Freedom of Expression Essay

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Introduction

  • The Key Concepts

Freedom of expression refers to the right to express one’s opinions or thoughts freely by utilizing any of the different modes of communication available. The ideas aired should, however, not cause any intentional harm to other personality or status through false or ambiguous statements. Communication of ideas can be achieved through speech, writing or art. Freedom of expression, unlike freedom of thought, may be regulated by the appropriate authorities in any society in order to avoid controversies between different individuals.

The extent to which this limitation or censorship is done varies from nation to nation and is dependent on the government of the day. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, every individual has the right to search for information, access and impart variety of ideas irrespective of the frontiers.

Freedom of Expression: The Key Concepts

The subject of freedom of expression has always been controversial, especially when considering political aspects. A state is perceived to have the mandate to impede people from convening groups in which they air their opinions if those views can result in direct harm to other people.

However, the interference would only be an exception if doing so results in more beneficial outcomes than standing aside. For one to be in a position to gauge the eventuality of a gain or a loss, then there should be absolute freedom of expression on all matters irrespective of the nature of the sentiments made.

Arguments for absolute freedom of expression can be a made by evaluating the purpose for which the ideas are expressed and the manner in which we evaluate what is true or false. According to Mill (Eisenach, 2004), the right to express one’s opinions offers humanity a rare chance to switch over an error for the truth if the idea expressed happens to be true.

In case the opinion happens to be wrong, mankind stands a chance of getting a clearer picture of the known truth through collusion with a mistake. Therefore, freedom of expression acts in the best interests of mankind as it endeavors to progress and its limitation deprives people of the prospects of growth.

Whether we let expression of an opinion to be limited or censored, whereas it could be true, then we present ourselves as beyond reproach. We consider all that we know to be the truth and therefore dispel all opinions that question this truth. It is possible for people or authorities to be in fault. For instance, what we consider to be morally right or wrong may not be so.

The lines that define moral rights and wrongs were set by people who could possibly have mistaken. In order to draw the limit, one must differentiate between sureness and the truth. Our certainty that a particular idea is false does not in any way excuse its expression. Suppressing such an idea would not only justify our confidence of the opinion being wrong, but also proves that we are flawless.

If limitation of people’s freedom of expression in matters such as racism is based on certainty that mankind does not stand to lose any benefit, then this sureness should be founded in the freedom itself. We can only consider ourselves to be certain when there have been no opinions raised to question the truths we hold. Therefore, in order to boost our certainty, we have to leave room for the opposing beliefs.

There are governments that censor the expression of certain ideas not because they are false, but because they are considered to be hazardous to the society. Mill argues that in such a situation, the hazard in the expressed opinions is questionable. The only way to ascertain that the opinion is in fact dangerous is not to suppress its expression but to allow its free discussion.

Secondly, if the opinion that is being limited is true, then the alternative view held by the government must be false. Experience has shown that all beliefs that are false are never constructive in the long run. Therefore, the government that prefers to hold a false conviction in place of a hazardous truth does not act in the best interests of its people.

In many instances, the silenced view may be a mistake. However, most of these mistakes do carry with them a scrap of truth. On the other hand, the existing view on each of the different topics often does not contain the entire truth. By listening to the opinions of others on the matter, an opportunity to learn the rest of the uncovered truths presents itself.

For instance in politics, we could have two political parties with different agendas. One wants to institute reforms while another desires to ensure stability. People may not be in a position to discern what should be retained or altered, but ensuring the parties at opposing ends ensures each party checks on the performance of the other. In the long run, we strike for a beneficial balance between their supposed agendas (Bhargava, 2008).

Moreover, if the opinion being expressed is entirely true, it may not be considered so with certainty. For confidence to feature, these views must be contested against other rational opinions of others in order to single out the supporting arguments. It is expected that those who believe in their opinions will place strong arguments in their favor (Matravers, 2001).

If an authority believes in the rationality of its ideas, then it should leave room for the expression of opposing ideas. For instance, if any reigning political party has faith in the views it has concerning the development of the country’s economy, it should not be wary of an opposition party with contradicting views. After all what they stand for has factual backing (O’Rourke, 2001).

Lastly, the battle for supremacy between different opinions opens up a more comprehensive understanding of our beliefs. We begin to comprehend what is required of us and are, thus, in a position to act on them. Human beliefs do not exhibit any motivation and the debates that arise are what add fuel to the fire.

Holding beliefs with a conservative mindset only serves to hinder our acceptance of the possible alternatives (Jones, 2001). Therefore, opposition exhibited in the freedom of speech opens up a lee way for open-mindedness besides posing a challenge to hypocrisy and logical sluggishness.

The absence of restrictions on people’s freedom of oppression allows for the exchange of error for truth or the clarification of the existing truth. It also reinforces our certainty in the opinions we consider true besides increasing our open-mindedness and thoughtfulness. For governments, it ensures those entrusted with the leadership of the country have reasonable opinions that work for the common good of the country’s citizens.

Free discussion and analysis of different ideas will, thus, result in the prosperity of mankind rather than the detrimental effects it is assumed to bring.

Freedom of Expression FAQ

  • What Is Freedom of Expression? Freedom of expression is the ability of individual people and groups to express their thoughts, beliefs, emotions, and ideas without any restrictions or censorship from the government. This freedom is protected by the First Amendment of the US Constitution.
  • How Does Freedom of Expression Protect Individual Liberty? The First Amendment of the US Constitution guarantees freedom of expression to all citizens. This means that the US Congress does not have the right to restrict the media or people from speaking freely. People also have the right to peaceful assemblies and petitions to the government.
  • Why Is Freedom of Expression Important for Democracy? Freedom of expression is an essential human right. It guarantees the free exchange of information, opinions, and ideas in the public space, allowing people to independently form their own views on all the essential issues.

Bhargava, H. (2008). Political Theory: An Introduction . Delhi: Pearson Education.

Eisenach, E. (2004). Mill and Moral Character . New York: Penn State Press.

Jones, T. (2001). Modern Political Thinkers and Ideas: An Historical Introduction . New York: Routledge.

Matravers, D. (2001) Reading Political Philosophy: Machiavelli to Mill . New York: Routledge.

O’Rourke, K. (2001). John Stuart Mill and Freedom of Expression: The Genesis of a Theory . Connecticut: Taylor & Francis.

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IvyPanda. (2023, October 29). Freedom of Expression Essay. https://ivypanda.com/essays/freedom-of-expression/

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Bibliography

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Freedom of Expression by Mark J. Richards LAST REVIEWED: 12 May 2017 LAST MODIFIED: 27 November 2023 DOI: 10.1093/obo/9780199796953-0105

Freedom of expression is a fundamental international human right. It is intrinsically valuable and necessary for the healthy functioning of democracy and civil society. Freedom of expression is necessary for the achievement of other human rights such as fair administration of justice, education, adequate standard of living, equality, human dignity, and the rights of women, peoples, and minorities. Although it is generally a negative liberty, freedom of expression places positive obligations on the state to provide access to information, Internet access, and to promote a child’s right to participate in education, work, and family life. Freedom of expression broadly understood encompasses a package of rights that are intimately intertwined, including freedom of opinion, speech, press, information, association, assembly, thought, conscience, belief, and religion. Although the rights can be conceptually organized into the four categories of expression, association, assembly, and thought, each with distinct meaning, actual cases commonly involve more than one of the rights. For example, a ban on wearing headscarves in a public educational setting raises issues of freedom of expression and religion. Freedom of expression is recognized by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), the Arab Charter on Human Rights (Arab Charter), and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Although freedom of expression is fundamental, it is not absolute. Article 19 of the ICCPR allows for restrictions on freedom of expression that are necessary to protect the rights or reputations of others, national security, public order, public health, or public morals. Any such restriction must be provided for by law and be proportionate. The literature on freedom of expression as an international human right tends to focus on cases and jurisprudence, with some attention paid to the roles of international human rights institutions. Regional and international civil society groups actively highlight current threats to freedom of expression, often in cases of threats to individuals, journalists, or small groups, but also more systematically via annual, country, regional, and thematic reports. Many of the most prevalent issues of the past decade revolve around the Internet such as hate speech, regulation of social media, Internet access, disinformation, and surveillance. Of course, the Internet has transformed communications, but it has also enabled unprecedented state and international surveillance that threatens privacy and freedom of expression alike. Other contemporary free expression issues arising under international law include protection of journalists and human rights defenders, sexual orientation and gender identity (SOGI), genocide and atrocity crimes, the speech rights of the child, and religion.

Barendt 2007 is a masterful treatment of the comparative law of freedom of expression. The second edition provides extensive coverage of the European Commission and (later) European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in addition to cases from Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, South Africa, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Barendt evaluates why freedom of speech should be protected, reviews its scope, and compares how it is treated in liberal democracies. He provides detailed, comparative analyses of a wide range of freedom of speech issues. Zeno-Zencovich 2008 covers European freedom of expression, takes a policy focus, and is especially attentive to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Textbooks in international human rights law typically have a chapter devoted to freedom of expression. McGoldrick 2022 provides a comprehensive overview of freedom of expression, including freedom of thought, religion, association, and assembly. Janis, et al. 2008 devotes one chapter to freedom of expression and association and another to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. They integrate explication and analysis with excerpts of the case law of the ECtHR. They also include extensive citations to case law as well as citations to select journal articles. While the primary focus is on the ECtHR, the chapters have an insightful comparative dimension. Chen and Renteln 2023 includes a comprehensive chapter on media and human rights in the authors’ introductory human rights textbook, which would be highly suitable for an undergraduate human rights course. See also the section Textbooks in the Oxford Bibliographies article “ Human Rights .” The edited volume Bollinger and Callamard 2021 takes a global norm approach to cover a wide range of free expression issues and would be an excellent supplementary text. Similarly, Hare and Weinstein 2009 is rich with international law content. The book contains more than thirty chapters written by a wide variety of scholars. Cram 2006 would be an excellent auxiliary text for any course focusing on freedom of expression in international law. Cram advances the contention that the judiciary in various jurisdictions plays a critical role in securing and promoting participatory democracy. He evaluates this thesis by reference to a variety of freedom of expression topics, including international issues arising under ECHR such as banning parties, party access to broadcast media, Holocaust denial, pro-Nazi expression, child pornography, and commercial expression. He also compares ECHR law to the law in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Barendt, Eric. Freedom of Speech . 2d ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225811.001.0001

Introductory chapters cover the scope of, and justifications for, freedom of speech and compare freedom of speech in liberal democracies. Remaining chapters are devoted to particular topics, including prior restraints, political speech, libel, copyright, assembly, protests, public fora, judicial process, pornography, commercial speech, media, Internet, campaign finance, employment, and education.

Bollinger, Lee C., and Agnès Callamard. Regardless of Frontiers: Global Freedom of Expression in a Troubled World . New York: Columbia University Press, 2021.

DOI: 10.7312/boll19698

Edited volume uses constructivist theory and comparative legal theory to understand what norms qualify as global freedom of expression norms, along with how those norms are contested and developed. Organizes nineteen chapters around four main themes: global norms, institutions and actors as norm entrepreneurs, anti-globalization and conflicts over norms, and global jurisprudence.

Chen, Cher W., and Alison D. Renteln. “Media and Human Rights.” In International Human Rights: A Survey . By Cher W. Chen and Alison D. Renteln, 541–587. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2023.

Comprehensive, media-focused overview of various freedom of expression and human rights issues. Covers issues such as Internet access, the rise of social media, digital privacy and the right to be forgotten, access to information, hate speech, the protection of journalists, and media in human rights advocacy.

Cram, Ian. Contested Words: Legal Restrictions on Freedom of Speech in Liberal Democracies . Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2006.

Applies legal philosophy to case law to claim that the judiciary has an important role to play in promoting a more participatory democracy. A consensus exists that political expression is to be protected in liberal democracy. Considers the impact of ECHR on British and European law in various contexts.

Hare, Ivan, and James Weinstein, eds. Extreme Speech and Democracy . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

For specific chapters covering extreme speech in international law, see Dworkin 2009 and Malik 2009 (cited under Normative Justifications ), Fraser 2009 (cited under Genocide and Atrocity Crimes ), Finnis 2009 and McGoldrick 2009 (cited under Religion ), and Cram 2009 , Hare 2009 , and Whine 2009 (cited under Genocide and Atrocity Crimes ).

Janis, Mark W., Richard S. Kay, and Anthony W. Bradley. European Human Rights Law . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Chapter 6 covers freedom of expression and association, and chapter 7 covers freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Chapters integrate detailed analysis with extensive excerpts from ECtHR case law.

McGoldrick, Dominic. “Thought, Expression, Association and Assembly.” In International Human Rights Law . 4th ed. Edited by Daniel Moeckli, Sangeeta Shah, Sandesh Sivakumaran, and David Harris, 209–234. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022.

DOI: 10.1093/he/9780198860112.001.0001

Provides a broad overview, replete with citations to international legal cases, of the four interrelated freedoms: thought (including religion, conscience, and belief), expression (including opinion and access to information), association, and assembly. Explains sources in international law, scope of freedoms, and recognized limitations.

Zeno-Zencovich, Vincenzo. Freedom of Expression: A Critical and Comparative Analysis . New York: Routledge-Cavendish, 2008.

DOI: 10.4324/9780203893081

Takes a policy-oriented look at contemporary freedom of expression issues arising in Europe, especially broadcasting, journalism, advertising, economic regulation, and the Internet. Includes ECHR and comparative European law.

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Freedom of Speech

[ Editor’s Note: The following new entry by Jeffrey W. Howard replaces the former entry on this topic by the previous author. ]

Human beings have significant interests in communicating what they think to others, and in listening to what others have to say. These interests make it difficult to justify coercive restrictions on people’s communications, plausibly grounding a moral right to speak (and listen) to others that is properly protected by law. That there ought to be such legal protections for speech is uncontroversial among political and legal philosophers. But disagreement arises when we turn to the details. What are the interests or values that justify this presumption against restricting speech? And what, if anything, counts as an adequate justification for overcoming the presumption? This entry is chiefly concerned with exploring the philosophical literature on these questions.

The entry begins by distinguishing different ideas to which the term “freedom of speech” can refer. It then reviews the variety of concerns taken to justify freedom of speech. Next, the entry considers the proper limits of freedom of speech, cataloging different views on when and why restrictions on communication can be morally justified, and what considerations are relevant when evaluating restrictions. Finally, it considers the role of speech intermediaries in a philosophical analysis of freedom of speech, with special attention to internet platforms.

1. What is Freedom of Speech?

2.1 listener theories, 2.2 speaker theories, 2.3 democracy theories, 2.4 thinker theories, 2.5 toleration theories, 2.6 instrumental theories: political abuse and slippery slopes, 2.7 free speech skepticism, 3.1 absoluteness, coverage, and protection, 3.2 the limits of free speech: external constraints, 3.3 the limits of free speech: internal constraints, 3.4 proportionality: chilling effects and political abuse, 3.5 necessity: the counter-speech alternative, 4. the future of free speech theory: platform ethics, other internet resources, related entries.

In the philosophical literature, the terms “freedom of speech”, “free speech”, “freedom of expression”, and “freedom of communication” are mostly used equivalently. This entry will follow that convention, notwithstanding the fact that these formulations evoke subtly different phenomena. For example, it is widely understood that artistic expressions, such as dancing and painting, fall within the ambit of this freedom, even though they don’t straightforwardly seem to qualify as speech , which intuitively connotes some kind of linguistic utterance (see Tushnet, Chen, & Blocher 2017 for discussion). Still, they plainly qualify as communicative activity, conveying some kind of message, however vague or open to interpretation it may be.

Yet the extension of “free speech” is not fruitfully specified through conceptual analysis alone. The quest to distinguish speech from conduct, for the purpose of excluding the latter from protection, is notoriously thorny (Fish 1994: 106), despite some notable attempts (such as Greenawalt 1989: 58ff). As John Hart Ely writes concerning Vietnam War protesters who incinerated their draft cards, such activity is “100% action and 100% expression” (1975: 1495). It is only once we understand why we should care about free speech in the first place—the values it instantiates or serves—that we can evaluate whether a law banning the burning of draft cards (or whatever else) violates free speech. It is the task of a normative conception of free speech to offer an account of the values at stake, which in turn can illuminate the kinds of activities wherein those values are realized, and the kinds of restrictions that manifest hostility to those values. For example, if free speech is justified by the value of respecting citizens’ prerogative to hear many points of view and to make up their own minds, then banning the burning of draft cards to limit the views to which citizens will be exposed is manifestly incompatible with that purpose. If, in contrast, such activity is banned as part of a generally applied ordinance restricting fires in public, it would likely raise no free-speech concerns. (For a recent analysis of this issue, see Kramer 2021: 25ff).

Accordingly, the next section discusses different conceptions of free speech that arise in the philosophical literature, each oriented to some underlying moral or political value. Before turning to the discussion of those conceptions, some further preliminary distinctions will be useful.

First, we can distinguish between the morality of free speech and the law of free speech. In political philosophy, one standard approach is to theorize free speech as a requirement of morality, tracing the implications of such a theory for law and policy. Note that while this is the order of justification, it need not be the order of investigation; it is perfectly sensible to begin by studying an existing legal protection for speech (such as the First Amendment in the U.S.) and then asking what could justify such a protection (or something like it).

But of course morality and law can diverge. The most obvious way they can diverge is when the law is unjust. Existing legal protections for speech, embodied in the positive law of particular jurisdictions, may be misguided in various ways. In other words, a justified legal right to free speech, and the actual legal right to free speech in the positive law of a particular jurisdiction, can come apart. In some cases, positive legal rights might protect too little speech. For example, some jurisdictions’ speech laws make exceptions for blasphemy, such that criminalizing blasphemy does not breach the legal right to free speech within that legal system. But clearly one could argue that a justified legal right to free speech would not include any such exception. In other cases, positive legal rights might perhaps protect too much speech. Consider the fact that, as a matter of U.S. constitutional precedent, the First Amendment broadly protects speech that expresses or incites racial or religious hatred. Plainly we could agree that this is so as a matter of positive law while disagreeing about whether it ought to be so. (This is most straightforwardly true if we are legal positivists. These distinctions are muddied by moralistic theories of constitutional interpretation, which enjoin us to interpret positive legal rights in a constitutional text partly through the prism of our favorite normative political theory; see Dworkin 1996.)

Second, we can distinguish rights-based theories of free speech from non-rights-based theories. For many liberals, the legal right to free speech is justified by appealing to an underlying moral right to free speech, understood as a natural right held by all persons. (Some use the term human right equivalently—e.g., Alexander 2005—though the appropriate usage of that term is contested.) The operative notion of a moral right here is that of a claim-right (to invoke the influential analysis of Hohfeld 1917); it thereby correlates to moral duties held by others (paradigmatically, the state) to respect or protect the right. Such a right is natural in that it exerts normative force independently of whether anyone thinks it does, and regardless of whether it is codified into the law. A tyrannical state that imprisons dissidents acts unjustly, violating moral rights, even if there is no legal right to freedom of expression in its legal system.

For others, the underlying moral justification for free speech law need not come in the form of a natural moral right. For example, consequentialists might favor a legal right to free speech (on, e.g., welfare-maximizing grounds) without thinking that it tracks any underlying natural right. Or consider democratic theorists who have defended legal protections for free speech as central to democracy. Such theorists may think there is an underlying natural moral right to free speech, but they need not (especially if they hold an instrumental justification for democracy). Or consider deontologists who have argued that free speech functions as a kind of side-constraint on legitimate state action, requiring that the state always justify its decisions in a manner that respects citizens’ autonomy (Scanlon 1972). This theory does not cast free speech as a right, but rather as a principle that forbids the creation of laws that restrict speech on certain grounds. In the Hohfeldian analysis (Hohfeld 1917), such a principle may be understood as an immunity rather than a claim-right (Scanlon 2013: 402). Finally, some “minimalists” (to use a designation in Cohen 1993) favor legal protection for speech principally in response to government malice, corruption, and incompetence (see Schauer 1982; Epstein 1992; Leiter 2016). Such theorists need not recognize any fundamental moral right, either.

Third, among those who do ground free speech in a natural moral right, there is scope for disagreement about how tightly the law should mirror that right (as with any right; see Buchanan 2013). It is an open question what the precise legal codification of the moral right to free speech should involve. A justified legal right to freedom of speech may not mirror the precise contours of the natural moral right to freedom of speech. A raft of instrumental concerns enters the downstream analysis of what any justified legal right should look like; hence a defensible legal right to free speech may protect more speech (or indeed less speech) than the underlying moral right that justifies it. For example, even if the moral right to free speech does not protect so-called hate speech, such speech may still merit legal protection in the final analysis (say, because it would be too risky to entrust states with the power to limit those communications).

2. Justifying Free Speech

I will now examine several of the morally significant considerations taken to justify freedom of expression. Note that while many theorists have built whole conceptions of free speech out of a single interest or value alone, pluralism in this domain remains an option. It may well be that a plurality of interests serves to justify freedom of expression, properly understood (see, influentially, Emerson 1970 and Cohen 1993).

Suppose a state bans certain books on the grounds that it does not want us to hear the messages or arguments contained within them. Such censorship seems to involve some kind of insult or disrespect to citizens—treating us like children instead of adults who have a right to make up our own minds. This insight is fundamental in the free speech tradition. On this view, the state wrongs citizens by arrogating to itself the authority to decide what messages they ought to hear. That is so even if the state thinks that the speech will cause harm. As one author puts it,

the government may not suppress speech on the ground that the speech is likely to persuade people to do something that the government considers harmful. (Strauss 1991: 335)

Why are restrictions on persuasive speech objectionable? For some scholars, the relevant wrong here is a form of disrespect for citizens’ basic capacities (Dworkin 1996: 200; Nagel 2002: 44). For others, the wrong here inheres in a violation of the kind of relationship the state should have with its people: namely, that it should always act from a view of them as autonomous, and so entitled to make up their own minds (Scanlon 1972). It would simply be incompatible with a view of ourselves as autonomous—as authors of our own lives and choices—to grant the state the authority to pre-screen which opinions, arguments, and perspectives we should be allowed to think through, allowing us access only to those of which it approves.

This position is especially well-suited to justify some central doctrines of First Amendment jurisprudence. First, it justifies the claim that freedom of expression especially implicates the purposes with which the state acts. There are all sorts of legitimate reasons why the state might restrict speech (so-called “time, place, and manner” restrictions)—for example, noise curfews in residential neighborhoods, which do not raise serious free speech concerns. Yet when the state restricts speech with the purpose of manipulating the communicative environment and controlling the views to which citizens are exposed, free speech is directly affronted (Rubenfeld 2001; Alexander 2005; Kramer 2021). To be sure, purposes are not all that matter for free speech theory. For example, the chilling effects of otherwise justified speech regulations (discussed below) are seldom intended. But they undoubtedly matter.

Second, this view justifies the related doctrines of content neutrality and viewpoint neutrality (see G. Stone 1983 and 1987) . Content neutrality is violated when the state bans discussion of certain topics (“no discussion of abortion”), whereas viewpoint neutrality is violated when the state bans advocacy of certain views (“no pro-choice views may be expressed”). Both affront free speech, though viewpoint-discrimination is especially egregious and so even harder to justify. While listener autonomy theories are not the only theories that can ground these commitments, they are in a strong position to account for their plausibility. Note that while these doctrines are central to the American approach to free speech, they are less central to other states’ jurisprudence (see A. Stone 2017).

Third, this approach helps us see that free speech is potentially implicated whenever the state seeks to control our thoughts and the processes through which we form beliefs. Consider an attempt to ban Marx’s Capital . As Marx is deceased, he is probably not wronged through such censorship. But even if one held idiosyncratic views about posthumous rights, such that Marx were wronged, it would be curious to think this was the central objection to such censorship. Those with the gravest complaint would be the living adults who have the prerogative to read the book and make up their own minds about it. Indeed free speech may even be implicated if the state banned watching sunsets or playing video games on the grounds that is disapproved of the thoughts to which such experiences might gave rise (Alexander 2005: 8–9; Kramer 2021: 22).

These arguments emphasize the noninstrumental imperative of respecting listener autonomy. But there is an instrumental version of the view. Our autonomy interests are not merely respected by free speech; they are promoted by an environment in which we learn what others have to say. Our interests in access to information is served by exposure to a wide range of viewpoints about both empirical and normative issues (Cohen 1993: 229), which help us reflect on what goals to choose and how best to pursue them. These informational interests are monumental. As Raz suggests, if we had to choose whether to express our own views on some question, or listen to the rest of humanity’s views on that question, we would choose the latter; it is our interest as listeners in the public good of a vibrant public discourse that, he thinks, centrally justifies free speech (1991).

Such an interest in acquiring justified beliefs, or in accessing truth, can be defended as part of a fully consequentialist political philosophy. J.S. Mill famously defends free speech instrumentally, appealing to its epistemic benefits in On Liberty . Mill believes that, given our fallibility, we should routinely keep an open mind as to whether a seemingly false view may actually be true, or at least contain some valuable grain of truth. And even where a proposition is manifestly false, there is value in allowing its expression so that we can better apprehend why we take it to be false (1859: chapter 2), enabled through discursive conflict (cf. Simpson 2021). Mill’s argument focuses especially on the benefits to audiences:

It is is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the calmer and more disinterested bystander, that this collision of opinions works its salutary effect. (1859: chapter 2, p. 94)

These views are sometimes associated with the idea of a “marketplace of ideas”, whereby the open clash of views inevitably leads to the correct ones winning out in debate. Few in the contemporary literature holds such a strong teleological thesis about the consequences of unrestricted debate (e.g., see Brietzke 1997; cf. Volokh 2011). Much evidence from behavioral economics and social psychology, as well as insights about epistemic injustice from feminist epistemology, strongly suggest that human beings’ rational powers are seriously limited. Smug confidence in the marketplace of ideas belies this. Yet it is doubtful that Mill held such a strong teleological thesis (Gordon 1997). Mill’s point was not that unrestricted discussion necessarily leads people to acquire the truth. Rather, it is simply the best mechanism available for ascertaining the truth, relative to alternatives in which some arbiter declares what he sees as true and suppresses what he sees as false (see also Leiter 2016).

Note that Mill’s views on free speech in chapter 2 in On Liberty are not simply the application of the general liberty principle defended in chapter 1 of that work; his view is not that speech is anodyne and therefore seldom runs afoul of the harm principle. The reason a separate argument is necessary in chapter 2 is precisely that he is carving out a partial qualification of the harm principle for speech (on this issue see Jacobson 2000, Schauer 2011b, and Turner 2014). On Mill’s view, plenty of harmful speech should still be allowed. Imminently dangerous speech, where there is no time for discussion before harm eventuates, may be restricted; but where there is time for discussion, it must be allowed. Hence Mill’s famous example that vociferous criticism of corn dealers as

starvers of the poor…ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn dealer. (1859: chapter 3, p. 100)

The point is not that such speech is harmless; it’s that the instrumental benefits of permitting its expressions—and exposing its falsehood through public argument—justify the (remaining) costs.

Many authors have unsurprisingly argued that free speech is justified by our interests as speakers . This family of arguments emphasizes the role of speech in the development and exercise of our personal autonomy—our capacity to be the reflective authors of our own lives (Baker 1989; Redish 1982; Rawls 2005). Here an emphasis on freedom of expression is apt; we have an “expressive interest” (Cohen 1993: 224) in declaring our views—about the good life, about justice, about our identity, and about other aspects of the truth as we see it.

Our interests in self-expression may not always depend on the availability of a willing audience; we may have interests simply in shouting from the rooftops to declare who we are and what we believe, regardless of who else hears us. Hence communications to oneself—for example, in a diary or journal—are plausibly protected from interference (Redish 1992: 30–1; Shiffrin 2014: 83, 93; Kramer 2021: 23).

Yet we also have distinctive interests in sharing what we think with others. Part of how we develop our conceptions of the good life, forming judgments about how to live, is precisely through talking through the matter with others. This “deliberative interest” in directly served through opportunities to tell others what we think, so that we can learn from their feedback (Cohen 1993). Such encounters also offer opportunities to persuade others to adopt our views, and indeed to learn through such discussions who else already shares our views (Raz 1991).

Speech also seems like a central way in which we develop our capacities. This, too, is central to J.S. Mill’s defense of free speech, enabling people to explore different perspectives and points of view (1859). Hence it seems that when children engage in speech, to figure out what they think and to use their imagination to try out different ways of being in the world, they are directly engaging this interest. That explains the intuition that children, and not just adults, merit at least some protection under a principle of freedom of speech.

Note that while it is common to refer to speaker autonomy , we could simply refer to speakers’ capacities. Some political liberals hold that an emphasis on autonomy is objectionably Kantian or otherwise perfectionist, valorizing autonomy as a comprehensive moral ideal in a manner that is inappropriate for a liberal state (Cohen 1993: 229; Quong 2011). For such theorists, an undue emphasis on autonomy is incompatible with ideals of liberal neutrality toward different comprehensive conceptions of the good life (though cf. Shiffrin 2014: 81).

If free speech is justified by the importance of our interests in expressing ourselves, this justifies negative duties to refrain from interfering with speakers without adequate justification. Just as with listener theories, a strong presumption against content-based restrictions, and especially against viewpoint discrimination, is a clear requirement of the view. For the state to restrict citizens’ speech on the grounds that it disfavors what they have to say would affront the equal freedom of citizens. Imagine the state were to disallow the expression of Muslim or Jewish views, but allow the expression of Christian views. This would plainly transgress the right to freedom of expression, by valuing certain speakers’ interests in expressing themselves over others.

Many arguments for the right to free speech center on its special significance for democracy (Cohen 1993; Heinze 2016: Heyman 2009; Sunstein 1993; Weinstein 2011; Post 1991, 2009, 2011). It is possible to defend free speech on the noninstrumental ground that it is necessary to respect agents as democratic citizens. To restrict citizens’ speech is to disrespect their status as free and equal moral agents, who have a moral right to debate and decide the law for themselves (Rawls 2005).

Alternatively (or additionally), one can defend free speech on the instrumental ground that free speech promotes democracy, or whatever values democracy is meant to serve. So, for example, suppose the purpose of democracy is the republican one of establishing a state of non-domination between relationally egalitarian citizens; free speech can be defended as promoting that relation (Whitten 2022; Bonotti & Seglow 2022). Or suppose that democracy is valuable because of its role in promoting just outcomes (Arneson 2009) or tending to track those outcomes in a manner than is publicly justifiable (Estlund 2008) or is otherwise epistemically valuable (Landemore 2013).

Perhaps free speech doesn’t merely respect or promote democracy; another framing is that it is constitutive of it (Meiklejohn 1948, 1960; Heinze 2016). As Rawls says: “to restrict or suppress free political speech…always implies at least a partial suspension of democracy” (2005: 254). On this view, to be committed to democracy just is , in part, to be committed to free speech. Deliberative democrats famously contend that voting merely punctuates a larger process defined by a commitment to open deliberation among free and equal citizens (Gutmann & Thompson 2008). Such an unrestricted discussion is marked not by considerations of instrumental rationality and market forces, but rather, as Habermas puts it, “the unforced force of the better argument” (1992 [1996: 37]). One crucial way in which free speech might be constitutive of democracy is if it serves as a legitimation condition . On this view, without a process of open public discourse, the outcomes of the democratic decision-making process lack legitimacy (Dworkin 2009, Brettschneider 2012: 75–78, Cohen 1997, and Heinze 2016).

Those who justify free speech on democratic grounds may view this as a special application of a more general insight. For example, Scanlon’s listener theory (discussed above) contends that the state must always respect its citizens as capable of making up their own minds (1972)—a position with clear democratic implications. Likewise, Baker is adamant that both free speech and democracy are justified by the same underlying value of autonomy (2009). And while Rawls sees the democratic role of free speech as worthy of emphasis, he is clear that free speech is one of several basic liberties that enable the development and exercise of our moral powers: our capacities for a sense of justice and for the rational pursuit a lifeplan (2005). In this way, many theorists see the continuity between free speech and our broader interests as moral agents as a virtue, not a drawback (e.g., Kendrick 2017).

Even so, some democracy theorists hold that democracy has a special role in a theory of free speech, such that political speech in particular merits special protection (for an overview, see Barendt 2005: 154ff). One consequence of such views is that contributions to public discourse on political questions merit greater protection under the law (Sunstein 1993; cf. Cohen 1993: 227; Alexander 2005: 137–8). For some scholars, this may reflect instrumental anxieties about the special danger that the state will restrict the political speech of opponents and dissenters. But for others, an emphasis on political speech seems to reflect a normative claim that such speech is genuinely of greater significance, meriting greater protection, than other kinds of speech.

While conventional in the free speech literature, it is artificial to separate out our interests as speakers, listeners, and democratic citizens. Communication, and the thinking that feeds into it and that it enables, invariably engages our interests and activities across all these capacities. This insight is central to Seana Shiffrin’s groundbreaking thinker-based theory of freedom of speech, which seeks to unify the range of considerations that have informed the traditional theories (2014). Like other theories (e.g., Scanlon 1978, Cohen 1993), Shiffrin’s theory is pluralist in the range of interests it appeals to. But it offers a unifying framework that explains why this range of interests merits protection together.

On Shiffrin’s view, freedom of speech is best understood as encompassing both freedom of communication and freedom of thought, which while logically distinct are mutually reinforcing and interdependent (Shiffrin 2014: 79). Shiffrin’s account involves several profound claims about the relation between communication and thought. A central contention is that “free speech is essential to the development, functioning, and operation of thinkers” (2014: 91). This is, in part, because we must often externalize our ideas to articulate them precisely and hold them at a distance where we can evaluate them (p. 89). It is also because we work out what we think largely by talking it through with others. Such communicative processes may be monological, but they are typically dialogical; speaker and listener interests are thereby mutually engaged in an ongoing manner that cannot be neatly disentangled, as ideas are ping-ponged back and forth. Moreover, such discussions may concern democratic politics—engaging our interests as democratic citizens—but of course they need not. Aesthetics, music, local sports, the existence of God—these all are encompassed (2014: 92–93). Pace prevailing democratic theories,

One’s thoughts about political affairs are intrinsically and ex ante no more and no less central to the human self than thoughts about one’s mortality or one’s friends. (Shiffrin 2014: 93)

The other central aspect of Shiffrin’s view appeals to the necessity of communication for successfully exercising our moral agency. Sincere communication enables us

to share needs, emotions, intentions, convictions, ambitions, desires, fantasies, disappointments, and judgments. Thereby, we are enabled to form and execute complex cooperative plans, to understand one another, to appreciate and negotiate around our differences. (2014: 1)

Without clear and precise communication of the sort that only speech can provide, we cannot cooperate to discharge our collective obligations. Nor can we exercise our normative powers (such as consenting, waiving, or promising). Our moral agency thus depends upon protected channels through which we can relay our sincere thoughts to one another. The central role of free speech is to protect those channels, by ensuring agents are free to share what they are thinking without fear of sanction.

The thinker-based view has wide-ranging normative implications. For example, by emphasizing the continuity of speech and thought (a connection also noted in Macklem 2006 and Gilmore 2011), Shiffrin’s view powerfully explains the First Amendment doctrine that compelled speech also constitutes a violation of freedom of expression. Traditional listener- and speaker-focused theories seemingly cannot explain what is fundamentally objectionable with forcing someone to declare a commitment to something, as with children compelled to pledge allegiance to the American flag ( West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1943). “What seems most troubling about the compelled pledge”, Shiffrin writes,

is that the motive behind the regulation, and its possible effect, is to interfere with the autonomous thought processes of the compelled speaker. (2014: 94)

Further, Shiffrin’s view explains why a concern for free speech does not merely correlate to negative duties not to interfere with expression; it also supports positive responsibilities on the part of the state to educate citizens, encouraging and supporting their development and exercise as thinking beings (2014: 107).

Consider briefly one final family of free speech theories, which appeal to the role of toleration or self-restraint. On one argument, freedom of speech is important because it develops our character as liberal citizens, helping us tame our illiberal impulses. The underlying idea of Lee Bollinger’s view is that liberalism is difficult; we recurrently face temptation to punish those who hold contrary views. Freedom of speech helps us to practice the general ethos of toleration in a manner than fortifies our liberal convictions (1986). Deeply offensive speech, like pro-Nazi speech, is protected precisely because toleration in these enormously difficult cases promotes “a general social ethic” of toleration more generally (1986: 248), thereby restraining unjust exercises of state power overall. This consequentialist argument treats the protection of offensive speech not as a tricky borderline case, but as “integral to the central functions of the principle of free speech” (1986: 133). It is precisely because tolerating evil speech involves “extraordinary self-restraint” (1986: 10) that it works its salutary effects on society generally.

The idea of self-restraint arises, too, in Matthew Kramer’s recent defense of free speech. Like listener theories, Kramer’s strongly deontological theory condemns censorship aimed at protecting audiences from exposure to misguided views. At the core of his theory is the thesis that the state’s paramount moral responsibility is to furnish the social conditions that serve the development and maintenance of citizens’ self-respect and respect for others. The achievement of such an ethically resilient citizenry, on Kramer’s view, has the effect of neutering the harmfulness of countless harmful communications. “Securely in a position of ethical strength”, the state “can treat the wares of pornographers and the maunderings of bigots as execrable chirps that are to be endured with contempt” (Kramer 2021: 147). In contrast, in a society where the state has failed to do its duty of inculcating a robust liberal-egalitarian ethos, the communication of illiberal creeds may well pose a substantial threat. Yet for the state then to react by banning such speech is

overweening because with them the system’s officials take control of communications that should have been defused (through the system’s fulfillment of its moral obligations) without prohibitory or preventative impositions. (2021: 147)

(One might agree with Kramer that this is so, but diverge by arguing that the state—having failed in its initial duty—ought to take measures to prevent the harms that flow from that failure.)

These theories are striking in that they assume that a chief task of free speech theory is to explain why harmful speech ought to be protected. This is in contrast to those who think that the chief task of free speech theory is to explain our interests in communicating with others, treating the further issue of whether (wrongfully) harmful communications should be protected as an open question, with different reasonable answers available (Kendrick 2017). In this way, toleration theories—alongside a lot of philosophical work on free speech—seem designed to vindicate the demanding American legal position on free speech, one unshared by virtually all other liberal democracies.

One final family of arguments for free speech appeals to the danger of granting the state powers it may abuse. On this view, we protect free speech chiefly because if we didn’t, it would be far easier for the state to silence its political opponents and enact unjust policies. On this view, a state with censorial powers is likely to abuse them. As Richard Epstein notes, focusing on the American case,

the entire structure of federalism, divided government, and the system of checks and balances at the federal level shows that the theme of distrust has worked itself into the warp and woof of our constitutional structure.

“The protection of speech”, he writes, “…should be read in light of these political concerns” (Epstein 1992: 49).

This view is not merely a restatement of the democracy theory; it does not affirm free speech as an element of valuable self-governance. Nor does it reduce to the uncontroversial thought that citizens need freedom of speech to check the behavior of fallible government agents (Blasi 1977). One need not imagine human beings to be particularly sinister to insist (as democracy theorists do) that the decisions of those entrusted with great power be subject to public discussion and scrutiny. The argument under consideration here is more pessimistic about human nature. It is an argument about the slippery slope that we create even when enacting (otherwise justified) speech restrictions; we set an unacceptable precedent for future conduct by the state (see Schauer 1985). While this argument is theoretical, there is clearly historical evidence for it, as in the manifold cases in which bans on dangerous sedition were used to suppress legitimate war protest. (For a sweeping canonical study of the uses and abuses of speech regulations during wartime, with a focus on U.S. history, see G. Stone 2004.)

These instrumental concerns could potentially justify the legal protection for free speech. But they do not to attempt to justify why we should care about free speech as a positive moral ideal (Shiffrin 2014: 83n); they are, in Cohen’s helpful terminology, “minimalist” rather than “maximalist” (Cohen 1993: 210). Accordingly, they cannot explain why free speech is something that even the most trustworthy, morally competent administrations, with little risk of corruption or degeneration, ought to respect. Of course, minimalists will deny that accounting for speech’s positive value is a requirement of a theory of free speech, and that critiquing them for this omission begs the question.

Pluralists may see instrumental concerns as valuably supplementing or qualifying noninstrumental views. For example, instrumental concerns may play a role in justifying deviations between the moral right to free communication, on the one hand, and a properly specified legal right to free communication, on the other. Suppose that there is no moral right to engage in certain forms of harmful expression (such as hate speech), and that there is in fact a moral duty to refrain from such expression. Even so, it does not follow automatically that such a right ought to be legally enforced. Concerns about the dangers of granting the state such power plausibly militate against the enforcement of at least some of our communicative duties—at least in those jurisdictions that lack robust and competently administered liberal-democratic safeguards.

This entry has canvassed a range of views about what justifies freedom of expression, with particular attention to theories that conceive free speech as a natural moral right. Clearly, the proponents of such views believe that they succeed in this justificatory effort. But others dissent, doubting that the case for a bona fide moral right to free speech comes through. Let us briefly note the nature of this challenge from free speech skeptics , exploring a prominent line of reply.

The challenge from skeptics is generally understood as that of showing that free speech is a special right . As Leslie Kendrick notes,

the term “special right” generally requires that a special right be entirely distinct from other rights and activities and that it receive a very high degree of protection. (2017: 90)

(Note that this usage is not to be confused from the alternative usage of “special right”, referring to conditional rights arising out of particular relationships; see Hart 1955.)

Take each aspect in turn. First, to vindicate free speech as a special right, it must serve some distinctive value or interest (Schauer 2015). Suppose free speech were just an implication of a general principle not to interfere in people’s liberty without justification. As Joel Feinberg puts it, “Liberty should be the norm; coercion always needs some special justification” (1984: 9). In such a case, then while there still might be contingent, historical reasons to single speech out in law as worthy of protection (Alexander 2005: 186), such reasons would not track anything especially distinctive about speech as an underlying moral matter. Second, to count as a special right, free speech must be robust in what it protects, such that only a compelling justification can override it (Dworkin 2013: 131). This captures the conviction, prominent among American constitutional theorists, that “any robust free speech principle must protect at least some harmful speech despite the harm it may cause” (Schauer 2011b: 81; see also Schauer 1982).

If the task of justifying a moral right to free speech requires surmounting both hurdles, it is a tall order. Skeptics about a special right to free speech doubt that the order can be met, and so deny that a natural moral right to freedom of expression can be justified (Schauer 2015; Alexander & Horton 1983; Alexander 2005; Husak 1985). But these theorists may be demanding too much (Kendrick 2017). Start with the claim that free speech must be distinctive. We can accept that free speech be more than simply one implication of a general presumption of liberty. But need it be wholly distinctive? Consider the thesis that free speech is justified by our autonomy interests—interests that justify other rights such as freedom of religion and association. Is it a problem if free speech is justified by interests that are continuous with, or overlap with, interests that justify other rights? Pace the free speech skeptics, maybe not. So long as such claims deserve special recognition, and are worth distinguishing by name, this may be enough (Kendrick 2017: 101). Many of the views canvassed above share normative bases with other important rights. For example, Rawls is clear that he thinks all the basic liberties constitute

essential social conditions for the adequate development and full exercise of the two powers of moral personality over a complete life. (Rawls 2005: 293)

The debate, then, is whether such a shared basis is a theoretical virtue (or at least theoretically unproblematic) or whether it is a theoretical vice, as the skeptics avow.

As for the claim that free speech must be robust, protecting harmful speech, “it is not necessary for a free speech right to protect harmful speech in order for it to be called a free speech right” (Kendrick 2017: 102). We do not tend to think that religious liberty must protect harmful religious activities for it to count as a special right. So it would be strange to insist that the right to free speech must meet this burden to count as a special right. Most of the theorists mentioned above take themselves to be offering views that protect quite a lot of harmful speech. Yet we can question whether this feature is a necessary component of their views, or whether we could imagine variations without this result.

3. Justifying Speech Restrictions

When, and why, can restrictions on speech be justified? It is common in public debate on free speech to hear the provocative claim that free speech is absolute . But the plausibility of such a claim depends on what is exactly meant by it. If understood to mean that no communications between humans can ever be restricted, such a view is held by no one in the philosophical debate. When I threaten to kill you unless you hand me your money; when I offer to bribe the security guard to let me access the bank vault; when I disclose insider information that the company in which you’re heavily invested is about to go bust; when I defame you by falsely posting online that you’re a child abuser; when I endanger you by labeling a drug as safe despite its potentially fatal side-effects; when I reveal your whereabouts to assist a murderer intent on killing you—across all these cases, communications may be uncontroversially restricted. But there are different views as to why.

To help organize such views, consider a set of distinctions influentially defended by Schauer (from 1982 onward). The first category involves uncovered speech : speech that does not even presumptively fall within the scope of a principle of free expression. Many of the speech-acts just canvassed, such as the speech involved in making a threat or insider training, plausibly count as uncovered speech. As the U.S. Supreme Court has said of fighting words (e.g., insults calculated to provoke a street fight),

such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. ( Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire 1942)

The general idea here is that some speech simply has negligible—and often no —value as free speech, in light of its utter disconnection from the values that justify free speech in the first place. (For discussion of so-called “low-value speech” in the U.S. context, see Sunstein 1989 and Lakier 2015.) Accordingly, when such low-value speech is harmful, it is particularly easy to justify its curtailment. Hence the Court’s view that “the prevention and punishment of [this speech] have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem”. For legislation restricting such speech, the U.S. Supreme Court applies a “rational basis” test, which is very easy to meet, as it simply asks whether the law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. (Note that it is widely held that it would still be impermissible to selectively ban low-value speech on a viewpoint-discriminatory basis—e.g., if a state only banned fighting words from left-wing activists while allowing them from right-wing activists.)

Schauer’s next category concerns speech that is covered but unprotected . This is speech that engages the values that underpin free speech; yet the countervailing harm of the speech justifies its restriction. In such cases, while there is real value in such expression as free speech, that value is outweighed by competing normative concerns (or even, as we will see below, on behalf of the very values that underpin free speech). In U.S. constitutional jurisprudence, this category encompasses those extremely rare cases in which restrictions on political speech pass the “strict scrutiny” test, whereby narrow restrictions on high-value speech can be justified due to the compelling state interests thereby served. Consider Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project 2010, in which the Court held that an NGO’s legal advice to a terrorist organization on how to pursue peaceful legal channels were legitimately criminalized under a counter-terrorism statute. While such speech had value as free speech (at least on one interpretation of this contested ruling), the imperative of counter-terrorism justified its restriction. (Arguably, commercial speech, while sometimes called low-value speech by scholars, falls into the covered but unprotected category. Under U.S. law, legislation restricting it receives “intermediate scrutiny” by courts—requiring restrictions to be narrowly drawn to advance a substantial government interest. Such a test suggests that commercial speech has bona fide free-speech value, making it harder to justify regulations on it than regulations on genuinely low-value speech like fighting words. It simply doesn’t have as much free-speech value as categories like political speech, religious speech, or press speech, all of which trigger the strict scrutiny test when restricted.)

As a philosophical matter, we can reasonably disagree about what speech qualifies as covered but unprotected (and need not treat the verdicts of the U.S. Supreme Court as philosophically decisive). For example, consider politically-inflected hate speech, which advances repugnant ideas about the inferior status of certain groups. One could concur that there is substantial free-speech value in such expression, just because it involves the sincere expression of views about central questions of politics and justice (however misguided the views doubtlessly are). Yet one could nevertheless hold that such speech should not be protected in virtue of the substantial harms to which it can lead. In such cases, the free-speech value is outweighed. Many scholars who defend the permissibility of legal restrictions on hate speech hold such a view (e.g., Parekh 2012; Waldron 2012). (More radically, one could hold that such speech’s value is corrupted by its evil, such that it qualifies as genuinely low-value; Howard 2019a.)

The final category of speech encompasses expression that is covered and protected . To declare that speech is protected just is to conclude that it is immune from restriction. A preponderance of human communications fall into this category. This does not mean that such speech can never be regulated ; content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations (e.g., prohibiting loud nighttime protests) can certainly be justified (G. Stone 1987). But such regulations must not be viewpoint discriminatory; they must apply even-handedly across all forms of protected speech.

Schauer’s taxonomy offers a useful organizing framework for how we should think about different forms of speech. Where does it leave the claim that free speech is absolute? The possibility of speech that is covered but unprotected suggests that free speech should sometimes be restricted on account of rival normative concerns. Of course, one could contend that such a category, while logically possible, is substantively an empty set; such a position would involve some kind of absoluteness about free speech (holding that where free-speech values are engaged by expression, no countervailing values can ever be weighty enough to override them). Such a position would be absolutist in a certain sense while granting the permissibility of restrictions on speech that do not engage the free-speech values. (For a recent critique of Schauer’s framework, arguing that governmental designation of some speech as low-value is incompatible with the very ideal of free speech, see Kramer 2021: 31.)

In what follows, this entry will focus on Schauer’s second category: speech that is covered by a free speech principle, but is nevertheless unprotected because of the harms it causes. How do we determine what speech falls into this category? How, in other words, do we determine the limits of free speech? Unsurprisingly, this is where most of the controversy lies.

Most legal systems that protect free speech recognize that the right has limits. Consider, for example, international human rights law, which emphatically protects the freedom of speech as a fundamental human right while also affirming specific restrictions on certain seriously harmful speech. Article 19 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights declares that “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds”—but then immediately notes that this right “carries with it special duties and responsibilities”. The subsequent ICCPR article proceeds to endorse legal restrictions on “advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence”, as well as speech constituting “propaganda for war” (ICCPR). While such restrictions would plainly be struck down as unconstitutional affronts to free speech in the U.S., this more restrictive approach prevails in most liberal democracies’ treatment of harmful speech.

Set aside the legal issue for now. How should we think about how to determine the limits of the moral right free speech? Those seeking to justify limits on speech tend to appeal to one of two strategies (Howard and Simpson forthcoming). The first strategy appeals to the importance of balancing free speech against other moral values when they come into conflict. This strategy involves external limits on free speech. (The next strategy, discussed below, invokes free speech itself, or the values that justify it, as limit-setting rationales; it thus involves internal limits on free speech.)

A balancing approach recognizes a moral conflict between unfettered communication and external values. Consider again the case of hate speech, understood as expression that attacks members of socially vulnerable groups as inferior or dangerous. On all of the theories canvassed above, there are grounds for thinking that restrictions on hate speech are prima facie in violation of the moral right to free speech. Banning hate speech to prevent people from hearing ideas that might incline them to bigotry plainly seems to disrespect listener autonomy. Further, even when speakers are expressing prejudiced views, they are still engaging their autonomous faculties. Certainly, they are expressing views on questions of public political concern, even false ones. And as thinkers they are engaged in the communication of sincere testimony to others. On many of the leading theories, the values underpinning free speech seem to be militate against bans on hate speech.

Even so, other values matter. Consider, for example, the value of upholding the equal dignity of all citizens. A central insight of critical race theory is that public expressions of white supremacy, for example, attack and undermine that equal dignity (Matsuda, Lawrence, Delgado, & Crenshaw 1993). On Jeremy Waldron’s view (2012), hate speech is best understood as a form of group defamation, launching spurious attacks on others’ reputations and thereby undermining their standing as respected equals in their own community (relatedly, see Beauharnais v. Illinois 1952).

Countries that ban hate speech, accordingly, are plausibly understood not as opposed to free speech, but as recognizing the importance that it be balanced when conflicting with other values. Such balancing can be understood in different ways. In European human rights law, for example, the relevant idea is that the right to free speech is balanced against other rights ; the relevant task, accordingly, is to specify what counts as a proportionate balance between these rights (see Alexy 2003; J. Greene 2021).

For others, the very idea of balancing rights undermines their deontic character. This alternative framing holds that the balancing occurs before we specify what rights are; on this view, we balance interests against each other, and only once we’ve undertaken that balancing do we proceed to define what our rights protect. As Scanlon puts it,

The only balancing is balancing of interests. Rights are not balanced, but are defined, or redefined, in the light of the balance of interests and of empirical facts about how these interests can best be protected. (2008: 78)

This balancing need not come in the form of some crude consequentialism; otherwise it would be acceptable to limit the rights of the few to secure trivial benefits for the many. On a contractualist moral theory such as Scanlon’s, the test is to assess the strength of any given individual’s reason to engage in (or access) the speech, against the strength of any given individual’s reason to oppose it.

Note that those who engage in balancing need not give up on the idea of viewpoint neutrality; they can accept that, as a general principle, the state should not restrict speech on the grounds that it disapproves of its message and dislikes that others will hear it. The point, instead, is that this commitment is defeasible; it is possible to be overridden.

One final comment is apt. Those who are keen to balance free speech against other values tend to be motivated by the concern that speech can cause harm, either directly or indirectly (on this distinction, see Schauer 1993). But to justify restrictions on speech, it is not sufficient (and perhaps not even necessary) to show that such speech imposes or risks imposing harm. The crucial point is that the speech is wrongful (or, perhaps, wrongfully harmful or risky) , breaching a moral duty that speakers owe to others. Yet very few in the free speech literature think that the mere offensiveness of speech is sufficient to justify restrictions on it. Even Joel Feinberg, who thinks offensiveness can sometimes be grounds for restricting conduct, makes a sweeping exception for

[e]xpressions of opinion, especially about matters of public policy, but also about matters of empirical fact, and about historical, scientific, theological, philosophical, political, and moral questions. (1985: 44)

And in many cases, offensive speech may be actively salutary, as when racists are offended by defenses of racial equality (Waldron 1987). Accordingly, despite how large it looms in public debate, discussion of offensive speech will not play a major role in the discussion here.

We saw that one way to justify limits on free speech is to balance it against other values. On that approach, free speech is externally constrained. A second approach, in contrast, is internally constrained. On this approach, the very values that justify free speech themselves determine its own limits. This is a revisionist approach to free speech since, unlike orthodox thinking, it contends that a commitment to free speech values can counterintuitively support the restriction of speech—a surprising inversion of traditional thinking on the topic (see Howard and Simpson forthcoming). This move—justifying restrictions on speech by appealing to the values that underpin free speech—is now prevalent in the philosophical literature (for an overview, see Barendt 2005: 1ff).

Consider, for example, the claim that free speech is justified by concerns of listener autonomy. On such a view, as we saw above, autonomous citizens have interests in exposure to a wide range of viewpoints, so that they can decide for themselves what to believe. But many have pointed out that this is not autonomous citizens’ only interest; they also have interests in not getting murdered by those incited by incendiary speakers (Amdur 1980). Likewise, insofar as being targeted by hate speech undermines the exercise of one’s autonomous capacities, appeal to the underlying value of autonomy could well support restrictions on such speech (Brison 1998; see also Brink 2001). What’s more, if our interests as listeners in acquiring accurate information is undermined by fraudulent information, then restrictions on such information could well be compatible with our status as autonomous; this was one of the insights that led Scanlon to complicate his theory of free speech (1978).

Or consider the theory that free speech is justified because of its role in enabling autonomous speakers to express themselves. But as Japa Pallikkathayil has argued, some speech can intimidate its audiences into staying silent (as with some hate speech), out of fear for what will happen if they speak up (Pallikkathayil 2020). In principle, then, restrictions on hate speech may serve to support the value of speaker expression, rather than undermine it (see also Langton 2018; Maitra 2009; Maitra & McGowan 2007; and Matsuda 1989: 2337). Indeed, among the most prominent claims in feminist critiques of pornography is precisely that it silences women—not merely through its (perlocutionary) effects in inspiring rape, but more insidiously through its (illocutionary) effects in altering the force of the word “no” (see MacKinnon 1984; Langton 1993; and West 204 [2022]; McGowan 2003 and 2019; cf. Kramer 2021, pp. 160ff).

Now consider democracy theories. On the one hand, democracy theorists are adamant that citizens should be free to discuss any proposals, even the destruction of democracy itself (e.g., Meiklejohn 1948: 65–66). On the other hand, it isn’t obvious why citizens’ duties as democratic citizens could not set a limit to their democratic speech rights (Howard 2019a). The Nazi propagandist Goebbels is said to have remarked:

This will always remain one of the best jokes of democracy, that it gave its deadly enemies the means by which it was destroyed. (as quoted in Fox & Nolte 1995: 1)

But it is not clear why this is necessarily so. Why should we insist on a conception of democracy that contains a self-destruct mechanism? Merely stipulating that democracy requires this is not enough (see A. Greene and Simpson 2017).

Finally, consider Shiffrin’s thinker-based theory. Shiffrin’s view is especially well-placed to explain why varieties of harmful communications are protected speech; what the theory values is the sincere transmission of veridical testimony, whereby speakers disclose what they genuinely believe to others, even if what they believe is wrongheaded and dangerous. Yet because the sincere testimony of thinkers is what qualifies some communication for protection, Shiffrin is adamant that lying falls outside the protective ambit of freedom of expression (2014) This, then, sets an internal limit on her own theory (even if she herself disfavors all lies’ outright prohibition for reasons of tolerance). The claim that lying falls outside the protective ambit of free speech is itself a recurrent suggestion in the literature (Strauss 1991: 355; Brown 2023). In an era of rampant disinformation, this internal limit is of substantial practical significance.

Suppose the moral right (or principle) of free speech is limited, as most think, such that not all communications fall within its protective ambit (either for external reasons, internal reasons, or both). Even so, it does not follow that laws banning such unprotected speech can be justified all-things-considered. Further moral tests must be passed before any particular policy restricting speech can be justified. This sub-section focuses on the requirement that speech restrictions be proportionate .

The idea that laws implicating fundamental rights must be proportionate is central in many jurisdictions’ constitutional law, as well as in the international law of human rights. As a representative example, consider the specification of proportionality offered by the Supreme Court of Canada:

First, the measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair, or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this first sense, should impair “as little as possible” the right or freedom in question[…] Third, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of “sufficient importance” ( R v. Oakes 1986).

It is this third element (often called “proportionality stricto sensu ”) on which we will concentrate here; this is the focused sense of proportionality that roughly tracks how the term is used in the philosophical literatures on defensive harm and war, as well as (with some relevant differences) criminal punishment. (The strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny tests of U.S. constitutional law are arguably variations of the proportionality test; but set aside this complication for now as it distracts from the core philosophical issues. For relevant legal discussion, see Tsesis 2020.)

Proportionality, in the strict sense, concerns the relation between the costs or harms imposed by some measure and the benefits that the measure is designed to secure. The organizing distinction in recent philosophical literature (albeit largely missing in the literature on free speech) is one between narrow proportionality and wide proportionality . While there are different ways to cut up the terrain between these terms, let us stipulatively define them as follows. An interference is narrowly proportionate just in case the intended target of the interference is liable to bear the costs of that interference. An interference is widely proportionate just in case the collateral costs that the interference unintentionally imposes on others can be justified. (This distinction largely follows the literature in just war theory and the ethics of defensive force; see McMahan 2009.) While the distinction is historically absent from free speech theory, it has powerful payoffs in helping to structure this chaotic debate (as argued in Howard 2019a).

So start with the idea that restrictions on communication must be narrowly proportionate . For a restriction to be narrowly proportionate, those whose communications are restricted must be liable to bear their costs, such that they are not wronged by their imposition. One standard way to be liable to bear certain costs is to have a moral duty to bear them (Tadros 2012). So, for example, if speakers have a moral duty to refrain from libel, hate speech, or some other form of harmful speech, they are liable to bear at least some costs involved in the enforcement of that duty. Those costs cannot be unlimited; a policy of executing hate speakers could not plausibly be justified. Typically, in both defensive and punitive contexts, wrongdoers’ liability is determined by their culpability, the severity of their wrong, or some combination of the two. While it is difficult to say in the abstract what the precise maximal cost ceiling is for any given restriction, as it depends hugely on the details, the point is simply that there is some ceiling above which a speech restriction (like any restriction) imposes unacceptably high costs, even on wrongdoers.

Second, for a speech restriction to be justified, we must also show that it would be widely proportionate . Suppose a speaker is liable to bear the costs of some policy restricting her communication, such that she is not wronged by its imposition. It may be that the collateral costs of such a policy would render it unacceptable. One set of costs is chilling effects , the “overdeterrence of benign conduct that occurs incidentally to a law’s legitimate purpose or scope” (Kendrick 2013: 1649). The core idea is that laws targeting unprotected, legitimately proscribed expression may nevertheless end up having a deleterious impact on protected expression. This is because laws are often vague, overbroad, and in any case are likely to be misapplied by fallible officials (Schauer 1978: 699).

Note that if a speech restriction produces chilling effects, it does not follow that the restriction should not exist at all. Rather, concern about chilling effects instead suggests that speech restrictions should be under-inclusive—restricting less speech than is actually harmful—in order to create “breathing space”, or “a buffer zone of strategic protection” (Schauer 1978: 710) for legitimate expression and so reduce unwanted self-censorship. For example, some have argued that even though speech can cause harm recklessly or negligently, we should insist on specific intent as the mens rea of speech crimes in order to reduce any chilling effects that could follow (Alexander 1995: 21–128; Schauer 1978: 707; cf. Kendrick 2013).

But chilling effects are not the only sort of collateral effects to which speech restrictions could lead. Earlier we noted the risk that states might abuse their censorial powers. This, too, could militate in favor of underinclusive speech restrictions. Or the implication could be more radical. Consider the problem that it is difficult to author restrictions on hate speech in a tightly specified way; the language involved is open-ended in a manner that enables states to exercise considerable judgment in deciding what speech-acts, in fact, count as violations (see Strossen 2018). Given the danger that the state will misuse or abuse these laws to punish legitimate speech, some might think this renders their enactment widely disproportionate. Indeed, even if the law were well-crafted and would be judiciously applied by current officials, the point is that those in the future may not be so trustworthy.

Those inclined to accept such a position might simply draw the conclusion that legislatures ought to refrain from enacting laws against hate speech. A more radical conclusion is that the legal right to free speech ought to be specified so that hate speech is constitutionally protected. In other words, we ought to give speakers a legal right to violate their moral duties, since enforcing those moral duties through law is simply too risky. By appealing to this logic, it is conceivable that the First Amendment position on hate speech could be justified all-things-considered—not because the underlying moral right to free speech protects hate speech, but because hate speech must be protected for instrumental reasons of preventing future abuses of power (Howard 2019a).

Suppose certain restrictions on harmful speech can be justified as proportionate, in both the narrow and wide senses. This is still not sufficient to justify them all-things-considered. Additionally, they must be justified as necessary . (Note that some conceptions of proportionality in human rights law encompass the necessity requirement, but this entry follows the prevailing philosophical convention by treating them as distinct.)

Why might restrictions on harmful speech be unnecessary? One of the standard claims in the free speech literature is that we should respond to harmful speech not by banning it, but by arguing back against it. Counter-speech—not censorship—is the appropriate solution. This line of reasoning is old. As John Milton put it in 1644: “Let [Truth] and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open encounter?” The insistence on counter-speech as the remedy for harmful speech is similarly found, as noted above, throughout chapter 2 of Mill’s On Liberty .

For many scholars, this line of reply is justified by the fact that they think the harmful speech in question is protected by the moral right to free speech. For such scholars, counter-speech is the right response because censorship is morally off the table. For other scholars, the recourse to counter-speech has a plausible distinct rationale (although it is seldom articulated): its possibility renders legal restrictions unnecessary. And because it is objectionable to use gratuitous coercion, legal restrictions are therefore impermissible (Howard 2019a). Such a view could plausibly justify Mill’s aforementioned analysis in the corn dealer example, whereby censorship is permissible but only when there’s no time for counter-speech—a view that is also endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969).

Whether this argument succeeds depends upon a wide range of further assumptions—about the comparable effectiveness of counter-speech relative to law; about the burdens that counter-speech imposes on prospective counter-speakers. Supposing that the argument succeeds, it invites a range of further normative questions about the ethics of counter-speech. For example, it is important who has the duty to engage in counter-speech, who its intended audience is, and what specific forms the counter-speech ought to take—especially in order to maximize its persuasive effectiveness (Brettschneider 2012; Cepollaro, Lepoutre, & Simpson 2023; Howard 2021b; Lepoutre 2021; Badano & Nuti 2017). It is also important to ask questions about the moral limits of counter-speech. For example, insofar as publicly shaming wrongful speakers has become a prominent form of counter-speech, it is crucial to interrogate its permissibility (e.g., Billingham and Parr 2020).

This final section canvasses the young philosophical debate concerning freedom of speech on the internet. With some important exceptions (e.g., Barendt 2005: 451ff), this issue has only recently accelerated (for an excellent edited collection, see Brison & Gelber 2019). There are many normative questions to be asked about the moral rights and obligations of internet platforms. Here are three. First, do internet platforms have moral duties to respect the free speech of their users? Second, do internet platforms have moral duties to restrict (or at least refrain from amplifying) harmful speech posted by their users? And finally, if platforms do indeed have moral duties to restrict harmful speech, should those duties be legally enforced?

The reference to internet platforms , is a deliberate focus on large-scale social media platforms, through which people can discover and publicly share user-generated content. We set aside other entities such as search engines (Whitney & Simpson 2019), important though they are. That is simply because the central political controversies, on which philosophical input is most urgent, concern the large social-media platforms.

Consider the question of whether internet platforms have moral duties to respect the free speech of their users. One dominant view in the public discourse holds that the answer is no . On this view, platforms are private entities, and as such enjoy the prerogative to host whatever speech they like. This would arguably be a function of them having free speech rights themselves. Just as the free speech rights of the New York Times give it the authority to publish whatever op-eds it sees fit, the free speech rights of platforms give them the authority to exercise editorial or curatorial judgment about what speech to allow. On this view, if Facebook were to decide to become a Buddhist forum, amplifying the speech of Buddhist users and promoting Buddhist perspectives and ideas, and banning speech promoting other religions, it would be entirely within its moral (and thus proper legal) rights to do so. So, too, if it were to decide to become an atheist forum.

A radical alternative view holds that internet platforms constitute a public forum , a term of art from U.S. free speech jurisprudence used to designate spaces “designed for and dedicated to expressive activities” ( Southeastern Promotions Ltd., v. Conrad 1975). As Kramer has argued:

social-media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter and YouTube have become public fora. Although the companies that create and run those platforms are not morally obligated to sustain them in existence at all, the role of controlling a public forum morally obligates each such company to comply with the principle of freedom of expression while performing that role. No constraints that deviate from the kinds of neutrality required under that principle are morally legitimate. (Kramer 2021: 58–59)

On this demanding view, platforms’ duties to respect speech are (roughly) identical to the duties of states. Accordingly, if efforts by the state to restrict hate speech, pornography, and public health misinformation (for example) are objectionable affronts to free speech, so too are platforms’ content moderation rules for such content. A more moderate view does not hold that platforms are public forums as such, but holds that government channels or pages qualify as public forums (the claim at issue in Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump (2019).)

Even if we deny that platforms constitute public forums, it is plausible that they engage in a governance function of some kind (Klonick 2018). As Jack Balkin has argued, the traditional model of free speech, which sees it as a relation between speakers and the state, is today plausibly supplanted by a triadic model, involving a more complex relation between speakers, governments, and intermediaries (2004, 2009, 2018, 2021). If platforms do indeed have some kind of governance function, it may well trigger responsibilities for transparency and accountability (as with new legislation such as the EU’s Digital Services Act and the UK’s Online Safety Act).

Second, consider the question of whether platforms have a duty to remove harmful content posted by users. Even those who regard them as public forums could agree that platforms may have a moral responsibility to remove illegal unprotected speech. Yet a dominant view in the public debate has historically defended platforms’ place as mere conduits for others’ speech. This is the current position under U.S. law (as with 47 U.S. Code §230), which broadly exempts platforms from liability for much illegal speech, such as defamation. On this view, we should view platforms as akin to bulletin boards: blame whoever posts wrongful content, but don’t hold the owner of the board responsible.

This view is under strain. Even under current U.S. law, platforms are liable for removing some content, such as child sexual abuse material and copyright infringements, suggesting that it is appropriate to demand some accountability for the wrongful content posted by others. An increasing body of philosophical work explores the idea that platforms are indeed morally responsible for removing extreme content. For example, some have argued that platforms have a special responsibility to prevent the radicalization that occurs on their networks, given the ways in which extreme content is amplified to susceptible users (Barnes 2022). Without engaging in moderation (i.e., removal) of harmful content, platforms are plausibly complicit with the wrongful harms perpetrated by users (Howard forthcoming).

Yet it remains an open question what a responsible content moderation policy ought to involve. Many are tempted by a juridical model, whereby platforms remove speech in accordance with clearly announced rules, with user appeals mechanisms in place for individual speech decisions to ensure they are correctly made (critiqued in Douek 2022b). Yet platforms have billions of users and remove millions of pieces of content per week. Accordingly, perfection is not possible. Moving quickly to remove harmful content during a crisis—e.g., Covid misinformation—will inevitably increase the number of false positives (i.e., legitimate speech taken down as collateral damage). It is plausible that the individualistic model of speech decisions adopted by courts is decidedly implausible to help us govern online content moderation; as noted in Douek 2021 and 2022a, what is needed is analysis of how the overall system should operate at scale, with a focus on achieving proportionality between benefits and costs. Alternatively, one might double down and insist that the juridical model is appropriate, given the normative significance of speech. And if it is infeasible for social-media companies to meet its demands given their size, then all the worse for social-media companies. On this view, it is they who must bend to meet the moral demands of free speech theory, not the other way around.

Substantial philosophical work needs to be done to deliver on this goal. The work is complicated by the fact that artificial intelligence (AI) is central to the processes of content moderation; human moderators, themselves subjected to terrible working conditions at long hours, work in conjunction with machine learning tools to identify and remove content that platforms have restricted. Yet AI systems notoriously are as biased as their training data. Further, their “black box” decisions are cryptic and cannot be easily understood. Given that countless speech decisions will necessarily be made without human involvement, it is right to ask whether it is reasonable to expect users to accept the deliverances of machines (e.g., see Vredenburgh 2022; Lazar forthcoming a). Note that machine intelligence is used not merely for content moderation, narrowly understood as the enforcement of rules about what speech is allowed. It is also deployed for the broader practice of content curation, determining what speech gets amplified — raising the question of what normative principles should govern such amplification; see Lazar forthcoming b).

Finally, there is the question of legal enforcement. Showing that platforms have the moral responsibility to engage in content moderation is necessary to justifying its codification into a legal responsibility. Yet it is not sufficient; one could accept that platforms have moral duties to moderate (some) harmful speech while also denying that those moral duties ought to be legally enforced. A strong, noninstrumental version of such a view would hold that while speakers have moral duties to refrain from wrongful speech, and platforms have duties not to platform or amplify it, the coercive enforcement of such duties would violate the moral right to freedom of expression. A more contingent, instrumental version of the view would hold that legal enforcement is not in principle impermissible; but in practice, it is simply too risky to grant the state the authority to enforce platforms’ and speakers’ moral duties, given the potential for abuse and overreach.

Liberals who champion the orthodox interpretation of the First Amendment, yet insist on robust content moderation, likely hold one or both of these views. Yet globally such views seem to be in the minority. Serious legislation is imminent that will subject social-media companies to burdensome regulation, in the form of such laws as the Digital Services Act in the European Union and the Online Safety Bill in the UK. Normatively evaluating such legislation is a pressing task. So, too, is the task of designing normative theories to guide the design of content moderation systems, and the wider governance of the digital public sphere. On both fronts, political philosophers should get back to work.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.
  • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) , adopted: 16 December 1966; Entry into force: 23 March 1976.
  • Free Speech Debate
  • Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University
  • van Mill, David, “Freedom of Speech”, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2023 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2023/entries/freedom-speech/ >. [This was the previous entry on this topic in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy – see the version history .]

ethics: search engines and | hate speech | legal rights | liberalism | Mill, John Stuart | Mill, John Stuart: moral and political philosophy | pornography: and censorship | rights | social networking and ethics | toleration

Acknowledgments

I am grateful to the editors and anonymous referees of this Encyclopedia for helpful feedback. I am greatly indebted to Robert Mark Simpson for many incisive suggestions, which substantially improved the entry. This entry was written while on a fellowship funded by UK Research & Innovation (grant reference MR/V025600/1); I am thankful to UKRI for the support.

Copyright © 2024 by Jeffrey W. Howard < jeffrey . howard @ ucl . ac . uk >

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Freedom of Expression, a Fundamental Human Right

About the author, ban ki-moon.

Freedom of expression is a fundamental human right, enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But around the world, there are governments and those wielding power who find many ways to obstruct it.

They impose high taxes on newsprint, making newspapers so expensive that people can't afford to buy them. Independent radio and TV stations are forced off the air if they criticize Government policy. The censors are also active in cyberspace, restricting the use of the Internet and new media.

Some journalists risk intimidation, detention and even their lives, simply for exercising their right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas, through any media, and regardless of frontiers.

Last year, UNESCO condemned the killing of 77 journalists. These were not high-profile war correspondents, killed in the heat of battle. Most of them worked for small, local publications in peacetime. They were killed for attempting to expose wrongdoing or corruption.

I condemn these murders and insist that the perpetrators are brought to justice. All Governments have a duty to protect those who work in the media. This protection must include investigating and prosecuting those who commit crimes against journalists.

Impunity gives the green light to criminals and murderers, and empowers those who have something to hide. Over the long term, it has a corrosive and corrupting effect on society as a whole.

This year's theme is Freedom of Information: the right to know. I welcome the global trend towards new laws which recognize the universal right to publicly held information. Unfortunately, these new laws do not always translate into action. Requests for official information are often refused, or delayed, sometimes for years. At times, poor information management is to blame. But all too often, this happens because of a culture of secrecy and a lack of accountability.

We must work to change attitudes and to raise awareness. People have a right to information that affects their lives, and states have a duty to provide this information. Such transparency is essential to good government.

The UN Chronicle  is not an official record. It is privileged to host senior United Nations officials as well as distinguished contributors from outside the United Nations system whose views are not necessarily those of the United Nations. Similarly, the boundaries and names shown, and the designations used, in maps or articles do not necessarily imply endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.

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Multilingual Education: A Key to Quality and Inclusive Learning

The potential of multilingual education is enormous, but realizing its full benefits requires a commitment to lifelong learning and a deeper appreciation of the value of linguistic diversity.

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In Turning the Tide Against Female Genital Mutilation, Survivors Can Be Effective Agents of Change

This year’s global campaign on the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation focuses on the voices, stories and initiatives of survivors in leading the #EndFGM movement.

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What is freedom of expression and why is it important.

ICORN Network Meeting 2017. In Other Words. Peter Normann Waage lecture on What is Freedom of Expression and Why is it so Important? Photo. Photo: Marianne Hovdan

Safeguarding freedom of expression is at the core of ICORN's work. But what is freedom of expression and why is it so important. Norwegian writer and journalist, Peter Normann Waage, tried to answer this question in his speech with the same title at the ICORN Network Meeting in Lillehammer 2 June 2017. 

First, let's have a look at the most obvious answers.

Without free flow of information and critique the society doesn't function – or it functions very badly. A closed, censored society will soon become somethig like an autocracy with corruption and frightened servants instead of citizens. Whether they like it or not, the people in power in the long run need critique and open information. As lord Acton put it: «Power corrupts. Absolute power corrupts absolutly».

But some heads of states, for example in China – and not only those, but also leading politicians in the West – argue that freedom of speech is not so important: look instead at all those people who have been lifted out of poverty and therefore have a better life. But those using this argument close their eyes to the fact that freedom of speech is not a derivative right. It is a right that guarantees all the other rights. It is a right that makes the rest possible, also the social rights. Looking at China and India in the 1950's we see countries ravaged by famine. In China, it led to millions of deaths. In India, the deaths were minimal. In China, there were no channels for information. Hence hardly any assistance came to disaster areas. In India even the smallest local paper reported what was about to happen, and the central government intervened.

Also business suffers without free flow of information. How is it possible to built trust between business partners when nobody is certain that what you hear is right? Therefore, if the businessmen understood their real, long term interests, they should support the struggle for freedom of expression. This is not always the case – as you know.

Then, let's look at some more profound answers and problems related to the above questions.

It is said that freedom of speech is not just a human right, but the fundamental human right. Without this right all other rights are in jeopardy. Is that correct? If so why? And why should we have freedom of speech when it continually insults, hurts and stirs up groups in society. The question is particularly urgent at a time when "society" is not limited by national boundaries, but has become global.  Therefore we might ask: Do we not need a freedom of speech with limits, limits that are adapted to our time?

Freedom of speech is intensely present at the intersection between law and ethics – this is at the core of the problems it creates. Even if something is ethically correct, it isn't necessarily legally guaranteed. Something that is within the legal framework, may not be very ethical.

As I mentioned, we live in communities that are not limited by national borders. In an instant information may be conveyed to the world, something that is especially problematic when it comes to pictures. While messages clothed in words retain their context and convey the sender's intent even when translated or transmitted – if conveyed correctly – pictures are not in the same way self-explanatory. The recipient must put the pictures into a context where they can be understood, and naturally they are understood in the cultural context of the beholder.

This became only too clear with the controversy over the Danish cartoons some eleven years ago. [1]

It is obviously easier to break the taboos of others than one's own, particularly if one has barely any taboos left. But should one do this, in the name of freedom of expression and speech?

'No,' concluded amongst others The Muslim Council of Britain and the Anglican Church. These two bodies tried in 2005 and 2006 to add defamation of religion to the legal prohibition of racist speech. The British Labour party agreed and the then Prime Minister Tony Blair was so confident of victory that he left the parliament before the vote. But the British PEN and the comedian Rowan Atkinson (Mr. Bean) were at the forefront of a protest movement. PEN published the book “Free Expression is no Offence” with contributions by Salman Rushdie and Hanif Kureishi among others. Atkinson believed he could lose his job if the act was passed. It was not. It lacked one vote. If Blair had not left parliament his casting vote would have passed the act. This happened in the country that once led the European struggle for freedom of speech.

A somewhat milder version of the act was passed in 2007. It prohibits threats and intended hatred of a religion and its followers. Under the guise of this act the police acted against UK Channel Four because the TV company produced a program where reporters with a hidden camera and microphone revealed that imams in a specific mosque used hate rhetoric against  "Jews, women, homosexuals and so-called adulterers." Note that it was not the Imams who were investigated, but the journalists. It took nine months for them to clear themselves.

Both the draft legislation and the final act must be seen in connection with the Organization of Islamic Conference's longstanding efforts to establish a ban on "defamation of religion" in the UN Declaration of Human Rights.

Is this not OK? Shouldn`t believers be protected? We will conclude later by returning to the question on broader grounds. First I will consider one of the measures used to protect minorities against abuses in the name of freedom of speech, The legislation against "hate speech", as it is expressed in the Norwegian penal code section 135a. Here we have a ban against presenting hateful or discriminatory remarks against someone on the basis of religion, ethnicity and sexual orientation.

The provision is rarely used, on the ground that it is better that frustration, bitterness and hatred come to light, so that, as the Norwegian phrase has it, "trolls burst in the light of day”. Even the most venomous claims must be met with justifiable and rational arguments in public. It is far better that we know what we are facing, and it is also better that such views are openly expressed than if they were to ferment in closed rooms, in echo-chambres.

The position has its merits, but is also problematic. I will give you some arguments pro et contra Firstly the comparison with "trolls who burst in the light" is a rather condescending attitude, condescending not to hateful cries, but to the arguments of others that may seem harsh but at the same time may point to serious problems with specific minorities, for example.

Secondly, the relationship between hate speech and the arguments we meet it with, is not simple. Hatred may well lead to more hatred, no matter how it is met at the rational level. Arguments do not necessarily lead to rational reflection. And groups that are constantly discussed in negative terms, can develop contempt for the greater society and turn against it.

And perhaps most importantly: The relationship between thoughts, words and actions is a dynamic relationship. To shout out fire in a crowded theater when there is no danger, is an obvious example of an utterance that leads to disastrous practical consequences. Calling people names or by objectifying them in other ways, paves the way for assaulting the same groups. Lenin used words like "beetles and pests" when he spoke of alleged enemies of the new Soviet state. They were to be cleaned out and destroyed. In Rwanda, on official radio channels, Tutsis were called "cockroaches", which clearly signaled that they should be destroyed – and this was attempted.

In Salman Rushdie's Satanic Verses the two main characters Saladin Chamcha and Gibreel Farishta are brought to a strange hospital in London. All admissions are non-Western, but transformed into half wolf, half human, to creatures with skins of glass or grotesque assemblages of plants and people: "But how do they do it?" Chamcha wanted to know. "They describe us," whispered the other solemnly. "Nothing more. They have the ability to describe us, and we now succumb to the pictures they construct."

It is no coincidence that most philosophical systems let a moral teaching be the result of an epistemology: An action plan follows the philosophical investigation of a problem. “Behind every action is a thought, even if it not always is the one acting, that has thought it," says an aphorism. Equally true is that every thought seeks to be realized, it will lead to action.

Who is responsible for an action taken? The person who puts the idea into action, or the one who provides the ideological justification for it? – This is one of the fundamental questions in Dostoevsky's novel The Brothers Karamazov – and for that matter, the relationship between «Fjordman» and Anders Behring Breivik.

We are not, however, talking about legal responsibility, but moral. This does not reduce the dilemma with regard to freedom of speech. As we know, the right is characterized precisely by its existence in the intersection between law and ethics.

This becomes evident in the case of critique of religion. What is legitimate criticism of religion? How is satire to be practiced, if it does not ridicule anyone?

A tentative solution is to claim that only those who are within a group, can criticize it. Only Muslims can criticize Islam and other Muslims. This is an intriguing thought, for with what legitimacy can I criticize the customs of others? How do I know what the problem is and how it best might be adressed, if I'm an outsider? Is it not better to allow those with taboos the time to break them themselves.

Such reasoning is seductive: But if we scratch the surface, we discover that this argument leads to absurdities. In his article "Pressure on Press Freedom" Frederik Stjernfelt refers to the debate surrounding the Mohammed cartoons and quotes one Ian Buruma who argues that only those who are within can criticize Islam. Even Ayaan Hirsi Ali is stripped of the right to speak – because she is no longer a Muslim. The consequence is that only those who agree with a point of view or a worldview can criticize it – which is meaningless. It also implies that all with a particular ethnicity, or who follow the same religion are the same. They belong to their group more than to themselves.

If criticism of traditional customs cannot come from outside or from "apostates," then it is hard to get rid of old traditions that oppress the individual in the name of culture, such as female genital mutilation or forced marriage. Then your culture might look like a celebratory costume, but it is a straitjacket. And you loose your individual rights.

We are closing in on the question «Why freedom of expression»

In the mid-1990s I was in St. Petersburg with the former chairman of the Norwegian Freedom of Speech Commission, Francis Sejersted. He had been invited to a televised debate with Governor Vladimir Jakovlev. The theme was freedom of speech.

After the recording, I asked Sejersted how it had turned out. "You know," he replied, "Jakovlev opened by declaring that certainly we shall have freedom of speech. But what is expressed must be true. And then I had him! "

The reason is obvious. Jakovlev – and others who think like him – knows what «the truth» is. Their position implies that truth is something that comes to one from the outside, that truth is imparted by an authority, a priest, a scribe or a party official, or that it is something you can collect like a package at the post office. But, as Bob Dylan puts it: «There are no truths outside the gates of Eden» When man had eaten from the tree of knowledge, the given truth disappeared. Each and one of us has to find his or her truth.

And as John Stuart Mill put it: «We need freedom of expression to find the truth», not to uncover it. Truth is a very personal and intimate concept. It can only be achieved by the individual, all the while all these individual truths must confront each other in the public sphere.

Freedom of speech is necessary so that each and every one of us should be able to develop and maintain both independence and dignity.

Therefore, it is such an irreplaceable value.

But what about violations of minorities, and what about their freedom of speech?

In the case of violations, we must be aware of how easy it is to confuse an individual’s dignity with a group's dignity. Nationalism systematizes this confusion and lives by it. It turns the individual into a kind of species, more close to the animal kingdom than to human existence.

So-called multiculturalism carries the same threat. It is not the prefix "multi" there is something wrong with - diversity is a stimulating reality - but the rest of the word: it implies that culture is superior to the individual. Culture, not the individual, has rights. But can culture have rights? Would not such a collective right be damaging to the individual who identifies with the group? Are you so sure that a Muslim, Sikh or Christian must agree with everything that other Muslims, Sikhs or Christians say and do? With such an idea of rights we risk letting the most dogmatic and reactionary in each group define the guidelines that apply to the other members.

Originally multiculturalism was an anthropological approach called "cultural relativism." As a method it made good sense. All phenomena must be understood on their own terms. Cultural relativism is this insight used in the cultural field. But the method was elevated to a description of reality. The result was that it became an ideology named multiculturalism: Cultures must be preserved, not individuals.

A group cannot have rights. A group - or a mass - cannot collectively be said to have dignity or cognitive ability. These are qualities only individuals can possess. Each individual must be allowed to join any religion or ideological grouping. But religion as such cannot have any rights. If so, members are forced to be subordinate to their group affiliation. Then the individual is dressed in a celebratory costume that turns out to be a straitjacket. Then each individual must be subordinate to what tradition and culture prescribes. Women in traditional societies become culturally destined to play second fiddle and to entrust the management of their lives to others.

But hold on!

Is not freedom of speech the child of a particular culture? Does it not have specific western assumptions that are strangers in other cultural contexts? Freedom of speech was perhaps born in one culture group, but I argue that it has universal validity. Antibiotics also come from the West. None would still refuse to export or import it.

Freedom of expression is also a necessity in our times, beause it liberates the individual and teaches him or her to think outside the traditional values. In our modern world everything is changing and everybody is moving, even if it looks like one is standing still. The reality around us is changing so fast that hardly any traditional solution is good enough. Therefore it is a crime to argue that one culture, one religion or some other tradition is more sacred than the single individual. This deprives the people living within the culture in question the possibility of finding their bearing in a modern world. The ability to make decisions independently of tradition is a must in a reality where all cultures and religions so to speak meet in each stairway. The ability to stand independently and courageously facing life is needed in a world where even what once was absolutely certain, like the boundaries between life and death, have become variable and uncertain. A child born so premature it is almost an abortion can be saved, but at what cost to the child? A very old man can be kept alive, but at what cost to society and himself? A child may be born with several mothers and one or more unknown fathers. Who makes the decision? You and I.

Before I conclude, I'll make a small detour to an often overlooked prerequisite for both the individual and for independence. It's called the rule of law.

I do not think that today's so-called conflict between Islam and the West only is a conflict between a religious and a secular society. I think it is a conflict between people who live within reasonably functioning constitutional state and people who do not. And remember: Very few have the privilege to be able to trust an independent superior authority to take care of one's rights. The vast majority of the world's population lives in a reality where one must resort to one’s own for protection and security, to clan, family, religious community. And if you have to do that, it is very difficult to oppose those who provide protection. One does not bite the hand that provides food. In this case it is easiest to believe in authority, that truth is passed from above, that one is not a free individual but a spearhead for family, relatives and traditions.

Those that have been lucky enough to be born under the rule of law can seek shelter – in the same rule of law. Then it is far easier to be independent and oppose tradition, religion or whatever.

Freedom of speech can call attention to this. Where there previously was only one authority, there are suddenly many. Then you must think for yourself. Then you have to find your own truth. But if freedom of speech in the West is predominantly used, for example, to mock what Muslims consider to be holy, then Muslims living in a European constitutional state will easily be pushed from state and society and join the ranks. Authority again becomes one: Their own traditions.

I further believe that the horrors we in the West are experiencing from Muslim fundamentalists are not directed mainly against the West. They are side-effects of a struggle within the Islamic world itself, for and against modernization, for and against the idea that each individual has an independent thinking ability, for and against the idea that authority is one.

The more threats of violence, or real attacks, the more important it is to hold high the banner of freedom of speech. It is the only banner for human cohabitation in a complex world.

What about the often used argument that we should show both tolerance and respect? Of course! But they have to be directed towards diferent targets. Respect is something that applies to people, not ideas or beliefs. Tolerance is an attitude I exhibit to opinions I do not agree with. Of course, the border between the believer and the belief is sometimes hard to see, especially for the believer himself: Whatever religion, non-religion or ideology a person feels at home with, he or she will look upon it as a part of one's identity, as a part of oneself. But, I have identities – as a man or woman, a believer or non-believer, as a member of a nation and a language community – still, I am not my identies. Therefore, we should learn to respect the person and tolerate the ideas, even those we wildly disagree with and critizise. They should not be prohibited, but – cririzised.

The believers of all denominations are entitled to protection. Belief as such has no right to protection, in the sense of protection from criticism.

Although I agree that both harassing, malicious and hate speech - that targets ideas, not human beings - must be accepted in the name of freedom of speech, I harbor a persistent hope that honesty and seriousness will take first place.

The arrogant attitude towards others comes in many forms. The most common, but often overlooked, expresses itself through medias' one-eyed fascination with fury and intolerance in Muslim countries, rather than to present the champions of liberal values ​​and free speech in the same countries. Thus these heros are isolated between two walls: the authoriterian attitides in their own countries, and disregard from a West that lives in the belief that "all" Muslims are savages who yearn to burn down embassies. This has serious consequences.

The development towards understanding of free speech and the dignity of the individual must be led by people within a religion or a culture. In this sense it is true that only those who are "inside" know what the problem is and which roads lead forward. This is why International PEN and ICORN's work is so important. They help freedom fighters who are «inside and within».

I also hope that those in the West who demand and see the necessity to publish cartoons of Muhammad or insist on how wonderful it is to depict him as a dog, do something for those Muslims who have been displaced or imprisoned in their homelands for their utterances. To what degree this hope is fulfilled I cannot tell. But when it happens, this type of criticism will also be accompanied by respect for the individual.

Freedom of speech raises more ethical than legal issues, but the legal framework must be as wide as possible. Otherwise it becomes a pseudo right.

Ethically freedom of speech can create both trouble and dramatic situations. This is not something that can be regulated by law. Here utterances must be balanced and considered by the individual himself. To the extent that this occurs with ethical seriousness and through reflection about one self and about those who believe that they are offended by utterances, the ethical problems might be solved. The solutions can only be found when we turn to the foundation of free speech: The dignity of the individual – both our own and others.

[1] In the following I'll mostly examples from the Muslim communities. That does not mean that I find them «worse» than other ideologies or religions, but the respond on critical utterances and cartoons is best known in the West.

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Freedom of Expression

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

Freedom of speech, of the press, of association, of assembly and petition — this set of guarantees, protected by the First Amendment, comprises what we refer to as freedom of expression. The Supreme Court has written that this freedom is “the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom.” Without it, other fundamental rights, like the right to vote, would wither and die.

But in spite of its “preferred position” in our constitutional hierarchy, the nation’s commitment to freedom of expression has been tested over and over again. Especially during times of national stress, like war abroad or social upheaval at home, people exercising their First Amendment rights have been censored, fined, even jailed. Those with unpopular political ideas have always borne the brunt of government repression. It was during WWI — hardly ancient history — that a person could be jailed just for giving out anti-war leaflets. Out of those early cases, modern First Amendment law evolved. Many struggles and many cases later, ours is the most speech-protective country in the world.

The path to freedom was long and arduous. It took nearly 200 years to establish firm constitutional limits on the government’s power to punish “seditious” and “subversive” speech. Many people suffered along the way, such as labor leader Eugene V. Debs, who was sentenced to 10 years in prison under the Espionage Act just for telling a rally of peaceful workers to realize they were “fit for something better than slavery and cannon fodder.” Or Sidney Street, jailed in 1969 for burning an American flag on a Harlem street corner to protest the shooting of civil rights figure James Meredith. (see box)

THE FIRST AMENDMENT IGNORED

Early Americans enjoyed great freedom compared to citizens of other nations. Nevertheless, once in power, even the Constitution’s framers were guilty of overstepping the First Amendment they had so recently adopted. In 1798, during the French-Indian War, Congress passed the Alien and Sedition Act, which made it a crime for anyone to publish “any false, scandalous and malicious writing” against the government. It was used by the then-dominant Federalist Party to prosecute prominent Republican newspaper editors during the late 18th century.

Throughout the 19th century, sedition, criminal anarchy and criminal conspiracy laws were used to suppress the speech of abolitionists, religious minorities, suffragists, labor organizers, and pacifists. In Virginia prior to the Civil War, for example, anyone who “by speaking or writing maintains that owners have no right of property in slaves” was subject to a one-year prison sentence.

The early 20th century was not much better. In 1912, feminist Margaret Sanger was arrested for giving a lecture on birth control. Trade union meetings were banned and courts routinely granted injunctions prohibiting strikes and other labor protests. Violators were sentenced to prison. Peaceful protesters opposing U. S. entry into World War I were jailed for expressing their opinions. In the early 1920s, many states outlawed the display of red or black flags, symbols of communism and anarchism. In 1923, author Upton Sinclair was arrested for trying to read the text of the First Amendment at a union rally. Many people were arrested merely for membership in groups regarded as “radical” by the government. It was in response to the excesses of this period that the ACLU was founded in 1920.

Free speech rights still need constant, vigilant protection. New questions arise and old ones return. Should flag burning be a crime? What about government or private censorship of works of art that touch on sensitive issues like religion or sexuality? Should the Internet be subject to any form of government control? What about punishing college students who espouse racist or sexist opinions? In answering these questions, the history and the core values of the First Amendment should be our guide.

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

During our nation’s early era, the courts were almost universally hostile to political minorities’ First Amendment rights; free speech issues did not even reach the Supreme Court until 1919 when, in Schenck v. U.S., the Court unanimously upheld the conviction of a Socialist Party member for mailing anti-anti-war leaflets to draft-age men. A turning point occurred a few months later in Abrams v. U.S. Although the defendant’s conviction under the Espionage Act for distributing anti-war leaflets was upheld, two dissenting opinions formed the cornerstone of our modern First Amendment law. Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis D. Brandeis argued speech could only be punished if it presented “a clear and present danger” of imminent harm. Mere political advocacy, they said, was protected by the First Amendment. Eventually, these justices were able to convince a majority of the Court to adopt the “clear and present danger test.”

From then on, the right to freedom of expression grew more secure — until the 1950s and McCarthyism. The Supreme Court fell prey to the witchhunt mentality of that period, seriously weakening the “clear and present danger” test by holding that speakers could be punished if they advocated overthrowing the government — even if the danger of such an occurrence were both slight and remote. As a result, many political activists were prosecuted and jailed simply for advocating communist revolution. Loyalty oath requirements for government employees were upheld; thousands of Americans lost their jobs on the basis of flimsy evidence supplied by secret witnesses.

Finally, in 1969, in Brandenberg v. Ohio, the Supreme Court struck down the conviction of a Ku Klux Klan member, and established a new standard: Speech can be suppressed only if it is intended, and likely to produce, “imminent lawless action.” Otherwise, even speech that advocates violence is protected. The Brandenberg standard prevails today.

WHAT DOES “PROTECTED SPEECH” INCLUDE?

First Amendment protection is not limited to “pure speech” — books, newspapers, leaflets, and rallies. It also protects “symbolic speech” — nonverbal expression whose purpose is to communicate ideas. In its 1969 decision in Tinker v. Des Moines, the Court recognized the right of public school students to wear black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War. In 1989 ( Texas v. Johnson) and again in 1990 ( U.S. v. Eichman), the Court struck down government bans on “flag desecration.” Other examples of protected symbolic speech include works of art, T-shirt slogans, political buttons, music lyrics and theatrical performances.

Government can limit some protected speech by imposing “time, place and manner” restrictions. This is most commonly done by requiring permits for meetings, rallies and demonstrations. But a permit cannot be unreasonably withheld, nor can it be denied based on content of the speech. That would be what is called viewpoint discrimination — and that is unconstitutional.

When a protest crosses the line from speech to action, the government can intervene more aggressively. Political protesters have the right to picket, to distribute literature, to chant and to engage passersby in debate. But they do not have the right to block building entrances or to physically harass people.

FREE SPEECH FOR HATEMONGERS?

The ACLU has often been at the center of controversy for defending the free speech rights of groups that spew hate, such as the Ku Klux Klan and the Nazis. But if only popular ideas were protected, we wouldn’t need a First Amendment. History teaches that the first target of government repression is never the last. If we do not come to the defense of the free speech rights of the most unpopular among us, even if their views are antithetical to the very freedom the First Amendment stands for, then no one’s liberty will be secure. In that sense, all First Amendment rights are “indivisible.”

Censoring so-called hate speech also runs counter to the long-term interests of the most frequent victims of hate: racial, ethnic, religious and sexual minorities. We should not give the government the power to decide which opinions are hateful, for history has taught us that government is more apt to use this power to prosecute minorities than to protect them. As one federal judge has put it, tolerating hateful speech is “the best protection we have against any Nazi-type regime in this country.”

At the same time, freedom of speech does not prevent punishing conduct that intimidates, harasses, or threatens another person, even if words are used. Threatening phone calls, for example, are not constitutionally protected.

SPEECH & NATIONAL SECURITY

The Supreme Court has recognized the government’s interest in keeping some information secret, such as wartime troop deployments. But the Court has never actually upheld an injunction against speech on national security grounds. Two lessons can be learned from this historical fact. First, the amount of speech that can be curtailed in the interest of national security is very limited. And second, the government has historically overused the concept of “national security” to shield itself from criticism, and to discourage public discussion of controversial policies or decisions.

In 1971, the publication of the “Pentagon Papers” by the New York Times brought the conflicting claims of free speech and national security to a head. The Pentagon Papers, a voluminous secret history and analysis of the country’s involvement in Vietnam, was leaked to the press. When the Times ignored the government’s demand that it cease publication, the stage was set for a Supreme Court decision. In the landmark U.S. v. New York Times case, the Court ruled that the government could not, through “prior restraint,” block publication of any material unless it could prove that it would “surely” result in “direct, immediate, and irreparable” harm to the nation. This the government failed to prove, and the public was given access to vital information about an issue of enormous importance.

The public’s First Amendment “right to know” is essential to its ability to fully participate in democratic decision-making. As the Pentagon Papers case demonstrates, the government’s claims of “national security” must always be closely scrutinized to make sure they are valid.

UNPROTECTED EXPRESSION

The Supreme Court has recognized several limited exceptions to First Amendment protection.

  • In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942), the Court held that so-called “fighting words … which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,” are not protected. This decision was based on the fact that fighting words are of “slight social value as a step to truth.”
  • In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), the Court held that defamatory falsehoods about public officials can be punished — only if the offended official can prove the falsehoods were published with “actual malice,” i.e.: “knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Other kinds of “libelous statements” are also punishable.
  • Legally “obscene” material has historically been excluded from First Amendment protection. Unfortunately, the relatively narrow obscenity exception, described below, has been abused by government authorities and private pressure groups. Sexual expression in art and entertainment is, and has historically been, the most frequent target of censorship crusades, from James Joyce’s classic Ulysses to the photographs of Robert Mapplethorpe.

In the 1973 Miller v. California decision, the Court established three conditions that must be present if a work is to be deemed “legally obscene.” It must 1) appeal to the average person’s prurient (shameful, morbid) interest in sex; 2) depict sexual conduct in a “patently offensive way” as defined by community standards; and 3) taken as a whole, lack serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. Attempts to apply the “Miller test” have demonstrated the impossibility of formulating a precise definition of obscenity. Justice Potter Stewart once delivered a famous one-liner on the subject: “I know it when I see it.” But the fact is, the obscenity exception to the First Amendment is highly subjective and practically invites government abuse.

THREE REASONS WHY FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IS ESSENTIAL TO A FREE SOCIETY

It’s the foundation of self-fulfillment. The right to express one’s thoughts and to communicate freely with others affirms the dignity and worth of each and every member of society, and allows each individual to realize his or her full human potential. Thus, freedom of expression is an end in itself — and as such, deserves society’s greatest protection.

It’s vital to the attainment and advancement of knowledge, and the search for the truth. The eminent 19th-century writer and civil libertarian, John Stuart Mill, contended that enlightened judgment is possible only if one considers all facts and ideas, from whatever source, and tests one’s own conclusions against opposing views. Therefore, all points of view — even those that are “bad” or socially harmful — should be represented in society’s “marketplace of ideas.”

It’s necessary to our system of self-government and gives the American people a “checking function” against government excess and corruption. If the American people are to be the masters of their fate and of their elected government, they must be well-informed and have access to all information, ideas and points of view. Mass ignorance is a breeding ground for oppression and tyranny.

THE ACLU: ONGOING CHAMPION OF FREE EXPRESSION

The American Civil Liberties Union has been involved in virtually all of the landmark First Amendment cases to reach the U.S. Supreme Court, and remains absolutely committed to the preservation of each and every individual’s freedom of expression. During the 1980s, we defended the right of artists and entertainers to perform and produce works of art free of government and private censorship. During the 1990s, the organization fought to protect free speech in cyberspace when state and federal government attempted to impose content-based regulations on the Internet. In addition, the ACLU offers several books on the subject of freedom of expression:

RESOURCES: Ira Glasser, Visions of Liberty, Arcade, 1991. J. Gora, D. Goldberger, G. Stern, M. Halperin, The Right to Protest: The Basic ACLU Guide to Free Expression, SIU Press, 1991. Franklin Haiman, “Speech Acts” and the First Amendment 1993, SIU Press, 1993. Nadine Strossen, Defending Pornography: Free Speech, Sex and the Fight for Women’s Rights, Anchor Press, 1995.

To order call 1-800-775-ACLU

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Freedom of expression in the Digital Age: Internet Censorship

  • Md Nurul Momen 4  
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  • First Online: 08 May 2020

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Freedom of expression includes freedom to hold opinions and ideas and to receive and impart information without restrictions by state authorities.

Introduction

Internet is regarded as an important issue that shapes free expression in today’s volatile nature of human rights world (Momen 2020 ). In the digital age, authoritarian governments in the world always attempt to undermine political and social movement through the complete shutdown of the Internet or providing partial access to it. It is also found that the restrictions on freedom of expression on the Internet are through surveillance and monitoring the online activities. In response to any kind of political and social movement, authoritarian governments across the border occasionally shut down many websites, along with the arrest of several anti-government bloggers and political activists. However, under the international legal instruments, for instance, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), denial of the...

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Momen, M.N. (2019). Freedom of expression in the Digital Age: Internet Censorship. In: Romaniuk, S., Thapa, M., Marton, P. (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Global Security Studies. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74336-3_31-1

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Freedom of Speech

By: History.com Editors

Updated: July 27, 2023 | Original: December 4, 2017

A demonstration against restrictions on the sale of alcohol in the united states of America.Illustration showing a demonstration against restrictions on the sale of alcohol in the united states of America 1875. (Photo by: Universal History Archive/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)

Freedom of speech—the right to express opinions without government restraint—is a democratic ideal that dates back to ancient Greece. In the United States, the First Amendment guarantees free speech, though the United States, like all modern democracies, places limits on this freedom. In a series of landmark cases, the U.S. Supreme Court over the years has helped to define what types of speech are—and aren’t—protected under U.S. law.

The ancient Greeks pioneered free speech as a democratic principle. The ancient Greek word “parrhesia” means “free speech,” or “to speak candidly.” The term first appeared in Greek literature around the end of the fifth century B.C.

During the classical period, parrhesia became a fundamental part of the democracy of Athens. Leaders, philosophers, playwrights and everyday Athenians were free to openly discuss politics and religion and to criticize the government in some settings.

First Amendment

In the United States, the First Amendment protects freedom of speech.

The First Amendment was adopted on December 15, 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights—the first ten amendments to the United States Constitution . The Bill of Rights provides constitutional protection for certain individual liberties, including freedoms of speech, assembly and worship.

The First Amendment doesn’t specify what exactly is meant by freedom of speech. Defining what types of speech should and shouldn’t be protected by law has fallen largely to the courts.

In general, the First Amendment guarantees the right to express ideas and information. On a basic level, it means that people can express an opinion (even an unpopular or unsavory one) without fear of government censorship.

It protects all forms of communication, from speeches to art and other media.

Flag Burning

While freedom of speech pertains mostly to the spoken or written word, it also protects some forms of symbolic speech. Symbolic speech is an action that expresses an idea.

Flag burning is an example of symbolic speech that is protected under the First Amendment. Gregory Lee Johnson, a youth communist, burned a flag during the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, Texas to protest the Reagan administration.

The U.S. Supreme Court , in 1990, reversed a Texas court’s conviction that Johnson broke the law by desecrating the flag. Texas v. Johnson invalidated statutes in Texas and 47 other states prohibiting flag burning.

When Isn’t Speech Protected?

Not all speech is protected under the First Amendment.

Forms of speech that aren’t protected include:

  • Obscene material such as child pornography
  • Plagiarism of copyrighted material
  • Defamation (libel and slander)
  • True threats

Speech inciting illegal actions or soliciting others to commit crimes aren’t protected under the First Amendment, either.

The Supreme Court decided a series of cases in 1919 that helped to define the limitations of free speech. Congress passed the Espionage Act of 1917, shortly after the United States entered into World War I . The law prohibited interference in military operations or recruitment.

Socialist Party activist Charles Schenck was arrested under the Espionage Act after he distributed fliers urging young men to dodge the draft. The Supreme Court upheld his conviction by creating the “clear and present danger” standard, explaining when the government is allowed to limit free speech. In this case, they viewed draft resistant as dangerous to national security.

American labor leader and Socialist Party activist Eugene Debs also was arrested under the Espionage Act after giving a speech in 1918 encouraging others not to join the military. Debs argued that he was exercising his right to free speech and that the Espionage Act of 1917 was unconstitutional. In Debs v. United States the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Espionage Act.

Freedom of Expression

The Supreme Court has interpreted artistic freedom broadly as a form of free speech.

In most cases, freedom of expression may be restricted only if it will cause direct and imminent harm. Shouting “fire!” in a crowded theater and causing a stampede would be an example of direct and imminent harm.

In deciding cases involving artistic freedom of expression the Supreme Court leans on a principle called “content neutrality.” Content neutrality means the government can’t censor or restrict expression just because some segment of the population finds the content offensive.

Free Speech in Schools

In 1965, students at a public high school in Des Moines, Iowa , organized a silent protest against the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to protest the fighting. The students were suspended from school. The principal argued that the armbands were a distraction and could possibly lead to danger for the students.

The Supreme Court didn’t bite—they ruled in favor of the students’ right to wear the armbands as a form of free speech in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District . The case set the standard for free speech in schools. However, First Amendment rights typically don’t apply in private schools.

What does free speech mean?; United States Courts . Tinker v. Des Moines; United States Courts . Freedom of expression in the arts and entertainment; ACLU .

definition essay on freedom of expression

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freedom of expression

noun phrase

Definition of freedom of expression, examples of freedom of expression in a sentence.

These examples are programmatically compiled from various online sources to illustrate current usage of the word 'freedom of expression.' Any opinions expressed in the examples do not represent those of Merriam-Webster or its editors. Send us feedback about these examples.

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“Freedom of expression.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary , Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/freedom%20of%20expression. Accessed 24 Feb. 2024.

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Legal definition of freedom of expression.

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  • Article 10: Freedom of expression

Published: 3 June 2021

Last updated: 3 June 2021

On this page

Article 10 protects your right to hold your own opinions, restrictions to the right to freedom of expression, using this right – example, what the law says, pages in this guide.

  • The Human Rights Act
  • Article 2: Right to life
  • Article 3: Freedom from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment
  • Article 4: Freedom from slavery and forced labour
  • Article 5: Right to liberty and security
  • Article 6: Right to a fair trial
  • Article 7: No punishment without law
  • Article 8: Respect for your private and family life
  • Article 9: Freedom of thought, belief and religion
  • Article 11: Freedom of assembly and association
  • Article 12: Right to marry
  • Article 14: Protection from discrimination
  • Article 1 of the First Protocol: Protection of property
  • Article 1 of Protocol 13: Abolition of the death penalty
  • Article 2 of the First Protocol: Right to education
  • Article 3 of the First Protocol: Right to free elections

What countries does this apply to?

Article 10 protects your right to hold your own opinions and to express them freely without government interference.

This includes the right to express your views aloud (for example through public protest and demonstrations) or through:

  • published articles, books or leaflets
  • television or radio broadcasting
  • works of art
  • the internet and social media

The law also protects your freedom to receive information from other people by, for example, being part of an audience or reading a magazine.

Although you have freedom of expression, you also have a duty to behave responsibly and to respect other people’s rights.

Public authorities may restrict this right if they can show that their action is lawful, necessary and proportionate in order to:

  • protect national security, territorial integrity (the borders of the state) or public safety
  • prevent disorder or crime
  • protect health or morals
  • protect the rights and reputations of other people
  • prevent the disclosure of information received in confidence
  • maintain the authority and impartiality of judges

An authority may be allowed to restrict your freedom of expression if, for example, you express views that encourage racial or religious hatred.

However, the relevant public authority must show that the restriction is ‘proportionate’, in other words that it is appropriate and no more than necessary to address the issue concerned.  

This right is particularly important for journalists and other people working in the media.

They must be free to criticise the government and our public institutions without fear of prosecution – this is a vital feature of a democratic society.

But that doesn't prevent the state from imposing restrictions on the media in order to protect other human rights, such as a person's right to respect for their private life .

Example case - Observer and The Guardian v United Kingdom [1991]

The Guardian and The Observer newspapers published excerpts from Peter Wright’s book Spycatcher, which included allegations that MI5 had acted unlawfully.

The government obtained a court order preventing the newspapers from printing further material until proceedings relating to a breach of confidence had finished.

But when the book was published, The Guardian complained that the continuation of the court order infringed the right to freedom of expression.

The European Court of Human Rights said that the court order was lawful because it was in the interests of national security.

However, it also said that that wasn't enough reason to continue the newspaper publication ban once the book had been published, because the information was no longer confidential anyway. 

This text is taken directly from the Human Rights Act .

Article 10 of the Human Rights Act: Freedom of expression

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.

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Life & Letters Magazine

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Defending Artistic Expression

By Michael Adams December 8, 2014 facebook twitter email

Should artistic expression receive the same degree of legal protection as other types of speech, such as political, religious, commercial, or educational speech? Should it enjoy less freedom, or more?  Michael Adams, a Plan II Honors  junior majoring in Asian Cultures and Languages  and Biology , penned this first-prize winning response during the Spring 2014 Freedom of Speech Essay Contest .

In the modern day and throughout recent history, the question of the distribution of liberty among the forms of speech and expression has driven contention, debate, and friction among the factions desiring complete artistic freedom, and those desiring to limit it. In the realm of the world, the complete freedom of speech, be it political, religious, or artistic, is a cultural anomaly; many societies find themselves mired in abstractions of censorship preventing free artistic expression at the expense of cultural development. The controversial Chinese artist Ai Weiwei represents one individual in the fight for free artistic expression in the world today. He intentionally provokes the Chinese government as well as the Chinese populace in order to make a statement demonstrating the suppression occurring as a result of Chinese government policies. In another sphere, Miley Cyrus employs the idea of freedom of expression to its threshold, making statements ardently condemned by individuals who have different tastes and perhaps moral values. Jean-Jacques Rousseau offers a counter idea to complete artistic freedom to be refuted by ideas and developments of modern artists. The freedom of artistic expression should have extended to it the same degree of legal freedom granted to all other forms of speech; to forgo complete freedom of artistic expression would result in the suppression of human creativity as well as the suppression of the other types of speech for the artistic tradition closely identifies with all of the other forms of free speech.

The eminent Chinese artist Ai Wei Wei works at the pinnacle of the freedom of art in our day, working proactively, provocatively, and politically. Modern China presents an astoundingly important example in the study of the freedom of artistic expression in the world today due to several factors: its recent history of suppression and its current titular censorship intermingled with cases of real censorship constitute a poisonous environment for art. Ai Weiwei has been described as “the most powerful artist in the world,” in what some predict will “become the most powerful nation in the world” (Stevens). Ai must therefore “hold up a mirror both to China’s failings and its potential” (Stevens). Contradiction and controversy dot the life of Mr. Ai. Some of his more famous pieces such as Sunflower Seeds at the Tate Modern in London, present the idea of China critically, in response to its sheer population and the magnitude of every entity associated with the nation. The installation includes one hundred million individually hand-painted porcelain sunflower seeds, evocative of “the sublime power of the mass and the unique singularity of each individual seed” (Sorace). Ai makes a political statement about the new Chinese status quo; people en masse, materialism en masse, yet human potential en masse. Another piece, Fragments, displayed in a show in 2005, creates a map of China from the fragments of ancient Qing era temples (Stevens). The idea of Ai is a criticism of the present on the back of the future. He questions the current status quo of China vehemently, yet not disruptive in a physical sense. Passive protest underscores a method of expression he feels is requisite to the health of the Chinese society. Ai seeks to disturb the myopia of the Chinese populace and peacefully annoy, through art, the government over the mass.

The Case of Ai Weiwei establishes a basis for one purpose of art: to question, visually and politically, a society. Just a socrates called himself a “Gadfly of Athens” (Plato 30e), Ai Weiwei, it could be said, is the Gadfly of Beijing. The suppression of his art has come in many untenable forms which ultimately embarrass and expose his government on the international art and political stage. Artistic freedom serves as an indicator of the health of a society at its root. A society able to withstand the condemnation of a single artist or stand in the wake of “Gadfly” in any form proves stability at the core. A government which must scramble to cover an artistic exposé of its wrongs depicted by the ideas of the same artist time and time again substantiates the idea of fragility; Ai, teaching artistically the invisible (to domestic Chinese) ideologies of his government, realizes the inherent fragility of the new order. By suppressing Ai’s artistic freedom, China likewise suppresses free political and educational speech, a dangerous action with putrid moral consequences and the dissemination of sentimental mistrust of a government amongst the people, if they find out. A society should grant the same legal freedom to artistic speech as it does to any other type of speech, pending it grants such freedoms in the first place. A sick, stagnant population may be created through censorship of free art, speech, and education. Ai notes that “‘education should teach you to think, but [the government] just wants to control everyone’s mind.’ What the regime is most afraid of, he says, is ‘free discussion’” (Stevens). Art is the spark of such free discussion.

A discussion of the morals, values, and culture of a society frequently arises from the production and dissemination of new art forms and artists; some discussions prove disturbing to some, constructive to others. Artists throughout recent history have attributed truth to the saying that “art should comfort the disturbed and disturb the comfortable.” An imperative of artistic purpose arises in this short collection of words, yet art serves so many other purposes as well. Perhaps a proof of the saying comes in the, what some would classify as disturbing, form of the music, persona, and performance of the American pop star Miley Cyrus. Whether or not one considers the productions of Cyrus art is contentious in itself; for the purposes of this paper and according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, art may be defined as an entity “intentionally endowed by their makers with a significant degree of aesthetic interest, often surpassing that of most everyday objects” (Stanford). Cyrus produces art. Those who condemn the girl who carries “the torch of sexually provocative pop stars,” ultimately call for the condemnation, suppression, and censorship of art (Feeny). Cyrus has progressed in her short career to exist at the far bounds of what we consider art and certainly what many consider negative and degrading art. Rather than culturally constructive art of, say, Louis Armstrong or Ansel Adams, Cyrus’s art tends toward the crude to what many consider offensive. Miley Cyrus’s sex-laced, drug influenced music videos in which she is often promiscuously (if barely) dressed incite rage in the more culturally conservative critics of American art. Parents of children who idolize such pop stars may also not appreciate the provocative artistry of the pop star. Fundamentally, a discussion of morals, ideologies, and cultural direction arises from the controversial figure, a healthy piece of a well functioning society and something that Ai Weiwei’s China cannot have due to incomplete freedom of art. A fundamental truth regarding the nature of art stems from such ideas; suppression of art destroys the ability of a society to communicate, even if some may consider the art destructive. Such destructive art, in the eyes of a particular group or individual, must remain on an even playing field as other forms art, for what, excepting content and form, differentiates pictorial art in the form of a Picasso painting from performance art in the form of a Miley Cyrus video? A society should never differentiate art based upon a measure of disturbance, crudeness, or distaste. The experiment of free artistic expression as demonstrated by Cyrus underscores the need of free speech; discussion is healthy and discussion often stems from art.

The implications of producing provocative, crude, or even bad art in the eyes of some may very well end up tainting a society at its core; Jean-Jacques Rousseau makes that very contention. The French enlightenment thinker wrote of the implications that the mass dissemination of the artistic production process would have as a consequence of total artistic expression in a free society. Because of the intrinsic human desire for admiration and applause, an artist “will lower his genius to the level of his time, and will prefer to compose ordinary works which are admired during his lifetime instead of marvels which would not be admired until long after his death” (Rousseau 53). With the power and tool of freedom of expression, Rousseau foresees the downfall of the great artistic tradition of Western Europe. He calls for the reduction of the privilege of artistic expression to the few whom we may call timeless masters: Michelangelo, Monet, or van Gogh among others. In response to the art of today, Rousseau would perhaps applaud Ansel Adams, Andy Warhol, or Ai Weiwei for such mastery of their craft. Likewise, Rousseau would likely comparatively condemn Miley Cyrus on the grounds of producing low art, disruptive of the cultural tradition of popular art, and art which has become corrupted on the grounds of appealing to the whims of the cultural epoch. A poison to society at large, ephemeral art, Rousseau would say, “has corrupted our morals…and impaired purity of taste” (Rousseau 62). The consequence of total artistic freedom leads to art at the whim of a society, yet art at the whim of society may represent cultural development and the creation of dialogue among the participants in such a society. Artistic freedom enables a culture to develop itself from the ground up; it enables the culture to stay malleable, to ebb and flow with the changes of time. An artistic tradition confined to art which is bred to last for centuries with little appeal in the present may never attain its full potential. In defense of the tradition of freedom, America may serve as a fine example. Of course popular art and music will cater to the fashions of the day; Miley Cyrus may again serve as a prime example. Catering to the desires of the day often commercializes art, a commercial freedom granted to corporations unsuppressed as a foundational right of capitalism. While Rousseau might criticize the commercialization of art, no individual is forced to purchase any commercialized art; he may stick to the art of high repute. Aside from popular and commercial art, modern America has produced lasting schools of art, architecture, and individual artists of high regard culturally in years past and in the modern day. The Hudson Valley School of art in New York and the eminent twentieth century German American architect Mies van der Rohe evolved out of the free conversation of American art which remain engaged as styles today. Entire ideologies of art which, especially in the case of the Hudson Valley School, have maintained prominence, demonstrate that Rousseau’s idea about the dissolution of lasting art may only partially ring true. Through the popular artistic whims of the day may develop lasting traditions of really good art. Freedom of artistic expression may produce plentiful as well as lasting art which impresses a place in the cultural tradition.

Complete artistic freedom proves equally as important, and even a compliment to, all the other forms of freedom of speech. In a healthy society, complete freedom of artistic expression coincides with the freedom of political. educational, religious, and commercial speech, for art is often the medium through which these other forms are expressed. As demonstrated by Ai Weiwei, dissidence and the demonstration of political action through art is a powerful means of communication in the international forum that is art. Art moves where words fail. Inherent interconnection between the forms of free speech and the idea that human creativity can come through art necessitates that legal freedoms granted to the other forms of art be granted equally to the complete freedom of artistic expression. All well-developed, sophisticated, and ideologically sound societies have little incentive to censor any type of art; in such places a fair distribution of liberty can exist. Suppression of free speech and art may prove to be the weightiest challenge for many modern societies today. To decide in favor of suppression continues a tradition of stagnation; to decide against opens a new tradition of acceptance, understanding, and unencumbered liberty.

The essay contest is organized in conjunction with the college’s Free Speech Dialogues , created to encourage thoughtful, informed discussion among students. Each semester, three nationally prominent panelists are invited to offer varying perspectives on free speech issues. The essay contest is open to UT Austin undergraduate students, with $1,500 awarded for first prize.

Freedom Essay for Students and Children

500+ words essay on freedom.

Freedom is something that everybody has heard of but if you ask for its meaning then everyone will give you different meaning. This is so because everyone has a different opinion about freedom. For some freedom means the freedom of going anywhere they like, for some it means to speak up form themselves, and for some, it is liberty of doing anything they like.

Freedom Essay

Meaning of Freedom

The real meaning of freedom according to books is. Freedom refers to a state of independence where you can do what you like without any restriction by anyone. Moreover, freedom can be called a state of mind where you have the right and freedom of doing what you can think off. Also, you can feel freedom from within.

The Indian Freedom

Indian is a country which was earlier ruled by Britisher and to get rid of these rulers India fight back and earn their freedom. But during this long fight, many people lost their lives and because of the sacrifice of those people and every citizen of the country, India is a free country and the world largest democracy in the world.

Moreover, after independence India become one of those countries who give his citizen some freedom right without and restrictions.

The Indian Freedom Right

India drafted a constitution during the days of struggle with the Britishers and after independence it became applicable. In this constitution, the Indian citizen was given several fundaments right which is applicable to all citizen equally. More importantly, these right are the freedom that the constitution has given to every citizen.

These right are right to equality, right to freedom, right against exploitation, right to freedom of religion¸ culture and educational right, right to constitutional remedies, right to education. All these right give every freedom that they can’t get in any other country.

Value of Freedom

The real value of anything can only be understood by those who have earned it or who have sacrificed their lives for it. Freedom also means liberalization from oppression. It also means the freedom from racism, from harm, from the opposition, from discrimination and many more things.

Get the huge list of more than 500 Essay Topics and Ideas

Freedom does not mean that you violate others right, it does not mean that you disregard other rights. Moreover, freedom means enchanting the beauty of nature and the environment around us.

The Freedom of Speech

Freedom of speech is the most common and prominent right that every citizen enjoy. Also, it is important because it is essential for the all-over development of the country.

Moreover, it gives way to open debates that helps in the discussion of thought and ideas that are essential for the growth of society.

Besides, this is the only right that links with all the other rights closely. More importantly, it is essential to express one’s view of his/her view about society and other things.

To conclude, we can say that Freedom is not what we think it is. It is a psychological concept everyone has different views on. Similarly, it has a different value for different people. But freedom links with happiness in a broadway.

FAQs on Freedom

Q.1 What is the true meaning of freedom? A.1 Freedom truly means giving equal opportunity to everyone for liberty and pursuit of happiness.

Q.2 What is freedom of expression means? A.2 Freedom of expression means the freedom to express one’s own ideas and opinions through the medium of writing, speech, and other forms of communication without causing any harm to someone’s reputation.

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  4. Freedom of expression

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COMMENTS

  1. What is freedom of expression?

    Freedom of expression is a foundational right, meaning it is essential for the enjoyment and protection of all human rights. With the right to freedom of expression, every person, every community, and every society can ask for the most fundamental things they need. Like water, food, shelter, and clean air.

  2. Freedom of Expression Essay Example

    Freedom of expression refers to the right to express one's opinions or thoughts freely by utilizing any of the different modes of communication available. The ideas aired should, however, not cause any intentional harm to other personality or status through false or ambiguous statements.

  3. Freedom of expression and opinion

    Freedom of expression is a fundamental human right, enshrined in article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, there are governments and individuals in positions of power around the globe that threaten this right. A number of freedoms fall under the category of freedom of expression.

  4. Freedom of Expression

    Article 19 Freedom of Expression is protected by Article 19 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Why is freedom of expression important? Press freedom Freedom of speech The digital frontier The Solution: What is Amnesty calling for? Protect the protest Why is freedom of expression important?

  5. Full article: Protecting the human right to freedom of expression in

    In international law, freedom to express opinions and ideas is considered essential at both an individual level, insofar as it contributes to the full development of a person, and being a foundation stone of democratic society.

  6. Freedom of Expression

    Freedom of expression broadly understood encompasses a package of rights that are intimately intertwined, including freedom of opinion, speech, press, information, association, assembly, thought, conscience, belief, and religion.

  7. Freedom of Speech

    1. What is Freedom of Speech? 2. Justifying Free Speech 2.1 Listener theories 2.2 Speaker theories 2.3 Democracy theories 2.4 Thinker theories 2.5 Toleration theories 2.6 Instrumental theories: political abuse and slippery slopes 2.7 Free speech skepticism 3. Justifying Speech Restrictions 3.1 Absoluteness, coverage, and protection

  8. Justifying Limitations on the Freedom of Expression

    Introduction The freedom of expression is vital to our ability to convey opinions, convictions, and beliefs, and to meaningfully participate in democracy. The state may, however, 'limit' the freedom of expression for certain reasons.

  9. Freedom of Expression, a Fundamental Human Right

    Freedom of expression is a fundamental human right, enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But around the world, there are governments and those wielding power who ...

  10. Freedom of expression: A fundamental human right underpinning ...

    Freedom of expression and information are pillars of a healthy democratic society and for social and economic growth, allowing for the free flow of ideas necessary for innovation and bolstering accountability and transparency.

  11. The right to freedom of expression: The mother of our democracy

    The right to freedom of expression, viewed as a pillar of democracy, is clearly addressed in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1976. 1 The freedom of expression, opinion and information is also protected in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 2 - which is a clear ...

  12. What is freedom of expression and why is it important?

    What is freedom of expression and why is it important? First, let's have a look at the most obvious answers. Without free flow of information and critique the society doesn't function - or it functions very badly. A closed, censored society will soon become somethig like an autocracy with corruption and frightened servants instead of citizens.

  13. (PDF) Freedom of expression

    Freedom of expression Authors: Matteo Bonotti Jonathan Seglow Royal Holloway, University of London Abstract This article surveys the classic and contemporary literature on the nature and limits...

  14. Freedom of Expression

    Freedom of Expression Document Date: March 1, 2002 Number 10 FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION Freedom of speech, of the press, of association, of assembly and petition — this set of guarantees, protected by the First Amendment, comprises what we refer to as freedom of expression.

  15. Freedom of expression in the Digital Age: Internet Censorship

    The right to freedom of expression is enshrined in Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), including the right to freedom of thought and opinion (UDHR, Article 18), freedom of association (UDHR, Article 20), and participation in government (UDHR, Article 21) (Momen 2020).But Internet shutdown is now a global phenomenon, which is rapidly increasing around the world.

  16. Freedom of expression and information

    Freedom of expression and information. You have the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of your choice without interference and regardless of frontiers. You have the freedom to express yourself online and to access information and the opinions and expressions of others. This includes political speech, views on religion ...

  17. Freedom of Speech

    Freedom of speech—the right to express opinions without government restraint—is a democratic ideal that dates back to ancient Greece. In the United States, the First Amendment guarantees free...

  18. Freedom of expression Definition & Meaning

    : the right to express one's opinions freely Examples of freedom of expression in a Sentence Recent Examples on the Web He was also accused of passing legislation against freedom of expression, with numerous journalists and activists critical of his establishment jailed on various charges.

  19. PDF What Freedom of Speech Means to Me

    Freedom of speech has been used throughout history and present times to express opinions about problems in America. Martin Luther King Jr. is a prime example of a man voicing his beliefs about what he thought was right. He used free speech to try and unite an entire nation. King was an admirable example of the use of freedom of speech.

  20. Hate speech or free speech: an ethical dilemma?

    Freedom of expression is the cornerstone and the warrant of democracy, but like all other rights and freedoms we enjoy, also the right to free speech has its limits. Hate speech is one of the most resilient manifestations of cyberviolence, and is not to be equalled with free speech. This is partly related to our perception of the freedom of ...

  21. Article 10: Freedom of expression

    An authority may be allowed to restrict your freedom of expression if, for example, you express views that encourage racial or religious hatred. However, the relevant public authority must show that the restriction is 'proportionate', in other words that it is appropriate and no more than necessary to address the issue concerned. ...

  22. Defending Artistic Expression

    Freedom of artistic expression may produce plentiful as well as lasting art which impresses a place in the cultural tradition. Complete artistic freedom proves equally as important, and even a compliment to, all the other forms of freedom of speech. In a healthy society, complete freedom of artistic expression coincides with the freedom of ...

  23. Freedom Essay for Students and Children

    Q.1 What is the true meaning of freedom? A.1 Freedom truly means giving equal opportunity to everyone for liberty and pursuit of happiness. Q.2 What is freedom of expression means? A.2 Freedom of expression means the freedom to express one's own ideas and opinions through the medium of writing, speech, and other forms of communication without ...