The Federalist Papers

By alexander hamilton , james madison , john jay, the federalist papers summary and analysis of essay 10.

Madison begins perhaps the most famous essay of The Federalist Papers by stating that one of the strongest arguments in favor of the Constitution is the fact that it establishes a government capable of controlling the violence and damage caused by factions. Madison defines factions as groups of people who gather together to protect and promote their special economic interests and political opinions. Although these factions are at odds with each other, they frequently work against the public interest and infringe upon the rights of others.

Both supporters and opponents of the plan are concerned with the political instability produced by rival factions. The state governments have not succeeded in solving this problem; in fact, the situation is so problematic that people are disillusioned with all politicians and blame the government for their problems. Consequently, any form of popular government that can deal successfully with this problem has a great deal to recommend it.

Given the nature of man, factions are inevitable. As long as men hold different opinions, have different amounts of wealth, and own different amounts of property, they will continue to fraternize with those people who are most similar to them. Both serious and trivial reasons account for the formation of factions, but the most important source of faction is the unequal distribution of property. Men of greater ability and talent tend to possess more property than those of lesser ability, and since the first object of government is to protect and encourage ability, it follows that the rights of property owners must be protected. Property is divided unequally, and, in addition, there are many different kinds of property. Men have different interests depending upon the kind of property they own. For example, the interests of landowners differ from those of business owners. Governments must not only protect the conflicting interests of property owners but also must successfully regulate the conflicts between those with and without property.

To Madison, there are only two ways to control a faction: to remove its causes and to control its effects. There are only two ways to remove the causes of a faction: destroy liberty or give every citizen the same opinions, passions, and interests. Destroying liberty is a "cure worse then the disease itself," and the second is impracticable. The causes of factions are thus part of the nature of man, so we must accept their existence and deal with their effects. The government created by the Constitution controls the damage caused by such factions.

The framers established a representative form of government: a government in which the many elect the few who govern. Pure or direct democracies (countries in which all the citizens participate directly in making the laws) cannot possibly control factious conflicts. This is because the strongest and largest faction dominates and there is no way to protect weak factions against the actions of an obnoxious individual or a strong majority. Direct democracies cannot effectively protect personal and property rights and have always been characterized by conflict.

If the new plan of government is adopted, Madison hopes that the men elected to office will be wise and good men,­ the best of America. Theoretically, those who govern should be the least likely to sacrifice the public good for temporary conditions, but the opposite could happen. Men who are members of particular factions or who have prejudices or evil motives might manage, by intrigue or corruption, to win elections and then betray the interests of the people. However, the possibility of this happening in a large country, such as the United States, is greatly reduced. The likelihood that public offices will be held by qualified men is greater in large countries because there will be more representatives chosen by a greater number of citizens. This makes it more difficult for the candidates to deceive the people. Representative government is needed in large countries, not to protect the people from the tyranny of the few, but rather to guard against the rule of the mob.

In large republics, factions will be numerous, but they will be weaker than in small, direct democracies where it is easier for factions to consolidate their strength. In this country, leaders of factions may be able to influence state governments to support unsound economic and political policies ­as the states, far from being abolished, retain much of their sovereignty. If the framers had abolished the state governments, then opponents of the proposed government would have had a legitimate objection.

The immediate object of the constitution is to bring the present thirteen states into a secure union. Almost every state, old and new, will have one boundary next to territory owned by a foreign nation. The states farthest from the center of the country will be most endangered by these foreign countries; they may find it inconvenient to send representatives long distances to the capital, but in terms of safety and protection, they stand to gain the most from a strong national government.

Madison concludes that he presents these previous arguments because he is confident that many will not listen to those "prophets of gloom" who say that the proposed government is unworkable. For this founding father, it seems incredible that these gloomy voices suggest abandoning the idea of coming together in strength—after all, the states still have common interests. Madison concludes that "according to the degree of pleasure and pride we feel in being Republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists."

James Madison carried to the Convention a plan that was the exact opposite of Hamilton's. In fact, the theory he advocated at Philadelphia and in his essays was developed as a republican substitute for the New Yorker's "high toned" scheme of state. Madison was convinced that the class struggle would be ameliorated in America by establishing a limited federal government that would make functional use of the vast size of the country and the existence of the states as active political organisms. He argued in his "Notes on Confederacy," in his Convention speeches, and again in Federalist 10 that if an extended republic were set up including a multiplicity of economic, geographic, social, religious, and sectional interests, then these interests, by checking each other, would prevent American society from being divided into the clashing armies of the rich and the poor. Thus, if no interstate proletariat could become organized on purely economic lines, the property of the rich would be safe even though the mass of the people held political power. Madison's solution for the class struggle was not to set up an absolute state to regiment society from above; he was never willing to sacrifice liberty to gain security. Rather, he wished to multiply the deposits of political power in the state itself to break down the dichotomy of rich and poor, thereby guaranteeing both liberty and security. This, as he stated in Federalist 10, would provide a "republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government."

It is also interesting to note that James Madison was the most creative and philosophical disciple of the Scottish school of science and politics in attendance at the Philadelphia Convention. His effectiveness as an advocate of a new constitution, and of the particular Constitution that was drawn up in Philadelphia in 1787, was based in a large part on his personal experience in public life and his personal knowledge of the conditions of American in 1787. But Madison's greatness as a statesman also rests in part on his ability to set his limited personal experience within the context of the experience of men in other ages and times, thus giving extra insight to his political formulations.

His most amazing political prophecy, contained within the pages of Federalist 10, was that the size of the United States and its variety of interests constituted a guarantee of stability and justice under the new Constitution. When Madison made this prophecy, the accepted opinion among all sophisticated politicians was exactly the opposite. It was David Hume's speculations on the "Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth," first published in 1752, that most stimulated James Madison's' thought on factions. In this essay, Hume decried any attempt to substitute a political utopia for "the common botched and inaccurate governments" which seemed to serve imperfect men so well. Nevertheless, he argued, the idea of a perfect commonwealth "is surely the most worthy curiosity of any the wit of man can possibly devise. And who knows, if this controversy were fixed by the universal consent of the wise and learned, but, in some future age, an opportunity might be afforded of reducing the theory to practice, either by a dissolution of some old government, or by the combination of men to form a new one, in some distant part of the world. " At the end of Hume's essay was a discussion that was of interest to Madison. The Scot casually demolished the Montesquieu small-republic theory; and it was this part of the essay, contained in a single page, that was to serve Madison in new-modeling a "botched" Confederation "in a distant part of the world." Hume said that "in a large government, which is modeled with masterly skill, there is compass and room enough to refine the democracy, from the lower people, who may be admitted into the first elections or first concoction of the commonwealth, to the higher magistrate, who direct all the movements. At the same time, the parts are so distant and remote, that it is very difficult, either by intrigue, prejudice, or passion, to hurry them into any measure against the public interest." Hume's analysis here had turned the small-territory republic theory upside down: if a free state could once be established in a large area, it would be stable and safe from the effects of faction. Madison had found the answer to Montesquieu. He had also found in embryonic form his own theory of the extended federal republic.

In Hume's essay lay the germ for Madison's theory of the extended republic. It is interesting to see how he took these scattered and incomplete fragments and built them into an intellectual and theoretical structure of his own. Madison's first full statement of this hypothesis appeared in his "Notes on the Confederacy" written in April 1787, eight months before the final version of it was published as the tenth Federalist. Starting with the proposition that "in republican Government, the majority, however, composed, ultimately give the law," Madison then asks what is to restrain an interested majority from unjust violations of the minority's rights? Three motives might be claimed to meliorate the selfishness of the majority: first, "prudent regard for their own good, as involved in the general . . . good" second, "respect for character" and finally, religious scruples. After examining each in its turn Madison concludes that they are but a frail bulwark against a ruthless party.

When one examines these two papers in which Hume and Madison summed up the eighteenth century's most profound thought on political parties, it becomes increasingly clear that the young American used the earlier work in preparing a survey on factions through the ages to introduce his own discussion of faction in America. Hume's work was admirably adapted to this purpose. It was philosophical and scientific in the best tradition of the Enlightenment. The facile domination of faction had been a commonplace in English politics for a hundred years, as Whig and Tory vociferously sought to fasten the label on each other. But the Scot, very little interested as a partisan and very much so as a social scientist, treated the subject therefore in psychological, intellectual, and socioeconomic terms. Throughout all history, he discovered, mankind has been divided into factions based either on personal loyalty to some leader or upon some "sentiment or interest" common to the group as a unit. This latter type he called a "Real" as distinguished from the "personal" faction. Finally, he subdivided the "real factions" into parties based on "interest, upon principle," or upon affection."

Hume spent well over five pages dissecting these three types; but Madison, while determined to be inclusive, had not the space to go into such minute analysis. Besides, he was more intent now on developing the cure than on describing the malady. He therefore consolidated Hume's two-page treatment of "personal" factions and his long discussion of parties based on "principle and affection" into a single sentence. The tenth Federalist reads" "A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex ad oppress each other than to co-operate for their common good." It is hard to conceive of a more perfect example of the concentration of idea and meaning than Madison achieved in this famous sentence.

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The Federalist Papers Questions and Answers

The Question and Answer section for The Federalist Papers is a great resource to ask questions, find answers, and discuss the novel.

How Madison viewed human nature?

Madison saw depravity in human nature, but he saw virtue as well. His view of human nature may have owed more to John Locke than to John Calvin. In any case, as Saul K. Padover asserted more than a half-century ago, Madison often appeared to steer...

How arguable and provable is the author of cato 4 claim

What specific claim are you referring to?

Federalist #10

According to Madison, there are only two ways to remove the causes of a faction: destroy liberty or give every citizen the same opinions, passions, and interests. As a result, he notes that destroying liberty is a "cure worse then the disease...

Study Guide for The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers study guide contains a biography of Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, literature essays, a complete e-text, quiz questions, major themes, characters, and a full summary and analysis.

  • About The Federalist Papers
  • The Federalist Papers Summary
  • The Federalist Papers Video
  • Character List

Essays for The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers essays are academic essays for citation. These papers were written primarily by students and provide critical analysis of The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison.

  • A Close Reading of James Madison's The Federalist No. 51 and its Relevancy Within the Sphere of Modern Political Thought
  • Lock, Hobbes, and the Federalist Papers
  • Comparison of Federalist Paper 78 and Brutus XI
  • The Paradox of the Republic: A Close Reading of Federalist 10
  • Manipulation of Individual Citizen Motivations in the Federalist Papers

Lesson Plan for The Federalist Papers

  • About the Author
  • Study Objectives
  • Common Core Standards
  • Introduction to The Federalist Papers
  • Relationship to Other Books
  • Bringing in Technology
  • Notes to the Teacher
  • Related Links
  • The Federalist Papers Bibliography

E-Text of The Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers e-text contains the full text of The Federalist Papers by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison.

  • FEDERALIST. Nos. 1-5
  • FEDERALIST. Nos. 6-10
  • FEDERALIST. Nos. 11-15
  • FEDERALIST. Nos. 16-20
  • FEDERALIST. Nos. 21-25

Wikipedia Entries for The Federalist Papers

  • Introduction
  • Structure and content
  • Judicial use
  • Complete list

what is the main idea of federalist paper #10

“Federalist 10” by James Madison: Summary and Analysis

Introduction, summary of federalist 10, analysis of madison’s arguments in federalist 10, works cited.

Federalist 10 is an essay written by James Madison and published in 1787 as a tenth part of The Federalist Papers, emphasizing the need for ratifying the United States Constitution. In this paper, Madison discussed factions, a group of citizens with similar interests and issues emerging in democracy, arguing that they often oppress minorities. As Madison sees factions as a significant problem for the state and interests of minority groups, he suggests a form of the representative republic as the most efficient against major oppressing groups.

In Madison’s essay, he claims that factions are created because of human nature and his tendency to join and organize communities. Moreover, as a crucial cause of factions, the author sees the unequal distribution of property in society, where there are creditors and debtors. Thus, he claims that debtors, for instance, may unite in a faction to try to protect their interests and solve their problems with the help of democracy, willing to redistribute creditors’ money, which will oppress the minority. Therefore, Madison suggests two ways of solving the problem of majoritarianism: either by removing its causes or controlling the effects.

As for removing causes producing factions, Madison also suggests two ways: either by denying the liberty of all the citizens or providing the same interests and values for all the people. However, Madison claims that both suggestions are impossible to be implemented because freedom and the guarantee of rights are crucial to political life. Moreover, no one can provide the same interests to a diverse society. Therefore, only controlling the effects of majoritarianism caused by human nature can be counted as a way to solve the problem of factions, which Madison sees possible only in a representative republic.

To make it clear, James Madison denies democracy as a form of government in which minorities are not oppressed. He sees democracy as a form of rule in which citizens are voting for or against proposed laws. At the same time, a republic for him is a government in which citizens, diverse in terms of their interests, choose a few representatives who will accept or deny laws for them. Therefore, in his essay Federalist 10, Madison argues that with the help of a representative republic, governments will be divided into small districts, avoiding factions.

It is crucial to start the analysis of Federalist 10 by defining its origins, meaning the essay Federalist 9 written by Alexander Hamilton, which addresses critics based on Montesquieu’s arguments of the failure nature of a federal Union. Hamilton writes that there is a “tendency of the Union to repress domestic faction and insurrection” (para. 14). Thus, as Hamilton in Federalist 9 answers the critique, claiming that Montesquieu’s words were taken out of the context, Madison in Federalist 10 continues the topic of fractions. In other words, Madison suggests a representative republic as a form of government in a Union as a means to avoid majoritarianism and insurrection.

James Madison’s essay number 10 is considered one of the most explanatory to the Constitution. The author provides a clear argument in favor of the republican form of government. McManus states: “Indeed, sheer geographic expanse can itself become an advantage since any leader who wishes to pursue a “wicked” project such as the abolition of debts or equality of property will be unable to gain sufficient traction to enact their “improper” egalitarian project” (29). Therefore, James Manus has successfully continued the discussion started by Hamilton, adding his own crucial arguments to support the federalist view.

Federalist 10 discusses the ways to avoid fractions because of oppressing wealthy citizens, which provides a ground for evaluating arguments’ weaknesses in the essay. According to McManus, “Madison was often far more concerned with the minority rights of the propertied than conventionally marginalized groups” (28). Thus, Madison tried to suggest solutions to protect the rights of people having property, not those marginalized and who need governmental protection. Therefore, the idea lying in the essay can be criticized for its vision of the poor majority as a threat and leading cause of fractions.

Moreover, another weak side of Madison’s arguments can be defined concerning its connection with official documents. Weiner claims: “when he announces at the end of the essay that he has “remedied” the “disease” of faction, Madison has not mentioned a single facet of the proposed Constitution—neither the judiciary nor bicameralism nor the president’s veto” (130-131). This may stand for Madison’s lack of proof to support his philosophical discussion on politics and the insufficiency of actual plans to avoid fractions and insurrections in the federal state.

It is necessary to state that the essay Federalist 10 is considered one of the most important in The Federalist Papers because it explains the US Constitution. In his paper, Madison argues that a representative republic is the best form of government to avoid harming the impact of fractions caused by majoritarianism. The essay continues the discussion started in Federalist 9 by Hamilton and provides clear arguments to support the republic and the federation. However, it does not concern marginalized groups, emphasizing the interests of wealthy minorities.

Hamilton, Alexander. Federalist Paper #9 – The Utility of the Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection . The Federalist Papers, 1787. Web.

McManus, Matthew. Liberal Rights and Their Critics. A Critical Legal Examination of Liberalism and Liberal Rights . Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, 2020. 3-65.

Weiner, Greg. After Federalist No. 10. National Affairs 33, 2017. 130-144.

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AP® US History

Federalist number 10: ap® us history crash course review.

  • The Albert Team
  • Last Updated On: March 1, 2022

Federalist Number 10 - AP® US History Crash Course Review

It’s no question that the Founding Fathers played an important role in American history. When it comes to the people who did so much for the founding of our nation, how can you keep track of everything they did? Luckily for you, we have all the tools you need to master the Fathers’ contributions to the American government. In this APUSH crash course review, we will talk about one of the key documents that could appear on the AP® exam: Federalist Number 10.

What is Federalist Number 10?

Federalist No. 10 is an essay written by James Madison, which appeared in The Federalist Papers . The papers were a collection of 85 articles and essays written by Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay in 1787 and 1788. They argued for the ratification of the Constitution and were published under the pseudonym Publius (the Roman Publius helped overthrow the monarchy and establish the Roman Republic).

Federalist Number 10 - AP® US History

The essay’s main argument was that a strong, united republic would be more effective than the individual states at controlling “factions” – groups of citizens united by some cause “adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the… interests of the community.” In other words, they were groups of people with radical ideas that weren’t good for everyone as a whole.

Factions are controlled either by removing the causes or controlling the effects. Essentially, this means that the government can either solve the problem with which the faction is concerned, or wait for the faction to act and repair the damage. Madison believed that removing the causes was impractical. Why? Well, he says, to get to factions’ ideas at the source, you would either have to take away their liberty or make it so everyone has the same opinions.

Taking away liberty was out of the question for Madison – he wrote, “Liberty is to faction what air is to fire.” Fire needs air to exist, but so do humans. Madison means that taking away liberty would destroy the factions, but it would also destroy others’ happiness. The second option – giving everyone the same opinions – is also impossible. As long as humans have the ability to reason, Madison says, they will form different opinions. Therefore, Madison argued instead that factions must be controlled by responding to them. He wanted to do this by giving them representation in a republican government.

The Constitution called for a republic, which elects representatives for the people. This is in contrast to a “pure democracy,” which would use the popular vote. Madison believed a republic would be able to extend the government to more free citizens of greater parts of the country, who wouldn’t necessarily be able to assemble, which would be required under a pure democracy.

According to Federalist No. 10, a large republic will help control factions because when more representatives are elected, there will be a greater number of opinions. Therefore, it is far less likely that there will be one majority oppressing the rest of the people.

Why is Federalist Number 10 Important?

Federalist No. 10 is possibly the most famous of The Federalist Papers , and is even regarded as one of the highest-quality political writings of all time. Some people even called James Madison the “Father of the Constitution” because of his essays’ influence.

Because Federalist No. 10 and the other Federalist Papers were published under a pseudonym, there was controversy surrounding them. You’re right. In fact, an entire group of Americans called the Anti-Federalists spoke out against these writings. In response to The Federalist Papers , Anti-Federalists even published an impressive collection of political writings called The Anti-Federalist Papers .

Anti-Federalists opposed making the government stronger, in the fear that giving more power to a president might lead to a monarchy. Instead, they wanted state governments to have more authority. This policy was outlined in the Articles of Confederation, the predecessor to the Constitution.

Federalist No. 10 may have had an influence on the eventual ratification of the Constitution, especially in New York. However, it is hard to measure its influence for sure. What is for sure is that debaters used many of the Federalist’s writings as a kind of handbook on how to argue in favor of the Constitution.

What You Need to Know for the APUSH Exam – Multiple-Choice

AP® exam multiple choice

The multiple-choice section of the APUSH exam could ask you either about specific details, like the contents of Federalist No. 10, or about broader implications, like its impact on ratification debates. You should be familiar with no only Federalist No. 10, but The Federalist Papers as a whole and the other authors, John Jay and Alexander Hamilton.

The multiple-choice section of the APUSH exam now asks you to respond to “stimulus material.” This means there will be sets of questions asking you about a primary or secondary source, such as a quote, painting, map, chart, etc.

Federalist No. 10 might be one of those primary documents. Luckily, you won’t have to identify it – the source will be written below the excerpt. However, you should read over Federalist 10 at some point during your studying, so you’re already familiar with the phrasing. That way, you can focus on the questions sooner, instead of having to digest all the material for the first time.

College Board has not released past multiple-choice questions of this type, but here is a question similar to the ones that could appear on the APUSH exam:

According to Federalist No. 10, Madison thought the most effective way to control factions was

(A)  eliminating the source of their grievances

(B)  forming a representative republic that would prevent oppression of their opponents

(C) adhering to the strong state powers outlined in the Articles of Confederation

(D) prohibiting faction assemblies

(E)  installing a pure democracy in which every man had equal political influence

The correct choice is B. Although Madison proposed the strategy in choice A as a potential option, he ultimately discredited it. Choice D is incorrect because Madison opposed taking away the factions’ liberty, as it was like “air is to fire.” Choices C and E directly contradict Madison’s position as a Federalist – instead, they represent the Anti-Federalist side of the debate.

What You Need to Know for the APUSH Exam – Essays and Document-Based Questions

The Free-Response Questions and DBQs on the APUSH exam will ask you to connect founding documents such as Federalist No. 10 with other events in the broader scope of American history. Madison’s essay or one of the other Federalist Papers could even be one of the sources for a DBQ.

Here is an example of a Free-Response Question  where you could tie in Federalist No. 10 into your answer:

Analyze the ways in which the political, economic, and diplomatic crises of the 1780’s shaped the provisions of the United States Constitution.  

If you want to write about Federalist No. 10 and the other essays from The Federalist Papers in your response, you could do so in your discussion of the political crises of the 1780’s. Talk about the debate over the Articles of Confederation between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists , and how Federalist No. 10 was used to convince Americans of the need to ratify the Constitution.

Of course, you will also need to bring in details about economic and diplomatic crises at this time, so Federalist No. 10 is only one piece of the puzzle. For more details on how to bring in those other aspects, check out our other APUSH crash courses and the College Board’s detailed scoring guidelines .

Congratulations – you’ve made it through our APUSH crash course on Federalist No. 10! Now you can feel confident tackling questions about one of the most important founding documents. With these tools in hand, you’re well on your way to a 5 in May.

Let’s put everything into practice. Try this AP® US History practice question:

APUSH Practice Question

Looking for more APUSH practice?

Check out our other articles on  AP® US History .

You can also find thousands of practice questions on Albert.io. Albert.io lets you customize your learning experience to target practice where you need the most help. We’ll give you challenging practice questions to help you achieve mastery of AP® US History.

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2 thoughts on “federalist number 10: ap® us history crash course review”.

I think it was James Madison who wrote Federalist No. 10, right? There are some points where this article says Hamilton, instead of Madison.

Good catch on the mix up; corrected!

Comments are closed.

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what is the main idea of federalist paper #10

Federalist 10

what is the main idea of federalist paper #10

Written by James Madison, this Federalist 10 defended the form of republican government proposed by the  Constitution . Critics of the Constitution argued that the proposed federal government was too large and would be unresponsive to the people.

PDF: Federalist Papers No 10

Writing Federalist Paper No 10

In response, Madison explored majority rule v. minority rights in this essay. He countered that it was exactly the great number of factions and diversity that would avoid tyranny. Groups would be forced to negotiate and compromise among themselves, arriving at solutions that would respect the rights of minorities. Further, he argued that the large size of the country would actually make it more difficult for factions to gain control over others. “The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other States.”

what is the main idea of federalist paper #10

Federalist 10 | BRI’s Primary Source Essentials

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what is the main idea of federalist paper #10

James Madison

No other Founder had as much influence in crafting, ratifying, and interpreting the United States Constitution and the Bill of Rights as he did. A skilled political tactician, Madison proved instrumental in determining the form of the early American republic.

what is the main idea of federalist paper #10

Would you have been a Federalist or an Anti-Federalist?

Federalist or Anti-Federalist? Over the next few months we will explore through a series of eLessons the debate over ratification of the United States Constitution as discussed in the Federalist and Anti-Federalist papers. We look forward to exploring this important debate with you! One of the great debates in American history was over the ratification […]

The Federalist Papers 10 and 51: Main Idea

How to create a goldilocks republic.

Both Federalist Papers 10 and 51 deal with how to make a government that's strong, but not too strong—basically, like the perfect Buffalo wing.

Federalist Paper 10 starts by pointing out that majority rule is kind of inherently chaotic. As nice as it sounds, using a simple majority to make difficult political decisions can lead to disaster when the people voting might not necessarily know the issues completely. Or, sometimes, not at all.

This can crash democracies straight into the wall—and it has in the past. By having a representative democracy, not only can ideas be looked over by qualified office holders, but the chance that one majority group will get a stranglehold on politics is also kicked down.

Along those lines, Federalist 51 states that the US Government will be composed of three branches, as each branch will keep the other from having too much power. Not only will the branches be entirely self-sufficient, but each will have some kind of power over the other. Since people aren't perfect, governments need to put all that explosive dictatorial power on the top shelf…where the people running the government can't reach.

  • Why would the legislative branch naturally be strongest branch of the government—what necessarily makes it stronger than either the executive or legislative branch?
  • Why does Madison think a Supreme Court Justice shouldn't be elected by popular vote?
  • Do you agree with him, or do you think they should be elected another way?
  • Why doesn't Madison think a true democracy can be trusted?
  • What does that imply about what he thought about popular movements in the United States?

Chew On This

In writing the Federalist Papers, James Madison was not only trying to win over the state legislatures in general, but specifically to address the concerns of the incredibly vocal Anti-Federalists who distrusted Federal power just as much as we distrust products from infomercials.

James Madison's intense distrust of the power of political factions as mentioned in Federalist Paper 10 might have a lot to do with Daniel Shay's rebellion , where impoverished farmers clashed against wealthy Boston merchants in the largest-scale rebellion in the United States since the Revolutionary War. When he wrote about faction conflict, it was likely that the readers of this Federalist Paper had that particular throwdown in the back of their minds.

AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. (10.1)

Controlling faction-power seemed to be an incredibly hot-button issue at the time, for Madison to say it is the main power of a well-made Union. Which factions was Madison concerned with having too much power?

It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm. (10.9)

Madison is being pragmatic about the need to make a government that can effectively keep corruption down. However, underneath you can read flashes of a distrust with what he views as the worst parts of a Democracy.

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former than in the latter. (10.20)

This is an interesting thing to bring up as a benefit of a Republic. Residents of the 13 states were, at the time, looking hungrily at the Ohio River Valley to the west, which was Native American territory barred from them by the British's treaty with its residents. Now that Great Britain was out of the picture, you can picture the United States licking its lips at the thought of expansion.

But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. (51.3)

This one concern is at the heart of the struggle between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists, and is one idea that they have in common. The Anti-Federalists think the government must be weak in order for its power not to be abused, while the Federalists think that a strong government can be structured in such a way that it can control itself.

Second. It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure. (51.6)

Here's where the theme of Federalist Paper 10 is reflected in Federalist Paper 51. Not only can we reason from this that they were likely written by the same author, but also its reemergence here underlines Madison's concerns about mob rule. The majority faction he's probably worried about is the poor, who he thinks would turn on the wealthy few in a heartbeat, given the chance.

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Teaching American History

Federalist 10

  • Constitution
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  • Political Culture
  • November 22, 1787

Introduction

Federalist 10 was written by James Madison and is probably the most famous of the eighty-five papers written in support of ratification of the Constitution that are collectively known as the Federalist Papers. The Federalist essays were formally addressed to the people of New York and were intended to influence the New York ratifying convention. Other essays had been written that defended the Constitution primarily by attacking those who opposed it. What made the Federalist unique was that it defended the proposed Constitution by explaining in careful detail its provisions and the principles behind them.

Though Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison collaborated on the essays that make up the Federalist, the three men wrote collectively under the pseudonym “Publius,” indicating their intention to speak in a single voice through the essays. Federalist 10 specifically deals with Publius’ treatment of factions and how a republican government can be constructed to protect against this dangerous malady. Factions, to Publius, were considered the bane of republican government, especially when a faction became a majority within the population. Factions were groups of people united by a common interest or passion adverse to the rights of other people in society. This oppressive nature of factions is what made them so dangerous and why Publius devoted so much time to discussing how to check and control them. In addition, Publius understood political parties to be factions and, in fact, uses “party” as a synonym for “faction” throughout Federalist 10 .

Source: The Federalist. Gideon Edition, eds. George W. Carey and James McClellan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 42–49.

. . . By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: The one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: The one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said, than of the first remedy, that it is worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment, [1] without which it instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties, is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them every where brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders, ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions, whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind, to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a monied interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests, forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government….

It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm: nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all, without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the right of another, or the good of the whole.

The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects .

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views, by regular vote. It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good, and private rights, against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add, that it is the great desideratum, [2] by which alone this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority, at the same time, must be prevented; or the majority, having such co-existent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert [3] and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know, that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together; that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.

From this view of the subject, it may be concluded, that a pure democracy, by which I mean, a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert, results from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have, in general, been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed, that, by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the union.

The two great points of difference, between a democracy and a republic, are, first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen, that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the people….

The other point of difference is, the great number of citizens, and extent of territory, which may be brought within the compass of republican, than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former, than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked, that where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust, in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary….

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular states, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other states; a religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it, must secure the national councils against any danger from that source: a rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the union, than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire state….

  • 2. A thing needed or desired.
  • 3. To coordinate or organize.

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what is the main idea of federalist paper #10

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The first amendment, constitution 101 resources, 3.5 primary source: federalist no. 10 and federalist no. 55.

This activity is part of  Module 3: Road to the Convention  from the Constitution 101 Curriculum.  

Federalist No. 10 View the document on the National Constitution Center’s website here .

After the Constitutional Convention adjourned in September 1787, heated debate on the merits of the Constitution followed. Each state was required to vote on the ratification of the document. A series of articles signed by “Publius” appeared in New York newspapers. These Federalist Papers supported the Constitution and continued to appear through the summer of 1788. Alexander Hamilton organized them, and he and Madison wrote most of the series of 85 articles, with John Jay contributing five. These essays were read and debated, especially in New York, which included many critics of the Constitution. The Federalist Papers have since taken on immense significance, as they have come to be seen as an important early exposition on the Constitution’s meaning. In Federalist 10, Madison explores how the Constitution combats the problem of faction.

A good government will counteract the dangers of faction. Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice.

Our state constitutions improved on those that came before them, but they still have problems; they are unstable; and they often value factional interests over the common good. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarranted partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected. Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.

Factions are driven by passion and self-interest, not reason and the common good. By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

But there are ways to tame the dangers of faction. There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction. The one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects. There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction. The one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

One way is to take away everyone’s liberty; this is a bad idea. It could never be more truly said, than of the first remedy, that it is worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it would not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

Another way is to give everyone the same opinions, passions, and interests; this isn’t possible in a free and diverse republic. The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self­love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to an uniformity of interests. The protection of those faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

Factions are natural, and they form easily; the most common cause is the unequal division of property. The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; … and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind, to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those, who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall into a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation and involves the spirit of the party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government.

We can’t rely on great leaders; we won’t always have them. It is vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm.

We can’t eliminate the causes of faction; so, we must figure out how to control them. The inference to which we are brought is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects.

Majority rule solves the problem of minority factions; we can vote abusive minority factions out of power; but this doesn’t solve the problem of a majority faction abusing the minority; we need to come up with a new solution to this vexing problem. If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views, by regular vote. It may clog the administration; it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good, and private rights, against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is the greatest object to which our inquiries are directed. …

There are a couple of ways to address this problem. By what means is the object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority, at the same time must be prevented; or the majority, having such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression.

Direct democracy isn’t the answer. From this view of the subject, it may be concluded, that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure from the mischiefs of faction.

But representative government offers a promising path; to address the problem of faction, we need to elect representatives, and we need a large (not small) republic. A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from the union. The two great points of difference, between a democracy and a republic, are, first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and the greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

Representative government promotes a process of deliberation led by virtuous leaders; this process improves public opinion and helps to ensure that we end up with a government that serves the common good, not the immediate passions of the people or the self-interests of powerful factions; finally, contrary to the views of famous political thinkers like Montesquieu, it is helpful that we have a large republic rather than a small one. The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen, that the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves, convened for the purpose.... The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are most favorable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of the latter by two obvious considerations.

There are a larger number of quality candidates in a large republic. In the first place, it is to be remarked, that however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the constituents, and being proportionately greatest in the small republic, it follows that if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater probability of a fit choice.

And in a large republic, the people are more likely to choose virtuous leaders than demagogues. In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to center in men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established characters.

Because a large republic covers more territory and contains a greater number of factions, it is more difficult for a majority faction to form and abuse power. The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens, and extent of territory, which may be brought within the compass of republican, than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former, than in the latter. .. Extend the sphere, and you will take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.

Large republics are better at controlling faction than small republics. Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage, which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic - enjoyed by the union over the states composing it.

We have found a republican solution to the problem of faction. In the extent and proper structure of the union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.

Federalist No. 55 View the document on the National Constitution Center’s website here .

On February 15, 1788, James Madison published Federalist No. 55—titled “The Total Number of the House of Representatives.” Following Shays’ Rebellion in Massachusetts, Madison and his allies pushed for a new Constitution that might address the dangers of excessive democracy, including mob violence. In Federalist No. 55, Madison addressed a range of important issues, including the proper size of the House of Representatives, the role of representation in a republican government, and the importance of civic republican virtue. Madison warned, “In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob.” Madison had in mind a specific episode in ancient history—the push by the demagogue Cleon to mislead the massive Athenian Assembly (filled with 6,000 people) into starting the Peloponnesian War. With the new Constitution, the framers sought to create a new government strong enough to achieve common purpose and curb mob violence, but also restrained enough that it would not threaten individual rights.

Critics fear that the U.S. House of Representatives is too small to represent the interests of a large country; instead, there’s a danger that it will be filled with a small governing elite distant from the people. The number of which the House of Representatives is to consist, forms another and a very interesting point of view, under which this branch of the federal legislature may be contemplated. Scarce any article, indeed, in the whole Constitution seems to be rendered more worthy of attention, by the weight of character and the apparent force of argument with which it has been assailed. The charges exhibited against it are, first, that so small a number of representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the public interests; secondly, that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous constituents; thirdly, that they will be taken from that class of citizens which will sympathize least with the feelings of the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of the few on the depression of the many; fourthly, that defective as the number will be in the first instance, it will be more and more disproportionate, by the increase of the people, and the obstacles which will prevent a correspondent increase of the representatives. 

There is no right answer to how large a legislative body should be in order to govern well; this is a difficult issue, and the states themselves disagree over it. In general it may be remarked on this subject, that no political problem is less susceptible of a precise solution than that which relates to the number most convenient for a representative legislature; nor is there any point on which the policy of the several States is more at variance, whether we compare their legislative assemblies directly with each other, or consider the proportions which they respectively bear to the number of their constituents. . . .

There are also serious dangers when a legislative body is too large; this may undermine deliberation and heighten the passions; in the end, the goal is to try to avoid a body that is either too small or too large. Another general remark to be made is, that the ratio between the representatives and the people ought not to be the same where the latter are very numerous as where they are very few. Were the representatives in Virginia to be regulated by the standard in Rhode Island, they would, at this time, amount to between four and five hundred; and twenty or thirty years hence, to a thousand. On the other hand, the ratio of Pennsylvania, if applied to the State of Delaware, would reduce the representative assembly of the latter to seven or eight members. Nothing can be more fallacious than to found our political calculations on arithmetical principles. Sixty or seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven. But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would be proportionably a better depositary. And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth is, that in all cases a certain number at least seems to be necessary to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against too easy a combination for improper purposes; as, on the other hand, the number ought at most to be kept within a certain limit, in order to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude. In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob. . . .

Elections are an important check on abuses by elected officials. The true question to be decided then is, whether the smallness of the number, as a temporary regulation, be dangerous to the public liberty? Whether sixty-five members for a few years, and a hundred or two hundred for a few more, be a safe depositary for a limited and well-guarded power of legislating for the United States? I must own that I could not give a negative answer to this question, without first obliterating every impression which I have received with regard to the present genius of the people of America, the spirit which actuates the State legislatures, and the principles which are incorporated with the political character of every class of citizens I am unable to conceive that the people of America, in their present temper, or under any circumstances which can speedily happen, will choose, and every second year repeat the choice of, sixty-five or a hundred men who would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery. . . .

The critics of the Constitution are too pessimistic; the American people have enough virtue to make our new republic work. The improbability of such a mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members of government, standing on as different foundations as republican principles will well admit, and at the same time accountable to the society over which they are placed, ought alone to quiet this apprehension. But, fortunately, the Constitution has provided a still further safeguard. The members of the Congress are rendered ineligible to any civil offices that may be created, or of which the emoluments may be increased, during the term of their election. No offices therefore can be dealt out to the existing members but such as may become vacant by ordinary casualties: and to suppose that these would be sufficient to purchase the guardians of the people, selected by the people themselves, is to renounce every rule by which events ought to be calculated, and to substitute an indiscriminate and unbounded jealousy, with which all reasoning must be vain. The sincere friends of liberty, who give themselves up to the extravagancies of this passion, are not aware of the injury they do their own cause. As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be, that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another.

*Bold sentences give the big idea of the excerpt and are not a part of the primary source. 

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1.3 Federalist No. 10 & Brutus 1 Summary

5 min read • february 7, 2023

Annika Tekumulla

Annika Tekumulla

Riya Patel

Federalist No. 10 Summary

Federalist No. 10 is an essay written by James Madison and published in 1787 as part of The Federalist Papers . It addresses the problem of faction , which Madison defines as a group of citizens who have a common interest contrary to the rights of other citizens or the good of the whole community. The essay argues that a large and diverse republic is the best form of government to guard against the danger of factions, as it makes it more difficult for any one faction to gain control. Madison also outlines the necessity of a strong central government to control the destructive effects of factions. In conclusion, Federalist No. 10 asserts that a federal system , which divides power between a central government and constituent states, is the best solution to the problem of factions and will ensure the preservation of liberty and the protection of the rights of citizens .

Here is an example of an application of Federalist No. 10 in a contemporary context:

Today in the United States, factions are still cause for concern. Our country has such a diverse population with varying interests, and many groups seeking to advance their interests at the expense of others. For instance, the debate over gun control is a classic example of a faction problem, with the interests of gun owners and gun control advocates often being in conflict.

Federalist No. 10 provides insight into how to manage this problem. The essay's argument is that a large and diverse republic is the best form of government to guard against the danger of factions is still relevant today. The federal system of the United States has proven to be an effective way of balancing the interests of different groups and ensuring that no one group gains too much power.

In this example, the principles outlined in Federalist No. 10 can be applied to the current debate over gun control . The federal system provides a mechanism for balancing the interests of different groups and ensuring that the rights of all citizens are protected. By understanding and applying the principles of Federalist No. 10, policymakers can work to compose solutions that protect individual rights and promote the common good.

Brutus No. 1 Summary

Brutus No. 1 is an essay written by an anonymous author, believed to be Robert Yates , and published in 1787 as a response to The Federalist Papers . It argues against the ratification of the proposed U.S. Constitution , claiming that it would lead to the concentration of power in the hands of a few and the erosion of individual liberty . The essay asserts that the Constitution fails to provide sufficient checks and balances to prevent the abuse of power by the national government and that it gives too much power to the central government at the expense of the states. The author also argues that the Constitution lacks a bill of rights to protect individual liberties, such as freedom of speech , religion , and the press . In conclusion, Brutus No. 1 argues that the Constitution represents a threat to the rights and freedoms of citizens and should not be ratified.

Here is an example of an application of Brutus No. 1 in the present day context:

In the United States today, there is ongoing debate about the role of the government in protecting individual rights and promoting the common good. For example, the debate over privacy rights versus national security is a classic example of this conflict. On one hand, privacy advocates argue that the government should not have access to individuals' personal information without a warrant. On the other hand, proponents of national security argue that the government needs access to this information in order to prevent terrorism and protect the country.

Brutus No. 1 provides insight into how to manage this problem. The essay's argument that the Constitution fails to provide sufficient checks and balances to prevent the abuse of power by the national government is still relevant today. In the debate over privacy rights versus national security , the author of Brutus No. 1 might argue that the government's access to individuals' personal information should be limited in order to protect individual rights and prevent the abuse of power.

In this example, the principles outlined in Brutus No. 1 can be applied to the current debate over privacy rights versus national security . By understanding and applying the principles of Brutus No. 1 , policymakers can work to find a solution that protects individual rights and promotes the common good, while also ensuring that the country remains safe.

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🎥 Watch: AP GOPO - Federalist 10 and 51, and Brutus 1

Key Questions

Here are some key questions about Federalist No. 10 and Brutus No. 1 :

Federalist No. 10:

  • What is the main argument of Federalist No. 10?
  • How does James Madison define the problem of faction ?
  • What does Madison argue is the best form of government to guard against the danger of factions?
  • Why does Madison believe a federal system is the best solution to the problem of factions?

Brutus No. 1 :

  • What is the main argument of Brutus No. 1 ?
  • Why does the author believe that the U.S. Constitution should not be ratified?
  • What are the main criticisms of the Constitution made by the author in Brutus No. 1 ?
  • What is the author's position on the concentration of power and individual liberty in the proposed Constitution?

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what is the main idea of federalist paper #10

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Federalist Papers

By: History.com Editors

Updated: June 22, 2023 | Original: November 9, 2009

HISTORY: Federalist Papers

The Federalist Papers are a collection of essays written in the 1780s in support of the proposed U.S. Constitution and the strong federal government it advocated. In October 1787, the first in a series of 85 essays arguing for ratification of the Constitution appeared in the Independent Journal , under the pseudonym “Publius.” Addressed to “The People of the State of New York,” the essays were actually written by the statesmen Alexander Hamilton , James Madison and John Jay . They would be published serially from 1787-88 in several New York newspapers. The first 77 essays, including Madison’s famous Federalist 10 and Federalist 51 , appeared in book form in 1788. Titled The Federalist , it has been hailed as one of the most important political documents in U.S. history.

Articles of Confederation

As the first written constitution of the newly independent United States, the Articles of Confederation nominally granted Congress the power to conduct foreign policy, maintain armed forces and coin money.

But in practice, this centralized government body had little authority over the individual states, including no power to levy taxes or regulate commerce, which hampered the new nation’s ability to pay its outstanding debts from the Revolutionary War .

In May 1787, 55 delegates gathered in Philadelphia to address the deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation and the problems that had arisen from this weakened central government.

A New Constitution

The document that emerged from the Constitutional Convention went far beyond amending the Articles, however. Instead, it established an entirely new system, including a robust central government divided into legislative , executive and judicial branches.

As soon as 39 delegates signed the proposed Constitution in September 1787, the document went to the states for ratification, igniting a furious debate between “Federalists,” who favored ratification of the Constitution as written, and “Antifederalists,” who opposed the Constitution and resisted giving stronger powers to the national government.

The Rise of Publius

In New York, opposition to the Constitution was particularly strong, and ratification was seen as particularly important. Immediately after the document was adopted, Antifederalists began publishing articles in the press criticizing it.

They argued that the document gave Congress excessive powers and that it could lead to the American people losing the hard-won liberties they had fought for and won in the Revolution.

In response to such critiques, the New York lawyer and statesman Alexander Hamilton, who had served as a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, decided to write a comprehensive series of essays defending the Constitution, and promoting its ratification.

Who Wrote the Federalist Papers?

As a collaborator, Hamilton recruited his fellow New Yorker John Jay, who had helped negotiate the treaty ending the war with Britain and served as secretary of foreign affairs under the Articles of Confederation. The two later enlisted the help of James Madison, another delegate to the Constitutional Convention who was in New York at the time serving in the Confederation Congress.

To avoid opening himself and Madison to charges of betraying the Convention’s confidentiality, Hamilton chose the pen name “Publius,” after a general who had helped found the Roman Republic. He wrote the first essay, which appeared in the Independent Journal, on October 27, 1787.

In it, Hamilton argued that the debate facing the nation was not only over ratification of the proposed Constitution, but over the question of “whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force.”

After writing the next four essays on the failures of the Articles of Confederation in the realm of foreign affairs, Jay had to drop out of the project due to an attack of rheumatism; he would write only one more essay in the series. Madison wrote a total of 29 essays, while Hamilton wrote a staggering 51.

Federalist Papers Summary

In the Federalist Papers, Hamilton, Jay and Madison argued that the decentralization of power that existed under the Articles of Confederation prevented the new nation from becoming strong enough to compete on the world stage or to quell internal insurrections such as Shays’s Rebellion .

In addition to laying out the many ways in which they believed the Articles of Confederation didn’t work, Hamilton, Jay and Madison used the Federalist essays to explain key provisions of the proposed Constitution, as well as the nature of the republican form of government.

'Federalist 10'

In Federalist 10 , which became the most influential of all the essays, Madison argued against the French political philosopher Montesquieu ’s assertion that true democracy—including Montesquieu’s concept of the separation of powers—was feasible only for small states.

A larger republic, Madison suggested, could more easily balance the competing interests of the different factions or groups (or political parties ) within it. “Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests,” he wrote. “[Y]ou make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens[.]”

After emphasizing the central government’s weakness in law enforcement under the Articles of Confederation in Federalist 21-22 , Hamilton dove into a comprehensive defense of the proposed Constitution in the next 14 essays, devoting seven of them to the importance of the government’s power of taxation.

Madison followed with 20 essays devoted to the structure of the new government, including the need for checks and balances between the different powers.

'Federalist 51'

“If men were angels, no government would be necessary,” Madison wrote memorably in Federalist 51 . “If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary.”

After Jay contributed one more essay on the powers of the Senate , Hamilton concluded the Federalist essays with 21 installments exploring the powers held by the three branches of government—legislative, executive and judiciary.

Impact of the Federalist Papers

Despite their outsized influence in the years to come, and their importance today as touchstones for understanding the Constitution and the founding principles of the U.S. government, the essays published as The Federalist in 1788 saw limited circulation outside of New York at the time they were written. They also fell short of convincing many New York voters, who sent far more Antifederalists than Federalists to the state ratification convention.

Still, in July 1788, a slim majority of New York delegates voted in favor of the Constitution, on the condition that amendments would be added securing certain additional rights. Though Hamilton had opposed this (writing in Federalist 84 that such a bill was unnecessary and could even be harmful) Madison himself would draft the Bill of Rights in 1789, while serving as a representative in the nation’s first Congress.

what is the main idea of federalist paper #10

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Ron Chernow, Hamilton (Penguin, 2004). Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788 (Simon & Schuster, 2010). “If Men Were Angels: Teaching the Constitution with the Federalist Papers.” Constitutional Rights Foundation . Dan T. Coenen, “Fifteen Curious Facts About the Federalist Papers.” University of Georgia School of Law , April 1, 2007. 

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Course: US history   >   Unit 3

  • The Articles of Confederation
  • What was the Articles of Confederation?
  • Shays's Rebellion
  • The Constitutional Convention
  • The US Constitution

The Federalist Papers

  • The Bill of Rights
  • Social consequences of revolutionary ideals
  • The presidency of George Washington
  • Why was George Washington the first president?
  • The presidency of John Adams
  • Regional attitudes about slavery, 1754-1800
  • Continuity and change in American society, 1754-1800
  • Creating a nation
  • The Federalist Papers was a collection of essays written by John Jay, James Madison, and Alexander Hamilton in 1788.
  • The essays urged the ratification of the United States Constitution, which had been debated and drafted at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787.
  • The Federalist Papers is considered one of the most significant American contributions to the field of political philosophy and theory and is still widely considered to be the most authoritative source for determining the original intent of the framers of the US Constitution.

The Articles of Confederation and Constitutional Convention

  • In Federalist No. 10 , Madison reflects on how to prevent rule by majority faction and advocates the expansion of the United States into a large, commercial republic.
  • In Federalist No. 39 and Federalist 51 , Madison seeks to “lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty,” emphasizing the need for checks and balances through the separation of powers into three branches of the federal government and the division of powers between the federal government and the states. 4 ‍  
  • In Federalist No. 84 , Hamilton advances the case against the Bill of Rights, expressing the fear that explicitly enumerated rights could too easily be construed as comprising the only rights to which American citizens were entitled.

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The federalist number 10, [22 november] 1787, the federalist number 10.

[22 November 1787]

Among the numerous advantages promised by a well constructed union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. 1 The friend of popular governments, never finds himself so much alarmed for their character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this dangerous vice. He will not fail therefore to set a due value on any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability, injustice and confusion introduced into the public councils, have in truth been the mortal diseases under which popular governments have every where perished; as they continue to be the favorite and fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the American constitutions on the popular models, both antient and modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually obviated the danger on this side as was wished and expected. Complaints are every where heard from our most considerate and virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith, and of public and personal liberty; that our governments are too unstable; that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival parties; and that measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice, and the rights of the minor party; but by the superior force of an interested and over-bearing majority. However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no foundation, the evidence of known facts will not permit us to deny that they are in some degree true. It will be found indeed, on a candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under which we labour, have been erroneously charged on the operation of our governments; but it will be found at the same time, that other causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes; and particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly, if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice, with which a factious spirit has tainted our public administration.

By a faction I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community.

There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: The one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.

There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: The one by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.

It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that it is worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction, what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could not be a less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.

The second expedient is as impracticable, as the first would be unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties of men from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to an uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government. From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results: And from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of the society into different interests and parties.

The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and we see them every where brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society. A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have in turn divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress each other, than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their unfriendly passions, and excite their most violent conflicts. But the most common and durable source of factions, has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold, and those who are without property, have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a monied interest, with many lesser interests, grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of government.

No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause; because his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body of men, are unfit to be both judges and parties, at the same time; yet, what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens; and what are the different classes of legislators, but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the creditors are parties on one side, and the debtors on the other. Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties are and must be themselves the judges; and the most numerous party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the manufacturing classes; and probably by neither, with a sole regard to justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the various descriptions of property, is an act which seems to require the most exact impartiality, yet there is perhaps no legislative act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a predominant party, to trample on the rules of justice. Every shilling with which they over-burden the inferior number, is a shilling saved to their own pockets.

It is in vain to say, that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm: Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all, without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may find in disregarding the rights of another, or the good of the whole.

The inference to which we are brought, is, that the causes of faction cannot be removed; and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its effects .

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat its sinister views by regular vote: It may clog the administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the constitution. When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government on the other hand enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest, both the public good and the rights of other citizens. To secure the public good, and private rights against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object to which our enquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the great desideratum, by which alone this form of government can be rescued from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.

By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a majority at the same time, must be prevented; or the majority, having such co-existent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together; that is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful. 2

From this view of the subject, it may be concluded that a pure democracy, by which I mean a society, consisting of a small number of citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from the form of government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of government, have erroneously supposed, that by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized, and assimilated in their possessions, their opinions, and their passions.

A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both the nature of the cure, and the efficacy which it must derive from the union.

The two great points of difference between a democracy and a republic, are first, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that the public voice pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be more consonant to the public good, than if pronounced by the people themselves convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local prejudices, or of sinister designs, may by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests of the people. The question resulting is, whether small or extensive republics are most favourable to the election of proper guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favour of the latter by two obvious considerations.

In the first place it is to be remarked, that however small the republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number, in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence the number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion to that of the constituents, and being proportionally greatest in the small republic, it follows, that if the proportion of fit characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater probability of a fit choice.

In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic, it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practise with success the vicious arts, by which elections are too often carried; and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre on men who possess the most attractive merit, and the most diffusive and established characters.

It must be confessed, that in this, as in most other cases, there is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniencies will be found to lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the representative too little acquainted with all their local circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local and particular to the state legislatures.

The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of republican, than of democratic government; and it is this circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to be dreaded in the former, than in the latter. The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked, that where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonourable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust, in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.

Hence it clearly appears, that the same advantage, which a republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic—is enjoyed by the union over the states composing it. Does this advantage consist in the substitution of representatives, whose enlightened views and virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices, and to schemes of injustice? It will not be denied, that the representation of the union will be most likely to possess these requisite endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the encreased variety of parties, comprised within the union, encrease this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the union gives it the most palpable advantage.

The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within their particular states, but will be unable to spread a general conflagration through the other states: A religious sect, may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it, must secure the national councils against any danger from that source: A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the union, than a particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire state. 3

In the extent and proper structure of the union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and pride, we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in cherishing the spirit, and supporting the character of federalists.

McLean description begins The Federalist, A Collection of Essays, written in favour of the New Constitution, By a Citizen of New-York. Printed by J. and A. McLean (New York, 1788). description ends , I, 52–61.

1 .  Douglass Adair showed chat in preparing this essay, especially that part containing the analysis of factions and the theory of the extended republic, JM creatively adapted the ideas of David Hume (“‘That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science’: David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist,” Huntington Library Quarterly , XX [1956–57], 343–60). The forerunner of The Federalist No. 10 may be found in JM’s Vices of the Political System ( PJM description begins William T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison (10 vols. to date; Chicago, 1962——). description ends , IX, 348–57 ). See also JM’s first speech of 6 June and his first speech of 26 June 1787 at the Federal Convention, and his letter to Jefferson of 24 Oct. 1787 .

2 .  In Vices of the Political System JM listed three motives, each of which he believed was insufficient to prevent individuals or factions from oppressing each other: (1) “a prudent regard to their own good as involved in the general and permanent good of the Community”; (2) “respect for character”; and (3) religion. As to “respect for character,” JM remarked that “in a multitude its efficacy is diminished in proportion to the number which is to share the praise or the blame” ( PJM description begins William T. Hutchinson et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison (10 vols. to date; Chicago, 1962——). description ends , IX, 355–56 ). For this observation JM again drew upon David Hume. Adair suggests that JM deliberately omitted his list of motives from The Federalist . “There was a certain disadvantage in making derogatory remarks to a majority that must be persuaded to adopt your arguments” (“‘That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science,’” Huntington Library Quarterly , XX [1956–57], 354). JM repeated these motives in his first speech of 6 June 1787, in his letter to Jefferson of 24 Oct. 1787 , and alluded to them in The Federalist No. 51 .

3 .  The negative on state laws, which JM had unsuccessfully advocated at the Federal Convention, was designed to prevent the enactment of “improper or wicked” measures by the states. The Constitution did include specific prohibitions on the state legislatures, but JM dismissed these as “short of the mark.” He also doubted that the judicial system would effectively “keep the States within their proper limits” ( JM to Jefferson, 24 Oct. 1787 ).

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3 mins read

10 Easiest Lunar New Year Decoration Ideas in 2024

By LingoAce Team | US | January 19, 2024

As the Lunar New Year approaches in 2024, it's time to deck the halls with festive decorations – many of which hold deep symbolism for prosperity in the new year. In Chinese culture, Lunar New Year decorations are called Chunjie Zhuangshi (春节装饰, chūnjié zhuāngshì). They play a crucial role in creating a joyous and harmonious atmosphere in the home or office.

Here are 10 Lunar New Year decoration ideas:   

Hang Red Lanterns for Prosperity and Luck 

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Red Lanterns (红灯笼, hóng dēnglóng) are iconic symbols of Chinese New Year, representing prosperity and good luck. Opt for traditional paper lanterns or explore modern designs to suit your style. Red lanterns can be found in online marketplaces like Amazon, local Chinese grocery stores, or stationary stores.  

Display Spring Couplets for Good Wishes 

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Spring Couplets (春联 - Chūn Lián) is a traditional Chinese New Year decoration consisting of two vertically aligned phrases or sentences written with Chinese calligraphy on red paper or scrolls.

These couplets are typically placed on both sides of a door or entrance to convey good wishes, blessings, and auspicious messages for the coming year. The content of Chunlian often includes expressions of good fortune, prosperity, health, happiness, and overall positive sentiments. People believe that displaying Chunlian at the entrance of their homes helps invite good luck and ward off evil spirits during the Lunar New Year celebration. The red color of the paper symbolizes luck and joy in Chinese culture. 

An example of a Spring Couplet is "Amidst the changing winds and clouds, dragons soar, and tigers leap" (风云际会龙腾虎跃, fēngyún jì huì lóng téng hǔ yuè) which would be written on one scroll. The corresponding scroll says, "With blessings and good fortune, prosperity and vitality fill the home" (福运齐来家兴旺盛, fú yùn qí lái jiā xīng wàng shèng).   

Decorate with Blossoming Flowers for Renewal 

Fill a vase with fresh cut branches of cherry blossoms, plum blossoms, or pussy willows you're your local florist. These budding or blossoming flowers signal the coming of Spring and represent renewal. Alternatively, artificial flowers can be found at major home decor retailers like Michaels, Walmart, Target, or HomeGoods. Explore online platforms such as Alibaba or specialized floral decor stores for a more comprehensive selection and authentic designs.  

Incorporate Chinese Knots to Symbolize Unity 

Chinese Knots (中国结 - Zhōngguó Jié) are decorative handicrafts that are made by tying intricate knots with colorful cords or ropes. Because of the "endless" design of the knots, they symbolize unity and good fortune and are a popular decoration for Chinese New Year and another joyous occasion. These knots can be used as wall hangings or table decorations to add a touch of cultural richness to your surroundings. You can find them in various colors and designs. They can be found on Amazon, eBay, or local Chinatown markets.   

Use Lucky Money Plants for Prosperity 

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Money Plants (钱树, Qián Shù) are believed to bring prosperity and good fortune. Consider placing them in decorative pots or vases for your Chinese New Year decorations. The vibrant greenery will add a fresh and lively element to your space. They can be purchased at local nurseries, gardening centers, or even retailers like IKEA. Ensure you choose healthy plants to symbolize prosperity and good fortune.  

Display Chinese Zodiac Animal Figurines for Personal Touch 

As 2024 marks the Year of the Dragon, consider including  Chinese New Year animals  in your decorations. An easy option is incorporating Zodiac Animal Figurines (生肖动物雕塑, shēngxiào Dòngwù Diāosù) representing your  Chinese Zodiac sign  animal for a personalized touch. Dragon and other Chinese zodiac animal figurines are commonly available at local Chinese gift and stationery shops, home decor stores, and online platforms like Etsy.   

Display Tangerines and Oranges for Abundance 

Tangerines and Oranges (橘子, júzi) are associated with abundance and good luck. Arrange them in bowls or use them as table centerpieces, and don't forget to keep the leaves and branches on them. The vibrant citrus colors will bring luck and a refreshing visual appeal to your decor. These fruits should be relatively easy to find at local grocery stores or farmers' markets. Consider buying in bulk for a cost-effective and abundant display, spreading good fortune and freshness throughout your space.  

Hang Lucky Red Banners with Auspicious Phrases 

Red Banners (红色横幅, hóngsè héngfú) with gold calligraphy featuring phrases like "blessing" (福 fú) or "May wealth come pouring in" (财源广进, cái yuán guǎng jìn) bring festive vibes. Hang them on walls or doorways to invite good fortune. These banners or supplies to make these banners can be found at Chinese cultural stores, party supply shops, or online marketplaces such as Oriental Trading.   

Paper Cutting Art for Traditional Elegance 

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Incorporate traditional Chinese paper-cutting art (剪纸, jiǎnzhǐ) into your decorations. These intricate designs often feature symbols of luck and happiness. For an elegant touch, you can frame or use them as window or wall decals. They can be purchased on Etsy, specialized art and craft stores, or directly from local artists. Explore cultural festivals or art markets for unique and handmade designs.  

Set a Festive Table Settings for Celebratory Meals 

A festive dining table (节日餐桌, jiérì Cānzhuō) can incorporate red tablecloths and gold utensils and include Chinese-themed tableware. You can find Chinese-themed tableware at major retailers like Bed Bath & Beyond or online platforms like Wayfair. Explore Chinatown or local Asian markets for unique tableware with a cultural touch.  

As you prepare your home and office for LunarNew Year 2024, these 10 easy decoration ideas promise to infuse your spaces with the spirit of joy, prosperity, and cultural richness. From traditional symbols like red lanterns and Spring Couplets to modern elements like zodiac animal figurines, each idea brings a unique touch to your festive decor. The key is to embrace the symbolism, colors, and traditions. May your new year be filled with abundance, good fortune, and happiness. Happy decorating!  

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what is the main idea of federalist paper #10

LingoAce Team

Editorial Team | US

what is the main idea of federalist paper #10

4 mins read

what is the main idea of federalist paper #10

5 mins read

Gaza ceasefire debate - live updates: Speaker sparks fury with amendments decision

The Commons is set to vote on an SNP motion for a ceasefire in Gaza, and the Speaker has sparked fury by going against convention and selecting both the government and Labour amendments. It's relief for Sir Keir Starmer, who could have been facing a sizeable rebellion from his MPs.

Wednesday 21 February 2024 17:25, UK

Please use Chrome browser for a more accessible video player

  • MPs debating Gaza ceasefire motion - watch and follow live
  • Speaker picks government and Labour amendments ahead of vote
  • Tories and SNP furious with decision that breaks convention
  • 'Lots of tears' amid claims Labour threatened Speaker's position
  • Ex-minister accuses MPs of 'battle of semantics' over ceasefire
  • Explained: Why Speaker's unusual move has sparked such anger
  • Sam Coates:  An unedifying day for politics - it's going to be a mess
  • Live reporting by  Ben Bloch   and (earlier)  Tim Baker ,  Emily Mee   and  Bhvishya Patel

Our weeknight politics show  Politics Hub With Sophy Ridge  is live on Sky News from 7pm.

The fast-paced show dissects the inner workings of Westminster, with interviews, insights, and analysis - bringing you, the audience, into the corridors of power.

Tonight, watch and follow live as MPs vote on SNP, Labour, and government motions on a Gaza ceasefire, including analysis and reaction.

Sophy Ridge will be based in our studio, while our political editor Beth Rigby, deputy political editor Sam Coates , and chief political correspodent Jon Craig  will be live in the studio and from Central Lobby, just outside the Commons chamber, to bring reaction from MPs across the House.

Tune in to watch on Sky News from 7pm, with live updates right here in the Politics Hub.

Watch Politics Hub With Sophy Ridge Monday to Thursday on Sky channel 501, Virgin channel 602, Freeview channel 233, on the  Sky News website  and  app  or on  YouTube .

Tory MP Mark Logan has told the House he will be rebelling against the government tonight and voting for any motion that calls for an immediate ceasefire.

Speaking in the Commons, the Bolton North East MP said: "What I said in private scores of time before today, I now say in public: I want, my constituents want, and Gaza needs, an immediate ceasefire."

He said with so many deaths in Gaza, "playing around with words is just playing around with people's lives".

He went on: "Israel has gone too far. It's disproportionate - it's not gone too far just today, it's gone too far already for months."

With the number of deaths, he questioned: "How can we have any trust and belief that the people, the 1.5 million people now in Rafah, will also be left untouched?"

He accepted any vote "may be signalling to an extent", but added: "That signal has to be given... that has to happen today."

Mr Logan continued: "I no longer, in good conscience, can continue on backing in public the line we have taken on this side of the House, regrettably. Because even from a geostrategic perspective, I don't see what... favours this does for Israel."

He added Hamas needs to be "obliterated" and the SNP's motion "could have gone further to call out" the proscribed terror group.

But more broadly, he said: "I think this is the time for the United Kingdom to step up and take a leadership position with other middle powers, and not wait for America.

"It's in my own good conscience, I cannot acquiesce to the government's position any more on Gaza. The people of Bolton certainly cannot."

An accusation flying around this afternoon has been that Commons Speaker Sir Lindsay Hoyle was pressurised by Labour to allow its amendment on a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war to go to a vote.

The convention has been that if the government tabled an amendment to an opposition day motion (today's being the SNP's), amendments from other opposition parties would not be accepted.

But Sir Lindsay surprised MPs by breaking with that today.

However, sources close to the Speaker have rejected accusations that he was pressurised by Labour.

Sky News understands he had the safety of MPs in mind when he broke with convention today (see previous post).

A Labour spokesperson has also rejected any accusation that the party pressured the Speaker.

We've just had a bit more detail about Commons Speaker Sir Lindsay Hoyle's controversial decision to select amendments both by Labour and the government to the SNP's Gaza ceasefire motion.

For context, the convention has been that if the government tabled an amendment to an opposition day motion, amendments from other parties would not be accepted.

Sky News understands Sir Lindsay had MPs' safety at the forefront of his mind when he decided on this unusual step.

It comes amid growing concerns for MPs' personal safety after incidents of confrontations and protests following the escalation of tensions in the Middle East.

It is understood Sir Lindsay did not make the decision to accept both Labour and the government's amendments lightly, and did so the widest possible debate could be had and all MPs' voices could be heard.

Nonetheless, there is palpable anger from the Tories and the SNP that he broke with convention in a way that had the effect of avoiding a Labour rebellion against Sir Keir Starmer - and his post could be under threat.

You can read our full explainer on the situation here .

Former minister Kit Malthouse has given his view on the Israel-Hamas war in a speech in the Commons.

He said he visited Israel and the Palestinian territories last week and visited the sites of "mass murder" in the Kibbitzim in southern Israel and "heard with horror the accounts of the victims and bereaved relatives".

He also said he saw artillery landing on Gaza, and heard gunfire and drones flying over when he "contemplated the futility of 30,000 dead, and with horror, thought of the assault upon Rafah and its 600,000 children".

Mr Malthouse said it is "widely accepted across the world" that there can be "no military victory over Hamas" because the war is "a recruiting sergeant for that appalling organisation".

"Anybody who is interested in the security of Israel in the future has to recognise that this conflict is making things worse, not better, and that the security of the Palestinians is required for the security of Israel into the future," he said.

On his return to the UK, he said, he found parliamentarians "trapped in a crazy battle of semantics".

"I do not, I have to say, understand the difference between a ceasefire, a pause, a cessation, a truce, qualified by sustainable, credible, whatever it is, humanitarian, one that lasts," he adds.

"The British people think our moral compass is spinning in this house, that we have no clue what we're doing any more. 

"And yet they see the bodies of shredded children coming across the media pretty much every day."

He said the public wants the "killing to stop", for the hostages to be returned, and for aid to flow into Gaza.

Hitting out at political game-playing, he said their job as MPs is to vote for the outcomes they want, not "some clever process by which we might get there".

Mr Malthouse concluded: "It is time for the bloodshed to stop and for the talking to begin. And in this House and in this country, we must do what we can to make that so."

Our political correspondent Jon Craig is reporting for us live from Central Lobby, just outside the House of Commons chamber, where MPs are debating Israel-Hamas war ceasefire motions.

He caught up a few minutes ago with veteran Tory MP Sir Desmond Swayne, who was heard shouting in the chamber as the Speaker announced he was breaking with convention to allow all three of the SNP, Labour, and Tory motions to be debated and voted on.

Asked what he shouted, he said he was "using irony" in a call to "bring back Bercow".

John Bercow was the Speaker during the Brexit years, and came in for criticism for making what were perceived as political interventions against Brexit.

Sir Desmond said he shouted to bring the former Speaker back "because of the shades of the last time Mr Bercow made a decision that surprised the Commons, and indeed, clearly surprised the clerk and [did not align with] the normal expectation of the way things are done".

He recognised that the debate over parliamentary procedure is "a Westminster bubble story", and notes there is barely a "cigarette paper" between the three main parties.

"Nevertheless, there was a highly-charged atmosphere because Sir Keir Starmer… was on the hook, and Sir Lindsay [Hoyle, the Speaker] has got him off it."

He said it has angered the Tories, the SNP, and the Labour left.

Asked if he thinks Sir Lindsay should be removed as Speaker, as some have suggested, Sir Desmond replied: "For this, certainly not."

He said the Speaker has "brought a useful change in the atmosphere of the House", and notes he does have the discretion to take the action he did today.

Wes Streeting, one of Labour's more outspoken members of the shadow cabinet, has given a Tory MP short shrift as the fallout continues from the Speaker's controversial decision.

Maria Caulfield, a junior Conservative health minister, said on X (formerly Twitter): "Now we know why Sue Gray was on the Speakers corridor ahead of the start of the opposition day debate and then outside the Labour whip's office."

Sue Gray is Sir Keir Starmer's chief of staff, and there have been claims from Tory MPs that Labour figures put huge pressure on the Speaker to pick the party's amendment on a Gaza ceasefire vote ( see 15.20 post ).

Mr Streeting replied: "Take your tin foil hat off. You're embarrassing yourself."

Foreign Office minister Andrew Mitchell is speaking on behalf of the government in the debate on a ceasefire in the Israel-Hamas war.

He reads out the government's motion which condemns Hamas's 7 October attack, supports Israel's right to self-defence under international humanitarian law, supports a sustainable ceasefire, and recognises the hostages need to be released for that to be achieved.

He says a ceasefire "will not last if hostages are still being held, if Hamas still rain down rockets on Israel, if they maintain control of Gaza with capabilities to carry out further terrorist atrocities".

Therefore, he says, the aim should be a humanitarian pause to get more hostages out, more aid into Gaza, and continue negotiations.

In terms of Israel's planned Rafah offensive, the minister says it would have "devastating consequences", and the UK is "deeply concerned about the loss of civilian life in Gaza and the worsening humanitarian crisis".

He calls on Israel to obey international law, including ensuring food, water, and shelter is available to all Gaza residents - and also protecting medical personnel working there.

The way to stop the fighting, the minister says, is to agree a humanitarian pause now to allow negotiations to take place that should lead to the establishment of a viable Palestinian state.

By Jennifer Scott , political reporter

We are getting reports of tense scenes in parliament amid the row over ceasefire amendments, with one shadow minister telling me there has been "lots of tears". 

But they also revealed more about the process - and pressure - that came before Speaker Sir Lindsay Hoyle's decision to select Labour's amendment, which broke with precedent and upset Tory and SNP MPs. 

According to our source, Labour whips told Sir Lindsay they wouldn't vote for him or back him to carry on as the Commons speaker after the next election if he didn't pick their party's amendment today.

Our chief political correspondent Jon Craig  has been told similar by Tory MPs, that claim it was Labour leader Sir Keir Starmer and the party's chief whip Sir Alan Campbell making the threat. 

A Labour Party spokesperson has said the claim is "completely untrue".

Sky's political editor Beth Rigby has been hearing more from the lobbying of Commons Speaker Sir Lindsay Hoyle.

She's been told "many MPs made personal pleas to Sir Lindsay about amendments".

"MPs have growing concerns for personal safety after incidents of confrontations and protests over the Israel-Hamas war," she adds.

Daniel Sugarman, the director of public affairs for the Board of Deputies of British Jews, said: "The Speaker's decision enables Labour MPs to vote for their party's motion, rather than refusing to back an alternative and consequently subjecting themselves and their staff to disgusting level of harassment.

"From an MP safety point of view, it's clearly the right call."

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what is the main idea of federalist paper #10

IMAGES

  1. The Federalist Papers 10 Summary and Analysis

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  2. James madison federalist 10 summary. What is the main message of fed 10

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  3. What Is The Main Point Of Federalist 10

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  4. Federalist Paper No. 10 Summary

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COMMENTS

  1. Federalist No. 10

    The main point of Federalist Paper 10 is that a strong federal government can protect liberty because it guards against the dangers of control by a narrow interest. Madison also called it...

  2. The Federalist Papers Essay 10 Summary and Analysis

    >Summary Madison begins perhaps the most famous essay of The Federalist Papers by stating that one of the strongest arguments in favor of the Constitution is the fact that it establishes a government capable of controlling the violence and damage caused by factions.

  3. Federalist No. 10

    Federalist No. 10 is an essay written by James Madison as the tenth of The Federalist Papers, a series of essays initiated by Alexander Hamilton arguing for the ratification of the United States Constitution. It was first published in The Daily Advertiser (New York) on November 22, 1787, under the name "Publius".

  4. Federalist 10 (1787)

    Federalist 10 (1787) James Madison | 1787 Summary After the Constitutional Convention adjourned in September 1787, heated local debate followed on the merits of the Constitution. Each state was required to vote on ratification of the document. A series of articles signed "Publius" soon began in New York newspapers.

  5. "Federalist 10" by James Madison: Summary and Analysis

    Federalist 10 is an essay written by James Madison and published in 1787 as a tenth part of The Federalist Papers, emphasizing the need for ratifying the United States Constitution. In this paper, Madison discussed factions, a group of citizens with similar interests and issues emerging in democracy, arguing that they often oppress minorities.

  6. Federalist Number 10: AP® US History Crash Course Review

    The essay's main argument was that a strong, united republic would be more effective than the individual states at controlling "factions" - groups of citizens united by some cause "adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the… interests of the community."

  7. Federalist No. 10 full text (article)

    Full text of Federalist no. 10 The Same Subject Continued The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection From the New York Packet. Friday, November 23, 1787. Author: James Madison To the People of the State of New York:

  8. Federalist 10

    Writing Federalist Paper No 10. In response, Madison explored majority rule v. minority rights in this essay. He countered that it was exactly the great number of factions and diversity that would avoid tyranny. Groups would be forced to negotiate and compromise among themselves, arriving at solutions that would respect the rights of minorities.

  9. The Federalist Papers 10 and 51: Main Idea

    The Federalist Papers 10 and 51: Main Idea. How to Create a Goldilocks Republic. Both Federalist Papers 10 and 51 deal with how to make a government that's strong, but not too strong—basically, like the perfect Buffalo wing. Federalist Paper 10 starts by pointing out that majority rule is kind of inherently chaotic. As nice as it sounds ...

  10. The Federalist Papers (1787-1789): Federalist Essays No.10

    Federalist Essays No.10 - No.17 Page 1 Page 2 Page 3 Previous Next Summary The practical advantages of the union held together by the U.S. Constitution include a reduction of factions, proactive promotion of trade and wealth, and a more cost-effective government.

  11. The Avalon Project : The Federalist Papers No. 10

    The Federalist Papers : No. 10. From the New York Packet. Friday, November 23, 1787. AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a wellconstructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their ...

  12. Federalist 10

    Introduction Federalist 10 was written by James Madison and is probably the most famous of the eighty-five papers written in support of ratification of the Constitution that are collectively known as the Federalist Papers.

  13. What is the summary of Federalist Paper 10?

    Share Cite. Federalist Paper 10 is basically a treatise against factions. James Madison argues in it that the Union will help guard against factions, which would create civil unrest. Madison first ...

  14. Federalist No. 10 (video)

    About Transcript The video explores the Federalist Papers, focusing on Federalist number 10 by James Madison. Madison argues for a large republic over a pure democracy, believing it better controls factions and represents public interest. He sees a republic as a safeguard against domestic faction and insurrection. Questions Tips & Thanks

  15. 3.5 Primary Source: Federalist No. 10 and Federalist No. 55

    The Federalist Papers have since taken on immense significance, as they have come to be seen as an important early exposition on the Constitution's meaning. In Federalist 10, Madison explores how the Constitution combats the problem of faction. Excerpt: A good government will counteract the dangers of faction.

  16. 1.3 Federalist No. 10 & Brutus 1 Summary

    Federalist No. 10 is an essay written by James Madison and published in 1787 as part of The Federalist Papers . It addresses the problem of faction , which Madison defines as a group of citizens who have a common interest contrary to the rights of other citizens or the good of the whole community. The essay argues that a large and diverse republic

  17. Federalist Papers: Summary, Authors & Impact

    A New Constitution The document that emerged from the Constitutional Convention went far beyond amending the Articles, however. Instead, it established an entirely new system, including a robust...

  18. The Federalist Papers (article)

    The Federalist was originally planned to be a series of essays for publication in New York City newspapers, but ultimately expanded into a collection of 85 essays, which were published as two volumes in March and May 1788. They did not become known as "The Federalist Papers" until the 20th century. The essays were aimed at convincing opponents of the US Constitution to ratify it so that it ...

  19. PDF The Federalist Papers Summary and Analysis

    1 Federalist #10 Summary (a) but possible in a republic. With pure democracy he means a system in which every citizen vote directly for laws. And with republic he intends a society in which citizens vote for an elite of representatives who then vote for laws.

  20. The Federalist Papers Main Ideas

    The authors of The Federalist Papers show a real determination to dispel such apprehensions. They carefully and methodically show that, in a federal system, the states will retain a great deal of their power. It is more likely, the authors declare repeatedly, that the states will encroach on the national government than the other way around.

  21. federalist #10 Flashcards

    - main idea of this federalist paper is how to tame factions for the greater good of the country. - the new Constitution WILL work - Republics, as opposed to pure democracies, are good - The passions of the people must pass through a representative who is more wise

  22. Federalist Papers 10, 51, 70 and 78 Flashcards

    Federalist Paper 10. James Madison. Addresses the question of how to guard against "factions", or groups of citizens, with interests contrary to the rights of others or the interests of the whole community. Madison argued that a strong, big republic would be a better guard against those dangers than smaller republics—for instance, the ...

  23. The Federalist Number 10, [22 November] 1787

    1. Douglass Adair showed chat in preparing this essay, especially that part containing the analysis of factions and the theory of the extended republic, JM creatively adapted the ideas of David Hume ("'That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science': David Hume, James Madison, and the Tenth Federalist," Huntington Library Quarterly, XX [1956-57], 343-60).

  24. The Federalist Papers: Exploring Arguments in Paper 10 and 51

    Ahmed Al Salhi Political Science 121 9/13/2019 Constitution Short Essay There were few Federalist Paper written by the most important politicians of the United States. James Madison was one of the writers of a few papers such as the federalist paper 10 and 51. Each of these papers had it owns argument and each of those papers focus on a specific type of issues and the goal is to help people ...

  25. 10 Easiest Luna New Year Decoration Ideas in 2024

    Spring Couplets (春联 - Chūn Lián) is a traditional Chinese New Year decoration consisting of two vertically aligned phrases or sentences written with Chinese calligraphy on red paper or scrolls. These couplets are typically placed on both sides of a door or entrance to convey good wishes, blessings, and auspicious messages for the coming year.

  26. Politics latest: Big day for Keir Starmer as MPs set to vote on Gaza

    A Commons vote calling for a ceasefire in Gaza is set to be held later, but there's a chance Labour's amendment will not be selected, putting Sir Keir Starmer in a difficult position.