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Characteristics of Nature, Essay Example

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Nature plays an ominous and interesting role in how people view the world around them.  Due to the ominous experience that nature can inflict upon us, three separate and unique characteristics have been developed to define nature.  Within the text it is written that “the three characteristics of nature might be identified as elements of Romantic vision.  First romantic nature is particular.  While it is still retains the aura that earlier surrounded nature as either a Paradise or a fallen realms, it is watched and understood first in its own right” (Damrosch 2151).  The romantic nature is effectively described and illustrated by many authors and it is through this description that readers are able to understand the healing powers of nature as well as its existence as a separate realm from the current reality.

Within the poem “Ode to the Nightingale,” John Keats portrays nature as a separate reality from that of the world in which we live.  It is suggested that nature, and more specifically the forest, is a place to escape from the harshness of the real world.  Therefore, nature is described from the Romantic view as a place that extends outside of the common living realm. Keats begins to emphasize this aspect of nature through lines 19-20 by writing, “That I might drink, and leave the world unseen, And with thee fade away into the forest dim.”  Clearly, the comment “leave the world unseen” states that there is a romantic notion that nature is a viable option to enter a world that is somewhat unknown and mysterious.  Through this unknown world, the writer is suggesting that nature is a separate place from the rest of the world and is often unknown and commonly uninhabited by the normal person.

While Keats suggests that nature is an unknown and separate realm, he continues to describe nature as an opportunity for escape from the everyday troubles that men and women experience.  In fact, he attempts to suggest that nature has a vague healing ability for individuals to escape from their problems and to forget about all that has happened.  This escape is conducive to healing because of the main romantic element that Keats has developed in stating that nature is separate and particular.  The healing powers of nature are described in lines 21-22 of the third stanza in the poem.  Here, Keats writes “Fade far away, dissolve, and quite forget, What thou among the leaves hast never known.”  The innocence of nature is the true element that is able to provide an escape for man.  The comment by Keats “what thou among the leaves has t never known” illustrates that there are pains and troubles from the current reality that have not plagued nature.  This creates the romantic nature and its separate and particular elements that force individuals to want to enter for its serenity.

Keats is able to further illustrate the separate and particular notion of nature by contrasting it with what he affectionately labels “here” to describe the present realm in which all men and women live.  In lines 23-24, Keats continues to describe the healing powers of nature by writing about the current realm in which he states, “The weariness, the fever, and the fret, Here, where men sit and hear each other groan.”  Not only do these two lines explain the pain and anguish that individuals are forced to endure in the current reality, but Keats is suggesting that all of the daily frustrations and pain can be forgotten when entering into nature.  He appropriately devalues the current reality by calling it “here.”  Clearly, the separate and particular elements of nature are beneficial to provide a certain amount of healing power and escape from the everyday struggles in the current reality.  It is through this romantic vision of nature that Keats and other authors have described that presents a highly desired and mysterious notion of nature and what characteristics it truly possesses.

Damrosch, David. The Longman Anthology of World Literature . New York: Pearson Longman, 2008.

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Interesting Literature

A Summary and Analysis of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s ‘Nature’

By Dr Oliver Tearle (Loughborough University)

‘Nature’ is an 1836 essay by the American writer and thinker Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-82). In this essay, Emerson explores the relationship between nature and humankind, arguing that if we approach nature with a poet’s eye, and a pure spirit, we will find the wonders of nature revealed to us.

You can read ‘Nature’ in full here . Below, we summarise Emerson’s argument and offer an analysis of its meaning and context.

‘Nature’: summary

Emerson begins his essay by defining nature, in philosophical terms, as anything that is not our individual souls. So our bodies, as well as all of the natural world, but also all of the world of art and technology, too, are ‘nature’ in this philosophical sense of the world. He urges his readers not to rely on tradition or history to help them to understand the world: instead, they should look to nature and the world around them.

In the first chapter, Emerson argues that nature is never ‘used up’ when the right mind examines it: it is a source of boundless curiosity. No man can own the landscape: it belongs, if it belongs to anyone at all, to ‘the poet’. Emerson argues that when a man returns to nature he can rediscover his lost youth, that wide-eyed innocence he had when he went among nature as a boy.

Emerson states that when he goes among nature, he becomes a ‘transparent eyeball’ because he sees nature but is himself nothing: he has been absorbed or subsumed into nature and, because God made nature, God himself. He feels a deep kinship and communion with all of nature. He acknowledges that our view of nature depends on our own mood, and that the natural world reflects the mood we are feeling at the time.

In the second chapter, Emerson focuses on ‘commodity’: the name he gives to all of the advantages which our senses owe to nature. Emerson draws a parallel with the ‘useful arts’ which have built houses and steamships and whole towns: these are the man-made equivalents of the natural world, in that both nature and the ‘arts’ are designed to provide benefit and use to mankind.

characteristics of nature essay

The second aspect of beauty Emerson considers is the spiritual element. Great actions in history are often accompanied by a beautiful backdrop provided by nature. The third aspect in which nature should be viewed is its value to the human intellect . Nature can help to inspire people to create and invent new things. Everything in nature is a representation of a universal harmony and perfection, something greater than itself.

In his fourth chapter, Emerson considers the relationship between nature and language. Our language is often a reflection of some natural state: for instance, the word right literally means ‘straight’, while wrong originally denoted something ‘twisted’. But we also turn to nature when we wish to use language to reflect a ‘spiritual fact’: for example, that a lamb symbolises innocence, or a fox represents cunning. Language represents nature, therefore, and nature in turn represents some spiritual truth.

Emerson argues that ‘the whole of nature is a metaphor of the human mind.’ Many great principles of the physical world are also ethical or moral axioms: for example, ‘the whole is greater than its part’.

In the fifth chapter, Emerson turns his attention to nature as a discipline . Its order can teach us spiritual and moral truths, but it also puts itself at the service of mankind, who can distinguish and separate (for instance, using water for drinking but wool for weaving, and so on). There is a unity in nature which means that every part of it corresponds to all of the other parts, much as an individual art – such as architecture – is related to the others, such as music or religion.

The sixth chapter is devoted to idealism . How can we sure nature does actually exist, and is not a mere product within ‘the apocalypse of the mind’, as Emerson puts it? He believes it doesn’t make any practical difference either way (but for his part, Emerson states that he believes God ‘never jests with us’, so nature almost certainly does have an external existence and reality).

Indeed, we can determine that we are separate from nature by changing out perspective in relation to it: for example, by bending down and looking between our legs, observing the landscape upside down rather than the way we usually view it. Emerson quotes from Shakespeare to illustrate how poets can draw upon nature to create symbols which reflect the emotions of the human soul. Religion and ethics, by contrast, degrade nature by viewing it as lesser than divine or moral truth.

Next, in the seventh chapter, Emerson considers nature and the spirit . Spirit, specifically the spirit of God, is present throughout nature. In his eighth and final chapter, ‘Prospects’, Emerson argues that we need to contemplate nature as a whole entity, arguing that ‘a dream may let us deeper into the secret of nature than a hundred concerted experiments’ which focus on more local details within nature.

Emerson concludes by arguing that in order to detect the unity and perfection within nature, we must first perfect our souls. ‘He cannot be a naturalist until he satisfies all the demands of the spirit’, Emerson urges. Wisdom means finding the miraculous within the common or everyday. He then urges the reader to build their own world, using their spirit as the foundation. Then the beauty of nature will reveal itself to us.

‘Nature’: analysis

In a number of respects, Ralph Waldo Emerson puts forward a radically new attitude towards our relationship with nature. For example, although we may consider language to be man-made and artificial, Emerson demonstrates that the words and phrases we use to describe the world are drawn from our observation of nature. Nature and the human spirit are closely related, for Emerson, because they are both part of ‘the same spirit’: namely, God. Although we are separate from nature – or rather, our souls are separate from nature, as his prefatory remarks make clear – we can rediscover the common kinship between us and the world.

Emerson wrote ‘Nature’ in 1836, not long after Romanticism became an important literary, artistic, and philosophical movement in Europe and the United States. Like Wordsworth and the Romantics before him, Emerson argues that children have a better understanding of nature than adults, and when a man returns to nature he can rediscover his lost youth, that wide-eyed innocence he had when he went among nature as a boy.

And like Wordsworth, Emerson argued that to understand the world, we should go out there and engage with it ourselves, rather than relying on books and tradition to tell us what to think about it. In this connection, one could undertake a comparative analysis of Emerson’s ‘Nature’ and Wordsworth’s pair of poems ‘ Expostulation and Reply ’ and ‘ The Tables Turned ’, the former of which begins with a schoolteacher rebuking Wordsworth for sitting among nature rather than having his nose buried in a book:

‘Why, William, on that old gray stone, ‘Thus for the length of half a day, ‘Why, William, sit you thus alone, ‘And dream your time away?

‘Where are your books?—that light bequeathed ‘To beings else forlorn and blind! ‘Up! up! and drink the spirit breathed ‘From dead men to their kind.

Similarly, for Emerson, the poet and the dreamer can get closer to the true meaning of nature than scientists because they can grasp its unity by viewing it holistically, rather than focusing on analysing its rock formations or other more local details. All of this is in keeping with the philosophy of Transcendentalism , that nineteenth-century movement which argued for a kind of spiritual thinking instead of scientific thinking based narrowly on material things. Emerson, along with Henry David Thoreau, was the most famous writer to belong to the Transcendentalist movement, and ‘Nature’ is fundamentally a Transcendentalist essay, arguing for an intuitive and ‘poetic’ engagement with nature in the round rather than a coldly scientific or empirical analysis of its component parts.

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13 Essays About Nature: Use These For Your Next Assignment

Essays about nature can look at the impact of human behavior on the environment, or on the impact of nature on human beings. Check out these suggestions.

Nature is one of humanity’s greatest gifts. It provides food, shelter, and even medication to help us live healthier, happier lives. It also inspires artists, poets, writers, and photographers because of its beauty.

Essays about nature can take many different paths. Descriptive essays about the beauty of nature can inspire readers. They give the writer the chance to explore some creativity in their essay writing. You can also write a persuasive essay arguing about an environmental topic and how humans harm the natural environment. You can also write an informative essay to discuss a particular impact or aspect of the natural world and how it impacts the human beings who live within it.

If you need to write a nature essay, read on to discover 13 topics that can work well. For help with your essays, check out our round-up of the best essay checkers .

1. How Happiness Is Related to Nature Connectedness

2. why protecting nature is everyone’s responsibility, 3. how technological advancements can help the environment, 4. why global warming is a danger for future generations, 5. how deforestation impacts the beauty of nature, 6. the relationship between plants and human beings, 7. the health benefits of spending time in nature, 8. what are the gifts of nature, 9. the importance of nature to sustain human life, 10. the beauty of non-living things in nature, 11. does eco-tourism help or hurt the natural world, 12. how sustainability benefits the natural environment, 13. does agriculture hurt or help nature.

Essays About Nature

Exposure to nature has a significant positive impact on mood and overall mental health. In other words, happiness and nature connectedness have a close link. Your nature essay can explore the research behind this and then build on that research to show why nature conservation is so important.

This essay on nature is important because it shows why people need the natural environment. Nature provides more than just the natural resources we need for life. Spending time in the fresh air and sunshine actually makes us happier, so behaviors that harm nature harm your potential happiness.

Planet earth is a precious gift that is often damaged by the selfish activities of human beings. All human beings have the potential to hurt the natural environment and the living creatures in that environment, and thus protecting nature is everyone’s responsibility. You can build this into an essay and explore what that responsibility may look like to different groups.

For the child, for example, protecting nature may be as simple as picking up trash in the park, but for the CEO of a manufacturing company, it may look like eco-friendly company policies. For an adult, it may look like shopping for a car with lower emissions. Take a look at the different ways people can protect nature and why it is essential.

Technology is often viewed as the enemy of nature, but you can find technological advancements helping rather than harming nature. For example, light bulbs that use less energy or residential solar panel development have reduced the average home’s amount of energy. Your essay could explore some inventions that have helped nature.

After looking at these technologies, dive into the idea that technology, when used well, has a significant positive impact on the environment, rather than a negative one. The key is developing technology that works with conservation efforts, rather than against them.

Essays About Nature: Why global warming is a danger for future generations

Global warming is a hot topic in today’s society, but the term gets used so often, that many people have tuned it out. You can explore the dangers of global warming and how it potentially impacts future generations. You can also touch on whether or not this problem has been over-blown in education and media.

This essay should be full of facts and data to back up your opinions. It could also touch on initiatives that could reduce the risks of global warming to make the future brighter for the next generation.

Much has been written about the dangers of deforestation on the overall ecosystem, but what about its effect on nature’s beauty? This essay topic adds an additional reason why countries should fight deforestation to protect green spaces and the beauty of nature.

In your essay, strike a balance between limiting deforestation and the need to harvest trees as natural resources. Look at ways companies can use these natural resources without destroying entire forests and ecosystems. You might also be interested in these essays about nature .

People need plants, and this need can give you your essay topic. Plants provide food for people and for animals that people also eat. Many pharmaceutical products come from plants originally, meaning they are vital to the medical field as well.

Plants also contribute to the fresh air that people breathe. They filter the air, removing toxins and purifying the air to make it cleaner. They also add beauty to nature with their foliage and flowers. These facts make plants a vital part of nature, and you can delve into that connection in your nature essay.

Spending time in nature not only improves your mental health, but it also improves your physical health . When people spend time in nature, they have lower blood pressure and heart rates. They also produce fewer damaging stress hormones and reduced muscle tension. Shockingly, spending time in nature may actually reduce mortality rates.

Take some time to research these health benefits, and then weave them into your essay. By showing the health benefits of nature exposure, you can build an appreciation for nature in your audience. You may inspire people to do more to protect the natural environment.

Nature has given people many gifts. Our food all comes from nature in its most basic form, from fruits and vegetables to milk and meats. It provides the foundation for many medicines and remedies. These gifts alone make it worth protecting.

Yet nature does much more. It also gives the gift of better mental health. It can inspire feelings of wonder in people of all ages. Finally, it provides beauty and tranquility that you cannot reproduce anywhere else. This essay is more descriptive and reflective than factual, but it can be an exciting topic to explore.

Can humans live without nature? Based on the topics already discussed, the answer is no. You can use this fact to create an essay that connects nature to the sustenance of human life. Without nature, we cannot survive.

One way to look at this importance is to consider the honey bee . The honey bee seems like a simple part of the natural world, yet it is one of the most essential. Without bees, fruits and vegetables will not get pollinated as easily, if at all. If bees disappear, the entire food system will struggle. Thus, bees, and many other parts of nature, are vital to human life.

Have you ever felt fully inspired by a glorious sunset or sunrise? Have you spent time gazing at a mountain peak or the ocean water crashing on the shoreline and found your soul refreshed? Write about one of these experiences in your essay.

Use descriptive words to show how the non-living parts of nature are beautiful, just like the living creatures and plants that are part of nature. Draw from personal experiences of things you have seen in nature to make this essay rich and engaging. If you love nature, you might also be interested in these essays about camping .

Ecotourism is tourism designed to expose people to nature. Nature tours, safaris, and even jungle or rainforest experiences are all examples of ecotourism. It seems like ecotourism would help the environment by making people more aware, but does it really?

For your essay, research if ecotourism helps or hurts the environment. If you find it does both, consider arguing which is more impactful, the positive side or the negative side. On the positive side, ecotourism emphasizes sustainability in travel and highlights the plight of endangered species, leading to initiatives that protect local ecosystems. On the negative side, ecotourism can hurt the ecosystems at the same time by bringing humans into the environment, which automatically changes it. Weigh these pros and cons to see which side you fall on.

For more help with this topic, read our guide explaining what is persuasive writing ?

Sustainability is the practice of taking care of human needs and economic needs while also protecting the natural environment for future generations. But do sustainable practices work? This essay topic lets you look at popular eco-friendly practices and determine if they are helpful to the environment, or not.

Sustainability is a hot topic, but unfortunately, some practices labeled as sustainable , aren’t helpful to the environment. For example, many people think they are doing something good when tossing a plastic bottle in the recycling bin, but most recycling centers simply throw away the bottle if that little plastic ring is present, so your effort is wasted. A better practice is using a reusable water bottle. Consider different examples like this to show how sustainability can help the environment, but only when done well.

Essays About Nature: Does agriculture hurt or help nature?

Agriculture is one way that humans interact with and change the natural environment. Planting crops or raising non-native animals impacts the nature around the farm. Does this impact hurt or help the local natural ecosystem?

Explore this topic in your essay. Consider the impact of things like irrigation, fertilization, pesticides, and the introduction of non-native plants and animals to the local environment. Consider ways that agriculture can benefit the environment and come to a conclusion in your essay about the overall impact.

If you are interested in learning more, check out our essay writing tips !

characteristics of nature essay

Nicole Harms has been writing professionally since 2006. She specializes in education content and real estate writing but enjoys a wide gamut of topics. Her goal is to connect with the reader in an engaging, but informative way. Her work has been featured on USA Today, and she ghostwrites for many high-profile companies. As a former teacher, she is passionate about both research and grammar, giving her clients the quality they demand in today's online marketing world.

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Literary Theory and Criticism

Home › Eco Criticism › Ecocriticism: An Essay

Ecocriticism: An Essay

By NASRULLAH MAMBROL on November 27, 2016 • ( 3 )

Ecocriticism is the study of literature and environment from an interdisciplinary point of view where all sciences come together to analyze the environment and brainstorm possible solutions for the correction of the contemporary environmental situation. Ecocriticism was officially heralded by the publication of two seminal works, both published in the mid-1990s: The Ecocriticism Reader , edited by Cheryll Glotfelty and Harold Fromm , and The Environmental Imagination, by Lawrence Buell.

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Ecocriticism investigates the relation between humans and the natural world in literature. It deals with how environmental issues, cultural issues concerning the environment and attitudes towards nature are presented and analyzed. One of the main goals in ecocriticism is to study how individuals in society behave and react in relation to nature and ecological aspects. This form of criticism has gained a lot of attention during recent years due to higher social emphasis on environmental destruction and increased technology. It is hence a fresh way of analyzing and interpreting literary texts, which brings new dimensions to the field of literary and theoritical studies. Ecocriticism is an intentionally broad approach that is known by a number of other designations, including “green (cultural) studies”, “ecopoetics”, and “environmental literary criticism.”

Western thought has often held a more or less utilitarian attitude to nature —nature is for serving human needs. However, after the eighteenth century, there emerged many voices that demanded a revaluation of the relationship between man and environment, and man’s view of nature. Arne Naess , a Norwegian philosopher, developed the notion of “Deep Ecology” which emphasizes the basic interconnectedness of all life forms and natural features, and presents a symbiotic and holistic world-view rather than an anthropocentric one.

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Earlier theories in literary and cultural studies focussed on issue of class, race, gender, region are criteria and “subjects”of critical analysis. The late twentieth century has woken up to a new threat: ecological disaster. The most important environmental problems that humankind faces as a whole are: nuclear war, depletion of valuable natural resources, population explosion, proliferation of exploitative technologies, conquest of space preliminary to using it as a garbage dump, pollution, extinction of species (though not a human problem) among others. In such a context, literary and cultural theory has begun to address the issue as a part of academic discourse. Numerous green movements have sprung up all over the world, and some have even gained representations in the governments.

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Large scale debates over “dumping,” North versus South environmentalism (the necessary differences between the en-vironmentalism of the developed and technologically advanced richer nations—the North, and the poorer, subsistence environmentalism of the developing or “Third World”—the South). Donald Worster ‘s Nature’s Economy (1977) became a textbook for the study of ecological thought down the ages. The historian Arnold Toynbee recorded the effect of human civilisation upon the land and nature in his monumental, Mankind and Mother Earth (1976). Environmental issues and landscape use were also the concern of the Annales School of historians , especially Braudel and Febvre. The work of environmental historians has been pathbreaking too. Rich-ard Grove et al’s massive Nature and the Orient (1998), David Arnold and Ramachandra Guha’s Nature, Culture, Imperialism (1995) have been significant work in the environmental history of India and Southeast Asia. Ramachandra Guha is of course the most important environmental historian writing from India today.

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Various versions of environmentalism developed.Deep ecology and ecofeminism were two important developments. These new ideas questioned the notion of “development” and “modernity,” and argued that all Western notions in science, philosophy, politics were “anthropocentric” (human-centred) and “androcentric”(Man/male-centred). Technology, medical science with its animal testing, the cosmetic and fashion industry all came in for scrutiny from environmentalists. Deep ecology, for instance, stressed on a “biocentric” view (as seen in the name of the environmentalist group, “ Earth First! !”).

Ecocriticism is the result of this new consciousness: that very soon, there will be nothing beautiful (or safe) in nature to discourse about, unless we are very careful.

Ecocritics ask questions such as: (1) How is nature represented in the novel/poem/play ? (2) What role does the physical-geographical setting play in the structure of the novel? (3) How do our metaphors of the land influence the way we treat it? That is, what is the link between pedagogic or creative practice and actual political, sociocultural and ethical behaviour towards the land and other non-human life forms? (4) How is science —in the form of genetic engineering, technologies of reproduction, sexualities—open to critical scrutiny terms of the effects of science upon the land?

The essential assumptions, ideas and methods of ecocritics may be summed up as follows. (1) Ecocritics believe that human culture is related to the physical world. (2) Ecocriticism assumes that all life forms are interlinked. Ecocriticism expands the notion of “the world” to include the entire ecosphere. (3) Moreover, there is a definite link between nature and culture, where the literary treatment, representation and “thematisation” of land and nature influence actions on the land. (4) Joseph Meeker in an early work, The Comedy of Survival: Studies in Literary Ecology (1972) used the term “literary ecology” to refer to “the study of biological themes and relationships which appear in literary works. It is simultaneously an attempt to discover what roles have been played by literature in the ecology of the human species.” (5) William Rueckert is believed to have coined the term “ecocriticism” in 1978, which he defines as “the application of ecology and ecological concepts to the study of literature.”

Source: Literary Theory Today,Pramod K Nair

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Categories: Eco Criticism

Tags: Annales School , Arne Naess , Arnold Toynbee , Cheryll Glotfelty , Deep Ecology , Earth First! , Ecocriticism , green studies , Harold Fromm , Literary Theory , Mankind and Mother Earth , Nature and the Orient , Nature's Economy , The Comedy of Survival: Studies in Literary Ecology , The Ecocriticism Reader , The Environmental Imagination

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What is Nature Writing?

Definition and Examples

  • An Introduction to Punctuation
  • Ph.D., Rhetoric and English, University of Georgia
  • M.A., Modern English and American Literature, University of Leicester
  • B.A., English, State University of New York

Nature writing is a form of creative nonfiction in which the natural environment (or a narrator 's encounter with the natural environment) serves as the dominant subject.

"In critical practice," says Michael P. Branch, "the term 'nature writing' has usually been reserved for a brand of nature representation that is deemed literary, written in the speculative personal voice , and presented in the form of the nonfiction essay . Such nature writing is frequently pastoral or romantic in its philosophical assumptions, tends to be modern or even ecological in its sensibility, and is often in service to an explicit or implicit preservationist agenda" ("Before Nature Writing," in Beyond Nature Writing: Expanding the Boundaries of Ecocriticism , ed. by K. Armbruster and K.R. Wallace, 2001).

Examples of Nature Writing:

  • At the Turn of the Year, by William Sharp
  • The Battle of the Ants, by Henry David Thoreau
  • Hours of Spring, by Richard Jefferies
  • The House-Martin, by Gilbert White
  • In Mammoth Cave, by John Burroughs
  • An Island Garden, by Celia Thaxter
  • January in the Sussex Woods, by Richard Jefferies
  • The Land of Little Rain, by Mary Austin
  • Migration, by Barry Lopez
  • The Passenger Pigeon, by John James Audubon
  • Rural Hours, by Susan Fenimore Cooper
  • Where I Lived, and What I Lived For, by Henry David Thoreau

Observations:

  • "Gilbert White established the pastoral dimension of nature writing in the late 18th century and remains the patron saint of English nature writing. Henry David Thoreau was an equally crucial figure in mid-19th century America . . .. "The second half of the 19th century saw the origins of what we today call the environmental movement. Two of its most influential American voices were John Muir and John Burroughs , literary sons of Thoreau, though hardly twins. . . . "In the early 20th century the activist voice and prophetic anger of nature writers who saw, in Muir's words, that 'the money changers were in the temple' continued to grow. Building upon the principles of scientific ecology that were being developed in the 1930s and 1940s, Rachel Carson and Aldo Leopold sought to create a literature in which appreciation of nature's wholeness would lead to ethical principles and social programs. "Today, nature writing in America flourishes as never before. Nonfiction may well be the most vital form of current American literature, and a notable proportion of the best writers of nonfiction practice nature writing." (J. Elder and R. Finch, Introduction, The Norton Book of Nature Writing . Norton, 2002)

"Human Writing . . . in Nature"

  • "By cordoning nature off as something separate from ourselves and by writing about it that way, we kill both the  genre and a part of ourselves. The best writing in this genre is not really 'nature writing' anyway but human writing that just happens to take place in nature. And the reason we are still talking about [Thoreau's] Walden 150 years later is as much for the personal story as the pastoral one: a single human being, wrestling mightily with himself, trying to figure out how best to live during his brief time on earth, and, not least of all, a human being who has the nerve, talent, and raw ambition to put that wrestling match on display on the printed page. The human spilling over into the wild, the wild informing the human; the two always intermingling. There's something to celebrate." (David Gessner, "Sick of Nature." The Boston Globe , Aug. 1, 2004)

Confessions of a Nature Writer

  • "I do not believe that the solution to the world's ills is a return to some previous age of mankind. But I do doubt that any solution is possible unless we think of ourselves in the context of living nature "Perhaps that suggests an answer to the question what a 'nature writer' is. He is not a sentimentalist who says that 'nature never did betray the heart that loved her.' Neither is he simply a scientist classifying animals or reporting on the behavior of birds just because certain facts can be ascertained. He is a writer whose subject is the natural context of human life, a man who tries to communicate his observations and his thoughts in the presence of nature as part of his attempt to make himself more aware of that context. 'Nature writing' is nothing really new. It has always existed in literature. But it has tended in the course of the last century to become specialized partly because so much writing that is not specifically 'nature writing' does not present the natural context at all; because so many novels and so many treatises describe man as an economic unit, a political unit, or as a member of some social class but not as a living creature surrounded by other living things." (Joseph Wood Krutch, "Some Unsentimental Confessions of a Nature Writer." New York Herald Tribune Book Review , 1952)
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The idea of nature in America

characteristics of nature essay

Leo Marx, a Fellow of the American Academy since 1972, is Senior Lecturer and William R. Kenan Professor of American Cultural History Emeritus in the Program in Science, Technology, and Society at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He is the author of The Machine in the Garden  (1964), The Pilot and the Passenger  (1988), and coeditor of Does Technology Drive History?  (with Merritt Roe Smith, 1994).

The idea of nature is – or, rather, was – one of the fundamental American ideas. In its time it served – as the ideas of freedom, democracy, or progress did in theirs – to define the meaning of America. For some three centuries, in fact, from the founding of Jamestown in 1607 to the closing of the Western frontier in 1890, the encounter of white settlers with what they perceived as wilderness – unaltered nature – was the defining American experience.

By the end of that era, however, the wilderness had come to seem a thing of the past, and the land of farms and villages was rapidly becoming a land of factories and cities. By 1920, half the population lived in cities, and as the natural world became a less immediate presence, images of the pristine landscape – chief icon of American nature – lost their power to express the nation’s vision of itself.

Then, in the 1970s, with the onset of the ecological ‘crisis,’ the refurbished, matter-of-fact word environment took over a large part of the niche in public discourse hitherto occupied by the word nature. Before the end of the century, the marked loss of status and currency suffered by the idea of nature had become a hot subject in academic and intellectual circles. Reputable scholars and journalists published essays and books about the ‘death’ – or the ‘end’ – of nature; the University of California recruited a dozen humanities professors to participate in a semester-long research seminar designed to “reinvent nature”; 1 and the association of European specialists in American studies chose, as the aim of its turn-of-the-century conference, to reassess the changing role played by the idea of nature in America. 2

What are we to make of the purported demise of nature? Can it be that the venerable idea is no longer meaningful? If that seems improbable on its face, it is because nature is our oldest, most nearly universal name for the material world, and despite the alarming extent of the transformation – and devastation – we humans have visited on it, that world is still very much with us. But why, then, is the general idea of nature – nature in all its meanings – falling into disuse? What other reasons might there be for the seeming end of nature? With these questions in mind, I want to reconsider the idea’s changing role in American thought.

But, first, these preliminary caveats. I do not mean to suggest that the imminent disappearance of nature – if that is what we are witnessing – is a peculiarly American development. But in view of the crucial role played by the idea over the course of American history, a reassessment of critical stages of that history may prove to be revealing. I say ‘stages’ because limitations of space – the subject calls for a long treatise rather than an essay – make it necessary to focus on a few significant points along the historical trajectory traced by the idea of nature in American thought.

But it also should be said that the word nature is a notorious semantic and metaphysical trap. As used in ordinary discourse nowadays, it is an inherently ambiguous word. We cannot always tell whether references to nature are meant to include or exclude people. Besides, the word also carries the sense of essence: of the ultimate, irreducible character or quality of something, as for example, ‘the nature of femininity’ or, for that matter, ‘the nature of nature.’ When this meaning is in play, the word tacitly imputes an idealist or essentialist – hence ahistorical – character to the particular subject at hand, whether it be femaleness or nature itself. The word’s multiple meanings testify to its age: its roots go back (by way of Latin and Old French) to the concept of origination – of being born. As Raymond Williams famously noted, nature is probably the most complex word in the English language. 3 And when, moreover, the idea of nature is yoked with the ideologically freighted concept of American nationhood, as in the historian Perry Miller’s sly allusion to America as Nature’s Nation, the ambiguity is compounded by chauvinism. 4

Contemplating the nature of nature in America has led many scholars, of whom the historian Frederick Jackson Turner is the exemplar, to adopt the contested idiom of ‘American exceptionalism.’ 5 And not without good reason. However wary of chauvinism one might be, it would be foolish to deny that when Europeans first encountered American nature, it truly was, and to some extent still is, exceptional – perhaps not unique but, like Australia, a continent even less developed at the time of contact, surely exceptional. It was exceptional in its immensity, its spectacular beauty, its variety of habitats, its promise of wealth, its accessibility to settlers from overseas, and, above all, in the scarcity of its indigenous population. Hence the remarkable extent of its underdevelopment – its wildness – as depicted in myriad representations of the initial landfall of European explorers on the Atlantic seaboard of North America. In that stock image, the newly discovered terrain appears to be untouched by civilization, a cultural void populated by godless savages, and not easy to distinguish from a state of nature.

In the beginning, then, Europeans formed their impressions of American nature in a geographical context: it was a place, a terrain, a landscape. But they invariably accommodated their immediate impressions of American places to their imported – typically religious – preconceptions about the nature of nature and the character of indigenous peoples. Thus all of the significant American ideas of nature are hybrids, conceived in Europe and inflected by New World experience. And each ideology that served as a rationale for one or another colonial system of power contained such a hybrid Euro-American conception of nature and of the colonists’ relations with it.

A revealing example is the Pilgrim leader William Bradford’s well-known description of the forbidding Cape Cod shoreline as seen from the deck of the Mayflower in 1620. He depicts it as “a hidious and desolate wildernes, full of wild beasts and wild men.” Here the bias inherent in the Christian idea of nature as fallen – as Satan’s domain – effectively erases the humanity of the indigenous Americans. To Bradford they are more like wild beasts than white men.

The concept of satanic nature provided a useful foil for the sacred mission of the Puritan colonists. 6 In 1645, for example, John Winthrop, lieutenant governor of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, used it as an ideological weapon to defend his theocratic authority. His enemies had charged him with infringing on their liberty, and in his uncompromising response in the General Court he develops the distinction between two kinds of liberty: natural and civil. Natural liberty, “common to man with beasts and other creatures,” is the liberty, he argues, we enjoy in a state of nature, namely, to do evil as well as good; civil liberty, on the other hand, is moral, hence available only to the truly regenerate, only to Christians redeemed from sin by the reception of divine grace. 7 According to Calvinist doctrine, only those rescued from the state of nature may enjoy the God-given liberty to do what is good, just, and honest. Here, on the coast of a vast, unexplored continent, the idea of an ostensibly separate realm of wild nature – a separateness underscored by the contrast with the tamed state of nature in Europe – was a valuable rhetorical asset for the colony’s leaders. Allusions to wild nature served to reinforce the doctrinal barrier between themselves, the elect, and the unregenerate, whom they consigned to the realm of natural lawlessness.

In the lexicon of Protestant Christianity in America, the essential character of primal nature was conveyed by epithets like ‘howling desert’ and ‘hideous wilderness,’ and by the malign names – savage, cannibal, slave – assigned to indigenous peoples. In Winthrop’s argument, accordingly, the unarguable existence of a separate (unredeemed) state of nature helps to justify his a priori condemnation of the unregenerate, who constitute a potential threat of lawlessness, anarchy, and misrule. Their geographical location underscored the theological argument: the only escape from natural unregeneracy open to them was the reception of divine grace.

By the time Thomas Jefferson wrote his draft of the Declaration of Independence, the theological notion of a dual nature – part profane, part sacred – was being supplanted by the unitary character of Newtonian science and Deism. Here, the initial identification of American nature with the landscape expanded to embrace the natural processes, or laws, operating behind its visible surface. Because the newly discovered celestial machinery obeys physical laws accessible to human reason, Newtonian physics had the effect of bringing humanity and nature closer together. Besides, the mathematical clarity and precision of the new physics made the old images of a dark, disorderly nature repugnant. Alexander Pope summed up the change in the prevailing worldview in the couplet engraved on Newton’s tomb in Westminster Abbey:

Nature and nature’s laws lay hid in night. God said, “Let Newton be!” and all was light.

By 1776 it made sense for a rhetorician as gifted as Jefferson to extend the hypothetical reach of nature’s laws – or, to be more precise, of principles analogous to them – to the unruly sphere of politics. To justify the colonists’ acts of treason and armed rebellion, he had merely to describe them as the means – indeed, the only possible means - of claiming the independent status to which they were entitled by “the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God.” Nature, as our free-thinking president conceived of it, was not so much the work of God as God was a constituent feature of Nature. By invoking a secularized idea of nature on behalf of a quintessentially political cause, Jefferson helped to narrow the gulf separating humanity and nature. But for that purpose, the idiom of the natural sublime was even more effective. Nine years later, in Notes on Virginia, Jefferson invoked the sublime to account for the unsurpassed beauty of one of American nature’s most cherished creations – Virginia’s Natural Bridge. An ardent practitioner of the neoclassical aesthetic, Jefferson credits the beauty of the Bridge to its symmetrical form, or, as it were, to the strikingly close approximation of its form to ostensibly natural principles of order and proportion. He begins his description of the bridge with a detailed analysis of its exact dimensions, as if reported by a detached observer writing in the third person. But then, partway through, he abruptly puts himself into the scene, climbs the parapet, and, shifting to the second person, describes how “you” inescapably would react if you too found yourself standing on the narrow ledge looking “over into the abyss”:

You involuntarily fall on your hands and feet, creep to the parapet and peep over it . . . . If the view from the top be painful and intolerable, that from below is delightful in an equal extreme. It is impossible for the emotions arising from the sublime to be felt beyond what they are here; so beautiful an arch, so elevated, so light, and springing as it were up to heaven! The rapture of the spectator is really indescribable! 8

As this passionate Wordsworthian apostrophe suggests – it was written about fifteen years before the preface to the Lyrical Ballads – Jefferson already was prepared to enlist in the Romantic movement. But even after the triumph of Romanticism, the separateness of nature remained a largely unchallenged if unstated premise of public discourse. Since no authoritative biological counterpart to the Newtonian laws of nature had yet been formulated, supernatural explanations of the origin of life were not yet vulnerable to the challenge of scientific materialism. By the same token, pantheism retained its status as a Christian heresy, and dutiful communicants were advised to be wary of the feeling of oneness with nature.

In 1836, four years after resigning his pastorate in the Second (Unitarian) Church of Boston, Ralph Waldo Emerson anonymously published the essay Nature, which came to be known as the manifesto of Transcendentalism, a New England variant of European Romanticism. The essay begins as a lament for the loss of humanity’s direct relations with nature. “Why,” Emerson asks, “should not we also enjoy an original relation to the universe?”

Like his title, the question rests on the assumption that nature was – and should once again become–a primary locus of meaning and value for Americans. What followed was Emerson’s first and only attempt to formulate a systematic theory of nature, and in it he probably came as close as he ever would to repudiating the orthodox theological assumption that humanity and nature belong to separate realms of being. To illustrate the potential effect of being in “the presence of nature,” Emerson describes an epiphany that is patently irreconcilable with the idea of nature’s separateness. One gloomy afternoon, while crossing the town common, he was suddenly – unaccountably – overwhelmed by a sense of immanence, or, as he puts it, of “being part or parcel of God.” It was a largely secularized variant of the Protestant conversion experience, and it suggests the possibility, as Emerson puts it, of an “occult relation” – or state of oneness – with nonhuman nature. The balance of Nature may be read as an effort to devise a reasoned explanation, or justification, for this transformative experience.

Emerson’s account of the epiphany reveals his ambivalence about the relative validity of religious and scientific conceptions of nature. On the one hand it expresses his growing skepticism, on both theological and scientific grounds, about the received idea of a separate nature. As a Unitarian, to be sure, he already had repudiated most supernatural aspects of Christian doctrine, including the divinity of Jesus. A few years before writing Nature, he had resigned his pastorate on the grounds that he no longer could in good conscience perform the – to him, excessively literal – sacrament of the Lord’s Supper. At that time, moreover, he was studiously keeping abreast of the latest advances in geology and zoology, which provided empirical evidence in support of various emerging theories of evolution. When Nature was reissued in 1849, in fact, he appended a new verse epigraph depicting humanity’s origin:

A subtle chain of countless rings The next unto the farthest brings; The eye reads omens where it goes, And speaks all languages the rose; And, striving to be man, the worm Mounts through all the spires of form. 9

But though Emerson, like many of his contemporaries, was receptive to evolutionary thinking long before the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species, he was not prepared – for reasons he never quite made explicit – to abandon the idea of nature’s separateness. That traditional assumption is built into the conceptual structure of Nature. In defining his key terms, he postulates a universe made up of all that exists except for one thing: the human soul. All being, he asserts, “is composed of Nature and the Soul,” and he goes on to specify that “all that is separate from us, all which Philosophy distinguishes as the NOT ME, both nature and art, all other men and my own body, must be ranked under this name, nature.” 10 Though he tacitly repudiated the major tenets of the Christian faith, and though he was prepared to embrace the theory of evolution, he continued to define NATURE as a discrete entity, eternally separated from human beings and their immortal souls.

But the theory of evolution, as definitively set forth by Darwin in 1859, made the age-old belief in nature’s separateness scientifically untenable once and for all. 11 On that score the logical import of evolutionary biology is clear and conclusive. If Homo sapiens evolved through a process of natural selection, if our species is inextricably embedded in a global web of biophysical processes, then there can be no such thing – on the planet Earth at least – as a separate domain of nature.

But the logic of science is one thing, and ancient habits of mind are another. Despite the passage of some 145 years since Darwin’s theory first caught the world’s attention, and despite the confirmation it has received, first and last, from an international consensus of scientists, its import has yet to be incorporated in prevailing assumptions about the nature of nature. To this day, the ‘nature’ commonly invoked in our public and private discourse – even by those of us who claim to ‘believe in’ evolution seems to be a discrete, almost wholly independent entity ‘out there’ somewhere. In ordinary usage the word rarely conveys a sense of humanity’s ties with other living things. As the historian of science, Lynn White, Jr., noted in his influential 1967 essay, “The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis,” “Despite Darwin, we are not, in our hearts, part of the natural process.” 12

But that is putting it mildly. As everyone knows, the publication of the Origin of Species aroused intense public hostility, especially among churchmen and religious believers. There was no way, after all, to disguise the simple truth: Darwin’s theory flatly contradicts the Biblical account of the creation. Besides, people of all persuasions, many nonbelievers among them, were – still are – revolted by the notion that we are kin to the higher primates. It makes them feel, as the saying goes, ‘tainted by bestiality.’ So does the idea that humanity reached the pinnacle of the food chain by winning a long, murderous struggle, “red” – in the poet Tennyson’s phrase – “in tooth and claw.” 13 But the repugnance aroused by evolutionary theory did not surprise its wisest proponents. Years before he published the Origin, for example, Darwin had begun to fear that it would raise the specter of atheism. He clearly understood – and empathized with – the widespread impulse to deny, or gloss over, the disturbing implications of his theory. But he urged readers of the Origin to resist the impulse. “Nothing is easier,” he warned,

than to admit in words the truth of the universal struggle for life, or more difficult atleast I have found it so – than constantly to bear this conclusion in mind. Yet unless it be thoroughly engrained in the mind, the whole economy of nature . . . will be dimly seen or quite misunderstood. 14

But the perceived antireligious import of Darwinism was not the only reason for its failure to win acceptance in America. Equally if not more important was the largely unremarked yet fundamental conflict between the evolutionary view of humanity’s embeddedness in natural processes and the nation’s chief geopolitical project: the settlement and economic development of the continental landmass. As Tocqueville observed, most European settlers were “insensible” to the beauty and wonder of the wilderness. “Their eyes,” he wrote, “are fixed on another sight: [their] . . . own march across these wilds, draining swamps, turning the course of rivers, peopling solitudes, and subduing nature.” 15 That westward march, aimed at transforming the continent’s natural resources into marketable wealth as rapidly as possible, was executed under the aegis of such slogans as ‘Manifest Destiny,’ the ‘Conquest of Nature,’ and, above all, ‘Progress.’

The belief in ‘progress,’ a shorthand label for a grand narrative of history, was post–Civil War America’s most popular secular creed. It held that our history is, or is rapidly becoming, a record of the steady, cumulative, continuous expansion of knowledge of – and power over – nature, a power destined to effect an overall improvement in the conditions of life. On this view, nature has a critical role in the unfolding of material progress – but a role largely defined by human purposes. Because it is an indispensable source of our knowledge and our raw materials, nature is most productively conceived as wholly Other – an unequivocally independent, separate, hence exploitable entity. The combined authority of the progressive ethos and the Christian faith accounts for much of nineteenth-century America’s aversion to the Darwinian view of nature and, by the same token, the popularity of Social Darwinism. Though seemingly an offshoot of evolutionary biology, Social Darwinism was in fact a perversion of the new science. It turned on the idea of “the survival of the fittest,” a catchphrase given worldwide currency by Herbert Spencer, the most influential popularizer of evolutionary theory. It was Spencer who did most to transform the idea of biological evolution into a full-fledged rationale – Social Darwinism – for the ruthless practices of ‘free market’ capitalism, as exemplified by the robber baron generation of American businessmen. 16

The massive incursion of white settlers into the Western wilderness enacted the American belief in nation-building progress. In the popular culture, the successive stages of that great migration were represented by an imaginary boundary – a moving boundary–separating the built environment of the East from the expanse of undeveloped, ostensibly unowned – or, as it was called, ‘free’–land of the West. Never mind that the land already was inhabited; the westward movement of the boundary represented the serial imposition of a beneficent Civilization on an unruly Nature, including its ‘savage’ inhabitants. The boundary’s westward movement was a gauge of national progress, and in tacit recognition of its ideological significance, it was given a proper name – the frontier – and accorded iconic status as an actual line – usually a broken or dotted line – imprinted on maps and documented by demographic data regularly collected, revised, and published in official reports of the United States Census. Eventually the word and the icon were compressed into a single term, ‘the frontier line,’ visual marker of the ‘conquest of nature.’ Conquest was an accurate name for it. After comparing America’s treatment of nature with that of other nations over the ages, one historian concluded that “the story of . . . [the United States] as regards the use of forests, grasslands, wildlife and water sources is the most violent and most destructive in the long history of civilization.” 17

It is not surprising that a people busily plundering that Western cornucopia had little use for Darwinism. The ravaging of the West was not easily reconciled with the view that human life is inextricably enmeshed in natural processes. What made the conventional idea of a separate nature especially popular, under the circumstances, was its hospitality to either of the reigning – and contradictory – conceptions of the national terrain. Most Americans, it would seem, regarded that terrain as a hostile wilderness, a state of nature tolerable only insofar as it could be subjected to human domination. At the same time, however, a vocal minority took the opposite view. A cohort of gifted artists and intellectuals, many of them adherents of European Romanticism, regarded Nature as the embodiment of ultimate meaning and value. Landscapes embodying that Romantic conviction were represented in the paintings of Thomas Cole, Frederic Church, and the other members of the Hudson River School; in the writings of Emerson, Thoreau, and a host of other poets, essayists, novelists, and philosophers; and in the work of conservation activists like John Muir, Gifford Pinchot, and Teddy Roosevelt. In the press and the popular arts of mid-century America, a sentimental, quasi-religious cult of Nature helped to vent the pathos aroused by the spectacle of ravaged forests, slaughtered bison, and ‘vanishing Americans.’

The ambiguity inherent in the idea of nature is central to the apocalyptic outcome of Moby-Dick, Herman Melville’s epical account of America’s violent assault on the natural world. Melville was so impressed by the irrational ferocity of the assault, in fact, that he instructs his narrator, Ishmael, to seek out its origin and its consequences. The inquiry rests on two assumptions: first, that the relations between American society and nonhuman nature are typified by whaling, a technologically sophisticated, for-profit industry devoted to killing whales; and, second, that the psychic roots of the enterprise are exemplified by Captain Ahab’s obsession with wreaking revenge on a particular sperm whale whose distinguishing feature is his preternatural whiteness. (The sperm whale, not coincidentally, is the largest living embodiment of nature on the face of the earth.) What is it about the whiteness of this whale, Ishmael asks, that provokes Ahab’s ungovernable hatred? Melville devotes an entire chapter to the inquiry – a chapter without which, Ishmael insists, the whole story would be pointless.

After an exhaustive analysis of every meaning of whiteness he can think of, it occurs to Ishmael that the uncanny effect of the color – or is it the absence of color? – is not attributable to any one of its meanings, but rather to its affinity, like that of material nature itself, with myriad, often antithetical meanings – or, in a word, to its ambiguity. At times, he observes, whiteness evokes disease, terror, death; and at others, “the sweet tinges of sunset skies and woods, and the gilded velvets of butterflies, and the butterfly cheeks of young girls.” But then, Ishmael recalls, the beauty of natural objects is no more inherent in their physical properties than their color is; actually, he realizes that their seeming beauty is the product of “subtle deceits” of light and color, and that in fact “all deified nature paints like a harlot, whose allurements cover nothing but the charnel-house within.” All of which leads him to conclude that Ahab’s obsession is in large measure attributable to the maddening blankness – the essential illusoriness – of nature, its capacity to provoke yet endlessly resist his rage for meaning. In the end, the mad captain’s anger overwhelms his reason, and the tragic outcome, as Ishmael interprets it, reveals the incalculable cost – and futility – of the human effort to grasp the ultimate meaning of nature.

The year 1970 is when the ecological ‘crisis’ caught up with the idea of nature. Public anxiety about the devastation of the natural world had grown steadily in the aftermath of Hiroshima and the onset of the nuclear arms race. But it was not until 1970, the year of the first Earth Day, that the threat to the human habitat attracted nationwide attention. And it was in 1970 that the emerging environmental movement first displayed its political power. In was then that President Nixon proposed, and Congress enacted, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Air Act, and the act establishing the Environmental Protection Agency. A large cohort of scientists and engineers was recruited to work on the problems involved in the accelerating rate of air and water pollution, climate change, and species extinction. At about that time, it became evident that the word environment was supplanting the word nature in American public discourse.

This was no coincidence. Natural scientists had long recognized the ambiguity and instability inherent in ordinary language, especially in words, like nature, used to describe the biophysical world. For centuries, after all, ‘Nature’ conceived as a separate entity had served as an all-purpose metaphysical Other. It had been depicted as the creation of God and the habitation of Satan, as harmonious and chaotic, beneficent and hostile, as something to be revered and something to be conquered. Over its history, indeed, the word nature had been encrusted with a rich deposit of meaning and metaphor, and practicing scientists often found themselves looking for ways to avoid, or circumvent, the imprecision and ambiguity.

In a revealing passage of the Origin, for example, Darwin feels compelled to defend himself for having alluded to natural selection as “a ruling power or Deity.” It is difficult, he explains,” to avoid personifying the word Nature,” and besides, “everyone knows what is meant and is implied by such metaphoric expressions.” But Darwin is not apologizing. An accomplished writer of English prose, he appreciates the beauty and power of figurative language, and he is not about to dispense with it. Nonetheless, as if to prove that he knows what the word nature actually means in scientific practice, he grudgingly offers this stripped-down, or positivist, definition: “I mean by Nature,” he writes, “only the aggregate action and product of many natural laws, and by laws the sequence of events as ascertained by us.” 18

Darwin’s recourse to this bloodless, ungraspable, if scientifically unobjectionable definition of nature was prophetic. It prefigured the partial eclipse of nature by environment in our time. The signal merits of environment , as compared with nature, are its unequivocal materiality, and what might be called its ideological neutrality or objectivity. It refers to the entire biophysical surround – or environ – we inhabit; it implies no distinction between human and other forms of life; it encompasses all that is built and (so to speak) unbuilt, the artificial and the natural, within the terrain we inhabit. Besides, as the related verb, to environ, indicates, most environments palpably are products of human effort. It is not difficult to understand, then, why this matter-of-fact word proved to be more acceptable than nature to people coping with the practical problems created by the degradation of ‘nature.’ But there is a troubling irony here. What recently has proven to be a serious shortcoming of the idea of a separate nature – its hospitality to a virtually limitless range of moral, religious, and metaphysical meaning – had for centuries been the reason for its immense appeal as a subject of art and literature, theology and philosophy, or, indeed, virtually all modes of thought and expression.

But to return to the final decades of the twentieth century when, as I noted at the outset, the loss of status and currency suffered by the idea of nature became obvious. In those years the work of avant-garde artists and intellectuals was filled with predictions of nature’s imminent demise. In an influential 1984 essay, Fredric Jameson, a prominent theorist of postmodernism, argued that the disappearance of nature was a necessary precondition for the emergence of the postmodern mentality. “Postmodernism is what you have,” he asserted, “when the modernization process is complete and nature is gone for good.” 19 With characteristic postmodern tendentiousness, Jameson assumes that nature is a cultural construction – a mere product of ‘discourse’ – and emphatically not an actual topographical or biophysical entity. From his idealist perspective, the dominant American idea of nature – nature primarily conceived as a terrain or other biophysical actuality – is meaningless. In Jameson’s view, that usage, with its implicit claim to unmediated knowledge of the material world, is epistemologically naive. Nature in that sense, he is saying, is gone for good because it epitomizes the age-old illusion that it is possible to arrive at a direct, wholly reliable relation with material reality.

In The Death of Nature (1989), Carolyn Merchant laments the demise of a widely accepted idea of nature, but in her view it died some four centuries ago. The authentic, biologically grounded concept of an organic nature actually was supplanted – though perhaps only temporarily – by the mechanistic, male-oriented Newtonian-Cartesian philosophy that accompanied the seventeenth-century Scientific Revolution. The basic model for that philosophy was the machine, and it has

permeated and reconstructed human consciousness so totally that today we scarcely question its validity. Nature, society, and the human body are composed of interchangeable atomized parts that can be repaired or replaced from outside. The ‘technological fix’ mends an ecological malfunction . . . . The mechanical view of nature now taught in most Western schools is accepted without question as our everyday, commonsense reality . . . . The removal of animistic, organic assumptions about the cosmos constituted the death of nature. 20

But Merchant, a committed environmentalist, leaves open the possibility of resurrecting and refining the premodern, organic idea of nature. Perhaps, she implies, the desperation induced by the accelerating ecological crisis will lead mankind to repudiate the mechanical view of nature and reaffirm a humane organicism. 21

Among the prominent obituaries for the idea of nature, however, the most pertinent to my argument is Bill McKibben’s The End of Nature (1989). He contends that nature came to an end, both as a discrete biophysical entity and as a meaningful concept, when the Earth’s atmospheric envelope was penetrated – and its filtering capacities damaged – by greenhouse gases and other manufactured chemicals. 22 By encompassing all of Earth’s space, the expanding technological power of modern industrial societies has rid the planet of unaltered nature. The last remaining patches of pristine wilderness are now wrapped in a layer of man-made atmosphere.

In McKibben’s view, however, the most serious consequences of the degradation of material nature are conceptual. They are at once psychological, moral, and spiritual. What chiefly concerns him is the impoverishment of human thought. “We have killed off nature,” he writes, “that world entirely independent of us which was here before we arrived and which encircles and supported our human society.” It is as if the real meaning and value of the ancient concept of nature only became apparent after technological ‘progress’ had made it obsolete. We “have ended the thing that has defined . . . nature for us,” he writes, “–its separation from human society.” 23

The importance McKibben assigns to the erasure of nature’s separateness distinguishes The End of Nature from other laments about the disappearance of nature. 24 To my knowledge, he is the only writer who attaches vital significance to this seldom noted, seemingly banal attribute of the received idea of nature. But exactly why is the independence of nature so important? Although McKibben does not adequately answer this hovering question, he provides a telling clue to its profound significance for him. “We have deprived nature of its independence, and that is fatal to its meaning,” he writes. And why is that? Because, he asserts, “nature’s independence is its meaning, without it there is nothing but us.” 25 It is an astute observation and a poignant confession: without nature there is nothing but us. For McKibben, like many ardent environmentalists, nature is at bottom a theological or metaphysical concept. In his vocabulary, nature refers to the foundational character – the ultimate meaning – of the cosmos. But if the idea of nature is to continue serving as an effective repository of that belief, he is saying, it must not be deprived of its traditional status as a separate, discrete entity. To compromise its independence, as Darwinism inescapably does, and as McKibben movingly testifies, is to expose its devotees to the skeptical influence of cosmic loneliness or – in a word – atheism.

The tenability of the idea of wilderness, the oldest and most popular American variant of the idea of nature, also was called into question at the end of the century. In a provocative 1995 essay, “The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” William Cronon, a prominent environmental historian, precipitated a heated controversy by asserting that the popular notion of a pristine American wilderness, or ‘virgin land,’ embodies a racist or colonialist falsification of the historical record. 26 Cronon had established the empirical basis for this judgment in Changes in the Land, his seminal 1983 study of the transformation of the New England terrain, long before the arrival of Europeans, by the indigenous peoples of North America. But now, with his 1995 essay, he shocked many environmentalists, for whom the idea of the unsullied American wilderness is sacrosanct, with plain talk about its covert meaning. By the time of the alleged European “discovery” of the “new world,” he argues, there no longer was anything “natural” about it. Far from “being the one place on earth that stands apart from humanity,” he writes, the American wilderness is “entirely the creation of the culture that holds it dear.” Actually, the mythic image of a “virgin, uninhabited land” was an ideological weapon in the service of the white European conquest of the Americas, and it was “especially cruel when seen from the perspective of the Indians who had once called that land home.”

And yet Cronon, an ardent environmentalist and outdoorsman, cannot bring himself to repudiate the idea of wilderness. To be sure, he clearly explains what makes it objectionable. “Any way of looking at nature that encourages us to believe that we are separate from nature – as wilderness tends to do – is likely,” he concedes, “to reinforce environmentally irresponsible behavior.” But he also acknowledges that respect for wilderness entails respect for nonhuman forms of life. Like many environmentalists, in fact, he had responded to the prevalence of arrogant anthropocentrism – especially the unfeeling disregard for the well-being of animals – by embracing an ecocentric version of species egalitarianism. Now, seemingly contradicting himself, he concedes that the idea of the “autonomy of nonhuman nature . . . [may be] an indispensable corrective to human arrogance.” He admits that he is torn between his viewpoint as a disinterested scholar and as an environmental activist, or, put differently, between historically informed skepticism about – and reverence for – the contested idea of wilderness. In the end, Cronon fails to resolve his ambivalence. But his failure strongly suggests that the idea of wilderness, like the pre-Darwinian idea of nature as a separate, largely independent entity, is incoherent and irremediably unstable.

In the event, however, Cronon proposes a way to rescue the notion of pristine, unaltered nature. He urges American environmentalists to follow the lead of their patron saints, Henry Thoreau and John Muir, and replace the idea of wilderness with the simpler, less problematic idea of wildness. (After founding the Sierra Club in 1892, Muir had chosen Thoreau’s famous epigram “In Wildness is the preservation of the World” as its official motto.) The chief merit of wildness as a locus of value and meaning, he notes, is that, unlike wilderness, it “can be found anywhere: in the seemingly tame fields and woodlots of Massachusetts, in the cracks of a Manhattan sidewalk, even in the cells of our own body.” Whereas wilderness is a particular kind of place (one that exhibits no signs of human intervention), wildness is an attribute of living organisms that may turn up anywhere; a blue jay or a daisy in a Manhattan park, he contends, is no less wild than its counterpart in the Rocky Mountains. As might be expected, Cronon’s critics were quick to note that there is something tenuous, even quixotic, about his notion that a change of vocabulary could resolve the debate about the value of wilderness. Still, his proposal does call attention to the critical shortcomings that the idea of wilderness shares with the idea of a separate nature. As he warns, and as the devastation of the American wilderness attests, the belief that we humans occupy a realm of being separate from the rest of nature encourages what he all-too politely refers to as “environmentally irresponsible behavior.”

In recent years several ecologically oriented writers, including Cronon, have endorsed a promising way to salvage the venerable idea of nature. 27 They propose to rehabilitate the compelling distinction, favored by Hegel and Marx, between two fundamentally distinct, historically grounded states of nature, to be called first nature and second nature. In this usage, first nature is the biophysical world as it existed before the evolution of Homo sapiens, and second nature is the artificial – material and cultural – environment that humanity has superimposed upon first nature. On this view, manifestly, nature is all. Unlike the traditional idea of a separate nature, the first nature/second nature distinction is consonant with the received history of nature, and especially with the primacy, in that history, of the process of biological evolution by natural selection and the emergence of life on Earth. During all but the final minutes, as it were, of this historical narrative, first nature was all that existed.

But then, beginning with the emergence of life and – eventually – Homo sapiens, second nature took over, and gradually transformed, an increasingly large area of the planet’s surface. Biologists have taught us that every organism modifies its habitat in some degree, but the extent of humanity’s modification of Earth exceeds that of other species by orders of magnitude. Second nature is in large measure a human artifact, and in recent centuries the rapidly accelerating expansion of humanity’s power – and its territorial reach – has had a devastating impact on global ecosystems. The result is a grave crisis in the relations, or putative ‘balance,’ between first and second nature. One of the singular merits of the first nature/second nature distinction is the clarity it affords us in characterizing the uniqueness – for good and ill – of humanity and its role in the overall history of nature. By dividing the concept of nature along an historical, or evolutionary, fault line, the first nature/second nature concept enables us to do full justice to humanity’s unmatched power to create a unique material and cultural environment. At the same time, however, it has the inestimable merit of validating the idea of a single, subdivided yet fundamentally unified realm of nature.

1 The essays they produced are reprinted in Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature, ed. William Cronon (W. W. Norton: New York, 1995).

2 This essay derives from a paper presented at the conference of the European Association for American Studies, in Graz, Austria, April 14–17, 2000. See Hans Bak and Walter W. Holbling, eds., “Nature’s Nation” Revisited: American Concepts of Nature from Wonder to Ecological Crisis (Amsterdam: VU Press, 2003).

3 Raymond Williams, Keywords (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 219.

4 Miller first used the phrase in his 1953 essay, “Nature and the National Ego,” in Errand into the Wilderness (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), 209. Elizabeth W. Miller and Kenneth Murdock later used it as the title of a posthumous collection of Miller’s essays, Nature’s Nation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967).

5 In his seminal 1893 essay, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” Turner argued that American nature, in the form of free land, in effect determined the “peculiarity of American institutions. ”

6 William Bradford, History of Plimoth Plantation, in Perry Miller and Thomas Johnson, eds., The Puritans (New York: American Book Company, 1938), 100–101 .

7 John Winthrop, “Speech to the General Court, July 3, 1625,” in Miller and Johnson, eds., The Puritans, 206.

8 Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, ed. William Peden (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1955), 55.

9 Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nature, Addresses, and Lectures (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1884), I, 8.

10 Ibid., 10–11. Emphasis added.

11 In Origin of Species, though Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection remained incomplete until the publication of the Descent of Man in 1871.

12 Lynn White, Jr., “The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis,” in Paul Shepherd, ed., The Subversive Science; Essays Toward an Ecology of Man (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1969), 369. See also Leo Marx, “American Institutions and Ecological Ideals,” Science 170 (November 27, 1970): 945–952.

13 “In Memoriam” (1850), which he had begun writing in 1833.

14 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species (New York: Mentor, 1958), 74.,

15 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. Phillips Bradley (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946), II, 74.

16 Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, 1800–1915 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944); Ronald L. Numbers, Darwinism Comes to America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998); Leo Marx, “The Domination of Nature and the Redefinition of Progress,” in Leo Marx and Bruce Mazlish, eds., Progress: Fact or Illusion? (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 201–218.

17 Fairfield Osborn, Our Plundered Planet (Boston: Little Brown, 1948), 175.

18 Darwin, Origin of Species, 88.

19 Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991), ix.

20 Carolyn Merchant, The Death of Nature: Women, Ecology, and the Scientific Revolution (San Francisco: Harper, 1989), 193.

21 Carolyn Merchant, Radical Ecology: The Search for a Livable World (New York: Routledge, 1992).

22 Subsequent observations of ‘global warming’ are widely accepted in the scientific community as evidence of the man-made transformation of Earth’s atmospheric envelope.

23 Bill McKibben, The End of Nature (New York: Random House, 1989), 96, 64.

24 Raymond Williams calls attention to the idea of nature’s separateness in “The Idea of Nature,” Problems of Materialism and Culture (London: Verso, 1980), 67–85.

25 McKibben, The End of Nature, 58.

26 Cronon, ed., Uncommon Ground, 69–90. For a comprehensive collection of the arguments, pro and con, including Cronon’s essay, see J. Baird Callicott and Michael P. Nelson, eds., The Great New Wilderness Debate (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998).

27 William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), xviiff; Janet Biehl, Rethinking Ecofeminist Politics (Boston: South End Press, 1991), 117–118.

Green Message

Green Message: The Evergreen Messages of Spirituality, Sanskrit and Nature

Characteristics of Nature

Beauty of Nature

Vedic Vision of Nature:

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Meditations on Earth, Life and Dharma: >>

Om, May there be Peace in Heaven, May there be Peace in the Sky, May there be Peace in the Earth, ( Shanti Mantra of Upanishad)

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Human Nature

Talk of human nature is a common feature of moral and political discourse among people on the street and among philosophers, political scientists and sociologists. This is largely due to the widespread assumption that true descriptive or explanatory claims making use of the concept of human nature have, or would have, considerable normative significance. Some think that human nature excludes the possibility of certain forms of social organisation—for example, that it excludes any broadly egalitarian society. Others make the stronger claim that a true normative ethical theory has to be built on prior knowledge of human nature. Still others believe that there are specific moral prohibitions concerning the alteration of, or interference in, the set of properties that make up human nature. Finally, there are those who argue that the normative significance derives from the fact that merely deploying the concept is typically, or even necessarily, pernicious.

Alongside such varying and frequently conflicting normative uses of the expression “human nature”, there are serious disagreements concerning the concept’s content and explanatory significance—the starkest being whether the expression “human nature” refers to anything at all. Some reasons given for saying there is no human nature are anthropological, grounded in views concerning the relationship between natural and cultural features of human life. Other reasons given are biological, deriving from the character of the human species as, like other species, an essentially historical product of evolution. Whether these reasons justify the claim that there is no human nature depends, at least in part, on what it is exactly that the expression is supposed to be picking out. Many contemporary proposals differ significantly in their answers to this question.

Understanding the debates around the philosophical use of the expression “human nature” requires clarity on the reasons both for (1) adopting specific adequacy conditions for the term’s use and for (2) accepting particular substantial claims made within the framework thus adopted. One obstacle to such clarity is historical: we have inherited from the beginnings of Western philosophy, via its Medieval reception, the idea that talk of human nature brings into play a number of different, but related claims. One such set of claims derives from different meanings of the Greek equivalents of the term “nature”. This bundle of claims, which can be labelled the traditional package , is a set of adequacy conditions for any substantial claim that uses the expression “human nature”. The beginnings of Western philosophy have also handed down to us a number of such substantial claims . Examples are that humans are “rational animals” or “political animals”. We can call these claims the traditional slogans . The traditional package is a set of specifications of how claims along the lines of the traditional slogans are to be understood, i.e., what it means to claim that it is “human nature” to be, for example, a rational animal.

Various developments in Western thought have cast doubt both on the coherence of the traditional package and on the possibility that the adequacy conditions for the individual claims can be fulfilled. Foremost among these developments are the Enlightenment rejection of teleological metaphysics, the Historicist emphasis on the significance of culture for understanding human action and the Darwinian introduction of history into biological kinds. This entry aims to help clarify the adequacy conditions for claims about human nature, the satisfiability of such conditions and the reasons why the truth of claims with the relevant conditions might seem important. It proceeds in five steps. Section 1 unpacks the traditional package, paying particular attention to the importance of Aristotelian themes and to the distinction between the scientific and participant perspectives from which human nature claims can be raised. Section 2 explains why evolutionary biology raises serious problems both for the coherence of this package and for the truth of its individual component claims. Sections 3 and 4 then focus on attempts to secure scientific conceptions of human nature in the face of the challenge from evolutionary biology. The entry concludes with a discussion of accounts of human nature developed from a participant perspective, in particular accounts that, in spite of the evolutionary challenge, are taken to have normative consequences.

1.1 “Humans”

1.2 unpacking the traditional package, 1.3 essentialisms, 1.4 on the status of the traditional slogan, 2.1 the nature of the species taxon, 2.2 the nature of species specimens as species specimens, 2.3 responding to the evolutionary verdict on classificatory essences, 3.1 privileging properties, 3.2 statistical normality or robust causality, 4.1 genetically based psychological adaptations, 4.2 abandoning intrinsicality, 4.3 secondary altriciality as a game-changer, 5.1. human nature from a participant perspective, 5.2.1. sidestepping the darwinian challenge, 5.2.2. human flourishing, 5.3. reason as the unique structural property, other internet resources, related entries, 1. “humans”, slogans and the traditional package.

Before we begin unpacking, it should be noted that the adjective “human” is polysemous, a fact that often goes unnoticed in discussions of human nature, but makes a big difference to both the methodological tractability and truth of claims that employ the expression. The natural assumption may appear to be that we are talking about specimens of the biological species Homo sapiens , that is, organisms belonging to the taxon that split from the rest of the hominin lineage an estimated 150,000 years ago. However, certain claims seem to be best understood as at least potentially referring to organisms belonging to various older species within the subtribe Homo , with whom specimens of Homo sapiens share properties that have often been deemed significant (Sterelny 2018: 114).

On the other hand, the “nature” that is of interest often appears to be that of organisms belonging to a more restricted group. There may have been a significant time lag between the speciation of anatomically modern humans ( Homo sapiens ) and the evolution of behaviourally modern humans, i.e., human populations whose life forms involved symbol use, complex tool making, coordinated hunting and increased geographic range. Behavioural modernity’s development is often believed only to have been completed by 50,000 years ago. If, as is sometimes claimed, behavioural modernity requires psychological capacities for planning, abstract thought, innovativeness and symbolism (McBrearty & Brooks 2000: 492) and if these were not yet widely or sufficiently present for several tens of thousands of years after speciation, then it may well be behaviourally, rather than anatomically modern humans whose “nature” is of interest to many theories. Perhaps the restriction might be drawn even tighter to include only contemporary humans, that is, those specimens of the species who, since the introduction of agriculture around 12,000 years ago, evolved the skills and capacities necessary for life in large sedentary, impersonal and hierarchical groups (Kappeler, Fichtel, & van Schaik 2019: 68).

It was, after all, a Greek living less than two and a half millennia ago within such a sedentary, hierarchically organised population structure, who could have had no conception of the prehistory of the beings he called anthrôpoi , whose thoughts on their “nature” have been decisive for the history of philosophical reflection on the subject. It seems highly likely that, without the influence of Aristotle, discussions of “human nature” would not be structured as they are until today.

We can usefully distinguish four types of claim that have been traditionally made using the expression “human nature”. As a result of a particular feature of Aristotle’s philosophy, to which we will come in a moment, these four claims are associated with five different uses of the expression. Uses of the first type seem to have their origin in Plato; uses of the second, third and fourth type are Aristotelian; and, although uses of the fifth type have historically been associated with Aristotle, this association seems to derive from a misreading in the context of the religiously motivated Mediaeval reception of his philosophy.

A first , thin, contrastive use of the expression “human nature” is provided by the application of a thin, generic concept of nature to humans. In this minimal variant, nature is understood in purely contrastive or negative terms. Phusis is contrasted in Plato and Aristotle with technē , where the latter is the product of intention and a corresponding intervention of agency. If the entire cosmos is taken to be the product of divine agency, then, as Plato argued (Nadaf 2005: 1ff.), conceptualisations of the cosmos as natural in this sense are mistaken. Absent divine agency, the types of agents whose intentions are relevant for the status of anything as natural are human agents. Applied to humans, then, this concept of nature picks out human features that are not the results of human intentional action. Thus understood, human nature is the set of human features or processes that remain after subtraction of those picked out by concepts of the non-natural, concepts such as “culture”, “nurture”, or “socialisation”.

A second component in the package supplies the thin concept with substantial content that confers on it explanatory power. According to Aristotle, natural entities are those that contain in themselves the principle of their own production or development, in the way that acorns contain a blueprint for their own realisation as oak trees ( Physics 192b; Metaphysics 1014b). The “nature” of natural entities thus conceptualised is a subset of the features that make up their nature in the first sense. The human specification of this explanatory concept of nature aims to pick out human features that similarly function as blueprints for something like a fully realised form. According to Aristotle, for all animals that blueprint is “the soul”, that is, the integrated functional capacities that characterise the fully developed entity. The blueprint is realised when matter, i.e., the body, has attained the level of organisation required to instantiate the animal’s living functions (Charles 2000: 320ff.; Lennox 2009: 356).

A terminological complication is introduced here by the fact that the fully developed form of an entity is itself also frequently designated as its “nature” (Aristotle, Physics 193b; Politics 1252b). In Aristotle’s teleological metaphysics, this is the entity’s end, “that for the sake of which a thing is” ( Metaphysics 1050a; Charles 2000: 259). Thus, a human’s “nature”, like that of any other being, may be either the features in virtue of which it is disposed to develop to a certain mature form or, thirdly , the form to which it is disposed to develop.

Importantly, the particularly prominent focus on the idea of a fully developed form in Aristotle’s discussions of humans derives from its dual role. It is not only the form to the realisation of which human neonates are disposed; it is also the form that mature members of the species ought to realise ( Politics 1253a). This normative specification is the fourth component of the traditional package. The second, third and fourth uses of “nature” are all in the original package firmly anchored in a teleological metaphysics. One question for systematic claims about human nature is whether any of these components remain plausible if we reject a teleology firmly anchored in theology (Sedley 2010: 5ff.).

A fifth and last component of the package that has traditionally been taken to have been handed down from antiquity is classificatory. Here, the property or set of properties named by the expression “human nature” is that property or property set in virtue of the possession of which particular organisms belong to a particular biological taxon: what we now identify as the species taxon Homo sapiens . This is human nature typologically understood.

This, then, is the traditional package:

The sort of properties that have traditionally been taken to support the classificatory practices relevant to TP5 are intrinsic to the individual organisms in question. Moreover, they have been taken to be able to fulfil this role in virtue of being necessary and sufficient for the organism’s membership of the species, i.e., “essential” in one meaning of the term. This view of species membership, and the associated view of species themselves, has been influentially dubbed “typological thinking” (Mayr 1959 [1976: 27f.]; cf. Mayr 1982: 260) and “essentialism” (Hull 1965: 314ff.; cf. Mayr 1968 [1976: 428f.]). The former characterisation involves an epistemological focus on the classificatory procedure, the latter a metaphysical focus on the properties thus singled out. Ernst Mayr claimed that the classificatory approach originates in Plato’s theory of forms, and, as a result, involves the further assumption that the properties are unchanging. According to David Hull, its root cause is the attempt to fit the ontology of species taxa to an Aristotelian theory of definition.

The theory of definition developed in Aristotle’s logical works assigns entities to a genus and distinguishes them from other members of the genus, i.e., from other “species”, by their differentiae ( Topics 103b). The procedure is descended from the “method of division” of Plato, who provides a crude example as applied to humans, when he has the Eleatic Stranger in the Statesman characterise them as featherless bipeds (266e). Hull and many scholars in his wake (Dupré 2001: 102f.) have claimed that this simple schema for picking out essential conditions for species membership had a seriously deleterious effect on biological taxonomy until Darwin (cf. Winsor 2006).

However, there is now widespread agreement that Aristotle was no taxonomic essentialist (Balme 1980: 5ff.; Mayr 1982: 150ff.; Balme 1987: 72ff.; Ereshefsky 2001: 20f; Richards 2010: 21ff.; Wilkins 2018: 9ff.). First, the distinction between genus and differentiae was for Aristotle relative to the task at hand, so that a “species” picked out in this manner could then count as the genus for further differentiation. Second, the Latin term “species”, a translation of the Greek eidos , was a logical category with no privileged relationship to biological entities; a prime example in the Topics is the species justice, distinguished within the genus virtue (143a). Third, in a key methodological passage, Parts of Animals , I.2–3 (642b–644b), Aristotle explicitly rejects the method of “dichotomous division”, which assigns entities to a genus and then seeks a single differentia, as inappropriate to the individuation of animal kinds. Instead, he claims, a multiplicity of differentiae should be brought to bear. He emphasises this point in relation to humans (644a).

According to Pierre Pellegrin and David Balme, Aristotle did not seek to establish a taxonomic system in his biological works (Pellegrin 1982 [1986: 113ff.]; Balme 1987, 72). Rather, he simply accepted the everyday common sense partitioning of the animal world (Pellegrin 1982 [1986: 120]; Richards 2010: 24; but cf. Charles 2000: 343ff.). If this is correct, Aristotle didn’t even ask after the conditions for belonging to the species Homo sapiens . So he wasn’t proposing any particular answer, and specifically not the “essentialist” answer advanced by TP5. In as far as such an answer has been employed in biological taxonomy (cf. Winsor 2003), its roots appear to lie in Neoplatonic, Catholic misinterpretations of Aristotle (Richards 2010: 34ff.; Wilkins 2018: 22ff.). Be that as it may, the fifth use of “human nature” transported by tradition—to pick out essential conditions for an organism’s belonging to the species—is of eminent interest. The systematic concern behind Mayr and Hull’s historical claims is that accounts of the form of TP5 are incompatible with evolutionary theory. We shall look at this concern in section 2 of this entry.

Because the term “essentialism” recurs with different meanings in discussions of human nature and because some of the theoretical claims thus summarised are assumed to be Aristotelian in origin, it is worth spending a moment here to register what claims can be singled out by the expression. The first , purely classificatory conception just discussed should be distinguished from a second view that is also frequently labelled “essentialist” and which goes back to Locke’s concept of “real essence” (1689: III, iii, 15). According to essentialism thus understood, an essence is the intrinsic feature or features of an entity that fulfils or fulfil a dual role: firstly, of being that in virtue of which something belongs to a kind and, secondly, of explaining why things of that kind typically have a particular set of observable features. Thus conceived, “essence” has both a classificatory and an explanatory function and is the core of a highly influential, “essentialist” theory of natural kinds, developed in the wake of Kripke’s and Putnam’s theories of reference.

An account of human nature that is essentialist in this sense would take the nature of the human natural kind to be a set of microstructural properties that have two roles: first, they constitute an organism’s membership of the species Homo sapiens . Second, they are causally responsible for the organism manifesting morphological and behavioural properties typical of species members. Paradigms of entities with such natures or essences are chemical elements. An example is the element with the atomic number 79, the microstructural feature that accounts for surface properties of gold such as yellowness. Applied to organisms, it seems that the relevant explanatory relationship will be developmental, the microstructures providing something like a blueprint for the properties of the mature individual. Kripke assumed that some such blueprint is the “internal structure” responsible for the typical development of tigers as striped, carnivorous quadrupeds (Kripke 1972 [1980: 120f.]).

As the first, pseudo-Aristotelian version of essentialism illustrates, the classificatory and explanatory components of what we might call “Kripkean essentialism” can be taken apart. Thus, “human nature” can also be understood in exclusively explanatory terms, viz. as the set of microstructural properties responsible for typical human morphological and behavioural features. In such an account, the ability to pick out the relevant organisms is simply presupposed. As we shall see in section 4 of this entry, accounts of this kind have been popular in the contemporary debate. The subtraction of the classificatory function of the properties in these conceptions has generally seemed to warrant withholding from them the label “essentialist”. However, because some authors have still seen the term as applicable (Dupré 2001: 162), we might think of such accounts as constituting a third , weak or deflationary variant of essentialism.

Such purely explanatory accounts are descendants of the second use of “human nature” in the traditional package, the difference being that they don’t usually presuppose some notion of the fully developed human form. However, where some such presupposition is made, there are stronger grounds for talking of an “essentialist” account. Elliott Sober has argued that the key to essentialism is not classification in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but the postulation of some “privileged state”, to the realisation of which specimens of a species tend, as long as no extrinsic factors “interfere” (Sober 1980: 358ff.). Such a dispositional-teleological conception, dissociated from classificatory ambitions, would be a fourth form of essentialism. Sober rightly associates such an account with Aristotle, citing Aristotle’s claims in his zoological writings that interfering forces are responsible for deviations, i.e., morphological differences, both within and between species. A contemporary account of human nature with this structure will be discussed in section 4 .

A fifth and final form of essentialism is even more clearly Aristotelian. Here, an explicitly normative status is conferred on the set of properties to the development of which human organisms tend. For normative essentialism, “the human essence” or “human nature” is a normative standard for the evaluation of organisms belonging to the species. Where the first, third and fourth uses of the expression have tended to be made with critical intent (for defensive exceptions, see Charles 2000: 348ff.; Walsh 2006; Devitt 2008; Boulter 2012), this fifth use is more often a self-ascription (e.g., Nussbaum 1992). It is intended to emphasise metaethical claims of a specific type. According to such claims, an organism’s belonging to the human species entails or in some way involves the applicability to the organism of moral norms that ground in the value of the fully developed human form. According to one version of this thought, humans ought be, or ought to be enabled to be, rational because rationality is a key feature of the fully developed human form. Such normative-teleological accounts of human nature will be the focus of section 5.2 .

We can summarise the variants of essentialism and their relationship to the components of the traditional package as follows:

Section 2 and section 5 of this entry deal with the purely classificatory and the normative teleological conceptions of human nature respectively, and with the associated types of essentialism. Section 3 discusses attempts to downgrade TP5, moving from essential to merely characteristic properties. Section 4 focuses on accounts of an explanatory human nature, both on attempts to provide a modernized version of the teleological blueprint model ( §4.1 ) and on explanatory conceptions with deflationary intent relative to the claims of TP2 and TP3 ( §4.2 and §4.3 ).

The traditional package specifies a set of conditions some or all of which substantial claims about “human nature” are supposed to meet. Before we turn to the systematic arguments central to contemporary debates on whether such conditions can be met, it will be helpful to spend a moment considering one highly influential substantial claim. Aristotle’s writings prominently contain two such claims that have been handed down in slogan form. The first is that the human being (more accurately: “man”) is an animal that is in some important sense social (“zoon politikon”, History of Animals 487b; Politics 1253a; Nicomachean Ethics 1169b). According to the second, “he” is a rational animal ( Politics 1253a, where Aristotle doesn’t actually use the traditionally ascribed slogan, “zoon logon echon”).

Aristotle makes both claims in very different theoretical contexts, on the one hand, in his zoological writings and, on the other, in his ethical and political works. This fact, together with the fact that Aristotle’s philosophy of nature and his practical philosophy are united by a teleological metaphysics, may make it appear obvious that the slogans are biological claims that provide a foundation for normative claims in ethics and politics. The slogans do indeed function as foundations in the Politics and the Nicomachean Ethics respectively (on the latter, see section 5 of this entry). It is, however, unclear whether they are to be understood as biological claims. Let us focus on the slogan that has traditionally dominated discussions of human nature in Western philosophy, that humans are “rational animals”.

First, if Pellegrin and Balme are right that Aristotelian zoology is uninterested in classifying species, then ascribing the capacity for “rationality” cannot have the function of naming a biological trait that distinguishes humans from other animals. This is supported by two further sets of considerations. To begin with, Aristotle’s explicit assertion that a series of differentiae would be needed to “define” humans ( Parts of Animals 644a) is cashed out in the long list of features he takes to be their distinguishing marks, such as speech, having hair on both eyelids, blinking, having hands, upright posture, breasts in front, the largest and moistest brain, fleshy legs and buttocks (Lloyd 1983: 29ff.). Furthermore, there is in Aristotle no capacity for reason that is both exclusive to, and universal among anthropoi . One part or kind of reason, “practical intelligence” ( phronesis ), is, Aristotle claims, found in both humans and other animals, being merely superior in the former ( Parts of Animals , 687a). Now, there are other forms of reasoning of which this is not true, forms whose presence are sufficient for being human: humans are the only animals capable of deliberation ( History of Animals 488b) and reasoning ( to noein ), in as far as this extends to mathematics and first philosophy. Nevertheless, these forms of reasoning are unnecessary: slaves, who Aristotle includes among humans ( Politics 1255a), are said to have no deliberative faculty ( to bouleutikon ) at all ( Politics 1260a; cf. Richter 2011: 42ff.). Presumably, they will also be without the capacities necessary for first philosophy.

Second, these Aristotelian claims raise the question as to whether the ascription of rationality is even intended as an ascription to an individual in as far as she or he belongs to a biological kind. The answer might appear to be obviously affirmative. Aristotle uses the claim that a higher level of reason is characteristic of humans to teleologically explain other morphological features, in particular upright gait and the morphology of the hands ( Parts of Animals 686a, 687a). However, the kind of reason at issue here is practical intelligence, the kind humans and animals share, not the capacity for mathematics and metaphysics, which among animals is exercised exclusively by humans. In as far as humans are able to exercise this latter capacity in contemplation, Aristotle claims that they “partake of the divine” ( Parts of Animals 656a), a claim of which he makes extensive use when grounding his ethics in human rationality ( Nicomachean Ethics 1177b–1178b). When, in a passage to which James Lennox has drawn attention (Lennox 1999), Aristotle declares that the rational part of the soul cannot be the object of natural science ( Parts of Animals 645a), it seems to be the contemplative part of the soul that is thus excluded from biological investigation, precisely the feature that is named in the influential slogan. If it is the “something divine … present in” humans that is decisively distinctive of their kind, it seems unclear whether the relevant kind is biological.

It is not the aim of this entry to decide questions of Aristotle interpretation. What is important is that the relationship of the question of “human nature” to biology is, from the beginning of the concept’s career, not as unequivocal as is often assumed (e.g., Hull 1986: 7; Richards 2010: 217f.). This is particularly true of the slogan according to which humans are rational animals. In the history of philosophy, this slogan has frequently been detached from any attempt to provide criteria for biological classification or characterisation. When Aquinas picks up the slogan, he is concerned to emphasise that human nature involves a material, corporeal aspect. This aspect is, however, not thought of in biological terms. Humans are decisively “rational substances”, i.e., persons. As such they also belong to a kind whose members also number angels and God (three times) (Eberl 2004). Similarly, Kant is primarily, indeed almost exclusively, interested in human beings as examples of “rational nature”, “human nature” being only one way in which rational nature can be instantiated (Kant 1785, 64, 76, 85). For this reason, Kant generally talks of “rational beings”, rather than of “rational animals” (1785, 45, 95).

There is, then, a perspective on humans that is plausibly present in Aristotle, stronger in Aquinas and dominant in Kant and that involves seeing them as instances of a kind other than the “human kind”, i.e., seeing the human animal “as a rational being” (Kant 1785 [1996: 45]). According to this view, the “nature” of humans that is most worthy of philosophical interest is the one they possess not insofar as they are human, but insofar as they are rational. Where this is the relevant use of the concept of human nature, being a specimen of the biological species is unnecessary for possessing the corresponding property. Specimens of other species, as well as non-biological entities may also belong to the relevant kind. It is also insufficient, as not all humans will have the properties necessary for membership in that kind.

As both a biologist and ethicist, Aristotle is at once a detached scientist and a participant in forms of interpersonal and political interaction only available to contemporary humans living in large, sedentary subpopulations. It seems plausible that a participant perspective may have suggested a different take on what it is to be human, perhaps even a different take on the sense in which humans might be rational animals, to that of biological science. We will return to this difference in section 5 of the entry.

2. The Nature of the Evolutionary Unit Homo sapiens and its Specimens

Detailing the features in virtue of which an organism is a specimen of the species Homo sapiens is a purely biological task. Whether such specification is achievable and, if so how, is controversial. It is controversial for the same reasons for which it is controversial what conditions need to be met for an organism to be a specimen of any species. These reasons derive from the theory of evolution.

A first step to understanding these reasons involves noting a further ambiguity in the use of the expression “human nature”, this time an ambiguity specific to taxonomy. The term can be used to pick out a set of properties as an answer to two different questions. The first concerns the properties of some organism which make it the case that it belongs to the species Homo sapiens . The second concerns the properties in virtue of which a population or metapopulation is the species Homo sapiens . Correspondingly, “human nature” can pick out either the properties of organisms that constitute their partaking in the species Homo sapiens or the properties of some higher-level entity that constitute it as that species. Human nature might then either be the nature of the species or the nature of species specimens as specimens of the species.

It is evolution that confers on this distinction its particular form and importance. The variation among organismic traits, without which there would be no evolution, has its decisive effects at the level of populations. These are groups of organisms that in some way cohere at a time in spite of the variation of traits among the component organisms. It is population-level groupings, taxa, not organisms, that evolve and it is taxa, such as species, that provide the organisms that belong to them with genetic resources (Ghiselin 1987: 141). The species Homo sapiens appears to be a metapopulation that coheres at least in part because of the gene flow between its component organisms brought about by interbreeding (cf. Ereshefsky 1991: 96ff.). Hence, according to evolutionary theory, Homo sapiens is plausibly a higher-level entity—a unit of evolution—consisting of the lower-level entities that are individual human beings. The two questions phrased in terms of “human nature” thus concern the conditions for individuation of the population-level entity and the conditions under which organisms are components of that entity.

The theory of evolution transforms the way we should understand the relationship between human organisms and the species to which they belong. The taxonomic assumption of TP5 was that species are individuated by means of intrinsic properties that are individually instantiated by certain organisms. Instantiating those properties is taken to be necessary and sufficient for those organisms to belong to the species. Evolutionary theory makes it clear that species, as population-level entities, cannot be individuated by means of the properties of lower-level constituents, in our case, of individual human organisms (Sober 1980: 355).

The exclusion of this possibility grounds a decisive difference from the way natural kinds are standardly construed in the wake of Locke and Kripke. Recall that, in this Kripkean construal, lumps of matter are instances of chemical kinds because of their satisfaction of intrinsic necessary and sufficient conditions, viz. their atoms possessing a certain number of protons. The same conditions also individuate the chemical kinds themselves. Chemical kinds are thus spatiotemporally unrestricted sets. This means that there are no metaphysical barriers to the chance generation of members of the kind, independently of whether the kind is instantiated at any contiguous time or place. Nitrogen could come to exist by metaphysical happenstance, should an element with the atomic number 14 somehow come into being, even in a world in which up to that point no nitrogen has existed (Hull 1978: 349; 1984: 22).

In contrast, a species can only exist at time \(t_n\) if either it or a parent species existed at \(t_{n-1}\) and there was some relationship of spatial contiguity between component individuals of the species at \(t_n\) and the individuals belonging to either the same species or the parent species at \(t_{n-1}\). This is because of the essential role of the causal relationship of heredity. Heredity generates both the coherence across a population requisite for the existence of a species and the variability of predominant traits within the population, without which a species would not evolve.

For this reason, the species Homo sapiens , like every other species taxon, must meet a historical or genealogical condition. (For pluralistic objections to even this condition, see Kitcher 1984: 320ff.; Dupré 1993: 49f.) This condition is best expressed as a segment of a population-level phylogenetic tree, where such trees represent ancestor-descendent series (Hull 1978: 349; de Queiroz 1999: 50ff.; 2005). Species, as the point is often put, are historical entities, rather than kinds or classes (Hull 1978: 338ff.; 1984: 19). The fact that species are not only temporally, but also spatially restricted has also led to the stronger claim that they are individuals (Ghiselin 1974; 1997: 14ff.; Hull 1978: 338). If this is correct, then organisms are not members, but parts of species taxa. Independently of whether this claim is true for all biological species, Homo sapiens is a good candidate for a species that belongs to the category individual . This is because the species is characterised not only by spatiotemporal continuity, but also by causal processes that account for the coherence between its component parts. These processes plausibly include not only interbreeding, but also conspecific recognition and particular forms of communication (Richards 2010: 158ff., 218).

Importantly, the genealogical condition is only a necessary condition, as genealogy unites all the segments of one lineage. The segment of the phylogenetic tree that represents some species taxon begins with a node that represents a lineage-splitting or speciation event. Determining that node requires attention to general speciation theory, which has proposed various competing criteria (Dupré 1993: 48f.; Okasha 2002: 201; Coyne & Orr 2004). In the case of Homo sapiens , it requires attention to the specifics of the human case, which are also controversial (see Crow 2003; Cela-Conde & Ayala 2017: 11ff.). The end point of the segment is marked either by some further speciation event or, as may seem likely in the case of Homo sapiens , by the destruction of the metapopulation. Only when the temporal boundaries of the segment have become determinate would it be possible to adduce sufficient conditions for the existence of such a historical entity. Hence, if “human nature” is understood to pick out the necessary and sufficient conditions that individuate the species taxon Homo sapiens , its content is not only controversial, but epistemically unavailable to us.

If we take such a view of the individuating conditions for the species Homo sapiens , what are the consequences for the question of which organisms belong to the species? It might appear that it leaves open the possibility that speciation has resulted in some intrinsic property or set of properties establishing the cohesion specific to the taxon and that such properties count as necessary and sufficient for belonging to it (cf. Devitt 2008: 17ff.). This appearance would be deceptive. To begin with, no intrinsic property can be necessary because of the sheer empirical improbability that all species specimens grouped together by the relevant lineage segment instantiate any such candidate property. For example, there are individuals who are missing legs, inner organs or the capacity for language, but who remain biologically human (Hull 1986: 5). Evolutionary theory clarifies why this is so: variability, secured by mechanisms such as mutation and recombination, is the key to evolution, so that, should some qualitative property happen to be universal among all extant species specimens immediately after the completion of speciation, that is no guarantee that it will continue to be so throughout the lifespan of the taxon (Hull 1984: 35; Ereshefsky 2008: 101). The common thought that there must be at least some genetic property common to all human organisms is also false (R. Wilson 1999a: 190; Sterelny & Griffiths 1999: 7; Okasha 2002: 196f.): phenotypical properties that are shared in a population are frequently co-instantiated as a result of the complex interaction of differing gene-regulatory networks. Conversely, the same network can under different circumstances lead to differing phenotypical consequences (Walsh 2006: 437ff.). Even if it should turn out that every human organism instantiated some property, this would be a contingent, rather than a necessary fact (Sober 1980: 354; Hull 1986: 3).

Moreover, the chances of any such universal property also being sufficient are vanishingly small, as the sharing of properties by specimens of other species can result from various mechanisms, in particular from the inheritance of common genes in related species and from parallel evolution. This doesn’t entail that there may be no intrinsic properties that are sufficient belonging to the species. There are fairly good candidates for such properties, if we compare humans with other terrestrial organisms. Language use and a self-understanding as moral agents come to mind. However, whether non-terrestrial entities might possess such properties is an open question. And decisively, they are obviously hopeless as necessary conditions (cf. Samuels 2012: 9).

This leaves only the possibility that the conditions for belonging to the species are, like the individuating conditions for the species taxon, relational. Lineage-based individuation of a taxon depends on its component organisms being spatially and temporally situated in such a way that the causal processes necessary for the inheritance of traits can take place. In the human case, the key processes are those of sexual reproduction. Therefore, being an organism that belongs to the species Homo sapiens is a matter of being connected reproductively to organisms situated unequivocally on the relevant lineage segment. In other words, the key necessary condition is having been sexually reproduced by specimens of the species (Kronfeldner 2018: 100). Hull suggests that the causal condition may be disjunctive, as it could also be fulfilled by a synthetic entity created by scientists that produces offspring with humans who have been generated in the standard manner (Hull 1978: 349). Provided that the species is not in the throes of speciation, such direct descent or integration into the reproductive community, i.e., participation in the “complex network […] of mating and reproduction” (Hull 1986: 4), will also be sufficient.

The lack of a “human essence” in the sense of intrinsic necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to the species taxon Homo sapiens , has led a number of philosophers to deny that there is any such thing as human nature (Hull 1984: 19; 1986; Ghiselin 1997: 1; de Sousa 2000). As this negative claim concerns properties intrinsic both to relevant organisms and to the taxon, it is equally directed at the “nature” of the organisms as species specimens and at that of the species taxon itself. An alternative consists in retracting the condition that a classificatory essence must be intrinsic, a move which allows talk of a historical or relational essence and a corresponding relational conception of taxonomic human nature (Okasha 2002: 202).

Which of these ways of responding to the challenge from evolutionary theory appears best is likely to depend on how one takes it that the classificatory issues relate to the other matters at stake in the original human nature package. These concern the explanatory and normative questions raised by TP1–TP4. We turn to these in the following three sections of this article.

An exclusively genealogical conception of human nature is clearly not well placed to fulfil an explanatory role comparable to that envisaged in the traditional package. What might have an explanatory function are the properties of the entities from which the taxon or its specimens are descended. Human nature, genealogically understood, might serve as the conduit for explanations in terms of such properties, but will not itself explain anything. After all, integration in a network of sexual reproduction will be partly definitive of the specimens of all sexual species, whilst what is to be explained will vary enormously across taxa.

This lack of fit between classificatory and explanatory roles confronts us with a number of further theoretical possibilities. For example, one might see this incompatibility as strengthening the worries of eliminativists such as Ghiselin and Hull: even if the subtraction of intrinsicality were not on its own sufficient to justify abandoning talk of human nature, its conjunction with a lack of explanatory power, one might think, certainly is (Dupré 2003: 109f.; Lewens 2012: 473). Or one might argue that it is the classificatory ambitions associated with talk of human nature that should be abandoned. Once this is done, one might hope that certain sets of intrinsic properties can be distinguished that figure decisively in explanations and that can still justifiably be labelled “human nature” (Roughley 2011: 15; Godfrey-Smith 2014: 140).

Taking this second line in turn raises two questions: first, in what sense are the properties thus picked out specifically “human”, if they are neither universal among, nor unique to species specimens? Second, in what sense are the properties “natural”? Naturalness as independence from the effects of human intentional action is a key feature of the original package (TP1). Whether some such conception can be coherently applied to humans is a challenge for any non-classificatory account.

3. Characteristic Human Properties

The answer given by TP2 to the first question was in terms of the fully developed human form, where “form” does not refer solely to observable physical or behavioural characteristics, but also includes psychological features. This answer entails two claims: first, that there is one single such “form”, i.e., property or set of properties, that figures in explanations that range across individual human organisms. It also entails that there is a point in human development that counts as “full”, that is, as development’s goal or “telos”. These claims go hand in hand with the assumption that there is a distinction to be drawn between normal and abnormal adult specimens of the species. There is, common sense tells us, a sense in which normal adult humans have two legs, two eyes, one heart and two kidneys at specific locations in the body; they also have various dispositions, for instance, to feel pain and to feel emotions, and a set of capacities, such as for perception and for reasoning. And these, so it seems, may be missing, or under- or overdeveloped in abnormal specimens.

Sober has influentially described accounts that work with such teleological assumptions as adhering to an Aristotelian “Natural State Model” (Sober 1980: 353ff.). Such accounts work with a distinction that has no place in evolutionary biology, according to which variation of properties across populations is the key to evolution. Hence, no particular end states of organisms are privileged as “natural” or “normal” (Hull 1986: 7ff.). So any account that privileges particular morphological, behavioural or psychological human features has to provide good reasons that are both non-evolutionary and yet compatible with the evolutionary account of species. Because of the way that the notion of the normal is frequently employed to exclude and oppress, those reasons should be particularly good (Silvers 1998; Dupré 2003: 119ff.; Richter 2011: 43ff.; Kronfeldner 2018: 15ff.).

The kinds of reasons that may be advanced could either be internal to, or independent of the biological sciences. If the former, then various theoretical options may seem viable. The first grounds in the claim that, although species are not natural kinds and are thus unsuited to figuring in laws of nature (Hull 1987: 171), they do support descriptions with a significant degree of generality, some of which may be important (Hull 1984: 19). A theory of human nature developed on this basis should explain the kind of importance on the basis of which particular properties are emphasised. The second theoretical option is pluralism about the metaphysics of species: in spite of the fairly broad consensus that species are defined as units of evolution, the pluralist can deny the primacy of evolutionary dynamics, arguing that other epistemic aims allow the ecologist, the systematist or the ethologist to work with an equally legitimate concept of species that is not, or not exclusively genealogical (cf. Hull 1984: 36; Kitcher 1986: 320ff.; Hull 1987: 178–81; Dupré 1993: 43f.). The third option involves a relaxation of the concept of natural kinds, such that it no longer entails the instantiation of intrinsic, necessary, sufficient and spatiotemporally unrestricted properties, but is nevertheless able to support causal explanations. Such accounts aim to reunite taxonomic and explanatory criteria, thus allowing species taxa to count as natural kinds after all (Boyd 1999a; R. Wilson, Barker, & Brigandt 2007: 196ff.). Where, finally , the reasons advanced for privileging certain properties are independent of biology, these tend to concern features of humans’—“our”—self-understanding as participants in, rather than observers of, a particular form of life. These are likely to be connected to normative considerations. Here again, it seems that a special explanation will be required for why these privileged properties should be grouped under the rubric “human nature”.

The accounts to be described in the next subsection (3.2) of this entry are examples of the first strategy. Section 4 includes discussion of the relaxed natural kinds strategy. Section 5 focuses on accounts of human nature developed from a participant perspective and also notes the support that the pluralist metaphysical strategy might be taken to provide.

Begin, then, with the idea that to provide an account of “human nature” is to circumscribe a set of generalisations concerning humans. An approach of this sort sees the properties thus itemised as specifically “human” in as far as they are common among species specimens. So the privilege accorded to these properties is purely statistical and “normal” means statistically normal. Note that taking the set of statistically normal properties of humans as a non-teleological replacement for the fully developed human form retains from the original package the possibility of labelling as “human nature” either those properties themselves (TP3) or their developmental cause (TP2). Either approach avoids the classificatory worries dealt with in section 2 : it presupposes that those organisms whose properties are relevant are already distinguished as such specimens. What is to be explained is, then, the ways humans generally, though not universally, are. And among these ways are ways they may share with most specimens of some other species, in particular those that belong to the same order (primates) and the same class (mammals).

One should be clear what follows from this interpretation of “human”. The organisms among whom statistical frequency is sought range over those generated after speciation around 150,000 years ago to those that will exist immediately prior to the species’ extinction. On the one hand, because of the variability intrinsic to species, we are in the dark as to the properties that may or may not characterise those organisms that will turn out to be the last of the taxon. On the other hand, the time lag of around 100,000 years between the first anatomically modern humans and the general onset of behavioural modernity around the beginning of the Upper Palaeolithic means that there are likely to be many widespread psychological properties of contemporary humans that were not possessed by the majority of the species’ specimens during two thirds of the species’ history. This is true even if the practices seen as the signatures of behavioural modernity (see §1.1 ) developed sporadically, disappeared and reappeared at far removed points of time and space over tens of thousands of years before 50,000 ka (McBrearty & Brooks 2000; Sterelny 2011).

According to several authors (Machery 2008; 2018; Samuels 2012; Ramsey 2013), the expression “human nature” should be used to group properties that are the focus of much current behavioural, psychological and social science. However, as the cognitive and psychological sciences are generally interested in present-day humans, there is a mismatch between scientific focus and a grouping criterion that takes in all the properties generally or typically instantiated by specimens of the entire taxon. For this reason, the expression “human nature” is likely to refer to properties of an even more temporally restricted set of organisms belonging to the species. That restriction can be thought of in indexical terms, i.e., as a restriction to contemporary humans. However, some authors claim explicitly that their accounts entail that human nature can change (Ramsey 2013: 992; Machery 2018: 20). Human nature would then be the object of temporally indexed investigations, as is, for example, the weight of individual humans in everyday contexts. (Without temporal specification, there is no determinate answer to a question such as “How much did David Hume weigh?”) An example of Machery’s is dark skin colour. This characteristic, he claims, ceased to be a feature of human nature thus understood 7,000 years ago, if that was when skin pigmentation became polymorphic. The example indicates that the temporal range may be extremely narrow from an evolutionary point of view.

Such accounts are both compatible with evolutionary theory and coherent. However, in as far as they are mere summary or list conceptions, it is unclear what their epistemic value might be. They will tend to accord with everyday common sense, for which “human nature” may in a fairly low-key sense simply be the properties that (contemporary) humans generally tend to manifest (Roughley 2011: 16). They will also conform to one level of the expression’s use in Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), which, in an attempt to provide a human “mental geography” (1748 [1970: 13]), lists a whole series of features, such as prejudice (1739–40, I,iii,13), selfishness (III,ii,5), a tendency to temporal discounting (III,ii,7) and an addiction to general rules (III,ii,9).

Accounts of this kind have been seen as similar in content to field guides for other animals (Machery 2008: 323; Godfrey-Smith 2014: 139). As Hull points out, within a restricted ecological context and a short period of evolutionary time, the ascription of readily observable morphological or behavioural characteristics to species specimens is a straightforward and unproblematic enterprise (Hull 1987: 175). However, the analogy is fairly unhelpful, as the primary function of assertions in field guides is to provide a heuristics for amateur classification. In contrast, a list conception of the statistically normal properties of contemporary humans presupposes identification of the organisms in question as humans. Moreover, such accounts certainly do not entail easy epistemic access to the properties in question, which may only be experimentally discovered. Nevertheless, there remains something correct about the analogy, as such accounts are a collection of assertions linked only by the fact that they are about the same group of organisms (Sterelny 2018: 123).

More sophisticated nature documentaries may summarise causal features of the lives of animals belonging to specific species. An analogous conception of human nature has also been proposed, according to which human nature is a set of pervasive and robust causal nexuses amongst humans. The list that picks out this set would specify causal connections between antecedent properties, such as having been exposed to benzene or subject to abuse as a child, and consequent properties, such as developing cancer or being aggressive towards one’s own children (Ramsey 2013: 988ff.). Human nature thus understood would have an explanatory component, a component internal to each item on the list. Human nature itself would, however, not be explanatory, but rather the label for a list of highly diverse causal connections.

An alternative way to integrate an explanatory component in a statistical normality account involves picking out that set of statistically common properties that have a purely evolutionary explanation (Machery 2008; 2018). This reinterpretation of the concept of naturalness that featured in the original package (TP1) involves a contrast with social learning. Processes grouped together under this latter description are taken to be alternative explanations to those provided by evolution. However, learning plays a central role, not only in the development of individual humans, but also in the iterated interaction of entire populations with environments structured and restructured through such interaction (Stotz 2010: 488ff.; Sterelny 2012: 23ff.). Hence, the proposal raises serious epistemic questions as to how the distinction is precisely to be drawn and operationalised. (For discussion, see Prinz 2012; Lewens 2012: 464ff.; Ramsey 2013: 985; Machery 2018: 15ff.; Sterelny 2018: 116; Kronfeldner 2018: 147ff.).

4. Explanatory Human Properties

The replacement of the concept of a fully developed form with a statistical notion yields a deflationary account of human nature with, at most, restricted explanatory import. The correlative, explanatory notion in the original package, that of the fully developed form’s blueprint (TP2), has to some authors seemed worth reframing in terms made possible by advances in modern biology, particularly in genetics.

Clearly, there must be explanations of why humans generally walk on two legs, speak and plan many of their actions in advance. Genealogical, or what have been called “ultimate” (Mayr) or “historical” (Kitcher) explanations can advert to the accumulation of coherence among entrenched, stable properties along a lineage. These may well have resulted from selection pressures shared by the relevant organisms (cf. Wimsatt 2003; Lewens 2009). The fact that there are exceptions to any generalisations concerning contemporary humans does not entail that there is no need for explanations of such exception-allowing generalisations. Plausibly, these general, though not universal truths will have “structural explanations”, that is, explanations in terms of underlying structures or mechanisms (Kitcher 1986: 320; Devitt 2008: 353). These structures, so seems, might to a significant degree be inscribed in humans’ DNA.

The precise details of rapidly developing empirical science will improve our understanding of the extent to which there is a determinate relationship between contemporary humans’ genome and their physical, psychological and behavioural properties. There is, however, little plausibility that the blueprint metaphor might be applicable to the way DNA is transcribed, translated and interacts with its cellular environment. Such interaction is itself subject to influence by the organism’s external environment, including its social environment (Dupré 2001: 29ff.; 2003: 111ff.; Griffiths 2011: 326; Prinz 2012: 17ff.; Griffiths & Tabery 2013: 71ff.; Griffiths & Stotz 2013: 98ff., 143ff.). For example, the feature of contemporary human life for which there must according to Aristotle be some kind of blueprint, viz. rational agency, is, as Sterelny has argued, so strongly dependent on social scaffolding that any claim to the effect that human rationality is somehow genetically programmed ignores the causal contributions of manifestly indispensable environmental factors (Sterelny 2018: 120).

Nevertheless, humans do generally develop a specific set of physiological features, such as two lungs, one stomach, one pancreas and two eyes. Moreover, having such a bodily architecture is, according to the evidence from genetics, to a significant extent the result of developmental programmes that ground in gene regulatory networks (GRNs). These are stretches of non-coding DNA that regulate gene transcription. GRNs are modular, more or less strongly entrenched structures. The most highly conserved of these tend to be the phylogenetically most archaic (Carroll 2000; Walsh 2006: 436ff.; Willmore 2012: 227ff.). The GRNs responsible for basic physiological features may be taken, in a fairly innocuous sense, to belong to an evolved human nature.

Importantly, purely morphological features have generally not been the explananda of accounts that have gone under the rubric “human nature”. What has frequently motivated explanatory accounts thus labelled is the search for underlying structures responsible for generally shared psychological features. “Evolutionary Psychologists” have built a research programme around the claim that humans share a psychological architecture that parallels that of their physiology. This, they believe, consists of a structured set of psychological “organs” or modules (Tooby & Cosmides 1990: 29f.; 1992: 38, 113). This architecture is, they claim, in turn the product of developmental programmes inscribed in humans’ DNA (1992: 45). Such generally distributed developmental programmes they label “human nature” (1990: 23).

This conception raises the question of how analogous the characteristic physical and psychological “architectures” are. For one thing, the physical properties that tend to appear in such lists are far more coarse-grained than the candidates for shared psychological properties (D. Wilson 1994: 224ff.): the claim is not just that humans tend to have perceptual, desiderative, doxastic and emotional capacities, but that the mental states that realise these capacities tend to have contents of specific types. Perhaps an architecture of the former kind—of a formal psychology—is a plausible, if relatively unexciting candidate for the mental side of what an evolved human nature should explain. Either way, any such conception needs to adduce criteria for the individuation of such “mental organs” (D. Wilson 1994: 233). Relatedly, if the most strongly entrenched developmental programmes are the most archaic, it follows that, although these will be species-typical, they will not be species-specific. Programmes for the development of body parts have been identified for higher taxa, rather than for species.

A further issue that dogs any such attempts to explicate the “human” dimension of human nature in terms of developmental programmes inscribed in human DNA concerns Evolutionary Psychologists’ assertion that the programmes are the same in every specimen of the species. This assertion goes hand in hand with the claim that what is explained by such programmes is a deep psychological structure that is common to almost all humans and underlies the surface diversity of behavioural and psychological phenomena (Tooby & Cosmides 1990: 23f.). For Evolutionary Psychologists, the (near-)universality of both developmental programmes and deep psychological structure has an ultimate explanation in evolutionary processes that mark their products as natural in the sense of TP1. Both, they claim, are adaptations. These are features that were selected for because their possession in the past conferred a fitness advantage on their possessors. Evolutionary Psychologists conceive that advantage as conferred by the fulfilment of some specific function. They summarise selection for that function as “design”, which they take to have operated equally on all species specimens since the Pleistocene. This move reintroduces the teleological idea of a fully developed form beyond mere statistical normality (TP3).

This move has been extensively criticised. First, selection pressures operate at the level of groups and hence need not lead to the same structures in all a group’s members (D. Wilson 1994: 227ff.; Griffiths 2011: 325; Sterelny 2018: 120). Second, other evolutionary mechanisms than natural selection might be explanatorily decisive. Genetic drift or mutation and recombination might, for example, also confer “naturalness” in the sense of evolutionary genesis (Buller 2000: 436). Third, as we have every reason to assume that the evolution of human psychology is ongoing, evolutionary biology provides little support for the claim that particular programmes and associated traits evolved to fixity in the Pleistocene (Buller 2000: 477ff.; Downes 2010).

Perhaps, however, there might turn out to be gene control networks that do generally structure certain features of the psychological development of contemporary humans (Walsh 2006: 440ff.). The quest for such GNRs can, then, count as the search for an explanatory nature of contemporary humans, where the explanatory function thus sought is divorced from any classificatory role.

There has, however, been a move in general philosophy of science that, if acceptable, would transform the relationship between the taxonomic and explanatory features of species. This move was influentially initiated by Richard Boyd (1999a). It begins with the claim that the attempt to define natural kinds in terms of spatiotemporally unrestricted, intrinsic, necessary and sufficient conditions is a hangover from empiricism that should be abandoned by realist metaphysics. Instead, natural kinds should be understood as kinds that support induction and explanation, where generalisations at work in such processes need not be exceptionless. Thus understood, essences of natural kinds, i.e., their “natures”, need be neither intrinsic nor be possessed by all and only members of the kinds. Instead, essences consist of property clusters integrated by stabilising mechanisms (“homeostatic property clusters”, HPCs). These are networks of causal relations such that the presence of certain properties tends to generate or uphold others and the workings of underlying mechanisms contribute to the same effect. Boyd names storms, galaxies and capitalism as plausible examples (Boyd 1999b: 82ff.). However, he takes species to be the paradigmatic HPC kinds. According to this view, the genealogical character of a species’ nature does not undermine its causal role. Rather, it helps to explain the specific way in which the properties cohere that make up the taxon’s essence. Moreover, these can include extrinsic properties, for example, properties of constructed niches (Boyd 1991: 142, 1999a: 164ff.; Griffiths 1999: 219ff.; R. Wilson et al. 2007: 202ff.).

Whether such an account can indeed adequately explain taxonomic practice for species taxa is a question that can be left open here (see Ereshefsky & Matthen 2005: 16ff.). By its own lights the account does not identify conditions for belonging to a species such as Homo sapiens (Samuels 2012: 25f.). Whether it enables the identification of factors that play the explanatory roles that the term “human nature” might be supposed to pick out is perhaps the most interesting question. Two ways in which an account of human nature might be developed from such a starting point have been sketched.

According to Richard Samuels’ proposal, human nature should be understood as the empirically discoverable proximal mechanisms responsible for psychological development and for the manifestation of psychological capacities. These will include physiological mechanisms, such as the development of the neural tube, as well as environmentally scaffolded learning procedures; they will also include the various modular systems distinguished by cognitive science, such as visual processing and memory systems (Samuels 2012: 22ff.). Like mere list conceptions (cf. §3.2 ), such an account has a precedent in Hume, for whom human nature also includes causal “principles” that structure operations of the human mind (1739–40, Intro.), for example, the mechanisms of sympathy (III,iii,1; II,ii,6). Hume, however, thought of the relevant causal principles as intrinsic.

A second proposal, advanced by Paul Griffiths and Karola Stotz, explicitly suggests taking explanandum and explanans to be picked out by different uses of the expression "human nature". In both cases, the “nature” in question is that of the taxon, not of individual organisms. The former use simply refers to “what human beings are like”, where “human beings” means all species specimens. Importantly, this characterisation does not aim at shared characteristics, but is open for polymorphisms both across a population and across life stages of individual organisms. The causal conception of human nature, what explains this spectrum of similarity and difference in life histories, is equated by Griffiths and Stotz with the organism-environment system that supports human development. It thus includes all the genetic, epigenetic and environmental resources responsible for varying human life cycles (Griffiths 2011: 319; Stotz & Griffiths 2018, 66f.). It follows that explanatory human nature at one point in time can be radically different from human nature at some other point in time.

Griffiths and Stotz are clear that this account diverges significantly from traditional accounts, as it rejects assumptions that human development has a goal, that human nature is possessed by all and only specimens of the species and that it consists of intrinsic properties. They see these assumptions as features of the folk biology of human nature that is as scientifically relevant as are folk conceptions of heat for its scientific understanding (Stotz 2010: 488; Griffiths 2011: 319ff.; Stotz & Griffiths 2018: 60ff.). This raises the question as to whether such a developmental systems account should not simply advocate abandoning the term, as is suggested by Sterelny (2018) on the basis of closely related considerations. A reason for not doing so might lie in the fact that, as talk of “human nature” is often practised with normative intent or at least with normative consequences (Stotz & Griffiths 2018: 71f.), use of the term to pick out the real, complex explanatory factors at work might help to counter those normative uses that employ false, folk biological assumptions.

Explanatory accounts that emphasise developmental plasticity in the products of human DNA, in the neural architecture of the brain and in the human mind tend to reject the assumption that explanations of what humans are like should focus on intrinsic features. It should, however, be noted that such accounts can be interpreted as assigning the feature of heightened plasticity the key role in such explanations (cf. Montagu 1956: 79). Accounts that make plasticity causally central also raise the question as to whether there are not biological features that in turn explain it and should therefore be assigned a more central status in a theory of explanatory human nature.

A prime candidate for this role is what the zoologist Adolf Portmann labelled human “secondary altriciality”, a unique constellation of features of the human neonate relative to other primates: human neonates are, in their helplessness and possession of a relatively undeveloped brain, neurologically and behaviourally altricial, that is, in need of care. However they are also born with open and fully functioning sense organs, otherwise a mark of precocial species, in which neonates are able to fend for themselves (Portmann 1951: 44ff.). The facts that the human neonate brain is less than 30% of the size of the adult brain and that brain development after birth continues at the fetal rate for the first year (Walker & Ruff 1993, 227) led the anthropologist Ashley Montagu to talk of “exterogestation” (Montagu 1961: 156). With these features in mind, Portmann characterised the care structures required by prolonged infant helplessness as the “social uterus” (Portmann 1967: 330). Finally, the fact that the rapid development of the infant brain takes place during a time in which the infant’s sense organs are open and functioning places an adaptive premium on learning that is unparalleled among organisms (Gould 1977: 401; cf. Stotz & Griffiths 2018: 70).

Of course, these features are themselves contingent products of evolution that could be outlived by the species. Gould sees them as components of a general retardation of development that has characterised human evolution (Gould 1977: 365ff.), where “human” should be seen as referring to the clade—all the descendants of a common ancestor—rather than to the species. Anthropologists estimate that secondary altriciality characterised the lineage as from Homo erectus 1.5 million years ago (Rosenberg & Trevathan 1995: 167). We are, then, dealing with a set of deeply entrenched features, features that were in place long before behavioural modernity.

It is conceivable that the advent of secondary altriciality was a key transformation in generating the radical plasticity of human development beginning with early hominins. However, as Sterelny points out, there are serious difficulties with isolating any particular game changer. Secondary altriciality, or the plasticity that may in part be explained by it, would thus seem to fall victim to the same verdict as the game changers named by the traditional human nature slogans. However, maybe it is more plausible to think in terms of a matrix of traits: perhaps a game-changing constellation of properties present in the population after the split from pan can be shown to have generated forms of niche construction that fed back into and modified the original traits. These modifications may in turn have had further psychological and behavioural consequences in steps that plausibly brought selective advantages (Sterelny 2018: 115).

5. Human Nature, the Participant Perspective and Morality

In such a culture-mind coevolutionary account, there may be a place for the referents of some of the traditional philosophical slogans intended to pin down “the human essence“ or “human nature”—reason, linguistic capacity ( “ the speaking animal”, Herder 1772 [2008: 97]), a more general symbolic capacity ( animal symbolicum , Cassirer 1944: 44), freedom of the will (Pico della Mirandola 1486 [1965: 5]; Sartre 1946 [2007: 29, 47]), a specific, “political” form of sociality, or a unique type of moral motivation (Hutcheson 1730: §15). These are likely, at best, to be the (still evolving) products in contemporary humans of processes set in motion by a trait constellation that includes proto-versions of (some of) these capacities. Such a view may also be compatible with an account of “what contemporary humans are like” that abstracts from the evolutionary time scale of eons and focuses instead on the present (cf. Dupré 1993: 43), whilst neither merely cataloguing widely distributed traits ( §3.2 ) nor attempting explanations in terms of the human genome ( §4.1 ). The traditional slogans appear to be attempts to summarise some such accounts. It seems clear, though, that their aims are significantly different from those of the biologically, or otherwise scientifically orientated positions thus far surveyed.

Two features of such accounts are worth emphasising, both of which we already encountered in Aristotle’s contribution to the original package. The first involves a shift in perspective from that of the scientific observer to that of a participant in a contemporary human life form. Whereas the human—or non-human—biologist may ask what modern humans are like, just as they may ask what bonobos are like, the question that traditional philosophical accounts of human nature are plausibly attempting to answer is what it is like to live one’s life as a contemporary human. This question is likely to provoke the counter-question as to whether there is anything that it is like to live simply as a contemporary human, rather than as a human-in-a-specific-historical-and-cultural context (Habermas 1958: 32; Geertz 1973: 52f.; Dupré 2003: 110f.). For the traditional sloganeers, the answer is clearly affirmative. The second feature of such accounts is that they tend to take it that reference to the capacities named in the traditional slogans is in some sense normatively , in particular, ethically significant .

The first claim of such accounts, then, is that there is some property of contemporary humans that is in some way descriptively or causally central to participating in their form of life. The second is that such participation involves subjection to normative standards rooted in the possession of some such property. Importantly, there is a step from the first to the second form of significance, and justification of the step requires argument. Even from a participant perspective, there is no automatic move from explanatory to normative significance.

According to an “internal”, participant account of human nature, certain capacities of contemporary, perhaps modern humans unavoidably structure the way they (we) live their (our) lives. Talk of “structuring” refers to three kinds of contributions to the matrix of capacities and dispositions that both enable and constrain the ways humans live their lives. These are contributions, first, to the specific shape other features of humans lives have and, second, to the way other such features hang together (Midgley 2000: 56ff.; Roughley 2011: 16ff.). Relatedly, they also make possible a whole new set of practices. All three relations are explanatory, although their explanatory role appears not necessarily to correspond to the role corresponding features, or earlier versions of the features, might have played in the evolutionary genealogy of contemporary human psychology. Having linguistic capacities is a prime candidate for the role of such a structural property: human perception, emotion, action planning and thought are all plausibly transformed in linguistic creatures, as are the connections between perception and belief, and the myriad relationships between thought and behaviour, connections exploited and deepened in a rich set of practices unavailable to non-linguistic animals. Similar things could be claimed for other properties named by the traditional slogans.

In contrast to the ways in which such capacities have frequently been referred to in the slogan mode, particularly to the pathos that has tended to accompany it, it seems highly implausible that any one such property will stand alone as structurally significant. It is more likely that we should be picking out a constellation of properties, a constellation that may well include properties variants of which are possessed by other animals. Other properties, including capacities that may be specific to contemporary humans, such as humour, may be less plausible candidates for a structural role.

Note that the fact that such accounts aim to answer a question asked from the participant perspective does not rule out that the features in question may be illuminated in their role for human self-understanding by data from empirical science. On the contrary, it seems highly likely that disciplines such as developmental and comparative psychology, and neuroscience will contribute significantly to an understanding of the possibilities and constraints inherent in the relevant capacities and in the way they interact.

5.2. Human Nature and the Human ergon

The paradigmatic strategy for deriving ethical consequences from claims about structural features of the human life form is the Platonic and Aristotelian ergon or function argument. The first premise of Aristotle’s version ( Nicomachean Ethics 1097b–1098a) connects function and goodness: if the characteristic function of an entity of a type X is to φ, then a good entity of type X is one that φs well. Aristotle confers plausibility on the claim by using examples such as social roles and bodily organs. If the function of an eye as an exemplar of its kind is to enable seeing, then a good eye is one that enables its bearer to see well. The second premise of the argument is a claim we encountered in section 1.4 of this entry, a claim we can now see as predicating a structural property of human life, the exercise of reason. According to this claim, the function or end of individual humans as humans is, depending on interpretation (Nussbaum 1995: 113ff.), either the exercise of reason or life according to reason. If this is correct, it follows that a good human being is one whose life centrally involves the exercise of, or life in accordance with, reason.

In the light of the discussion so far, it ought to be clear that, as it stands, the second premise of this argument is incompatible with the evolutionary biology of species. It asserts that the exercise of reason is not only the key structural property of human life, but also the realization of the fully developed human form. No sense can be made of this latter notion in evolutionary terms. Nevertheless, a series of prominent contemporary ethicists—Alasdair MacIntyre (1999), Rosalind Hursthouse (1999), Philippa Foot (2001) and Martha Nussbaum (2006)—have all made variants of the ergon argument central to their ethical theories. As each of these authors advance some version of the second premise, it is instructive to examine the ways in which they aim to avoid the challenge from evolutionary biology.

Before doing so, it is first worth noting that any ethical theory or theory of value is engaged in an enterprise that has no clear place in an evolutionary analysis. If we want to know what goodness is or what “good” means, evolutionary theory is not the obvious place to look. This is particularly clear in view of the fact that evolutionary theory operates at the level of populations (Sober 1980: 370; Walsh 2006: 434), whereas ethical theory operates, at least primarily, at the level of individual agents. However, the specific conflict between evolutionary biology and neo-Aristotelian ethics results from the latter’s constructive use of the concept of species and, in particular, of a teleological conception of a fully developed form of individual members of the species “ qua members of [the] species” (MacIntyre 1999: 64, 71; cf. Thompson 2008: 29; Foot 2001: 27). The characterisation of achieving that form as fulfilling a “function”, which helps the analogy with bodily organs and social roles, is frequently replaced in contemporary discussions by talk of “flourishing” (Aristotle’s eudaimonia ). Such talk more naturally suggests comparisons with the lives of other organisms (although Aristotle himself excludes other animals from eudaimonia ; cf. Nicomachean Ethics 1009b). The concept of flourishing in turn picks out biological—etymologically: botanical—processes, but again not of a sort that play a role in evolutionary theory. It also seems primarily predicated of individual organisms. It may play a role in ecology; it is, however, most clearly at home in practical applications of biological knowledge, as in horticulture. In this respect, it is comparable to the concept of health.

Neo-Aristotelians claim that to describe an organism, whether a plant or a non-human or human animal, as flourishing is to measure it against a standard that is specific to the species to which it belongs. To do so is to evaluate it as a more or less good “specimen of its species (or sub-species)” (Hursthouse 1999: 198). The key move is then to claim that moral evaluation is, “quite seriously” (Foot 2001: 16), evaluation of the same sort: just as a non-defective animal or plant exemplifies flourishing within the relevant species’ life form, someone who is morally good is someone who exemplifies human flourishing, i.e., the fully developed form of the species. This metaethical claim has provoked the worry as to whether such attributions to other organisms are really anything more than classifications, or at most evaluations of “stretched and deflated” kinds that are missing the key feature of authority that we require for genuine normativity (Lenman 2005: 46ff.).

Independently of questions concerning their theory of value, ethical Neo-Aristotelians need to respond to the question of how reference to a fully developed form of the species can survive the challenge from evolutionary theory. Three kinds of response may appear promising.

The first adverts to the plurality of forms of biological science, claiming that there are life sciences, such as physiology, botany, zoology and ethology in the context of which such evaluations have a place (Hursthouse 1999: 202; 2012: 172; MacIntyre 1999: 65). And if ethology can legitimately attribute not only characteristic features, but also defects or flourishing to species members, in spite of species not being natural kinds, then there is little reason why ethics shouldn’t do so too. This strategy might ground in one of the moves sketched in section 3.1 of this entry. It might be argued, with Kitcher and Dupré, that such attributions are legitimate in other branches of biological science because there is a plurality of species concepts, indeed of kinds of species, where these are relative to epistemic interests. Or the claim might simply rest on a difference in what is taken to be the relevant time frame, where temporal relevance is indexed relative to the present. In ethics we are, it might be claimed, interested in humans as they are “at the moment and for a few millennia back and for maybe not much longer in the future” (Hursthouse 2012: 171).

This move amounts to the concession that talk of “the human species” is not to be understood literally. Whether this concession undermines the ethical theories that use the term is perhaps unclear. It leaves open the possibility that, as human nature may change significantly, there may be significant changes in what it means for humans to flourish and therefore in what is ethically required. This might be seen as a virtue, rather than a vice of the view.

A second response to the challenge from evolutionary biology aims to draw metaphysical consequences from epistemic or semantic claims. Michael Thompson has argued that what he calls alternatively “the human life form” and “the human species” is an a priori category. Thompson substantiates this claim by examining forms of discourse touched on in section 3.2 , forms of discourse that are generally taken to be of mere heuristic importance for amateur practices of identification, viz. field guides or animal documentaries. Statements such as “The domestic cat has four legs, two eyes, two ears and guts in its belly”, are, Thompson claims, instances of an important kind of predication that is neither tensed nor quantifiable. He calls these “natural historical descriptions” or “Aristotelian categoricals” (Thompson 2008: 64ff.). Such generic claims are not, he argues, made false where what is predicated is less than universal, or even statistically rare. Decisively, according to Thompson, our access to the notion of the human life form is non-empirical. It is, he claims, a presupposition of understanding ourselves from the first-person perspective as breathing, eating or feeling pain (Thompson 2004: 66ff.). Thus understood, the concept is independent of biology and therefore, if coherent, immune to problems raised by the Darwinian challenge.

Like Foot and Hursthouse, Thompson thinks that his Aristotelian categoricals allow inferences to specific judgments that members of species are defective (Thompson 2004: 54ff.; 2008: 80). He admits that such judgments in the case of the human life form are likely to be fraught with difficulties, but nevertheless believes that judgments of (non-)defective realization of a life form are the model for ethical evaluation (Thompson 2004: 30, 81f.). It may seem unclear how this might be the case in view of the fact that access to the human life form is supposed to be given as a presupposition of using the concept of “I”. Another worry is that the everyday understanding on which Thompson draws may be nothing other than a branch of folk biology. The folk tendency to ascribe teleological essences to species, as to “races” and genders, is no indication of the reality of such essences (Lewens 2012: 469f.; Stotz & Griffiths 2018: 60ff.; cf. Pellegrin 1982 [1986: 16ff., 120] and Charles 2000: 343ff., 368, on Aristotle’s own orientation to the usage of “the people”).

A final response to evolutionary biologists’ worries aims equally to distinguish the Neo-Aristotelian account of human nature from that of the sciences. However, it does so not by introducing a special metaphysics of “life forms”, but by explicitly constructing an ethical concept of human nature. Martha Nussbaum argues that the notion of human nature in play in what she calls “Aristotelian essentialism” is, as she puts it, “internal and evaluative”. It is a hermeneutic product of “human” self-understanding, constructed from within our best ethical outlook: “an ethical theory of human nature”, she claims,

should force us to answer for ourselves, on the basis of our very own ethical judgment, the question which beings are fully human ones. (Nussbaum 1995: 121f.; cf. Nussbaum 1992: 212ff.; 2006: 181ff.; McDowell 1980 [1998: 18ff.]; Hursthouse 1999: 229; 2012: 174f.)

There can be no question here of moving from a biological “is” to an ethical “ought”; rather, which features are taken to belong to human nature is itself seen as the result of ethical deliberation. Such a conception maintains the claim that the key ethical standard is that of human flourishing. However, it is clear that what counts as flourishing can only be specified on the basis of ethical deliberation, understood as striving for reflective equilibrium (Nussbaum 2006: 352ff.). In view of such a methodological proposal, there is a serious question as to what work is precisely done by the concept of human nature.

Neo-Aristotelians vary in the extent to which they flesh out a conception of species-specific flourishing. Nussbaum draws up a comprehensive, open-ended catalogue of what she calls “the central human capacities”. These are in part picked out because of their vulnerability to undermining or support by political measures. They include both basic bodily needs and more specifically human capacities, such as for humour, play, autonomy and practical reason (Nussbaum 1992: 216ff.; 2006: 76ff.). Such a catalogue allows the setting of three thresholds, below which a human organism would not count as living a human life at all (anencephalic children, for instance), as living a fully human life or as living a good human life (Nussbaum 2006: 181). Nussbaum explicitly argues that being of human parents is insufficient for crossing the first, evaluatively set threshold. Her conception is partly intended to provide guidelines as to how societies should conceive disability and as to when it is appropriate to take political measures in order to enable agents with nonstandard physical or mental conditions to cross the second and third thresholds.

Nussbaum has been careful to insist that enabling independence, rather than providing care, should be the prime aim. Nevertheless, the structure of an account that insists on a “species norm”, below which humans lacking certain capacities count as less than fully flourishing, has prompted accusations of illiberality. According to the complaint, it disrespects the right of members of, for example, deaf communities to set the standards for their own forms of life (Glackin 2016: 320ff.).

Other accounts of species-specific flourishing have been considerably more abstract. According to Hursthouse, plants flourish when their parts and operations are well suited to the ends of individual survival and continuance of the species. In social animals, flourishing also tends to involve characteristic pleasure and freedom from pain, and a contribution to appropriate functioning of relevant social groups (Hursthouse 1999: 197ff.). The good of human character traits conducive to pursuit of these four ends is transformed, Hursthouse claims, by the addition of “rationality”. As a result, humans flourish when they do what they correctly take themselves to have reason to do—under the constraint that they do not thereby cease to foster the four ends set for other social animals (Hursthouse 1999: 222ff.). Impersonal benevolence is, for example, because of this constraint, unlikely to be a virtue. In such an ethical outlook, what particular agents have reason to do is the primary standard; it just seems to be applied under particular constraints. A key question is thus whether the content of this primary standard is really determined by the notion of species-specific flourishing.

Where Hursthouse’s account builds up to, and attempts to provide a “natural” framework for, the traditional Aristotelian ergon of reason, MacIntyre builds his account around the claim that flourishing specific to the human “species” is essentially a matter of becoming an “independent practical reasoner” (MacIntyre 1999: 67ff.). It is because of the central importance of reasoning that, although human flourishing shares certain preconditions with the flourishing, say, of dolphins, it is also vulnerable in specific ways. MacIntyre argues that particular kinds of social practices enable the development of human reasoning capacities and that, because independent practical reasoning is, paradoxically, at core cooperatively developed and structured, the general aim of human flourishing is attained by participation in networks in local communities (MacIntyre 1999: 108). “Independent practical reasoners” are “dependent rational animals”. MacIntyre’s account thus makes room on an explanatory level for the evolutionary insight that humans can only become rational in a socio-cultural context which provides scaffolding for the development and exercise of rationality ( §4 ). Normatively, however, this point is subordinated to the claim that, from the point of view of participation in the contemporary human life form, flourishing corresponds to the traditional slogan.

MacIntyre, Hursthouse and Nussbaum (Nussbaum 2006: 159f.) all aim to locate the human capacity for reasoning within a framework that encompasses other animals. Each argues that, although the capacities to recognise reasons as reasons and for deliberation on their basis transform the needs and abilities humans share with other animals, the reasons in question remain in some way dependent on humans’ embodied and social form of life. This emphasis is intended to distinguish an Aristotelian approach from other approaches for which the capacity to evaluate reasons for action as reasons and to distance oneself from ones desires is also the “central difference” between humans and other animals (Korsgaard 2006: 104; 2018: 38ff.; cf. MacIntyre 1999: 71ff.). According to Korsgaard’s Kantian interpretation of Aristotle’s ergon argument, humans cannot act without taking a normative stand on whether their desires provide them with reasons to act. This she takes to be the key structural feature of their life, which brings with it “a whole new way of functioning well or badly” (Korsgaard 2018: 48; cf. 1996: 93). In such an account, “human nature” is monistically understood as this one structural feature which is so transformative that the concept of life applicable to organisms that instantiate it is no longer that applicable to organisms that don’t. Only “humans” live their lives, because only they possess the type of intentional control over their bodily movements that grounds in evaluation of their actions and self-evaluation as agents (Korsgaard 2006: 118; 2008: 141ff.; cf. Plessner 1928 [1975: 309f.]).

We have arrived at an interpretation of the traditional slogan that cuts it off from a metaphysics with any claims to be “naturalistic”. The claim now is that the structural effect of the capacity for reasoning transforms those features of humans that they share with other animals so thoroughly that those features pale into insignificance. What is “natural” about the capacity for reasoning for humans here is its unavoidability for contemporary members of the species, at least for those without serious mental disabilities. Such assertions also tend to shade into normative claims that discount the normative status of “animal” needs in view of the normative authority of human reasoning (cf. McDowell 1996 [1998: 172f.]).

The most radical version of this thought leads to the claim encountered towards the end of section 1.4 : that talk of “human nature” involves no essential reference at all to the species Homo sapiens or to the hominin lineage. According to this view, the kind to which contemporary humans belong is a kind to which entities could also belong who have no genealogical relationship to humans. That kind is the kind of entities that act and believe in accordance with the reasons they take themselves to have. Aliens, synthetically created agents and angels are further candidates for membership in the kind, which would, unlike biological taxa, be spatiotemporally unrestricted. The traditional term for the kind, as employed by Aquinas and Kant, is “person” (cf. Hull 1986: 9).

Roger Scruton has recently taken this line, arguing that persons can only be adequately understood in terms of a web of concepts inapplicable to other animals, concepts whose applicability grounds in an essential moral dimension of the personal life form. The concepts pick out components of a life form that is permeated by relationships of responsibility, as expressed in reactive attitudes such as indignation, guilt and gratitude. Such emotions he takes to involve a demand for accountability, and as such to be exclusive to the personal life form, not variants of animal emotions (Scruton 2017: 52). As a result, he claims, they situate their bearers in some sense “outside the natural order” (Scruton 2017: 26). According to such an account, we should embrace a methodological dualism with respect to humans: as animals, they are subject to the same kinds of biological explanations as all other organisms, but as persons, they are subject to explanations that are radically different in kind. These are explanations in terms of reasons and meanings, that is, exercises in “Verstehen”, whose applicability Scruton takes to be independent of causal explanation (Scruton 2017: 30ff., 46).

Such an account demonstrates with admirable clarity that there is no necessary connection between a theory of “human nature” and metaphysical naturalism. It also reinforces the fact, emphasised throughout this entry, that discussions of “human nature” require both serious conceptual spadework and explicit justification of the use of any one such concept rather than another.

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Aquinas, Thomas | Aristotle, General Topics: biology | Aristotle, General Topics: ethics | ethics: virtue | evolution | Kant, Immanuel | Locke, John: on real essence | naturalism: moral | natural kinds | psychology: evolutionary | species

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Michelle Hooge, Maria Kronfeldner, Nick Laskowski and Hichem Naar for their comments on earlier drafts.

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Nature Vs Nurture Essay for Students and Children

500+ words essay on nature vs nurture.

The topic of nature vs nurture is always a great topic of debate among people. There are great men who did work hard to achieve great heights . But still, they are some people who didn’t work that hard yet still managed to be successful.

Nature Vs Nurture Essay

In other words, it is a debate between hard work and talent. In the grooming of a person, the nurturing is essential. However, still, there are some individuals who were never born in a great environment . Yet by their sense of knowledge and intellectualism created a special place in the hearts of people.

Nature has given us many things in life and one of them is talents. Either we are born as the only individual in our family or it is in our genes. Furthermore, nature plays a vital role in deciding the future of a child. Many singers in this era are born with beautiful voices. They did not need any nurturing. Their talent took them to heights they couldn’t even imagine.

For instance, some of the great legends like Lata Mangeshkar, Asha Bhosle, Kishor Kumar had soulful voices. Also, they were the ones who sang from their childhood days. They started their careers and became successful at a very early age. Moreover, they did not get much teaching but still are the legends of all time.

Apart from singing, there are other talents that nature has given us. Various scientists like Albert Einstein , Isaac Newton , Galileo Galilei, started their work in their teenage years. They had amazing intellectualism, because of which they got recognition in their entire world. Furthermore, these scientists did not get any mentoring. They did everything on their own. Because they had extraordinary intelligence and ambition in life.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

On the other hand, the nurturing of a person is important. Because hard work beats talent. With proper mentoring and practice, a person can achieve success in life. If a person has an environment in which everybody is in the same profession and are successful in it.

Then there is a great chance that the person will land up in the same profession and will achieve heights. Because in that environment he will get proper nurturing.

Furthermore, he will also be able to perform better over the years. “ Hard work always pays off ”. This idiom is always true and nobody can deny that. If a person has true dedication then it can beat talent. Various singers, dancers, musicians, businessmen, entrepreneurs did work really hard for years.

And because of that, they got recognition in the entire world. In these categories, musicians are who achieved heights only with their hard work and constant practice.

It is true that there are no shortcuts to success. Various known legends like Bob Dylon. Lou Reed, Elvis Persley, Michael Jackson worked hard throughout their lives. As a result, they were some of the great personalities in the entire world.

Q1. What is the meaning of nurture?

A1. Nurture means the way a person grooms himself. This is done in order to achieve success. Nurturing is essential in a person’s life because it can be a way a person can cross the barrier and do something great. Moreover nurture also means the mentoring and care a person is getting in an environment.

Q2. What is the difference between Nature and Nurture?

A2. The main difference between nature and nurture is, nature is the talent a person inherits from his parents or is God gifted. While nurturing is hard work and mentoring of a person in a particular field. So that he may excel in that field.

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The Nature vs. Nurture Debate

Genetic and Environmental Influences and How They Interact

Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

characteristics of nature essay

Verywell / Joshua Seong

  • Definitions
  • Interaction
  • Contemporary Views

Nature refers to how genetics influence an individual's personality, whereas nurture refers to how their environment (including relationships and experiences) impacts their development. Whether nature or nurture plays a bigger role in personality and development is one of the oldest philosophical debates within the field of psychology .

Learn how each is defined, along with why the issue of nature vs. nurture continues to arise. We also share a few examples of when arguments on this topic typically occur, how the two factors interact with each other, and contemporary views that exist in the debate of nature vs. nurture as it stands today.

Nature and Nurture Defined

To better understand the nature vs. nurture argument, it helps to know what each of these terms means.

  • Nature refers largely to our genetics . It includes the genes we are born with and other hereditary factors that can impact how our personality is formed and influence the way that we develop from childhood through adulthood.
  • Nurture encompasses the environmental factors that impact who we are. This includes our early childhood experiences, the way we were raised , our social relationships, and the surrounding culture.

A few biologically determined characteristics include genetic diseases, eye color, hair color, and skin color. Other characteristics are tied to environmental influences, such as how a person behaves, which can be influenced by parenting styles and learned experiences.

For example, one child might learn through observation and reinforcement to say please and thank you. Another child might learn to behave aggressively by observing older children engage in violent behavior on the playground.

The Debate of Nature vs. Nurture

The nature vs. nurture debate centers on the contributions of genetics and environmental factors to human development. Some philosophers, such as Plato and Descartes, suggested that certain factors are inborn or occur naturally regardless of environmental influences.

Advocates of this point of view believe that all of our characteristics and behaviors are the result of evolution. They contend that genetic traits are handed down from parents to their children and influence the individual differences that make each person unique.

Other well-known thinkers, such as John Locke, believed in what is known as tabula rasa which suggests that the mind begins as a blank slate . According to this notion, everything that we are is determined by our experiences.

Behaviorism is a good example of a theory rooted in this belief as behaviorists feel that all actions and behaviors are the results of conditioning. Theorists such as John B. Watson believed that people could be trained to do and become anything, regardless of their genetic background.

People with extreme views are called nativists and empiricists. Nativists take the position that all or most behaviors and characteristics are the result of inheritance. Empiricists take the position that all or most behaviors and characteristics result from learning.

Examples of Nature vs. Nurture

One example of when the argument of nature vs. nurture arises is when a person achieves a high level of academic success . Did they do so because they are genetically predisposed to elevated levels of intelligence, or is their success a result of an enriched environment?

The argument of nature vs. nurture can also be made when it comes to why a person behaves in a certain way. If a man abuses his wife and kids, for instance, is it because he was born with violent tendencies, or is violence something he learned by observing others in his life when growing up?

Nature vs. Nurture in Psychology

Throughout the history of psychology , the debate of nature vs. nurture has continued to stir up controversy. Eugenics, for example, was a movement heavily influenced by the nativist approach.

Psychologist Francis Galton coined the terms 'nature versus nurture' and 'eugenics' and believed that intelligence resulted from genetics. Galton also felt that intelligent individuals should be encouraged to marry and have many children, while less intelligent individuals should be discouraged from reproducing.

The value placed on nature vs. nurture can even vary between the different branches of psychology , with some branches taking a more one-sided approach. In biopsychology , for example, researchers conduct studies exploring how neurotransmitters influence behavior, emphasizing the role of nature.

In social psychology , on the other hand, researchers might conduct studies looking at how external factors such as peer pressure and social media influence behaviors, stressing the importance of nurture. Behaviorism is another branch that focuses on the impact of the environment on behavior.

Nature vs. Nurture in Child Development

Some psychological theories of child development place more emphasis on nature and others focus more on nurture. An example of a nativist theory involving child development is Chomsky's concept of a language acquisition device (LAD). According to this theory, all children are born with an instinctive mental capacity that allows them to both learn and produce language.

An example of an empiricist child development theory is Albert Bandura's social learning theory . This theory says that people learn by observing the behavior of others. In his famous Bobo doll experiment , Bandura demonstrated that children could learn aggressive behaviors simply by observing another person acting aggressively.

Nature vs. Nurture in Personality Development

There is also some argument as to whether nature or nurture plays a bigger role in the development of one's personality. The answer to this question varies depending on which personality development theory you use.

According to behavioral theories, our personality is a result of the interactions we have with our environment, while biological theories suggest that personality is largely inherited. Then there are psychodynamic theories of personality that emphasize the impact of both.

Nature vs. Nurture in Mental Illness Development

One could argue that either nature or nurture contributes to mental health development. Some causes of mental illness fall on the nature side of the debate, including changes to or imbalances with chemicals in the brain. Genetics can also contribute to mental illness development, increasing one's risk of a certain disorder or disease.

Mental disorders with some type of genetic component include autism , attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), bipolar disorder , major depression , and schizophrenia .

Other explanations for mental illness are environmental. This includes being exposed to environmental toxins, such as drugs or alcohol, while still in utero. Certain life experiences can also influence mental illness development, such as witnessing a traumatic event, leading to the development of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

Nature vs. Nurture in Mental Health Therapy

Different types of mental health treatment can also rely more heavily on either nature or nurture in their treatment approach. One of the goals of many types of therapy is to uncover any life experiences that may have contributed to mental illness development (nurture).

However, genetics (nature) can play a role in treatment as well. For instance, research indicates that a person's genetic makeup can impact how their body responds to antidepressants. Taking this into consideration is important for getting that person the help they need.

Interaction Between Nature and Nurture

Which is stronger: nature or nurture? Many researchers consider the interaction between heredity and environment—nature with nurture as opposed to nature versus nurture—to be the most important influencing factor of all.

For example, perfect pitch is the ability to detect the pitch of a musical tone without any reference. Researchers have found that this ability tends to run in families and might be tied to a single gene. However, they've also discovered that possessing the gene is not enough as musical training during early childhood is needed for this inherited ability to manifest itself.

Height is another example of a trait influenced by an interaction between nature and nurture. A child might inherit the genes for height. However, if they grow up in a deprived environment where proper nourishment isn't received, they might never attain the height they could have had if they'd grown up in a healthier environment.

A newer field of study that aims to learn more about the interaction between genes and environment is epigenetics . Epigenetics seeks to explain how environment can impact the way in which genes are expressed.

Some characteristics are biologically determined, such as eye color, hair color, and skin color. Other things, like life expectancy and height, have a strong biological component but are also influenced by environmental factors and lifestyle.

Contemporary Views of Nature vs. Nurture

Most experts recognize that neither nature nor nurture is stronger than the other. Instead, both factors play a critical role in who we are and who we become. Not only that but nature and nurture interact with each other in important ways all throughout our lifespan.

As a result, many in this field are interested in seeing how genes modulate environmental influences and vice versa. At the same time, this debate of nature vs. nurture still rages on in some areas, such as in the origins of homosexuality and influences on intelligence .

While a few people take the extreme nativist or radical empiricist approach, the reality is that there is not a simple way to disentangle the multitude of forces that exist in personality and human development. Instead, these influences include genetic factors, environmental factors, and how each intermingles with the other.

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National Institutes of Health. Common genetic factors found in 5 mental disorders .

Pain O, Hodgson K, Trubetskoy V, et al. Identifying the common genetic basis of antidepressant response . Biol Psychiatry Global Open Sci . 2022;2(2):115-126. doi:10.1016/j.bpsgos.2021.07.008

Moulton C. Perfect pitch reconsidered . Clin Med J . 2014;14(5):517-9 doi:10.7861/clinmedicine.14-5-517

Levitt M. Perceptions of nature, nurture and behaviour . Life Sci Soc Policy . 2013;9:13. doi:10.1186/2195-7819-9-13

Bandura A, Ross D, Ross, SA. Transmission of aggression through the imitation of aggressive models . J Abnorm Soc Psychol. 1961;63(3):575-582. doi:10.1037/h0045925

Chomsky N. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax .

Galton F. Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development .

Watson JB. Behaviorism .

By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

Nature Vs Nurture Essay

Nature is the influence of genetics or hereditary factors in determining the individual’s behavior. In other words, it is how natural factors shape the behavior or personality of an individual. In most cases, nature determines the physical characteristics which in effect influence the behavior of an individual. Physical characteristics such as physical appearance, type of voice and sex which are determined by hereditary factors influences the way people behave.

Nurture on the other is the upbringing of an individual according to the environmental conditions. That is, the way individuals are socialized. Basically, nurture is the influence of environmental factors on an individual’s behavior.

According to this paradigm, an individual’s behavior can be conditioned depending on the way one would like it to be. Often, individuals’ behaviors are conditioned by the socio-cultural environmental factors. It is because of socio-cultural environmental conditions that the differences in the behavior of individuals occur.

Nature determines individual traits that are hereditary. In other words, human characteristics are determined by genetic predispositions which are largely natural. Hereditary traits are normally being passed from the parents to the offspring. They include characteristics that determine sex and physical make up. According to natural behaviorists, it is the genes that will determine the physical trait an individual will have. These are encoded on the individuals DNA.

Therefore, behavioral traits such as sexual orientation, aggression, personality and intelligence are also encoded in the DNA. However, scientists believe that these characteristics are evolutionary. That is, they change over time depending on the physical environment adaptability. Evolutionary scientists argue that changes in genes are as a result of mutations which are caused by environmental factors. Thus, natural environment determines individual characteristics which are genetically encoded in the DNA.

Conversely, individuals possess traits that are not naturally determined. These are characteristics that are learnt rather than being born with. These are traits which largely determined by the socio-cultural environmental factors or the way the individuals are socialized within the society depending on the societal values.

These traits are learnt as an individual develops and can easily be changed by the socio-cultural environment where the individual is currently staying. These characteristics include temperament, ability to master a language and sense of humor. Behavioral theorists believe that these traits can be conditioned and altered much like the way animal behavior can be conditioned.

From the discussion it can be deduced that individuals’ traits are determined by hereditary genes and at the same time can be natured. There are those traits that cannot be changed in an individual no matter what condition the person is exposed to. These traits are inborn and embed within the individual hereditary factors.

In most cases, they constitute the physical characteristics of an individual. They also determine the physical behaviors such as walking style, physical appearance and eating habits. At the same time there are learned characteristics which are normally being conditioned by the socio-cultural values. Individuals learn these traits from the way they are socialized within the immediate social or cultural environment. In other words, such behaviors are conditioned by the cultural values encouraged by the immediate society.

In conclusion, nature vs. nurture debate still remains controversial. However, all agree that nature and nurture play a crucial role in determining an individual’s behavior. Nature is associated with heredity roles in determining the individuals characteristics where as nurture is associated with the role of socio-cultural environment in determining the individuals behavior.

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Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Nature Vs Nurture." October 29, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/nature-vs-nurture/.

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Beauty of Nature Essay

It is hard for one to witness the beauty of nature and not fall for it. Whether we listen to the mesmerising sounds of birds in the morning or love to watch the brilliant sunset in the evening, there is something beautiful about nature that fills us with joy. We are extremely lucky beings that we get to enjoy the beauty of nature every day. Let us discuss the different things that nature provides us through this short essay on beauty of nature.

When we describe the beauty of nature, several aspects like trees, plants, animals, water, hills and weather come into play. Through essay writing on beauty of nature, your kids will be able to express what they admire about nature clearly. Moreover, this essay will reveal how kids pay close attention to things that we hardly notice or care about.

Beauty of Nature Essay

Experience with the Beauty of Nature

During the mid-summer season, I went to a beautiful hill station with my family. Even though the ride was long, the beautiful scenery on the way kept me entertained. I could see deep forests and misty mountains as we went higher and higher. The winding roads also fascinated me, and I felt as if I had entered a different world. Upon our arrival at the place, I immediately fell in love with nature as it was preserved as such with fresh fragrant flowers of different kinds, cool weather and lush greenery. I found all my worries melting away as I walked amidst this wonderful nature.

Nature offers limitless happiness and satisfaction to us. As a nature enthusiast, one would find joy in the calm breeze, flowing streams or dancing flowers. From the little pebbles to sturdy rocks, everything is part of nature, which adds charm to it. Even nature creates music through the running rivers, twittering birds and gentle winds. When the sun sets and the moon takes its place, the whole sky is lit, and there is nothing more dreamlike than sleeping under the starry sky.

The seasons change, and each has its distinct beauty that cannot be matched. While spring brings in the best of nature through its vibrant greenery, winter calls for a misty and foggy beauty of nature. Autumn covers nature with a golden carpet of leaves and flowers, and summer witnesses the brightest days with delicious fruits. Besides, there are many living creatures, like birds, insects, fish, etc., in varying shape, size and colour that makes nature lively. A single peek through the window of your house would help you understand the true beauty of nature, which will surely lighten your mood.

Moral of the Essay

Each one of us will have a unique feeling when we look at nature. You can know what your child likes about nature through this essay writing on beauty of nature. We can see, feel and hear the glamour of nature in every step that we take and the air we breathe. This short essay on beauty of nature would inspire your kids to look around and take delight in its different forms so that they will be energised and enthusiastic.

How to enjoy the beauty of nature?

All of us can enjoy the beauty of nature in the ways we see it. You could either go for an early morning walk or jog in the evening, where you could be close to nature, thus imbibing its beauty. Travel with your friends and family to hill stations, beaches and exotic places, and enjoy the beautiful sunrise or sunset.

What are the factors that affect the beauty of nature?

Although nature maintains its beauty, human exploitation has caused serious threats to nature. The excessive cutting down of trees for industry and home purposes and the pollution of water, air and land through the dumping of waste from factories are the main factors that threaten the beauty of nature.

How to preserve the beauty of nature?

Nature is an invaluable gift given to us, and we must not involve in any activity that would diminish its beauty. By planting more trees, avoiding the use of plastic, and reusing and recycling things, we can maintain the beauty of nature as it is.

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What Are Nature vs. Nurture Examples?

How is nature defined, how is nurture defined, the nature vs. nurture debate, nature vs. nurture examples, what is empiricism (extreme nurture position), contemporary views of nature vs. nurture.

Nature vs. nurture is an age-old debate about whether genetics (nature) plays a bigger role in determining a person's characteristics than lived experience and environmental factors (nurture). The term "nature vs. nature" was coined by English naturalist Charles Darwin's younger half-cousin, anthropologist Francis Galton, around 1875.

In psychology, the extreme nature position (nativism) proposes that intelligence and personality traits are inherited and determined only by genetics.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, the extreme nurture position (empiricism) asserts that the mind is a blank slate at birth; external factors like education and upbringing determine who someone becomes in adulthood and how their mind works. Both of these extreme positions have shortcomings and are antiquated.

This article explores the difference between nature and nurture. It gives nature vs. nurture examples and explains why outdated views of nativism and empiricism don't jibe with contemporary views. 

Thanasis Zovoilis / Getty Images

In the context of nature vs. nurture, "nature" refers to genetics and heritable factors that are passed down to children from their biological parents.

Genes and hereditary factors determine many aspects of someone’s physical appearance and other individual characteristics, such as a genetically inherited predisposition for certain personality traits.

Scientists estimate that 20% to 60% percent of temperament is determined by genetics and that many (possibly thousands) of common gene variations combine to influence individual characteristics of temperament.

However, the impact of gene-environment (or nature-nurture) interactions on someone's traits is interwoven. Environmental factors also play a role in temperament by influencing gene activity. For example, in children raised in an adverse environment (such as child abuse or violence), genes that increase the risk of impulsive temperamental characteristics may be activated (turned on).

Trying to measure "nature vs. nurture" scientifically is challenging. It's impossible to know precisely where the influence of genes and environment begin or end.

How Are Inherited Traits Measured?

“Heritability”   describes the influence that genes have on human characteristics and traits. It's measured on a scale of 0.0 to 1.0. Very strong heritable traits like someone's eye color are ranked a 1.0.

Traits that have nothing to do with genetics, like speaking with a regional accent ranks a zero. Most human characteristics score between a 0.30 and 0.60 on the heritability scale, which reflects a blend of genetics (nature) and environmental (nurture) factors.

Thousands of years ago, ancient Greek philosophers like Plato believed that "innate knowledge" is present in our minds at birth. Every parent knows that babies are born with innate characteristics. Anecdotally, it may seem like a kid's "Big 5" personality traits (agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion, neuroticism, and openness) were predetermined before birth.

What is the "Big 5" personality traits

The Big 5 personality traits is a theory that describes the five basic dimensions of personality. It was developed in 1949 by D. W. Fiske and later expanded upon by other researchers and is used as a framework to study people's behavior.

From a "nature" perspective, the fact that every child has innate traits at birth supports Plato's philosophical ideas about innatism. However, personality isn't set in stone. Environmental "nurture" factors can change someone's predominant personality traits over time. For example, exposure to the chemical lead during childhood may alter personality.

In 2014, a meta-analysis of genetic and environmental influences on personality development across the human lifespan found that people change with age. Personality traits are relatively stable during early childhood but often change dramatically during adolescence and young adulthood.

It's impossible to know exactly how much "nurture" changes personality as people get older. In 2019, a study of how stable personality traits are from age 16 to 66 found that people's Big 5 traits are both stable and malleable (able to be molded). During the 50-year span from high school to retirement, some traits like agreeableness and conscientiousness tend to increase, while others appear to be set in stone.

Nurture refers to all of the external or environmental factors that affect human development such as how someone is raised, socioeconomic status, early childhood experiences, education, and daily habits.

Although the word "nurture" may conjure up images of babies and young children being cared for by loving parents, environmental factors and life experiences have an impact on our psychological and physical well-being across the human life span. In adulthood, "nurturing" oneself by making healthy lifestyle choices can offset certain genetic predispositions.

For example, a May 2022 study found that people with a high genetic risk of developing the brain disorder Alzheimer's disease can lower their odds of developing dementia (a group of symptoms that affect memory, thinking, and social abilities enough to affect daily life) by adopting these seven healthy habits in midlife:

  • Staying active
  • Healthy eating
  • Losing weight
  • Not smoking
  • Reducing blood sugar
  • Controlling cholesterol
  • Maintaining healthy blood pressure

The nature vs. nurture debate centers around whether individual differences in behavioral traits and personality are caused primarily by nature or nurture. Early philosophers believed the genetic traits passed from parents to their children influence individual differences and traits. Other well-known philosophers believed the mind begins as a blank slate and that everything we are is determined by our experiences.

While early theories favored one factor over the other, experts today recognize there is a complex interaction between genetics and the environment and that both nature and nurture play a critical role in shaping who we are.

Eye color and skin pigmentation are examples of "nature" because they are present at birth and determined by inherited genes. Developmental delays due to toxins (such as exposure to lead as a child or exposure to drugs in utero) are examples of "nurture" because the environment can negatively impact learning and intelligence.

In Child Development

The nature vs. nurture debate in child development is apparent when studying language development. Nature theorists believe genetics plays a significant role in language development and that children are born with an instinctive ability that allows them to both learn and produce language.

Nurture theorists would argue that language develops by listening and imitating adults and other children.

In addition, nurture theorists believe people learn by observing the behavior of others. For example, contemporary psychologist Albert Bandura's social learning theory suggests that aggression is learned through observation and imitation.

In Psychology

In psychology, the nature vs. nurture beliefs vary depending on the branch of psychology.

  • Biopsychology:  Researchers analyze how the brain, neurotransmitters, and other aspects of our biology influence our behaviors, thoughts, and feelings. emphasizing the role of nature.
  • Social psychology: Researchers study how external factors such as peer pressure and social media influence behaviors, emphasizing the importance of nurture.
  • Behaviorism: This theory of learning is based on the idea that our actions are shaped by our interactions with our environment.

In Personality Development

Whether nature or nurture plays a bigger role in personality development depends on different personality development theories.

  • Behavioral theories: Our personality is a result of the interactions we have with our environment, such as parenting styles, cultural influences, and life experiences.
  • Biological theories: Personality is mostly inherited which is demonstrated by a study in the 1990s that concluded identical twins reared apart tend to have more similar personalities than fraternal twins.
  • Psychodynamic theories: Personality development involves both genetic predispositions and environmental factors and their interaction is complex.

In Mental Illness

Both nature and nurture can contribute to mental illness development.

For example, at least five mental health disorders are associated with some type of genetic component ( autism ,  attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) ,  bipolar disorder , major depression, and  schizophrenia ).

Other explanations for mental illness are environmental, such as:

  • Being exposed to drugs or alcohol in utero 
  • Witnessing a traumatic event, leading to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
  • Adverse life events and chronic stress during childhood

In Mental Health Therapy

Mental health treatment can involve both nature and nurture. For example, a therapist may explore life experiences that may have contributed to mental illness development (nurture) as well as family history of mental illness (nature).

At the same time, research indicates that a person's genetic makeup may impact how their body responds to antidepressants. Taking this into consideration is important for finding the right treatment for each individual.

 What Is Nativism (Extreme Nature Position)?

Innatism emphasizes nature's role in shaping our minds and personality traits before birth. Nativism takes this one step further and proposes that all of people's mental and physical characteristics are inherited and predetermined at birth.

In its extreme form, concepts of nativism gave way to the early 20th century's racially-biased eugenics movement. Thankfully, "selective breeding," which is the idea that only certain people should reproduce in order to create chosen characteristics in offspring, and eugenics, arranged breeding, lost momentum during World War II. At that time, the Nazis' ethnic cleansing (killing people based on their ethnic or religious associations) atrocities were exposed.

Philosopher John Locke's tabula rasa theory from 1689 directly opposes the idea that we are born with innate knowledge. "Tabula rasa" means "blank slate" and implies that our minds do not have innate knowledge at birth.

Locke was an empiricist who believed that all the knowledge we gain in life comes from sensory experiences (using their senses to understand the world), education, and day-to-day encounters after being born.

Today, looking at nature vs. nature in black-and-white terms is considered a misguided dichotomy (two-part system). There are so many shades of gray where nature and nurture overlap. It's impossible to tease out how inherited traits and learned behaviors shape someone's unique characteristics or influence how their mind works.

The influences of nature and nurture in psychology are impossible to unravel. For example, imagine someone growing up in a household with an alcoholic parent who has frequent rage attacks. If that child goes on to develop a substance use disorder and has trouble with emotion regulation in adulthood, it's impossible to know precisely how much genetics (nature) or adverse childhood experiences (nurture) affected that individual's personality traits or issues with alcoholism.

Epigenetics Blurs the Line Between Nature and Nurture

"Epigenetics " means "on top of" genetics. It refers to external factors and experiences that turn genes "on" or "off." Epigenetic mechanisms alter DNA's physical structure in utero (in the womb) and across the human lifespan.

Epigenetics blurs the line between nature and nurture because it says that even after birth, our genetic material isn't set in stone; environmental factors can modify genes during one's lifetime. For example, cannabis exposure during critical windows of development can increase someone's risk of neuropsychiatric disease via epigenetic mechanisms.

Nature vs. nurture is a framework used to examine how genetics (nature) and environmental factors (nurture) influence human development and personality traits.

However, nature vs. nurture isn't a black-and-white issue; there are many shades of gray where the influence of nature and nurture overlap. It's impossible to disentangle how nature and nurture overlap; they are inextricably intertwined. In most cases, nature and nurture combine to make us who we are. 

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By Christopher Bergland Christopher Bergland is a retired ultra-endurance athlete turned medical writer and science reporter. 

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There has long been a debate about whether nature or nurture matters more in determining the traits an individual will have. In other words, do genetics or environment play a more formative role in the development of one’s personality? Nature says that our traits are influenced by genetic inheritance and similar biological factors while nurture is meant as the influence of environmental factors after conception.

We know that physical characteristics like eye color, hair color, and height can be attributed to specific genes within our DNA. But what about emotional or behavioral traits?  This sample biological essay from the essay writing services at Ultius examines the question that while some behavioral traits can be traced to certain genes, does our environment play a role in activating those genes?

Our genetic makeup

Science tells us that certain traits are most definitely attributed to genetic causes. Our eye color, skin pigmentation, and certain diseases like Tay-Sachs or Huntingdon’s chorea are all direct results of the genes we inherit from our parents. Other traits to which we can be genetically predisposed include weight, height, life expectancy, hair loss, and vulnerability to certain illnesses (McLeod 2007). Because these characteristics can be definitively connected to our biology, many speculate on whether or not genetic factors can contribute to behavioral tendencies, mental abilities, and personality traits .

Nativists, those who believe that every characteristic we have is determined only by nature, assume that the characteristics of the human species as a whole are simply a product of evolution and that the things that make us unique are a result of our own specific genetic code. They believe that the characteristics that are not observable at birth, such as personality traits, emerge later as the product of maturation.

We each have a biological clock inside us that turns certain behaviors on and off in a way that is preprogrammed from birth. An example of this would be the way our bodies change during puberty. Nativists also believe that:

“maturation governs the emergence of attachment in infancy, language acquisition, and even cognitive development as a whole” (McLeod 2007).

Bowlby’s theory of attachment views the bond between the mother and child as being an innate process that aids in our survival as a species. Likewise, Chomsky believed that language is learned through the use of an innate language acquisition device that all humans are born with (McLeod 2007). In addition, Freud speculated that traits like aggression are engrained in our DNA. 

Fraternal twins as evidence of nature over nurture

Similarly, it is often debated whether or not criminal activity can be linked to a genetic disposition. One of the biggest pieces of supporting evidence for the nature over nurture is the fact that fraternal twins exhibit similar characteristics even when they are raised apart. Often times, these twins will share behavioral traits as if they were raised together in the same place. Mental health is undoubtedly affected by our biological dispositions.

For example, bipolar is approximately five times as likely to develop when there is a family history of the condition (“Nature vs. Nurture Debate”). There are similar statistics available for a wide number of mental health conditions . Researchers also tend to place more emphasis on nature when it comes to addiction. Alcoholism, for example, can recur in families and it has been found that certain genes may influence the development of alcoholism and the way alcohol effects the body.

Alternatively, to nativists, empiricists believe that the human mind is a blank slate at birth and any characteristics we develop are a result of our experiences and environment. With point of view speculates that psychological characteristics and our behavioral tendencies are things we learned during our development. While the concept of maturation applies to the biological development we experience, any psychological growth is a result of the way we are brought up.

Attachment of infants as evidence of nurturing

An example of this would be the way infants form attachment. The formation of attachment is a direct result of the love and attention a child receives. If they are not given love and attention, the attachment will not develop. Similarly, we learn language by mirroring the speech we hear from others.

Our cognitive development is dependent on the environment and civilization in which we are reared (“Nature vs. Nurture”). Bandura’s social learning theory states that aggression is a characteristic that we learn through observation and imitation. In addition, Skinner believed that language is something individuals learn from others via behavioral shaping techniques.

Watson's ideas on environmental learning

John Watson, one of the most well-known psychologists to propose environmental learning as the dominating factor in the nature versus nurture debate, feels that our behavioral traits are purely a result of our surroundings and experiences. He felt that he could condition a new behavior in a child or alter an already existing behavior that is considered to be unfavorable (Sincero 2016).

Watson believed that he could randomly choose any baby out of a group of twelve infants and raise the child to become any type of specialist he chose. He stated that he could train any child to be anything, regardless of the individual’s talents, potentialities, and social groups.

Benefits of nurturing on mental health

Just like nature, nurture affects our mental health, as well. While someone may have a genetic disposition for one condition or another, there still needs to be an environmental trigger for that condition to develop. If there is a genetic indication that a mental condition may develop, the individual can be ‘nurtured’ in a way that can prevent the condition from developing or lessen its severity.

A neuroscientist named James Fallon discovered that he possessed the brain of a psychopath and believed that being raised in a loving and nurturing environment helped ensure that he never fully developed enough sociopathic traits for them to affect his success (“Nature vs. Nurture Debate”).

The foundations of addiction

In a similar way, the basis for addiction is not entirely determined by genetics. Certain environmental aspects, such as the habits of our friends, partners, and parents, can contribute significantly to the development of addiction. A genetic predisposition to alcoholism becomes entirely more significant when the individual in question is frequently exposed to alcohol abuse and comes to view the harmful behavior as normal.

A study conducted at the University of Liverpool found that a family history of mental health conditions was only the second strongest indicator that a mental condition would develop (“Nature vs. Nurture Debate”). The strongest predictor was life events and experiences that contributed to the development of the mental condition, such as abuse, bullying, or childhood trauma.

Meeting in the middle

Today, most people agree that our characteristics are a result of a combination of both nature and nurture. There is enough support for both sides to completely count either side out. For example, if one twin develops schizophrenia gene , the other twin has only a fifty percent chance of also developing the same condition (“Nature vs. Nurture Debate”). Clearly, both nature and nurture can affect the development of certain disorders.

The question then shifted from ‘which one’ to ‘how much?’ We know that both play a role, but which force is more important? Francis Galton was the first to pose this question during the late nineteenth century. A relative of Charles Darwin, he felt that intellectual ability was mostly attributed to genetics and that the tendency for genius to be a familial trait was the result of natural superiority (McLeod 2007).

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Arthur Jenson on intelligence testing

Many others have agreed throughout history, which has spurred an influx of intelligence testing; in particular, on separated twins and adopted children. Arthur Jenson is an American psychologist who is a modern proponent of nature over nurture. Jenson cites average IQ scores in which black Americans scored significantly lower than white participants and suggested that as much as eighty percent of intelligence is inherited (McLeod 2007).

Not surprisingly, controversy developed surrounding Jenson’s claims due to the logical weakness of his argument. It was widely agreed that his study was tainted by social and political implications that are often drawn from various studies that claim to represent natural inequalities between race and other social groups. Differences in IQ scores between various ethnic groups can be explained by biases in testing methods and social inequalities in access to resources and opportunities (McLeod 2007). Similarly, it is hotly debated whether or not alleged intelligence difference in male versus female results is a consequence of biology or culture.

The importance of both nature and nurture

Now, however, the scientific world has come to understand that trying to place a numerical value on nature and nurture to judge which is more important is not really the right approach (Davies 2001). Intelligence, for example, is a complex human characteristic that can exhibit itself in a wide variety of ways from genius to basic common sense .

By attempting to place quantitative values on the separate factors, we fail to focus on the fact that biology and environment interact in a host of important and intricate ways (Ridley 2003). Today, most people agree that neither biology nor environment act independently of one another. Both are necessary for any characteristic to manifest. Because they are dependent on each other and interact in such a complex manner, it is illogical to attempt to think of them separately. 

How nature and nurture combine in the individual

Rather than defending nativists or empiricists, most psychologists are now more interested in researching the ways in which nature and nurture interact with each other to develop characteristics and traits. In psychotherapy, this means that not only does there need to be a genetic disposition required for mental disorders to develop, but there also needs to be an environmental trigger, as well (Feller 2015).

The recognition of this important relationship is especially important given the genetic advancements made during the twenty-first century. The Human Genome Project and advent of bioengineering sparked wide interest in tracing types of behavior to particular strands of DNA found on certain chromosomes (McLeod 2007). Scientists expect to soon find specific genes that are linked to criminality, alcoholism, and other characteristics.

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Conclusion 

Psychologists have been debating the influence of nature versus nurture over human characteristics for a very long time. After the scientific world came to recognize that biology and environment both play a role, the emphasis shifted to determining which was more important. Now though, as we have come to truly understand the complexity of the relationship between our genetic dispositions and environmental triggers, we no longer focus on one versus the other, but rather the way they interact with and affect each other.

While it is certainly helpful in the development of certain conditions for there to be a genetic disposition, there almost always needs to be an environmental trigger that causes the characteristic to manifest in an individual. This is only a small part of this complex discussion and an example of what you can expect when you buy a critical essay from Ultius.

Davies, Kevin. “Nature vs. Nurture Revisited.” PBS . WGBH Educational Foundation, 17 Apr. 2001. Web. 14 Apr. 2016.  

Feller, Stephen. “Nature vs. Nurture: It’s a tie, study finds.” UPI . United Press International, Inc., 19 May 2015. Web. 14 Apr. 2016.

McLeod, S.A. “Nature vs. Nurture in Psychology.” Simply Psychology . Simple Psychology, 2007. Web. 14 Apr. 2016. 

“Nature vs. Nurture.” Diffen . Diffen, 2016. Web. 14 Apr. 2016. 

“Nature vs. Nurture Debate”. GoodTherapy.org . GoodTherapy.org, 2016. Web. 14 Apr. 2016. 

Ridley, Matt. “Nature via nurture: Genes, experience, and what makes us human.” APA PsycNET . HarperCollins Publishers, 2003. Web. 14 Apr. 2016. 

Sincero, Sarah Mae. “Nature and Nurture Debate” Explorable . Explorable.com, 2016. Web. 14 Apr. 2016.

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Nature vs. Nurture Debate In Psychology

Saul Mcleod, PhD

Editor-in-Chief for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester

Saul Mcleod, Ph.D., is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years experience of working in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.

Learn about our Editorial Process

Olivia Guy-Evans, MSc

Associate Editor for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MSc Psychology of Education

Olivia Guy-Evans is a writer and associate editor for Simply Psychology. She has previously worked in healthcare and educational sectors.

On This Page:

The nature vs. nurture debate in psychology concerns the relative importance of an individual’s innate qualities (nature) versus personal experiences (nurture) in determining or causing individual differences in physical and behavioral traits. While early theories favored one factor over the other, contemporary views recognize a complex interplay between genes and environment in shaping behavior and development.

Key Takeaways

  • Nature is what we think of as pre-wiring and is influenced by genetic inheritance and other biological factors.
  • Nurture is generally taken as the influence of external factors after conception, e.g., the product of exposure, life experiences, and learning on an individual.
  • Behavioral genetics has enabled psychology to quantify the relative contribution of nature and nurture concerning specific psychological traits.
  • Instead of defending extreme nativist or nurturist views, most psychological researchers are now interested in investigating how nature and nurture interact in a host of qualitatively different ways.
  • For example, epigenetics is an emerging area of research that shows how environmental influences affect the expression of genes.
The nature-nurture debate is concerned with the relative contribution that both influences make to human behavior, such as personality, cognitive traits, temperament and psychopathology.

Examples of Nature vs. Nurture

Nature vs. nurture in child development.

In child development, the nature vs. nurture debate is evident in the study of language acquisition . Researchers like Chomsky (1957) argue that humans are born with an innate capacity for language (nature), known as universal grammar, suggesting that genetics play a significant role in language development.

Conversely, the behaviorist perspective, exemplified by Skinner (1957), emphasizes the role of environmental reinforcement and learning (nurture) in language acquisition.

Twin studies have provided valuable insights into this debate, demonstrating that identical twins raised apart may share linguistic similarities despite different environments, suggesting a strong genetic influence (Bouchard, 1979)

However, environmental factors, such as exposure to language-rich environments, also play a crucial role in language development, highlighting the intricate interplay between nature and nurture in child development.

Nature vs. Nurture in Personality Development

The nature vs. nurture debate in personality psychology centers on the origins of personality traits. Twin studies have shown that identical twins reared apart tend to have more similar personalities than fraternal twins, indicating a genetic component to personality (Bouchard, 1994).

However, environmental factors, such as parenting styles, cultural influences, and life experiences, also shape personality.

For example, research by Caspi et al. (2003) demonstrated that a particular gene (MAOA) can interact with childhood maltreatment to increase the risk of aggressive behavior in adulthood.

This highlights that genetic predispositions and environmental factors contribute to personality development, and their interaction is complex and multifaceted.

Nature vs. Nurture in Mental Illness Development

The nature vs. nurture debate in mental health explores the etiology of depression. Genetic studies have identified specific genes associated with an increased vulnerability to depression, indicating a genetic component (Sullivan et al., 2000).

However, environmental factors, such as adverse life events and chronic stress during childhood, also play a significant role in the development of depressive disorders (Dube et al.., 2002; Keller et al., 2007)

The diathesis-stress model posits that individuals inherit a genetic predisposition (diathesis) to a disorder, which is then activated or exacerbated by environmental stressors (Monroe & Simons, 1991).

This model illustrates how nature and nurture interact to influence mental health outcomes.

Nature vs. Nurture of Intelligence

The nature vs. nurture debate in intelligence examines the relative contributions of genetic and environmental factors to cognitive abilities.

Intelligence is highly heritable, with about 50% of variance in IQ attributed to genetic factors, based on studies of twins, adoptees, and families (Plomin & Spinath, 2004).

Heritability of intelligence increases with age, from about 20% in infancy to as high as 80% in adulthood, suggesting amplifying effects of genes over time.

However, environmental influences, such as access to quality education and stimulating environments, also significantly impact intelligence.

Shared environmental influences like family background are more influential in childhood, whereas non-shared experiences are more important later in life.

Research by Flynn (1987) showed that average IQ scores have increased over generations, suggesting that environmental improvements, known as the Flynn effect , can lead to substantial gains in cognitive abilities.

Molecular genetics provides tools to identify specific genes and understand their pathways and interactions. However, progress has been slow for complex traits like intelligence. Identified genes have small effect sizes (Plomin & Spinath, 2004).

Overall, intelligence results from complex interplay between genes and environment over development. Molecular genetics offers promise to clarify these mechanisms. The nature vs nurture debate is outdated – both play key roles.

Nativism (Extreme Nature Position)

It has long been known that certain physical characteristics are biologically determined by genetic inheritance.

Color of eyes, straight or curly hair, pigmentation of the skin, and certain diseases (such as Huntingdon’s chorea) are all a function of the genes we inherit.

eye color genetics

These facts have led many to speculate as to whether psychological characteristics such as behavioral tendencies, personality attributes, and mental abilities are also “wired in” before we are even born.

Those who adopt an extreme hereditary position are known as nativists.  Their basic assumption is that the characteristics of the human species as a whole are a product of evolution and that individual differences are due to each person’s unique genetic code.

In general, the earlier a particular ability appears, the more likely it is to be under the influence of genetic factors. Estimates of genetic influence are called heritability.

Examples of extreme nature positions in psychology include Chomsky (1965), who proposed language is gained through the use of an innate language acquisition device. Another example of nature is Freud’s theory of aggression as being an innate drive (called Thanatos).

Characteristics and differences that are not observable at birth, but which emerge later in life, are regarded as the product of maturation. That is to say, we all have an inner “biological clock” which switches on (or off) types of behavior in a pre-programmed way.

The classic example of the way this affects our physical development are the bodily changes that occur in early adolescence at puberty.

However, nativists also argue that maturation governs the emergence of attachment in infancy , language acquisition , and even cognitive development .

Empiricism (Extreme Nurture Position)

At the other end of the spectrum are the environmentalists – also known as empiricists (not to be confused with the other empirical/scientific  approach ).

Their basic assumption is that at birth, the human mind is a tabula rasa (a blank slate) and that this is gradually “filled” as a result of experience (e.g., behaviorism ).

From this point of view, psychological characteristics and behavioral differences that emerge through infancy and childhood are the results of learning.  It is how you are brought up (nurture) that governs the psychologically significant aspects of child development and the concept of maturation applies only to the biological.

For example, Bandura’s (1977) social learning theory states that aggression is learned from the environment through observation and imitation. This is seen in his famous bobo doll experiment (Bandura, 1961).

bobo doll experiment

Also, Skinner (1957) believed that language is learned from other people via behavior-shaping techniques.

Evidence for Nature

  • Biological Approach
  • Biology of Gender
  • Medical Model

Freud (1905) stated that events in our childhood have a great influence on our adult lives, shaping our personality.

He thought that parenting is of primary importance to a child’s development , and the family as the most important feature of nurture was a common theme throughout twentieth-century psychology (which was dominated by environmentalists’ theories).

Behavioral Genetics

Researchers in the field of behavioral genetics study variation in behavior as it is affected by genes, which are the units of heredity passed down from parents to offspring.

“We now know that DNA differences are the major systematic source of psychological differences between us. Environmental effects are important but what we have learned in recent years is that they are mostly random – unsystematic and unstable – which means that we cannot do much about them.” Plomin (2018, xii)

Behavioral genetics has enabled psychology to quantify the relative contribution of nature and nurture with regard to specific psychological traits. One way to do this is to study relatives who share the same genes (nature) but a different environment (nurture). Adoption acts as a natural experiment which allows researchers to do this.

Empirical studies have consistently shown that adoptive children show greater resemblance to their biological parents, rather than their adoptive, or environmental parents (Plomin & DeFries, 1983; 1985).

Another way of studying heredity is by comparing the behavior of twins, who can either be identical (sharing the same genes) or non-identical (sharing 50% of genes). Like adoption studies, twin studies support the first rule of behavior genetics; that psychological traits are extremely heritable, about 50% on average.

The Twins in Early Development Study (TEDS) revealed correlations between twins on a range of behavioral traits, such as personality (empathy and hyperactivity) and components of reading such as phonetics (Haworth, Davis, Plomin, 2013; Oliver & Plomin, 2007; Trouton, Spinath, & Plomin, 2002).

Implications

Jenson (1969) found that the average I.Q. scores of black Americans were significantly lower than whites he went on to argue that genetic factors were mainly responsible – even going so far as to suggest that intelligence is 80% inherited.

The storm of controversy that developed around Jenson’s claims was not mainly due to logical and empirical weaknesses in his argument. It was more to do with the social and political implications that are often drawn from research that claims to demonstrate natural inequalities between social groups.

For many environmentalists, there is a barely disguised right-wing agenda behind the work of the behavioral geneticists.  In their view, part of the difference in the I.Q. scores of different ethnic groups are due to inbuilt biases in the methods of testing.

More fundamentally, they believe that differences in intellectual ability are a product of social inequalities in access to material resources and opportunities.  To put it simply children brought up in the ghetto tend to score lower on tests because they are denied the same life chances as more privileged members of society.

Now we can see why the nature-nurture debate has become such a hotly contested issue.  What begins as an attempt to understand the causes of behavioral differences often develops into a politically motivated dispute about distributive justice and power in society.

What’s more, this doesn’t only apply to the debate over I.Q.  It is equally relevant to the psychology of sex and gender , where the question of how much of the (alleged) differences in male and female behavior is due to biology and how much to culture is just as controversial.

Polygenic Inheritance

Rather than the presence or absence of single genes being the determining factor that accounts for psychological traits, behavioral genetics has demonstrated that multiple genes – often thousands, collectively contribute to specific behaviors.

Thus, psychological traits follow a polygenic mode of inheritance (as opposed to being determined by a single gene). Depression is a good example of a polygenic trait, which is thought to be influenced by around 1000 genes (Plomin, 2018).

This means a person with a lower number of these genes (under 500) would have a lower risk of experiencing depression than someone with a higher number.

The Nature of Nurture

Nurture assumes that correlations between environmental factors and psychological outcomes are caused environmentally. For example, how much parents read with their children and how well children learn to read appear to be related. Other examples include environmental stress and its effect on depression.

However, behavioral genetics argues that what look like environmental effects are to a large extent really a reflection of genetic differences (Plomin & Bergeman, 1991).

People select, modify and create environments correlated with their genetic disposition. This means that what sometimes appears to be an environmental influence (nurture) is a genetic influence (nature).

So, children that are genetically predisposed to be competent readers, will be happy to listen to their parents read them stories, and be more likely to encourage this interaction.

Interaction Effects

However, in recent years there has been a growing realization that the question of “how much” behavior is due to heredity and “how much” to the environment may itself be the wrong question.

Take intelligence as an example. Like almost all types of human behavior, it is a complex, many-sided phenomenon which reveals itself (or not!) in a great variety of ways.

The “how much” question assumes that psychological traits can all be expressed numerically and that the issue can be resolved in a quantitative manner.

Heritability statistics revealed by behavioral genetic studies have been criticized as meaningless, mainly because biologists have established that genes cannot influence development independently of environmental factors; genetic and nongenetic factors always cooperate to build traits. The reality is that nature and culture interact in a host of qualitatively different ways (Gottlieb, 2007; Johnston & Edwards, 2002).

Instead of defending extreme nativist or nurturist views, most psychological researchers are now interested in investigating how nature and nurture interact.

For example, in psychopathology , this means that both a genetic predisposition and an appropriate environmental trigger are required for a mental disorder to develop. For example, epigenetics state that environmental influences affect the expression of genes.

epigenetics

What is Epigenetics?

Epigenetics is the term used to describe inheritance by mechanisms other than through the DNA sequence of genes. For example, features of a person’s physical and social environment can effect which genes are switched-on, or “expressed”, rather than the DNA sequence of the genes themselves.

Stressors and memories can be passed through small RNA molecules to multiple generations of offspring in ways that meaningfully affect their behavior.

One such example is what is known as the Dutch Hunger Winter, during last year of the Second World War. What they found was that children who were in the womb during the famine experienced a life-long increase in their chances of developing various health problems compared to children conceived after the famine.

Epigenetic effects can sometimes be passed from one generation to the next, although the effects only seem to last for a few generations. There is some evidence that the effects of the Dutch Hunger Winter affected grandchildren of women who were pregnant during the famine.

Therefore, it makes more sense to say that the difference between two people’s behavior is mostly due to hereditary factors or mostly due to environmental factors.

This realization is especially important given the recent advances in genetics, such as polygenic testing.  The Human Genome Project, for example, has stimulated enormous interest in tracing types of behavior to particular strands of DNA located on specific chromosomes.

If these advances are not to be abused, then there will need to be a more general understanding of the fact that biology interacts with both the cultural context and the personal choices that people make about how they want to live their lives.

There is no neat and simple way of unraveling these qualitatively different and reciprocal influences on human behavior.

Epigenetics: Licking Rat Pups

Michael Meaney and his colleagues at McGill University in Montreal, Canada conducted the landmark epigenetic study on mother rats licking and grooming their pups.

This research found that the amount of licking and grooming received by rat pups during their early life could alter their epigenetic marks and influence their stress responses in adulthood.

Pups that received high levels of maternal care (i.e., more licking and grooming) had a reduced stress response compared to those that received low levels of maternal care.

Meaney’s work with rat maternal behavior and its epigenetic effects has provided significant insights into the understanding of early-life experiences, gene expression, and adult behavior.

It underscores the importance of the early-life environment and its long-term impacts on an individual’s mental health and stress resilience.

Epigenetics: The Agouti Mouse Study

Waterland and Jirtle’s 2003 study on the Agouti mouse is another foundational work in the field of epigenetics that demonstrated how nutritional factors during early development can result in epigenetic changes that have long-lasting effects on phenotype.

In this study, they focused on a specific gene in mice called the Agouti viable yellow (A^vy) gene. Mice with this gene can express a range of coat colors, from yellow to mottled to brown.

This variation in coat color is related to the methylation status of the A^vy gene: higher methylation is associated with the brown coat, and lower methylation with the yellow coat.

Importantly, the coat color is also associated with health outcomes, with yellow mice being more prone to obesity, diabetes, and tumorigenesis compared to brown mice.

Waterland and Jirtle set out to investigate whether maternal diet, specifically supplementation with methyl donors like folic acid, choline, betaine, and vitamin B12, during pregnancy could influence the methylation status of the A^vy gene in offspring.

Key findings from the study include:

Dietary Influence : When pregnant mice were fed a diet supplemented with methyl donors, their offspring had an increased likelihood of having the brown coat color. This indicated that the supplemented diet led to an increased methylation of the A^vy gene.

Health Outcomes : Along with the coat color change, these mice also had reduced risks of obesity and other health issues associated with the yellow phenotype.

Transgenerational Effects : The study showed that nutritional interventions could have effects that extend beyond the individual, affecting the phenotype of the offspring.

The implications of this research are profound. It highlights how maternal nutrition during critical developmental periods can have lasting effects on offspring through epigenetic modifications, potentially affecting health outcomes much later in life.

The study also offers insights into how dietary and environmental factors might contribute to disease susceptibility in humans.

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Petrill, S. A., Plomin, R., Berg, S., Johansson, B., Pedersen, N. L., Ahern, F., & McClearn, G. E. (1998). The genetic and environmental relationship between general and specific cognitive abilities in twins age 80 and older.  Psychological Science ,  9 (3), 183-189.

Plomin, R., & Petrill, S. A. (1997). Genetics and intelligence: What’s new?.  Intelligence ,  24 (1), 53-77.

Plomin, R. (2018). Blueprint: How DNA makes us who we are . MIT Press.

Plomin, R., & Bergeman, C. S. (1991). The nature of nurture: Genetic influence on “environmental” measures. behavioral and Brain Sciences, 14(3) , 373-386.

Plomin, R., & DeFries, J. C. (1983). The Colorado adoption project. Child Development , 276-289.

Plomin, R., & DeFries, J. C. (1985). The origins of individual differences in infancy; the Colorado adoption project. Science, 230 , 1369-1371.

Plomin, R., & Spinath, F. M. (2004). Intelligence: genetics, genes, and genomics.  Journal of personality and social psychology ,  86 (1), 112.

Plomin, R., & Von Stumm, S. (2018). The new genetics of intelligence.  Nature Reviews Genetics ,  19 (3), 148-159.

Skinner, B. F. (1957). Verbal behavior . Acton, MA: Copley Publishing Group.

Sullivan, P. F., Neale, M. C., & Kendler, K. S. (2000). Genetic epidemiology of major depression: review and meta-analysis.  American Journal of Psychiatry ,  157 (10), 1552-1562.

Szyf, M., Weaver, I. C., Champagne, F. A., Diorio, J., & Meaney, M. J. (2005). Maternal programming of steroid receptor expression and phenotype through DNA methylation in the rat .  Frontiers in neuroendocrinology ,  26 (3-4), 139-162.

Trouton, A., Spinath, F. M., & Plomin, R. (2002). Twins early development study (TEDS): a multivariate, longitudinal genetic investigation of language, cognition and behavior problems in childhood . Twin Research and Human Genetics, 5(5) , 444-448.

Waterland, R. A., & Jirtle, R. L. (2003). Transposable elements: targets for early nutritional effects on epigenetic gene regulation . Molecular and cellular biology, 23 (15), 5293-5300.

Further Information

  • Genetic & Environmental Influences on Human Psychological Differences

Evidence for Nurture

  • Classical Conditioning
  • Little Albert Experiment
  • Operant Conditioning
  • Behaviorism
  • Social Learning Theory
  • Bronfenbrenner’s Ecological Systems Theory
  • Social Roles
  • Attachment Styles
  • The Hidden Links Between Mental Disorders
  • Visual Cliff Experiment
  • Behavioral Genetics, Genetics, and Epigenetics
  • Epigenetics
  • Is Epigenetics Inherited?
  • Physiological Psychology
  • Bowlby’s Maternal Deprivation Hypothesis
  • So is it nature not nurture after all?

Evidence for an Interaction

  • Genes, Interactions, and the Development of Behavior
  • Agouti Mouse Study
  • Biological Psychology

What does nature refer to in the nature vs. nurture debate?

In the nature vs. nurture debate, “nature” refers to the influence of genetics, innate qualities, and biological factors on human development, behavior, and traits. It emphasizes the role of hereditary factors in shaping who we are.

What does nurture refer to in the nature vs. nurture debate?

In the nature vs. nurture debate, “nurture” refers to the influence of the environment, upbringing, experiences, and social factors on human development, behavior, and traits. It emphasizes the role of external factors in shaping who we are.

Why is it important to determine the contribution of heredity (nature) and environment (nurture) in human development?

Determining the contribution of heredity and environment in human development is crucial for understanding the complex interplay between genetic factors and environmental influences. It helps identify the relative significance of each factor, informing interventions, policies, and strategies to optimize human potential and address developmental challenges.

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Nature vs. Nurture

Reviewed by Psychology Today Staff

The expression “nature vs. nurture” describes the question of how much a person's characteristics are formed by either “nature” or “nurture.” “Nature” means innate biological factors (namely genetics ), while “nurture” can refer to upbringing or life experience more generally.

Traditionally, “nature vs. nurture” has been framed as a debate between those who argue for the dominance of one source of influence or the other, but contemporary experts acknowledge that both “nature” and “nurture” play a role in psychological development and interact in complex ways.

  • The Meaning of Nature vs. Nurture
  • The Nature-vs.-Nurture Debate
  • Identifying Genetic and Environmental Factors

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The wording of the phrase “nature vs. nurture” makes it seem as though human individuality— personality traits, intelligence , preferences, and other characteristics—must be based on either the genes people are born with or the environment in which they grew up. The reality, as scientists have shown, is more complicated, and both these and other factors can help account for the many ways in which individuals differ from each other.

The words “nature” and “nurture” themselves can be misleading. Today, “ genetics ” and “environment” are frequently used in their place—with one’s environment including a broader range of experiences than just the nurturing received from parents or caregivers. Further, nature and nurture (or genetics and environment) do not simply compete to influence a person, but often interact with each other; “nature and nurture” work together. Finally, individual differences do not entirely come down to a person’s genetic code or developmental environment—to some extent, they emerge due to messiness in the process of development as well.

A person’s biological nature can affect a person’s experience of the environment. For example, a person with a genetic disposition toward a particular trait, such as aggressiveness, may be more likely to have particular life experiences (including, perhaps, receiving negative reactions from parents or others). Or, a person who grows up with an inclination toward warmth and sociability may seek out and elicit more positive social responses from peers. These life experiences could, in turn, reinforce an individual’s initial tendencies. Nurture or life experience more generally may also modify the effects of nature—for example, by expanding or limiting the extent to which a naturally bright child receives encouragement, access to quality education , and opportunities for achievement.

Epigenetics—the science of modifications in how genes are expressed— illustrates the complex interplay between “nature” and “nurture.” An individual’s environment, including factors such as early-life adversity, may result in changes in the way that parts of a person’s genetic code are “read.” While these epigenetic changes do not override the important influence of genes in general, they do constitute additional ways in which that influence is filtered through “nurture” or the environment.

Photo by NEOSiAM 2020 from Pexels

Theorists and researchers have long battled over whether individual traits and abilities are inborn or are instead forged by experiences after birth. The debate has had broad implications: The real or perceived sources of a person’s strengths and vulnerabilities matter for fields such as education, philosophy , psychiatry , and clinical psychology. Today’s consensus—that individual differences result from a combination of inherited and non-genetic factors—strikes a more nuanced middle path between nature- or nurture-focused extremes.

The debate about nature and nurture has roots that stretch back at least thousands of years, to Ancient Greek theorizing about the causes of personality. During the modern era, theories emphasizing the role of either learning and experience or biological nature have risen and fallen in prominence—with genetics gaining increasing acknowledgment as an important (though not exclusive) influence on individual differences in the later 20th century and beyond.

“Nature versus nurture” was used by English scientist Francis Galton. In 1874, he published the book English Men of Science: Their Nature and Nurture , arguing that inherited factors were responsible for intelligence and other characteristics.

Genetic determinism emphasizes the importance of an individual’s nature in development. It is the view that genetics is largely or totally responsible for an individual’s psychological characteristics and behavior. The term “biological determinism” is often used synonymously.

The blank slate (or “tabula rasa”) view of the mind emphasizes the importance of nurture and the environment. Notably described by English philosopher John Locke in the 1600s, it proposed that individuals are born with a mind like an unmarked chalkboard and that its contents are based on experience and learning. In the 20th century, major branches of psychology proposed a primary role for nurture and experience , rather than nature, in development, including Freudian psychoanalysis and behaviorism.

Photo by Daria Shevtsova from Pexels

Modern scientific methods have allowed researchers to advance further in understanding the complex relationships between genetics, life experience, and psychological characteristics, including mental health conditions and personality traits. Overall, the findings of contemporary studies underscore that with some exceptions—such as rare diseases caused by mutations in a single gene—no one factor, genetic or environmental, solely determines how a characteristic develops.

Scientists use multiple approaches to estimate how important genetics are for any given trait, but one of the most influential is the twin study. While identical (or monozygotic) twins share the same genetic code, fraternal (or dizygotic) twins share about 50 percent of the same genes, like typical siblings. Scientists are able to estimate the degree to which the variation in a particular trait, like extraversion , is explained by genetics in part by analyzing how similar identical twins are on that trait, compared to fraternal twins. ( These studies do have limitations, and estimates based on one population may not closely reflect all other populations.) 

It’s hard to call either “nature” or “nurture,” genes or the environment, more important to human psychology. The impact of one set of factors or the other depends on the characteristic, with some being more strongly related to one’s genes —for instance, autism appears to be more heritable than depression . But in general, psychological traits are shaped by a balance of interacting genetic and non-genetic influences.

Both genes and environmental factors can contribute to a person developing mental illness. Research finds that a major part of the variation in the risk for psychiatric conditions such as autism spectrum disorder, anxiety disorders, depression, and schizophrenia can be attributed to genetic differences. But not all of that risk is genetic, and life experiences, such as early-life abuse or neglect, may also affect risk of mental illness (and some individuals, based on their genetics, are likely more susceptible to environmental effects than others).

Like other psychological characteristics, personality is partly heritable. Research suggests less than half of the difference between people on measures of personality traits can be attributed to genes (one recent overall estimate is 40 percent). Non-genetic factors appear to be responsible for an equal or greater portion of personality differences between individuals. Some theorize that the social roles people adopt and invest in as they mature are among the more important non-genetic factors in personality development.

characteristics of nature essay

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characteristics of nature essay

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The new Biophilia Reactivity Hypothesis argues our attraction to the natural world is not an instinct but a measurable temperament trait.

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There is a roadmap for supporting highly sensitive children, who are wired to register and react to experiences more intensely.

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What If a Candidate Dies? Your 2024 Election Questions, Answered.

Tackling the big unknowns — and what we do, mostly, know — with “The Run-Up” podcast.

A large group of people seen from behind, with one person holding up an American flag.

By Frannie Carr Toth

Featuring Astead W. Herndon ,  Reid J. Epstein ,  Maggie Haberman and Nate Cohn

There’s the one big question when it comes to 2024: Which presidential candidate is going to win in November?

Then there are lots and lots of other related questions.

“ The Run-Up ,” a weekly politics podcast from The Times, is trying to answer as many listener questions as we can — on the show, which you can subscribe to wherever you get your podcasts. And here .

What else do you want to know? Email and ask us, ideally in the form of a voice memo, at [email protected] . We’ll keep updating this post periodically.

What if something happens to Biden or Trump that disqualifies them? Like, I know this is morbid, but what if one of them dies?

Let’s start with President Biden and the Democrats.

We asked our colleague Reid Epstein , who is covering Biden’s re-election campaign, for insight into how the president and the Democratic Party are thinking about this question:

There is no Plan B. Joe Biden will be the Democratic nominee unless one of two things happens. Either he suffers a major health calamity between now and November, or Biden himself decides that he’s not going to run.

On the first point, you know, we all hope that the president remains in good health. He seems to be. He rides his bike. He rides the Peloton. He is a very healthy 81-year-old man.

There’s also no reason to believe that he’s going to wake up one day and decide this is not for him. Like, the man has wanted to be president of the United States for most of his adult life. He first started seriously considering running for president in 1984. He ran for president three times. He has already raised more than $200 million in this campaign for re-election. There’s no reason to think that he is going to change his mind.

The Run-Up Poster

Your Biggest 2024 Election Questions, Answered

This transcript was created using speech recognition software. While it has been reviewed by human transcribers, it may contain errors. Please review the episode audio before quoting from this transcript and email [email protected] with any questions.

[PHONE RINGING]

This is Amy.

Hi. Thank you so much for picking up and for, more importantly, sending in a question to us. Can you first just tell me the question that you sent in to the show?

Yeah, so the thing I wanted to know, given the age of the presumed candidates, what does happen if one or both of these candidates dies before the election? I know that sounds harsh, but statistically speaking, it’s possible. And then what?

I guess, like, when did this question get on your radar? I know that’s a weird way to ask.

Oh, that’s a good question. I think because probably, like a lot of other people, this sounds weird, but just looking for a way out of this. And obviously by no unnatural ending, I don’t want that to happen to anyone. But I just thought is there any circumstance where it’s just not Trump-Biden again? Just what is every possibility of what could happen to set this up any differently whatsoever?

Amy is not alone. For the past few months, we’ve been asking our listeners to send in questions. And as November gets closer, there’s an increasing sense of desperation reflected in these questions. You’re asking about third party candidates, health emergencies, criminal convictions, death, things that could alter the inevitable rematch.

It kind of feels like, as a country, we all fell asleep on the train, and now the conductor is announcing that you have to get off at the last stop, that you have no other choice but this one. And you have this moment of panic. You’re like, this is it? This is my only option?

So today, we take on your two biggest 2024 questions. What if something happens to Biden or Trump? And is anyone else coming? From “The New York Times,” I’m Astead Herndon. This is “The Run Up.”

[MUSIC PLAYING]

Yo, what’s up?

You’re wearing a tie?

Just for you.

Do I need to go change?

No, I did CNN this morning. To start, we turned to some highly qualified friends.

My name is Reed Epstein, and I cover Joe Biden’s re-election campaign and the broader Democratic universe for “The New York Times.”

In the time since Amy sent in her question, the age issue had only gotten more real. Scrutiny of President Biden’s age intensified after a recent special counsel report described him as quote, “An elderly man with a poor memory.” I wondered how, in your work reporting on the Biden campaign and the broader Democratic Party, how did that report land in Biden world, and what’s the campaign’s response been?

It landed like a ton of bricks. Think of like the old “Far Side” cartoons where an anvil would drop from a tree on somebody, and it was kind of like that.

I’m glad I got that. I was worried where that would go.

They were furious at the inclusion of the broadsides against the president’s memory, which they universally felt were out of bounds from his assignment to determine whether charges should be brought against the president on the documents retention issue. And they were also mad at the coverage of the special counsel’s report. We saw in the immediate aftermath, the campaign blasted reporters with the number of stories written about Biden’s age compared to stories about Donald Trump.

They were clearly taking this as a license to go to war, not just with the Attorney General’s office, which they did, but also the media for covering what the special counsel said.

As this kind of news cycle on age was developing, I totally see how the Biden campaign can make this argument. They made those arguments to us directly when we went to Wilmington, kind of saying that the concerns about Joe Biden’s age were overblown in a kind of insidery conversation I remember them framing it at the time, rather than the ways that people are actually going to experience the election. But like there are voters who are concerned, like the caller who sent in this question. What is the campaign doing about the legitimate voter issue regarding age looking ahead to the summer and the fall?

Well, I think you’re right. Do not have to ask voters about Joe Biden’s age. I ask a lot of open ended questions to people I talk to. And it usually starts with, what do you think of Joe Biden? And inevitably, as you have heard, too —

They say he’s old.

The answer is he’s so old I can’t believe he’s running again. I mean, I will tell you this. I was on vacation last year in Morocco, and we were in a car being led by a tour guide to the Sahara desert. And in that place, the guy asked — we were talking about — he was asking us what we do for a living.

And I told him I’m a reporter, and he said, “Of all the people in America, is there no one younger than 80 years old who can run for president?

And so this is truly a global concern that people have about him. And so I don’t believe that the media is overplaying the issue and concern that voters have with Joe Biden’s age. I do think that — and we do know that the campaign is trying to reframe the age question every day into a choice question between a return to Trump or Joe Biden and not a referendum on Joe Biden. In part, because we have seen in polling for years at this point, that a referendum on Joe Biden alone, the president would almost certainly lose.

And so part of that is them pushing stories about Trump being old, too. And when Trump said that Nikki Haley was in charge of security on January 6 when he met Nancy Pelosi, like they pushed that on their social media platforms. And they pushed that out to reporters, and they tried to make that into a news cycle about Trump’s forgetfulness and his predilection for getting things wrong while speaking to rallies.

And they’re right that he does do that, and he’s 77 years old. He’s gotten a lot of things wrong as well, but the fact of the matter is voters receive Trump and Biden differently when it comes to their age and their acuity. And while Trump is also slipping, quite publicly, that has not baked in for voters in the same way that it has been for Biden.

I mean, but that description of what you’re saying the campaign’s plan is, which is to reframe the age question into a choice question, it doesn’t actually go at the heart of what voters think about the president, right? Like is there any plans to put him out there more? Is there any plans to have him talk?

I was with someone yesterday who says that he should call his economic plan like grandpa economics and kind of embrace the older person kind of mantra. I guess I’m wondering, is there any plans to legitimately reframe him on his age rather than just say Donald Trump is also old?

I mean, they’ve gotten a lot of advice along the grandpa economics lines. I’ve talked with advisors to the campaign, donors to the campaign, other Democratic elected officials, and many of them have offered unsolicited advice, both directly to the campaign and through the press to the campaign, about how the president should lean into his age as a way to answer that question. They have not done that, in part because the president doesn’t want to.

Like he doesn’t want the age to be an issue. And so they haven’t done it aside from he will make jokes about when he was with the founding fathers. But they don’t engage in a serious way, the way that some of their allies would like them to. And that has led to the scenario that we’ve been talking about where voters are concerned about his age and acuity, and they don’t do a whole lot to answer those questions.

I want to really focus on the heart of the question Amy asked us, though. Does the Democratic Party have a plan if, for whatever reason, Biden became unable to run? Does a Plan B exist somewhere in some secret lock vault?

So there is no Plan B. It is — Joe Biden will be the Democratic nominee unless one of two things happens. Either there is a major health calamity that he suffers between now and November, or Joe Biden himself decides that he’s not going to run. And for the first thing, we all hope that the president remains in good health. He appears to be in good health.

Yeah, there’s no wish — we’re not wishcasting.

There’s no reason to believe that his health is deteriorating. He seems to be — he rides his bike. He rides the Peloton. He is a very healthy 81-year-old man. There’s also no reason to believe that he’s going to wake up one day and decide this is not for him. Like, the man has wanted to be president of the United States for most of his adult life.

He first started seriously considering running for president in 1984. He ran for president three times. He has raised already more than $200 million in this campaign for re-election. There’s no reason to think that he is going to change his mind.

Let’s slow this down, though. The only two things that could derail what seems like the inevitable path of Joe Biden becoming the Democratic nominee would be a major health scare that would cause him to be unable to run.

Yeah, that’s right. This would be a really serious, calamitous health episode.

I mean, Bernie Sanders had a heart attack in the 2020 election and took a couple of weeks off the trail, if I remember correctly. Of course, there was the situation with Senator John Fetterman as he was running, but you’re saying it would have to be something that would completely shift his ability to go out on the campaign trail or do his duties as president.

It would have to be worse than those episodes, I would think.

The other option is for him to decide independently that he would not want to run anymore. Let’s say Joe Biden were to say, in two months, I want to step down. What would even be the process? Like what would even have to happen? Would it automatically go to the vice president? Like, I actually don’t know what would happen.

So I had to make some calls on this.

Nice, thank you for doing that.

When you all told me that I had to answer this question, I didn’t know, either. So there’s two different scenarios, and it depends on when either a decision would be made or an episode happened. If it was before the Democratic Convention in August, the delegates to the convention would choose both the president and the vice president if there was a vacancy. It would be a free-for-all at the convention. And based on what we know generally of the makeup of who those delegates typically are, it would be hard to imagine a scenario where it didn’t go to Kamala Harris just because —

Those are party people. Those are people who —

Party people, the biggest caucus is women. The second biggest caucus is African-Americans, and those are two groups that are generally pretty loyal to the vice president. And also like in a scenario where Biden is not the nominee anymore and there is chaos at the convention, you have to wonder like what Democrats are going to step up and challenge the vice president in that scenario.

Further adding to the chaos.

Further adding to the chaos. She could be in some of these scenarios. She could be the president at that point, and then you’d be challenging a sitting president and not the vice president. That’s a very steep political lift for anybody in that type of chaotic environment.

The second scenario is something happens with Biden after the convention. There’s no precedent for this. But the Democratic National Committee chair, who is Jaime Harrison, would confer with the Democratic leadership in Congress and the leadership of the Democratic Governors Association.

And that group would then basically be authorized to fill vacancies on the national ticket with some conferring with the broader DNC membership, which is about 440-some people.

And again, this is a scenario where it would be like virtually impossible for them to pick anybody but the vice president to fill that spot based on what we know of those groups.

One, I so appreciate you doing this kind of reporting because I have not thought about these scenarios. But there’s a couple things that jump out to me. In both of those situations, either before the convention or after, this becomes an elite process. The leadership of the Democratic Party, whether at the DNC or at the Congressional level or the gubernatorial level, would essentially get the power to choose who replaces Biden. Correct?

That’s right. That’s the way it would work.

And importantly, because of that, because of the who the people are who would then be making the selection and their investment in the top levels of the Democratic Party, it becomes very difficult to see this becoming a situation that would lead to someone outside of the vice president.

It just is a very difficult scenario to figure out how it would be anybody else, assuming that she wants it, which there’s no reason to believe that she wouldn’t want it. You talk to Democrats, and people say, what about Gretchen Whitmer or Gavin Newsom or any of the people who ran for president in 2020? And it’s just it’s hard to fathom a scenario where anybody in that crew of Democrats could muster the sort of organization and fundraising, essentially on a moment’s notice, to compete in a serious way with the vice president.

Right. I mean, it’s interesting because on one hand, this is really expected. That is the reason the job of vice president exists. But at the same time, it’s super interesting to me that because of the unprecedented nature of this scenario, and because it would only come up in a moment of chaos — like inherently, if Joe Biden is not going to be the person on the ballot in November, or if something were to come up that were to trigger some of these scenarios, it would inherently be a chaotic moment for the party.

That it does seem as if the only answer to what happens after that is more chaos. Like it doesn’t seem — like even if they were to hand it over to the vice president, I can’t imagine that being a thing that happens really swimmingly. To answer Amy’s question of is there something that very neatly takes Joe Biden off of the path of being the Democratic nominee? The answer to me, from what you’re telling me, seems to be no. The only reason that can happen is mess.

If — yeah, if, I mean, an alien abduction, anything that took Joe Biden off the stage would be immensely chaotic and — for the political system and the American government in general. And it’s, frankly, a situation that we’ve never seen before. You have to go back to 1968 when Lyndon Johnson decided after the New Hampshire primary to get out, but that was much earlier.

It was later in the calendar than we are now, but it was much earlier in the process of nominating a president than what — where the Democrats are at this point. And everybody remembers that 1968 ended with riots at the Democratic party convention —

Also in Chicago.

And also in Chicago.

Where we’ll be this year.

And a victory for Richard Nixon in part because of chaos that was — sort of engulfed the Democratic Party in that cycle.

Thank you, Reid, for your time.

Thanks, Astead.

Are we still in here? Are we — when is Maggie [INAUDIBLE]?

Next up, someone to field our questions about Trump, who himself is 77 and is appearing to coast in the Republican primary after winning contests in Iowa, New Hampshire, and Nevada. He’s also favored in this weekend’s South Carolina Republican Primary, as he’s polling well ahead of Nikki Haley, the state’s former governor. Hey, Maggie. How are you?

Hi, Astead.

Naturally, I called Maggie Haberman. How’s it going?

This has been a crazy morning because of these hearings.

Yeah, I’m sure.

Hang on, let me just — all right, we’re good.

We just talked to Reid Epstein, our colleague, about Biden’s age and if there was anything that could happen that can kind of change the course of his kind of path to the nomination in November. And he said there was two things. One is a big enough health event, and two would be something that would cause him to wake up one morning and decide that he doesn’t want to run anymore. But both are very unlikely scenarios.

Now, we know that Donald Trump is also of advanced age. I guess I wanted to pose the same question to you. Is there anything that comes up in the kind of Plan B category that could mean that Donald Trump wasn’t the Republican nominee or that the campaign wouldn’t kind of continue its inevitable march to the conventions in November?

It’s a really good question. So, Astead, thinking about what Reid said about does Biden wake up one day and decide not to go forward? The chances of that happening for Donald Trump are close to zero, if not greater than zero, less — whatever negative integer you want to use. The campaign is so intertwined with his fight for staying out of jail, given that he has been indicted four times and is now facing a certain trial starting at the end of March in Manhattan.

So that comes off the table. In terms of whether there would be a health event, that’s not an impossible thought. He is somebody who, when he was president, we know from the White House doctors he had a form of heart disease. It’s unlikely that that has changed dramatically in a positive direction. We don’t know what his health is like now, but I do know that at the end of 2022, when they were looking ahead to a campaign that he was about to run, there was private discussion about not holding too many events in part because he’s old.

And they didn’t want to cause him damage by running him into the ground. And I do think that that’s part of why we have seen less of him. I think there’s other reasons, too, like it saves them money not putting on events and so forth. But his age is a factor. That having been said, it would have to be a catastrophic event to keep him from running. If it was something mild or something light, I think he would try to push forward, and I’m not sure we would even know it was happening.

Well, let’s try to separate these two things. The first thing you said is that because of the kind of legal questions swirling around him and the fact that his political campaign is, frankly, his response for those things, that that kind of decreases the likelihood that he would ever kind of voluntarily step out of the race. We’re talking to you on the day when those things are jumping off.

As you said, there was just a trial set for his criminal case in New York. I guess I wanted to just underscore that. Part of the reason you’re saying that there is — not — there is very little likelihood, next to zero, that Trump would voluntarily step out of the race, is because he needs the campaign as an answer to his legal troubles.

Correct, and as an answer to his legal troubles both in terms of a shield during the cases. Remember, he has claimed presidential immunity, although that’s been struck down by an appeals court and is likely to go to the Supreme Court now In the January 6 federal trial. But in Manhattan where he’s facing trial at the end of March, and this is related to hush money payments to a porn star in 2016 and in Georgia where it’s related to his efforts to subvert the transfer of power that he’s been charged, he is claiming pieces related either to his duties in office.

In Georgia or in Manhattan, this is being done to distract from my successful Republican presidential primary campaign. And I shouldn’t have to face this trial because we’re in the middle of campaign season and so forth and so on. So the presidential campaign has become a set piece.

Got it. Yeah, and so that makes a lot of sense. The second part you’re talking about, regarding his age, I do think it’s a kind of underrated point, the point about heart disease that you made, we learned when he was in office. And that just as we had spent a lot of talk about Biden’s kind of visible decline, there has been more instances of Donald Trump. I think about him confusing Nikki Haley for Nancy Pelosi in reference to who was running January 6 security.

I mean, when you think about the question of Trump’s age, how do you think that is going to be a factor on the campaign’s mind heading into November? Reid used the term that the things that would trouble the Biden campaign is a health calamity. When you think about the Trump campaign, is it that similar standard when we think about what could cause them to kind of alter their direction?

Yeah, it is. I mean, I think that what you’re talking about specifically — that Nikki Haley, Nancy Pelosi moment — that was really, really pronounced. And so pronounced that Trump felt the need to try to clear it up at a rally in South Carolina this week. When he’s trying to rewrite the history of it and insist he really did it on purpose — which he clearly did not if you watch the tape — then you can see that he knows this is a problem, and that this is sinking in.

But I do think it’s the same issue if — it would have to be something significant. And I would put it, actually, even in a separate category, which is a little different than Biden, because we don’t see an incumbent president or at least this incumbent president as often as you might see a challenger because challengers need to be out on the road more. Presidents are protected by the armor of the office —

Doing the job.

And doing the job and don’t have to be seen as much and always seem to be busy, even if we don’t have visibility into that. In Trump’s case, I think it would have to be something that literally could not be hidden. It would have to be an extended hospital stay, or it would have to be something that happens on stage or in front of a crowd.

That’s interesting. I mean, you’re kind of pointing to if they could keep it away from the public, they would if something were to happen under that kind of public standard.

Correct, and what I’m basing that on, Astead, is it’s not like we have no predicate for that with Trump. He was really, really sick with COVID, and they were, to put it mildly, less than candid about what was going on with his health. So I have no reason to believe it would be different this time.

Yeah, I guess I wanted to ask you also about some things that came up in our conversation with one of our listeners. Does the Republican Party have a Plan B if it were not to be Trump, or if something were to happen? We asked this question also of Reid and Democrats.

It’s a good question, but I mean, I would — I don’t know what Reid’s answer was. But I would imagine it’s similar, which is there they. There is no party absent Trump. Trump is literally in the process of ousting his own hand-picked Republican Party chair to try to get another one who he thinks will focus more on his false claims of widespread election fraud.

So there is no they. The process works this way. If something happens ahead of the convention, there would have to be a change in the rules. And it would have to be that the delegates process changes because Trump is the person leading delegates right now. And Nikki Haley wouldn’t necessarily get those by default just because she’s the person still actively campaigning. I think you would see a lot of other candidates who have suspended their candidacies suddenly start campaigning again, and then it would get decided at the convention.

Just because Nikki Haley is currently the other candidate still actively running would not inherently mean that if something were to happen to Trump, Nikki Haley becomes the nominee.

Correct. That is not how this works. If something were to happen after the convention, then the 168 members of the Republican National Committee would have to meet again and decide on what happens. And even then, Astead, it gets murky because depending on when something would happen, you could end up in a situation where it’s a write-in campaign in a lot of states because a lot of states will have printed their ballots already.

That would already say Donald Trump.

Correct, and so it just gets — it gets hairy.

So if something were to happen before the convention, then the delegates who formally nominate the party’s nominee would have to — there would have to be some rule change that allows for them to back somebody else, but that doesn’t inherently mean Nikki Haley. It could mean other people try to woo them, including the people who have previously dropped out of the race.

If something were to happen after the convention, then the insiders of the Republican Party or the 168 members of the RNC would then have to select someone. But to your point, there’s not real clarity on any direction that would go. It sounds like either before convention or after, if something were to happen, it leads to enormous amounts of questions and somewhat inevitable chaos.

It is definitely going to be chaos. What level of chaos, we don’t know, but yes, it would be chaos.

So to sum it up, in answer to our listener Amy’s question of if there’s anything that takes us off of this road of Biden-Trump — we asked kind of specifically in relation to age, health, and the legal concerns. We asked Reid on the Democratic side, and his answer was extremely unlikely that anything would take us off this road. I want to pose the same question to you. What is the likelihood that this ends in November with someone other than Donald Trump at this point?

As a Republican?

Extremely unlikely, and can I add an asterisk to that?

It’s going to be a long asterisk. There is an episode of “Curb Your Enthusiasm” where Larry David is at a table, and somebody spills on the table. And his mother-in-law sits still and doesn’t move and says somebody get a sponge. And Larry David says, why don’t you get a sponge?

And this sort of somebody get a sponge approach to Donald Trump, I mean, we hear this a lot about it won’t really be Donald Trump from including Republicans who don’t want to deal with him but also from Democrats who don’t want to deal with him anymore. And somebody get a sponge, somebody else take care of this has not been a solution. And so that extends to all manners of things that could happen to make him not the nominee.

It is extremely, extremely unlikely that he will not be the nominee. It’s not impossible. Anything can happen, as we’ve seen.

Yeah, no, I appreciate it I think about just talking to you and Reid back to back makes me think of just the interconnected nature of this like.

Like, I’m not sure if it wasn’t Donald Trump that we would have Joe Biden, and I’m not sure if it wasn’t Joe Biden that we would have Donald Trump on this side. But they both seem to at least politically need each other in this one.

I completely agree with you. And I think we’ve talked about this, but this race is going to feel a lot less like 2020, at least as it’s shaping up, than 2016, when it was two nominees with — who had — neither of whom had been president with high negatives. Now it’s a former president and an incumbent president, both with high negatives in an era where every president has bad approval ratings at this point because that’s just how voters are toward elected officials.

Voters have not given anybody high marks, but they’re giving these two people, especially low marks.

The national numbers are a unique situation. That is true.

Thank you, Maggie. We really appreciate your time, as always.

Thank you. Thanks for having me.

One more question after the break.

Hey, Astead.

Hey, Anna. What’s up?

Nothing much, another beautiful day in the office.

Another beautiful day in the office.

So I’ve been producing this episode, the question and answer, listeners reaching out, and I actually ended up talking to a listener who had a question, this guy named Elly. Hello?

This is Anna from “The New York Times.”

Hi, this is Elly.

Hi, Elly. How are you doing?

I’m doing well.

And his question was kind of in line with the broad beam that we’ve been talking about. What could possibly happen that would rock us off the course that we’re barreling towards? So far we’ve talked about what’s happening within the parties, like what’s happening with these candidates — party infighting and bylaws and all that sort of thing. His question was more about outside forces that can make a difference in this race.

I wrote a question asking, basically, how voters and different people in more critical positions are thinking about third party candidates. There’s — I mean, primarily around RFK. I’m a big supporter of RFK.

Oh, you are.

Yeah. I’m a big supporter of RFK, have been since beginning of this summer.

Basically, Elly’s question was, what about all the people who aren’t Trump or Biden who are or might get in this race? Because he doesn’t see what he believes represented in either the Democratic or the Republican Party.

I, in general, have a philosophy of positive politics and not negative politics. I try to resist the urge of doomsday politicking, like you have to vote for this person or the world’s going to end because that just incentivizes negative politics. And I want to try to find candidates who I actually support for what they’re saying, even if I don’t support everything they’re saying.

So like, yeah, if RFK wasn’t in the race, I probably would have been supportive of maybe Cornel West. Maybe I would have looked for someone in the Green Party or Libertarian Party.

It’s very much a question in line with what we’ve been talking about this whole episode, right? People want to know is there anyone else coming? Could anybody spoil the match between Trump and Biden? Like how would all of that even play out?

And so when I was thinking about all of that, I realized that there’s actually quite a few candidates or people in this bucket of potential third party, potential independents, and it’s been a while since we’ve talked about them on the show. So what I was hoping to do to help this listener with his question is to do a lightning round update, basically where each of these candidates are and what challenges they face.

Yeah that sounds great. Am I the — I’m the lightning round answerer.

Yeah, I didn’t mean for this to feel like a pop quiz, but now I’m realizing it kind of feels like a pop quiz.

It definitely feels like a pop quiz.

I’m so sorry. Did you like pop quizzes? That’s a crazy question.

We both know I did not like pop quizzes. Now, you and me both know. I was a mid student. The representation Joe Biden gives is for the real C students of America, and so I didn’t like quizzes of any form, told before or pop.

And I got a little crafty with all of the candidates. And so I made something.

Oh my. Oh, this is a wheel.

A Wheel of Fortune wheel.

Yes, with all of the people that I could come up with. And so I figured we could spin it, and you could give an update.

This is so cute. I like this.

[WHEEL SPINNING]

Oh, that’s — oh, God. I’m sorry. This is so funny. It has little like —

Confetti. Cornel West.

Yeah, what’s up with him?

Well, Cornel West is a pretty famous Black Studies professor who has taught at the Harvards and the Yales.

We need you to be part and parcel of wrestling with this corporate duopoly, this two party system that impedes. It gets in the way of the unleashing of the kind of policies of abolishing poverty and homelessness, of dealing with working —

He announced a Green Party presidential run last year. But then after receiving some criticism, he got off of the Green Party ticket and is now trying to start his own party, which is called a Justice for All party. The problem is — and I think this is going to be an issue that comes up with several of these people — is when you’re not in one of the major parties, it’s a lot harder to get ballot access.

When you say ballot access, are you talking — you’re talking general, right?

Yeah, I’m talking about in November will their name appear as an option for people to vote for? So obviously, that’s step number one to actually have a tangible impact on the race. So Cornel West is in the position where I’m pretty sure he’s only kind of at this point focused on Florida. I think there’s an intent to focus on North Carolina, but for the purposes of like will this be a person who affects the November race, I would say at this point, that’s looking unlikely because of the real ballot challenges.

But as always with third party candidates, they can push issues to the top. They can push sentiments to the forefront that go beyond their importance of actual votes. So I do think Cornel West is someone who could highlight

Biden’s potential struggles with Black voters. He’s someone who can highlight, particularly the war in Gaza and the progressive kind of leftist group who is really upset with Biden. And I think that is a candidacy that threatens to stoke some of those concerns, but its Cornel West going to be on the ballot in all 50 states? It’s not looking likely.

Jill Stein.

Jill Stein. Well, this is helpful because Jill Stein has taken the place that Cornel West left on the Green Party.

Democrats have betrayed their promises for working people, youth, and the climate again and again while Republicans don’t even make such promises in the first place. And both parties are a danger to our democracy, expanding —

Unlike some of the other candidates we’re going to talk about, ballot access is not Stein’s biggest problem because she is the Green Party candidate. And so she has ballot access in several states because the party already has access. Jill Stein threatens to play the same role she played in 2016 when she was on the ballot at that time.

Now, remember, in that close election, there was a lot of talk about whether third party votes really pulled away from Hillary Clinton and helped spur the victory of Donald Trump. And while there’s some kind of evidence or data to that, I think that all of the one determining factors are overblown. It was a really close election in 2016. It was a really close election in 2020, and it threatens be a really close election in 2024.

So in that reality, all of these other impacts matter. And certainly the possibility that some people could follow a trend from 2016 and maybe back a Green Party candidate over one of the two nominees could be possible. And I think for Jill Stein specifically, there will be a fear that she will pull from Joe Biden. But I would say on the scale of potency relative to other candidates, I have not heard the Biden campaign or someone involved in Democratic politics be particularly concerned about Jill Stein this time around.

Well, this one’s easy.

Marianne Williamson.

Marianne Williamson has dropped out of the presidential race. I don’t know if that’s information that maybe has cut through, or if people even knew Marianne Williamson was running. But the candidate that went kind of viral in 2020 about being a kind of vibes-y chacras-y version of Democratic politics. She was running again last year as someone who was ostensibly trying to challenge Joe Biden in the Democratic nomination alongside Dean Phillips, the Congressman who’s also taken up that mantle.

But as we’ve reported, there is very little appetite in the Democratic party to have a competitive primary and specifically not so for the two candidates who are trying to mount that. And so Williamson formally dropped out a couple of weeks ago and suspended her campaign.

Yeah, so this is a kind of tricky one. RFK, Jr is by far the most prominent non Trump-Biden candidate who has entered the 2024 race. Now, remember, originally RFK, Jr was running as a Democrat. So like Marianne Williamson, like Dean Phillips, he was in the Democratic primary and trying to run against Joe Biden.

Several months ago, towards the end of last year, he dropped out of the Democratic race and announced that he would run as an independent. And that creates some possibility and some challenges. On the possibility side, as I was saying, running in the Democratic primary has not proved really successful for folks because you have to run in this kind of process that Joe Biden functionally controls through the DNC. And there hasn’t been real motivation from base Democrats to replace Joe Biden even if they express some satisfaction.

What there has been is real kind of polling data that says that people want an option outside of Biden and Trump. And that is now where RFK, Jr is trying to position himself. As people remember, his Super PAC paid a lot of money to have a Super Bowl ad that was a carbon copy of an iconic Kennedy ad that JFK ran in the 60s and kind of updated it to say you should think about someone who was not a Democrat or Republican — [MUSIC PLAYING]

(SINGING) A man who’s old enough to know —

(SINGING) And young enough to do.

— who’s younger than these other candidates and is kind of pitching himself as the free thinking person’s candidate. If you look at polling, RFK is in a different category than the Williamsons or the Dean Phillips or the Jill Steins or Cornel Wests. Because of his name recognition, you can see sometimes 10 percent, 15 percent of voters, even upwards of that, say they will be interested in that candidacy.

But I would also say that RFK would not just represent a challenge for Joe Biden. Donald Trump is usually the person who that type of Libertarian or cranky or doesn’t fit in a conspiratorial voter flows to, and that might not be the case if RFK is also on the ballot. And so that has created a lot of fear from top levels of both Democrats and Republicans, who think it’s not clear exactly who he would play spoiler for. That’s the first thing.

Second thing is, like Cornel West, he also has ballot access problems. The benefit of running in a Democratic primary is, of course, if you were to beat Joe Biden and become the nominee, you’re on the ballot. Because he is now saying he’s running as an independent, he is currently engaged in a very expensive and difficult effort to get his name on the ballot and across the states. And that’s the real thorn in the candidacy side is the kind of logistical question of will they be able to get on the ballot?

But if he can overcome the ballot access problem and become a legitimate candidate in this race, this is the person that will keep [? DNR ?] up at night. Because if you can combine name, money, and message, that’s the ingredients of a Ross Perot or someone who can take a third-party candidacy and really go far.

Last one. Do we still spin the wheel or no?

I feel like for — to complete the wheel, we have to.

Yeah, this is a literal follow up to the work we did last year, but No Labels is a non-partisan, independent political group in Washington, DC that has tried to brand itself as the organization that’s above partisanship and polarization, tries to encourage bipartisanship through lawmakers and both parties rejecting their extremes. In the last year, No Labels has made a very public effort to try to entice a candidate to run a third party campaign for president that they would support and help get on the ballot.

They called it a unity ticket.

Exactly. They called it a unity ticket, and the premise was that they were going to have one party at the top, a different party as vice president, and that that’s what Americans needed was a kind of joint ideological ticket. Now, I think it’s important to point out the differences between that and the kind of RFK. That’s talking about independence in terms of picking and choosing different ideological buckets but isn’t saying I’m strict right or left.

What No Labels is talking about is having one Republican, one Democrat in a specific ticket that’s centered around unity. And so that was their premise. Now when we talked to No Labels, it was clear that they had not fully thought through how a unity ticket was the solution to polarization. And one of the things I really remember about that reporting is that it made clear that the kind of top-down, ideologically-driven premise that No Labels works in is not necessarily the language of people who hate both candidates.

So when you ask, why do you hate both candidates? They might just say because they’re old. They might just say because they don’t like the system itself. It’s not clear that the type of candidates No Labels was pitching as the solution — the Joe Manchins, the Mitt Romneys, the Larry Hogans — are even people that these folks know or would be people they come to. So that’s important to say.

Now, to update in the last year, No Labels has kind of had a tough go at it, partially because their entire strategy is premised on the idea of attracting a top tier candidate to join their ticket. Now, the person they have most tried to float is Senator Joe Manchin of West Virginia, who is the more centrist Democrat who has already announced that he won’t be running for re-election in November. He just said last week that he would not run as a third party candidate and close the door on the prospect of working with No Labels.

Now, this was their top choice. This is someone who is doing a listening tour, talking about the need for bipartisanship, and is really the avatar for centrism in DC as a whole. But because of the low likelihood of success from a third party candidate and considering that Manchin is someone who does remain close to President Biden, it’s not particularly a surprise that he decided not to eventually join the No Labels ticket. But it does strike a big blow to the unity ticket that they wanted to project because their top candidate that they wanted to lead that has now bowed out.

The other candidates they’ve talked about have also made different decisions. So Larry Hogan, the former Republican governor of Maryland, who No Labels is trying to entice, he just announced that he was going to be running for Senate in Maryland. So that’s going to be a tough race, but more importantly, he’s not taking the presidential option. And the drop off between those type of candidates and who else they could get is so big that it’s really created a difficult position for No Labels to be in because if they don’t have a candidate to actualize a lot of that signing work, a lot of that ballot access work, it all kind of crumbles.

So if you’re recognizing a theme here, it’s that our system makes it very difficult for these third party options to succeed. If you want to be president, the hardest thing to do is to try to do that without the Democratic or Republican parties. This unique situation, because of the distastefulness of candidates, has created a different space so the RFKs, so the other parties can garner more interest. And the closeness of our elections mean that that interest might really matter.

But for the broader question, for the listener question of will these third party options mean that we don’t have Trump v Biden, I think that answer is clearly no. What they can do is complicate the calculus of how Trump versus Biden might play out or impact the type of issues they have to address. Or they could become a vessel for people to lodge their distaste.

It would not surprise me if we end this year with the highest number of third party votes we’ve had in a long time, and that will certainly matter. But it is overwhelmingly likely, because of the way that our political process works, that the next president is either the Democratic or Republican nominee.

Thanks, Anna, appreciate it. [MUSIC PLAYING]

Thanks so much for the questions. We’ll keep answering them regularly on the show, so keep sending them in. And we’re game to tackle whatever you’re curious about from the top of the ticket on down, from the serious to the political trivia you’ve always wondered about. Here’s a couple of mine.

What’s with the donkeys and the elephants? Do celebrity endorsements actually matter? Email us at [email protected]. That’s [email protected]. And tell us what you think of the show, too. Have a great day.

That’s the run up for Thursday, February 22, 2024. Now, the rundown.

Now, to the race for the White House. The South Carolina Republican primary is set for this upcoming Saturday.

Former President Donald Trump and former governor of South Carolina Nikki Haley have been campaigning all over the state ahead of this weekend’s contest there. Trump goes in as the overwhelming favorite. In one recent poll, the former President leads Haley 63-35 among those very likely to vote in the primary.

In a Fox News town hall with Laura Ingraham in Greenville, South Carolina, on Tuesday night —

She’s not working. She’s here. She’s down by 30, 35 points, and everybody knows her. You’re not supposed to lose your home state. Shouldn’t happen anyway, and she’s losing it bigly — big, I mean, really. I said bigly and bigly —

Losing it bigly, but —

— Trump took on Haley directly. Meanwhile, Haley continues on her bus tour throughout the state.

I refuse to quit. South Carolina will vote on Saturday, but on Sunday, I’ll still be running for president. I’m not going anywhere.

Instead, she plans to continue campaigning beyond South Carolina no matter the result. We’re three days away from the South Carolina Republican primary and 257 days away from the general election. See you next week.

“The Run Up” is reported by me, Astead Herndon, and produced by Elisa Gutierrez, Caitlin O’Keefe, and Anna Foley. It’s edited by Rachel Dry, Lisa Tobin, and Frannie Carr Toth with original music by Dan Powell, Marion Lozano, Pat McCusker, Diane Wong, Sophia Lanman, and Elisheba Ittoop. It was mixed by Sophia Lanman and fact checked by Caitlin Love.

Special thanks to Paula Szuchman, Sam Dolnick, Larissa Anderson, David Halbfinger, Maddy Masiello, Mahima Chablani, Jeffrey Miranda, and Jennifer Poyant. And finally, if you like the show and want to get updates on latest episodes, follow our feed wherever you get your podcasts. Thanks for listening, y’all.

How would the Democratic Party pick a replacement?

Scenario One: before the Democratic convention in August.

In that case, the delegates to the convention would choose both the president and the vice president if there was a vacancy. It would be a free-for-all at the convention. And based on what we know about who those delegates typically are, it would be hard to imagine a scenario where the presidential nomination didn’t go to Vice President Kamala Harris. The delegates are loyal to the Democratic Party. The biggest caucus is women. The second biggest caucus is African Americans. And those are two groups that are generally loyal to the vice president. It’s unlikely that other Democrats would step up and challenge Harris under those circumstances. She could even be the president at that point — and then that would mean challenging a sitting president. That’s a very steep political lift for anybody in that type of chaotic environment.

Scenario Two: after the convention.

If something happens to Mr. Biden — or he changes his mind — after he is officially nominated, there is no precedent for what happens next. But the document officially calling for the 2024 convention outlines the process. Jaime Harrison, the Democratic National Committee chair, would confer with the Democratic leadership in Congress and the leadership of the Democratic Governors Association — and that group would be authorized to fill vacancies on the national ticket with some input from the broader D.N.C. membership, which is about 440 people.

In both scenarios, before or after the convention, the decision is up to the leadership of the Democratic Party, which makes it a relatively elite process.

For related reporting on this question, click here .

On the Republican side, is there any chance it’s not Trump?

We called Maggie Haberman , the Times senior political correspondent, to talk through the hypotheticals that could impede the 77-year-old Mr. Trump’s path to the nomination:

The chances of Donald Trump waking up one day and deciding not to go forward are close to zero. The campaign is so intertwined with his fight for staying out of prison, given that he has been indicted four times and is now facing a certain trial starting at the end of March in Manhattan. So that comes off the table.

In terms of whether there would be a health event, that’s not an impossible thought. We know from the White House doctors, he had a form of heart disease during his presidency. It’s unlikely that has changed dramatically in a positive direction. We don’t know what his health is like now, but I do know that at the end of 2022, when they were looking ahead to a campaign that he was about to run, there was private discussion about not holding too many events in part because he’s old. And they didn’t want to cause him damage by running him into the ground. And I do think that that’s part of why we have seen less of him. I think there are other reasons, too, but his age is a factor.

[You can follow “The Run-Up” on the NYT Audio App , Apple , Spotify , Amazon Music , YouTube or wherever you get your podcasts.]

Could anything keep Trump from being on the ballot?

It would have to be a catastrophic event. If it was something mild, I think he would try to push forward, and I’m not sure we would even know it was happening. I think it would have to be something that could not be hidden, like an extended hospital stay, or something that happens onstage, or in front of a crowd. It’s not as if we have no predicate for that with Trump. He was really, really sick with Covid, and they were, to put it mildly, less than candid about what was going on with his health. So I have no reason to believe it would be different this time.

As for whether the Republican Party has a Plan B, let’s be clear: There is no party absent Trump. He is literally in the process of ousting his own hand-picked Republican Party chair to try to get another one who he thinks will focus more on his false claims of widespread election fraud. So there is no “they.”

The process works this way. If something were to happen ahead of the convention, there would have to be a change in the rules. And it would have to be that the delegates process changes, because Trump is the person leading in delegates right now. And Nikki Haley wouldn’t necessarily get those by default just because she’s the person still actively campaigning. I think you would see a lot of other candidates who have suspended their candidacies suddenly start campaigning again, and then it would get decided at the convention.

If something were to happen after the convention, then the 168 members of the Republican National Committee would have to meet again and figure out what to do. And even then, it gets murky because depending on the timing, you could end up in a situation where a lot of states have already printed ballots with Trump’s name.

So to summarize, I think it is extremely, extremely unlikely that he will not be the nominee. But it’s not impossible. Anything can happen, as we’ve seen.

Could a third-party candidate make a difference?

The answer , according to Astead W. Herndon , the host of “The Run-Up,” is pretty clearly no:

Third-party candidates — even with the name recognition of Robert F. Kennedy Jr. — face significant challenges in terms of ballot access. The centrist group No Labels hasn’t managed to attract prominent candidates to join its efforts.

But what third-party candidates can do, even if they’re not on a ballot, is complicate the calculus of how Trump versus Biden might play out, or affect the type of issues they have to address. Or they could become a vessel for people to lodge their distaste.

We could end this year with the highest number of third-party votes this country has seen in a long time. And that will certainly matter. But it is overwhelmingly likely, because of the way that our political process works, that the next president is either the Democratic or Republican nominee.

So, how does polling work? And can I trust it?

To answer the biggest question of all when it comes to polling — can we trust what the numbers say? — we turned to Nate Cohn , chief political analyst for The Times:

Trust is an interesting word to use. At The Times, the standard for what it means to trust our journalism is super high. We present ourselves as providing something like an objective truth to readers, true facts. And the truth is, polling does not reach that standard. And it never has. Even when response rates were very high, polls are random samples. They’re fuzzy statistics that are deeply imperfect and subject to all different kinds of error.

What you can do is learn quite a bit from polling even though it’s deeply imperfect.

Take the recent elections. As bad as polls were in 2020 and 2016, the national polls were only off by three and a half points in 2020 and two points in 2016. Now, in an era of close elections, three and a half and two points is a lot. It’s the difference between victory and defeat or, in the case of 2020, between a landslide and a fairly close race. But it gets you in the ballpark for a lot of things.

But what about very low response rates?

It is fair to ask, how do we even know polling is in the ballpark? How do we reach voters in an era when people screen their calls? We have a mix of evidence that tells us that this stuff is still useful. Some of it’s based on hard research. In 2022, The Times did this study of Wisconsin, where we mailed voters financial incentives to take a poll, and got 30 percent of people to take that survey, and ran a telephone phone poll in parallel that had a 1 percent response rate. And the answers were basically the same.

So the differences between this group of people who take a telephone poll and the broader population may not be that great. And then on an individual poll-by-poll basis, we can scrutinize the poll based on the handful of facts that we do have. Does it have the right number of Democrats or Republicans by party registration? Does it have the right number of young people and old people? Does it have the right number of white voters or Black voters and so on? And those characteristics help give us confidence as well. None of it adds up to being perfect. None of it adds up to being objective fact. But it does add up to being useful.

Astead W. Herndon is a national politics reporter and the host of the politics podcast “The Run-Up.” More about Astead W. Herndon

Reid J. Epstein covers campaigns and elections from Washington. Before joining The Times in 2019, he worked at The Wall Street Journal, Politico, Newsday and The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel. More about Reid J. Epstein

Maggie Haberman is a senior political correspondent reporting on the 2024 presidential campaign, down ballot races across the country and the investigations into former President Donald J. Trump. More about Maggie Haberman

Nate Cohn is The Times’s chief political analyst. He covers elections, public opinion, demographics and polling. More about Nate Cohn

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  1. The Nature Essay and Genre

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    Nature is a book-length essay written by Ralph Waldo Emerson, published by James Munroe and Company in 1836. [1] In the essay Emerson put forth the foundation of transcendentalism, a belief system that espouses a non-traditional appreciation of nature. [2] Transcendentalism suggests that the divine, or God, suffuses nature, and suggests that ...

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    The honey bee seems like a simple part of the natural world, yet it is one of the most essential. Without bees, fruits and vegetables will not get pollinated as easily, if at all. If bees disappear, the entire food system will struggle. Thus, bees, and many other parts of nature, are vital to human life. 10.

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  8. Ecocriticism: An Essay

    Ecocriticism is an intentionally broad approach that is known by a number of other designations, including "green (cultural) studies", "ecopoetics", and "environmental literary criticism.". Western thought has often held a more or less utilitarian attitude to nature —nature is for serving human needs. However, after the eighteenth ...

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    So let us go through the different characteristics of Nature: 1. Nature is not man-made: Nature is not created by human beings. Nature has its own universe and is governed by its own laws. 2. Nature is not dependent on human beings: Nature can survive even without the existence of human beings. 3. Nature sustains human beings: Nature provides ...

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    Human Nature. First published Mon Mar 15, 2021. Talk of human nature is a common feature of moral and politicaldiscourse among people on the street and among philosophers, politicalscientists and sociologists. This is largely due to the widespreadassumption that true descriptive or explanatory claims making use ofthe concept of human nature ...

  14. Nature Vs Nurture Essay for Students and Children

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    The nature vs. nurture debate in psychology concerns the relative importance of an individual's innate qualities (nature) versus personal experiences (nurture) in determining or causing individual differences in physical and behavioral traits. While early theories favored one factor over the other, contemporary views recognize a complex interplay between genes and environment in shaping ...

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