be little advantage in attempting an open and honest political debate with someone espousing the following fixed opinion:

“[W]e must be closed to compromise. No one need try to convince me otherwise. The effort is futile; my conviction is absolute.”

Charles M. Blow, “ The Death of Compassion ,” The New York Times (February 23, 2017) A stance such as this one leads credence to the ad hominem charge of bias since the author is so deeply entrenched in a partisan issue that he refuses to consider any possible evidence for an opposing view. Even so, to some extent, everyone has deeply rooted fixed opinions:

“There is still another kind of prejudice similar to that just considered — namely, the judgments which are born of other minds and which, nevertheless, we come to appropriate as our own. the reasons in which such judgments are grounded we have never examined ourselves — possibly we could never understand even if they were presented to us with elaborate explanation; and yet the second-hand judgments cannot be eliminated wholly from our body of knowledge without an incalculable loss.”

John Grier Hibben, “A Defence of Prejudice,” Scribner's Magazine 43 no. 1 (Jan. 1908), 118.] ↩

48. Douglas Walton argues that poisoning the well, even though having much in common with ad hominem arguments, is best analyzed in terms of argument schemes as as a distinctive fallacy type. He concludes that poisoning the well is a sophistical method associated with several different informal fallacies but is not itself an informal fallacy. Instead, he sees it as a dialectical fallacy in that its function is to obviate further argument. Douglas Walton, “ Poisoning the Well ,” Argumentation 20 no. 3 (September 2006), 273-307. doi: 10.1007/s10503-006-9013-z ↩

49. Ms. Toynbee initiates distrust of Baron Tebbit in advance of his arguments. Polly Toynbee, “ The Lords Exposed the Government's Hypocrisy After Protecting EU Citizens ,” The Guardian . (March 2, 2017). ↩

50. Herbert Grosshans, Web of Conspiracy (White Bear Lake, MN: Mélange Books, 2011), 8. ↩

51. For more on reflexive poisoning-the-well arguments see Douglas Walton, Ad Hominem Arguments (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1998), 231. ↩

52. See Joseph Grcic, “ The Halo Effect Fallacy ,” E-Logos 15 no. 1 (October, 2008), 1-6, for a brief application of E.L. Thorndike “A Constant Error in Psychological Rating,” Journal of Applied Psychology 4 no. 1 (January, 1920), 25-29. doi: 0.1037/h0071663 ↩

53. Stuart Chase, “ Language and Loyalty ,” The Train Dispatcher 32 no. 7 July 1950), 514. ↩

54. Cal Thomas, "Suppose Bachmann Is Right?" Index-Journal 94 no. 95 (2 Aug. 2012), 8A. ↩

55. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (2nd. ed. 1989) Cohen and Nagel first designated the genetic fallacy and classified it as a failure to make proper discrimination between values of the truth of a belief and its origin. [Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method 1934 rpt. (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1968), 88.] According to Steve Fuller, the occasional cause of Cohen and Nagel's stipulative definition is in response to John Dewey's notion that the historical career of an idea is relevant to its evaluation. Steve Fuller, Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History for Our Times (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 83 fn. Nevertheless, versions of the genetic fallacy are described throughout the history of philosophy. John Locke, for example, states:

“For the cause of any sensation, and the sensation itself, in all the simple ideas of one sense, are two ideas; and two ideas so different, and distant one from another, that no two can be more so.”
“I cannot see how the mere ascertainment that a certain class of apparently self-evident judgments has been caused in certain known and determinate ways, can be in itself a valid ground for distrusting such cognitions. I cannot even admit that those who affirm the truth of such judgments are bound to show in their causes a tendency to make them true.” Henry Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics: A Supplement to the Second Edition (London: Macmillan and Co., 1884), 105.
“When someone gives an account of what led someone (or a group) to a view and argues that since this (the account) is true, the view is false, this is called the Genetic Fallacy. ” [J.D. Carney and R.K. Scheer. Fundamentals of Logic (New York: Macmillan, 1964), 32.]

Even so, usually the claim is not that the view under consideration is false — only that the claim has not been proved. ↩

56. Norwood Russell Hanson, “II. The Genetic Fallacy Revisited,” American Philosophical Quarterly 4 no.2 (April 1967), 101. ↩

57. James William Lett, Science, Reason, and Anthropology: The Principles of Rational Inquiry (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield: 1997), 65. ↩

58. Willaim R. Klemm, “Starting Points for Agency Research,” in Constraints of Agency: Explorations of Theory in Everyday Life ed. Craig W. Gruber, et al. (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2015), 127. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-10130-9 ↩

59. Barbara Montero, On the Philosophy of Mind (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2009), 70. ↩

60. Peter Godfrey-Smith, “Not Sufficiently Reassuring.” London Review of Books 35 no.2 (24 Jan. 2013), 20. ↩

61. Hans Reichenbach, The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (1951 Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1968), 231. The distinction between discovery and justification extents to other disciplines as well. In law, for example, Jaap Hage writes, “The context of discovery deals with the psychological side of legal reasoning, while the context of justification concerns the justification of legal conclusion. Jaap Hage, “Legal Reasoning,” in Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, ed. J.M. Smits (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2006), 407. doi: 10.4337/9781847200204.00043 ↩

62. Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959 London: Hutchinson, 1974). 31. ↩

“I do not wish to maintain that any strictly social animal, if its intellectual faculties were to become as active and as highly developed as in man, would acquire exactly the same moral sense as ours. … If, for instance, to take an extreme case, men were reared under precisely the same condition as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters; and no one would think of interfering. Nevertheless, the bee, or any other social animal, would gain in our supposed case, as it appears to me, some feeling of right or wrong, or a conscience.”

64. W. V. Quine, “ Two Dogmas of Empiricism ,” The Philosophical Review 60 no. 1 (January 1951), 20-43. The original and revised 1961 edition, with alterations, are fully provided on the Web by the Foundation for Information Technology, Logic and Mathematics, Warsaw, Poland: Two Dogmas of Empiricism ↩

65. Richard F. Kitchener, “ Is Genetic Epistemology Possible ,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 no. 3 (September 1987), 283-299. (preview) Kitchener states the genesis vs. justification distinction as follows:

“Questions about the genesis of an idea (belief, concept theory) is one thing (an empirical question for psychology, sociology or history), whereas questions about the validity and justification of an idea is a different question (a normative question for logic and epistemology).” Kitchener, 285.“

He cites this distinction as one kind of the fact-norm distinction which “provides the underlying rationale of the notorious genetic fallacy.” Further, he concludes, “What is clearly being ruled out, thererfore is the very possibility that a question about the ‘genesis’ of an idea could have some relevance towards evaluating its epistemic adequacy.” (Kitchener, 286). ↩

66. Ledger Wood, “ Genetic Fallacy ” and “ Genetic Method ,” in Dagobert D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy (Paterson, NJ: Littlefield, Adams, 1962), 116. ↩

67. Kim Sterelny, “ Escaping Illusion?" ” American Scientist 94 no. 5 (September–October, 2006), 461. doi: 10.1511/2006.61.461 ↩

68. Dino Franco Felluga, Perversity of Poetry (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2005), 84-85. ↩

69. Daniel Martin Varisco, Reading Orientalism: Said and the Unsaid (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2007), 36. doi: 10.1093/jis/etp012 ↩

70. Eric S. Lander and Joseph J. Ellis, “News and Views: Founding Father,” Nature 396 no. 6706 (November 5, 1998), 14. doi: 10.1038/23802 ↩

71. S. Morris Engel, With Good Reason: A Guide to Informal Fallacies (New York: St. Martins Press, 1976), 108-109. ↩

72. John F. Cargan and Craig W. Cutbirth, “A Revisionist Perspective on Political Ad Hominem Argument : A Case Study,” Central States Speech Journal 35 no. 4 (December, 1984), 228-237. doi: 10.1080/10510978409368192 ↩

73. Sophia Grace Toplis, Twelfth Night in Young England (London: Young England Office, 1833), 121. ↩

74. William James, Pragmatism (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1910), 6-11. ↩

75. Thomas A. Mauet, Trial Techniques and Trials , 10th ed. (New York: Wolters Kluwer, 2017), 547-548. ↩

76. See for example David Hitchcock, ” Why There Is No Argumentum Ad Hominem Fallacy ,” ISSA Proceedings 2006 in The Rozenberg Quarterly Magazine doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-53562-3_26 . See also John Woods, “ Lightening Up On the Ad Hominem ” Informal Logic 27 no. 1 (2007), 111. doi: 10.22329/il.v27i1.467 ] ↩

77. Douglas N. Walton, “ Argumentation Schemes and Historical Origins of the Circumstantial Ad Hominem Argument ,” Argumentation 18 (2004), 359-368. doi: 10.1023/B:ARGU.0000046706.45919.83 ↩

78. Louise Cummings, “ Reasoning Under Uncertainty: The Role of Two Informal Fallacies in an Emerging Scientific Inquiry ,” Informal Logic 22 no. 2 (2002), 121. doi: 10.22329/il.v22i2.2578 ↩

79. Alan Brinton, “A Rhetorical View of the Ad Hominem ,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 no. 1 (March 1985), 55. doi: 10.1080/00048408512341681 ↩

80. “Briefing,” Time 177 no. 19 (May 16, 2011) 177, 9. ↩

81. Kathleen, Parker, "Girl Fight," Index-Journal 93 no. 355 (April 19, 2012), 8A. ↩

82. John Rosemond, “ ADHD: You Are What You Eat,” Index-Journal 97 no. 187 (September 5, 2015), 7A. ↩

83. Eugene Robinson, “Expected to Save the World, Kushner Will Surely Fail,” Index-Journal 99 no. 20 (April 2, 2017), 7a. ↩

84. Francis L. Wellman, The Art of Cross-Examination (New York: Macmillan, 1903), 29. ↩

85. Bill O'Reilly, “The French Way,” Index-Journal 95 no. 191 (November 18, 2013), 6A. ↩

86. Froma Harrop, “Will Americans Pay for American-Made?” Index-Journal 95 no. 204 (December 9, 2013), 9A. ↩

87. John Stossel, “Earth Daze,” Index-Journal 95 no. 331 (April 14, 2014), 9A. ↩

88. Barbara Ellen, “ Faint-Hearted Feminists? What's Salma Hayek's Problem? ” The Guardian US edition (November 9, 2016). ↩

89. George Will, “The Apostle Mike Huckabee,” Index-Journal (May 12, 2015) 97 No. 79, 6A. ↩

90. Huey P. Long, “Share Our Wealth: Radio Speech, 1935,” in Gerald D. Nash, ed., Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Great Lives Observed 2nd. ed (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 109. ↩

91. Sandra Harding, “ Conclusion: Epistemological Questions ,” in Feminism and Methodology: Social Science Issues, ed. Sandra Harding (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1987), 183-184. ↩

92.Thomas Nickles, “ Introductory Essay: History of the Idea of a ‘Logic ’ of Discovery ,” in Scientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality , ed. Thomas Nickles (Dordrecht: Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1978), 8. doi: 10.1007/978-94-009-8986-3 Herbert Feigel explains, “It is one thing to ask how we arrive at our scientific knowledge claims and what socio-cultural factors contribute to their acceptance or rejection; and it is another thing to ask what sort of evidence and what general, objective rules and standards govern the testing, the confirmation or disconfirmation and the acceptance or rejection of knowledge claims of science.” Herbert Feigel, “ Philosophy of Science ,” in Philosophy , eds. R. M. Chisholm, et al. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 472. ↩

Readings: Ad Hominem

Andrew Aberden, “ Commentary on Patrick Bondy, ‘Bias in Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments ,’” OSSA Conference Archive 11 , 7 (2016), 1-5.

Scott Aikin, “ Tu Quoque Arguments and the Significance of Hypocrisy ,” Informal Logic 28 no. 2 (June 2008), 155-169. doi: 10.22329/il.v28i2.543

E. M. Barthand and J.L. Martens. “ Argumentum Ad Hominem : From Chaos to Formal Dialectic ,” Logique & Analyse 20 no. 77-78 (March-June 1977), 76-96.

Heather Battaly, “ Attacking Character: Ad Hominem Argument and Virtue Epistemology ,” Informal Logic 30 no.4 (2010), 361-390. doi: 10.22329/il.v30i4.2964 .

Patrick Bondy, “ Bias in Legitimate Ad Hominem Arguments ,” In Argumentation, Objectivity, and Bias . Eds. P. Bondy and L. Benacquista OSSA (May 2016), 1-8.

Patrick Bondy, “ Virtues, Evidence, and Ad Hominem Arguments ,” Informal Logic 35 no. 4 (2015), 450-466. doi: 10.22329/il.v35i4.4330 .

Alan Brinton, “ A Rhetorical View of the Ad Hominem ,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63 no. 1 (March 1985), 50-63. doi: 10.1080/00048408512341681 . (paywall)

Alan Brinton, “The Ad Hominem ,” Fallacies: Classical and Contemporary Readings . Eds. Hans V. Hansen and Robert C. Pinto. (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University, 1995), 213-222. (preview)

Maarten Boudry and Fabio Paglieri and Massimo Pigliucci. “ The Fake, the Flimsy, and the Fallacious: Demarcating Arguments in Real Life ,” Maarten Boudry Google Scholar . https://sites.google.com/site/maartenboudry/teksten-1/fake . Argumentation 29 no. 4 (November 2015), 431-456. doi: 10.1007/s10503-015-9359-1

Katarzna Budzynska and Chris Reed. “ The Structure of Ad Hominem Dialogues ,” Computational Models of Arguments Series: Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications vol.245 (2012), 410-421. doi: 10.3233/978-1-61499-111-3-410

James Cargile, “ Two Fallacies ,” Logos & Episteme 1 no. 2 (2010), 257-268. doi: 10.5840/logos-episteme2010124

Graciela Marta Chichi, “ The Greek Roots of the Ad Hominem -Argument ,” Argumentation 16 no. 3 (September 2002), 333-348. doi: 10.1023/A:1019967112062 (paywall)

Margaret A. Crouch, “ A ‘Limited’Defense of the Genetic Fallacy ,” Metaphilosophy 24 no 3 (July 1993), 227-240. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9973.1993.tb00900.x (paywall)

Stephen De Wijze “ Complexity, Relevance and Character: Problems with Teaching the Ad Hominem Fallacy ,” Educational Philosophy and Theory 35 (2003), 31-56. doi: 10.1111/1469-5812.00004 (paywall)

S. Morris.Engel, “ The Five Forms of the Ad Hominem Fallacy ,” Inquiry 14 no. 1 (Autumn 1994): 19-36. doi:10.5840/inquiryctnews199414123 (paywall)

T. A. Goudge, “ The Genetic Fallacy ,” Synthese 13 no. 1 (1961), 41-48. doi: 10.1007/BF00485935 (paywall)

Ulrike Hahn and Mike Oaksford, Adam J.L. Harris. “Testimony and Argument: A Bayesian Perspective,” Bayesian Argumentation ed. Frank Zenker (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013), 15-38. doi: 10.1007/978-94-007-5357-0_2

Norwood Russell Hansen, “The Irrelevance of History of Science to Philosophy of Science,” The Journal of Philosophy 59 no. 21 (Oct. 1962), 574-586. doi: 10.2307/2023279 (paywall)

David Hitchcock, “Is There an Argumentum ad Hominem Fallacy?,” in On Reasoning and Argument . Ed. David Hitchcock (Springer International, 2017), 409-419. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-53562-3_26 (preview)

David Hitchcock, “The Pragma-Dialectical Analysis of the Ad Hominem Fallacy,” In Considering Pragma-Dialectics . . Eds. Peter Houtlosser and Agnès van Rees. (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaus Associates, 2006), 109-119. (preview)

David Hitchcock, “ Why There is No Argumentum Ad Hominem Fallacy ,” In Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation . Eds. F.H. van Eemeren and B. Garssen. 1 (Amsterdam: Sic Sat, 2007), 615-620.

John Hoaglund, “ Argumentum ad Hominem : Aut Bonum aut Malum? ,” Informal Logic 4 no. 3 (July 1981), 7-9. doi: 10.22329/il.v4i3.2773

Gary James Jason, “ Is There a Case for Ad Hominem Arguments? ,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 no. 2 (1984), 182-185. doi: 10.1080/00048408412341381 (paywall)

Christopher M. Johnson, “ Reconsidering the Ad Hominem ,” Philosophy 84 no. 2 (April 2009), 251-266. doi: 10.1017/S0031819109000217 (paywall)

H.W. Johnstone, Jr., “Philosophy and Argumentum ad Hominem ,” Journal of Philosophy 49 no. 15 (17 July 1952), 489-498. doi: 10.2307/2021667 (paywall)

Kevin C. Klement, “ When Is Genetic Reasoning Not Fallacious ,” Argumentation 16 no. 4 (December 2002), 383-400. doi: 10.1023/A:1021132731699

Erik C.W. Krabbe and Douglas Walton, “ It's All Very Well for You to Talk! Situationally Disqualifying Ad Hominem Attacks ,” Informal Logic 15 no. 2 (1993), 79-91. doi: 10.22329/il.v15i2.2475"

T. Z. Lavine, “ Reflections on the Genetic Fallacy ,” Social Research. 29 no. 3 (Autumn 1962), 321-336. (paywall)

Stephen Law, “ Thinking Tools: The Genetic Fallacy ,” Think 5 no. 13 (June 2006), 23-24. doi: 10.1017/S1477175600001500 (paywall)

P.T. Mackenzie, “ Ad Hominem and Ad Verecundiam ,” Informal Logic 3 no. 3 (1980), 9-11. doi: 10.22329/il.v3i3.2792

John. McMurtry, “ The Argumentum Ad Adversarium ,” Informal Logic 8 no. 1 (Winter, 1986), 27-36. doi: 10.22329/il.v8i1.2678"

Moti Mizrahi, “ Take My Advice — I Am Not Following It: Ad Hominem Arguments as Legitimate Rebuttals to Appeals to Authority ,” Informal Logic 30 no. 4 (2010): 435-456. doi: 10.22329/il.v30i4.2990

B. Meuffels, and F.H. van Eemeren, “ Ordinary Arguers' Judgments on Ad Hominem Fallacies ,” Advances in Pragma-dialectics . Ed. F.H. van Eemeren (Amsterdam: Sic Sat/Vale Press, 2002), 45-64. (no preview)

Gabriël Nuchelmans, “On the Fourfold Root of The Argumentum Ad Hominem ,” in E.C.W. Krabe, R.J. Dalitz and P. Smith (eds.), Empirical Logic and Public Debate (Amsterdam-Atlanta, Rodopi,1993), 37-47.

Jon Pashman, “Is the Genetic Fallacy a Fallacy?,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 8 no. 1 (Spring 1970), 57-62. doi: 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1970

H.J. Plug, “ Parrying Ad-Hominem Arguments in Parliamentary Debates .” Proceedings of the 7th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation . Eds. F.H. van Eemeren, et al. (Amsterdam: Rozenberg/Sic Sat.), 1538-1546. https://pure.uva.nl/ws/files/1830340/128194_138_Plug.pdf

Yvone Raley, “ Character Attacks: How to Properly Apply the Ad Hominem .” Scientific American Mind . https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/character-attack/

van Eemeren, Frans H. and Rob Grootendorst. “ Argumentum Ad Hominem: A Pragma-Dialectical Case in Point .” In Fallacies: Classical and Contemporary Readings . Eds. Hans V. Hansen and Robert C. Pinto (University Park PA: Pennsylvania State University Press: 1995), 223-228.

Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst. “ Relevance Reviewed: The Case of Argumentum ad Hominem ,” Argumentation 6 no. 2 (May 1992), 141-159. doi: 10.1007/BF00154322

Douglas N. Walton, “ The Ad Hominem Argument as an Informal Fallacy .” Argumentation 1 no.3 (1987), 320. doi: 10.1007/bf00136781

Douglas N. Walton, Ad Hominem Arguments , (Tuscalooosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1998). (preview)

Douglas N. Walton, “ Argumentation Schemes and Historical Origins of the Circumstantial Ad Hominem Argument .” Argumentation 18 no. 3 (September 2004), 359-368. doi: 10.1023/B:ARGU.0000046706.45919.83

Douglas N. Walton, “ The Ad Hominem Argument as an Informal Fallacy ,” Argumentation 1 (1987), 317-331. doi:10.1007/BF00136781

Douglas N. Walton, Character Evidence: An Abductive Theory (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2006). doi: 10.1007/1-4020-4943-9

Douglas N. Walton, “ Formalization of the Ad Hominem Argumentation Scheme ,” Journal of Applied Logic 8 no. 1 (March 2010), 1-21. doi: 10.1016/j.jal.2008.07.002

Douglas N. Walton, “ On a Razor's Edge: Evaluating Arguments from Expert Opinion ,” Argument & Computation 5 no. 2/3 (2014), 139-159. doi: 10.1080/19462166.2013.858183

Douglas N. Walton, “ Poisoning the Well ,” Argumentation 20 no. 3 (September 2006), 273-307. doi: 10.1007/s10503-006-9013-z

Douglas N. Walton, “ Searching for the Roots of the Circumstantial Ad Hominem ” Argumentation 15 no. 2 (May 2001), 207-221. doi: 10.1023/A:1011120100277

Douglas N. Walton, “ Witness Testimony as Argumentation .” Witness Testimony Evidence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 12-61. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511619533.002

A.C. Ward, “ The Value of Genetic Fallacies .” Informal Logic 30 no. 1 (2010), 1-30. doi:10.22329/il.v30i1.1237

Wikipedia contributors, ” Ad hominem ,” Wikipedia (accessed June 23, 2020).

John Woods, “ Lightening Up on the Ad Hominem .” Informal Logic 27 no. 1 (2007), 109-134. 10.22329/il.v27i1.467

Audrey Yap, “ Ad Hominem Fallacies, Bias, and Testimony,” Argumentation 27 (2013), 97-109. doi: 10.1007/s10503-011-9260-5.

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15 ad hominem Fallacy Examples

ad hominem fallacy examples and definition

The ad hominem fallacy is a fallacy in which a person discredits or rebuts an argument by attacking the speaker rather than the argument itself. In Latin, ad hominem means ‘to the man’ and this fallacy does exactly that. It targets the person rather than the argument. 

The ad hominem fallacy forms part of a group of fallacies known as informal logic fallacies. These fallacies find faults in arguments that occur in everyday situations rather than strictly logical arguments in academic work. It is a very common tactic in many situations, particularly in politics. 

There are three main forms of this fallacy to look out for:

  • abusive ad hominem ,
  • circumstantial ad hominem ,
  • and tu quoque .

The abusive form occurs when the person’s character is attacked. The circumstantial form occurs when it is in the person’s self-interest for the argument or statement to be true. Tu quoque , also a Latin term, means ‘you too’. It is intended to discredit a person’s argument because their own actions or views contradict the argument they are putting forward.

The ad hominem fallacy deals with people’s character, circumstances, and opinions. It is important to keep in mind that they can occur in many forms because it occurs in so many different situations. For this reason, when looking out for the ad hominem fallacy make sure to follow the one golden rule and ask yourself: is the person engaging with the argument or the speaker? Below, the examples will be grouped according to the three main forms the fallacy can take.

Abusive ad hominem Fallacy Examples

1. a checkered past.

Scenario: A politician is campaigning for road safety in an area with bad traffic accidents. However, voters find out he has lied in previous campaigns so they decide that his campaign is a bad idea. 

In this scenario, the voters don’t believe in the politician’s campaign because he has lied in the past. However, even though this may be true, the voters are not engaging with the politician’s proposal about road safety and instead are focusing on his character. This is an ad hominem fallacy.

2. Driving to work

Scenario: John sees his doctor driving very badly one day and decides that he must be a bad doctor because he is a bad driver. 

John decides that his doctor is bad at his job because of his bad driving. John is committing the ad hominem fallacy because he is not basing his judgment on facts relating to the doctor’s professional skills. 

Instead, John is basing his judgment on the driving abilities of the doctor which are unrelated to his capabilities as a doctor. It is logically possible to be a bad driver and a good doctor.

3. They must have done it!

Scenario: A bag is stolen from a classroom. A few students accuse William and Luke of stealing the bag because they are always late for school, even though William and Luke claim they are innocent. 

The students are making the assumption that William and Luke are capable of stealing because they have a tendency to be late. This is an ad hominem fallacy because the students are not relying on evidence that relates to theft or the stolen bag in the classroom for their conclusion about William and Luke. They are using unconnected aspects of William and Luke’s character as evidence for the theft, which is illogical.

4. Here comes the mail

Scenario: Teresa, the postal service worker assures Fred that his package will be delivered in time. Fred sees a stain on Teresa’s shirt and thinks to himself, I can’t trust her she has a dirty shirt.

Fred is committing the ad hominem fallacy because he thinks that Teresa’s dirty shirt is evidence of her being untrustworthy as a postal service worker. However, having a dirty shirt has nothing to do with the efficiency of the postal service or Teresa’s ability. Therefore, Fred is making an assumption based on an unrelated aspect of Teresa’s character.

5. You don’t really care

Scenario: Caroline is arguing for more green areas around the city to improve air quality in the city. Her colleagues say that if she is really worried about air quality, she should not drive her car to the office every day.

It is true that because Caroline drives to work every day she is polluting the air and decreasing air quality. However, even though her colleagues are correct they are still committing the ad hominem fallacy. This is because green areas would improve air quality and in this scenario, they are a good idea. 

Therefore, Caroline’s colleagues are not engaging with the argument about green areas in the city but they are rather choosing a different aspect of Caroline’s character and finding fault with it. In this case, they are pointing out that Caroline might be not doing everything she can do to reduce her impact on the environment.

The argument “you don’t really care!” is also often used in appeal to emotion fallacies .

Circumstantial ad hominem Fallacy Examples

6. trusting the salesman.

Scenario: Tyrone is looking to buy a car. The salesman is giving him all the details about the car and says what great quality it is. Tyrone does not believe him because it is the salesman’s job to sell the car.

Tyrone is committing the ad hominem fallacy in this scenario because he believes that the salesman will lie about the car’s quality just to sell it. He is basing his judgment on the self-interest of the salesman, However, it is perfectly possible for the salesman to want to sell the car but also tell the truth about what good quality it is.

7. The gardener’s troubles

Scenario: Claire really believes in fighting for climate change and she is having a discussion with her family about it. They tell her she only thinks it is important because she loves to garden.

Claire has a passion for gardening and loves all plants. Because of this, she has a clear self-interest in avoiding climate change so that she can save all her plants and keep doing the thing she loves. 

Her family takes Claire’s self-interest to discredit her argument about climate change. They believe that Claire’s argument is only based on self-interest and is therefore wrong. 

Claire’s family is committing the ad hominem fallacy. Even though Claire is self-interested they have not engaged with arguments or reasoning about climate change or the environment that Claire is putting forward. 

8. Innocent until proven guilty

Scenario: Philip is convicted of a crime but says he is innocent and has evidence proving it was someone else. The police don’t believe him because they think he just wants to get out of prison.

The police are committing the ad hominem fallacy because they believe that Philip is lying just to get out of prison. Even though it is true that Philip does want to get out of prison this does not mean that he is guilty. 

Philip could very well have good evidence proving it was someone else and still want to get out of prison. However, the police just assume that he is lying because it is in Philip’s self-interest to get out of prison.

9. Bad service

Scenario: Clarissa complains about some cold food at a restaurant and she asks to see the manager. The manager thinks Clarissa is just complaining to get a free meal.

The manager is assuming that Clarissa wants a free meal and is not engaging with the issue of the food being cold. The manager believes that it is Clarissa’s self-interest in getting a free meal that is motivating her complaint about the food. 

However, because the manager does not assess Clarissa’s complaint about the food he is committing the ad hominem fallacy. Even though it is in Clarrisa’s self-interest to not pay for the food that does not mean that she was lying about the food being cold. 

10. First place

Scenario: George and Mohammed are running a race. George has a bad pain in his knee and Mohammed suggests he should stop so he does not injure himself further. George suspects that Mohammed is just saying that to get him out of the race.

George is committing the ad hominem fallacy by assuming that Mohammed wants him to stop racing so that Mohammed can win. George makes this assumption because he thinks Mohammed is acting in his own self-interest – if George stops racing, it will be easier for Mohammed to win. 

However, It is possible for Mohammed to really care about if George gets injured while he wants to win the race. Furthermore, it is true that George has a pain in his knee. Therefore, George is committing the ad hominem fallacy. 

Tu quoque ad hominem Fallacy Examples

11. but you got a fine.

Scenario: Chantel’s father is explaining to her that it’s bad to get a speeding fine when she responds: ‘but you used to get them all the time!’

Chantel accuses her father of also getting speeding fines all the time. By doing this she attempts to discredit his argument by focusing on the fact that he is also guilty of getting traffic fines. 

However, Chantel is committing an ad hominem fallacy. She is not engaging with the argument her father is putting forward, that it is wrong for her to get speeding fines. Rather, she is trying to discredit his argument by focusing on something he has done in the past.

12. You are just as bad as me.

Scenario: Helen is giving her friend advice about her marriage, but her friend ignores her because Helen is experiencing marital difficulties of her own. 

Helen thinks that her friend’s advice on marriage will be bad because her friend is also having marital issues. Helen is using her friend’s life to discredit the advice her friend is giving, instead of engaging with the advice on its own merit. 

In this scenario, the logical thing to do is to engage with the advice and assess if it is good or not. Helen does not do this and yet she comes to the conclusion that she should ignore her friend’s advice. Helen is therefore committing the ad hominem fallacy because she used evidence irrelevant to the argument to come to her conclusion.

This also happens to be a false analogy fallacy because the two marriages are not the same, and the problems are not analogous.

13. Once a liar, always a liar.

Scenario: Dario got caught lying once at work. A few years later he is accused of lying at work again and his boss tells him ‘once a liar always a liar’ without listening to his side of the story.

Dario’s boss thinks he does not even need to listen to Dario’s side of the story because Dario has lied in the past. For Dario’s boss, this past action discredits anything Dario could say. 

While Dario’s boss has some right to be suspicious he is also being illogical. Lying once does not mean Dario will lie every time. Therefore, by not engaging with Dario’s side of the story his boss is committing an ad hominem fallacy. 

14. Broken promises.

Scenario: Shaun promises to be at his family event on time. However, his parents expect him to be late because he has been late before. 

The crucial thing in the ad hominem fallacy is to engage with the person’s argument or statement. In this scenario, the argument or statement is Shaun’s promise. However, we see that Shaun’s parents expect him to be late – not because of the type of promise or the contents of the promise, but because he has been late before.

Shaun’s family is therefore committing the ad hominem fallacy. They are using a past event as evidence for Shaun’s promise rather than the validity of his statement.

15. You did it first!

Scenario: Mathilda is playing with her friend Zara. Mathilda decides she wants the toy Zara has and so just takes it without asking. Zara says: ‘Hey! Why did you do that, I was playing with it. Mathilda responds that she took it because Zara ate her chocolate earlier. 

Mathilda is committing the ad hominem fallacy because her excuse for taking the toy is based on her friend Zara’s past actions. Mathilda claims that it is fine to take Zara’s toy because Zara had taken her chocolate earlier.

Mathilda is not offering an apology or reason for why she took Zara’s toy without asking, instead, she uses Zara’s past actions as an excuse. By doing this she is not engaging with the situation at hand but instead is relying on past events which are unrelated to her current actions.

Other Logical Fallacies

  • Gambler’s Fallacy
  • Straw Man Fallacy
  • Equivocation Fallacy
  • Appeal to Tradition Fallacy
  • Begging the Question Fallacy

The ad hominem fallacy is especially useful for us to understand. It is so commonly used and so it is valuable to know how to spot it. It is commonly used because a person’s character, actions, and motivation are important considerations when interacting with them. 

However, this does not mean that a person’s character, actions, and motivation are the only thing that we should take into account. When we are trying to determine if a person’s statement or argument is correct we must look at it logically. In order to do so, it is the contents of their statement which must be assessed. Their character can be a consideration, but not something we make our final conclusion on. 

Chris

Chris Drew (PhD)

Dr. Chris Drew is the founder of the Helpful Professor. He holds a PhD in education and has published over 20 articles in scholarly journals. He is the former editor of the Journal of Learning Development in Higher Education. [Image Descriptor: Photo of Chris]

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Argument Against the Person - Argumentum Ad Hominem

Ad Hominem Fallacies of Relevance

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The ad hominem fallacy is a class of fallacies which is not only common but also commonly misunderstood. Many people assume that any personal attack is an ad hominem argument, but that isn't true. Some attacks aren't ad hominem fallacies, and some ad hominem fallacies aren't clear insults.

What the concept argumen t​ ad hominem means is "argument to the man," although it is also translated as "argument against the man." Instead of criticizing what a person says and the arguments they are offering, what we have instead is a criticism of where the arguments are coming from (the person). This is not necessarily relevant to the validity of what is said - thus, it is a Fallacy of Relevance.

The general form this argument takes is:

1. There is something objectionable about person X. Therefore, person X's claim is false.

Types of Ad Hominem Fallacy

This fallacy can be separated into five different types:

  • Abusive ad hominem : The most common and well-known type of ad hominem fallacy is just a simple insult and is called the abusive ad hominem. It occurs when a person has given up attempting to persuade a person or an audience about the reasonableness of a position and is now resorting to mere personal attacks.
  • Tu quoque (two wrongs don't make a right): An ad hominem fallacy which does not attack a person for random, unrelated things, but instead attacks them for some perceived fault in how they have presented their case is often called tu quoque , which means "you too." It often occurs when a person is attacked for doing what they are arguing against.
  • Circumstantial ad hominem : Dismissing an argument by attacking an entire class of people who presumably accept that argument is called the circumstantial ad hominem. The name is derived from the fact that it addresses the circumstances of those who hold the position in question.
  • Genetic fallacy : Attacking the origins for the position someone is proposing instead of the person or the argument is called the genetic fallacy because it is based on the idea that the original source of an idea is a sound basis for evaluating its truth or reasonableness.
  • Poisoning the well : A preemptive attack on a person which questions their character is called poisoning the well and is an attempt to make the target appear bad before they even have a chance to say anything.

All of these different types of ad hominem argument are fairly similar and in some cases can appear almost identical. Because this category involves fallacies of relevance, the ad hominem argument is a fallacy when the comments are directed against some aspect about a person which is irrelevant to the topic at hand.

Valid Ad Hominem Arguments

It is important, however, to remember that an argumentum ad hominem is not always a fallacy! Not everything about a person is irrelevant to every possible topic or any possible argument that they might make. Sometimes it is entirely legitimate to bring up a person's expertise in some subject as a reason to be skeptical, and perhaps even dismissive, of their opinions about it.

For example:

2. George is not a biologist and has no training in biology. Therefore, his opinions about what is or is not possible with regards to evolutionary biology do not have a lot of credibility.

The above argument rests upon the assumption that, if a person is going to make credible assertions about what is or is not possible for evolutionary biology, then they really should have some training in biology - preferably a degree and perhaps some practical experience.

Now, to be fair pointing out the lack of training or knowledge does not qualify as an automatic reason for declaring their opinion to be false. If nothing else, it's at least possible that they have made a guess by random chance. When contrasted with the conclusions offered by a person who does have relevant training and knowledge, however, we have a sound basis for not accepting the first person's statements.

This type of valid ad hominem argument is therefore in some ways the reverse of a valid appeal to authority argument.

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  • Quoting Out of Context Fallacy
  • Logical Fallacies: Begging the Question
  • Argumentum ad Populum (Appeal to Numbers)
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  • False Dilemma Fallacy
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  • 10 Tips for Understanding Philosophical Texts
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  • Ad Hominem Fallacy | Definition & Examples

Ad Hominem Fallacy | Definition & Examples

Published on 24 April 2023 by Kassiani Nikolopoulou . Revised on 9 October 2023.

Ad hominem fallacy (or ad hominem ) is an attempt to discredit someone’s argument by personally attacking them. Instead of discussing the argument itself, criticism is directed toward the opponent’s character, which is irrelevant to the discussion.

Ad hominem fallacy is often used as a diversion tactic to shift attention to an unrelated point like a person’s character or motives and avoid addressing the actual issue. It is common in both formal and informal contexts, ranging from political debates to online discussions.

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Table of contents

What is the ad hominem fallacy, when is an ad hominem argument valid, different types of ad hominem arguments, ad hominem examples, other interesting articles, frequently asked questions about the ad hominem fallacy.

Ad hominem fallacy is a group of argumentation strategies that focus on the person making an argument rather than their viewpoint. This involves an attack on any aspect of the opponent’s personality, like their intelligence, reputation, or group affiliations. The attack can be subtle, such as casting doubt on a person’s character, or overt, like insulting someone.

Ad hominem fallacy

The ad hominem fallacy is a logical fallacy , specifically a fallacy of relevance, i.e, the argument raised is irrelevant to the discussion. An ad hominem fallacy appeals to our emotions and prejudices rather than facts.

Ad hominem literally means “to the person” as in being “directed at the person”. An ad hominem argument is therefore an attack directed against the person who makes a statement rather than the validity of their statement. In everyday language, this is known as a personal attack.

The goal of an ad hominem argument or ad hominem attack is to refute an opposing view indirectly, without ever engaging with it. The target of the attack usually feels the need to defend themself and thus digress from the discussion topic, which shows just how powerful ad hominem arguments are.

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An ad hominem argument is not always fallacious. Because ad hominem arguments have been associated with dirty tricks and name-calling, they are usually considered as hits below the belt that do not advance a healthy debate.

However, an ad hominem argument can sometimes be used as a legitimate rhetorical strategy. When the claims made about a person’s character are relevant to the discussion or the conclusions being drawn, and they are properly justified, the ad hominem argument is valid.

For example, attacks on a person who has cheated on their partner are irrelevant to the quality of their mathematical reasoning, but they are relevant to deciding whether this person should be the leader of an association that emphasises family values.

Ad hominem arguments can take various forms. In some cases, they are almost always a fallacy, while in other cases they can be valid depending on how they are used. Here are the most common types of ad hominem arguments:

  • Abusive ad hominem is a direct attack on the other person’s character, targeting their age, character, gender identity, appearance, etc. Abusive ad hominem arguments are usually fallacious because the attack is irrelevant to the discussion. For example, “who is going to vote for a person looking like this?” is a fallacy because appearance has nothing to do with one’s leadership abilities.
  • Circumstantial ad hominem (or appeal to motive) argues that a person’s circumstances, such as their job, political affiliation, or other vested interests, motivate their argument and thus it must be biased and false. For example, a salesperson may tell you that the pair of jeans you’re trying on looks good on you, and you may half-jokingly point out that of course they think so since they want to make a sale.
  • Tu quoque (“you too”) ad hominem is an attempt to refute an argument by attacking its proponent and accusing them of hypocrisy (i.e , pointing to a contradiction between their words and their deeds). For example, a doctor suggests that a patient should lose weight, and the patient dismisses the advice on the grounds that the doctor has a few extra pounds too.
  • Guilt by association ad hominem is a variant in which someone is attacked because of their alleged connection with a person or group that has an unfavorable reputation. For example, “Stalin was evil and against religion. All people against religion are evil.”
  • Poisoning the well is a type of ad hominem where (irrelevant) negative information is preemptively presented to an audience to discredit whatever the opponent is about to say. For example, “before you listen to her, I should remind you that she has been charged with embezzlement”.

The ad hominem argument or personal attack is very common in public discourse, especially in the run-up to elections.

President Trump claimed Biden is “against God” and on the “wrong side of history”, while Democrats were attacked for viewing America as “a wicked nation that must be punished for its sins”.

On the other side, Joe Biden used a similar approach and claimed “the fact is this man has no idea what he’s talking about”, accusing his opponent of receiving payment from foreign countries.

An argument contains an ad hominem fallacy when you make an irrelevant attack on a person and suggest that this attack proves that what the person says cannot be trusted.

If you want to know more about fallacies , research bias , or AI tools , make sure to check out some of our other articles with explanations and examples.

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  • Using ChatGPT for your studies
  • Sunk cost fallacy
  • Straw man fallacy
  • Slippery slope fallacy
  • Red herring fallacy
  • Ecological fallacy
  • Logical fallacy

Research bias

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  • Hawthorne effect
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An ad hominem (Latin for “to the person”) is a type of informal logical fallacy . Instead of arguing against a person’s position, an ad hominem argument attacks the person’s character or actions in an effort to discredit them.

This rhetorical strategy is fallacious because a person’s character, motive, education, or other personal trait is logically irrelevant to whether their argument is true or false.

Name-calling is common in ad hominem fallacy (e.g., “environmental activists are ineffective because they’re all lazy tree-huggers”).

Ad hominem is a persuasive technique where someone tries to undermine the opponent’s argument by personally attacking them.

In this way, one can redirect the discussion away from the main topic and to the opponent’s personality without engaging with their viewpoint. When the opponent’s personality is irrelevant to the discussion, we call it an ad hominem fallacy .

Ad hominem tu quoque (‘you too”) is an attempt to rebut a claim by attacking its proponent on the grounds that they uphold a double standard or that they don’t practice what they preach. For example, someone is telling you that you should drive slowly otherwise you’ll get a speeding ticket one of these days, and you reply “but you used to get them all the time!”

Argumentum ad hominem means “argument to the person” in Latin and it is commonly referred to as ad hominem argument or personal attack. Ad hominem arguments are used in debates to refute an argument by attacking the character of the person making it, instead of the logic or premise of the argument itself.

Sources for this article

We strongly encourage students to use sources in their work. You can cite our article (APA Style) or take a deep dive into the articles below.

Nikolopoulou, K. (2023, October 09). Ad Hominem Fallacy | Definition & Examples. Scribbr. Retrieved 15 February 2024, from https://www.scribbr.co.uk/fallacy/ad-hominem/
Lillo-Unglaube, M., Canales-Johnson, A., Navarrete, G., & Bravo, C. (2014). Toward an experimental account of argumentation: the case of the slippery slope and the ad hominem arguments. Frontiers in Psychology , 5 . https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.01420

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Fallacy Watch: Ad Hominem and Arguments from Authority

Fallacy Watch: Ad Hominem and Arguments from Authority

3-minute read

  • 9th January 2019

Welcome to Fallacy Watch! This is where we look at some common fallacies (i.e., bad arguments), what they involve, and how to avoid them in your own writing . This time, for example, we’re looking at two fallacies that focus on the person making an argument rather than the argument itself: ad hominem attacks and arguments from authority. Read on to find out more.

Ad Hominem Arguments

Ad hominem is a Latin term meaning “against the person.” An ad hominem argument is therefore an attack on person making an argument rather than a case against what they say. For instance:

Socrates’ ideas on beauty must be wrong because he was so ugly.

This is obviously wrong, because someone’s appearance does not have an impact on their ideas. But the same would be true if we had attacked Socrates for being stupid, selfish, or smelly. The fallacy here is focusing on Socrates the person, not the arguments he makes.

Socrates sneers at your fallacious arguments.

Such arguments are common in real life (e.g., political attack ads). But in academic writing, it’s vital to focus on arguments and evidence, not the personality of the person we’re arguing against.

Arguments from Authority

An argument from authority , also known as an appeal to authority, relies on the status of the person cited instead of their ideas. For example:

Isaac Newton was a great scientist and an alchemist, so we should take alchemy seriously.

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We would never deny that Newton was a great scientist. His work on gravity and optics? The boy done good. But Newton’s belief in alchemy doesn’t mean we can change lead into gold. If we wanted to argue that this were possible, we would need evidence. And there is none.

But is Isaac more or less attractive than Socrates?

It is worth comparing arguments from authority with scientific consensus. There are some scientists, for example, who deny that climate change exists or say it has nothing to do with humans. However,  97% percent of climate scientists agree that human activity contributes to climate change.

If we were to take a study by one of the 3% who disagree, we could say “This expert scientist says there is no such thing as climate change, so we don’t need to worry about it.” This would be an argument from authority, as it relies entirely on the scientist being an “expert.” However, it would also involve ignoring the 97% of scientists who say climate change is real.

This is not to say that scientific consensus can’t be proven wrong. But if we want to prove it wrong, we need to look at the evidence, not just appeal to someone who disagrees with the consensus.

As with ad hominem arguments, then, the key to avoiding this fallacy is to always focus on evidence. If someone is known as an “authority” in a certain subject area, that’s a great starting point. But you need to follow up on this by looking at what they argue in detail, not just who they are.

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Humanities LibreTexts

6.02: Trust and the Ad Hominem

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  • Page ID 127563

Thaddeus Robinson

  • Muhlenberg College

Trust and the Ad Hominem

Section 1: introduction.

As we saw in the last chapter, our normal attitude toward the testimony of others is one of vigilant trust.  That is, although we tend to accept what other people tell us, we are constantly on the lookout for signs of deception, insincerity, and incompetence.  As we have seen, the fact that a person has something to gain or is somehow lacking in skill or expertise can give us a reason not to trust what they say.  However, the fact that some features of a person can undermine the credibility of what they say, does not mean that they always do .  This raises a number of questions: namely what features of a person undermine credibility, and under what circumstances?  In this chapter we take up these questions.  We will zero-in on arguments that appeal to some feature of a person to conclude that they are not credible.  Arguments like this are called ad hominem arguments (Latin for “against the man”).  Perhaps unsurprisingly, ad hominems are extremely common in everyday thinking.  Of course, like other inductive argument forms, there are logically strong ad hominems and logically weak ones.  Accordingly, in this chapter we will take a close look at how ad hominem arguments are used in everyday life, talk about what makes an ad hominem logically strong, and identify some strategies for accurate evaluation.

Section 2: To Trust or Not to Trust: Ad hominem Arguments

It is important to recognize that there are all kinds of conclusions we might draw about what a person has said based on what they are like, who they are, or what they have done.  One common kind of inference appeals to what a person is like to draw a conclusion about their right to speak in some particular context.  This is what we do when we say, for example: “since you aren’t part of the family, this is none of your business”.  Similarly, when we say “people in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones” we are questioning the fairness or appropriateness of a comment.  Neither of these are ad hominem arguments, however.  What is distinctive about an ad hominem argument is that it is an inference from what a person is like to a conclusion about whether we can trust what they say in a particular case.  As we have seen, our trust in a source is embodied in our assumption that they are both sincere and in a good position to have a true belief in this specific case.  This is what we called The Credibility Assumption .  Given this, we can define an ad hominem as follows:

An ad hominem argument draws a conclusion about The Credibility Assumption on the basis some feature of a source.

In principle, almost any feature of a person can serve as the foundation for an ad hominem argument; it is common for ad hominems to draw upon a person’s physical features, group membership (e.g. religion, class, political affiliation), achievements and failures, motives or interests, morality, and personal history (among many others).  However, to say that these features can be used to challenge other people’s credibility is not to say that they actually do so.  Again, as we will see there are both logically strong and logically weak ad hominems .

In addition, we can distinguish between positive and negative ad hominems.   A positive ad hominem draws on some feature of the source as support for The Credibility Assumption , and to thereby bolster the importance of their testimony.  Here is an example:

If you are in the market for a new car, I’d hold off until December.  My aunt worked in car dealerships for 20 years, and always says the best time to buy a new car is at the end of the calendar year.

In this case, the speaker is treating his aunt as credible on this issue because of some feature of her—namely her decades in the car sales industry.  In contrast, a negative ad hominem draws on some feature of the source to raise doubt about The Credibility Assumption, and to thereby dismiss or set aside their testimony.  For example, the cases from Section 4 of the last chapter are all examples of ad hominem arguments:

We cannot simply take Isabel’s word for it that she saw Max leaving Ethan’s around the time of the murder, since she has a motive to lie.

The author here is concluding that we cannot accept Isabel’s testimony because of some feature of her—namely that she has a motive to lie.  While we sometimes use positive ad hominems , negative ad hominems are much more common.  Consequently, in the rest of this chapter we will focus on negative ad hominems .

A sign that says "Don't trust anyone under 30"

Section 3: Negative Ad Hominems

Let us begin our discussion of negative ad hominems with some examples.

Taylor: Don’t worry.  The CEO promises that Company A will never sell customers’ email addresses.

Cho:    You can’t take her word for it; she made the same promise when she was working for Company B and it turned out that Company B was selling customer’s information as soon as it got it!

In this example, Cho gives an ad hominem that challenges the credibility of the CEO.  He argues that we cannot take the CEO’s claim for granted because of a feature of the CEO, namely that she has broken similar promises in the past.  Let’s take a look at another example.

Lara: I think pot should be legalized, I mean there is no good reason for legally distinguishing between alcohol and marijuana.

Ryan: You love smoking weed. Of course that’s what you think.

This is also an ad hominem , but Ryan’s argument is not nearly as clear as Cho’s was above.  Ryan is attacking Lara’s credibility on this issue on the grounds that she loves smoking weed.  He seems to be questioning Lara’s objectivity: she can’t think about the issue of legalization clearly because she has a clear preference.  Moreover, he doesn’t come right out and conclude that “we can’t take her word for it.”  Instead he insinuates that we cannot trust her by dismissing her claim, and this is common in ad hominems .

In the effort to identify ad hominem arguments, it is important to remember that not every argument that appeals to a feature of a person is an ad hominem .  Consider the following example:

Brandon: E. M. Waterhouse claims that we would all be better off if we lowered the tax rate on millionaires.

Omar: That’s not true—I mean this is coming from a guy who is a millionaire himself!

Omar’s argument in this example is not an ad hominem , although it certainly looks like one.  Omar is appealing to a feature of E.M. Waterhouse, namely that he is a millionaire, in order to criticize his claim.  However, he is not challenging his credibility.  Instead she claims that what Waterhouse says is false (he says, “that’s not true”).  We will call this kind of argument, a denier , since they deny what the speaker has said. [1]   That is, a denier uses a feature of a person to conclude that what they’ve said is false or incorrect.   In contrast, ad hominem arguments only challenge a source’s credibility—they do not conclude that what the speaker says is false or incorrect (thought it might be).  It is important not to confuse ad hominems and deniers, since deniers are almost never logically strong.   That is, a feature of a person rarely offers sufficient evidence for thinking that what a person has said is false.

Not only can negative ad hominems draw different kinds of conclusions, but they can draw conclusions about the credibility of different subjects.  In general, people draw ad hominem conclusions about three kinds of communication.  On the most basic level, an ad hominem can draw a conclusion about a person’s credibility with respect to a specific claim (see Ex. 1, 2, and 3).  Second, an ad hominem can draw a conclusion about a person’s credibility with respect to an argument (as is the case in Ex. 4).  Last, we can draw conclusions about a person’s credibility when it comes to more substantial productions , e.g. a speech, article, book, or movie.  For example:

I wouldn’t trust anything you see in that so-called “documentary”; the director is a well-known conservative activist.

The speaker in this case is giving an ad hominem which does not target any specific claim or argument, but challenges the credibility of the documentary as a whole based on the director’s political activity.  Thus, negative ad hominems come in many different forms.  They are often stated in somewhat ambiguous terms, and can target different forms of communication.  Moreover, it is important to distinguish ad hominems from a similar form we’ve called Deniers.  Suppose we’ve done that: we have spotted an ad hominem .  What now?  How do we evaluate it?

Section 4: Evaluating Negative Ad Hominem Arguments

As we have said, negative ad hominems all point to some feature of the source to challenge The Credibility Assumption .  Again, the credibility of a source is embodied in our trust in its honesty, and our trust that the source is in a position to have an accurate belief.  Thus, any feature of a person that gives good reason to doubt either of these conditions, thereby gives reason to doubt the source’s credibility.  To evaluate an ad hominem , then, is simply to ask whether the feature in question gives us a reason to doubt either of these conditions.  In Ex. 4 above, Cho gives a logically strong ad hominem: the fact that the CEO has failed to fulfill similar promises in the past calls into question her honesty in this case.  In contrast, suppose Cho had responded this way:

Cho:    You can’t take her word for it; she has been married three times!

Having been married three times does not give us a reason to think that the CEO is not being honest, nor does it give evidence that the CEO is not in a position to have accurate beliefs about this issue.  Consequently, Cho’s ad hominem in this case would be logically weak.  In general, to conclude that there is good reason to doubt a source’s credibility is to conclude only that the source’s testimony—all by itself—does not give us enough reason to believe what they have said.  Again, to draw this conclusion is not to say they are wrong or mistaken.  It is simply to refuse to take their word for it, and to agree to wait for more evidence before making a decision one way or another.

The fact that ad hominems can have different targets introduces a complication to the process of evaluating for logical strength.  In order to illustrate the issue, consider the following two arguments.  One is logically strong, and the other is not.  Before reading on, see if you can distinguish the two.

Mike: The salesman says that the previous owner of this car was a little old lady who only drove the car to church on Sundays.

Ali:  This guy earns a commission if we buy the car, so I am not just going to take his word for it.

TV News analyst: Mega Petroleum argues on the basis of the 1990 Oil Pollution Act that they are only legally responsible for paying 75 million in damages for the oil spill.  We should be skeptical, however, since of course they want to avoid paying for the clean-up.

The crucial difference between these two cases has to do with the target of the ad hominem .  In Ex. 8 Ali is questioning the credibility of the car salesman with respect to his claim that the previous owner was a little old lady.  In Ex. 9, on the other hand, the analyst is challenging the credibility of Mega Petroleum with respect to their argument .  This matters because when a person simply makes a claim, they are asking you to take their word for it.  In contrast, when a person gives an argument, they are not.  Rather they are appealing to evidence that they take to justify the conclusion, and this evidence will either stand or fall independent of their credibility or reliability.

Picture of a referee with the caption "we have an ad hominem attack; Personal foul, attacks the opponent instead of the argument"

The practical consequence of this is that, in most cases, to use an ad hominem against an argument is to violate The Rule of Total Evidence.   Recall that according to this rule we are required, in formulating a conclusion, to take all the available evidence into account.  When a person uses an ad hominem to draw a conclusion about an argument they ignore relevant evidence.  Consider Ex. 9 above.  The analyst in this case is skeptical of Mega Petroleum’s claim that they are only responsible for paying 75 million in damages.  This makes sense given that Mega Petroleum clearly has an interest in this matter.  However, Mega Petroleum has offered an argument for this claim.  They are not asking us to trust them, but have presented independent evidence on behalf of this claim.  Thus, given The Rule of Total Evidence we must take this argument into account if we want to draw a conclusion about the claim that they are only legally liable for 75 million in damages.

The upshot is that if we want to express skepticism about Mega Petroleum’s conclusion, we have to suggest that there is something wrong with the argument by challenging either its factual correctness or logical strength.  The analyst in Ex. 9 has completely ignored Mega Petroleum’s argument by drawing the conclusion solely on the basis of the company’s interest in paying only 75 million.  As with most inductive arguments, there are exceptions.  For example, if a person offers an argument the premises of which rely on the credibility of the person, one might have a logically strong ad hominem for an argument.  Nonetheless, most ad hominems when applied to arguments violate The Rule of Total Evidence .

In closing this chapter is it important to point out how useful ad hominem arguments are.   They can help us know when we ought to ask more questions, as well as guide us to more reliable sources (among other things).  Similarly, if a person has a history of exaggerating, then it makes perfect sense to doubt her claim that she saw “like 100 whales” on her vacation.  So too when the mechanic says you need 4 new tires instead of just 1, you could just take his word for it.  But if he has an interest in your buying 4 new tires you should be skeptical on the basis of an ad hominem and ask for more information.

Ad hominems are also useful for sorting through information.  Suppose, for example, that you are interested in learning about some controversial topic—say abortion.  You want to get a solid sense of the relevant issues so you can think about it for yourself.  To this end there are all kinds of sources available, but you cannot read them all.  So how are you going to decide what to read?  To simplify, suppose you have narrowed the field to three books.  You find out that one of the books is written by the director of a prominent Pro-Life organization, one of the books is written by a prominent member of a Pro-Choice organization, and one is written by a professional bioethicist.  Presumably you will choose the book written by the bioethicist, and presumably you will do so on the basis of an ad hominem —there is some reason to think that the overall credibility of the two other books might be compromised (they may not offer a fair presentation of the issues, for example).  To be clear: this is not to say that these authors cannot offer a balanced presentation of the issues (we are not appealing to a Denier after all), but only that we have some reason to be suspicious that this is the case.  In this case we can justifiably use ad hominems to decide among many possible sources.

Nevertheless, we have to be careful with negative ad hominems .  We do not want to unfairly or inaccurately challenge a person’s credibility.  This means that we have be sure that the feature in question genuinely gives us good reason to suspect the other person’s honesty or their ability to have an accurate belief on the issue in question.  Often simply taking the time to ask this question will allow us to quickly distinguish between logically strong and logically weak ad hominem s.  That is, once you’ve identified the feature in question ask:

Two Questions to Ask of Negative Ad Hominems:  Does this feature…

  • Give us reason to think the source is not being honest or sincere in this case?
  • Give us reason to think the source is not in a good position to know in this case?

Exercise Set 17A:

Directions: For each of the following (i) decide if it is an ad hominem argument or not.  If it is a Denier say so.  (ii) Using the questions above, briefly comment on the arguments’ logical strength.  Be ready to share your answers.

Health Inspector to Restaurant Owner: Sorry, but I just can’t take your word for it that everything is up to code.  In recent years you have claimed to be up to code, but have actually had numerous health code violations.

Nixon is surely our worst president; after all, no other president has had to resign the office.

A: According to Senator X, without a boost to defense funding, the U. S. will be at increased risk for a terrorist attack.

B: That has got to be false; Senator X has been a staunch supporter of the defense industry, nobody in the Senate receives more campaign contributions from this industry than X.

A: The Company’s accountant claims that she is not aware of any accounting irregularities.

B: Whatever, don’t you know that she owns thousands of shares of the company’s stock!

A: C thinks my relationship with D is not healthy and that we should go out on more dates instead of hanging around the dorm all the time.

B: I wouldn’t exactly take relationship advice from C.  She’s never had a long-term relationship.

Exercise Set 17B:

Directions: Assume that all the following are ad hominems.  For each case, evaluate the argument for logical strength using the questions above.  Explain your answer.

A: I am totally on board with limiting the capacity of gun magazines.  I think that the danger to society of large-capacity magazines outweighs individual’s preferences for them.

B: Whatever, you’ve never even held a gun, much less fired one!

You can’t take what he says seriously! I mean the guy’s name is ‘Cletus’!

A: The football team is underfunded.  We have by far the lowest operating budget of any team in our conference.  We can’t even afford to have our jerseys washed after every game!

B: It is no surprise you’d say that since you’re on the team.

You can’t take the candidate’s economic policy seriously, I mean the guy has an elevator—for his cars—and gets a $70,000 tax break—on his horses!

Kid to mom: “How can you stand there and tell me I shouldn’t smoke pot?  I know that you did when you were in college!”

A: The American prison system needs to be reformed.  Per capita the U.S. imprisons more of its citizens than any other country in the world.

B: This , coming from a convict.  Yeah, right.

Exercise Set 17C:

This chapter is all about distinguishing logically strong ad hominems from logically weak ones.  But why does this matter?  That is, why should we care whether our ad hominems are good or not?

In this chapter we have focused primarily on interpersonal ad hominems .  But as we’ve seen, we use ad hominem -style reasoning to sort out trustworthy and untrustworthy sources more broadly.  Are there any sources of information you tend to dismiss?  On what grounds?  Explain.

What is a conflict of interest?  Give an example.  How are conflicts of interest related to ad hominem arguments?

  • Use of the term 'denier' follows Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter and Fogelin, Robert. (2010). Understanding Arguments 8th ed . Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Cengage, 355-56. ↵

Optimize Your Thinking Skills

Ad Hominem: How to Deal With a Personal Attack

Personal attack

I had a disagreement with my boss. He insisted that we should move forward on a project his way instead of mine. To make his case, he began criticizing me. 

When I called him out for a personal attack instead of my position, he was tongue-tied. He didn’t even realize his argument was commiting a common fallacy : the ad hominem.

What Is an Ad Hominem Fallacy?

Ad hominem arguments look to falsify a claim by attacking the person who’s making the claim. Since claims are true or false regardless of who makes them, the person who is making the claim is irrelevant to evaluating the claim’s truth or falsity. 

For example, if Hitler claims that 2 + 2 = 4, that doesn’t automatically make the claim false. Hitler is a bad person, but that doesn’t mean that everything he says is false. Dismissing a claim simply because a bad person says it is an example of Ad hominem. 

When people commit an ad hominem fallacy, they are mistaking criticism of a person with criticism of a claim or an argument. The Latin term ‘Ad hominem’ means “to the person.” When people commit an ad hominem fallacy, they’re attacking the arguer in an effort to falsify the arguer’s claim. It’s a fallacy because attacking the person can’t succeed in falsifying the claim. The truth or falsity of the claim is completely independent of the person who makes it.  

Some synonyms for “Ad hominem” include, “Appeal to the person,” “Personal abuse,” “Verbal abuse fallacy,” “Name-calling,”  “Ad hominem attack,” and “Argumentum ad hominem.” 

Here’s what ad hominem looks like:

Alex: “We should have free college for all, so more people can get a college degree.” 

Jen: “No, college shouldn’t be free. You’re just a hippie.” 

This is a logical fallacy because attacking the person with abusive remarks or name-calling does not prove the claim to be false. Even if Alex is a hippie, that doesn’t give us any reason to think that what Alex says is false. Alex could just as easily say that 2 + 2 = 4. Would Jen reject that claim as well? 

An argument is bad because of its logic, not because of the person who makes it.

Personal attack

Ad Hominem as the Mirror Image of Appeal to Authority

Ad hominem is often a mirror image of appeal to authority. In ad hominem, someone appeals to negative characteristics of a person to reject a claim, and in an appeal to authority , someone appeals to the positive characteristics of a person to accept a claim. Both appeals are fallacious because the characteristics of the person are irrelevant to whether the person’s claim is true.

 Ad Hominem    

Sam, “There is an afterlife.”

Sam is a devil.

So, there is no afterlife.

Appeal to Authority          

Sam is a saint.

So, there is an afterlife.

Contrast the earlier Hitler example with another: If Mother Teresa claims that you should give money to the poor, that doesn’t automatically make the claim true. 

People with negative characteristics can still be right, and people with positive characteristics can still be wrong , so discussing personal characteristics instead of the claim itself is a fallacy. 

Some common traits that people think are either negative or positive are based on people’s social, physical, personality or characteristic traits. Examples include being rude or polite, being obese or thin, being a man or a woman, being loud or quiet, being conservative or liberal, being rich or poor, being a KKK member or an ACLU donor. All and all, it could be any characteristic of a person that factors into an ad hominem. 

Ad hominem is so common because evaluating people is so familiar to us. It’s one of the first things we learn to do in childhood. Because that way of evaluating things is so familiar, people tend to default to it even when it’s irrelevant. This results in ad hominem being one of the most common fallacies—like tu quoque or straw man. 

Here are some examples of personal attack, aka ad hominem:

Anderson Cooper said, “We should eliminate the death penalty because it is inhuman,” but Cooper is a left-leaning political head, so his claim must be false.

Explanation: It doesn’t matter what political party Anderson Cooper endorses; we are evaluating his claim about the death penalty, so we need to remove Cooper from the equation to avoid an ad hominem fallacy.

James said, “College is a waste of time.” Since James didn’t go to college, he has to be wrong.

Explanation: Again, we’ll need to look at James’s claim rather than his background. He could very well be wrong, but we can’t dismiss his claim based on whether or not he went to college.

Example #3 

Trump said, “The USA is the best place to start a business because the tax rates are so low for small businesses.” Since Trump is a pig in human clothing, this claim is false.

Explanation: You can’t reject an argument simply because it comes from someone you dislike. The argument itself needs to be evaluated before accepting, rejecting, or withholding judgment about the conclusion .

Rob says that we shouldn’t have affirmative action. But Rob isn’t a minority, so we should reject that claim.

Explanation: Again, we will need to look at Rob’s claim rather than his background. He could very well be wrong, but we can’t dismiss what he says simply because of his genetics. 

Sally says we should help the poor, but she grew up in a rich family, so she doesn’t know what she’s talking about. 

Explanation: We will need to evaluate Sally’s claim rather than her upbringing. She could very well be wrong, but we can’t dismiss what she says simply because of her family’s economic circumstances. 

How to Disarm Personal Attack

Most of the time, people resort to ad hominem attacks because evaluating people is something they learned from an early age. It takes skills to argue against a good argument or claim, and most people aren’t skilled at doing it, so they fall back on something that’s more familiar, easy, and comfortable: evaluating people instead of arguments and claims. 

If someone attacks you and not your claim, then point out that it is the claim that needs to be evaluated not the person making it. By focusing attention back on the claim, you’re bringing the fallacy to light and bringing the discussion to a more productive place.

Also, politicians are notorious for using dirty tricks to attempt character assassination. Next time you hear them talk about their opponents, be on the lookout for personal attacks that altogether avoid dealing with the opponent’s argument. 

Free Thinker Approach to Ad Hominem

Free thinkers are interested in knowing and understanding what’s true , and they are interested in the evidence , not the source. In every case, the claim needs to be evaluated, not the person who makes it. 

Personal attack aka ad hominem verus free thinker

In general, you need to completely remove the person who’s making the claim from your evaluation of the claim. This is the only way to avoid an ad hominem fallacy and ensure that you’re genuinely focused on knowing and understanding what’s true.

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Argumentum ad hominem

Argumentum ad hominem (from the Latin , "argument to the person") is an informal logical fallacy that occurs when someone attempts to refute an argument by attacking the claim-maker , rather than engaging in an argument or factual refutation of the claim. There are many subsets of ad hominem , all of them attacking the source of the claim rather than attacking the claim or attempting to counter arguments. They are a type of fallacy of relevance.

The fallacy is a subset of the genetic fallacy , as it focuses on the source of the argument, at the expense of focusing on the truth or falsity of the actual argument itself.

An ad hominem should not be confused with an insult, which admittedly attacks a person, but does not seek to rebut that person's arguments by doing so — that type of rhetoric is better termed as poisoning the well .

Of note: if the subject of discussion is whether or not somebody is credible and/or competent — e.g., "believe X because I am Y" — then it is not an ad hominem to criticize their qualifications.

  • 1 Alternative names
  • 2 Strict usage
  • 3.2 As convincing rhetoric
  • 4.1 When debating about a person
  • 4.2 Incidental, unrelated ad hominem
  • 7 Additional meanings
  • 8.1 Want to read this in another language?
  • 9 External links
  • 10 References

Alternative names [ edit ]

  • Argument against the man
  • Attack on the person
  • Character assassination
  • Personal attack

Strict usage [ edit ]

An ad hominem argument has the basic form:

How ad hominem works [ edit ]

Usage [ edit ].

While an ad hominem attack is not synonymous with "crass insult" ( see below ), it is also true that you can make a fallacious ad hom argument without being rude or crass about it. As a result, these can go unacknowledged as fallacious.

The "circumstantial ad hominem ", or "appeal to motive", happens where an opponent's argument is discarded on the basis that they have some motivation for making it; for example, that it is in a banker's best interests to say he has not stolen from his company's accounts, so obviously he has. All "well they would say that, wouldn't they?" arguments are based on this form of ad hominem and can regularly be found propping up conspiracy theories when their existence is denied by an authority. A good rule of thumb to spot the fallacy here is that this sort of argument devalues the denial, but does not bolster the original assertion.

As convincing rhetoric [ edit ]

Often, ad hominem attacks are used subtly in order to influence the views of spectators. This is often termed poisoning the well where it occurs before an argument has been made, and is a form of psychological priming . One could point out bad things that the opponent has done in the past, for instance, or establish an untrustworthy track record. In arguments about morality , one could make the argument that the opponent does not practice what they preach . This is a special case called ad hominem tu quoque .

Ad hominem arguments can work to convince people via a combination of the halo effect and cognitive ease . The halo effect is a cognitive bias in which the perception of one trait is influenced by the perception of an unrelated trait, e.g. treating an attractive person as more intelligent or more honest. Thus, if you can attribute a bad trait to your opponent, others will tend to doubt the quality of their arguments. With respect to cognitive ease, by repeating the ad hominem enough times , the cognitive strain required to reject someone's argument is lowered. By sufficient association with negative personal traits, rejecting an argument (with or without thorough evaluation) becomes a favoured option.

Not ad hom [ edit ]

There is common confusion about what is, and what isn't, ad hominem — that is, what does and does not employ fallacious reasoning. Generally, ad hominem does not mean "crass insult".

When debating about a person [ edit ]

As ad hominem arguments are only fallacious if they do not follow ( non sequitur ), if the argument and the person's character are related, then there may not be a fallacy. In particular, a criticism is not an ad hominem argument if a person's merits are actually the topic of the argument. If the subject of the debate is the inherent trustworthiness of someone, or what prior probability you would assign to them telling the truth, then their previous track record is relevant to the subject. If debating a person's ability to do a task, then their effectiveness at that task or suitably similar ones is relevant.

Incidental, unrelated ad hominem [ edit ]

Ad hominem attacks are strictly fallacious when the attack has little or no bearing on the argument at hand. For example, dismissing a female scientist 's opinion on a subject because she is a woman would be a fallacious ad hominem argument. Dismissing it for being incorrect with relevant evidence or reasoning, but making a sexist comment at the same time, would not employ formally fallacious reasoning. On the flip-side, dismissing that evidence or reasoning because it came packaged with a sexist comment wouldn't follow.

Of course, the fact that something is not a logical fallacy does not automatically make it a desirable debating tactic. Even if the underlying argument is sound, snide remarks and obnoxious insults can form an effective part of the rhetoric and cause people to dismiss an argument as the incidental attack triggers their own prior biases ( see above ).

Abuse [ edit ]

Strangely, the people who cry about " ad hominem " the most tend to be those who make ad hominems the most. This may be because the people who tend to care about ad hominem attacks (since they, unlike most people, aren't able to brush them off and get back to the substance of the debate) are also those who aren't able to make more substantive attacks than "You're dumb."

Alternatively, people all too often cry " ad hominem " when their debate opponent insults them, while failing to see the opposing arguments. [5]

TL;DR [ edit ]

  • You are wrong and you are an idiot.
  • You are wrong because you are an idiot.

Additional meanings [ edit ]

The traditional meaning of the phrase is that an " argumentum ad hominem " is one tailored to appeal to the person with whom one is arguing rather than to impartial reason. This definition may be seen in Modern English Usage by H. H. Fowler, [6] a book whose explanations of usage are often taken as highly authoritative, if not definitive. For example, if you wanted to convince someone that Costa Rica was a superior place to go on vacation and you knew that the person was a keen birdwatcher, you might point out that Costa Rica is full of interesting bird life.

Fowler also mentions the following types of argumenta:

  • ad baculum (stick) or baculimum, threat of force instead of argument;
  • ad ignorantiam , one depending for its effect on the hearer's not knowing something essential;
  • ad populum , one pandering to popular passion;
  • ad vericundiam (modesty), one to meet which requires the opponent to offend against decorum.

See also [ edit ]

  • Argumentum ad cellarium
  • Argumentum ex culo
  • Emotional appeal
  • Loaded language
  • Non sequitur
  • Red herring
  • Shill gambit

Want to read this in another language? [ edit ]

External links [ edit ].

  • See the Wikipedia article on Ad hominem .
  • "Ad Hominem: How People Use Personal Attacks to Win Arguments" , Effectiviology
  • "Ad Hominem" Fallacy Files
  • "Ad Hominem" , Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
  • Attacking the Person , Michael J. Connelly
  • Your logical fallacy is ad hominem , YLFI

References [ edit ]

  • ↑ Gloria Allred has been endlessly parodied. A new movie aims to celebrate her instead. by Stephanie Merry (February 9, 2018 at 1:04 PM) The Washington Post .
  • ↑ "Are the Chronicles of Narnia Sexist and Racist? A Discussion in Eight Parts" by Dr. Devin Brown, Narnia Web
  • ↑ "A Secular Fantasy: The Flawed But Fascinating Fiction of Philip Pullman" by Cathy Young , Reason Magazine
  • ↑ Kissing a hot cousin in this case just may be better than promoting communism and socialism, sucking Muslim dick and living a libtard fairy tale dream where the only reality is cashing in that welfare check that is endorsed by those slimy, murderous, disgusting politicians you call "leaders"… by u/Quietuus (c. 2016) Reddit (archived from February 22, 2017).
  • ↑ The Ad Hominem Fallacy Fallacy by Stephen Bond
  • ↑ Fowler's Dictionary of Modern English Usage , edited by Jeremy Butterfield (2015) Oxford Unviersity Press. 4 th ed. ISBN 9780199661350.
  • Latin phrases
  • Pages using DynamicPageList parser function
  • Articles with unsourced statements

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  1. Ad Hominem Examples: Types & Functions

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COMMENTS

  1. Ad hominem

    Ad hominem ( Latin for 'to the person'), short for argumentum ad hominem, refers to several types of arguments, which are fallacious.

  2. Ad Hominem Fallacy

    Ad hominem fallacy (or ad hominem) is an attempt to discredit someone's argument by personally attacking them. Instead of discussing the argument itself, criticism is directed toward the opponent's character, which is irrelevant to the discussion. Ad hominem fallacy example

  3. Ad hominem

    ad hominem, (Latin: "against the man") type of argument or attack that appeals to prejudice or feelings or irrelevantly impugns another person's character instead of addressing the facts or claims made by the latter.

  4. Ad Hominem: When People Use Personal Attacks in Arguments

    An ad hominem argument is a personal attack against the source of an argument, rather than against the argument itself. Essentially, this means that ad hominem arguments are used to attack opposing views indirectly, by attacking the individuals or groups that support these views.

  5. Definition and Examples of an Ad Hominem Fallacy

    Ad hominem is a logical fallacy that involves a personal attack: an argument based on the perceived failings of an adversary rather than on the merits of the case.

  6. What Is the Ad Hominem Logical Fallacy?

    Ad hominem (Latin for "to the person") is a category of argumentative strategies that involve criticizing an opponent's character, motive, background, or other personal attributes instead of their argument's content. Here's a quick example: Person 1: I'm tired of always being the driver whenever we go out as a group.

  7. Ad Hominem

    Using ad hominem in an argumentive text or rhetoric is not a good idea; and that it becomes a logical fallacy and connects to ethos. It means that the person must use ethos to avoid ad hominem in his arguments or writing. Ethos is based on the argument with reference to an authority whereby an appeal to authority is made.

  8. Fallacies

    Hamblin (1970, 161-62) and Nuchelmans (1993) trace the idea of ad hominem arguments back to Aristotle, and Locke's remark that the name argumentum ad hominem was already known has been investigated by Finocchiaro (1974) who finds the term and the argument kind in Galileo's writings more than a half-century before the Essay Concerning ...

  9. Wising Up About Ad Hominem Arguments

    Argumentum Ad Hominem: Fallacious argument that attacks not an opponent's beliefs but his motives or character. It's often misunderstood. Here's an example of what it really means.

  10. Ad hominem Definition & Meaning

    An "argument ad hominem" (or argumentum ad hominem, to use the full New Latin phrase) was a valid method of persuasion by which one took advantage of an opponent's interests or feelings in a debate, instead of just sticking to general principles.

  11. Fallacies: Introduction to Ad Hominem (video)

    P3: An ad feminam argument is one which attempts to ignore a person's argument on the basis of their female gender. P4: An abusive ad hominem argument is one which presents a person's characteristic as a reason to ignore their argument. C1: Therefore, gender is a characteristic. C2: Therefore, an ad feminam argument is an abusive ad hominem ...

  12. Ad Hominem Fallacy (18 Examples

    An ad hominem fallacy happens when someone tries to discredit an argument by attacking the individual presenting it. They're not taking on the argument itself. It's crucial to differentiate an ad hominem argument from genuine critique or feedback. Criticism is focused on the argument or the idea, not the person making it.

  13. Fallacies in Ad Hominem Arguments

    Arguments ad hominem are common in political debates, legal argumentation and everyday conversations. In this article, we propose a general definition of ad hominem arguments. An argument ad hominem is an argument that makes a claim about the reliability of a person in the performance of a certain function, based on some attribute relating to the person in question.

  14. Ad Hominem

    Ad Hominem Fallacy: (abusive and circumstantial): the fallacy of attacking the character or circumstances of an individual who is advancing a statement or an argument instead of seeking to disprove the truth of the statement or the soundness of the argument. Often the fallacy is characterized simply as a personal attack.

  15. 15 ad hominem Fallacy Examples (2024)

    The ad hominem fallacy is a fallacy in which a person discredits or rebuts an argument by attacking the speaker rather than the argument itself. In Latin, ad hominem means 'to the man' and this fallacy does exactly that. It targets the person rather than the argument.

  16. Argument Against the Person

    The ad hominem fallacy is a class of fallacies which is not only common but also commonly misunderstood. Many people assume that any personal attack is an ad hominem argument, but that isn't true. Some attacks aren't ad hominem fallacies, and some ad hominem fallacies aren't clear insults.

  17. Ad Hominem Fallacy

    The ad hominem fallacy is a logical fallacy, specifically a fallacy of relevance, i.e, the argument raised is irrelevant to the discussion.An ad hominem fallacy appeals to our emotions and prejudices rather than facts. Ad hominem literally means "to the person" as in being "directed at the person". An ad hominem argument is therefore an attack directed against the person who makes a ...

  18. What Is Ad Hominem Fallacy?

    Ad hominem arguments come in many forms, and some fall into multiple categories. The varieties of ad hominem arguments include the following: Poisoning the well is an ad hominem attempt to dismiss an argument by commenting on the person who will present it (e.g., a candidate might say in a debate, "My opponent, who is funded by oil companies, will of course argue against renewable energy ...

  19. Fallacy Watch: Ad Hominem and Arguments from Authority

    Ad Hominem Arguments. Ad hominem is a Latin term meaning "against the person.". An ad hominem argument is therefore an attack on person making an argument rather than a case against what they say. For instance: Socrates' ideas on beauty must be wrong because he was so ugly. This is obviously wrong, because someone's appearance does not ...

  20. 6.02: Trust and the Ad Hominem

    For example, if a person offers an argument the premises of which rely on the credibility of the person, one might have a logically strong ad hominem for an argument. Nonetheless, most ad hominems when applied to arguments violate The Rule of Total Evidence. In closing this chapter is it important to point out how useful ad hominem arguments ...

  21. Ad Hominem: How to Deal With a Personal Attack

    Ad hominem arguments look to falsify a claim by attacking the person who's making the claim. Since claims are true or false regardless of who makes them, the person who is making the claim is irrelevant to evaluating the claim's truth or falsity. For example, if Hitler claims that 2 + 2 = 4, that doesn't automatically make the claim false.

  22. Argumentum ad hominem

    Argumentum ad hominem (from the Latin, "argument to the person") is an informal logical fallacy that occurs when someone attempts to refute an argument by attacking the claim-maker, rather than engaging in an argument or factual refutation of the claim. There are many subsets of ad hominem, all of them attacking the source of the claim rather than attacking the claim or attempting to counter ...

  23. Argumentum Ad Hominem: Different Types of Personal Attack in an

    Ad hominem arguments are fallacious because they don't actually address the other person's argument, they just attack the person making the argument. So let's try to avoid ad hominems. If we ...

  24. Biden campaign channels Jill Biden's frustration over special counsel

    Mitch Landrieu, who recently left a White House post to become a co-chair of Biden's campaign, said the report was an "ad hominem attack that questioned the president's capacity" and didn ...

  25. Апелляция к личности

    Апелляция к личности (лат. argumentum ad hominem — «аргумент к человеку») — логическая ошибка, при которой аргумент опровергается указанием на характер, мотив или другой атрибут лица, приводящего аргумент, или лица ...