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Hélène Landemore and Ana Tanasoca have recently proposed two different approaches to deepening the deliberative dimension of democracy. In  Open Democracy  (2020), Landemore introduces a novel paradigm of democracy—open democracy—which grants ordinary citizens access to an actual exercise of political power through innovative forms of democratic representation. In  Deliberation Naturalized  (2020), Tanasoca develops a naturalized normative theory of deliberative democracy which stresses the role of citizen deliberation in what she refers to as ‘naturalistic’ settings, i.e., the public sphere. Both texts invite us to stretch our imaginations of how contemporary democracy can be deepened in deliberative ways.

Landemore, deliberative democracy, democracy, open democracy, Tanasoca

How to Cite

Wong, J. K., (2022) “Review Essay: Deepening Deliberative Democracy – Experimentation vs. Naturalization”, Journal of Deliberative Democracy 18(1). doi: https://doi.org/10.16997/jdd.1282

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Ana Tanasoca, Deliberation Naturalized: Improving Real Existing Deliberative Democracy . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020.

Hélène Landemore, Open Democracy: Reinventing Popular Rule for the Twenty-First Century . Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020.

Hélène Landemore and Ana Tanasoca have recently proposed two different approaches to deepening the deliberative dimension of democracy. In Open Democracy (2020), Landemore introduces a novel paradigm of democracy—open democracy—which grants ordinary citizens access to an actual exercise of political power through innovative forms of democratic representation. In Deliberation Naturalized (2020), Tanasoca develops a naturalized normative theory of deliberative democracy which stresses the role of citizen deliberation in what she refers to as ‘naturalistic’ settings, i.e., the public sphere. Both texts invite us to stretch our imaginations of how contemporary democracy can be deepened in deliberative ways.

The Problem of Democracy

Both Landemore and Tanasoca start with discussing the problem of democracy. Landemore is concerned about the fundamental flaws in the original design of representative democracy. More specifically, its premises on electoral representation and the protection of individual rights are unable to empower all citizens equally, such that genuine popular rule remains a mirage. This is not only suboptimal to the ideal of democracy but also contributes to the frustrations in citizens who make use of elections and referendums to voice against the system per se rather than for the common good. Such populist movements are bringing about a global recession of democracy and even the rejection of democracy altogether ( Landemore 2020: chapter 1 ).

On the other hand, Tanasoca zooms into how deliberative democracy is practiced in the real world. She points out that there is by far too much attention to deliberations in small-scale, artificially organized settings performed by a limited number of representatives. These include deliberations in the formal political structure (e.g., the legislative, executive, and judicial) as well as in other organized deliberative events (e.g., the mini-publics). Such artificially engineered deliberations are unlikely to produce genuine democratic deliberations due to their insufficient inclusiveness, unequal participation, inadequate exchange, and/or lack of sincere motivation. The overemphasis of these pseudo-deliberations restricts our understanding as to how ordinary citizens can deliberate with each other in the public sphere ( Tanasoca 2020: chapter 2 ).

Landemore’s solution: open democracy

Open Democracy contains the following structure:

Landemore first examines the crisis of representative democracy and the myth of direct democracy (chapters 2 and 3). The major purpose is to demonstrate the restrictive conception of representation in representative democracy and why direct democracy fails to serve as a feasible and normatively desirable response to the crisis of representative democracy.

In the core theoretical chapters (chapters 4 and 5), Landemore conceptualizes lottocratic, self-selected, and liquid representation and defends their normative credentials in relation to democratic legitimacy.

In the subsequent chapters, Landemore theorizes open democracy based on the five institutional principles (chapter 6), illustrates these principles of open democracy through the real-life case study of the Icelandic constitutional process (chapter 7), and defends open democracy as a feasible and desirable model of democracy (chapter 8).

Towards the end, Landemore outlines how open democracy can be expanded for global democratic institutions as well as democracy within private firms (chapter 9).

Central to Landemore’s proposal is the idea of experimentation. She considers a list of experiments in democratic innovation conducted around the Western world in the past few decades. In particular, she focuses on three deliberative experiments; namely, the constitutional redrafting in Iceland, a crowdsourced policy process in Finland, and the Great National Debate in France. Landemore suggests that these experiments demonstrate how democratic institutions can be redesigned to align with the democratic goal of popular rule. In addition, they also serve as an empirical foundation for an idealized model of democracy – open democracy (chapter 7).

Open democracy is a new paradigm of democracy that includes novel forms of democratic representation through which political power is made equally accessible to all ordinary citizens. Inspired by the freedom and self-organization on the Internet, the concept of openness comprises both the spatial and temporal dimensions. It means that the democratic system is, respectively, open to people and ideas and is open-ended for change. In this way, citizens are guaranteed of the right to participate in law-making at any time they want, such as initiating laws when they are dissatisfied with the legislative agenda of the elected representatives. Moreover, democratic institutions are also adaptive and revisable such that they must change whenever citizens wish them to change (chapter 6).

Realizing open democracy requires a mixture of various forms of representation that allow ordinary citizens to be in charge. To Landemore, lottocratic and self-selected representation are authentically democratic because citizens have equal opportunities to become representatives, while the former’s combination of sortition and rotation ensures that political institutions are accessible over time, the latter ensures that the institutions are spatially open to anyone who is willing and able to join. Landemore also suggests a third kind of representation—‘liquid’ representation—which lowers the entry barriers to becoming electoral representatives, although it is relatively less democratic than lottocratic and self-selected representation (chapters 4 and 5).

As a new paradigm of democracy, open democracy is underpinned by a set of core institutional principles and conditions, namely: participation rights, deliberation, majoritarian principle, democratic representation, and transparency. Landemore treats these principles and conditions as not merely evaluative standards for existing democratic institutions but also as abstract while practicable guidelines for picturing the specific institutional arrangements for open democracy. While the design choices may vary based on trial and error from experimentation, Landemore proposes that, ideally, open democracy should incorporate the institution called ‘open mini-public’ which is:

A large, all-purpose, randomly selected assembly of between 150 and a thousand people or so, gathered for an extended period of time (from at least a few days to a few years) for the purpose of agenda-setting and law-making of some kind, and connected via crowdsourcing platforms and deliberative forums (including other mini-publics) to the larger population (p. 13).

It is worth noting that, even at the ideal level, open democracy does not require citizens to participate in decision-making. Unlike participatory democracy, citizens are free to delegate the task to representatives selected by lottocratic or other means, but should they wish to participate instead, they can decide how much and how often they would like to do so at any point in time. This model guarantees citizens of their participation rights while leaving them flexibility as to when and how to activate such rights (chapter 6).

Tanasoca’s solution: naturalized deliberation

Naturalized Deliberation consists of the following structure:

Tanasoca first suggests that there are limitations to democratic deliberation in the formal political system, but such pseudo- or symbolic deliberation might promote genuinely deliberative ends elsewhere within the deliberative system (chapters 2 and 3).

Next, Tanasoca considers three types of mechanisms for deliberative democracy, namely, mechanisms of how individuals weigh arguments and reasons in internal deliberation (i.e., micro-micro relationships, chapter 4), mechanisms of how individuals deliberate together, and how their opinions are fed back into the deliberative system (i.e., micro-macro relationships, chapter 5), as well as how citizens’ deliberations are shaped by the public spectacles (i.e., macro-micro relationships, chapter 6).

The last three chapters are dedicated to proposing ways to overcome some principal barriers to networked deliberation in the public sphere. Tanasoca discusses why political polarization does not impede informal networked deliberation (chapter 7), how deliberative intervention can be designed to fix the problem of pluralistic ignorance (chapter 8), and finally, how the problem of message repetition can be tackled (chapter 9).

In contrast to Landemore, Tanasoca’s response to the problem of democracy is not at all about experimentation but naturalization. By naturalization, it means that deliberative democracy should be understood as a naturally occurring rather than an ‘artificially engineered’ process. To Tanasoca, it is misguided to equate deliberative democracy with deliberative experiments, because democratic deliberation does not merely exist among the selected participants in these experiments. Quite differently, democratic deliberation is already being practiced by ordinary citizens in the civil society on an everyday basis, and these informal, unadulterated interactions result in what Tanasoca refers to as ‘networked deliberation’ (chapter 1).

In this sense, Tanasoca would not regard the list of deliberative experiments discussed by Landemore as the only or major sites of deliberative democracy. That being said, Tanasoca in no sense rules out the use of organized deliberative events, but they should be valued only instrumentally for improving the deliberative system as a whole. In this way, deliberation is naturalized (chapter 3).

Networked deliberation is the central idea in Tanasoca’s argument. It speaks of the mechanisms that connect deliberation at various levels and sites in a deliberative system, such as micro-level and macro-level deliberation as well as deliberation in the formal political sphere and civil society. Here, mechanisms are the ‘cogs and wheels’ linking the interrelated parts in a system, such that they contribute to producing certain behavior and consequences of the system. In the context of deliberative democracy, these mechanisms enable different components and processes to interact with each other as well as to work together to shape the outcomes of the deliberative system (chapter 5).

Tanasoca aims to develop a mechanism-based account for the already practicing deliberative democracy in the real world. This enables us to make sense of how democratic deliberation can take place at the systemic level. There are several mechanisms in a deliberative system:

Situational mechanisms explain macro-micro relationships, with the individual being exposed to a particular social situation that in turn affects her behavior. Belief-formation mechanisms… are of this kind. Action-formation mechanisms are located at the individual level and explain how individual states generate specific actions ( micro-micro ). Finally, transformational mechanisms connect the micro and macro levels—they explain how a number of individuals interact with one another and how their combined actions give rise to collective outcomes, intended or unintended (p. 17, Tanasoca’s emphases).

Tanasoca believes that the above mechanisms can be used to analyze all changes in the processes and outcomes of a deliberative system. The overall performance of the deliberative system, hence, depends on the quality of interactions between actors within these mechanisms. If we expect the entire system to deliver good outcomes, one possible approach would be to boost the performance of certain mechanisms within the system, such that it compensates for any sub-optimal performance elsewhere. Given that deliberative interactions are already occurring spontaneously across society, Tanasoca contends that we should acknowledge this ‘naturalistic’ background condition and focus our attention on enhancing these interactions within the deliberative system (chapters 3 and 5).

Contributions

Both Landemore and Tanasoca have advanced the existing literature on deliberative democracy by extending the debate on three recurring themes in the field:

Should the effects of deliberative politics be scaled up with the focus on mini-publics or networked deliberation?

How should the desirable qualities of deliberative democracy be assessed?

How can the normative theorizing of deliberative democracy be sensitive to empirical deliberative politics in the real world?

Although Landemore and Tanasoca understand the problem of democracy differently, one unifying theme of their projects is the concern about how deliberative democracy can be deepened. After all, a recurring puzzle in the debates of deliberative democracy remains as to how, on the one hand, more people can be engaged for democratic deliberation and how, on the other hand, the effects of such deliberation can be scaled up ( Niemeyer & Jennstål 2019 ).

Landemore is interested in advancing structured deliberative events which can simultaneously engage a vast number of participants. This is done through experimenting with various deliberative innovations with the help of new digital technologies, such as crowdsourcing platforms as in the case of Iceland. On the other hand, Tanasoca rejects the idea of creating any artificially engineered, structured deliberative events as such. She reminds us that informal networked deliberation has been naturally occurring in the public sphere. To deepen deliberative democracy, we should instead set our sights on the entire deliberative system and examine how the various mechanisms in the system can be enhanced.

Put another way, both Landemore and Tanasoca are aware of the importance of scaling up deliberative democracy. Landemore focuses on how deliberative events can be made more inclusive and accessible to ordinary citizens, while Tanasoca focuses on how the already existing deliberation among citizens can be improved to boost the performance of the entire deliberative system. In short, Landemore is more concerned of whether citizens can participate in formal deliberative institutions, whereas Tanasoca sees that citizen deliberation does not have to take place in formal institutions but is already ongoing in the informal public sphere.

Landemore and Tanasoca invite us to consider a new perspective into the question about how we should scale up the effects of deliberative politics, should we invest time and energy creating new institutions for more experimentation or leaving deliberation ‘naturalized’ by linking up the already existing deliberation?

Normative principles

Another contribution concerns the refinement of normative principles for assessing deliberative democracy. For Landemore, she specifies a combination of five core principles for evaluating and recommending deliberative institutions. These principles require that: (1) citizens are granted individual participation rights beyond formal political rights, such as citizens’ initiative (‘participation rights’); (2) citizens are able to collectively make some key laws based on deliberation and majority rule (‘deliberation’ and ‘the majoritarian principle’); (3) citizens are democratically represented through means such as lottery and self-selection (‘democratic representation’); and (4) the process is transparent (‘transparency’). Landemore refers to these principles as ‘mid-level institutional principles’, meaning that they are neither too abstract nor too specific, which are just good enough for informing the design of deliberative institutions ( Landemore 2020: chapter 6 ).

In a similar vein, Tanasoca also lays out three desiderata for appraising the performance of informal networked deliberation. First, ‘inclusion’ demands that all citizens be indirectly included in public deliberation through their social-qua-communicative ties. Second, ‘feedback and reciprocity’ requires that deliberation be a dynamic and interactive process with every participant speaking and responding to each other. Third, ‘equality’ requires the communicative networks to be balanced such that people have equal opportunities to participate in, and have equal influence over, the deliberation. Tanasoca is aware that these desiderata can be too ideal for mass deliberation, hence proposing that they might be relaxed to suit the real-world context. For example, she suggests that rough equality, instead of perfect equality, should be expected for networked deliberation, which is achieved across a variety of informal deliberative exchanges where all citizens engage ( Tanasoca 2020: chapter 5 ).

Both Landemore and Tanasoca acknowledge that deliberative democracy should not be understood only as an ideal theory. Instead, for assessing and constructing deliberative democracy in the real world , no matter it is through experimentation or naturalization, the guiding principles must take into consideration not only the normative ideals but also the empirical reality, such that what they demand would be both normatively desirable and practically feasible. The formulation of such ‘mid-range’ prescriptive standards is helpful for bridging the philosophical and empirical dimensions of deliberative democracy ( Bächtiger 2019 ).

Landemore’s and Tanasoca’s arguments remind us that there is no need to draw a sharp divide between the ideal and non-ideal theories of deliberative democracy. The normative principles used for assessing the desirable qualities of deliberative democracy can be normatively justifiable and sensitive to empirical conditions at the same time.

Another related contribution concerns the method of political theorizing. For Landemore, her model of open democracy is far from a conclusion deduced from some abstract, fundamental principles but is developed based on direct observation of real-life deliberative experimentation. She demonstrates how inductive political theorizing is possible through empirical case studies, by looking at how people would like to experiment with novel methods and procedures in actual democracies, she infers principles that are, at the same time, consistent with the ideal of democracy and acceptable to the people in actual democracies. This enables us to construct normative theories of deliberative democracy to be sensitive to the ‘already widely shared’ collective views and intuitions, such that they are not only normatively desirable but also empirically tractable ( Landemore 2020: chapters 7 and 8 ; Thacher 2006 ).

Similarly, Tanasoca’s idea of naturalized deliberation is grounded in the empirical analysis of citizen deliberation in ‘naturalistic’ settings, i.e., the real existing deliberative democracy. She describes her normative theory of deliberative democracy as ‘middle-range,’ meaning that she is interested not quite in theorizing what deliberative democracy should be as an ideal, but instead in proposing what deliberative democracy can be like given the empirical conditions in the real world. In this way, Tanasoca illustrates how the divide between empirical and normative methods can be married up, the understanding of what is happening in a non-ideal reality informs us of what can be included as feasible normative desiderata for deliberative democracy ( Tanasoca 2020: chapter 1 ).

Once again, both Landemore and Tanasoca demonstrate how we can bridge the gap between ideal and non-ideal theories of deliberative democracy. They provide us with concrete methods for making the normative theorizing of deliberative democracy sensitive to empirical deliberative politics in the real world.

Reflections

Despite the solid contributions of Landemore and Tanasoca’s work, the ideas of open democracy and naturalized deliberation still deserve some further scrutiny.

Blind deference?

Landemore’s proposal of experimentation relies heavily on the use of novel deliberative institutions. As pointed out previously, Landemore suggests an ideal institution for open democracy—i.e., ‘open mini-public’—a type of deliberative mini-public with 150 to 1,000 randomly selected participants. It is open in the sense that, while it recognizes the participation rights of ordinary citizens, it allows them to choose whether and when to participate in such an institution. In other words, mass participation of citizens is not required at any time, and citizens can as well delegate their decision-making power to their representatives chosen through sortition or other democratic means. In short, Landemore’s model is not premised on mass participation.

In Democracy without Shortcuts , Cristina Lafont ( 2020a ) warns us against the reliance on any reformed democratic institutions, including deliberative mini-publics. Lafont argues that some of these institutions would intensify rather than alleviate democratic deficits as in the existing representative democracy, they can at most be regarded as ‘shortcuts’ that bypass meaningful public deliberation of political decisions and hence eroding the ideal of democratic self-rule. She writes succinctly, ‘The road to an undemocratic hell might be paved by good democratic intentions’ (p. 3).

Lafont specifies the conditions under which democratic institutions remain as problematic shortcuts, they require citizens to blindly defer to the decisions of others. For instance, if a mini-public is organized in a way such that, those who are not selected as participants have no reason to believe that the participants are making decisions that track the considered judgments of both the participants and non-participants, then blind deference is said to be present in such mini-public. In this way, the decisions made in those mini-publics are the decisions of the participants only, rather than the decisions of the citizenry at large.

It would be worth discussing whether Landemore’s open mini-publics are vulnerable to the issue of blind deference. On the one hand, Landemore seems to emphasize the decision-making functions of these deliberative institutions, as reflected from two of the core institutional principles: deliberation and majoritarianism. On the other hand, citizens remain free to choose whether or not to participate in these institutions. If such experimentation involves collective decision-making but requires voluntary, flexible participation, it makes sense to suggest that there will be anyway some non-participants delegating their decision-making power to the participants. On what grounds can we believe that the former is not doing so blindly to the latter?

The challenge for Landemore is that, while we respect citizens’ freedom to choose whether or not, as well as when and how, to participate in her experimentation, how can we ensure that, when citizens are exercising such freedom, they are not giving up their capacity for democratic control altogether? Landemore would have to demonstrate how the ideal of democratic self-rule can be secured without mass participation in her experimentation, or why her open mini-publics would not degenerate into shortcuts that bypass deliberation among the citizenry at large.

One response for Landemore would be to look at the reasons behind the choices of citizens, such as why they choose to participate in the way they do and/or why they choose not to participate at all. For instance, as Lafont ( 2020b ) suggests, citizens who choose not to participate can have reasons to expect alignment between the participants’ decisions and the decisions that they would endorse upon reflection. If there are no such reasons, deference is considered blind, such as randomly choosing whether and how to participate by tossing a coin. By contrast, if there are some reasons to delegate the deliberation and decisions to others, deference is considered not blind, such as deferring highly technical decisions to experts.

The key is to build experimentation that does not, at least, encourage randomness and arbitrariness in delegation for deliberation and decisions. This will require citizens to actively reflect on their choices of participation, such that they understand why they are (not) participating in the experimentation in the way they do as well as why the decisions of (other) participants can align with their values, beliefs, and interests. Arguably, there is no way we can avoid active engagement of citizens in the process of delegation, regardless of whether mass participation is expected in the process of deliberation and decisions.

To be fair, Landemore is in no sense agnostic about active engagement of citizens. She is, for example, aware of the importance of linking participants in the mini-publics to the larger population through crowdsourcing platforms and other deliberative forums. She also aspires to cultivate and nurture open-mindedness in ordinary citizens through the use of open mini-publics. That said, it is still possible for citizens to choose randomly or arbitrarily as to whether and how to participate in such deliberative experimentation. It remains an open question as to whether these institutions can ever enhance, rather than compromise, the ideal of democratic self-governance.

Natural as reasonable?

On the other hand, Tanasoca’s proposal of naturalization puts emphasis on informal networked deliberation that is already existing among citizens in the public sphere. Any organized, structured interactions as in deliberative events are ‘artificial’ and should at most be treated as a means to improving the deliberative quality of the entire deliberative system. In other words, micro-deliberations in the formal, ‘artificially engineered’ institutions, such as Landemore’s open mini-publics, are valuable if and only if they can produce positive macro-systemic effects. Even if deliberations in these institutions are bad (e.g., ritual deliberation), they can still indirectly produce good deliberative systemic effects, such as promoting genuinely deliberative ends in other parts of the deliberative system.

It is reasonable to consider discursive interactions in the informal public sphere as legitimate sites for deliberative democracy, but common sense tells us that some of these interactions are non-deliberative and even morally problematic, such as exchanges involving epistemic injustice that undermines the mutual respect of certain interlocutors. If micro-deliberations as in the naturalistic setting serve only as a means to enhancing the performance of the deliberative system, it remains possible that some morally unacceptable micro-deliberations will be tolerated or even valued instrumentally by the system as a whole. As Owen and Smith ( 2015 ) point out, such a systemic perspective ‘all too easily becomes a functional defence of non-deliberative acts and practices that does not cohere with even the minimal requirements of mutual respect that all theorists consider central to deliberation per se’ (p. 22). The issue is that, if we are not rejecting the systemic view of deliberative democracy altogether, how ‘bad’ the deliberations at the micro-level should we be prepared to accept for naturalized deliberation?

What is existing naturally might not be at all reasonable. Likewise, some discursive interactions are problematic per se, even if they might bring about indirect positive effects on the deliberative system. Any deliberative wrongs done on individual interlocutors, as in the example of epistemic injustice, cannot simply be offset or neutralized by the genuinely deliberative ends promoted elsewhere in the system. Otherwise, we suffer the same problem as utilitarianism of failing to treat individual persons as ends in themselves but only as a means to the system. This undoubtedly compromises the ethical function of a deliberative system ( Mansbridge et al. 2012 ).

It is understandable that Tanasoca (and other systemic theorists) are aware of the limits of how real existing deliberative democracy can ‘realistically embody the ideal’ ( Tanasoca 2020: 5 ). It might be sensible to say that, in face of the reality constraints, the normative conditions can be relaxed, or they need not be all satisfied at the same time. That said, there are still merits for stipulating the bottom-line as to which discursive interactions or non-deliberative acts and practices should be rejected by the deliberative system in the first place. Otherwise, not only is the ideal of deliberative democracy compromised but also the concept of deliberation might be stretched too far ( Goodin 2019 ). As Goodin assertively writes, ‘[while] all of the stretches do have the virtue of realism… to stretch the ideal [of deliberative democracy] too far is to abandon it altogether’ (p. 893).

Competing Interests

The author has no competing interests to declare.

1 Bächtiger, A. (2019). A preface to studying deliberation empirically. In A. Bächtiger et al. (eds.) The Oxford handbook of deliberative democracy (pp. 657–662). Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI:   http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198747369.013.57

2 Goodin, R. (2019). If deliberation is everything, maybe it’s nothing. In A. Bächtiger et al. (eds.) The Oxford handbook of deliberative democracy (pp. 883–899). Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI:   http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198747369.013.23

3 Lafont, C. (2020a). Democracy without shortcuts: A participatory conception of deliberative democracy . Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI:   http://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198848189.001.0001

4 Lafont, C. (2020b). Against anti-democratic shortcuts: A few replies to critics. Journal of Deliberative Democracy , 16(2), 96–109. DOI:   http://doi.org/10.16997/jdd.367

5 Landemore, H. (2020). Open democracy: Reinventing popular rule for the twenty-first century . Princeton: Princeton University Press. DOI:   http://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691181998.001.0001

6 Mansbridge, J. et al. (2012). A systemic approach to deliberative democracy. In J. Mansbridge and J. Parkinson (eds.) Deliberative systems: Deliberative democracy at the large scale (pp. 1–26). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. DOI:   http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139178914.002

7 Niemeyer, S., & Jennstål, J. (2019). Scaling up deliberative effects—applying lessons of mini-publics. In A. Bächtiger et al. (eds.) The Oxford handbook of deliberative democracy (pp. 329–347). Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI:   http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198747369.013.31

8 Owen, D., & Smith, G. (2015). Survey article: Deliberation, democracy, and the systemic turn. The Journal of Political Philosophy , 23(2), 213–234. DOI:   http://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12054

9 Tanasoca, A. (2020). Deliberation naturalized: Improving real existing deliberative democracy . Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI:   http://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198851479.001.0001

10 Thacher, D. (2006). The normative case study. American Journal of Sociology , 111(6), 1631–1676. DOI:   http://doi.org/10.1086/499913

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A Journal of Ideas

Can we deliberate, please, why an intriguing recent experiment in deliberative democracy suggests we can scale it up and make use of it., tagged deliberative democracy james fishkin politics.

Electoral representation is the double-edged sword of democracy. The ability of millions of citizens to choose proxies for their own will has made modern, nationwide democracy possible, yet it has also reduced the democratic citizen to a passive agent in her nation’s political life. In The Social Contract , Rousseau remarks caustically that the English public “is free only during the election of the members of Parliament. As soon as they are elected, it is a slave, it is nothing.” That implicit understanding—less pejoratively phrased—has governed democratic life ever since; yet even that wobbly contract may have expired. Democratic citizens have rarely, if ever, been more disgusted with those who govern them, and with democracy itself. An ancient deference no longer applies; entrepreneurs of mass resentment have gained power by turning voters against political elites. The global populist contagion forces us to ask whether we need less democracy or more. Do we, that is, need more elite control or a more engaged—and more responsible—public?

It was the frail hope that the answer might be the latter that brought me this past June to the online “deliberative poll” known as America In One Room. The deliberative poll is a practice invented, and more or less owned and operated, by James Fishkin, a political scientist who teaches at Stanford and runs the Deliberative Democracy Lab there. A deliberative poll assembles what Fishkin calls a “mini-public”—a group of people, usually numbering around 500, who have been rigorously selected to represent a nation’s full demographic and attitudinal range. The group receives carefully balanced briefing materials that prepare it to discuss a series of policy ideas—in the case of the exercise I witnessed, proposals to reform democracy, including deliberative polling itself. Then the participants talk. They are given an opportunity to ask questions of experts. At the end they do not vote, since no political authority is waiting for their judgment, but they fill out extensive surveys that show how the deliberative process has changed their views.

The partisan hatred that increasingly poisons our politics and endangers our democracy would seem to doom in advance any hopes for a more participatory politics. Yet Fishkin’s experiments, and kindred ones, have shown that, under the right conditions, deliberation causes people to listen to one another, and even respect one another, despite profound differences of opinion. Deliberation blunts polarization. A more deliberative politics might be the precondition for a more participatory democracy—if, that is, we can figure out how to scale up the exercise from 500 people to 300 million.

I n his 1991 book Democracy and Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform , Fishkin explained that “a deliberative poll models what the public would think if it had a more adequate chance to assess the questions at issue.” Unlike a conventional poll—which simply asks people what they think about a given subject, and thus repackages as “public opinion” the welter of bias, ignorance, and media frenzy that forms much of our thinking—Fishkin envisioned a forum that would give citizens access to the same process of education and discussion available to legislative bodies. The deliberative poll was designed not to supplant parliaments, but to send a signal to them: This is what the public really thinks. No less, Fishkin wished to dignify the democratic public by demonstrating that it could think if given the chance. He claims to have been the first political scientist to bring the idea of deliberation down from legislatures, where Montesquieu and Madison had put it, to the level of the ordinary citizen. Certainly he was the first to put the idea into practice. The deliberative poll was a thought experiment brought to life.

There was something charming about the idea of deploying a proposed democratic reform to assess the popularity of proposed democratic reforms. Yet the imperative of halting democratic erosion has given a fierce urgency to concepts that had once been the private darlings of political scientists—ranked-choice voting, nonpartisan primaries, multimember districts, the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (designed to circumvent the Electoral College), and the like. The implicit subject of the exercise was thus: How can we save democracy? Fishkin and his colleagues had impaneled a group of political scientists, liberal and conservative, to compile the list of proposals. (Of course, political scientists are hardly the final authority on how to save democracy.) Once the subject matter had been determined, the Stanford lab turned to NORC, a social science research and polling organization at the University of Chicago, to do “sortition”—the selection of a representative sample. Researchers there consulted the U.S. Postal Service address file to randomly select census tracts, then blocks, then actual addresses. They then contacted 30,000 individuals and surveyed the 40 percent or so who said they would consider participating to determine demographic and ideological characteristics. That produced a much smaller sample, which was reduced yet further as people dropped out. At the end of this process of distillation, which took several months, NORC delivered to Stanford what was, in effect, America in one room.

But that was only the beginning. Scholars at Stanford prepared a précis and background description of the agenda items, which Norman Bradburn, the former director of NORC and an expert in the drafting of survey questions, used to draw up a polling document asking participants to state their current views on the 40-odd reform proposals. This baseline document would allow researchers to later determine how dramatically participants’ views changed as a result of the polling exercise. Stanford officials also drew up a draft of the background materials that would be sent to each participant; this was submitted to an advisory group of scholars to ensure the highest possible level of accuracy and fairness. Though expensive and immensely time-consuming, the process would have been yet more elaborate had the participants been convening in person, as they had in the past. At a 2019 event, NORC used a “concierge approach” to help participants get leave from jobs and find them child care.

America In One Room convened virtually at noon Eastern time on June 3. I followed a group of 12 or so who agreed to let an outsider eavesdrop. They began by introducing themselves: George, a retired police sergeant in Galveston; Brian, a nurse in Albuquerque; Larry, a retiree in San Diego; Amanda, a mother of three; Ean, an Afghan War veteran; Diana, who worked for FedEx. Despite the fine-grained sortition process, the group skewed old and white. The discussion was guided by Stanford’s Online Deliberation Platform, which features an AI-assisted virtual moderator that offers prompts to stimulate discussion, nudge a shy participant, curb an abusive speaker, move on to the next subject, and so on. The system, which makes it possible for thousands of people to deliberate simultaneously, is so persuasively human that Brian, the nurse, later told me that he had assumed the voice belonged to “Alice”—Alice Siu, a colleague of Fishkin’s who helped manage the event.

After the introductions, the group was shown a short video that recapitulated information they had received earlier about a series of proposed reforms. The video, like the literature, was exactingly balanced, with advocacy introduced by locutions like “some say….” Many of the participants were initially reluctant to speak, but soon about half a dozen were regularly using their one minute of allotted time and then responding to further comments. At first they rambled over topics close to their heart, like the Electoral College, which no one liked. Then they focused on the first topic, ranked-choice voting, which allows voters to list their top three or more candidates, eliminates the last-place finisher, and then redistributes votes to the remaining candidates until one emerges with a majority. The idea struck Amanda as dumb. “What if you don’t like that least-ranked candidate?” she asked. “Who would remarry their least-favorite person?” It wasn’t clear if she or many of the others had read the briefing literature. Larry, the San Diego retiree, who very clearly had, explained that voters could just choose one candidate if they wished. As they talked their way through the proposals, the group gravitated toward those that seemed most likely to reduce polarization, like nonpartisan primaries. “Let’s just vote the human being,” Brian said. They were flummoxed by unfamiliar ideas like fusion voting, which allows a candidate to run on more than one ticket and make common cause with other parties, and proportional representation, in which voters choose multiple winners for large, multimember districts. Both help third parties and at least aim to reduce polarization, and so should have been popular, but this wasn’t clear to the group.

After an hour of discussion, the virtual moderator signaled that time was up. Now the participants were to draw up questions they would like to pose to the experts and then to vote on which they preferred. After a 60-minute break, our very human moderator, public radio personality Ray Suarez, turned to political scientist Lee Drutman to talk about the growing polarization that the reforms were intended to address. Drutman is on record as a skeptic of some of the reforms under discussion, including ranked-choice voting, and a devotee of one of them—proportional representation. “We need five or six parties,” Drutman explained. “Break the binary.” Afterward Brian complained, not unreasonably, that he had looked for “teaching, not preaching.” Other experts followed. They were temperate and thoughtful. I did, however, note my own reaction: “Asleep by 2:10,” 40 minutes into the hour-long session. Deliberation asks a lot of the citizen.

In the afternoon, the group learned about and discussed some extremely wonky subjects, such as the vote compact, and some hot-button issues, like term limits for the Supreme Court. The participants appeared to be of one mind on almost everything—get rid of the Electoral College, impose term limits on the Court—though it was hard to be sure since several of them remained silent. One extremely weird thing happened: A new member, Doug, suddenly loomed up gigantically in his camera, his hair plastered across his forehead, his words slurred. “We have a President who doesn’t know his asshole from a hole in the ground,” Doug blurted out, apropos of nothing. The platform registered Doug’s use of a forbidden word and prompted the others to decide if he should be cut off. He should not, they voted. After another outburst, George wrote, “I believe Doug is intoxicated.” But the collective commitment to civility was so deep that Doug was tolerated as if he were the village eccentric.

Indeed, the most striking feature of the six hours of group deliberation was the palpable wish to maintain among themselves the bipartisan comity that so many of them said they yearned for in our public life. Many of the proposals felt so technocratic that the participants weren’t clear about which side, if either, they were likely to benefit. At times, however, the discussion veered toward the third rail of voter fraud. On day one Susan, a West Coast liberal, said, “I do believe our system is safe.” Amanda, a Southern conservative, retorted: “There’s no way. Our votes are not safe.” The following day, Larry, a long-ago political science major and now a careful student of politics, noted that “research has shown the incidence of fraud is minimal,” at which Brian asked how, then, it could be that 7,500 people had voted in a New Mexico city of 5,000, as he had heard. Nobody persuaded anyone, but neither did anyone lose their temper. The very fact of coming together to discuss weighty questions had apparently induced the group to speak softly and listen courteously. “Voter fraud is possible,” Amanda said at one point, “but I respect y’all’s opinion.”

The extensive questionnaire that all participants filled out afterward showed how deeply the discussions had changed their views, albeit on issues where few of them may have had deep-rooted convictions. Self-described Republicans found themselves far more receptive than they had been before to reforms designed to remove impediments to voting and registration, such as allowing online or Election Day registration. Republicans went from opposing to supporting restoring the right to vote to felons who had served their time. On the highly charged issue of transferring power over redistricting from state legislatures to nonpartisan commissions, members of both parties switched from negative to positive, but the change among Republicans, whose local political leaders have perfected the art of gerrymandering, was much larger. On other issues, like ranked-choice voting and proportional representation, partisans remained divided, with Democrats generally pro and Republicans con—but the latter moved significantly closer to the former.

Though the summary of the outcome drawn up by Stanford scholars emphasized that on several issues Democrats also drew closer to Republicans, conservatives would have good reason to fear that calm and reasonable deliberation has the effect of clarifying the merits of good-government reforms advanced by mainstream figures and of dissipating suspicions designed to demonize the other side. In short, bad for them. Astonishingly, the percentage of Republicans who pronounced themselves satisfied with American democracy rose from 19 percent to 50 percent. That is good news for democracy, but not necessarily for Donald Trump’s Republican Party.

D eliberative democracy is itself a reform, if a carefully circumscribed one, of the classical model of representative democracy. The early Federalists, above all John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, feared “the mob” and regarded electoral representation as a bulwark against the irrationality of the average citizen. The mass movements that cheered the rise of fascist governments in the 1930s confirmed those dark premonitions. In 1942, the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, who had left Germany for the United States a decade earlier, argued in his immensely influential Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy that democracy operates like a marketplace, with aspiring leaders competing for voters’ favor as companies do with their products. Voters choose, and then withdraw. Schumpeter effectively resurrected Rousseau’s gibe as a virtue: “The electoral mass,” he claimed, “is incapable of action other than a stampede.” Postwar political scientists characterized the disengagement of the average voter as an act of “rational ignorance.” Having agreed to cede active control over the political process, voters had little incentive to educate themselves on the subject.

The very different mass movements of the 1960s, deeply idealistic and less violent than those of the 1930s, seemed to belie the assumption that citizens were content simply to designate their proxies. Their disengagement from partisan politics could be construed as a sign of alienation from a nonresponsive system, as the radical students who drew up the 1962 Port Huron Statement argued. Younger, left-wing scholars trusted leaders less and ordinary people more than Schumpeter’s generation had. In her 1970 Participation and Democratic Theory , the British political theorist Carole Pateman argued—as de Tocqueville had—that citizenship in democracy was a learned and active skill. “Participation develops and fosters the very qualities necessary for it,” she wrote; “the more individuals participate the better able they become to do so.” In Strong Democracy , political scientist Benjamin Barber argued that participation made the people worthy of democracy. “Without participating in the common life that defines them and in the decision-making that shapes their social habitat,” Barber wrote, “women and men cannot become individuals.”

Yet the idea of replacing representation with direct participation presupposed a faith in the wisdom of the average citizen that struck more mainstream liberals as wildly utopian. In Political Liberalism , John Rawls argued that democratic legitimacy depended not on a transfer of power from representatives to citizens, but on acts of deliberation that ensured that policy decisions were based on what he called “an ideal of public reason.” Rawls, in turn, was building on the work of the German political philosopher Jürgen Habermas, who argued that free and widespread debate—in cafes as well as parliaments—ultimately produced outcomes whose legitimacy all could accept. Writing at the same moment, James Fishkin proposed a practical way of institutionalizing these informal modes of deliberation based on the model of the ancient republics. He reminded readers that while the Athenian Assembly had been open to all male citizens—that is, fully participatory—the Athenians had deployed a lottery system to choose the agenda-setting Council of 500 as well as juries that judged the work of the assembly.

Fishkin first got to put his theories into practice in 1996, when he was teaching at the University of Texas. State electric utilities asked him to hold a series of deliberative polls to determine how to provide electric power in various regions. Between 1996 and 1998, Fishkin convened eight groups, whose members strongly endorsed increasing the use of wind power. A subsequent study found that state utilities “changed their level of interest in and commitment to renewables and efficiency as a result of what they heard from customers.” Texas is now first in the country on wind power production. In 1996 Fishkin also held a National Issues Convention in which several of the Republican candidates for President addressed the participants. The event was co-sponsored and broadcast by PBS. The convention offered a modest proof of concept, since participants reported having changed their views on a number of subjects, such as the efficacy of foreign aid.

As the years passed, however, the Texas poll remained the only example of a political entity in the United States authorizing one of Fishkin’s deliberative polls and accepting its outcome. In What’s Next California, in 2011, and in the first iteration of America In One Room, in 2019, political scientists and issue experts set the agenda and drew their own inferences from the outcomes of the discussions. The exercise seemed to have stalled somewhere between social science experiment and democratic reform. Deliberative polling has nothing like the popular following that some of the reforms the participants debated in June enjoy—a fact that perplexes its inventor. Earlier this year, when I paid a visit to Fishkin, a thickly bearded and bespectacled 75-year-old, he said, “I’m amazed at how many people haven’t heard about it.” That might even include some readers of this article.

E ven before the advent of deliberative polling, more rough-and-ready forms of deliberative or participatory democracy struck deep roots with citizens, though chiefly outside the United States. Since 1990, Brazil has held several hundred national and municipal “public policy conferences” that focus on social issues like the rights of minorities. The discussions begin in municipalities, where they are open to all citizens. Those participants choose delegates to state events who in turn elect representatives for a national deliberation. The public policy conferences completely bypass the stage of sortition; anyone can participate. Fishkin told me bluntly that self-selected processes offer no meaningful insight into what the larger public believes. But the idea speaks to something ordinary people in countries long under the thumb of authoritarian leaders may care about much more deeply: having a voice. The Brazilian model has spread to other nations in Latin America, including Mexico and Ecuador.

In Europe and East Asia, national governments have increasingly come to use versions of the deliberative poll as a democratic means of breaking political deadlock. In 2012 Ireland convened a 100-person “constitutional convention,” with two-thirds drawn randomly from the public and one-third from elected representatives. Of the eight issues the convention considered, by far the most explosive was same-sex marriage. After 79 percent of the group endorsed putting “marriage equality” on the ballot, Ireland’s right-of-center government came under pressure to hold a referendum. When the right to same-sex marriage easily passed in 2015—a virtual revolution of opinion in this once devoutly Catholic nation—the constitutional convention was widely credited with shaping public opinion. Virtually the same sequence of events occurred three years later on the yet more explosive subject of abortion—resounding endorsement of legalization by a “citizens’ assembly” modeled after the convention followed by approval of the nation in a referendum. Fishkin regards the citizens’ assembly as a “debilitated version” of his method, yet the Irish appear to have accorded it great legitimacy.

Political leaders elsewhere in Europe have impaneled assemblies to extricate themselves from trouble. In the aftermath of the “yellow vest” protests provoked by an abrupt increase in gasoline taxes to reduce gas consumption and pay for climate change legislation, French President Emmanuel Macron convened 150 randomly selected citizens to recommend policies to reduce carbon emissions. The group met seven times in 2019 and 2020 and forwarded 149 proposals to the president. In the end, however, Macron ignored the most far-reaching suggestions. Apparently he had regarded the poll as a means not so much to hear the voice of citizens as to demonstrate to them that he was doing so. In a postmortem, the participants awarded the government a 3 out of 10 for its response.

Fishkin’s Deliberative Democracy Lab has itself organized many mini-publics in Europe and Asia, always adhering strictly to Marquess of Queensberry rules. An initial poll in Mongolia in 2015 so persuaded the country’s leaders of the merits of the exercise that in 2017 the legislature passed a law requiring that a deliberative poll be held before the government considers a constitutional amendment. In 2003, President Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea proposed a deliberative poll on controversial plans to build a giant tunnel through a mountain. The effort failed, but the idea that deliberative polls could serve the interests of political leaders took hold. Chun Seok Kim, a member of the board of directors at Hankook Research, which organizes mini-publics in collaboration with Stanford, offered a telling explanation for the institutionalization of the practice: “All of these attempts were grounded in practical reasons rather than theoretical questions about democracy.”

One of the most remarkable vindications of the merits of the deliberative poll came in 2017, when South Korea’s president, Moon Jae-In, authorized one to determine whether his government should continue building two nuclear reactors. Moon had campaigned against nuclear power but agreed in advance to abide by the outcome. Political scientists and politicians publicly worried that a subject so technical would be beyond the capacity of the average citizen. Yet the deliberators, who had been selected according to Fishkin’s exacting standards, arrived at a complex split decision , voting both to approve the construction of two new reactors at the Shin-kori facility and to scale down nuclear power over time. Moon, true to his vow, accepted the outcome. Earlier this year, the South Korean parliament, deadlocked on a series of electoral reforms, authorized a poll on the subject. South Korea elects members of parliament through both single-member districts and proportional representation. After hearing arguments on both sides, the participants proved vastly more favorable to proportional representation than they had been in pre-deliberation surveys. The legislature has not yet acted, but Kim notes that the proceedings were broadcast live on Korea’s public TV service. “It is impossible,” he said, “for members of the National Assembly to just neglect the citizen voices and ignore the context.”

Why have political elites created space for citizen deliberation in Europe and East Asia, but not the United States? Larry Diamond, a scholar of democracy at Stanford and partner of Fishkin’s in the Deliberative Democracy Lab, points out that the polarization that deliberative polls have the capacity to help us overcome is precisely what is blocking the adoption of all sorts of democratic reforms, including this one. “There’s an appetite for reform,” he notes, “but no common vision of what that reform can be.” If Republicans think that making it easier to register or to vote, or putting an end to gerrymandering, or deferring to the outcome of a deliberative poll is bad for them, they’ll make sure it doesn’t happen. Some of the resistance, however, is bipartisan. American democracy, like baseball, is the very first, the most venerable, the most mythologized. Change feels like sacrilege. Baseball only modified some of its rules this past year when the game had become so slow and boring that it seemed to be shedding its mystique. The crisis in American democracy is just as grave, at least if you can accept that democracy matters as much as baseball; but so far, the growing sense of despair among fans hasn’t compelled management to act.

D eliberative polling in the United States, to reverse Kim’s terms, has been driven more by academic theories than by practical expedients. James Fishkin is a political scientist by training and temperament, and the leader of a movement more or less by accident. He is extremely protective of his invention; his reluctance to release the pure strain into the wild, where less exacting practitioners might relax rules on sortition or deliberation in order to save time or money, has probably limited its propagation. Yet the world has changed in ways that make deliberative democracy much more important than it was a generation ago, or even five years ago. In 2018, when he wrote Democracy When the People Are Thinking: Revitalizing Our Politics Through Public Deliberation , Fishkin was still preoccupied with the perfecting of public will. He expressed confidence that deliberative polling would enjoy widespread legitimacy “provided the citizen has a normative commitment to democracy.” That is taking for granted precisely what is now in dispute. Many Americans don’t have that normative commitment and won’t feel heard in an experiment carried out by Stanford political scientists. Finding out what the public would think under ideal circumstances of deliberation feels a lot less urgent than persuading Americans to deliberate with one another at all.

In 2019, Fishkin and his colleagues stumbled on a finding that had been largely latent until then: Deliberative polling has a “depolarizing” effect on participants. As in the National Issues Convention in 1996, a representative group was convened to discuss the hot-button issues of the upcoming election—the economy, health care, climate change, and foreign policy. The 526 participants met in a hotel outside of Dallas; they spent the weekend not only deliberating together but eating and drinking and schmoozing together. The effect was remarkable. Brian and Matt, from the group I watched, had both participated in the Dallas event. (Fishkin intentionally includes repeat participants in order to explore the effect of multiple deliberations.) When we talked afterward, both spoke almost rapturously of the sense of camaraderie they felt across all lines of background and ideology. “What I found is that we’re human beings first,” Brian told me. “We all want the same thing.”

A study of the pre- and post-deliberation surveys by Fishkin, Diamond, and colleagues concluded that on immigration, for example, deliberation on the most intensely contentious issues produced “massive changes” in opinion. Fishkin had seen this pattern often before. But what was new was the precipitous drop in “affective polarization”—how you feel about the other. On a 1 to 100 scale, Democrats rated Republicans 13 points higher than they had beforehand; Republicans rated Democrats 14 points higher. Those at the extreme ends of partisanship reported the largest increase in favorability ratings of the other. This past June’s version of America In One Room would confirm these findings: The fraction of voters who said, “I respect their point of view though it is different from mine” went from 57 to 75 percent, with similar increases among Democrats, Republicans, and independents.

The cause was no mystery: As the authors noted, the mid-century psychologist Gordon Allport had posited that contact between antagonistic groups could reduce polarization so long as it was conducted under conditions that foster “equal status between groups, common goals, cooperation, and institutional support.” America In One Room did just that. Yet a good deal of recent research in social psychology would not have predicted this hopeful outcome. The legal scholar Cass Sunstein has cited studies of juries to argue for what he calls a law of “group polarization,” in which deliberation produces a convergence around more extreme views than the average speaker held beforehand. Extremists typically exercise outsize influence on moderates. Yet Sunstein recognized that “the circumstances and nature of deliberation” shape that dynamic, and conceded that the design of deliberative polls may, in fact, produce convergence around the middle.

What’s more, the depolarization effect persists over time. Norman Bradburn of NORC told me that while the policy views of participants tend to revert once they get back home, change in views of the other remains. What’s more, Bradburn says, the Dallas event “changed their self-perception as citizens. It made them a little bit more independent of their group ideas and somewhat more attentive to information.” Participants became more likely to “vote for a policy reason” rather than because of vague personal feelings. Bradburn added however, “That’s based on the maximum treatment.”

The maximum treatment—that’s a problem. A single exemplary deliberative event, with all the elaborate trappings of sortition and minutely balanced policy input, can reveal what the public really thinks under ideal conditions. But if the purpose of the reform is not to produce a certain outcome but rather to give people access to the process, because doing so will change them , then you don’t need and can’t afford the maximum treatment. You need the clash of antagonistic views, but you don’t need representativeness. You need to release the mini-public into the wild. The automated platform makes it possible to do so, to extend a milder version of the treatment, online rather than in person, to a vast number of people, though inevitably under less rigidly controlled conditions. When I mentioned this paradox to Fishkin, he agreed that his invention had turned out to be “a potential cure” for polarization, but he wasn’t sure how to “deliver the medication.” Diamond, a more worldly figure who spent time in Iraq in 2004 seeking to nurture the seeds of democracy there, now sees in retrospect that deliberative polling “began with one purpose, quite noble and laudable, but it’s taken on a second purpose, in regard to the future of democracy, that may be more important than the first.”

Deliberative polling is like a drug that was developed to treat, say, migraines, but then turned out to slow the growth of cancer. Of course, the migraine treatment—showing what the public would believe under ideal conditions—still matters, at least in countries that have begun to institutionalize the mini-public. But in order to make inroads against the cancer of polarization, the medicine must be administered very differently. The only value in depolarizing the views of 526 carefully selected Americans is to demonstrate that it can work for everyone; otherwise, it’s a niche treatment. Everyone needs to have the opportunity to meet the other under the conditions Allport stipulated.

Fishkin actually dreamed of universalizing the experience long before he thought about polarization. In 2004, he and the legal thinker Bruce Ackerman proposed a “Deliberation Day,” to be held two weeks before major national elections, in which all voters would listen to a debate between the candidates, gather in groups of 15 to come up with questions, and then convene in 500-person assemblies to hear local proxies for the adversaries respond. It’s the kind of grassroots exercise of which de Tocqueville surely would have approved, but it presupposed an act of political will by the two parties so unlikely that even the authors described it as “realistic utopianism.” Indeed, if we wait for American political elites to embrace deliberative democracy, it will remain every bit as remote as proposals to abolish the Electoral College.

F ishkin now lists “scaling up” as his third objective, after perfecting the democratic will and countering polarization. The Deliberative Democracy Lab recently secured a grant from the Helena Foundation to work on such initiatives. The efforts to date have been modest. Fishkin and his colleagues have begun working with Close Up, a Washington, D.C.-based organization that promotes civic education in schools. Introducing deliberative polling into civics classes is a promising idea, but Mia Charity, president of Close Up, says that so far she has held only a few scattered events. Alice Siu told me that she has tried to enlist adults for deliberative events, but the effort hasn’t gotten off the ground owing to a low “take-up rate.” That may prove, as critics of participatory efforts typically argue, that most voters really don’t want to be more engaged in their democracy; they just want it to produce outcomes they like more. But what the experience in other countries shows is that citizens are prepared to set aside the time if they feel that the stakes matter. People might be quicker to volunteer if the subject were, say, whether to build a homeless shelter in their neighborhood. It also helps to pay people, as the Athenians did.

Larry Diamond has some practical suggestions. Diamond saw more evidence than I did of heated discussion and then rapprochement during the latest iteration of America In One Room. “It’s kind of stunning that this keeps happening,” he said to me. “We get more and more polarized, we get more and more embittered, but if you bring Americans together under good conditions, they don’t necessarily all agree, but they leave with almost a sense of relief that they’ve been able to have the conversation.” How, then, to diffuse that experience? Diamond envisions a series of local events that build on America’s unique network of civil society organizations. “You could,” he mused, “go into any community in the United States and bring together a diverse group to deliberate” under the aegis of the local Rotary Club or a coalition of churches. “You would ask, `What’s dividing us?’ They would define their own agenda. It could be abortion, pornography, minimum wage.” The organizers would dispense with the machinery of sortition but assure enough diversity to generate sufficient friction. Diamond has played a central role in preparing the briefing papers for Stanford’s deliberative polls and has practically killed himself with the effort to boil down the social science into bite-sized, ideology-free passages. He imagines a national clearinghouse that would take over the job by compiling background material on a vast range of subjects.

One could, in short, envision a world in which deliberative exercises were both more politically salient and far more widespread than they are now. The salience may, in fact, depend on the proliferation. A recent report from Carnegie Europe notes that while “more or less any strategy, document, or debate about the state of European democracy now makes a routine call for more citizen participation,” these initiatives have not yet proven “capable of reshaping democratic politics in a more far-reaching fashion.” The author, Richard Youngs, argues that deliberative democracy can never become a mass phenomenon so long as it is handed down from above, its legitimacy assumed rather than earned. Rather, he writes, political parties, social movements, civil society organizations, and the like must come to embrace deliberative exercises as important elements of their own decision-making. Only when the process has been embedded in politics and society, Youngs argues, will it begin to systematically shape national legislative outcomes.

In such a world, the distinction between “participatory” and “deliberative” democracy would dissolve, because widespread participation in deliberative exercises would compel political actors to take their outcomes seriously. In The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy , a 2018 compendium of essays by many of the leading scholars in the field as well as some of its chief critics, Stephen Elstub, a British political scientist, makes the case for “participatory deliberative democracy.” Elstub believes in the legitimating function of sortition-based assemblies but thinks that all citizens should have access to some form of deliberative exercise. Like Youngs, he suggests that we can let a thousand flowers bloom—mini-publics; referenda; deliberation in political parties, workplaces, and parliaments. Elstub observes that some leading theorists of deliberative democracy believe, like Schumpeter and his followers, that ordinary citizens don’t really want the burden of decision-making, and that democratic legitimacy does not rest on universal or even widespread political engagement.

Many of us, in fact, believe that. The spectacle of millions of apparently rational citizens endorsing bizarre conspiracy theories and questioning the outcome of obviously legitimate elections seems to have strengthened the argument for more elite control—more “professional vetting” of political candidates, as the scholars Jonathan Rauch and Ray La Raja put it—rather than more direct participation. After all, is it really true, as Carole Pateman argued half a century ago, that more participation would make people better able to participate? Is it even true that people yearn for more political agency? In his 1819 essay “The Liberty of Ancients Compared with That of Moderns,” the French political philosopher Benjamin Constant offered the classic formulation of the right to be left alone—a right cherished by liberals ever since. Constant observed that while for the citizens of the Roman republic “liberty” meant the right of full engagement in the political life of the state, “the aim of the moderns is the enjoyment of security in private pleasures, and they call liberty the guarantees accorded by institutions to these pleasures.” Brian and Matt and Larry would have concurred: Everyone in my group regarded a proposal to make voting mandatory as an intolerable infringement on personal autonomy.

Yet everybody in the group also liked deliberative polling. People want to be left alone—but they also want to have a voice. Angry people are angry about not being heard. The era of deference—to experts, to teachers, to elites of every kind—is over, for better and for worse. In our commercial life, participation has become the norm; we can hardly engage in a transaction without having our opinion of it solicited. Can we really wall off our political life from that demand to be listened to? If not, then we need to determine the conditions under which people would both volunteer for a more active role and behave in ways that do more good than harm. That is just the question James Fishkin has spent the last three decades thinking about. In 2018 he wrote that we need to find a third way between populism (deferring to the loudest voice) and technocracy (deferring to expertise). The Fishkin-style mini-public does that, but it isn’t the only way to foster civilized discourse and participatory decision-making. Let’s try everything.

Read more about Deliberative Democracy James Fishkin politics

James Traub is the author of True Believer: Hubert Humphrey’s Quest for a More Just America , which will be published in February.  

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1 Deliberative Democracy: An Introduction

André Bächtiger Professor of Political Theory, University of Stuttgart

John S. Dryzek Centenary Professor, ARC Laureate Fellow, Centre for Deliberative Democracy and Global Governance, University of Canberra

Jane Mansbridge is Charles F. Adams Professor of Political Leadership and Democratic Values at the Harvard Kennedy School.

Mark E. Warren Professor of Political Science, University of British Columbia

• Published: 09 October 2018
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We define deliberation minimally to mean mutual communication that involves weighing and reflecting on preferences, values, and interests regarding matters of common concern. Deliberative democracy incorporates the requirements that deliberation take place in contexts of equal recognition, respect, reciprocity, and sufficiently equal power for communicative influence to function. These aspirational ideals have inspired a flourishing field, with theoretical and empirical research across many disciplines, and many democratic innovations and practices in many countries and cultures. We survey the evolution of the ideals of deliberative democracy, their numerous sites in deliberative systems, the places of these sites within broader political arenas, and the many critics, criticisms, and revisions the concept and practice of deliberative democracy have attracted.

The Aim of this Handbook

Deliberative democracy is now a flourishing field. Deliberative democratic thinking characterizes ever more areas of theory and empirical study. Practical democratic innovations explicitly grounded in deliberative principles are proliferating, there is now a large academic and practical literature on deliberation, political figures increasingly appeal to deliberative democratic principles, and criticism has been robust and productive.

But all is not rosy on other fronts. As we bring this Handbook to fruition, the world at large appears to be moving in some disconcerting anti-deliberative and anti-democratic directions. Post-truth politics is the antithesis of deliberative democracy. Resurgent authoritarian and populist leaders in many countries have little interest in deliberation—except to suppress it. Even where deliberation is not repressed, we too often see levels of political polarization that signal inabilities to listen to the other side and reflect upon what they may have to say.

We hope that these sorts of trends can and will be reversed, and that the ideas and practices of deliberative democracy can play a key role in their reversal. In the meantime, however, these trends feed the cynicism of those who believe that deliberative democracy is a pipe dream. A long tradition in political science deploys empirical evidence and analysis to show that ordinary people are not up to the task of competent participation in democracy. Recently Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels, in Democracy for Realists , argue that identities and partisan attachments rather than issue opinions or interests drive voting behavior. Achen and Bartels dismiss deliberative democracy in a footnote as irrelevant when it comes to “understanding democratic politics on a national scale” ( Achen and Bartels 2016 , 2 n. 2). In contrast, we believe that deliberative democracy provides the best hope for countering the democratic deficiencies described by Achen and Bartels, and also constitutes an essential response to authoritarian populism and post-truth politics. Normative thinking about deliberative democracy and deliberative experiments is aimed not at duplicating democratic politics today but instead at providing ideals toward which to work and showing empirically how political systems can work better. Deliberative democracy puts meaningful communication at the heart of democracy, not as a naive hope, but in full recognition of the real capacities and limitations of citizens, politicians, and political processes. We hope this Handbook will demonstrate the possibilities and limitations of deliberative democracy, the opportunities for and the obstructions to politically constructive and democratic deliberation, the accomplishments of both the theory and the practice, and the challenges that remain.

Deliberative democracy is grounded in an ideal in which people come together, on the basis of equal status and mutual respect, to discuss the political issues they face and, on the basis of those discussions, decide on the policies that will then affect their lives.

In this volume, we define deliberation itself minimally to mean mutual communication that involves weighing and reflecting on preferences, values, and interests regarding matters of common concern . Defining it this way minimizes the positive valence that attaches to the word “deliberation” itself, so that we can then speak of “good” and “bad” deliberation without “bad deliberation” being a contradiction in terms. We define deliberative democracy as any practice of democracy that gives deliberation a central place.

We conceptually contrast deliberative democracy to aggregative democracy, which is normally based on the counting of votes. That deliberative and aggregative democracy contrast conceptually does not make them antithetical in practice. At least in established liberal democratic states, both deliberation (talking) and aggregation (voting) are usually important for democratic decision-making at different stages. Citizens and representatives discuss the issues before them, then sometimes come to agreement or, when conflict remains after discussion, make the decision by a vote. The role of the deliberation before the vote is to help the citizens to understand better the issues, their own interests, and the interests and perceptions of others; forge agreement where possible; and, in the instances in which agreement is not possible, both structure and clarify the questions behind the conflict and the eventual vote.

Like many human ideals and almost all democratic ideals, the ideals that animate deliberative democracy are aspirational—ideals that cannot be achieved fully in practice but that provide standards toward which to aim, all other things equal. 1 Many common criticisms of deliberative democracy fail to recognize the aspirational quality of deliberative ideals. That deliberative democracy in its ideal form cannot be achieved perfectly in the world of practice does not undermine its use as a standard toward which to strive. The central ideal in aggregative democracy, equal power, is also impossible to achieve perfectly in practice. Even referenda, in which each citizen may have an equally weighted and aggregated vote, are worded and placed before the citizenry by individuals whose power over that wording and placement is greater than that of the typical citizen. It is impossible to achieve either deliberative or aggregative ideals in all their fullness.

Despite the impossibility of fully achieving these ideals, however, in some circumstances we may want to try hard and incur significant costs to come closer to an ideal. In other circumstances, trying too hard to achieve one ideal may create impediments to achieving other ideals and values—for example, when the time and resources required for extensive deliberation undermine decisive action on a matter of urgent public concern. When the costs in other values of promoting the deliberative ideal seem on reflection too high, we appropriately settle for institutions and practices that come less close to the deliberative ideal. This contingent approach, attending to the greater or lesser importance and the greater and lesser costs of different ideals in different contexts, applies to all aspirational democratic ideals, including deliberative ones.

Over the past half-century, thinking about the content of deliberative ideals has evolved. In what we call the “first generation” of thinkers on the subject, 2 philosophers in several different and sometimes competing traditions introduced a series of related concepts to contemporary democratic theory: Jürgen Habermas developed one tradition, John Rawls and Joshua Cohen another, and writers in the civic republican tradition a third. Thinkers in other traditions and fields, including those rearticulating the ideals of participatory democracy, analyzing successful policy processes, and studying the internal workings of legislatures and courts, all contributed ideas to the field (see Floridia, this volume, Chapter 2 ). At the same time, scholars and practitioners interested in improving the practice of democracy on the ground introduced different kinds of deliberative experiments whose outcomes have also influenced the evolving and contested theory. These first-generation thinkers all viewed deliberation fairly generically, as the offering and receiving of reasons for positions or policies. They often also combined this generic idea with the ideals of high-quality argumentation or rational-critical debate, a focus on the common good, mutual respect, and the concept of a rationally motivated consensus to which all could agree (see Chambers, this volume, Chapter 3 ). Almost as soon as thinkers from these different strands of theory and practice introduced their conceptions of deliberation into contemporary democratic theory, those conceptions met opposition. To that opposition others responded in defense, and as the debate continued, the ideals began to evolve. What we call “second-generation” ideals do not reflect a consensus of either theorists or practitioners, but are nevertheless, we believe, more sensitive to the nuances of the pluralist aspirations and dimensions of modern democracies. The first-generation ideal that arguments ought to give and respond to “reasons,” for example, has evolved into the criterion that arguments ought to give and respond to appropriate “considerations” and contexts—for example, more emotionally rooted expressions and differing styles of communication such as narrative and rhetoric.

These second-generation ideals are not more “realistic” in the sense of being practical accommodations to the reality of not being able to reach the first-generation ideals fully. Rather, they embody expansions of first-generation ideals, often driven by ideals of democratic inclusion and plurality. The theorists who have advanced the second-generation views of deliberation have advanced them as better ideals —more inclusive and better thought through—than the ideals of the first generation. The choice between first- and second-generation ideals is contested, as is the meaning of each of the ideals in either generation. What any democratic ideal ought to imply in practice is always contested. An important job of political theory is to make clear the strands in any such contest so that both practitioners and theorists may understand better what they want in the realm of democratic ideals.

Table 1.1 presents our summary of the first- and second-generation ideals. These ideals are not only contested but also evolving, so that what we present here is a snapshot that will undoubtedly change further as deliberative theorists continue to place the ideals under scrutiny, examining their implications and suggesting alternatives. 3

The ideal of mutual respect is central to all theories of deliberation ( Gutmann and Thompson 1996 ). Although theorists have explored what respect might mean in any interaction, no one has suggested revising the underlying ideal significantly. For Larmore, for example, “to respect another person as an end is to require that coercive or political principles be as justifiable to that person as they presumably are to us” ( Larmore 1999 , 608; see also Forst 2012 ). That justifiability may be tested in deliberation. In practice, respect in deliberation includes listening actively and trying to understand the meaning of a speaker’s statements to that speaker, rather than viewing the statements as objects to be dismissed, demeaned, manipulated, or destroyed. It means, without sacrificing realism, trying to see the motives of the speaker as the speaker experiences them. It means, as Bernard Williams put it, that each speaker “is owed an effort at identification; that he [or she] should not be regarded as the surface to which a certain label can be applied, but one should try to see the world (including the label) from his [or her] point of view” ( Williams 1962 , 41).

In response to early formulations of the ideal of mutual respect as requiring an “effort at identification,” subsequent thinkers, particularly Black feminist theorists, have pointed out that this effort should include a consciousness that one cannot ever fully understand or identify with the experiences of another, particularly if one’s interlocutor comes from a background very different from one’s own ( Collins 1990 ). Thus, one should give highly respectful attention to, and ask questions designed to elicit, each person’s own understanding of their experiences and their own interpretations of their words (for an early formulation, see Barber 1984 , 173–4). Even when difficult, members of dominant groups interacting with members of historically subordinate groups should work to understand the expressions, narratives, problems, and positions of subordinate groups. In practice, regardless of the background of any of the individuals involved, mutual respect in deliberation enhances the frank and free flow of ideas. Respect in interaction is, in short, an unchallenged standard of good deliberation.

The ideal of absence of coercive power in deliberation has also remained unchallenged since Habermas first targeted its importance in his 1962 Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere ([1962] 1989, 202) and later portrayed it as possibly the central presupposition of argumentation based on the quest for understanding (Habermas [1981] 1984, 25 and 1982, 235, 255). Reconceived from a pragmatic presupposition to an ideal, the aim is that in deliberation, coercive power, defined as the threat of sanction or the use of force (moving others against their will), should not play a role. It requires no subtlety to realize that such conditions never exist in reality. Since Foucault (e.g. [1975] 1977), however, our understanding of the subtlety of the effects of power has expanded greatly. We now see how even the words we have available to us to speak, including the language we must speak ( van Parijs 2011 ), carry with them a host of forced choices emanating from the context of social, political, and economic power—for example giving us, before the recent feminist movement, “mankind” as the most accessible word in English to describe humanity (see e.g. Lupia and Norton 2017 ). Despite the impossibility of removing coercive power from any deliberative situation, however, that aspiration remains central to the deliberative enterprise. We rightly judge particular deliberative institutions by how closely they approach this ideal.

Although mutual respect and the absence of power stand unchallenged as deliberative ideals throughout the evolution of deliberative thought, other earlier ideals embedded in the concept of good deliberation have undergone some evolution, ranging from minor to significant. The ideal of equality, for example, has undergone a slight modification from certain earlier formulations. It still encompasses the component ideals of mutual respect (as discussed above), inclusion (the ideal that those with interests at stake in collective concern should have a voice in deliberations), and equality of communicative freedom (the ideal that each should be equally free to give his or her opinion; see e.g. Habermas [2005] 2008; Cohen 1989 ). But early formulations of the ideal using phrases such as “equal voice” or “equal influence,” which seemed to require that each participant have an equal effect on the deliberative outcome, have come under critical scrutiny and revision. Knight and Johnson argue, for example, that democratic deliberation requires not equal influence (i.e. equal persuasive effects), but “equal opportunity of access to political influence” or simply “equal opportunity of political influence” (1997, 280, 292). An ideal of equal influence would give equal weight to both good and bad arguments, but in good deliberation one should change one’s mind under the influence of a good argument, not a bad one. Knight and Johnson point out that in practice, a fully achieved ideal of equal opportunity to influence would require “equality of resources,” including “material wealth and educational treatment,” in order to “ensure that an individual’s assent to arguments advanced by others is indeed uncoerced.” The full goal of the “equal capacity to advance persuasive claims,” would require remedying “the asymmetrical distribution in any political constituency of relevant deficiencies and faculties” (1997, 281). In a significant critique of Habermas, Fraser (1990) had earlier made a similar point, writing that “societal equality is … a necessary condition for political democracy”—although this point cannot, of course, mean waiting for social and economic equality before pursuing democracy, since democracy is often the means through which these kinds of equality are advanced ( Young 2000 , chapter 1 ). Because both the equal capacity to advance persuasive claims and social/economic equality are aspirational ideals, it should be clear that the shift from equal influence to the equal opportunity to influence as an ideal is not a concession to “reality” but an attempt to specify the ideal more carefully.

The ideal of reason giving a central part of the early deliberative theories of Jürgen Habermas and the Rawlsian theorist Joshua Cohen, has also come under criticism, sometimes unfairly, for being too focused on the kind of rational argumentation one might find in an academic seminar. It is true that Habermas’s early archetypical “public sphere” was characterized by the “people’s public use of their reason” ([1962] 1989, 26) in “rational-critical debate,” which in turn rested only on “the standards of ‘reason’ ” (28) and “the authority of the better argument” (36; see also 54 and passim ). In later work, however, Habermas argued forcefully that “[f]eelings have a similar function for the moral justification of action as sense perceptions have for the theoretical justification of facts” (1990, 50; see Neblo 2003 ). Joshua Cohen in early work (1989) portrayed the relevant ideal as requiring that deliberative outcomes should be settled only by reference to the “reasons” participants offer, but he meant to include in that concept a set of fuller considerations. Cohen’s early formulation followed John Rawls’s emphasis on “public reasons” (as eventually expressed in Rawls 1993 ) as well as the emphasis on reason of Joseph Bessette, who coined the term “deliberative democracy” (1979, 1982, 1994).

Amelie Rorty (1985) , Martha Nussbaum (2001) , and many others have pointed out the flaws in dichotomizing “reason” and “emotion.” The emotions always include some form of appraisal and evaluation, and reason itself requires an underlying emotional commitment to the process of reasoning. Nussbaum’s positive account of the role of emotions in deliberation particularly singles out the emotion of compassion as an essential element of good reasoning in matters of public concern. Neblo (2015) , Krause (2008), and Morrell (2010) have argued that empathy is both a precursor to good deliberation and plays important roles within deliberation. Others have focused on the importance to deliberation of many important kinds of human communication other than reason-giving, including “testimony” (stating one’s own perspective and experience in one’s own words) (Sanders 1991 ; 1997 , 351, 371), “greetings” (explicit mutual recognition and conciliatory caring) ( Barber 1984 , 187), “rhetoric” (persuasive speaking that can involve humor or arresting figures of speech), and “storytelling” (which can back prescriptions or communicate understandings based on personal experience rather than abstract argument) ( Young 1996 , 129; 2000, chapter 2 ). These additions to the ideal are particularly important when the less purely “reason”-oriented forms of communication are more cognitively and emotionally available to members of relatively marginalized groups, such as women, people with less formal education, and members of non-dominant ethnicities. Contemporary deliberative theorists have, by and large, accepted these criticisms by expanding the deliberative ideal of eliciting and presenting “reasons” to an ideal of eliciting and presenting “relevant considerations,” which may have a more emotional than purely rational base (Mansbridge 1999 , 2015 ).

The ideal of consensus has undergone greater revision. Jürgen Habermas was the preeminent first-generation theorist to stress consensus as the goal of deliberation. In his early Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere , he described that aim as “the consensus developed in rational-critical public debate” and the “final unanimity wrought by a time-consuming process of mutual enlightenment, for the ‘general interest’ on the basis of which alone a rational agreement between publicly competing opinions could freely be reached” ([1962] 1989, 179, 195). In Elster’s later stylized rendition of Habermas’s thought, the goal of political action “should be rational agreement rather than compromise, and the decisive political act is that of engaging in public debate with a view to the emergence of a consensus” (1986, 103). In his Theory of Communicative Action (1984, [1981] 1987 ) , however, Habermas presented consensus not as a political ideal but as part of a speech-act theory of deliberative influence: when speakers aim at mutual understanding by making “validity claims,” they are, in effect, seeking consensus with other speakers ( Floridia 2017 ). Still later, Habermas pointed out that a deliberative democracy should underwrite and protect deliberative influence in the sense of aiming at mutual understanding, but will also have processes that enable fair compromises and bargains when interests or values genuinely conflict, as they will in pluralistic societies ( Habermas [1992] 1996 , esp. 164–9). Within the Rawlsian tradition, Joshua Cohen early on wrote that “ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus—to find reasons that are persuasive to all who are committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of alternatives by equals.” He immediately pointed out, however, that even “under ideal conditions there is no promise that consensual reasons will be forthcoming. If they are not, then deliberation concludes with voting, subject to some form of majority rule” (1989, 23). Later theorists were to investigate further the conditions in which consensual reasons were not forthcoming, arguing that a goal of deliberative communication more attentive to pluralist contexts and ideals would be consensus in matters of compatible values and common interests, but conflict clarification and fair compromise when those conditions did not hold ( Habermas 1996 ; Mansbridge et al. 2010 ).

Relatedly, early deliberative theorists stressed the centrality to good deliberation of an orientation to the common good. Habermas made such an orientation central to his early concept of a “rational-critical” public sphere ([1962] 1989; see Elster 1986 , 103). Sunstein (1988) and Cohen (1989) also made the common good central to their discussions of deliberation. More recently, however, some theorists have suggested that in some circumstances self-interest is an appropriate motivation in deliberation, as long as that motivation is constrained by considerations of fairness and others’ rights ( Fraser 1990 ; Mansbridge et al. 2010 ).

In addition to these centrally constitutive elements of ideal deliberation, other characteristics of the traditional ideal, such as publicity, accountability, and sincerity, have also come under critical scrutiny and suggestions for revision. One recent group of theorists, for example, has suggested that the ideal of “publicity,” which many theorists, including Kant, thought required by the deliberative ideal (see overview in Habermas [1962] 1989 , 100, 116, 165ff), is not appropriate for all deliberations, particularly those that occur within highly strategic contexts like legislatures. These theorists have enumerated some of the conditions under which privacy rather than publicity is likely to promote better deliberation ( Chambers 2004 ; Warren and Mansbridge et al. 2016 , 174–85). Such conditions include guards against corruption and requirements for public justification following a closed forum. The ideal of accountability appears in Gutmann and Thompson’s (2004) analysis as a requirement for good deliberation in the context of elected representation. Deliberation in other forums would require other forms of accountability that still remain to some degree untheorized. Finally, traditional views of good deliberation may have emphasized the importance of authenticity and sincerity among the speakers, but more recent theorists have pointed out that some insincerity is allowable and even preferable in the non-substantive matters of greeting, compliments, and other communications aimed at generating the mutual respect necessary for deliberation ( Warren 2006 ).

On the non-ideal but pragmatic and prudential front, a major goal of deliberation has always been the epistemic goal of improving knowledge (Estlund and Landemore, this volume, Chapter 7 ; see also Estlund 1993 ; 2009 ; Landemore 2013 ; Martí 2006 ; Nino 1996 ), but the tensions within that goal and how it is to be achieved are constantly contested ( Bohman 1998 ).

In short, there is no Platonic ideal of good deliberation. The ideals of which good deliberation is composed are rightly constantly subjected to critical scrutiny, examined for unintended implications, opened to revision, revised, and subjected again to contest and further scrutiny. The ideals evolve as those who have placed them under scrutiny suggest revisions and others accept those revisions. Deliberative democracy is an excellent example of what Gallie (1956) called an “essentially contested concept,” in that contestation and reflection are integral to the concept itself ( Gutmann and Thompson 2004 , chapter 4 ).

The Sites of Deliberative Democracy

Where can and should the ideal of deliberative democracy be pursued? The short answer is almost everywhere and that different locations can be joined in productive combinations.

We may begin with the formal institutions of government, notably legislatures, courts, and executives (see Quirk, Bendix, and Bächtiger, this volume, Chapter 17 ). Legislatures in practice often do not adhere closely to deliberative standards. Elected representatives often use public speech strategically, as their motivations are usually shaped in the first instance by the imperatives of winning elections within adversarial contexts. Parliamentary debates can be ritualized performances, conceived in the service of strategizing for electoral victory and aimed primarily at scoring points in the public eye. Reflection and being amenable to changing one’s mind, central deliberative ideals, are often in short supply in public legislative debate, especially in the adversarial systems of Anglo-American countries. Westminster-style parliamentary systems in particular have the virtue of sharpening the accountability of governments, but do so at some cost to deliberative learning within political institutions.

Yet not all legislatures are as deliberatively problematic as the Anglo-American adversarial versions. Using measures derived from Habermas’s work on deliberation, Steiner et al. (2004) show that deliberative quality is higher in more consensual systems with no strict party discipline (such as Switzerland), where the divide between “government” and “opposition” is less clear. They have also shown that deliberative quality is higher in committees that are not open to the public, where legislators are more likely to show respect for the others’ perspectives. Even in the American system, informal meetings among legislators can produce significant deliberation, while legislative staff may deliberate privately with other legislative staff ( Mansbridge 1988 ; Bessette 1994 ). Because a mutually trusting environment in which participants can speak freely is often crucial to good deliberation, the quality of deliberation may be inversely proportional to the degree of attention that deliberation will get from the public. Thus transparency may not always be a deliberative good and may do deliberative harm. (For evidence on the anti-deliberative effects of transparency and an accompanying normative argument, see Warren and Mansbridge et al. 2016 .) The future is open to work comparing the quality of deliberation in state and provincial legislatures in federated systems, as well as in direct face-to-face democracies of different sizes and compositions, as in New England town meetings or participatory budgeting assemblies.

For Rawls (1993 , 231) the exemplary deliberative institution is not a legislature but rather the US Supreme Court, which is populated by specialists in a certain kind of public reason. Such enthusiasm for the deliberative centrality of constitutional courts is hard to find outside the United States. Moreover, although constitutional courts may be deliberative they are not very democratic, given that their members are only appointed by democratically elected representatives and often appointed for life. In the United States today, the Supreme Court today increasingly fails to approach deliberative standards because its members divide along predictable partisan lines and are thus at times tempted not to take seriously the arguments of members with contrary partisan leanings. This said, judges and justices must still justify their decisions with reasoning, and they are constrained by institutional rules, norms of impartiality, and the particulars of cases to respond to the positions they oppose, especially when overturning precedents ( Rosanvallon 2011 , part 3). Constitutional court systems are thus an important, if limited, site of deliberation.

Juries also provide important sites of citizen deliberation within the judicial system. Although in many countries the actual deliberations of juries cannot be observed, mock juries and retrospective accounts give a largely positive account of the quality and effects of deliberation, with the egalitarian qualification that class, race, and gender (to a declining extent) tend significantly to affect deliberative participation (see York and Cornwell 2006 and Gastil, Burkhalter, and Black 2007 , summarizing an extensive literature).

In the executive branch of government, the appointed members of government agencies often deliberate extensively over which policies are to the public good (see Sunstein 2017 on the US Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs; also Weaver and Jones 1989 on “deliberative process privilege,” a form of executive privilege in the US). This deliberation may be especially inclusive when there are coalition governments and the consent of coalition partners is needed in order to pass and implement legislation (see Steiner et al. 2004 ). Political requirements for consent can lead to “deliberative negotiations” ( Warren and Mansbridge et al. 2016 ), not only in legislatures but also in administrative agencies, where high levels of justification rationality and mutual respect may be necessary to cope successfully with factual disagreements and issues of fairness and justice, as well as to spark a constructive spirit during policy negotiations. Administrations in many countries have adopted practices of ‘governance-driven democratization’ ( Warren 2009 ), in which they consult stakeholders or broader publics in order to craft better policies. This kind of consultation can involve only simple “notice and comment” procedures in which regulators are required by law to post possible regulations publicly, so that members of relevant publics can register their disagreements and suggestions for change. But such consultations can also be far more thorough, including iterative processes that incorporate elements of negotiation as well as deliberation (for the EU, see e.g. Sabel and Zeitlin 2008 ).

As societies become politically more complex, administrators have turned to formal and informal networks of mutual consultation and decision in the service of effective governance. In many polities, particularly in the “consensual” democracies of Northern Europe, these networks are increasingly outweighing, and some think displacing, the formal institutions of government in the production of collective decisions ( Rhodes 1997 ). Although such networks sometimes include important civil society actors such as NGOs, they are often democratically and deliberatively problematic because they fail to approach sufficiently the standards of inclusion and equality required for democratic deliberation. The NGOs involved in the consultations and negotiations are often self-selected or selected on a non-democratic basis, and the networks can be dominated by powerful actors such as corporations, with little or no citizen involvement ( Hendriks 2008 ; see also Hendriks and Boswell, this volume, Chapter 25 ). Although such networks have the potential to multiply dramatically the sites of deliberation, they should always be scrutinized and evaluated in the light of deliberative and democratic standards. As a general democratic rule, the closer any NGO or voluntary association comes to being a constitutive part of the consultation and negotiation that results in formal state coercion, the more internally democratic and open to citizen choice and input that association should be—although when such consultation and negotiation are not significant, there are good reasons to allow each association to govern itself adaptively in response to its own purposes and constituencies ( Smith and Teasdale 2012 ).

Moving further outside the institutions of government, civil society and the public sphere have loomed large in deliberative democratic thinking, especially in strands inspired by Jürgen Habermas. Following the connotations of the word “public,” the public sphere could be considered the totality of deliberation in public life in a society, including the institutions of government. Deliberative democratic theorists who follow Habermas, however, conceive the public sphere as public life, outside the formal institutions of government, which forms the public opinion to which the institutions should respond. Following Fraser’s elaborations of the concept (1990), we will speak of such public spheres as plural, differentiated, and overlapping, encompassing political activists, social movements, old and new media. They may also encompass informal political conversations, or conversations on issues the public ought to discuss, among friends, acquaintances, and online interlocutors. Public spheres flourish when political speech and association are protected and people have robust capacities to associate for shared purposes. The deliberative qualities of actual public spheres should not, of course, be idealized; much that goes on in the speaking public is vicious, manipulative, exclusive, and deceptive. But deliberative thinking can evaluate what is going on in these spheres and generate ideas for improvement. Public spheres are a site for resistance, for the generation of influence over formal institutions of government, and for deliberative social learning across ideological, ethnic, or religious differences. They are a source of change that can be consequential even in the absence of governmental decisions. Public spheres enable issues to be identified, formulated, and advocated in innovative ways. Barriers to entry tend to be lower and topics more diverse than within the institutions of government. In Habermas’s terms, public spheres function as deliberative “sensors” of new issues and problems, which may eventually find deliberative uptake within more formally institutionalized contexts ([1992] 1996, chapter 8 ). The rise of feminism, environmentalism, and LGBT rights all provide examples.

As this focus on public spheres suggests, the theory of deliberative democracy is not, unlike some of its more established competitors, tied to state-based organizations of politics. The “town hall” meetings that legislators sometimes hold on particular issues and the public hearings held by legislators and administrators are intermediary between state and public. Many of these are attended primarily by activists and come up wanting on many deliberative criteria. Elections also play an intermediate role between state and public, offering opportunities for citizen deliberation. In a deliberative innovation in Benin, experimental town hall meetings in the electoral context provided information, candidates’ proposed solutions, and open policy-based public debate. These forums increased participants’ information and subsequent discussion with others when compared to standard clientelist in which candidates make localized promises and distribute cash in exchange for votes ( Fujiwara and Wantchekon 2013 ). A “Deliberation Day” in the week before a presidential election has been suggested in the US ( Ackerman and Fishkin 2004 ). Political forums with deliberative elements are being instituted across the globe (e.g. Heller and Rao 2015 , and in this volume, inter alia, Fischer and Boosabong (Chapter 36 ), Hendriks and Boswell (Chapter 25 ), Forester (Chapter 37 ), Parkinson (Chapter 27 ), and Chapters 44 through 49 in the section on “Practical Applications”). Deliberative theories and practices may also be applied to the internal mechanisms and external influences of private entities such as firms and private universities ( Felicetti 2016 , Smith and Teasdale 2012 ).

With its focus on deliberative influence that works through publics, deliberative democracy travels relatively well into the international system. As Risse (this volume, Chapter 32 ) points out, international politics and negotiations feature a great deal of persuasion, which often has deliberative characteristics. Indeed, deliberative influence is often more important in the international domain because state-like institutions are weak or absent. Transnational public spheres and global civil society can function as components of a global deliberative democracy—and even serve as sites of inclusion where the state-like features of democracy do not exist ( Bohman 2007 ; Dryzek 2012 ). Such public spheres meet deliberative ideals best when they involve the representation of categories of people or ideas that would otherwise not emerge or be heard within existing political structures and institutions.

Existing formal institutions and informal practices can, then, be analyzed and evaluated according to deliberative standards, and ideas can be generated for improvement based on those standards.

Alongside existing institutions, we are now seeing a proliferation of institutions designed to reflect the ideals and purposes of deliberative democracy. Some intentionally designed forums address existing policy or partisan divides, bringing together people with a history of conflict on a policy issue. In such cases, deliberative principles work synergistically with long-established dispute resolution principles and practices (see Susskind, Gordon, and Zaerpoor, this volume, Chapter 45 ). In forums like these, partisans are taken out of their normal strategic interactions (whether in judicial or legislative politics or in the larger public sphere) and join a process involving more or less deliberative principles, under the auspices of a facilitator or mediator. The practices often include mediation, stakeholder dialogues, and consensus-building. They may involve the pursuit of substantive consensus on particular policies, but often the participants expect to reach mutual understanding of the kind that enables a negotiated settlement that all parties view as fair and mutually advantageous. Deliberation thus does not need to result in consensus to be successful; it is often sufficient that it clarifies conflicts or generates warranted legitimacy for negotiated settlements. Restorative justice processes and truth commissions draw on some similar dynamics, but involve criminal justice cases rather than public policy disputes, and are usually focused on establishing the voice and public standing of victims of violence ( Gutmann and Thompson 2004 , chapter 6 ). In all of these cases the goal is to get participants to craft positions and solutions that respond to the key interests and values of conflicting parties through deliberative reciprocal understanding. These kinds of partisan and conflict-focused forums date back to the early 1970s.

Recently deliberative democrats have paid particular attention to non-partisan forums, usually composed of lay citizens with no history of activism or even necessarily interest in the issue at hand—termed “mini-publics” (Smith and Setälä, this volume, Chapter 18 ). Indeed, for some observers “deliberative democracy” means only such intentionally designed citizen forums. We consider such a restricted use of the term misleading.

Sometimes a mini-public is open to all who wish to attend (see Fung 2003 on AmericaSpeaks). This format has the advantage of advancing the participation of many citizens but the disadvantage of self-selection, which tends to over-represent some kinds of citizens, usually those of higher socio-economic status. More frequently, some kind of stratified random selection is used to create deliberative mini-publics that better represent an affected public (hence the term “mini-public”).

Among these near-randomly selected mini-publics, “citizens’ juries” and “consensus conferences” normally involve fifteen to twenty participants who deliberate face-to-face and are charged with coming up with a recommendation and a report on a policy issue. Such forums have been deployed in thousands of cases worldwide, addressing, for example, the risks and promises of new technologies (such as biotechnology or nanotechnology) and environmental issues (such as climate change). Sometimes they are used in conjunction with other decision-making processes. In the state of Oregon, the Citizens’ Initiative Review involves mini-publics of twenty to twenty-four randomly-selected citizens deliberating and issuing recommendations to voters about ballot initiatives (issues placed on the ballot though a process of petition) that an independent commission determines to be especially important owing to their constitutional status, fiscal implications, or other kinds of impacts. The mini-public’s report on the arguments for and against a particular proposal is then distributed to all the voters in the state ( Knobloch et al. 2013 ). Although small mini-publics are attractive because they are relatively inexpensive and easy to organize, their size often compromises their representativeness and heterogeneity.

“Citizens’ assemblies” and “Deliberative Polls” are larger, generally involving 150 or more participants, and so have a better claim to involve a descriptively representative sample of the relevant public. Citizens’ assemblies generally conclude with a recommendation and report, while Deliberative Polls focus on the shift in informed opinions, with questionnaires that reveal change or lack of change over the deliberative period ( Fishkin 2009 ). The British Columbia Citizen Assembly, a large mini-public charged with producing a referendum question as to whether British Columbia should change its electoral system, is to date the most thorough, well-designed, and well-studied of the citizens’ assemblies ( Warren and Pearse 2008 ). Deliberative Polls, with a well-refined and now well-studied standard format, have been organized in more than twenty countries, including with less literate populations ( Fishkin et al. 2017 ).

One can think of mini-publics as generating a particular kind of reflective public opinion, as opposed to the unreflective opinions revealed by standard public opinion surveys. Internally, many deliberative mini-publics work as intended by their designers. They feature supportive institutional features, such as balanced information materials, experts on both sides available for questioning, facilitation, and sessions with different functions, as well as deliberative norms. Minipublics that are well-designed and well-supported are proving conducive to surprisingly high levels of deliberative quality as well as to opinion change driven by argument rather than by undesirable group dynamics (see e.g. Gerber et al. 2016 ; Siu 2009 ; 2017 ; Warren and Pearse 2008 ).

Almost all deliberative mini-publics are advisory to other decision-makers, whether the citizens themselves in a referendum or ballot initiative, elected representatives, or appointed administrators, although (see later discussion) in some cases administrators commit themselves in advance to following the mini-public’s recommendations. Some theorists (e.g. Dahl 1985 ; Leib 2004 ) advocate a second (or third) assembly in legislatures, in which randomly selected citizens would deliberate together on key matters of policy, thus avoiding partisan dynamics such as incentives to block the other party’s attempts at solving public problems, while providing venues in which citizens themselves can master some of the more complex features of issues such as climate change and even military strategy and nuclear weapons. Mini-publics of all kinds can also function as “trusted information proxies” ( Mackenzie and Warren 2012 ) for other citizens. (For the relation of deliberation to “sortition,” or representation by lot, see Delgado et al. 2017 and Gastil and Wright forthcoming .)

Deliberation, then, can be sought, analyzed, and evaluated in many locations, each with its particular institutional locations and designs, issues, and constraints. Rather than look for the essence of deliberative democracy in any one of them, it is now common to think in terms of deliberative systems that join many locations.

Thinking About Deliberative Democracy Systemically

The idea of a deliberative system, introduced by Mansbridge (1999) , is now widely deployed ( Parkinson and Mansbridge 2012 ). The basic idea is that we should attend to the deliberative qualities of the system as a whole as well as to its particular components. One of the most important and difficult challenges for deliberative democrats is to understand how the many sites and kinds of deliberation are enabled and constrained by their environments, how they interact with established institutions, how deliberation translates from face-to-face to large-scale deliberation, and how, more generally, deliberation contributes to democratic political systems.

From a systemic perspective, deliberative ideals can be realized in distributed ways, with some venues (and persons) providing high quality reasons, other venues (or persons) having greater capacities for active listening and finding common ground, and still others functioning to include the marginalized or catalyzing new ideas. Inclusion might be sought in the public sphere, the components of good justification in legislative argumentation, and reflection on the merits of those arguments in mini-publics ( Dryzek 2017 ). Systemic distribution can promote equality, as when the public sphere or a deliberatively designed feature of a civic forum provides spaces in which otherwise deliberatively disadvantaged groups consult together in “enclave deliberation” ( Karpowitz and Raphael 2014 ; for cautions on enclave deliberation see Sunstein 2002 ). Another division of deliberative labor emerges when we trust a jury in a court case to reflect on arguments made by the lawyers for the two sides. A systems perspective also alerts us to the possibility that non-deliberative political activities may have positive deliberative consequences for the system as a whole, as when disruptive social movement activism gets an issue on the public agenda, where it can be deliberated.

Recent theorizing about deliberative systems is helping us to rethink deliberative capacities in democracies beyond particular deliberative institutions and outside individual deliberative abilities (Parkinson, this volume, Chapter 27 ; Neblo and White, this volume, Chapter 28 ). As Habermas (this volume, Chapter 56 ) notes, and as he has suggested throughout his work, the deliberative character of democratic opinion- and will-formation can be realized only through the democratic system as a whole. Hence, a systemic view does not have to lament the fact that deliberative virtues such as reason-giving and listening are not simultaneously and continuously on display in all democratic institutions. Even deliberative deficiencies can be justified on deliberative grounds if the particular deficiency in one venue helps advance the deliberative quality of the system as a whole. A systemic approach can help to uncover deliberative deficits as well as identify those sites in which more or better deliberation would strengthen democracy and political system performance.

Owen and Smith (2015) have challenged the deliberative systems approach, pointing out that a systemic or macro perspective makes it seem less urgent to create as close to optimal deliberative conditions as possible in any one forum or to encourage better citizen deliberation in general. If deliberative ideals can be understood as distributed and emergent properties realized through the interplay of various sites in a democratic system, then encouraging or even searching for high deliberative quality in a specific forum may seem less important both normatively and analytically.

Yet the systemic (macro) and site-specific (micro) perspectives can be reconciled by arguing that from a deliberative perspective every democratic forum that affects the public should be as deliberative as possible unless there are good systemic reasons why it should or could deviate from deliberative norms. A departure might be justified if it contributed to overall deliberation within a deliberative system. A departure might also be justified through reference to other values, such as freedom of speech. But the burden of justification should lie with those arguing for departures from deliberative ideals.

From almost any systemic perspective, institutions with a high levels of decision-making power such as legislatures play key roles in deliberative systems.In general, the more empowered the venue, the greater the need to justify departures from deliberative standards. Future students of deliberative democracy should investigate, and practitioners should (all else being equal) try to improve, the deliberative quality of discourse in highly empowered venues such as the meetings of presidents and their advisors, legislative committees, and the boards of central banks, all of which make binding decisions that affect entire polities and often beyond. In judging the quality of deliberation in these spaces, we might be interested in whether the pool of competing perspectives was large or restricted (particularly in regard to perspectives from marginalized groups or classes of people), whether the positions advanced were well-justified and attentively listened to or based on shallow reasons and low engagement, and whether good arguments had some effect on the decisions or instead power and interests dominated in the decision-making process. (These variables are no less important for being hard to measure.) Indeed, such questions about highly empowered spaces, especially legislatures, prompted some of the earliest work on deliberative democracy ( Bessette 1994 ; Gutmann and Thompson 1996 ).

As the perceived legitimacy of many elected legislatures has declined, and as new representative entities such as the European Union have tried to build their legitimacy, considerable attention has focused on inserting deliberative mini-publics into political systems ( Curato and Böker 2016 ). Lafont ( 2015 ; 2017 ; see also Chambers 2009 ) has criticized such efforts on the grounds that when only a handful of (randomly selected) citizens has the opportunity to deliberate and make decisions that non-deliberating citizens are not likely to fully appreciate, there may be a fundamental challenge for both normative and perceived democratic legitimacy. From the perspective of normative legitimacy, the randomly selected “representatives” are neither selected by the other citizens nor accountable to them, either in the sense of having to explain the reasons for their decisions to the other citizens or in the sense of being sactionable by those citizens for their actions. From the perspective of perceived legitimacy (an issue not covered by Lafont), citizens currently have so little experience with representation by near-random selection that they have little basis on which to decide whether this kind of selection method provides better or worse representation than elections. Both normatively and perceptually, however, a great deal will rest on whether a mini-public makes binding decisions for the polity. Few, if any, have done so. In a significant number of cases duly elected or appointed authorities have announced in advance that they would follow the decisions of the randomly selected mini-public ( Fishkin 2009 ; Fishkin et al. 2017 ; He and Warren 2011 , 277; Johnson 2015 ; Sintomer 2011 ; Warren and Pearse 2008 ). In all of these cases, however, authorities held from the beginning, and retained throughout, the legitimate power to make the decision, never legally relinquishing that authority. Far more frequently, deliberative mini-publics fit into the deliberative system in an advisory role, either to elected or appointed bodies or to the citizenry as a whole. Although such groups have no formal power, administrators and elected officials may trust the process more and be more persuaded by the results and the reasoning than, for example, by the testimony and process in public hearings, which may be dominated by activists ( Karpowitz and Raphael 2014 ). So too non-deliberating citizens may place more trust in the careful deliberations of fellow citizens than in the strategic rhetorics of interest groups or elected politicians ( Warren and Gastil 2015 ). Alternatively, one can think of mini-publics more as advancing and propagating arguments that influence deliberation in the larger deliberative system than as making specific decisions—in which case their recommendations are less relevant than their reasons ( Niemeyer 2014 ).

Finally, mini-publics can have an individually educative function both for participating and non-participating citizens. Many researchers have found increases in information and civic engagement among the participants in randomly selected groups (e.g. Neblo et al. 2017 ; Fishkin 2009 ). Because the participants in these forums tend to speak with others later about their experiences ( Lazer et al. 2015 ), the effects on information and engagement may spread beyond—and potentially far beyond—the participants themselves. In the US context, Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini (2009) and other researchers find, correlationally and perhaps causally, that those who regularly participate in structured discussions in open forums more frequently connect with elites, engage in civic voluntary activities, and participate in electoral politics. In short, deliberative experiences in citizen forums can advance essential democratic capacities that are valuable for an entire democratic system.

If a measure of the success of a political theory is the number of critics it attracts, deliberative democracy is doing very well indeed. In this section, we identify and respond to several of the more prominent and persistent critiques.

Deliberative democracy is too idealistic and ignores power and politics . Speaking for what sounds like mainstream political science, Ian Shapiro (1999) holds: “Enough of deliberation: Politics is about interests and power.” According to Shapiro, a deliberative account of politics is not sensitive enough to conflicting interests and powerful players who have no willingness to enter a deliberative process, but will strategize and if necessary use coercive means to realize their interests. In a more economistic vein and focusing on the link between politicians and citizens, Pincione and Teson (2006 , see also Achen and Bartels 2016 ) diagnose what they call a “discourse failure” in politics. In their account, citizens face high costs in obtaining reliable knowledge about political issues. Politicians can then take advantage of the “rational ignorance” of the public. For political gain, they will posture and use vivid rhetoric rather than engage in rational discussion, because such posturing and rhetoric are more accessible to citizens and have greater emotional appeal. The philosopher Michael Walzer (1999 , 71) further claims that most political debates generally do not produce anything like a deliberative exchange: “a debate is very often a contest between verbal athletes with the object to win the debate. The means are the exercise of rhetorical skill, the mustering of favorable evidence (and the suppression of unfavorable evidence), and the discrediting of the other debaters.”

These “realist” criticisms correctly highlight the many strategic features of political speech. But they tend to deny that actors can and often do influence one another with reasons and arguments, and fail to identify the ideals embedded in these moments of speech. Indeed, by flattening speech to its purely expressive and strategic elements, these criticisms overlook not only instances in which politics is conducted through deliberation (and there are many, once we look for them), but also strip democratic politics of deliberative ideals altogether, leaving us with an impoverished landscape of political possibility. Nor, as we observed above, are aspirational deliberative ideals undermined by the empirical fact that political actors do not instantiate them fully in practice ( Neblo 2015 ).

Some of these criticisms are contextually limited, focused on Anglo-American politics. Different institutions in other systems may reveal greater potential for deliberative action. As noted earlier, comparative research on legislatures reveals that certain institutional contexts—such as consensus systems with less party discipline in combination with non-public committees—can spur better deliberation in legislatures.

Likewise, many of these criticisms are directed toward first-generation ideals of deliberative democracy. The first-generation perspective, stressing the ideals of common-good and consensus-oriented argumentation, a coercion-free environment, and complete openness to the better argument, could be criticized for devaluing political conflict (see e.g. Honig 1993 ), although Habermas’s later work is not subject to this criticism. The second-generation perspective, however, stresses plurality as an ideal. It thus embraces conflict. It also both broadens the range of deliberative acts and takes into account the deliberative functions of a wider range of communicative acts that are not themselves predominantly deliberative. These evolutions of deliberative ideals make it more likely that we can identify and assess the deliberative content of political interactions. For instance, the concept of deliberative negotiations (Naurin and Reh, this volume, Chapter 46 ) helps in analyzing mixed communications that qualify as neither pure deliberation nor pure bargaining. Risse (this volume, Chapter 32 ) finds such mixed communications common in international negotiations.

Deliberative negotiations allow self-interest to be a necessary and productive component of political decision-making, yet simultaneously highlight the desirability of mutual justification, mutual respect, and equality among the participants. In mixed communications, to the extent that negotiation partners aspire even implicitly to the deliberative ideal, they should abstain from using force, threats, and strategic manipulation, relying instead on the influence of arguments. Depending on the context, some forms of domination (such as the all too common requirement to speak a hegemonic language) and threat (“If you don’t vote for my policy this time, I won’t vote for yours next time”), may be compensated for or balanced so that they do not greatly threaten the deliberative process and therefore, from a deliberative perspective, may play a permissible part in mixed communication. But any manipulation that involves deception deeply undermines deliberation, present and future. It directly contradicts, inter alia , the core values of reciprocity, respect, and equality on which good deliberation is based ( Gutmann and Thompson 2004 , chapters 3 – 4 ).

Modified in the light of pluralist ideals, deliberative ideals become more applicable to situations of underlying conflict and also capable of further evolution. When we take pluralism seriously (as, for example, when underlying conflicting interests make negotiation more appropriate than substantive consensus), then it becomes clear that deliberative quality cannot be assessed solely on the basis of the full list of first-generation standards. Rather this quality should be assessed in ways relevant to specific contexts without losing its core in reason-giving and listening ( Bächtiger and Parkinson 2018 ).

Deliberative democracy mistakenly aims at consensus . Empirical political scientists, difference democrats, pluralists, and agonists have criticized deliberative democrats for putting a misplaced stress on (rational) consensus as an ideal. From the viewpoint of difference democrats and agonists, rational consensus is not just undesirable but also conceptually misguided. To Mouffe (1999) , its pursuit means that deliberative democrats seek to repress plurality and the articulation of different perspectives through the conflict that defines politics. To Shapiro (2017) , stressing consensus means that deliberative democrats seek to repress the structured antagonism that makes clear choices and accountability possible.

This criticism misrepresents the role of consensus even among first-generation deliberative democrats. It is particularly misplaced for the second generation of theorists, who grapple with problems of inclusion with particular sensitivity to differences (e.g. Young 2000 ). Habermas, often the target of such criticisms, came to view substantive consensus in politics as less important than consensus with respect to the rules, rights, and procedures that protect differences and enable them to be deliberated, bargained, or subject to votes when sufficiently clarified (1996). In addition, recent years have seen a number of reformulations of the consensus concept that are compatible with political struggle and conflict. Dryzek and Niemeyer (2006) , for instance, develop the concept of meta-consensus. Rather than requiring unanimous agreement on substance, meta-consensus requires only agreement on acceptable domains of preferences and ranges of competing options, the credibility of disputed beliefs, and the legitimacy of competing values. Meta-consensus so defined ought to be acceptable to pluralists and difference democrats, as well as conducive to tractable political outcomes. Miller (1992 , see also List, this volume, Chapter 29 ) argued that deliberation can play a significant role in structuring conflict to avoid indeterminate voting cycles. Gutmann and Thompson note that respect for differences is part and parcel of mutual respect and reciprocity in deliberation (1996; 2004). They advocate a working rule of “economizing on disagreements,” particularly with respect to fundamental world views and principles in those many cases that do not require agreement “all the way down.” Others suggest thinking of consensus as a “working agreement” ( Eriksen 2009 ) that entails “some movements of positions and normative learning” yet also ultimately rests not on the “same reasons” as in Habermas ([1992] 1996 ), but on “different, but reasonable and mutually acceptable grounds” ( Eriksen 2009 , 51; Gutmann and Thompson 2004 , chapters 2 , 4 ; see also Sunstein 1995 ).

These reworkings of the concept of consensus recognize and value diversity in modern pluralistic societies. But, as noted above, these reworked concepts should not be viewed as the only defensible principles for good deliberative process. For instance, participants might initially think that their preferences are reconcilable (or not too distant), but find out in discussion that the opposite is true ( Bachrach 1974 ). Knight and Johnson (2011 : 145) point out that “even if as a result of the increased information that political argument makes available, individuals come to hold their preferences more reflectively, it in no way follows that this will lead to greater substantive agreement at the aggregate level.” Like many of today’s deliberative democrats, they consider opinion clarification and “structured disagreement” more important than consensus. Most recent research shows that in well-formed deliberative venues those whose opinions move away from the opinions of the opposing group after deliberation learn and clarify their opinions at rates equal to those whose opinions move toward the opinions of the opposing group ( Lindell et al. 2017 ). In short, a good deliberative process can have a variety of outcomes, of which consensus is only one—and perhaps not even the most important one.

Deliberative democracy misunderstands human motivations and the limits to the cognitive capacities of ordinary citizens. One such criticism is that deliberative democrats overestimate the demand for deliberative democracy. Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) argue in Stealth Democracy that in the US citizens dislike politics, and are thus happy to let elites govern, provided the elites are honest and can be trusted; when citizens participate, it is because they think they need to monitor and sanction untrustworthy political elites. Yet the conclusions of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse derive from what citizens think about opportunities to participate in a currently deficient system. Empirical studies of more authentically deliberative opportunities tell a different story. On the basis of an experiment with deliberative sessions of citizens with members of the US Congress, Neblo et al. (2010) conclude that Hibbing and Theiss-Morse are wrong. Their seminal study shows that in the US the willingness to deliberate is much higher than usually presumed and, importantly, is highest of all among the disaffected, those “turned off by standard partisan and interest group politics” (p. 582).

A related and frequently mentioned criticism is that ordinary citizens lack the cognitive capacities for deliberative democracy (e.g. Achen and Bartels 2016 , 301; see also Brennan 2016 ). On the basis of a study of some US citizen groups, Rosenberg (2014) reports that “most ‘participants’ who attend a deliberation do not, in fact, engage in the give and take of the discussion.” Instead they “offer simple, short, unelaborated statements of their views of an event.” Biases in human reasoning compound the problem ( Kahneman 2011 ). Notably, “motivated reasoning” makes people who initially feel strongly about an issue evaluate supportive arguments as more compelling than opposing arguments, even when they try to be objective ( Taber and Lodge 2006 ). The individual capability for weighing arguments in an unbiased way would thus seem quite limited. Finally, studies on the social psychology of group polarization reveal that discussion often induces groups to move to extremes as individuals hear new arguments in support of the positions they already hold, leading them on average to hold those positions more strongly ( Sunstein 2002 ). In summary, as Mutz (2008 , 533) has put it: “As an empirical theory, deliberative theory has been widely criticized for making assumptions that seem to fly in the face of what scholars already know about human behavior.”

Many of these skeptical findings, however, are based on experiments and empirical studies that were not designed with deliberation in mind. Empirical studies more closely attuned to good deliberative conditions produce different conclusions. Close analysis of the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly on Electoral Reform suggests that members gained levels of knowledge about electoral systems at the level of most experts ( Blais, Carty, and Fournier 2008 ). In a prominent study of citizen deliberation in an online forum, Stromer-Galley finds “[t]he participants generally produced a fairly high volume of reasoned opinion” (2007, 18–19). In addition, several empirical studies indicate that opinion change in well-structured deliberative events can be substantially attributed to systematic engagement with arguments, rather than to group polarization or motivated reasoning ( Gerber et al. 2016 ; Esterling, Fung, and Lee 2018 ; Warren and Gastil 2015 ).

Institutional designs can play a crucial role in countering otherwise expected biases. Strandberg et al. (2017) varied discussion rules in an experiment on attitudes toward immigrants in Finland. Among groups deliberately selected to be composed only of individuals whose attitudes ranged from mildly hostile to very hostile to immigrants, discussion with facilitation guided by deliberative norms reversed the usual tendencies toward polarization as the group on average became less hostile, whereas discussion without facilitation produced the polarization described by Sunstein and some social psychologists. The Deliberative Polls organized by James Fishkin show no evidence of polarization, probably because they recruit diverse individuals and put them into diverse discussion groups with facilitators ( Fishkin and Luskin 2005 ; Fishkin, this volume, Chapter 19 ). Institutional design informed by deliberative principles can negate anti-deliberative tendencies in human behavior.

Even outside the “safe havens” of deliberative mini-publics, citizens have a deliberative potential far beyond that postulated by a Schumpeterian or “realist” account of democracy. New research on opinion formation in direct democratic votes in Switzerland shows that substantial numbers of citizens form their opinions on the basis of substantive and well-justified arguments and not on the basis of partisan cues, contrary to much public opinion research ( Colombo 2016 ). Again, the results are highly context-specific, in that argument-based pathways of opinion formation are more prevalent in direct democratic settings with relatively low elite polarization, as in Switzerland.

In short, the ideals of deliberative democratic theory do not fly in the face of what we already know about human motivations and cognitive limitations. We need an empirical psychology that takes into account the context-specific realizations of deliberative ideals, including institutional designs that compensate for well-known cognitive and emotional biases.

Deliberation is too rational, excluding the informal social and speaking styles typical of many marginalized groups. Drawing from existing psychological experiments and jury studies as well as well as real-world observation, early critics claimed that “deliberative” capacities are strongly stratified in a way that reinforces socio-economic and cultural inequality. According to Sanders (1997) , not only may disadvantaged people have less access to the necessary prerequisites for deliberation, but the focus of deliberative theorists on rational, calm, and dispassionate discussions also excludes or marginalizes positions that are voiced in impassioned or emotional ways. If this were to be true, the ideal of democratic inclusion would be violated. Hooghe has boldly claimed that participants with greater verbal and rhetorical skills always have an “undue advantage” in deliberative venues: “Even in perfect circumstances, a university professor will always have better chances of convincing others than a manual worker has” (1999, 292).

Empirical research shows that in most deliberatively well-designed situations these criticisms do not withstand scrutiny. It is true that the early studies of deliberation in juries showed gender, occupation, and income influencing both participation and choice of “foreman” for the jury (see Hickerson and Gastil 2006; Siu 2017 ). Yet in his pioneering study on deliberative quality in a citizen forum, Dutwin (2003) found no evidence in this forum that socio-economic status affected the quality of deliberation: the overall amount of speaking and the number of topics discussed were roughly equal across gender, race, and perceived political minority status. The major factor behind differences in deliberative quality was experience with political conversation in everyday life. This surprising absence of socio-economic biases is corroborated in several other studies (e.g. Siu 2009 ; 2017 ). An in-depth evaluation of a European-wide Deliberative Poll (“Europolis”) showed that the less privileged people in the discussion groups—lower-class participants, particularly from the European periphery—were also the least skilled deliberators ( Gerber et al. 2016 ). Yet the same study also found that the deliberatively skilled and otherwise advantaged participants did not have greater success than other participants in changing the minds of others in the deliberation (a result corroborated by a meta-study of Deliberative Polls; see Luskin et al. 2015 ). Those who were good at providing sophisticated justifications in the Europolis discussions also listened respectfully and seemed as open-minded as participants with lower deliberative skills.

Second-generation approaches to deliberative democracy have also helped to broaden the idea of what counts as communicative rationality to be more fully inclusive of diverse people and their histories, identities, biases, and imperfections. Once we include stories and narratives in the conceptual apparatus of good deliberation, it is more difficult to claim that effective deliberation in a heterogeneous group of citizens is biased against democratic inclusions. Empirical studies show that almost all participants can tell stories and share experiences to make their points; these studies also suggest that stories can help to include disadvantaged perspectives (Polletta and Gardner, this volume, Chapter 4 ). Even from a purely epistemic, or knowledge-centered, perspective, deliberative virtues can be seen as distributed goods. Although some people may be less skilled or confident in presenting logical arguments for their positions, they can represent their perspectives by other means. Even those who participate at minimum levels can be represented by other participants who have the relevant abilities (see Chambers 2013 ).

Although many longstanding critiques can be rebutted by systematic empirical research, deliberative democracy is far from being a finished project. Future research should continue to contest and re-evaluate deliberative ideals, connect deliberative with democratic ideals (such as inclusion and decisiveness; see Bächtiger and Parkinson 2018), and investigate both the democratic contributions that deliberation can make to our political systems and the possible trade-offs in other valued outcomes when we promote greater deliberation.

Outline of the Volume

We have organized this volume with several purposes in view. We survey the diverse origins of deliberative democracy as a set of theories, as a research paradigm, and as a family of practices. We provide a representative selection from the field that portrays its fertility, multidimensionality, and rapid evolution. We cover the many spaces and styles of deliberative democracy within political institutions and a variety of contexts beyond those institutions. We document the emergence and development of deliberative democracy as an approach within many disciplines and across a large number of contexts around the world.

Part I surveys the origins of deliberative approaches to democracy and politics. As we suggested earlier, the basic idea of deliberative democracy is straightforward: all other things being equal, it is better to deal with conflict and solve collective action problems through deliberation—the give and take of reasons and justification—among those affected, rather than through other means, such as coercion or conformity to tradition. Deliberative approaches connect individual knowledge, needs, interests, values, and preferences to collective decisions and generate collective actions that will tend to be more legitimate, more intelligent, and more socially stable than the alternatives. This broad idea was not invented by contemporary deliberative democrats: it can be found in Aristotle reflecting on the practices of Athenian democracy, among early modern republicans, and in the American founding; it found its way into more explicit democratic theory in the work of J. S. Mill, John Dewey, and others. Nor are the origins of deliberative ideas solely Western. Many cultures, both ancient and contemporary, including Confucian and many indigenous cultures, have valued deliberative politics. Twentieth-century philosophers of language identified the ways in which some “truths” are performative, dependent upon both speaker and audience for not only their validity but also their availability as motives. Other philosophers, such as Arendt and Rawls, noted the rightful dependence of political truths—those truths we hold in common and use to guide collective actions—upon inclusive processes of opinion-formation. As we discussed above, Habermas, Cohen, Gutmann and Thompson, and others built similar ideas into full-fledged democratic theories. The chapters in Part I trace these multiple origins of democratic deliberative ideas.

Part II focuses on contemporary deliberative democratic theory, representing the many ways in which it has evolved in relation to a range of problems that define contemporary political theory. Contemporary deliberative democracy derived, in effect, from a fusion of democratic ideals of inclusion with deliberative ideals focused on talk-based approaches to common issues and collective decisions. Many recent developments involve incorporating ideals traditionally associated with democratic theory—ideals such as inclusive participation, equality, mutual respect, reciprocity, reflection, and empathy—into deliberative democratic theory. Several chapters in this section focus on the relationship between democratic ideals and deliberative ideals. But the problems animating contemporary political theory are more wide-ranging than those that derive from traditional democratic theory, and several chapters in this section relate deliberative democratic theory to these other issues and problems. These include the relationships between deliberative democracy and epistemically good decisions, justice, multiculturalism, political representation, religion, voting, and recognition of future generations.

Part III looks at deliberative politics from the standpoint of political institutions and systems. Deliberative democracy as a focus of research has spread well beyond political theory, informing empirical research as well as practical experiments and innovations. This part is oriented by a deliberative systems framework, one that views deliberative politics both as differing by the kind of institution or location, and as a holistic property of political systems. The first chapters introduce the deliberative systems approach. Subsequent chapters examine deliberative politics within institutions of government such as legislatures as well as within governance networks, in popular forums, in the media, and in social movements and protests. The other chapters in this part examine new venues explicitly designed for deliberative purposes, such as deliberative mini-publics, online deliberation, and deliberative media.

One remarkable feature of deliberative democracy research is that the many uses of deliberative politics, interaction, and governance have been “discovered” almost simultaneously within numerous disciplines—although each discipline has its distinctive interests and focus. Part IV approaches deliberative democracy from the standpoint of disciplinary problems and conversations in social and rational choice, democratization studies, communication studies, international relations, psychology, sociology, public policy, planning, law, and studies of science and technology. The final three chapters in this part examine the problem of measuring deliberation. How do we know when it exists, and how can we measure its normatively desirable qualities?

The deliberative approach to democracy and politics is not just an academic enterprise. Part V looks at current deliberative practices, with a focus on challenging contexts. Chapters in this section identify and discuss deliberative democracy as a reform movement, as an approach to conflict resolution, and within deeply divided societies. Further chapters in this section ask what deliberation can contribute to problems characterized by extreme difficulty—“wicked” problems such as climate change or problems driven by the potential for catastrophic outcomes.

Part VI surveys deliberative politics around the world. Deliberative approaches to conflict can be found in many cultures and contexts—not just in the “West” and “Global North,” from which much current theory has emanated. Although it is difficult to be globally comprehensive, chapters in this section identify and discuss deliberative politics in East Asia, India, Latin America, Africa, the European Union, and within global and transnational public spheres and institutions.

Part VII concludes with reflections on deliberative democracy by several political theorists—Jürgen Habermas, Amy Gutmann, Dennis Thompson, and Robert Goodin—who have played key roles developing deliberative democratic theory and the research programs and paradigms associated with the theory.

Although we have no doubt failed to include and discuss every development within deliberative democracy, given that theory, research, and practice grow apace daily, we hope that this volume serves both as an introduction to the breadth, depth, and diversity of this expansive and multidimensional enterprise as it exists today, and as a resource for those who want to contribute to the future development of the field. We cannot know what the future holds for this field, but we hope that it will be exemplary in its engagement with critics and in its integration of micro forums and macro systems, normative and empirical inquiry, theory and practice.

Immanuel Kant called these kinds of ideals “regulative” ideals ( [1781] 1998, 552, A569/B597; also A570/B598 on a “regulative principle” as a standard “with which we can compare ourselves, judging ourselves and thereby improving ourselves, even though we can never reach the standard”). An ideal may be unachievable in its fullness for practical reasons, because it conflicts with other ideals, or because, in conditions of “the second best,” it may be right to act contrary to the ideal (see Elster 1986 , 116, 119; Lipsey and Lancaster 1956 , and Mansbridge et al. 2010 , n. 3).

For some reasons why it may be hard to speak meaningfully of generations of deliberative democratic theory, see Dryzek 2016 , 209.

We use the words “standards” and “ideals” interchangeably to describe normative aims to which we ought to aspire.

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• pt. 1. Challenging the value of deliberative democracy. Talking as a decision procedure / Frederick Schauer. Enough of deliberation: politics is about interests and power / Ian Shapiro. Diversity, toleration, and deliberative democracy: religious minorities and public schooling / William A. Galston. Three limitations of deliberative democracy: identity politics, bad faith, and indeterminacy / William H. Simon. Deliberation, and what else? / Michael Walzer. Democratic deliberation: the problem of implementation / Daniel A. Bell. Mutual respect as a device of exclusion / Stanley Fish. Deliberation: method, not theory / Russell Hardin
• pt. 2. Expanding the limits of deliberative democracy. Agreement without theory / Cass R. Sunstein. Justice, inclusion, and deliberative democracy / Iris Marion Young. Constitutionalism and deliberative democracy / Jack Knight. Internal disagreements: deliberation and abortion / Alan Wertheimer. Law, democracy, and moral disagreement: reciprocity, slavery, and abortion / Robert P. George. Enabling democratic deliberation: how managed care organizations ought to make decisions about coverage for new technologies / Norman Daniels. Everyday talk in the deliberative system / Jane Mansbridge
• pt. 3. Reply to the critics. Democratic disagreement / Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson.

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Twelve Key Findings in Deliberative Democracy Research

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Nicole Curato , John S. Dryzek , Selen A. Ercan , Carolyn M. Hendriks , Simon Niemeyer; Twelve Key Findings in Deliberative Democracy Research. Daedalus 2017; 146 (3): 28–38. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/DAED_a_00444

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This essay reflects on the development of the field of deliberative democracy by discussing twelve key findings that capture a number of resolved issues in normative theory, conceptual clarification, and associated empirical results. We argue that these findings deserve to be more widely recognized and viewed as a foundation for future practice and research. We draw on our own research and that of others in the field.

Deliberative democracy is a normative project grounded in political theory. And political theorists make a living in large part by disagreeing with and criticizing each other. In fact, it is possible to evaluate the success of a political theory by the number of critics it attracts, and the vitality of its intramural disputes. By this measure, deliberative democracy is very successful indeed. Yet if the normative project is to progress and be applied effectively in practice, it needs to lay some issues to rest.

Deliberative democracy is not just the area of contention that its standing as a normative political theory would suggest. It is also home to a large volume of empirical social science research that, at its best, proceeds in dialogue with the normative theory. Indeed, the field is exemplary in this combination of political theory and empirical research. Deliberative ideas have also attracted the attention of citizens, activists, reform organizations, and decision-makers around the world. The practical uptake of deliberative ideas in political innovation provides a rich source of lessons from experience that can be added to theorizing and social science. This combination has proven extremely fruitful. Rather than proving or falsifying key hypotheses, deliberative practice has sharpened the focus of the normative project, showing how it can be applied in many different contexts.

We believe that conceptual analysis, logic, empirical study, normative theorizing, and the refinement of deliberative practice have set at least some controversies to rest, and we provide the following set of twelve key findings that can be used as the basis for further developments.

Deliberative democracy is realistic . Skeptics have questioned the practical viability of deliberative democracy: its ideals have been criticized as utopian and its forums have been dismissed as mere experiments, with no hope of being institutionalized effectively. 1

But skeptics have been proved wrong by the many and diverse deliberative innovations that have been implemented in a variety of political systems. 2 Both state and nonstate institutions demand more deliberative forms of citizen engagement. Policymakers and politicians convene citizens' forums to elicit informed views on particular issues. 3 Studies find that deliberating citizens can and do influence policies, though impacts vary and can be indirect. 4 Deliberative forums are also being implemented in parliamentary and electoral contexts. 5 Outside the state, citizen forums are funded and implemented variously by civil society organizations, think tanks, corporations, and international organizations to advance a particular cause, foster public debate, or promote democratic reform. 6

The recent turn toward deliberative systems demonstrates that deliberative democratic ideals can be pursued on a large scale in ways that link particular forums and more informal practices, such as communication in old and new media. 7 Deliberative democracy is not utopian; it is already implemented within, outside, and across governmental institutions worldwide.

Deliberation is essential to democracy . Social choice theory appears to demonstrate that democratic politics must be plagued by arbitrariness and instability in collective decision. Notably, for political scientist William Riker, clever politicians can manipulate agendas and the order in which votes are taken to ensure their preferred option wins. 8 But if their opponents are also clever, they can do the same. And in that case, there can be no stable will of the people that can possibly be revealed by voting (in, say, a legislature). So, how can meaning and stability be restored to democracy? There are essentially two mechanisms, once dictatorship is ruled out. The first is what rational choice theorist Kenneth Shepsle calls “structure induced equilibrium,” under which formal rules and informal understandings restrict strategizing, including the ability to manipulate agendas and the order in which votes are taken. 9 The second is deliberation.

Political theorist David Miller and, later, John Dryzek and political philosopher Christian List have demonstrated formally that deliberation can, among other responses: 1) induce agreement to restrict the ability of actors to introduce new options that destabilize the decision process and 2) structure the preferences of participants such that they become “single-peaked” along one dimension, thus reducing the prevalence of manipulable cycles across alternatives (in which option A beats B in a majority vote, B beats C, and C beats A). 10 Empirical research confirms this effect. 11

This result explains why all democratic settings, in practice, feature some combination of communication, which can be more or less deliberative, and formal and informal rules. The more deliberative the communication, the better democracy works. Democracy must be deliberative.

Deliberation is more than discussion . Deliberative democracy is talk-centric. But talk alone can be pathological, producing wildly mixed results from an ideal deliberative perspective. 12 Resolution here requires distinguishing carefully between deliberation and discussion.

Empirical observation reveals that deliberation is more complex than originally theorized, involving both dispositional and procedural components. The purely procedural rationalist model of deliberation is normatively problematic because it is empirically questionable. 13 Distinguishing between deliberation and discussion introduces an emotional dimension in which dispositional factors, such as open-mindedness, are important. 14

The overall content of this disposition has more recently been referred to as the “deliberative stance,” which political theorists David Owen and Graham Smith have defined as “a relation to others as equals engaged in mutual exchange of reasons oriented as if to reaching a shared practical judgement.” 15 Achieving a deliberative stance in citizen deliberation involves careful facilitation and attention to “emotional interaction.” 16 Its achievement in group settings can be a pleasurable experience and consistent with ideals of human cognition. 17 Scaling these effects up to the wider deliberative system requires careful attention to institutional settings. 18

Deliberative democracy involves multiple sorts of communication . Some democrats have charged deliberative democracy with being overly rationalistic. For political scientist Lynn Sanders, deliberation works undemocratically for it excludes “those who are less likely to present their arguments in ways that we recognize as characteristically deliberative.” 19 Sanders refers to women, racial minorities, and the poor, whose speech cultures depart from “rationalist” forms of discourse that privilege dispassionate argumentation, logical coherence, and evidence-based claims as practiced in the most exclusive kinds of scholarly debates, parliamentary procedures, and judicial argumentation. A similar kind of critique has been raised by political theorist Chantal Mouffe, who criticizes deliberative democrats for missing the crucial role that passion plays in politics and for emphasizing the rationalism of liberal democratic political thought. 20

Deliberative democrats have responded by foregrounding the varied articulations of reason-giving and consensus requirements of deliberation. Most have acknowledged political philosopher Iris Young's conception of “communicative democracy” and have conditionally embraced greeting, rhetoric, humor, testimonies, storytelling, and other sorts of communication. 21 Even the originally somewhat rationalistic criteria of the widely used Discourse Quality Index have evolved to include storytelling as one indicator, recognizing the importance of personal narratives in political claim-making. 22 Recent developments in deliberative theory have begun to recognize the plurality of speech cultures. The turn to deliberative systems has emphasized multiple sites of communication, each of which can host various forms of speech that can enrich the inclusive character of a deliberative system. The increasing attention paid to deliberative cultures is also part of this trajectory, in which systems of meanings and norms in diverse cultural contexts are unpacked to understand the different ways political agents take part in deliberative politics. 23

Deliberation is for all . The charge of elitism was one of the earliest criticisms of deliberative democratic theory: that only privileged, educated citizens have access to the language and procedures of deliberation. However, empirical research has established the inclusive, rather than elitist, character of deliberative democracy.

Findings in deliberative experiments suggest that deliberation can temper rather than reinforce elite power. Political scientists James Druckman and Kjersten Nelson have shown how citizen conversations can vitiate the influence of elite framing. 24 Simon Niemeyer has shown how deliberative mini-publics, such as citizens' juries (composed of a relatively small number of lay citizens), can see through “symbolic politics” and elite manipulation of public discourse through spin doctoring. 25 Realworld deliberative processes provide considerable evidence on deliberation's potential to build capacities of traditionally marginalized groups. Economist Vijayendra Rao and sociologist Paromita Sanyal's work on gram sabhas in South India is a landmark study, demonstrating village-level deliberations' capacity to mobilize civic agency among the poor, counteracting resource scarcity and social stratification. 26 Brazil's National Public Policy Conferences – one of the biggest nationally successful exercises in public deliberation – illustrate how ordinary citizens influence public policy once they acquire the opportunity to take part in consequential deliberation. 27

These examples illustrate deliberative democracy's record in curtailing, rather than perpetuating, elite domination by creating space for ordinary political actors to create, contest, and reflect upon ideas, options, and discourses.

Deliberative democracy has a nuanced view of power . Early critics of deliberative democracy worried about its political naiveté, particularly its neglect of power and strategy. 28 However, deliberative democracy is not naive about power, but rather has a nuanced approach to it.

In the deliberative ideal, coercive forms of power, defined as the threat of sanction or use of force against another's interests, are absent because they distort communication. 29 But deliberative practice reveals that coercive power is ubiquitous: it pervades the very process of argumentation and communication, affects the remit and organization of deliberative procedures, and shapes the broader policy context. 30 Procedural designs can, however, limit coercive power by, for example, selecting participants that are less partisan, using independent facilitators, or ensuring deliberations are public.

Empowering or generative forms of power are central to the communicative force of deliberative governance. 31 Authoritative power is also necessary for deliberative democracy, which requires leaders who are receptive to the concerns of affected publics and have the legitimate authority to consider and act on the public's preferences and concerns. 32 Actors in and around deliberative processes can also strategize to advance agendas and address inequalities. 33

Deliberative democrats recognize that coercive power pervades social relations, but understand that certain kinds of power are needed to maintain order in a deliberative process, to address inequalities, and to implement decisions. 34

Productive deliberation is plural, not consensual . A seeming commitment to the pursuit of consensus – that is, agreement on both a course of action and the reasons for it – once provided a target for critics of deliberative democracy, who stressed its otherworldly character and silencing of dissident voices. 35 However, contrary to these arguments, deliberative democrats have rarely endorsed consensus as an aspiration for real-world decision-making (as opposed to one theoretical reference point).

Decision-making in deliberative democracy can involve voting, negotiation, or workable agreements that entail agreement on a course of action, but not on the reasons for it. All of these benefit from deliberation, which can involve clarification of the sources of disagreement, and understanding the reasons of others. Rather than consensus, deliberation should recognize pluralism and strive for metaconsensus, which involves mutual recognition of the legitimacy of the different values, preferences, judgments, and discourses held by other participants. 36

At first sight, this acceptance of pluralism and metaconsensus might seem to contradict the findings of political scientist Jürg Steiner and colleagues that the more consensual a system of government, the better the quality of deliberation that occurs in its legislature. Consensual democracies – notably the Nordic countries, The Netherlands, Germany, and Switzerland – are also arguably the world's most successful states on a variety of indicators, suggesting a strong correlation between deliberation and public policy success, though correlation here does not necessarily imply causality. However, the concept of consensual liberal democratic states (as opposed to adversarial ) does not imply consensus in the strong sense we identified. Consensual states are still pluralistic, but their pluralism is channeled into workable agreements, not adversarial point-scoring.

Participation and deliberation go together . A sharp distinction between participation and deliberation is drawn by political theorist Carole Pateman, who argues that deliberative democrats have shown “little interest in the last thirty years of participatory promotion” and instead focus on mini-publics or “new deliberative bodies.” 37

This distinction misfires. First, while it is true that a large number of deliberative scholars research mini-publics, these studies are motivated by the desire to better understand how lessons learned from small-scale deliberative forums can be scaled up to mass democracies and enhance the quality of political participation. So, for example, John Dryzek and ecological economist Alex Lo have shown how particular rhetorical moves can increase the quality of reasoning in a mini-public, which has direct implications for how climate change should be communicated in the public sphere (further examples will be provided in our discussions of time, group polarization, and divided societies). 38 Mini-publics, in other words, are not valorized as democratic practice par excellence, but rather are used as a tool to democratize other facets of political life and deepen the quality of political participation.

Second, the political projects of participatory and deliberative democracy are intimately linked. Pateman's aspirations for a “participatory society,” in which various aspects of our social and political lives are democratized, are not distinct from deliberative democrats' vision of a society in which all citizens affected by a decision have capacities and opportunities to deliberate in the public sphere. 39 This has been articulated by “macro” deliberative theorists, whose focus is to improve the quality of political participation in the public sphere, whether online or offline, mediated or face-to-face, such that citizens can affect political processes on issues they care about.

Deliberative transformation takes time . Deliberation by definition requires amenability to preference transformation, but such transformation may not be a good measure of the quality of deliberation. 40 While large changes in preferences can occur early in deliberative processes, this change can reflect anticipation of absorbing information and group deliberation as much as the effect of deliberation proper. 41

The goal of deliberation is for citizens to determine reflectively not only preferences, but also the reasons that support them. 42 As we have already noted, at the group level, this involves the formation of a kind of metaconsensus featuring mutual recognition of the manner in which beliefs and values map onto preferences. 43

This process takes time and deliberation does not necessarily follow a smooth path. Initial changes to preferences can even be partially reversed. The initial opening up of minds (as part of taking a deliberative stance) and uptake of information represents a dramatic threshold in the transition toward deliberation proper, producing changes that represent catharsis as much as deliberation. It is subsequent reflection that produces deliberative preferences, only after the stance is achieved. 44 Consequently, reported results from very short deliberative processes may only reflect the path toward, rather than the result of, deliberation. True deliberative transformation takes longer than that.

Deliberation is the solution to group polarization . Cass Sunstein has claimed that a “law of group polarization” causes “deliberative trouble.” 45 For if a group is made up of people whose opinions range from moderate to extreme on an issue, after deliberation, the group's average position will be closer to the extreme. Thus, deliberation leads to unhealthy political polarization. There are three reasons why deliberative democracy does not succumb to this.

First, polarization depends crucially on group homogeneity, in which initial opinions vary from moderate to extreme in a single direction, such as the degree of denial of climate science or the degree of support for public education. For anyone designing a deliberative forum, the solution is simple: make sure there are participants from different sides on an issue. James Fishkin says this is exactly how his deliberative opinion polls resist polarization: a random selection of participants ensures a variety of initial views. 46

Second, what Sunstein describes as polarization could, in many cases, be described as clarity. This is especially important for oppressed groups struggling to find a voice. 47 Talk with like-minded others can give people, individually and collectively, the confidence subsequently to enter the larger public sphere; enclave deliberation can have positive effects in the deliberative system.

Third, political scientist Kimmo Grönlund and colleagues have demonstrated that polarization only applies under unstructured conversation; 48 polarization is not found when groups are run on standard deliberative principles with a facilitator. Their experiment involved citizens deliberating immigration in Finland, and after deliberation, a group that was moderately to extremely hostile to immigrants shifted toward a generally more tolerant opinion. After unstructured discussion, a similar group was, on average, more extreme. Deliberation does, then, provide solutions to group polarization, most obviously when it moves beyond unstructured discussion.

Deliberative democracy applies to deeply divided societies . Deeply divided societies characterized by mutually exclusive religious, national, racial, or ethnic identity claims challenge any kind of democratic politics, including deliberative politics, which some skeptics believe belongs only in more orderly and less fraught settings. Popular political solutions for deeply divided societies instead involve power-sharing negotiated by elites from different blocs, leaving no space for public deliberation (indeed, communication of any sort) across the divide. 49

There is, however, growing empirical evidence showing that deliberative practices can flourish in deeply divided societies to good effect, be it in association with, or at some distance from, power-sharing arrangements. Evidence comes from formats ranging from mixed-identity discussion groups located in civil society to more structured citizen forums with participants from different sides. 50 Mini-public experiments on deeply divided societies, for example, generate crucial lessons on how conversations in the public sphere can be organized in such a way that they aid in forging mutual respect and understanding across discursive enclaves. As political scientist Robert Luskin and colleagues have noted, once assembled, conflicting groups in divided societies can “have enough in common to permit meaningful and constructive deliberation.” 51 Such deliberation can promote recognition, mutual understanding, social learning about the other side, and even solidarity across deep differences. 52

Deliberative processes have been applied in divided societies such as South Africa, Turkey, Bosnia, Belgium, and Northern Ireland. Given the depth of the disagreement among conflicting groups, deliberative practices do not seek or yield consensus (understood as universal agreement both on a course of action and the reasons for it), but they play a crucial role in terms of “working agreements” across the parties to a conflict. Under the right conditions, deliberation in divided societies can help to bridge the deep conflicts across religious, national, racial, and ethnic lines.

Deliberative research productively deploys diverse methods . Standard social science methods, such as surveys and psychological experiments, are often used to study deliberation. However, they do not do full justice to the ability of deliberators to develop their own understanding of contexts, which can extend to the kinds of social science instruments that are appropriate and to questions that should be asked. Standard methods have a hard time capturing these dynamic aspects of deliberative opinion formation, and they tell us nothing about the broader political or social context in which public deliberation occurs. 53

Innovative quantitative methods have been developed to remedy these short-comings: 54 they can involve analyzing the content of deliberations to assess deliberative practice against normative standards, to measure the quality of deliberation, and to evaluate the intersubjective consistency of deliberators across preferences and values. 55 Qualitative and interpretive methods have also generated empirical insights into public deliberation, particularly through in-depth case studies. Methods such as in-depth interviews and observation have been used to examine the views and behavior of political actors in and around deliberative forums. 56 Frame and narrative analysis have been used to map discourses and analyze the communicative dynamics of deliberative systems. 57

Deliberative democracy scholars deploy multiple research methods to shed light on diverse aspects of public deliberation in practice. Those who insist on using conventional social science methods must recognize that their results should be interpreted in light of this broader array of methods and the breadth of understanding so enabled.

We have surveyed what we believe to be a number of key resolved issues in the theory, study, and practice of deliberative democracy. In a number of cases, we have replied to critics skeptical of the desirability, possibility, and applicability of deliberative democracy. Our intent is not, however, to silence critics. Rather, we hope that their efforts can be more tightly focused on the real vulnerabilities of the project, rather than its imagined or discarded features. However, we suspect that, in practice, our summary of key findings will be more useful to those seeking to advance or study the project, rather than those trying to refute it. For these scholars and practitioners, identifying the resolved issues will leave them free to concentrate on unresolved issues.

John Mueller, Capitalism, Democracy, and Ralph's Pretty Good Grocery (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Daniel A. Bell, “Democratic Deliberation: The Problem of Implementation,” in Deliberative Politics: Essays on Democracy and Disagreement , ed. Stephen Macedo (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 71–87.

Stephen A. Coleman, Anna Przybylska, and Yves Sintomer, eds., Deliberation and Democracy: Innovative Processes and Institutions (New York: Peter Lang, 2015).

Tina Nabatchi, John Gastil, G. Michael Weiksner, and Matt Leighninger, eds., Democracy in Motion: Evaluating the Practice and Impact of Deliberative Civic Engagement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

Gregory Barrett, Miriam Wyman, and Vera Schatten, “Assessing Policy Impacts of Deliberative Civic Engagement,” in ibid., 181–203.

Carolyn M. Hendriks, “Coupling Citizens and Elites in Deliberative Systems: The Role of Institutional Design,” European Journal of Political Research 55 (1) (2016): 43–60.

See Nabatchi et al., Democracy in Motion .

John Parkinson and Jane Mansbridge, eds., Deliberative Systems: Deliberative Democracy at the Large Scale (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

William H. Riker, Liberalism Against Populism: A Confrontation Between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1982).

Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Institutional Agreements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models,” American Journal of Political Science 23 (1) (1979): 27–59.

David Miller, “Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice,” Political Studies 40 (1) (1992): 54–67; and John S. Dryzek and Christian List, “Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation,” British Journal of Political Science 33 (1) (2003): 1–23.

Christian List, Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin, and Iain McLean, “Deliberation, Single-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy,” Journal of Politics 75 (1) (2013): 80–95.

Tali Mendelberg, “The Deliberative Citizen: Theory and Evidence,” in Political Decision Making, Deliberation and Participation: Research in Micropolitics , vol. 6, ed. Michael X. Delli Carpini, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Y. Shapiro (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 2002), 151–193.

Iris Marion Young, “Justice, Inclusion, and Deliberative Democracy,” in Deliberative Politics , ed. Macedo, 151–158.

George Loewenstein, Ted O'Donoughue, and Sudeep Bhatia, “Modelling the Interplay Between Affect and Deliberation,” Decision 2 (2) (2015): 55–81; and Jason Barabas, “How Deliberation Affects Policy Opinions,” American Political Science Review 98 (4) (2004): 687–701.

David Owen and Graham Smith, “Survey Article: Deliberation, Democracy, and the Systemic Turn,” Journal of Political Philosophy 23 (2) (2015): 228.

Jane Mansbridge, Janette Hartz-Karp, Matthew Amengual, and John Gastil, “Norms of Deliberation: An Inductive Study,” Journal of Public Deliberation 2 (1) (2006).

Hugo Mercier and Hélène E. Landemore, “Reasoning is for Arguing: Understanding the Successes and Failures of Deliberation,” Political Psychology 33 (2) (2012): 243–258.

Simon J. Niemeyer, “Scaling Up Deliberation to Mass Publics: Harnessing Mini-Publics in a Deliberative System,” in Deliberative Mini-Publics: Practices, Promises, Pitfalls , ed. Kimmo Grönlund, André Bächtiger, and Maija Setälä (Colchester, United Kingdom: ECPR Press, 2014).

Lynn M. Sanders, “Against Deliberation,” Political Theory 25 (3) (1997): 349.

Chantal Mouffe, “Politics and Passions: The Stakes of Democracy,” Ethical Perspectives 7 (2/3) (2000): 146–150.

Iris Marion Young, “Difference as a Resource for Democratic Communication,” in Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics , ed. James F. Bohman and William Rehg (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997), 383–406.

Jürg Steiner, André Bächtiger, Markus Spörndli, and Marco Steenbergen, Deliberative Politics in Action: Analyzing Parliamentary Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Jensen Sass and John S. Dryzek, “Deliberative Cultures,” Political Theory 42 (1) (2014): 3–25.

James N. Druckman and Kjersten R. Nelson, “Framing and Deliberation: How Citizens' Conversations Limit Elite Influence,” American Journal of Political Science 47 (4) (2003): 729–745.

Simon J. Niemeyer, “The Emancipatory Effect of Deliberation: Empirical Lessons from Mini-Publics,” Politics & Society 39 (1) (2011): 103–140.

Vijayendra Rao and Paromita Sanyal, “Dignity Through Discourse: Poverty and the Culture of Deliberation in Indian Village Democracies,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 629 (1) (2010): 146–172.

Thamy Pogrebinschi and David Samuels, “The Impact of Participatory Democracy: Evidence from Brazil's National Public Policy Conferences,” Comparative Politics 46 (2014): 313–332.

Ian Shapiro, “Enough of Deliberation: Politics is About Interests and Power,” in Deliberative Politics , ed. Macedo, 28–38.

Jane Mansbridge, James Bohman, Simone Chambers, et al., “The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy,” Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (1) (2010): 64–100.

Carolyn M. Hendriks, “Deliberative Governance in the Context of Power,” Policy and Society 28 (3) (2009): 173–184.

Jonathan W. Kuyper, “Deliberative Democracy and the Neglected Dimension of Leadership,” Journal of Public Deliberation 8 (1) (2012).

Jennifer Dodge, “Environmental Justice and Deliberative Democracy: How Social Change Organizations Respond to Power in the Deliberative System,” Policy and Society 28 (3) (2009): 225–239.

See Mansbridge et al., “The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy.”

Iris Marion Young, “Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy,” in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political , ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 120–135; and Aletta J. Norval, Aversive Democracy: Inheritance and Originality in the Democratic Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

John S. Dryzek and Simon J. Niemeyer, “Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals,” American Journal of Political Science 50 (3) (2006): 634–649.

Carole Pateman, “Participatory Democracy Revisited,” Perspectives on Politics 10 (1) (2012): 8.

John S. Dryzek and Alex Y. Lo, “Reason and Rhetoric in Climate Communication,” Environmental Politics 24 (1) (2015): 1–16.

Pateman, “Participatory Democracy Revisited,” 10.

Lucio Baccaro, André Bächtiger, and Marion Deville, “Small Differences that Matter: The Impact of Discussion Modalities on Deliberative Outcomes,” British Journal of Political Science 46 (3) (2016).

Robert E. Goodin and Simon J. Niemeyer, “When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy,” Political Studies 51 (4) (2003): 627–649.

Bernard Manin, “On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation,” Political Theory 15 (3) (1987): 338–368.

See also Simon Niemeyer and John S. Dryzek, “The Ends of Deliberation: Metaconsensus and Intersubjective Rationality as Deliberative Ideals,” Swiss Political Science Review 13 (4) (2007): 497–526.

Simon J. Niemeyer, “When Does Deliberation Really Begin?” working paper series (Canberra, Australia: Centre for Deliberative Democracy and Global Governance, 2016).

Cass R. Sunstein, “Deliberative Trouble: Why Groups Go to Extremes,” Yale Law Journal 110 (1) (2000): 71–119.

James Fishkin, When the People Speak: Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 131–132.

Christopher F. Karpowitz, Raphael Chad, and Allen S. Hammond, “Deliberative Democracy and Inequality: Two Cheers for Enclave Deliberation among the Disempowered,” Politics & Society 37 (4) (2009): 576–615.

Kimmo Grönlund, Herne Kaisa, and Maija Setälä, “Does Enclave Deliberation Polarize Opinions?” Political Behavior 37 (4) (2015): 995–1020.

Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977).

Ian O'Flynn, “Divided Societies and Deliberative Democracy,” British Journal of Political Science 37 (4) (2007): 731–751.

Robert C. Luskin, Ian O'Flynn, James S. Fishkin, and David Russell, “Deliberating across Deep Divides,” Political Studies 62 (1) (2014): 117.

Bora Kanra, Islam, Democracy, and Dialogue in Turkey: Deliberating in Divided Societies (Aldershot, United Kingdom: Ashgate, 2009); and George Vasilev, Solidarity across Divides: Promoting the Moral Point of View (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2015).

John S. Dryzek, “Handle with Care: The Deadly Hermeneutics of Deliberative Instrumentation,” Acta Politica 40 (2) (2005): 197–211; and Selen A. Ercan, Carolyn M. Hendriks, and John Boswell, “Studying Public Deliberation After the Systemic Turn: The Crucial Role for Interpretive Research,” Politics & Policy 45 (2) (2017): 195–218.

Laura W. Black, Stephanie Burkhalter, John Gastil, and Jennifer Stromer-Galley, “Methods for Analyzing and Measuring Group Deliberation,” in The Sourcebook of Political Communication Research: Methods, Measures, and Analytical Techniques , ed. R. Lance Holbert (New York: Routledge, 2009), 323–345.

See, for example, Katharina Holzinger, “Kommunikationsmodi und Handlungstypen in den Internationalen Beziehungen. Anmerkungen zu einigen irreführenden Dichotomien,” Zeitschrift Für Internationale Beziehungen 8 (2) (2001): 243–286; Steiner et al., Deliberative Politics in Action ; and Niemeyer, “The Emancipatory Effect of Deliberation.”

Carolyn M. Hendriks, “Praxis Stories: Experiencing Interpretive Policy Research,” Critical Policy Analysis 1 (3) (2007): 278–300.

John Boswell, Carolyn M. Hendriks, and Selen A. Ercan, “Message Received? Examining Transmission in Deliberative Systems,” Critical Policy Studies 10 (3) (2016): 263–283; and Ercan et al., “Studying Public Deliberation After the Systemic Turn.”

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Courting Deliberation: An Essay on Deliberative Democracy in the American Judicial System

Many legal theorists and political philosophers – among them John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Amy Gutmann, Dennis Thompson, and Joshua Cohen – believe that decision making through deliberation is a normative ideal that yields both better laws as well as a positive transformation in its participants. They further have assumed the judiciary is perhaps best equipped to realize this kind of “deliberative democracy,” and that the courts can effectively provide an example for other, less deliberative branches of government to follow. This essay argues, however, that judicial deliberation is both more complicated than is assumed by these theorists and also embodies a kind of deliberation different in nature than the one we would expect in a deliberative model. Indeed, contributions from social science suggest that judges are strategic (and oftentimes political) actors, and that their “deliberations” are more like akin to bargaining than reasoned exchanges. In addition, the products of judicial decision making – the courts’ opinions – often fail to reflect true deliberative reasoning. Thus, the judiciary might in many ways be less deliberative than its sister branches. This is not to say that judicial processes cannot be modified to become more deliberative – and therefore more normatively desirable -- but it does suggest that the assumption that the courts provide a deliberative model for other decision makers to follow might be based on a romanticized view of judicial processes, rather than on the way judges actually behave. This conclusion has, moreover, strong implications for the feasibility of deliberation as a decision making mechanism.

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The Prospects & Limits of Deliberative Democracy

Democracy is under siege. Approval ratings for democratic institutions in most countries around the world are at near-record lows. The very ideal of democracy as rule by the people is suffering a crisis of confidence: If the “will of the people” can be manufactured by marketing strategies, fake news, and confirmation bias, then how real is democracy? If the expanse between decision-making elites and a mobilized public grows, then how functional is democracy? If political alienation and apathy increase, then how representative is democracy?

The thirteen essays in this issue assess the current crisis of democratic governance and explore the alternative potential of deliberative democracy , in which the will of the people is informed by thoughtful, moderated citizen engagement and discussion. But is a diverse and polarized citizenry even capable of deliberation? How likely is group deliberation to reach a well-reasoned decision? And wouldn’t group deliberation recreate the same power imbalances obstructing other kinds of discourse?

The Summer 2017 issue of Dædalus , guest-edited by James S. Fishkin (Center for Deliberative Democracy at Stanford University) and Jane Mansbridge (The Harvard Kennedy School), explores these questions.

Introduction

The legitimacy of democracy depends on some real link between the public will and the public policies and office-holders who are selected. But the model of competition-based democracy has come under threat by a disillusioned and increasingly mobilized public that no longer views its claims of representation as legitimate. This essay introduces the alternative potential of deliberative democracy, and considers whether deliberative institutions could revive democratic legitimacy, provide for more authentic public will formation, provide a middle ground between mistrusted elites and the angry voices of populism, and help fulfill some of our shared expectations about democracy.

Referendum vs. Institutionalized Deliberation: What Democratic Theorists Can Learn from the 2016 Brexit Decision

Putting aside the substantive question of whether the United Kingdom leaving the European Union was a “good” idea, Claus Offe uses the Brexit referendum to illuminate the weaknesses of plebiscitarian methods of “direct” democracy, and shows how Parliament failed to build safeguards into the referendum process. He then proposes a design for enriching representative electoral democracy with random, deliberative bodies and their methods of political will formation (as opposed to the expression of a popular will already formed).

Twelve Key Findings in Deliberative Democracy Research

Deliberative democracy is a normative project grounded in political theory; but it is also home to a large volume of empirical social science research. So what have we learned about deliberative democracy, its value, and its weaknesses? This essay surveys the field by discussing twelve key findings that conceptual analysis, logic, empirical study, normative theorizing, and the refinement of deliberative practice have set to rest. The authors thus free both critics and proponents of deliberative democracy to concentrate on yet unresolved issues.

Political Deliberation & the Adversarial Principle

Retrieving an insight dating back to antiquity, Bernard Manin argues that the confrontation of opposing views and arguments is beneficial to any political deliberation. But freedom of speech and diversity among deliberators do not suffice to secure that outcome; we must actively facilitate the presentation of contrary opinions during deliberation. Such confrontation is our best means of improving the quality of collective decisions. It also counteracts the pernicious fragmentation of the public sphere. It facilitates the comprehension of choices. And it treats minority voices with respect. This essay proposes practical ways of promoting adversarial deliberation, in particular the organization of debates disconnected from electoral competition.

Deliberative Democracy as Open, Not (Just) Representative Democracy

Is deliberative democracy a dated paradigm for a precrisis order, maladjusted to the world of Occupy, the Pirate Party, the Zapatistas, and other antirepresentative movements? And is deliberative democracy thus at risk of becoming collateral damage of the current crisis of representative democracy? In this essay, Hélène Landemore argues that in order to retain its normative appeal and political relevance, deliberative democracy should dissociate itself from representative democracy and reinvent itself as the core of a more truly democratic paradigm, which she calls open democracy . In open democracy, popular rule means the mediated but real exercise of power by ordinary citizens. This new paradigm privileges nonelectoral forms of representation, and in it, power is meant to remain constantly inclusive of and accessible to all citizens.

Inequality is Always in the Room: Language & Power in Deliberative Democracy

Deliberative democracy has the potential to legitimize collective decisions. Deliberation’s legitimating potential, however, depends on whether those who deliberate truly enter as equals, whether they are able to express on equal terms their visions of the common good, and whether the forms that govern deliberative assemblies advance or undermine their goals. Here, Arthur Lupia and Anne Norton examine these sources of deliberation’s legitimating potential, and contend that even in situations of apparent equality, deliberation is limited by its potential to increase power asymmetries. They conclude by describing how deliberative contexts could be modified to reduce certain types of power asymmetries, such as those often associated with gender, race, or class.

Collusion in Restraint of Democracy: Against Political Deliberation

Robustly defending the model of competitive democracy, Ian Shapiro argues that calls to inject deliberation into democratic politics rest on a misdiagnosis of its infirmities. Deliberation, Shapiro continues, undermines competition over proposed political programs, while deliberative institutions are all-too-easily hijacked by people with intense preferences and disproportionate resources. Arguments in support of deliberation are at best diversions from more serious threats to democracy: namely, money’s toxic role in politics. Shapiro concludes that a better focus would be on restoring meaningful competition between representatives of two strong political parties over the policies that, if elected, they will implement.

Can Democracy be Deliberative & Participatory? The Democratic Case for Political Uses of Mini-Publics

Against recent proposals to insert deliberative mini-publics into political decision-making processes, such as through citizens’ juries, Deliberative Polls, and citizens’ assemblies, Cristina Lafont argues that deliberative mechanisms could diminish the democratic legitimacy of the political system as a whole. But she does propose several uses of mini-publics that could enhance the democratic legitimacy of political decision-making in current societies.

Deliberative Citizens, (Non)Deliberative Politicians: A Rejoinder

Both politicians and citizens have the capacity to deliberate when institutions are appropriate, yet high-quality deliberation can collide with democratic principles and ideals. André Bächtiger and Simon Beste thus employ a “need-oriented” perspective, proposing institutional interventions and reforms that may help boost deliberation in ways that exploit its unique epistemic and ethical potential while making it compatible with democratic principles and ideals.

Deliberation & the Challenge of Inequality

Deliberative critics contend that the deliberative process inevitably perpetuates societal inequalities and can produce distorted dialogue determined by inequalities, not merits. Alice Siu, however, presents empirical evidence demonstrating that inequalities in skill and status do not translate into inequalities of influence when deliberations are carefully structured to provide a more level playing field.

Deliberative Democracy in the Trenches

Much of the time, the U.S. executive branch has combined both democracy and deliberation, placing a high premium on reason-giving, the acquisition of necessary information, internal diversity, and debate and disagreement. Cass R. Sunstein, who served in the Obama administration, explores the concrete practices, rather than the abstract ideals, of the operation of deliberative democracy in the executive branch.

Applying Deliberative Democracy in Africa: Uganda’s First Deliberative Polls

Reflecting on the first two applications of deliberative democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, James S. Fishkin, Roy William Mayega, Lynn Atuyambe, Nathan Tumuhamye, Julius Ssentongo, Alice Siu, and William Bazeyo apply the same criteria for success commonly used for such projects in the most advanced countries. They find that the projects were representative, produced substantial opinion change, avoided distortions, and achieved actionable results that can be expected to influence policy on difficult choices.

Authoritarian Deliberation in China

Authoritarian rule in China increasingly involves deliberative practices that combine authoritarian command with deliberative influence, producing the apparent anomaly of authoritarian deliberation. Drawing from their own research in China, Baogang He and Mark E. Warren explore two possible trajectories of political development in China in this context: that the increasing use of deliberative practices could stabilize and strengthen authoritarian rule, or deliberative practices could serve as a leading edge of democratization.

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Normative democratic theory deals with the moral foundations of democracy and democratic institutions, as well as the moral duties of democratic representatives and citizens. It is distinct from descriptive and explanatory democratic theory, which aim to describe and explain how democracy and democratic institutions function. Normative democracy theory aims to provide an account of when and why democracy is morally desirable as well as moral principles for guiding the design of democratic institutions and the actions of citizens and representatives. Of course, normative democratic theory is inherently interdisciplinary and must draw on the results of political science, sociology, psychology, and economics in order to give concrete moral guidance.

This brief outline of normative democratic theory focuses attention on seven related issues. First, it proposes a definition of democracy. Second, it outlines different approaches to the question of why democracy is morally valuable at all. Third, it discusses the issue of whether and when democratic institutions have authority and different conceptions of the limits of democratic authority. Fourth, it explores the question of what it is reasonable to demand of citizens in large democratic societies. This issue is central to the evaluation of normative democratic theories. A large body of opinion has it that most classical normative democratic theory is incompatible with what we can reasonably expect from citizens. Fifth, it surveys different accounts of the proper characterization of equality in the processes of representation and the moral norms of representation. Sixth, it discusses the relationship between central findings in social choice theory and democracy. Seventh, it discusses the question of who should be included in the group that makes democratic decisions.

1. Democracy Defined

2.1.1.1 the production of relatively good laws and policies: responsiveness theories, 2.1.1.2 the production of relatively good laws and policies: epistemic theories, 2.1.1.3 character-based arguments, 2.1.2 instrumental arguments against democracy, 2.1.3 grounds for instrumentalism, 2.2.1 liberty, 2.2.2 democracy as public justification, 2.2.3 equality, 3.1 instrumentalist conceptions of democratic authority, 3.2.1 democracy as collective self-rule, 3.2.2 freedom and democratic authority, 3.2.3 equality and authority, 3.3.1 internal limits to democratic authority, 3.3.2 the problem of persistent minorities, 3.3.3 external limits to democratic authority, 4.1 the problem of democratic participation, 4.2.1 elite theory of democracy, 4.2.2 interest group pluralism, 4.2.3 neo-liberalism.

• 4.2.4. The self-interest assumption

4.2.5 The Division of Democratic Labor

4.3.1 the duty to vote, 4.3.2 principled disobedience of the law, 4.3.3 accommodate disagreement through compromise and consensus, 5.1 what sort of representative system is best, 5.2 the ethics of representation, 6. social choice and democracy, 7. the boundary problem: constituting the demos, other internet resources, related entries.

The term “democracy”, as we will use it in this entry, refers very generally to a method of collective decision making characterized by a kind of equality among the participants at an essential stage of the decision-making process. Four aspects of this definition should be noted. First, democracy concerns collective decision making, by which we mean decisions that are made for groups and are meant to be binding on all the members of the group. Second, we intend for this definition to cover many different kinds of groups and decision-making procedures that may be called democratic. So there can be democracy in families, voluntary organizations, economic firms, as well as states and transnational and global organizations. The definition is also consistent with different electoral systems, for example first-past-the-post voting and proportional representation. Third, the definition is not intended to carry any normative weight. It is compatible with this definition of democracy that it is not desirable to have democracy in some particular context. So the definition of democracy does not settle any normative questions. Fourth, the equality required by the definition of democracy may be more or less deep. It may be the mere formal equality of one-person one-vote in an election for representatives to a parliament where there is competition among candidates for the position. Or it may be more robust, including substantive equality in the processes of deliberation and coalition building leading up to the vote. “Democracy” may refer to any of these political arrangements. It may involve direct referenda of the members of a society in deciding on the laws and policies of the society or it may involve the participation of those members in selecting representatives to make the decisions.

The function of normative democratic theory is not to settle questions of definition but to determine which, if any, of the forms democracy may take are morally desirable and when and how. To evaluate different moral justifications of democracy, we must decide on the merits of the different principles and conceptions of human beings and society from which they proceed.

2. The Justification of Democracy

In this section, we examine different views concerning the justification of democracy. Proposed justifications of democracy identify values or reasons that support democracy over alternative forms of decision-making, such as oligarchy or dictatorship. It is important to distinguish views concerning the justification of democracy from views concerning the authority of democracy, which we examine in section 3 . Attempts to establish democratic authority identify values or reasons in virtue of which subjects have a duty to obey democratic decisions. Justification and authority can come apart (Simmons 2001: ch. 7)—it is possible to hold that the balance of values or reasons supports democracy over alternative forms of decision-making while denying that subjects have a duty to obey democratic decisions.

We can evaluate the justification of democracy along at least two different dimensions: instrumentally, by reference to the outcomes of using it compared with other methods of political decision; or intrinsically, by reference to values that are inherent in the method.

2.1 Instrumentalism

2.1.1 instrumental arguments in favor of democracy.

Two kinds of in instrumental benefits are commonly attributed to democracy: (1) the production of relatively good laws and policies and (2) improvements in the characters of the participants.

It is often argued that democratic decision-making best protects subjects’ rights or interests because it is more responsive to their judgments or preferences than competing forms of government. John Stuart Mill, for example, argues that since democracy gives each subject a share of political power, democracy forces decision-makers to take into account the rights and interests of a wider range of subjects than are taken into account under aristocracy or monarchy (Mill 1861: ch. 3). There is some evidence that as groups are included in the democratic process, their interests are better advanced by the political system. For example, when African Americans regained the right to vote in the United States in 1965, they were able to secure many more benefits from the state than previously (Wright 2013). Economists argue that democracy promotes economic growth (Acemoglu et al. 2019). Several contemporary authors defend versions of this instrumental argument by pointing to the robust empirical correlation between well-functioning democratic institutions and the strong protection of core liberal rights, such as rights to a fair trial, bodily integrity, freedom of association, and freedom of expression (Gaus 1996: ch. 13; Christiano 2011; Gaus 2011: ch. 22).

A related instrumental argument for democracy is provided by Amartya Sen, who argues that

no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press. (Sen 1999: 152)

The basis of this argument is that politicians in a multiparty democracy with free elections and a free press have incentives to respond to the expressions of needs of the poor.

Epistemic justifications of democracy argue that, under the right conditions, democracy is generally more reliable than alternative methods at producing political decisions that are correct according to procedure-independent standards. While there are many different explanations for the reliability of democratic decision-making, we outline three of the most prominent explanations here: (1) Condorcet’s Jury Theorem, (2) the effects of cognitive diversity, and (3) information gathering and sharing.

The most prominent explanation for democracy’s epistemic reliability rests on Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (CJT), a mathematical theorem developed by eighteenth-century mathematician the Marquis de Condorcet that builds on the so-called “law of large numbers”. CJT states that, when certain assumptions hold, the probability that a majority of voters support the correct decision increases and approaches one as the number of voters increases. The assumptions are (Condorcet 1785):

• each voter is more likely than not to identify the correct decision (the competence assumption );
• voters vote for what they believe is the correct decision (the sincerity assumption );
• votes are statistically independent of one another (the independence assumption ).

While Condorcet’s original proof was restricted to decisions with only two choices, more recent work argues that CJT can be extended to decisions with three or more choices (List & Goodin 2001). The use of CJT to explain democracy’s reliability is often thought to originate with Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s claim that

[i]f, when a sufficiently informed populace deliberates, the citizens were to have no communication among themselves, the general will would always result from the large number of small differences, and the deliberation would always be good. (Rousseau 1762: Book III, ch. IV)

Contemporary theorists continue to rely on CJT, or variants of it, to justify democracy (Barry 1965; Cohen 1986; Grofman and Feld 1988; Goodin & Spiekermann 2019).

The appeal of CJT for epistemic democrats derives from the fact that, if its underlying assumptions are satisfied, decisions produced by even moderately-sized electorates are almost certain to be correct. For example, if the assumptions of CJT hold for an electorate of 10,000 voters, and if each voter is 51 percent likely to identify the correct decision of two options, then the probability that a majority will select the correct decision is 99.97 percent. The formal mathematics of CJT are not subject to dispute. However, critics of CJT-based arguments for democracy argue that the assumptions underlying CJT are rarely, if ever, satisfied in actual democracies (see Black 1963: 159–65; Ladha 1992; Estlund 1997b; 2008: ch. XII; Anderson 2006). First, many have remarked that voters’ opinions are not independent of each other. Indeed, the democratic process seems to emphasize persuasion and coalition building. Second, the theorem does not seem to apply to cases in which the information that voters have access to, and on the basis of which they make their judgments, is segmented in various ways. Segmentation occurs when some sectors of the society do not have the relevant information while others do have it. Modern societies and politics seem to instantiate this kind of segmentation in terms of class, race, ethnic groupings, religion, occupational position, geographical place and so on. Finally, all voters approach issues they have to make decisions on with strong ideological biases that undermine the claim that each voter is bringing a kind of independent observation on the nature of the common good to the vote.

Advocates of CJT-based justifications of democracy generally respond to these sorts of criticisms by attempting to develop variations of CJT with weaker assumptions. These assumptions are more easily satisfied in democracies and so the revised theorems may show that even moderately-sized electorates are almost certain to produce correct decisions (Grofman & Feld 1988; Austen-Smith 1992; Austen-Smith & Banks 1996).

A second common epistemic justification for democracy—which is often traced to Aristotle ( Politics , Book II, Ch. 11; see Waldron 1995)—argues that democratic procedures are best able to exploit the underlying cognitive diversity of large groups of citizens to solve collective problems. Since democracy brings a lot of people into the process of decision making, it can take advantage of many sources of information and perspectives in assessing proposed laws and policies. More recently, Hélène Landemore (2013) has drawn on the “diversity-trumps-ability” theorem of Scott Page and Lu Hong (Hong & Page 2004; Page 2007)—which states that a random collection of agents drawn from a large set of limited-ability agents typically outperforms a collection of the very best agents from that same set—to argue that democracy can be expected to produce better decisions than rule by experts. Both Page and Hong’s original theorem and Landemore’s use of it to justify democracy are subject to dispute (see Quirk 2014; Brennan 2014; Thompson 2014; Bajaj 2014).

A third common epistemic justification for democracy relies on the idea that democratic decision-making tends to be more informed than other forms of decision-making about the interests of citizens and the causal mechanisms necessary to advance those interests. John Dewey argues that democracy involves “a consultation and a discussion which uncovers social needs and troubles”. Even if experts know how best to solve collective problems, they need input from the masses to correct their biases tell them where the problems lie (Dewey 1927 [2012: 154–155]; see also Anderson 2006; Knight & Johnson 2011).

Many have endorsed democracy on the grounds that democracy has beneficial effects on the characters of subjects. Many agree with Mill and Rousseau that democracy tends to make people stand up for themselves more than other forms of rule do because it makes collective decisions depend on their input more than monarchy or aristocracy do. Hence, in democratic societies individuals are encouraged to be more autonomous. Relatedly, by giving citizens a share of control over political-decision-making, democracy cultivates citizens with active and productive characters rather than passive characters. In addition, it has been argued that democracy tends to get people to think carefully and rationally more than other forms of rule because it makes a difference to political outcomes whether they do or not. Finally, some argue that democracy tends to enhance the moral qualities of citizens. When they participate in making decisions, they have to listen to others, they are called upon to justify themselves to others and they are forced to think in part in terms of the interests of others. Some have argued that when people find themselves in this kind of circumstance, they can be expected genuinely to think in terms of the common good and justice. Hence, some have argued that democratic processes tend to enhance the autonomy, rationality, activity, and morality of participants. Since these beneficial effects are thought to be worthwhile in themselves, they count in favor of democracy and against other forms of rule (Mill 1861 [1991: 74]; Elster 1986 [2003: 152]; Hannon 2020).

Some argue in addition that the above effects on character tend to enhance the quality of legislation as well. A society of autonomous, rational, active, and moral decision-makers is more likely to produce good legislation than a society ruled by a self-centered person or a small group of persons who rule over slavish and unreflective subjects. Of course, the soundness of any of the above arguments depends on the truth of the causal theories of the consequences of different institutions.

Not all instrumental arguments favor democracy. Plato argues that democracy is inferior to various forms of monarchy, aristocracy and even oligarchy on the grounds that democracy tends to undermine the expertise necessary to the proper governance of societies (Plato 1974, Book VI). Most people do not have the kinds of intellectual talents that enable them to think well about the difficult issues that politics involves. But in order to win office or get a piece of legislation passed, politicians must appeal to these people’s sense of what is right or not right. Hence, the state will be guided by very poorly worked out ideas that experts in manipulation and mass appeal use to help themselves win office. Plato argues instead that the state should be ruled by philosopher-kings who have the wisdom and moral character required for good rule. He thus defends a version of what David Estlund calls “epistocracy”, a form of oligarchy that involves rule by experts (Estlund 2003).

Mill defends a form of epistocracy that is sometimes referred to as the “plural voting” scheme (1861: ch. 4). While all rational adults get at least one vote under this scheme, some citizens get a greater number of votes based on satisfying some measure of political expertise. While Mill identifies the relevant measure of expertise in terms of formal education, the plural voting scheme is consistent with other measures. This scheme might be thought to combine the instrumental value of political expertise with the intrinsic value of broad inclusion.

One objection to any form of epistocracy—the demographic objection —holds that any criterion of expertise is likely to select demographically homogeneous individuals who are be biased in ways that undermine their ability to produce political outcomes that promote the general welfare (Estlund 2003).

Hobbes argues that democracy is inferior to monarchy because democracy fosters destabilizing dissension among subjects (Hobbes 1651: chap. XIX). On his view, individual citizens and even politicians are apt not to have a sense of responsibility for the quality of legislation because no one makes a significant difference to the outcomes of decision making. As a consequence, citizens’ concerns are not focused on politics and politicians succeed only by making loud and manipulative appeals to citizens in order to gain more power, but all lack incentives to consider views that are genuinely for the common good. Hence the sense of lack of responsibility for outcomes undermines politicians’ concern for the common good and inclines them to make sectarian and divisive appeals to citizens.

Many contemporary theorists expand on these Platonic and Hobbesian criticisms. A good deal of empirical data shows that citizens of large-scale democracies are ill-informed and apathetic about politics. This makes room for special interests to control the behavior of politicians and use the state for their own limited purposes all the while spreading the costs to everyone. Moreover, there is empirical evidence that democratic citizens often engage in motivated reasoning that unconsciously aims to affirm their existing political identities rather than arrive at correct judgments (Lord, Ross, & Lepper 1979; Bartels 2002; Kahan 2013; Achen & Bartels 2016). Some theorists argue that these considerations justify abandoning democracy altogether, while modest versions of these arguments have been used to justify modification of democratic institutions (Caplan 2007; Somin 2013; Brennan 2016). Relatedly, some theorists argue that rather than having beneficial effects on the characters of subjects as Mill and others argue, democracy actually has deleterious effects on the subjects’ characters and relationships (Brennan 2016: ch. 3).

Pure instrumentalists argue that these instrumental arguments for and against the democratic process are the only bases on which to evaluate the justification of democracy or compare it with other forms of political decision-making. There are a number of different kinds of argument for pure instrumentalism. One kind of argument proceeds from a more general moral theory. For example, classical utilitarianism has no room in its monistic axiology for the intrinsic values of fairness and liberty or the intrinsic importance of an egalitarian distribution of political power. Its sole concern with maximizing utility—understood as pleasure or desire satisfaction—guarantees that it can provide only instrumental arguments for and against democracy.

But one need not be a thoroughgoing utilitarian to argue for instrumentalism in democratic theory. There are arguments in favor of instrumentalism that pertain directly to the question of democracy and collective decision making generally. One argument states that political power involves the exercise of power of some over others. And it argues that the exercise of power of one person over another can only be justified by reference to the protection of the interests or rights of the person over whom power is exercised. Thus no distribution of political power could ever be justified except by reference to the quality of outcomes of the decision making process (Arneson 1993 [2002: 96–97]; 2003; 2004; 2009). Another sort of argument for instrumentalism proceeds negatively, attempting to show that the non-instrumental values most commonly used in attempted justifications for democracy do not actually justify democracy, and that an instrumental justification for democracy is therefore the only available sort of justification (Wall 2007).

Other arguments question the coherence of the idea of intrinsically fair collective decision making processes. For instance, social choice theory questions the idea that there can be a fair decision making function that transforms a set of individual preferences into a rational collective preference. The core objection is that no general rule satisfying reasonable constraints can be devised that can transform any set of individual preferences into a rational social preference. And this is taken to show that democratic procedures cannot be intrinsically fair (Riker 1982: 116). Ronald Dworkin argues that the idea of equality, which is for him at the root of social justice, cannot be given a coherent and plausible interpretation when it comes to the distribution of political power among members of the society. The relation of politicians to citizens inevitably gives rise to inequality; the process of democratic deliberation inevitably gives those with superior argument making abilities and greater willingness to participate more influence and therefore more power, than others, so equality of political power cannot be intrinsically fair or just (Dworkin 2000). In later work, Dworkin has pulled back from this originally thoroughgoing instrumentalism (Dworkin 1996).

2.2 Non-instrumentalism

Few theorists deny that political institutions must be at least in part evaluated in terms of the outcomes of having those institutions. Some argue in addition, that some forms of decision making are morally desirable independent of the consequences of having them. A variety of different approaches have been used to show that democracy has this kind of intrinsic value.

One prominent justification for democracy appeals to the value of liberty. According to one version of the view, democracy is grounded in the idea that each ought to be master of his or her life. Each person’s life is deeply affected by the larger social, legal and cultural environment in which he or she lives. Only when each person has an equal voice and vote in the process of collective decision-making will each have equal control over this larger environment. Thinkers such as Carol Gould conclude that only when some kind of democracy is implemented, will individuals have a chance at self-government (Gould 1988: 45–85). Since individuals have a right of self-government, they have a right to democratic participation. The idea is that the right of self-government gives one a right, within limits, to do wrong. Just as an individual has a right to make some bad decisions for himself or herself, so a group of individuals have a right to make bad or unjust decisions for themselves regarding those activities they share.

One major difficulty with this line of argument is that it appears to require that the basic rule of decision-making be consensus or unanimity. If each person must freely choose the outcomes that bind him or her then those who oppose the decision are not self-governing. They live in an environment imposed on them by others. So only when all agree to a decision are they freely adopting the decision (Wolff 1970: ch. 2). The trouble is that there is rarely agreement on major issues in politics. Indeed, it appears that one of the main reasons for having political decision making procedures is that they can settle matters despite disagreement.

One liberty-based argument that might seem to escape this worry appeals to an irreducibly collective right to self-determination. It is often argued that political communities have a right as a community to organize themselves politically in accordance with their values, principles, or commitments. Some argue that the right to collective self-determination requires democratic institutions that give citizens collective control over their political and legal structure (Cassese 1995). However, many argue democratic institutions are sufficient but not necessary to realize the right to collective self-determination because political communities might exercise this right to implement non-democratic institutions (Altman & Wellman 2009; Stilz 2016).

Another non-instrumental justification of democracy appeals to the ideal of public justification. The idea behind this approach is that laws and policies are legitimate to the extent that they are publicly justified to the citizens of the community. Public justification is justification to each citizen as a result of free and reasoned debate among equals.

Jürgen Habermas’s discourse theory of deliberative democracy has been highly influential in the development of this approach. Habermas analyses the form and function of modern legal systems through the lens of his theory of communicative action. This analysis yields the Democratic Principle:

[O]nly those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted. (Habermas 1992 [1996: 110])

Habermas advances a conception of democratic legitimacy according to which law is legitimate only if it results from a free and inclusive democratic process of “opinion and will-formation”. What might such a process look like in a complex and differentiated society? Habermas answers by advancing a “two-track” model that understands democratic legitimation in terms of the relationship between institutionalized deliberative bodies (e.g legislatures, agencies, courts) and informal communication in the public sphere, which is “wild”, and not centrally coordinated.

One possible objection to this view is that free and inclusive democratic procedures are insufficient to satisfy the demand for deliberative consensus embodied in the Democratic Principle. This demand is unlikely to be satisfied in diverse societies, since deep disagreements about which laws ought to be enacted is likely to remain after the relevant process of opinion and will-formation. The Democratic Principle might thus be thought to embody an overly idealistic conception of democratic legitimacy (Estlund 2008: ch.10). Another possible worry is that the Discourse Principle is not a genuine moral principle, but a principle that embodies the felicity conditions of practical discourse. As such, the Discourse Principle cannot ground a conception of democratic legitimacy that yields robust moral prescriptions (Forst 2016).

Drawing on Habermas and John Rawls, among others, Joshua Cohen (1996 [2003]) develops a conception of democracy in which citizens justify laws and policies on the basis of mutually acceptable reasons. Democracy, properly understood, is the context in which individuals freely engage in a process of reasoned discussion and deliberation on an equal footing. The ideas of freedom and equality provide guidelines for structuring democratic institutions.

The aim of Cohen’s conception of democracy as public justification is reasoned consensus among citizens. But a serious problem arises when we ask about what happens when disagreement remains. Two possible replies have been suggested. It has been urged that forms of consensus weaker than full consensus are sufficient for public justification and that the weaker varieties are achievable in many societies. For instance, there may be consensus on the list of reasons that are acceptable publicly but disagreement on the weight of the different reasons. Or there may be agreement on general reasons abstractly understood but disagreement about particular interpretations of those reasons. What would have to be shown here is that such weak consensus is achievable in many societies and that the disagreements that remain are not incompatible with the ideal of public justification.

The basic principle seems to be the principle of reasonableness according to which reasonable persons will only offer principles for the regulation of their society that other reasonable persons can reasonably accept. One only offers principles that others, who restrain themselves in the same way, can accept. Such a principle implies a kind of principle of restraint which requires that reasonable persons avoid proposing laws and policies on the basis of controversial moral or philosophical principles. When individuals offer proposals for the regulation of their society, they ought not to appeal to the whole truth as they see it but only to that part of the whole truth that others can reasonably accept. To put the matter in the way Rawls puts it: political society must be regulated by principles on which there is an overlapping consensus (Rawls 2005: Lecture IV). This is meant to obviate the need for a complete consensus on the principles that regulate society.

However, it is hard to see how this approach avoids the need for a complete consensus, which is highly unlikely to occur in any even moderately diverse society. The reason for this is that it is not clear why it is any less of an imposition on me when I propose legislation or policies for the society that I must restrain myself to considerations that other reasonable people accept than it is an imposition on others when I attempt to pass legislation on the basis of reasons they reasonably reject. For if I do restrain myself in this way, then the society I live in will not live up to the standards that I believe are essential to evaluating the society. I must then live in and support a society that does not accord with my conception of how it ought to be organized. It is not clear why this is any less of a loss of control over society than for those who must live in a society that is partly regulated by principles they do not accept. If one is a problem, then so is the other, and complete consensus is the only solution (Christiano 2009).

Many democratic theorists have argued that democracy is a way of treating persons as equals when there is good reason to impose some kind of organization on their shared lives but they disagree about how best to do it. Peter Singer argues that when people insist on different ways of arranging matters properly, each person in a sense claims a right to be dictator over their shared lives (Singer 1973: 30–41). But these claims to dictatorship cannot all hold up. Democracy embodies a kind of peaceful and fair compromise among these conflicting claims to rule. Each compromises equally on what he claims as long as the others do, resulting in each having an equal say over decision making. In effect, democratic decision making respects each person’s point of view on matters of common concern by giving each an equal say about what to do in cases of disagreement (Singer 1973; Waldron 1999: chap. 5).

What if people disagree on the democratic method or on the particular form democracy is to take? Are we to decide these latter questions by means of a higher order procedure? And if there is disagreement on the higher order procedure, must we also democratically decide that question? The view seems to lead to an infinite regress.

An alternative way of justifying democracy on the basis of equality is to ground democracy in public equality. Public equality is a principle of equality which ensures that people can see that they are being treated as equals. This view arises from three ideas. First, there is the basic egalitarian idea that people’s interests ought to be equally advanced, or at least that they ought to have equal opportunities to advance them. Second, human beings generally have highly fallible and biased understandings of their own and other people’s interests. Third, persons have fundamental interests in being able to see that they are being treated as equals. Public equality is an egalitarian principle that can be seen to be realized among persons despite the dramatically incomplete forms of knowledge people have. It is not all of justice, but it is essential that the principle be realized in a pluralistic society.

Democracy is a uniquely publicly egalitarian way to make collective decisions when there is substantial disagreement and conflict of interest among persons about how to shape the society they share. Each can see that the only plausible way of overcoming persistent disagreement over how to shape the society they all live in, while still publicly treating all persons as equals in the face of bias and fallibility, is to give each person an equal say in the process of shaping that society. Thus, democracy is necessary to the realization of public equality in a political society. Within the framework determined by this publicly realized equality, persons are permitted to attempt to bring about their more particular ideas about justice and the common good that they think are right.

The idea of public equality also grounds limits to democratic decision making. The thought is that a society cannot democratically decide to abolish the democratic rights of some of its members. Public equality also requires that basic liberal and civil rights be respected as well, by the democratic process and so serves as a limit to democratic decision making (Christiano 2008; Valentini 2013).

A number of worries attend this kind of view. First, it is generally thought that majority rule is required for treating persons as equals in collective decision making. This is because only majority rule is neutral towards alternatives in decision making. Unanimity tends to favor the status quo as do various forms of supermajority rule. But if this is so, the above view raises the twin dangers of majority tyranny and of persistent minorities, i.e., groups of persons who find themselves always losing in majority decisions. Surely these latter phenomena must be incompatible with public equality. Second, the kind of view defended above is susceptible to the worry that political equality is not a coherent ideal in any modern state with a complex division of labor and the need for representation. This last worry will be discussed in more detail in the next sections on democratic citizenship and legislative representation. The first worry will be discussed more in the discussion on the limits to democratic authority.

A related approach grounds democracy in the ideal of relational equality . A concern with relational equality is a concern for

human relationships that are, in certain crucial respects at least, unstructured by differences of rank, power, or status. (Scheffler 2010: 225)

Niko Kolodny argues that democratic institutions are an essential component of relational equality (Kolodny 2014a,b). One line of Kolodny’s argument holds that political decisions involve the use of coercive force. Inequalities in the power to use force undermine equal social status at least in part because the power to use force is “the power that usually determines the distribution of other powers” (Kolodny 2014b: 307). Individuals who have superior power to use force on others have a superior social status. An egalitarian distribution of political power is thus essential for realizing social equality. And only democratic institutions provide an egalitarian distribution of political power. We will discuss the relationship between relational equality and democracy further when we discuss the authority of democracy in Part 3 below.

3. The Authority of Democracy

Since democracy is a collective decision process, the question naturally arises about whether there is any duty of citizens to obey democratic decisions when they disagree with it.

There are three main concepts of the legitimate authority of the state. First, a state has legitimate authority to the extent that it is morally justified in coercively imposing its rule on the members. Legitimate authority on this account has no direct implications concerning the obligations or duties that citizens may hold toward that state. It simply says that if the state is morally justified in doing what it does, then it has legitimate authority. Second, a state has legitimate authority to the extent that its directives generate duties in citizens to obey. The duties of the citizens need not be owed to the state but they are real duties to obey. The third is that the state has a right to rule that is correlated with the citizens’ duty to it to obey it. This is the strongest notion of authority and it seems to be the core idea behind the legitimacy of the state. The idea is that when citizens disagree about law and policy it is important to be able to answer the question, who has the right to choose?

Instrumental arguments for democracy give some reason for why one ought to respect the democracy when one disagrees with its decisions. There may be many instrumental considerations that play a role in deciding on the question of whether one ought to obey. And these instrumental considerations are pretty much the same whether one is considering obedience to democracy or some other form of rule.

There is one instrumentalist approach which is quite unique to democracy and that seems to ground a strong conception of democratic authority. That is the epistemic approach inspired by the Condorcet Jury Theorem, which we discussed in section 2.1.1.2 above. There, we discussed a number of difficulties with the application of the Condorcet Jury Theorem to the case of voting in elections and referenda in large-scale democracies, including lack of independence, informational segmentation, and the existence of ideological biases.

One further worry about the Jury Theorem’s epistemic conceptions of authority is that it would prove too much since it undermines the common practice of the loyal opposition in democracies. If the background conditions of the Jury Theorem are met, a large-scale democracy majority is practically certain to produce the right decisions. On what basis can citizens in a political minority rationally hold on to their competing views? The members of the minority have a powerful reason for shifting their allegiance to the majority position, since each has very good reason to think that the majority is right. The epistemic conception of authority based on the Jury Theorem thus threatens to be objectionably authoritarian, since it looks like it demands not only obedience of action but obedience of thought as well. Even in scientific communities the fact that a majority of scientists favor a particular view does not make the minority scientists think that they are wrong, though it does perhaps give them pause (Goodin 2003: ch. 7).

Some theories of democratic authority combine instrumental and non-instrumental considerations. David Estlund argues that democratic procedures have legitimate authority because they are better than random and epistemically the best of the political systems that are acceptable to all reasonable citizens (Estlund 2008). They must be better than random because, otherwise, why wouldn’t we use a fair random procedure like a lottery or coin flip? Democratic authority must have an epistemic element. And the justification of democratic procedure must be acceptable to all reasonable citizens in order to respect their freedom and equality. Estlund’s conception of democratic authority—which he calls “epistemic proceduralism”— thus combines the ideal of public justification with a concern for the tendency of democracies to produce good decisions.

3.2 Intrinsic Conceptions of Democratic Authority

Some theorists argue that there is a special relation between democracy and legitimate authority grounded in the value of collective self-rule. John Locke argues that when a person consents to the creation of a political society, they necessarily consent to the use of majority rule in deciding how the political society is to be organized (Locke 1690: sec. 96). Locke thinks that majority rule is the natural decision rule when there is disagreement. He argues that a society is a kind of collective body that must move in the direction of the greater force. One way to understand this argument is as follows. If we think of each member of society as an equal and if we think that there is likely to be disagreement beyond the question of whether to join society or not, then we must accept majority rule as the appropriate decision rule. This interpretation of the greater force argument assumes that the expression “greater force” is to be understood in terms of the equal worth of each person’s interests and rights, so the society must go in the direction in which the greater number of persons wants it to go.

Locke thinks that a people, which is formed by individuals who consent to be members, could choose a monarchy by means of majority rule and so this argument by itself does not give us an argument for democracy. But Locke refers back to this argument when he defends the requirement of representative institutions for deciding when property may be regulated and taxes levied. He argues that a person must consent to the regulation or taxation of his property by the state. But he says that this requirement of consent is satisfied when a majority of the representatives of property holders consent to the regulation and taxation of property (Locke, 1690: sec. 140). This does seem to be moving towards a genuinely democratic conception of legitimate authority.

Rousseau argues that when individuals consent to form a political community, they agree to put themselves under the direction of the “general will” (Rousseau 1762). The general will is not a mere aggregation of individuals’ private wills. It is, rather, the will of the political community as a whole. And since the general will can only emerge as the product of a properly organized democratic procedure, individuals consent to put themselves under the direction of a properly organized democratic procedure. On one interpretation of Rousseau, democratic procedures are properly organized only when they (1) define rights that apply equally to all, (2) via a procedure that considers everyone’s interests equally, and (3) everyone who is coerced to obey the laws has a voice in that procedure.

There are at least two ways of understanding the idea of the general will. On what might be called the constitutive interpretation, the general will is constituted by the results of a properly organized democratic procedure. That is, the results of a properly organized democratic procedure are the general will in virtue of the fact that they emerge from a properly organized democratic procedure, and not because they reflect some procedure-independent truth about the common good. On what might be called the epistemic interpretation, the results of a properly organized democratic procedure are the way of tracking the procedure-independent truth about the common good. As we discussed in section 3.1 , Rousseau is often interpreted as appealing to Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to support the epistemic credentials of a properly organized democratic procedure.

Anna Stilz develops an account of democratic authority that appeals to the value of “freedom as independence” (Stilz 2009). Freedom as independence is freedom from being subject to the will of another. In order not to be subject to the will of others, individuals need property rights and a protected sphere of autonomy to pursue one’s plans. Drawing on Kant, Stilz argues that attempts by particular individuals, no matter how conscientious, to define and secure rights to property and autonomy in a state of nature will be inconsistent with freedom as independence. Such attempts unilaterally impose new obligations on others through acts of private will in the face of competing claims. But even if individuals in a state of nature do agree to a resolution of their competing claims, they are dependent on the will of others to honor this agreement. Stilz thus argues that justice must be administered by an authoritative legal system which can coercively impose one set of objective rules—rules we must respect even when we disagree—to adjudicate our conflicting claims. But if such a system is to be consistent with the freedom of subjects, it cannot be imposed by the private wills of rulers. The solution, Stilz argues, lies in Rousseau’s idea of the general will. When subjects obey the general will, they are not obeying the private will of any individual; they are obeying a will that arises from all and applies to all.

One worry with this account is that those who oppose democratically-enacted laws or policies can complain that those laws or policies are imposed against their will. Perhaps they are not subject to the will of a particular individual, but they are subject to the will of a majority. This might be thought to constitute a significant threat to individuals’ freedom as independence. Another worry, which Stilz’s view arguably inherits from Rousseau, is that the conditions for the general will to emerge are so demanding that the view implies that no state that exists or has existed has legitimate political authority. Stilz’s view might thus be thought to entail what A.J. Simmons calls “a posteriori anarchism” (Simmons 2001).

Another approach to democratic authority asserts that failing to obey the decisions of a democratic assembly amounts to treating one’s fellow citizens as inferiors (Christiano 2008: ch. 6). In the face of disagreement about substantive law and policy, democracy realizes a kind of public equality by giving each individual an equal say in determining which laws or policies will be enacted. Citizens who skirt laws made by suitably egalitarian procedures act contrary to the equal right of all citizens to have a say in making laws. Those who refuse to pay taxes or respect property laws on the grounds that they are unjust are affirming a superior right to that of others in determining how the shared aspects of social life ought to be arranged. Thus, they violate the duty to treat others publicly as equals. And there is reason to think this duty must normally have some pre-eminence. Public equality is the most important form of equality and democracy is required by public equality. The other forms of equality in play in substantive disputes about law and policy are ones about which people can have reasonable disagreements (within limits specified by the principle of public equality). Citizens thus have obligations to abide by the democratic process even if their favored conceptions of justice or equality are passed by in the decision making process.

Daniel Viehoff develops an egalitarian conception of democratic authority based on the ideal of relational equality (Viehoff 2014; see section 2.2.3 above for more on relational equality). Viehoff argues that relational equality is threatened by “subjection” in a relationship, which occurs when individuals have significantly different power over how they interact with and relate to one another. According to Viehoff, obeying the outcomes of egalitarian democratic procedures is necessary and sufficient for citizens to achieve coordination on common rules without subjection. It is sufficient because democratic procedures distribute decision-making power equally, which ensures that coordination is not determined by unequal power advantages. It is necessary because parties must set aside the considerations of greater and lesser power to realize non-subjection in their relationship.

Fabienne Peter develops a fairness-based conception of democratic authority that incorporates epistemic considerations (Peter 2008; 2009). Drawing on insights from proceduralist epistemology, Peter’s “pure epistemic proceduralism” holds that suitably egalitarian democratic decisions are binding at least in part because they result from a fair procedure of knowledge-production. This account differs from Estlund’s epistemic proceduralism (see section 5.1 above) because it does not condition the authority of democratic procedures on their ability to produce decisions that track the procedure-independent truth. Rather, the authority of democratic procedures is grounded in their fairness. And it differs from pure procedural accounts because the relevant notion of fairness is fairness in knowledge-production.

3.3 Limits to the Authority of Democracy

What are the limits to democratic authority? A limit to democratic authority is a principle violation of which defeats democratic authority. When the principle is violated by the democratic assembly, the assembly loses its authority in that instance or the moral weight of the authority is overridden. A number of different views have been offered on this issue. We can distinguish between internal and external limits to democratic authority. An internal limit arises from the constitutive requirements of the democratic process or from the principles that ground democracy. An external limit arises from principles that are independent of the values or requirements that ground democracy.

External limits to democratic authority are rebutting limits, which are principles that weigh against—and may sometimes outweigh the principles that ground democracy. So in a particular case, an individual may see that there are reasons to obey the assembly and some reasons against obeying the assembly and in the case at hand the reasons against obedience outweigh the reasons in favor of obedience. Internal limits to democratic authority are undercutting limits. These limits function not by weighing against the considerations in favor of authority, they undercut the considerations in favor of authority altogether; they simply short circuit the authority. When an undercutting limit is in play, it is not as if the principles which ground the limit outweigh the reasons for obeying the democratic assembly, it is rather that the reasons for obeying the democratic assembly are undermined altogether; they cease to exist or at least they are severely weakened.

Some have argued that the democratic process ought to be limited to decisions that are not incompatible with the proper functioning of the democratic process. So they argue that the democratic process may not legitimately take away the political rights of its citizens in good standing. It may not take away rights that are necessary to the democratic process such as freedom of association or freedom of speech. But these limits do not extend beyond the requirements for proper democratic functioning. They do not protect non political artistic speech or freedom of association in the case of non political activities (Ely 1980: chap. 4).

Another kind of internal limit is a limit that arises from the principles that underpin democracy. And the presence of this limit would seem to be necessary to making sense of the first limit because in order for the first limit to be morally important we need to know why a democracy ought to protect the democratic process.

Locke gives an account of the internal limits of democracy in his idea that there are certain things to which a citizen may not consent (Locke 1690: ch. XI). She may not consent to arbitrary rule or the violation of fundamental rights including democratic and liberal rights. Since consent is the basis of democratic authority for Locke, this account provides an explanation of the idea behind the first internal limit, that democracy may not be suspended by democratic means but it goes beyond that limit to suggest that rights that are not essentially connected with the exercise of the franchise may also not be violated because one may not consent to their violation.

More recently, Ronald Dworkin has defended an account of the limits of democratic authority (Dworkin 1996). He argues that democracy is justified by appeal to a principle of self-government. He argues that self-government cannot be realized unless all citizens are treated as full members of the political community, because, otherwise, they are not able to identify as members of the community. Among the conditions of full membership, he argues, are rights to be treated as equals and rights to have one’s moral independence respected. These principles support robust requirements of non-discrimination and of basic liberal rights.

The conception of democratic authority that grounds it in public equality also provides an account of the limits of that authority (Christiano 2008: ch. 6). Since democracy is founded in public equality, it may not violate public equality in any of its decisions. The basic idea is that overt violation of public equality by a democratic assembly undermines the claim that the democratic assembly embodies public equality. Democracy’s embodiment of public equality is conditional on its protecting public equality. To the extent that liberal rights are grounded in public equality and the provision of an economic minimum is also so grounded, this suggests that democratic rights and liberal rights and rights to an economic minimum create a limit to democratic authority. This account also provides a deep grounding for the kinds of limits to democratic authority defended in the first internal limit and it goes beyond these to the extent that protection of rights that are not connected with the exercise of the franchise is also necessary to public equality.

This account of the authority of democracy also provides some help with a vexing problem of democratic theory. This problem is the difficulty of persistent minorities. There is a persistent minority in a democratic society when that minority always loses in the voting. This is always a possibility in democracies because of the use of majority rule. If the society is divided into two or more highly unified voting blocks in which the members of each group votes in the same ways as all the other members of that group, then the group in the minority will find itself always on the losing end of the votes. This problem has plagued some societies, particularly those with indigenous peoples who live within developed societies. Though this problem is often connected with majority tyranny it is distinct from the problem of majority tyranny because it may be the case that the majority attempts to treat the minority well, in accordance with its conception of good treatment. It is just that the minority never agrees with the majority on what constitutes proper treatment. Being a persistent minority can be highly oppressive even if the majority does not try to act oppressively. This can be understood with the help of the very ideas that underpin democracy. Persons have interests in being able to correct for the cognitive biases of others and to be able to make the world in such a way that it makes sense to them. These interests are set back for a persistent minority since they never get their way.

The conception of democracy as grounded in public equality can shed light on this problem. It can say that the existence of a persistent minority violates public equality (Christiano 2008: chap. 7). In effect, a society in which there is a persistent minority is one in which that minority is being treated publicly as an inferior because it is clear that its fundamental interests are being set back. Hence to the extent that violations of public equality undercut the authority of a democratic assembly, the existence of a persistent minority undermines the authority of the democracy at least with respect to the minority. This suggests that certain institutions ought to be constructed so that the minority is not persistent.

One natural kind of limit to democratic authority is the external kind of limit. Here the idea is that there are certain considerations that favor democratic decision making and there are certain values that are independent of democracy that may be at issue in democratic decisions. For example, many theories recognize core liberal rights—such as rights to property, bodily integrity, and freedom of thought and expression—as external limits to democratic authority. Locke is often interpreted as arguing that individuals have natural rights to property in themselves and the external world that democratic laws must respect in order to have legitimate authority (Locke 1690).

Some views may assert that there are only external limits to democratic authority. But it is possible to think that there are both internal and external limits. Such an issue may arise in decisions to go to war, for example. In such decisions, one may have a duty to obey the decision of the democratic assembly on the grounds that this is how one treats one’s fellow citizens as equals but one may also have a duty to oppose the war on the grounds that the war is an unjust aggression against other people. To the extent that this consideration is sufficiently serious it may outweigh the considerations of equality that underpin democratic authority. Thus one may have an overall duty not to obey in this context. Issues of foreign policy in general seem to give rise to possible external limits to democracy.

4. The Demands of Democratic Participation

In this section, we examine the demands of participation in large-scale democracies. We begin by examining a core challenge to the idea that democratic citizens are capable of governing a large and complex society. We then explore different proposed solutions to the core challenge. Finally, we examine the moral duties of democratic citizens in large-scale democracies in light of the core challenge.

A vexing problem of democratic theory has been to determine whether ordinary citizens are up to the task of governing a large and complex society. There are three distinct problems here:

• Plato argued that some people are more intelligent and informed about political matters than others and have a superior moral character, and that those persons ought to rule ( The Republic , Book VI)
• Others have argued that a society must have a division of labor. If everyone were engaged in the complex and difficult task of politics, little time or energy would be left for the other essential tasks of a society. Conversely, if we expect most people to engage in other difficult and complex tasks, how can we expect them to have the time and resources sufficient to devote themselves intelligently to politics?
• Since individuals have so little impact on the outcomes of political decision making in large societies, they have little sense of responsibility for the outcomes. Some have argued that it is not rational to vote since the chances that an individual’s vote will a decide the outcome of an election (i.e., will determine whether a candidate gets elected or not) are nearly indistinguishable from zero. For example, one widely accepted estimate puts the odds of an individual casting the deciding vote in a United States presidential election at 1 in 100 million. Many estimates put the odds much lower. Worse still, Anthony Downs has argued that almost all of those who do vote have little reason to become informed about how best to vote (Downs 1957: ch.13). On the assumption that citizens reason and behave roughly according to the Downsian model, either the society must in fact be run by a relatively small group of people with minimal input from the rest or it will be very poorly run. As we can see these criticisms are echoes of the sorts of criticisms Plato and Hobbes made.

These observations pose challenges for any robustly egalitarian or deliberative conception of democracy. Without the ability to participate intelligently in politics one cannot use one’s votes to advance one’s aims nor can one be said to participate in a process of reasoned deliberation among equals. So, either equality of political power implies a kind of self-defeating equal participation of citizens in politics or a reasonable division of labor seems to undermine equality of power. And either substantial participation of citizens in public deliberation entails the relative neglect of other tasks or the proper functioning of the other sectors of the society requires that most people do not participate intelligently in public deliberation.

4.2 Proposed Solutions to the Problem of Democratic Participation

Some modern theorists of democracy, called elite theorists, have argued against any robustly egalitarian or deliberative forms of democracy in light of the problem of democratic participation. They argue that high levels of citizen participation tend to produce bad legislation designed by demagogues to appeal to poorly informed and overly emotional citizens. They look upon the alleged uninformedness of citizens evidenced in many empirical studies in the 1950s and 1960s as perfectly reasonable and predictable. Indeed they regard the alleged apathy of citizens in modern states as highly desirable social phenomena.

Political leaders are to avoid divisive and emotionally charged issues and make policy and law with little regard for the fickle and diffuse demands made by ordinary citizens. Citizens participate by voting but since they know very little they are not effectively the ruling part of the society. The process of election is usually just a fairly peaceful way of maintaining or changing those who rule (Schumpeter 1942 [1950: 269]).

On Schumpeter’s view, however, citizens do have a role to play in avoiding serious disasters. When politicians act in ways that nearly anyone can see is problematic, the citizens can throw the bums out.

So the elite theory of democracy does seem compatible with some of the instrumentalist arguments given above but it is strongly opposed to the intrinsic arguments from liberty, public justification and equality. To be sure, there can be an elite deliberative democracy wherein elites deliberate, perhaps even out of sight of the population at large, on how to run the society.

A view akin to the elite theory but less pessimistic about citizens’ political agency and competence argues that a well-functioning representative democracy can function as a kind of “defensible epistocracy” (Landa & Pevnick 2020). This view holds that, under the right conditions, elected officials can be expected to exercise political power more responsibly than citizens in a direct democracy because each official is far more likely to cast the deciding vote in legislative assemblies (the “pivotality effect”) and officials have more incentive to exercise power with due regard for the general welfare (the “accountability effect”). Moreover, under the right conditions, representative democracy allows individuals to assess the competence of candidates for office and to select candidates who are best able to help the community pursue its commitments.

One approach that is in part motivated by the problem of democratic citizenship but which attempts to preserve some elements of equality against the elitist criticism is the interest group pluralist account of politics. Robert Dahl’s early statement of the view is very powerful.

In a rough sense, the essence of all competitive politics is bribery of the electorate by politicians… The farmer… supports a candidate committed to high price supports, the businessman…supports an advocate of low corporation taxes… the consumer…votes for candidates opposed to a sales tax. (Dahl 1959: 69)

In this conception of the democratic process, each citizen is a member of an interest group with narrowly defined interests that are closely connected to their everyday lives. On these subjects citizens are supposed to be quite well informed and interested in having an influence. Or at least, elites from each of the interest groups that are relatively close in perspective to the ordinary members are the principal agents in the process. On this account, democracy is not rule by the majority but rather rule by coalitions of minorities. Policy and law in a democratic society are decided by means of bargaining among the different groups.

This approach is conceivably compatible with the more egalitarian approach to democracy. This is because it attempts to reconcile equality with collective decision making by limiting the tasks of citizens to ones which they are able to perform reasonably well. It is not particularly compatible with the deliberative public justification approach because it takes the democratic process to be concerned essentially with bargaining among the different interest groups where the preferences are not subject to further debate in the society as a whole.

A third approach inspired by the problem of participation may be called the neo-liberal approach to politics favored by public choice theorists such as James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock (1962). Against elite theories, they contend that elites and their allies will tend to expand the powers of government and bureaucracy for their own interests and that this expansion will occur at the expense of a largely inattentive public. For this reason, they argue for severe restrictions on the powers of elites. They argue against the interest group pluralist theorists that the problem of participation occurs within interest groups more or less as much as among the citizenry at large. Only powerful economic interests are likely to succeed in organizing to influence the government and they will do so largely for their own benefit. Since economic elites will advance their own interests in politics while spreading the costs to others, policies will tend to be more costly (because imposed on everyone in society) than they are beneficial (because they benefit only the elites in the interest group.)

Neo-liberals infer that one ought to transfer many of the current functions of the state to the market and limit the state to the enforcement of basic property rights and liberties. These can be more easily understood and brought under the control of ordinary citizens.

But the neo-liberal account of democracy must answer to two large worries. First, citizens in modern societies have more ambitious conceptions of social justice and the common good than are realizable by the minimal state. The neo-liberal account thus implies a very serious curtailment of democracy of its own. More evidence is needed to support the contention that these aspirations cannot be achieved by the modern state. Second, the neo-liberal approach ignores the problem of large private concentrations of wealth and power that are capable of pushing small states around for their own benefit and imposing their wills on populations without their consent.

Somin (2013) also argues that government be significantly reduced in size so that citizens have a lesser knowledge burden to carry. But he calls for government decentralization so that citizens can vote with their feet in favor of or against competing units of government, in effect creating a kind of market in governments among which citizens can choose.

4.2.4 The self-interest assumption

A considerable amount of the literature in political science and the economic theory of the state are grounded in the assumption that individuals act primarily and perhaps even exclusively in their self-interest narrowly construed. The problem of participation and the accounts of the democratic process described above are in large part dependent on this assumption. When the preferences of voters are not assumed to be self-interested the calculations of the value of participation change. For example, if a person is a motivated utilitarian, the small chance of making a difference is coupled with a huge accumulated return to many people if there is a significant difference between alternatives. It may be worth it in this case to become reasonably well informed (Parfit 1984: 74). Even more weakly altruistic moral preferences could make a big difference to the rationality of becoming informed, for example if one had a preference to comply with perceived civic duty to vote responsibly (see section 4.3.1 for discussion of the duty to vote). Any moral preference can be formulated in consistent utility functions.

Moreover, defenders of deliberative democracy often claim that concerns for the common good and justice are not merely given prior to politics but that they can evolve and improve through the process of discussion and debate in politics (Elster 1986 [2003]; Gutmann & Thompson 2004; Cohen 1989 [2009]). They assert that much debate and discussion in politics would not be intelligible were it not for the fact that citizens are willing to engage in open minded discussion with those who have distinct morally informed points of view. Empirical evidence suggests that individuals are motivated by moral considerations in politics in addition to their interests (Mansbridge 1990).

Public deliberation in any large-scale democracy will occur within a complex and differentiated “deliberative system”, a

wide variety of institutions, associations, and sites of contestation accomplish political work. (Mansbridge et. al. 2012)

Moreover, the deliberative system of a complex democracy will be characterized by a division of democratic labor , with different parts of the system making different contributions to the overall system. The question arises: what is the appropriate role for a citizen in this division of labor? Philosophically, we should ask two questions. What ought citizens have knowledge about in order to fulfill their role? What standards ought citizens’ beliefs live up to in order to be adequately supported? One promising view is that citizens must think about what ends the society ought to aim at and leave the question of how to achieve those aims to experts (Christiano 1996: ch 5). The rationale for this division of labor is that expertise is not as fundamental to the choice of aims as it is to the development of legislation and policy. Citizens are capable in their everyday lives of understanding and cultivating deep understandings of values and of their interests. And if citizens genuinely do choose the aims and others faithfully pursue the means to achieving those aims, then citizens are in the driver’s seat in society and they can play this role as equals.

To be sure, citizens need to know who to vote for and whether those they vote for are genuinely advancing their aims. This would appear to require some basic knowledge of about how best to achieve their political aims. How is this possible without extensive knowledge? In addition, there is empirical evidence that those who are better informed have more influence on representatives (Erikson 2015). So, if this task requires some kind of knowledge to do well, how can this be compatible with equality?

One promising response is that ordinary citizens do not need individually to have a lot of knowledge of social science and particular facts in order to make political decisions based on such knowledge. Recent research in cognitive science indicates the individuals use “cognitive shortcuts” to save on time in acquiring information about the world they live in (Lupia & McCubbins 1998). This use of shortcuts is common and essential throughout economic and political life. In political life, we see part of the rationale for the many intermediate institutions between government and citizens (Downs 1957: 221–229). Citizens save time by making use of institutions such as the press, unions and other interest group associations, political parties, and opinion leaders to get information about politics. They also rely on interactions in the workplace as well as conversations with friends and families. Political parties can connect ordinary citizens in various ways to expertise because each one contains a division of labor within them that mirrors that in the state. Experts in parties have incentives to make their expertise intelligible to other members (Christiano 2012). In addition, under favorable conditions, political parties stimulate the development of citizens’ normative perspectives and facilitate a healthy public competition of political justifications based on those perspectives (White & Ypi 2016).

People are dependent on social networks in other ways in a democracy. People receive “free” information (which they do not deliberately seek out) about politics and law in school, through their jobs, in discussion with friends, colleagues and family and incidentally through the media. And this can form a better or worse basis on which to pursue other information. Institutions can make a difference to the stream of free information individuals receive. Education can be distributed in a more or less egalitarian way. The circumstances of work can provide more or less free information about politics and law. People who have jobs with a significant amount of power such as lawyers, business persons, government officials will be beneficiaries of very high quality free information. They need to know about law and politics to do their jobs properly. Those who hold low skilled and non-unionized jobs will receive much less free information about politics at work. To the extent that we can alter the economic division of labor by for example giving more place to unions or having greater worker participation, we might be able to reduce inequalities of information among citizens.

4.3 The Moral Duties of Democratic Citizens

What are the moral duties of democratic citizens in complex democracies? In this section, we discuss three important democratic duties: (1) the duty to vote, (2) the duty to promote justice through principled disobedience of the law, and (3) duties to accommodate disagreement through compromise and consensus.

It is often thought that democratic citizens have a moral duty to vote in elections. But this is not obvious. Individual votes are a causally insignificant contribution to the democratic process. In large-scale democracies, the chance that any particular citizen’s vote will decide the outcome of an election is minuscule. What moral reason do democratic citizens have to participate in politics even though they’re almost certain not to make the difference to who gets elected? Why shouldn’t they seek to promote the good or justice in other ways?

Parfit develops an act-utilitarian answer to this question (Parfit 1984: 73–75). Act-utilitarians hold that morally right actions maximize the total expected sum of the utilities of all persons in the society. Parfit argues that voting might nonetheless maximize expected utility if one candidate is significantly superior to the other(s). If we add the benefits to each member of the society of having the superior candidate win, we get a very large difference in value. So when we multiply that value by the probability of casting the deciding vote, which is often thought to be about 1/100,000,000 in a United States presidential election, we might still get a reasonably high expected value. When we subtract the cost to the voter and others of voting, which is often quite low, from this number, we may still have a good reason to vote.

One worry with Parfit’s view is that it faces a version of what Jason Brennan calls “the particularity problem” (Brennan 2011). This is the problem of explaining why citizens ought to promote value through political participation as opposed to through non-political acts. Voting is just one way of promoting overall utility; we need to know the expected utility of the different acts they might perform instead. Even if the argument above is correct, it might be the case that many individuals maximize expected utility by not voting and doing something even more beneficial with their time.

Alex Guerrero argues that citizens have moral reasons to vote because candidates who win by a larger proportion of votes can claim a greater “normative mandate” to govern (Guerrero 2010). Still each individual vote makes only a tiny contribution to the proportion of votes a candidate receives. So, we might doubt the strength of the reason to vote that Guerrero identifies.

Some theorists argue that individuals have a moral duty to vote in order to absolve themselves of complicity in state injustices (Beerbohm 2012; Zakaras 2018). All states commit injustices—they make and enforce unjust laws, wage unjust wars, and much else. And citizens of large-scale democracies have a kind of standing responsibility, by paying taxes and obeying laws, for their state’s injustices of which they must actively absolve themselves The complicity account argues that citizens avoid shared responsibility for their state’s injustices if they oppose those injustices through voting and of public advocacy (Beerbohm 2012).

One worry is that it is unclear why voting and publicly advocating against injustice should be thought to absolve responsibility that is established by paying taxes and obeying laws. Another worry is that one’s concern to oppose injustice should derive from a more direct concern for the wrongs suffered by victims of injustice rather than a concern with keeping one’s hands clean.

One sort of account that avoids this worry grounds the moral duty to vote in the importance of doing one’s fair share of the demands of political justice consistent with public equality. The demands of creating and sustaining just institutions distribute fairly among all citizens (Maskivker 2019). If one fails to do one’s fair share of these demands, then one fails to show due regard for the eventual victims of injustice. Furthermore, voting provides citizens with a mechanism for doing their fair shares of the demands of making their institutions just in a way that is consistent with respecting the public equality of fellow citizens. By showing up and casting a vote, citizens can contribute to the collective achievement of justice while maintaining equal decision-making power with fellow citizens.

Civil disobedience has long been recognized as a central mechanism through which democratic citizens may legitimately promote political justice in their society. According to the standard view, civil disobedience is a public, non-violent and conscientious breach of law that aims to change laws or government policies. People who engage in civil disobedience are willing to accept the legal consequences of their actions in order to show fidelity to the law (Bedau 1961; Rawls 1971: ch. 55). The standard definition of civil disobedience has been subjected to challenge. For example, some argue that the private acts in which the disobedient seeks to evade legal consequences can count as instances of civil disobedience (Raz 1979; Brownlee 2004, 2007, 2012).

Perhaps the most common way of justifying civil disobedience argues that the same considerations that ground the pro tanto duty to obey the law sometimes make it appropriate to engage in civil disobedience of the law (see, e.g., Rawls 1971: ch. 57; Sabl 2001; Markovits 2005; Smith 2011). For example, Rawls argues that while citizens of a “nearly just” society have a pro tanto duty to obey its laws in virtue of it being nearly just, civil disobedience can be justified as a way of making the relevant society more just (Rawls 1971: ch. 57). Similarly, Daniel Markovits argues that members of a society with suitably egalitarian and inclusive democratic procedures have a general duty to obey its laws because they are produced by procedures that are suitably egalitarian and inclusive, but that civil disobedience can be justified as a way of making the relevant procedures more egalitarian or inclusive (Markovits 2005).

It is easy to see why this constitutes an attractive way of justifying civil disobedience, since it justifies it by appeal to the same values that ground the pro tanto duty to obey the law. On the other hand, as Simmons notes, if there is no general duty to obey the law, there would seem to be no presumption in favor of obedience and thus no special need for a justification of civil disobedience; obedience and disobedience would stand equally in need of justification (Simmons 2007: ch 4).

Advocates of the standard approach generally assume that only civil disobedience can be justified in this way. However, some argue civil disobedience does not enjoy a special normative presumption over uncivil disobedience. The core idea that insofar as the values that ground a pro tanto duty to obey the law—for example, justice or democratic equality—are sometimes best served by civil disobedience of the law, they are sometimes best served by covert, evasive, anonymous, or even violent disobedience of the law (Delmas 2018; Lai 2019; Pasternak 2018).

Disagreement about what laws, policies, or principles ought to be implemented is a persistent feature of democratic societies. It is often argued that citizens and officials have duties to moderate their political activity in order to accommodate the competing views of fellow citizens or officials. Two duties of accommodation are widely discussed in the literature: duties of compromise and duties of public justification.

A compromise can be understood as an agreement between parties to advance laws or policies that all regard as suboptimal because they disagree about which laws or policies are optimal (May 2005). While it is widely accepted that there are sometimes compelling instrumental reasons to compromise, whether there are intrinsic moral reasons to compromise is more controversial. Some defend intrinsic reasons to compromise based on democratic values like inclusion, mutual respect, and reciprocity (Gutmann and Thompson 2014; Wendt 2016; Weinstock 2013). However, Simon May argues that such arguments fail and that all reasons to compromise are pragmatic (May 2005).

Advocates of the public justification approach to democracy (see section 2.2.2 ) often argue that democratic citizens and officials have individual moral duties of public justification. John Rawls argues for a “duty of civility” that requires citizens and officials to be prepared to give mutually acceptable justifications for important laws when voting and engaged in public advocacy. Given the inevitability of disagreement about comprehensive moral and philosophical truth in free democracies, the duty of civility requires citizens to appeal to a reasonable “political” conception of justice that can be the object of an “overlapping consensus” between different comprehensive doctrines. While different theorists motivate duties of public justification in different ways, many appeal to the need for exercises of coercive political authority to respect citizens’ freedom and equality.

5. Democratic Representation

Representation is an essential part of the division of labor of large-scale democracies. In this section, we examine two moral questions concerning representation. First, what sort of representative system is best? Second, by what moral principles are representatives bound?

A number of debates have centered on the question of what kinds of representative systems are best for a democratic society. What choice we make here will depend heavily on our underlying moral justification of democracy, our conception of citizenship as well as on our empirical understanding of political institutions and how they function. The most basic types of formal political representation available are single member district representation, proportional representation and group representation. In addition, many societies have opted for multicameral legislative institutions. In some cases, combinations of the above forms have been tried.

Single member district representation returns single representatives of geographically defined areas containing roughly equal populations to the legislature and is prominent in the United States, the United Kingdom, and India, among other places. The most common form of proportional representation is party list proportional representation. In a simple form of such a scheme, a number of parties compete for election to a legislature that is not divided into geographical districts. Parties acquire seats in the legislature as a proportion of the total number of votes they receive in the voting population as a whole. Group representation occurs when the society is divided into non-geographically defined groups such as ethnic or linguistic groups or even functional groups such as workers, farmers and capitalists and returns representatives to a legislature from each of them.

Many have argued in favor of single member district legislation on the grounds that it has appeared to them to lead to more stable government than other forms of representation. The thought is that proportional representation tends to fragment the citizenry into opposing homogeneous camps that rigidly adhere to their party lines and that are continually vying for control over the government. Since there are many parties and they are unwilling to compromise with each other, governments formed from coalitions of parties tend to fall apart rather quickly. The post war experience of governments in Italy appears to confirm this hypothesis. Single member district representation, in contrast, is said to enhance the stability of governments by virtue of its favoring a two party system of government. Each election cycle then determines which party is to stay in power for some length of time.

Charles Beitz argues that single member district representation encourages moderation in party programs offered for citizens to consider (Beitz 1989: ch. 7). This results from the tendency of this kind of representation towards two party systems. In a two party system with majority rule, it is argued, each party must appeal to the median voter in the political spectrum. Hence, they must moderate their programs to appeal to the median voter. Furthermore, they encourage compromise among groups since they must try to appeal to a lot of other groups in order to become part of one of the two leading parties. These tendencies encourage moderation and compromise in citizens to the extent that political parties, and interest groups, hold these qualities up as necessary to functioning well in a democracy.

In criticism, advocates of proportional and group representation have argued that single member district representation tends to muffle the voices and ignore the interests of minority groups in the society (Mill 1861; Christiano 1996). Minority interests and views tend to be articulated in background negotiations and in ways that muffle their distinctiveness. Furthermore, representatives of minority interests and views often have a difficult time getting elected at all in single member district systems so it has been charged that minority views and interests are often systematically underrepresented. Sometimes these problems are dealt with by redrawing the boundaries of districts in a way that ensures greater minority representation. The efforts are invariably quite controversial since there is considerable disagreement about the criteria for apportionment.

In proportional representation, by contrast, representatives of different groups are seated in the legislature in proportion to citizens’ choices. Minorities need not make their demands conform to the basic dichotomy of views and interests that characterize single member district systems so their views are more articulated and distinctive as well as better represented.

Advocates of group representation, like Iris Marion Young, have argued that some historically disenfranchised groups may still not do very well under proportional representation (Young 1990: ch. 6). They may not be able to organize and articulate their views as easily as other groups. Also, minority groups can still be systematically defeated in the legislature and their interests may be consistently set back even if they do have some representation. For these groups, some have argued that the only way to protect their interests is legally to ensure that they have adequate and even disproportionate representation.

One worry about group representation is that it tends to freeze some aspects of the agenda that might be better left to the choice of citizens. For instance, consider a population that is divided into linguistic groups for a long time. And suppose that only some citizens continue to think of linguistic conflict as important. In the circumstances a group representation scheme may tend to be biased in an arbitrary way that favors the views or interests of those who do think of linguistic conflict as important.

What moral norms apply to representatives carrying out their official duties? We can get a better handle on possible answers by introducing Hannah Pitkin’s famous distinction between trustees and delegates (Pitkin 1967). Representatives who act as trustees rely on their own independent judgments in carrying out their duties. Norms of trusteeship are supported in recognition that, given a natural division of democratic labor, officials are in a much better position to make well-reasoned and well-informed political decisions than ordinary citizens.

Representatives who act as delegates defer to the judgments of their citizens. These norms might be thought to reflect the value of democratic accountability. Because the people authorize representatives to govern, it is natural to think that representatives are accountable to the people to enact their judgments. If representatives are not accountable in this way, citizens lose democratic control over their representatives’ actions.

Which norms should win out when they conflict? Pitkin argues that the answer varies by context. This seems plausible. For example, if we take the view that citizens primarily have the role of determining the aims of the society, we might think that representatives ought to be delegates with regard to the aims, but trustees with regard to the ways of realizing the aims (Christiano 1996). See Suzanne Dovi’s discussion of representation for a deeper and more nuanced discussion of these issues.

Kenneth Arrow’s impossibility theorem is thought by some to provide a major set of difficulties for democratic theory (Arrow 1951). William Riker, Russell Hardin, and others have thought that the impossibility theorem shows that there are deep problems with democratic ideals (Riker 1982; Hardin 1999). Neither of these thinkers are opposed to democracy itself, they both think that there are good instrumental reasons for having democracy.

The basic results of social choice theory are laid out in detail elsewhere in the encyclopedia (List 2013). Here we will simply articulate the basic result and an illustration. The question of Arrowian social choice theory is: how do we determine a social preference for a society overall on the basis of the set of the individual preferences of the members? Arrow shows that a social choice function that satisfies a number of plausible constraints cannot be defined when there are three or more alternatives to be chosen by the group. He lays out a number of conditions to be imposed on a social choice function. Unlimited domain : The social choice function must be able to give us a social preference no matter what the preferences of the individuals over alternatives are. Non dictatorship : the social choice function must not select the preference of one particular member regardless of others’ preferences. Transitivity and completeness : The individual preferences orderings must be transitive and complete orderings and the social preference derived from them must be transitive and complete. Independence of irrelevant alternatives : the social preference between two alternatives must be the result only of the individual orderings between those two alternatives. Pareto condition : if all the members prefer an alternative x over y , then x must be ranked above y in the social preference. The theorem says that no social choice function over more than two alternatives can satisfy all of these conditions.

A useful illustration of this idea involves an extension of majority rule to cases of more than two alternatives. The Condorcet rule says that an alternative x wins when, for every other alternative, a majority prefers x over that alternative. For example, suppose we have three persons A , B and C and three alternatives x , y and z . A prefers x over y , y over z ; B prefers y over z and z over x ; C prefers x over z and z over y . In this case, x is the Condorcet winner since it beats y , and it beats z . The problem with this plausible sounding rule is the case of a majority cycle. Suppose you have three persons A , B and C , and three alternatives, x , y and z . In the case in which A prefers x over y and y over z , while B prefers y over z and z over x , and C prefers z over x and x over y , the Condorcet rule will yield a social preference of x over y , y over z and z over x . One can see here that the Condorcet rule satisfies all the conditions except transitivity of social preference. One way to avoid intransitivity is to restrict the domain of preferences from which the social preference arises. Another is to introduce cardinal information that compares the how much people prefer alternatives (violating independence). Another might be to make one person a dictator. So, this case nicely illustrates that one cannot satisfy all of the constraints simultaneously.

Riker argues that the theorem shows that the idea that the popular will can be the governing element in a society is false. If an existence condition for a popular will is a restricted set of preferences the question naturally arises as to whether such a condition is always or normally met in a moderately complex society. We might wonder whether a highly pluralistic society with a very complex division of labor is likely to satisfy the restricted preference set condition necessary to avoid cycles or other pathologies of social choice. Some have argued that we have empirical evidence to the effect that modern societies do normally satisfy such conditions (Mackie 2003). Others have argued that this seems unlikely (Riker 1982; Ingham 2019). This is not merely a defense of unlimited domain. It is a defense of the thesis that normally the collections of preferences in modern societies are not likely to have the properties that enable them to avoid cycles.

The fairness critique from social choice theory is based on the idea that when a voting process meets requirements of fairness, the fairness of the process and the preferences may not generate determinate outcomes. If cycles are pervasive, the outcomes of democratic processes may be determined by clever strategies and not by the fairness of the procedures (Riker 1982). Three remarks are in order here. First, it is compatible with the process being completely fair that the outcomes of the process are indeterminate. After all, coin flips are fair. Second, there is some question as to how prominent the cycles are. Third, one might think that if the conditions which enable opposing sides to strategize effectively are themselves roughly equal, then the concerns for fairness are fully met. If resources for persuasion and organization are distributed in an egalitarian way, perhaps the fairness account is vindicated after all. This point can be made more compelling when we consider Sean Ingham’s account of political equality. He includes intensity of preference in his account of fairness. This is a departure from the Arrowian approach, but it is in many ways a realistic one. The idea is that majorities have equal control over policy areas when they are able to get what they want with the same amount of intensity of preferences. And equality holds generally when all groups of the same size have the same control (Ingham 2019). There remains an extreme case in which all majorities have equal intensity of preference and are caught in a majority cycle. But the chances of this happening are very slim, even if the chances of majority cycles more generally are not as small. Even if there are a lot of majority cycles, if the issues are resolved in such a way that those majorities that have most at stake in the conflict are the ones that get their way, then we can have fairness in a quite robust sense even while having pervasive majority cycles.

If democratic societies allow members to participate as equals in collective decision making, a natural question arises: who has the right to participate in making collective decisions? We can ask this question within a particular jurisdiction (ought all adults have the right to participation? Ought children have the right to participation? Ought all residents have such rights?). But we can also ask what the extent of the jurisdiction ought to be. How many of the people in the world ought to be included in the collective decision-making? An easy, though slightly misleading, way of asking this question is, what ought the physical boundaries of a particular institution of collective decision-making be? We see partially democratic societies within the confines of the modern nation-state. But we might ask, why should we restrict the set of persons who participate in making decisions of the modern state just to those who happen to be the physical inhabitants of those states? Surely there are many other persons affected by decisions made by democratic states aside from those persons. For example, activities in one society A can pollute another society B . Why shouldn’t the members of B have a say in the decisions regarding the polluting activities in A ? And there can be many other effects that activities in A can have on B .

Some have suggested that the boundaries of a state ought to be determined through a principle of national self-determination. We identify a nation as an ongoing group of persons who share certain cultural, historical and political norms and who identify with each other and with a piece of land. Then we determine the boundaries of the territory by appeal to the size of the group of people and the land they cherish (Miller 1995; Song 2012). This is an appealing idea in many ways: shared nationality breeds a willingness to share the sacrifices that arise from collective decision making; it generates a sense of at-homeness for people. But it is hard to use as a general principle for dividing land among persons when one of the central facts for many societies is that a diversity of nations, ethnic groups and cultures co-mingle on the very same land.

Is there a democratic solution to the boundary problem? A number of ideas have been suggested. The first idea is that the people ought to decide what the boundaries are. But this suggestion, while it may be a pragmatic resolution to the problem, seems to beg the question about who the members are and who are not (Whelan 1983).

A second theoretical solution that has some democratic credentials is to invoke the principle that all who are subjected to decision making, in the sense of who are coerced or have duties imposed upon them, ought to have a say in the decision making (Abizadeh 2008). This principle is plausible enough, but it doesn’t get at enough cases. The pollution case above is not a case of subjection.

A third proposed theoretical solution is the all-affected principle. One formulation is “all affected persons ought to have a say in the decisions that affect them”. This does suggest that when the activities in one state affect those of another state, the people of the other state ought to have a say in those activities. Some have thought that this principle tends to lead to a kind of politically cosmopolitan principle in support of world government (Goodin 2007).

But the all-affected principle is conceptually quite uncertain and morally deeply problematic, and it provides very little, if anything, in the way of a solution to the boundary problem.

First, “having a say” is not clear. Does it require having a vote in collective decision-making? Or is it also satisfied by a person’s being able to modify another’s action by negotiating with them, as we see when there is bargaining over an externality? This latter version would undermine the idea that the all-affected principle has direct implications for the boundary problem. When the United States permits activities that produce acid rain in Canada, Canada can negotiate with the United States to lessen the production of acid rain and/or to compensate Canada for the harm. As long as there is a fair and effective system of negotiation, this would seem to satisfy the all-affected principle without giving Canadians a vote in American politics or Americans a vote in Canadian politics.

Second, it is not clear what “being affected” means. One, does a person being affected just mean that there is a change in the person’s situation or must the effect involve the setting back of one’s preferences, or interests, or legitimate interests, or exercise of one’s capacities or one’s good? Two, are one’s interests affected by a decision only when they are advanced or set back relative to some baseline (either the present state of affairs or some morally defined baseline like what you have promised me), or am I affected by decisions that could be to my advantage or disadvantage but end up making no difference? For example, if I am drowning in a pool and you are deciding whether to save me or go buy yourself a candy bar, am I affected by your buying the candy bar? If I am not affected when no change occurs, then who is affected by a decision often depends on who participates in the decision and we have no solution to the problem of inclusion. If I am affected, then the principle has some quite extraordinary implications. Now it turns out that impoverished persons in South Asia are affected by my buying a candy bar, since I could have sent the money to them (Goodin 2007).

The all-affected principle is a merely suggestive and rhetorically effective phrase. It is a conversation starter and a list of topics to be discussed, not a genuine principle. For example, if I must include everyone possibly affected by my decision for every decision I make, I will not be able to make many decisions and my decision making will no longer enable me to give a shape to my own life and my relations with others. My life becomes fragmented and lacks integrity (Williams 1973). An analog of this problem would arise for political societies, presumably. Each society would have to include a variety of different persons in each decision. It is hard to see how any society could take on any particular character if this is the case.

A more plausible principle that encompasses some of the suggestions of the all-affected principle is that a framework of institutions should be set up so that people have power to advance and protect their legitimate interests in life.

But if we understand the principle in this way, it is not clear that it helps us much with the boundary problem. First of all, there are different ways in which people can be said to possess power over their lives. One kind of power is the power to participate as an equal in a collective decision-making process. Another kind is to be able to advance one’s interests in a decentralized process like a market or a system of agreement making like international law. Recalling our pollution problem above, we could give the state of which they are members power to negotiate with the polluting state terms that are mutually agreeable. Only the power to participate as an equal in collective decision-making involves the boundaries of collective decision-making.

Another solution to the boundary problem is a conservative one. The basic idea is to keep the boundaries of states roughly as they are except if there is a pressing need to change them. Trying to alter the boundaries of political societies is a recipe for serious conflict because there is no institution that has the legitimacy or power actually to resolve problems at an international level and there is likely to be a lot of disagreement on how to do it. States as we know them, are by far the most powerful political entities in the international system. They have developed more effective practices of accountability of power than any other entity in the system. They have created unified societies with highly interdependent populations. Finally, states and the individuals in them can be made accountable to some degree to other individuals and states through the process of negotiation and international law making. The origin of these boundaries may be arbitrary, but it is not, for all that, irrelevant. To be sure, there are clear cases where borders can be changed. One source of pressing need is serious injustice within a country. Another might be the existence of permanent minorities that are sectionally defined. Here, we ask only how to revise boundaries and the basis of such revision is that it is a remedy for serious injustice (Buchanan 1991).

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Deliberative Democracy in Divided Societies

2005, Political Theory

For contemporary democratic theorists, democracy is largely a matter of deliberation. But the recent rise of deliberative democracy (in practice as well as theory) coincided with ever more prominent identity politics, sometimes in murderous form in deeply divided societies. This essay considers how deliberative democracy can process the toughest issues concerning mutually contradictory assertions of identity. After considering the alternative answers provided by agonists and consociational democrats, the author makes the case for a power-sharing state with attenuated sovereignty and a more engaged deliberative politics in a public sphere that is semidetached from the state and situated transnationally.

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Political Theory

John S. Dryzek

Referendums are now common in 'conflict societies' — societies where widespread armed engagement recently occurred, is occurring or is liable to occur. If well designed, a referendum might improve the prospects of achieving a conflict settlement. The referen-dum's relative democratic legitimacy may also help to ensure against subsequent breach, once a settlement is reached. However, in practice the utility of referendums for conflict settlement has been inconsistent. Some past referendums faltered (eg a 'no' vote delayed settlement) as a result of neglect of careful institutional design. In particular, a number of past referendums proceeded as simple majoritarian exercises with little in the way of support for voters' deliberation about issues at stake. By contrast, a handful of authors have described 'Deliberative Referendums' purpose-designed to generate more rational and informed referendum campaigns. Nearly all past work on Deliberative Referendums has focused on peaceful societies. Building on this past work, the present article introduces the term 'Shotgun Referendum' to refer to a Deliberative Referendum held under conditions of ongoing or apprehended violence. The article explains why such a referendum might incrementally improve the prospects for conflict settlement. It proposes the use of deliberative design features — some novel, others well known — and places these within a distinctive frame drawing on constitutional and deliberative theory. The article thus serves as a scoping study of the aspirations and boundaries of Shotgun Referendums. This can offer more careful direction when, as seems inevitable, in future more conflict societies hold referendums.

Robert W. Glover

Democratic theory has “gone global.” Numerous recent works by insightful democratic theorists have sought to understand contemporary trends which propel democracy above and beyond the traditional nation-state paradigm. In addition, these theorists aim to construct a conception of democracy beyond borders towards which the global community ought to strive. In this paper, I focus upon three such articulations: David Held’s conception of federated cosmopolitanism, John Dryzek’s vision of a deliberative global politics, and James Bohman’s recent discussion of a transnational, differentiated democracy across dêmoi. While broadly sympathetic to the aspirations of these thinkers, I fear that their sophisticated treatments harbor over-generalizations and project a fictive ideal of linear transition onto contemporary political developments that are complex, contingent and, for the moment at least, indeterminate. Yet I do not wish to imply that we should dispense with aspirations for modes of democratic claims-making which exceed the nation-state. Instead, I articulate a sketch of an alternative model of global democratic empowerment, rooted in the insights of agonistic pluralism. I argue that this articulation is better-suited than its Held-ian, Dryzek-ian, and Bohman-ian predecessors to engage and endure the undecidability, contingency, and ambiguity found within contemporary world politics.

Sandrine Baume

Journal of Social Philosophy

Margaret Moore

Ian O'Flynn

There are many reasons why democracy is difficult in societies deeply divided along ethnic lines. But of those reasons, one of the most troubling is outbidding—ethnic divisions tend to produce ethnic parties each of which seeks to portray itself as the true defender of the group while at the same time portraying its rivals as weak or as selling out. Claim and counter-claim result in an 'ethnic auction' that leads even moderate parties to adopt an increasingly hard-line stance, which in turn makes compromise across ethnic lines all the harder to secure. What generally goes unnoticed, however, is that outbidding can occur only if voters generally like their politics as hard-line or uncompromising as possible (e.g., because they think that other groups will be more fearful of them) or if they are so fearful of what other groups might do to them that ethnic parties can easily play upon their insecurities (e.g., because they are in a minority and feel that they might be overrun). Neither assumption must inevitably hold. But if either does hold, the prospects for democracy may be severely diminished.

rcgd.isr.umich.edu

Patterns of Adjustment Associated with Academic Competence and Depressive Symptoms in Adolescence Kathleen M. Jodl Kai Schnabel Jacquelynne S. Eccles University of Michigan DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF AUTHORS Presented at the biennial meeting of ...

In recent years a growing number of democratic theorists have proposed ways to increase citizen engagement, while channeling those democratic energies in positive directions and away from systematic marginalization, exclusion, and intolerance. One novel answer is provided by a strain of democratic theory known as agonistic pluralism, which valorizes adversarial engagement and recognizes the marginalizing tendencies implicit in drives to consensus and stability. However, the divergences between competing variants of agonistic pluralism remain largely under-developed or unrecognized. In this piece, I address this shortcoming, examining these strains of agonism around the constraints placed upon democratic discourse. I argue that the ‘associative agonism’ of theorists such as Bonnie Honig and William Connolly offers the best means for cultivating virtues necessary to revitalize a contentious democratic politics which also fosters receptivity to pluralism and difference.

The Review of Politics

George Vasilev

Consensus both serves and threatens democratic inclusion. On the one hand it provides the means for individuals to will in common. On the other hand, it can impose assimilatory pressures that marginalize perspectives at odds with the prevailing point of view. Agonists have responded to this tension with a call to abandon consensus-oriented politics, contending an adversarial democracy more credibly advances inclusionary and egalitarian goals. I argue this wholesale rejection of consensus is unsustainable from the very pluralist perspective agonists wish to promote. In place of the view of consensus as an unattainable and undesirable absolute, I put forward an understanding of it as a matter of degree. I contend this understanding better captures the complexity of human relations and allows us to distinguish the potential accomplishments of consensus from its potential hazards.

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A Critique on Deliberative Democracy Essay (Critical Writing)

Deliberative democracy, problems with the ideal.

The belief that the United States of America is a democratic country automatically create the assumption that it is a government by the people, for the people, and of the people as laid down by Abraham Lincoln (Brien, 71). Nevertheless, it is a grave mistake to believe that this happens automatically after conducting free and honest elections. It will be revealed later that even if the majority has voted this does not mean that democracy has prevailed. The ideal form of democracy according to Brien is one where deliberative democracy is at work, a form of democracy where citizens engage in public deliberations so that only laws that can benefit the community will be ratified and not the self-interest of a particular group. The only problem is that America does not really practice deliberative democracy and it can even be argued that a small number of people are pulling the strings that in turn control the minds of the public. The best way to counter this is to promote deliberative democracy but the challenge is how to encourage people to participate in this manner and not rely on what spin-doctors and pressure groups tell them what to do.

One of the theorists who contributed much to the construction of deliberative democracy is Adam Smith who coined the phrase “invisible hand” – it is the belief that individuals acting on their own self-interest and acts rationally at the same will create a spontaneous ordering of society, the result of which is better than those engineered by laws, policies, regulations, decisions of individuals or governments (Brien, 78). Adam Smith’s idea provided a contrast allowing for a clear understanding of what deliberative democracy should be. In other words deliberative democracy must run counter to what Smith proposed, that people simply make judgments based on their self-interest alone and that is the locomotive that drives a democracy forward.

In order to encourage people’s participation in political decision, the government has to educate the people and make them realise that they are important in the democratic process. The most important goal of the whole process is to contribute in the creation of a solution such as a bill or law that can help protect their self-interest. This can be achieved by making it convenient for them to communicate their needs and aspirations. They have to access to the mechanisms that comprise the process of deliberative democracy. In the short term the government can help provide “e-political continuum” and in the long term the general public must be educated to be able to think independently. It would also be helpful to establish moral institutions that will help create limits on the power of political leaders, especially those who are abusive and prone to be a dictator.

In the social rationality theory, Brien suggested that one of the advantages of the deliberative approach is to attract citizens to participate in political events and provide them the opportunity to make rational decisions through social discussion. In this way, the deliberative process, marked by true discussion involving everyone, would make more opportunities for people to express their thoughts regarding a political issue. Rationality would be helpful to negotiate the reality and relevance of each issue. Rationality would also help the participants to weigh each idea in order to come up with the most reasonable solution to the problems in their community and society.

It must also be pointed out that it is not enough to stage a public deliberation of issues, those who will go up on stage to make their views known must make sure that they are “embedded in a web of social relationships” in other words those who will participate must genuinely love their community, known by the members of the said group (Brien, 79). The author made an emphatic statement regarding the qualifications of those who will engage in deliberations and he wrote, “Embeddedness underlies rational action; and the rationality of each citizen is then a product of that citizen’s embeddedness in the civic culture” (Brien, 80). This leads to the idea that if the individual is embedded in a particular culture then he can counter human nature which easily gravitates towards self-interest. In other words the author is saying that this is the only way that a citizen can make self-sacrifice in order to make deliberative democracy effective.

In order for deliberative democracy to work it must have sound fundamentals. It must first rest on ideal democracy and one of the major requirements is that the citizens alone can shape or establish a government that they desire to govern them. This is in response to an elitist form of government wherein the process of selection is limited to a “people drawn from a restricted group” (Brien, 73). But in a real-life situation, this principle is difficult to apply. It can also be argued that although there is universal suffrage in highly-industrialized countries like the U.S. the ability of the average citizen to occupy high places in government is easier said than done. It can even be said that an ordinary American may find it impossible to be elected as a senator or President of the United States unless he or she has some certain qualification, of which the average citizen could not achieve in this lifetime. For instance, membership to the dominant party, the Democratic or Republican Party entails certain requirements. This is only the beginning if a citizen would like to engage others in the highest levels of government, he or she cannot easily earn a seat in the Senate or the U.S. Congress.

It will not require an astute political analyst to realize that those who are included in the roster of Senators and those who are nominated as the standard-bearer in the next presidential elections is someone who is either rich or a graduate of some prestigious university. Is this not elitism or another variation of elitism? It is hard to refute the claim that as a democratic country progresses, then so too is the electoral process. Looking at the qualifications needed to be considered as the next presidential candidate makes one realize that many are barred from entry. Thus, inadvertently the system has taken life of its own and has created a sub-system that allows the elite members of society to rule. This is a problematic aspect of American democracy that an adherent of deliberative democracy has to address first in order to move to the next level.

This leads to another pathway in this discussion, which is the idea that universal suffrage could be limited by distance. In other words, the ideal of democracy can work in the confines of a community where the members know each other and knows the candidates so well that they can have an informed consent. However, if the distance covered is so great, e.g. U.S. presidential elections universal suffrage is not enough, there is a need to trust a dominant political party to help the people make the decision. The Republican and Democratic Party of the U.S. can now be considered as the backbone of a new form of elitism. This new form of elitism is strengthened by the fact that the U.S. Congress, if controlled by a major political party can also ensure that the directives of the incumbent president – who also happens to be from the same party – can push through unimpeded.

The examples given are the establishment of congress that will check on the power of the president and an independent legal and court system that can settle disputes in a fair manner. Aside from that there is also the need for programs that help educate people as well as engender in them civic pride. All of these will helpfully produce citizens that will defend and honor the ideals of deliberative democracy (Brien, 88). It is easy to understand the ideals of democracy, especially those that can help establish a higher form of democracy. The only problem is that the author forgot to address two issues related to his thesis. First of all the creation of a parliament or congress does not automatically create a system where impartiality is observed. Secondly, the author failed to address the impact of having two dominant political parties that can easily control the destiny of America. Their size and influence is not the major concern here but the realization that the ability to rise to the upper echelons of power within these two parties is reserved only to a few. Finally, the author failed to focus on the impact of power hungry politicians who will prevent deliberative democracy from taking place in this country. They can be a powerful force that could easily frustrate ideal democracy from operating.

In my view, deliberate democracy is such a good idea because it provides an impartial environment where people are free to vote. They can share their views and each opinion is of equal value to others. Deliberative democracy can prevent the elitists from abusing their power by allowing the people to scrutinise their actions. Moreover, a careful study of deliberative democracy will allow us to see the necessity and close connection between democracy and rationality. It is understood as a “coherent pattern of life that is appropriate to a person, as a person, in specific circumstances” (Brien, 92). Social rationality confirms the effects of deliberative approach by providing more information, knowledge, and understanding based mainly on public participation. Finally, yet importantly, deliberate democracy creates the correct standard for decision-making based on social rationality. In this way, the public is well informed about the different facets of a particular political issue or government policy. The author, Brien himself, asserted that the relationship between two of the key elements: democracy and rationality is valid and crucially tenable because it would develop a non-corporatist and non-elitist society.

The belief that the United States is a democratic country, automatically generate the assumption that it is indeed a nation created by the governed. If citizens of this country will remain ignorant to the flaws of democracy then pressure groups and unscrupulous individuals will continue to manipulate the masses. The solutions listed by the author are only good on paper. Something has to be done to make it applicable to real-life settings. A close inspection of the discussion will reveal that one of the best ways to solve the specter of elitism in this country is to provide decent education to all citizens and train them to think independently. This does not guarantee success but it is a good starting point.

Brien, A. (n.d.). Rationality and Democracy. From Philosophy in a Democratic Society .

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IvyPanda. (2021, November 13). A Critique on Deliberative Democracy. https://ivypanda.com/essays/a-critique-on-deliberative-democracy/

"A Critique on Deliberative Democracy." IvyPanda , 13 Nov. 2021, ivypanda.com/essays/a-critique-on-deliberative-democracy/.

IvyPanda . (2021) 'A Critique on Deliberative Democracy'. 13 November.

IvyPanda . 2021. "A Critique on Deliberative Democracy." November 13, 2021. https://ivypanda.com/essays/a-critique-on-deliberative-democracy/.

1. IvyPanda . "A Critique on Deliberative Democracy." November 13, 2021. https://ivypanda.com/essays/a-critique-on-deliberative-democracy/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "A Critique on Deliberative Democracy." November 13, 2021. https://ivypanda.com/essays/a-critique-on-deliberative-democracy/.

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• Democratic Deficit in the European Union
• Elitism vs. Egalitarianism
• The Role of Political Communication in Society
• Types of Democracy Known to Modern Society
• Constitutionalism and Federalism in State Politics
• American Government Structure
• Barack Obama and Joe Biden Committing to Domestic Reform
• How Popular Is the Congress Among the Population?
• The Incumbency Advantage in Congressional Elections

Stanford University

Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law is housed in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies

Introducing Our 2024-25 CDDRL Honors Students

• Nora Sulots

The Fisher Family Honors Program in Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (DDRL) at CDDRL provides undergraduates from different majors and schools at Stanford the opportunity to write an honors thesis in a cohort based on a shared interest in democracy, development, and rule of law. Honors students graduate in their majors but receive honors in DDRL.

Our Honors Program aims to encourage participating undergraduates to carry out original, policy-relevant research on democracy, development, or the rule of law and produce a coherent, eloquently argued, and well-written honors thesis.

We are thrilled to welcome fourteen outstanding students to the class of 2024-25 who represent fourteen different majors and minors and hail from eight different states and two countries around the world.

Meet the Students

Seamus allen.

Major: Public Policy Hometown:  Carnation, Washington Thesis Advisor:  James Fishkin

Tentative Thesis Title:   Force of the Better Argument: Mechanisms of Persuasion in Deliberative Polling

Why is this topic important to the field of democracy, development, and the rule of law?  Democracy’s radically egalitarian promise is that the people shall rule themselves. Around the world, this commitment is being challenged. Populism is rising, authoritarians are on the march, and trust in government is falling. Recent experiments in deliberation offer a uniquely strong response to the charge of democratic inadequacy—under the right conditions, ordinary citizens are more than capable of coming to an informed consensus on even the toughest and most technical issues. Yet, we still do not fully understand why Deliberative Polling works as well as it does—is it the social pressure to think deeply about the issues, the exposure to people who are different, or is it the force of the better argument persuading deliberators? My research will dive into the transcripts from a Deliberative Poll to determine how persuasion takes place—potentially further legitimizing their use and providing a greater understanding of how to set up deliberative institutions for success. 

What attracted you to the CDDRL undergraduate honors program?  I'm thrilled by the prospect of diving deep into not just my research question but the research questions of the other students. I can't wait to meet and work with peers and faculty who are just as excited about these issues as I am.

What are your summer research plans?  I've applied for the VPUE Major Grant to allow me to spend the summer working to build my dataset, which involves using AI tools developed to search through discovery documents for litigation to categorize all the arguments each participant made in a deliberative poll.

Future aspirations post-Stanford:  I could see a lot of paths forward from here. Heading to law school, working as a legislative aide, running for local office, and fleeing from modernity to a cabin in the wilderness are all ideas I'm currently considering.

A fun fact about yourself:  I design games. If you're a nerd like me and you like the sound of fighting giant monsters, check out Trail of the Behemoth on DriveThruRPG!

Alex Borthwick

Major: International Relations Minor:  Human Rights & Arabic Hometown:   San Diego, California Thesis Advisor: Lisa Blaydes 

Tentative Thesis Title: Historical Memory of the Lebanese Civil War in the City of Beirut

Why is this topic important to the field of democracy, development, and the rule of law?  Lebanon is an interesting case study because, post-civil war, while a lot of development has taken place in the process of recovery, the country still struggles deeply with democratic governance and the rule of law. Post-conflict historical memory is considered to be crucial to national reconciliation, social cohesion, trust-building, and accountability; I am interested in how the issues plaguing Lebanon’s democracy and sustainable development today, including sectarianism and social divisions, relate to or are impacted by the lack of an official process of historical memory after the war. 

What attracted you to the CDDRL undergraduate honors program?  I was drawn to the CDDRL honors program because of its collaborative environment, faculty, and the chance to be part of and learn from a cohort. I’m excited to undertake a project that will challenge me to develop and carry out a long-term project beyond the scope of traditional research papers for class and to have the opportunity to carry out original research.

What are your summer research plans?  I plan to look into the vast online archives of work carried out by non-governmental organizations in Lebanon to document and commemorate the events of the civil war and compare such memorialization to the actions taken by official actors within the state. Pending local safety, I am considering traveling to Beirut to study the physical manifestations of the war and the memory of it on the city’s urban landscape. 

Future aspirations post-Stanford:  I plan to take a year or two off to study or research abroad and then go to law school. I'm hoping to go into international/human rights law, potentially focusing on international tribunals, but we'll see! I'm interested in post-conflict studies, transitional justice, and migration. 

A fun fact about yourself:  I used to competitively Irish Dance

Elizabeth Evers

Major: Human Biology Minor: Human Rights Hometown:  San Francisco, California Thesis Advisor:  Eunice Rodriguez

Tentative Thesis Title:  Temporary Guestworker Programs and Circular Migration: A Comparative Analysis of the US H-2A Visa and Spanish GECCO Program

Why is this topic important to the field of democracy, development, and the rule of law?  This research would compare the U.S.' H-2A visa program and Spain's GECCO program to evaluate their respective systems of governance, specifically how they manage "irregular" migration and protect workers' rights. By analyzing their legal frameworks, decision-making processes, and enforcement mechanisms, the project may offer insights into how these programs — which utilize circular migration pathways — impact migration patterns in practice, labor markets, and development. I hope that this may be relevant for policymakers working on meaningful immigration reform.  

What attracted you to the CDDRL undergraduate honors program?  CDDRL offers an interdisciplinary environment that aligns with my academic background and interests in evaluating how political systems influence health, particularly in the context of immigration policy and global development. I am excited about the opportunities for mentorship, community, and learning from peers.

What are your summer research plans?  This summer, I will be interning at the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (ASPE) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in Washington, D.C. I plan to design my CDDRL project during the spring quarter so that I can begin undertaking research this summer. 

Future aspirations post-Stanford:  After Stanford, I intend to pursue graduate studies related to public policy, law, and/or public health (maybe an MPH, MPP, or JD, not sure yet!). I hope to pursue a career focused on improving the US healthcare system and shaping more effective policies for the provision of health, human, and social services. 

A fun fact about yourself:  I am a sixth-generation San Franciscan!

Adrian Feinberg

Major: International Relations Hometown:  Berkeley, California Thesis Advisor:  Kathryn Stoner

Tentative Thesis Title:   Atrocity Denial and State Formation in the Balkans

Why is this topic important to the field of democracy, development, and the rule of law?  Understanding political development in post-conflict contexts requires grappling with state violence and collective memory. 

What attracted you to the CDDRL undergraduate honors program?  The honors program is a wonderful opportunity to test out my maybe ill-advised aspirations in academia.

What are your summer research plans?  Brushing up on my Turkish and Bosnian!

Future aspirations post-Stanford:  Maybe a PhD? Maybe international law? Maybe writing? Suggestions welcome.

A fun fact about yourself:  I put pomegranate molasses in 90% of the dishes I cook.

Grace Geier

Major:  Sociology Minor:  Neuroscience Hometown:  Shaker Heights, Ohio Thesis Advisor:  Adam Bonica

Tentative Thesis Title:  The American Defense Sector and Disaster Capitalism Complex

Why is this topic important to the field of democracy, development, and the rule of law?  I plan to research defense spending as a facet of democratic interference. I’ll look into the strategies utilized by defense contractors to entrench their business model in government institutions. This exploration will underscore how profits in the defense sector are fundamentally intertwined with its outsized political activity. For one, my research seeks to explain the extreme capture of regulatory outcomes pioneered by the defense sector through their persistent engagement in political organization. It will also cover how funding and favorable legislation is secured through “revolving door” hiring practices between Congress, the Pentagon, and private defense companies. This falls under a broader investigation of shared pools of employment and the elite skew of government priorities, especially military spending. Overall, my thesis aims to interrogate the American military-industrial complex.

What attracted you to the CDDRL undergraduate honors program?  I appreciate the opportunity to analyze developmental policies in a collaborative environment while receiving support to conduct individual research. I also plan to take a more international perspective with my thesis than was typically afforded by my undergraduate programming.

What are your summer research plans?  I plan to work on OpenSecrets' Revolving Door and Dark Money projects, as well as contribute to their Defense Industry Political Influence Dataset. Among many objectives, the projects help the public identify key players in the Washington lobbying sector, and reveal how governmental ties provide them with privileged access to power.

Future aspirations post-Stanford:  After completing my master's in Sustainability, I'd like to continue my education with law school and work in international climate litigation.

A fun fact about yourself:  I had the same high school band teacher as Kid Cudi and MGK.

Gabriela Holzer

Major: Economics Minor: Human Rights Hometown:  Hyattsville, Maryland Thesis Advisor:  Beatriz Magaloni

Tentative Thesis Title: Rightward Attitudinal Shifts in Post-Dictatorship Democracies: A Chilean Case Study

Why is this topic important to the field of democracy, development, and the rule of law?  In recent years, there has been a notable global trend towards embracing more conservative political ideologies. In Chile, this is reflected in a rise in public support for the police — which seems counterintuitive given the context of the recent 50th anniversary of the coup that ushered in a violent 17-year-long dictatorship. My study aims to investigate the underlying mechanisms driving this surge in support for the police in Chile, especially amidst heightened awareness of the violence perpetrated by similar authorities during the Pinochet regime. By unraveling this phenomenon, I hope to illuminate the interplay between public memory, security concerns, and political attitudinal shifts in a post-dictatorship context. The broader relevance of this study lies in its potential to contribute to our understanding of how societies grapple simultaneously with the legacies of authoritarian rule and the growing pains accompanying democratization. 

What attracted you to the CDDRL undergraduate honors program?  I was excited by the opportunity to dedicate an entire year to exploring a question in depth, which is often challenging within the confines of a 10-week quarter. The program also seemed like a unique way to engage with a range of subjects that I may not encounter quite as closely through my classes, both through conversations with my peers and through engagement with the CDDRL's exceptional faculty.

What are your summer research plans?  I plan to acquire the longitudinal survey data that I need for the more quantitative side of my analysis. I'm also exploring the possibility of conducting interviews in Chile for the qualitative aspect later in the summer. 

Future aspirations post-Stanford:  Following Stanford, my long-term goal is to pursue public interest law. However, I plan on taking a few years between graduating and starting law school to pursue a Master's in Economics or another closely related field. 

A fun fact about yourself:  I did musical theatre for ten years and was in three different productions of "Annie."

Elizabeth Jerstad

Major: International Relations Minor: Slavic Languages & Literature Hometown:  Sioux Falls, South Dakota Thesis Advisor:  Kathryn Stoner

Tentative Thesis Title:   Wartime Emigration from Russia Since February 24, 2022: Political Engagement of Émigrés Abroad

Why is this topic important to the field of democracy, development, and the rule of law?  The wartime flight from Russia is the latest in a series of emigration waves from the country since the turn of the 21st century. However, wartime émigrés differ in key ways from previous waves of emigrants. Broadly speaking, wartime émigrés are younger and more prosperous than the average Russian citizen, have higher levels of education, and are driven more so by political push factors than members of previous waves (Emil Kamalov and Ivetta Sergeeva, A Year and a Half in Exile: Progress and Obstacles in the Integration of Russian Migrants , (January 15, 2024): 12.). Many of the recent émigrés were engaged in political activism against the regime before emigrating, working as journalists, NGO employees, activists, and dissidents of the regime at large (Emil Kamalov, “New Russian Migrants Against the War: Political Action in Russia and Abroad,” Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Russia Programme: The Russia Crisis, Paper No. 5 (June 2023): 5). The political implications of this wartime flight-both on Russia and receiving communities abroad-are not yet well understood, and thus I believe this research topic to be a prudent one given the political moment in the region.

What attracted you to the CDDRL undergraduate honors program?  Last summer, I interned doing research at CDDRL and the faculty and staff drew my attention to applying for the program. Ultimately, I felt that CDDRL honors would be a great way to continue my research on wartime emigration from Russia in a more structured environment while receiving guidance and support from the lovely faculty at CDDRL. In addition to my academic motivations for applying, I love the CDDRL community and am excited to support and contribute to the center's mission in any way that I can! 

What are your summer research plans?  This summer I will be in Tbilisi, Georgia doing an immersive Russian language program through the State Department's CLS (Critical Language Scholarship) program. 

Future aspirations post-Stanford:  After completing my undergraduate studies, I hope to apply to law school. I am also interested in continuing my current research projects after graduation, and am looking into avenues through which to do so. 

A fun fact about yourself:  I have recently gotten into rock climbing, and I'm hoping to do some outdoor bouldering while in Tbilisi this summer!

Malaina Kapoor

Major: International Relations Hometown:  Redwood City, California  Thesis Advisor:  Abbas Milani 

Tentative Thesis Title:  From Kashf-e-Hijab to the Islamic Republic: Veiling, Unveiling, and State Power in Iran

Why is this topic important to the field of democracy, development, and the rule of law  I plan to explore why Iranian leaders enact gendered policies targeted at women, and how they believe these policies will help them achieve their ideological and political goals. I also plan to study the coercive effect of veiling laws on both men and women to understand the link between these policies and subsequent societal transformations. Findings from this research could help explain why the oppression of women is a feature of so many regimes, both in the present day and throughout history. In regards to modern-day Iran, this thesis could illuminate the strategies that the Islamic Republic is using to maintain control as its legitimacy is being threatened, both at home and abroad. This research could also be globally relevant at a time where the veil is used as a political tool by groups like the Taliban in Afghanistan, but also by far-right politicians in countries such as France. It could also be useful in understanding how recent rollbacks of women’s rights in countries like the United States are being used in pursuit of political power.

What attracted you to the CDDRL undergraduate honors program?  I was drawn to the CDDRL honors program for the chance to conduct interdisciplinary research and learn from students with a variety of interests, areas of expertise, and research questions. I also have two friends who have done the program and loved it! 

What are your summer research plans?  I plan to spend the summer reviewing literature, studying primary sources (including archives here at Stanford), and conducting interviews. 

Future aspirations post-Stanford:  I participated in the Stanford in Washington program last fall and loved exploring the city, working in government, and learning from incredible mentors. I'd love to go back to D.C. after graduation and work at the intersection of foreign policy and women's rights. 

A fun fact about yourself:  I have been a competitive opera singer for twelve years!

Adelaide Madary

Major: Political Science Minor: Modern Languages & Data Science Hometown:  Lodi, California Thesis Advisor:  Anna Grzymala-Busse 

Tentative Thesis Title: Combating Agricultural Labor Exploitation among Migrant Workers in Italy and California

Why is this topic important to the field of democracy, development, and the rule of law?  A combination of irregular legal status and economic need makes many migrants vulnerable to labor trafficking and exploitation. In Italy, labor exploitation among migrants, referred to as “caporalato,” heavily plagues the agricultural sector. Unsafe working conditions, wage theft, and intimidation tactics are also widespread in California’s agricultural sector. In an effort to understand the conditions under which exploited workers manage to collectively organize, I aim to compare labor unionization among agricultural workers in both places. I strive to understand how overlooked workers, often undocumented, can become active participants in political change, resist oppressive power structures and advocate for the rule of law. 

What attracted you to the CDDRL undergraduate honors program?  As a Political Science major at Stanford, I have often felt a tension between my desire to pursue academics and my desire to bring about tangible change in the world. The CDDRL Honors Program appealed to me as an opportunity to connect academic research with policy implications for pressing world problems. I am excited to explore the potential for social science research to dismantle unjust systems of oppression and protect the most vulnerable people in society while learning alongside an outstanding cohort of students and mentors. 

What are your summer research plans?  This summer, I plan to conduct research for my thesis in Italy and California, where I will interview labor union leaders, lawyers, and nonprofits and closely analyze labor statistics. 

Future aspirations post-Stanford:  After Stanford, I would like to attend graduate school, continue to learn languages, and participate in public service projects. 

A fun fact about yourself:  I ran my first half marathon in Rome while studying abroad in Florence this past winter!

Josh Orszag

Major: Data Science Hometown:  Washington, D.C. Thesis Advisor:  Larry Diamond

Tentative Thesis Title:   The Impact of Prospective NATO Membership on Democratic Quality in Aspiring Nations

Why is this topic important to the field of democracy, development, and the rule of law?  The world has been in a democratic recession for nearly twenty years, so it feels particularly imperative to explore the factors that can make democracies stronger. Whether the prospect of a security agreement is one such factor is a relevant and intriguing question. My research seeks to answer this question in part by investigating the impact of the prospect of NATO membership on democratic quality in Bulgaria and Romania. These countries acquired NATO membership before EU membership and therefore will serve as compelling case studies. This research could demonstrate the degree to which security alliances compel aspiring nations to further institutionalize their democracies. My hope is that this, in turn, provides insight into potential new avenues of democracy promotion. 

What attracted you to the CDDRL undergraduate honors program?  I was intrigued by the program because it offered the chance to conduct research I am passionate about in a supportive environment with such incredible faculty and students. I’m very excited to collaborate with and learn from the rest of the cohort.

What are your summer research plans?  My plan is to travel to Bulgaria and Romania to conduct interviews with officials about the process by which their nations prepared themselves for NATO membership. 

Future aspirations post-Stanford:  I’d like to find ways to combine my interest in data science with my interest in strengthening democracy and democratic norms.

A fun fact about yourself:  My main form of exercise is boxing!

Major:  International Relations Hometown:  New York City Thesis Advisor:  Michael Bennon 

Tentative Thesis Title:   Words and Actions: China in the Post-BRI World

Why is this topic important to the field of democracy, development, and the rule of law?  China’s Belt and Road Initiative is one of the most ambitious and controversial infrastructure programs ever created. A central question among China scholars worldwide is what Beijing’s motivations are for such an expensive (and expansive) program. Now, China has launched a separate Global Development Initiative in conjunction with a Global Security Initiative. Though very similar in function, the GDI emphasizes some of what was lacking in the BRI’s narrative: a greater focus on the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and encouragement of multilateralism instead of bilateralism. Are these changes substantial or superficial, and what do they reveal about Beijing’s priorities moving forward?

What attracted you to the CDDRL undergraduate honors program?  I knew I wanted to write a thesis early in my time at Stanford. As I learned more about it ˆ and after taking INTNLREL 114D with Professor Kathryn Stoner in freshman year — CDDRL seemed like the perfect place in which to do so. The collaborative and interdisciplinary nature of the program, along with its incredible resources and faculty expertise, was very appealing to me. I have been interested in the BRI since learning about it during a high school summer in China, and I am excited to have the opportunity to delve so deeply into this topic. The lovely conversations that I have had with CDDRL faculty and students have only strengthened my excitement.

What are your summer research plans?  After finishing my summer internship in August, I plan to explore several datasets that I have found, finalize which lenses of comparison I will focus on, and read a great deal of literature on my topic. Since the GDI is so new, there is a flow of new analyses being published, and I look forward to seeing what additional information comes to light before September.

Future aspirations post-Stanford:  I hope to work at the intersection of foreign policy and international business. I am interested in how policy change, both directly related to and unrelated to trade, impacts global markets and how this trickles down to individuals around the world. After a few years of working, I also plan to consider graduate school — perhaps a joint MIP/MBA or something similar.

A fun fact about yourself:  I have dual citizenship in Italy and the US. I can also type 124 words per minute, which will hopefully serve me well in the next year.

Charles Sheiner

Major: International Relations Hometown:  Toronto, Canada Thesis Advisor:  Jean Oi

Tentative Thesis Title:  Exploring Stakeholder Decision-Making and Incentive Dynamics in Chinese Development Projects

Why is this topic important to the field of democracy, development, and the rule of law?  The Chinese government has committed over $1 trillion to fund infrastructure and mining projects abroad, with varied levels of success. While extensive research has explored the motivations of government actors and impacts on recipient countries, this paper seeks to contribute to the literature by investigating micro-level decision-making among stakeholders in both the lending (China) and recipient nations. It aims to assess how these decisions influence project outcomes and broader development indicators in recipient countries. By understanding these micro-level dynamics, the paper intends to shed light on the efficacy of China's development initiatives and inform aid policy within multilateral lending organizations.

What attracted you to the CDDRL undergraduate honors program?  I was attracted to the CDDRL program for its emphasis on academic breadth and experiential rigor. Academically, I was excited to leverage my previous research on China in the field of development studies while learning from incredible professors. On the experiential side, I was excited to get close to a cohort of like-minded students through DDRL coursework and a Washington, D.C. trip in September. 

What are your summer research plans?  I will be working for Ergo Intelligence, a geopolitical intelligence and advisory firm based in New York City. In my free time, I will begin analyzing Chinese development finance datasets for preliminary trends. 

Future aspirations post-Stanford:  After graduation, I hope to 1) pursue a graduate degree in international policy and/or law and 2) work at a think tank or geopolitical research firm, with the eventual possibility of joining the Canadian government. Climate tech is another passion of mine, so I will always remain open to joining a startup too. 

A fun fact about yourself:  People always think being from Canada is a fun fact... but I'll say that I'm ambidextrous.

Avinash Thakkar

Major: Economics and Philosophy Minor:  Mathematical and Computational Science Hometown:  Baltimore, Maryland Thesis Advisor:  Colleen Honigsberg 

Tentative Thesis Title:   Post-NSMIA: An Analysis of SEC Regulatory Enforcement and Priorities after 1996

Why is this topic important to the field of democracy, development, and the rule of law?  Integrity and trust are bedrock principles for political and economic systems. In the U.S., the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) aims to safeguard these values within the financial system. Since its inception in 1934, it has been led by its core mission to protect the interests of investors. With the passage of the National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) in 1996, the SEC began to consider not just 1) investor protection but also 2) market efficiency and 3) capital formation during its rule-making process.

I aim to assess how the SEC’s regulatory approach changed with the passage of this law and the extent to which recent developments within the financial system — such as the inversion of the allocation between public and private capital—can be attributed to any such regulatory change. Answering these questions can help us understand the long-term impact of certain regulations on the financial system and the government’s ability to effectively create and enforce securities laws.

What attracted you to the CDDRL undergraduate honors program?  CDDRL’s interdisciplinary approach to research is particularly appealing to me as I aim to consider the economic, political, and legal consequences of regulatory changes. Scholars at the Center who specialize in many fields and have policy experience will be excellent sources of guidance and support. I hope to approach my research in both a quantitative and qualitative manner, and CDDRL’s ability to bridge these two methods will be quite helpful. I can’t wait to start my research!

What are your summer research plans?  While staying in D.C., I hope to further my knowledge of the history and nuances of SEC regulations through guided reading and interviews. I would also like to formalize any experimental parts of my thesis during the summer.

Future aspirations post-Stanford:  I aspire to contribute to making government work better by helping craft and enforce policies that more effectively safeguard public interest. To that end, I’d like to pursue a legal education and ultimately practice within government.

A fun fact about yourself:  An avid gardener, I’ve grown more than roughly 100 varieties of fruits and vegetables in my home garden, and I’m always on the lookout for more opportunities to learn gardening chops!

Major: Political Science Hometown:  Sacramento, California Thesis Advisor:  Condoleezza Rice and Stephen Kotkin

Tentative Thesis Title:   The Sahelian Coup Belt: Authoritarian Capture and Serial State Failure

Why is this topic important to the field of democracy, development, and the rule of law?  The West African Sahel is a case study in serial state failure and the rapid penetration of militarized, autocratic regimes in an already destabilized landscape. This region is facing the most persistent and looming threat of region-wide serial state failure anywhere in the world and has witnessed eight coups across six nations in only three years. The existence of a coup-belt is a largely unprecedented phenomenon in modern development studies and urgently requires greater research on institutional precepts, the cause of serial military coups, and the role of the state in either mitigating or exacerbating regional instability.

What attracted you to the CDDRL undergraduate honors program?  CDDRL’s honors program is the best forum to investigate authoritarian coups, serial state failure, and nascent attempts at democracy with the support of world-class faculty. I greatly appreciate the interdisciplinary and collaborative nature of the honors cohort and am excited to embark on a sustained and rigorous original research project. 

What are your summer research plans?  This summer, I hope to conduct field research in Guinea and Burkina Faso alongside a UN Fact-Finding mission on unconstitutional changes of governance. I will also begin to aggregate World Bank and Afrobarometer data on civilian perceptions of democracy, state resilience, and violent extremism in the Sahel. 

Future aspirations post-Stanford:  After my undergraduate studies, I hope to pursue a Master's degree in International relations with a concentration on theories of state failure, international policy, and great power competition. I also intend to complete a J.D. program with a focus on national security law. I ultimately hope to serve in the federal government within the diplomatic, defense, or intelligence agencies. 

A fun fact about yourself:  I type at 120 words per minute!