cuban missile crisis extended essay

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Extended Essay - The Role of a UN-Secretary General to Achieve World Peace: The Endeavor of U Thant in Handling the Cuban Missile Crisis

Candidate Number: 006048004

Topic: The Role of a UN Secretary-General to Achieve World Peace: The Endeavour of U Thant in handling the Cuban Missile Crisis

Question: To what extent did U Thant play a vital role as Secretary-General of the United Nations, maintaining his neutral position, in keeping the peace and preventing a Nuclear Warfare by Disentangling the US-Soviet Conflict in the Caribbean Area in 1962?

Name: Zwe Kyaw Zwa

Candidate Number: 006048-004

Centre Number: 6048

Subject: History

Extended Essay Supervisor: Ms. Sandar Chen Date: 16/9/2012

Word Count: 3975

Abstract: 280

        This extended essay examines the question: To what extent did U Thant play a vital role as Secretary-General of the United Nations, maintaining his neutral position, in keeping the peace and preventing a nuclear warfare by disentangling the US-Soviet Conflict in the Caribbean area in 1962? My thesis examines the historical investigation of the US naval quarantine of the Soviet shipment of nuclear warheads to Cuba, the confrontational conversations between the conflicting governments and U Thant’s unbiased negotiation for compromised solution for world peace. Along with the withdrawal of the Soviet warships and bombers, and the disassembling of nuclear weapons in Cuba, the crisis ends with US’s pledge of not invading Cuba.

        The scope of the essay is restricted only to the negotiations between the state leaders of the conflicting nations, John F. Kennedy, Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro, and the UN Secretary-General U Thant. Also, the essay does not explore the historical details of the background of the crisis but focuses mainly on U Thant’s compromised solution destined to peace during the Cuban missile crisis. In order to examine the research question, secondary sources relating to U Thant’s position in the crisis written by both foreign and Burmese authors, including the Secretary-General himself, are used.

        The investigation undertaken leads to the conclusion that U Thant’s attempt to solve the crisis was more significant rather than the role played by Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro. It can also be learnt from this historical event that a peaceful, impartial solution to the crisis is better than a confrontation by warfare. Therefore, the third Secretary-General’s involvement in settling the Cuban missile crisis as a neutral mediator for peace negotiations is of vital significance.

• Abstract………………………………………………………………..2
• Introduction…………………………………………………………....4
• Direct Confrontation of US and USSR negotiated by U Thant for Peace in the Cuban Missile Crisis
• The Threat of a Nuclear War……………………………….5
• First Phase: The Naval Quarantine ………...........................6
• Second Phase: Negotiation Peak…………………………...9
• Third Phase: Mission to Cuba……………………………..12
• Resolution………………………………………………….15
• Conclusion............................................... …………………………....16
• Bibliography………………………………………………………….18
• Appendices…………………………………………………………...20
• Introduction

During U Thant’s tenure as the third Secretary-General of the United Nations, he was instrumental in solving numerous peace-threatening crises such as the Cuban missile crisis in the Caribbean area (1962), the formation of independent Malaysia (1963), the Congo Civil War (1960-64), the Cyprus crisis (1963-64) and the emergence of Bangladesh (1971). Out of these, this extended essay analyses the Cuban missile crisis in details in order to highlight U Thant’s peace-keeping role in saving the world on a brink of nuclear war.

        U Thant’s neutral position as a mediator between the nuclear superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, to achieve world peace has been emphasized. Among the most difficult problems he tackled, this crisis seems to be the most prominent event in which U Thant fulfilled his responsibility as a Secretary-General to shun war and seek peace in times even when he was presented with the most challenging obstacles and dilemmas. The choice of compromised diplomacy by U Thant rather than military confrontation has prevented the devastating effects of warfare such as a massive loss of lives, economic failure, starvation and famine, as well as health problems including the social impacts on the victims of war.

Despite U Thant’s contribution in solving the missile crisis, his efforts have not been recognized over time, when books published on the crisis emphasize only on President John F. Kennedy, leaving the Secretary-General’s role out of the conflict. Traditionalists believed that the victor of the crisis was America according to the popular belief that when two world powers went eye-ball to eye-ball, “the other guy blinked.”  On the other hand, revisionists assumed that Kennedy had consented to Khrushchev’s proposal for political gain.  However, no one called attention to U Thant’s vital role as a neutral mediator and peace negotiator in the crisis. Therefore, the purpose of this extended essay is to remind the world of U Thant’s participation as a central figure in solving the major conflict between two nuclear superpowers which would certainly have led to a catastrophe.

• Direct Confrontation of US and USSR Negotiated by U Thant for Peace in the Cuban Missile Crisis
• The Threat of a Nuclear War

On 22 nd  October 1962, the United States president, John F. Kennedy, made one of 20th century's most memorable presidential speeches. Kennedy told the world of the Soviet Union’s secret plans to build bases in Cuba, capable of launching nuclear missiles which had a range of over 2,000 miles.  His announcement to begin a '500 mile naval and air quarantine' on 24th October on all military cargo under shipment to Cuba alarmed the world.  He also requested the United Nations to intervene in order to de-escalate and resolve the nuclear standoff between the USSR and the USA.

        Kennedy’s speech could be assumed illegitimate as the United States had no right to interfere in the Soviet’s shipment to Cuba which was travelling on the International route. The US and the USSR could have consulted with the UN in order to solve to the crisis without notifying the world, which had made the case much more critical. On the other hand, the urgency of the crisis had made the United Nations’ involvement even more crucial.

• First Phase: The Naval Quarantine

Soon after the United States had called upon an emergency meeting of the Security Council, U Thant, the United Nations' Secretary-General, received further requests from the Soviet Union and Cuba to solve the predicament, stating that the action of the US was breaching the UN Charter and international law,  and that Cuba had been forced to prepare to defend itself against “American aggression,”  respectively. Apparently, each of the concerned nations desired the United Nations to fulfill its demand; the US wished the UN to withdraw the shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba while the USSR demanded the UN to lift the naval blockade on Cuba, leading to the fact that it considered the UN to be nothing more than a mediating organization. Therefore, the peace desired by these nations was of bias while the duty of a Secretary-General was to seek a consensual peace.

During a tense week of serious discussion, despite the US’s anticipation of the UN’s role in the crisis, the Secretary-General himself was not expected to play a vital part. Furthermore, the United States viewed the UN only as an assembly in which it would gain approval of the world view and an organization providing eyewitness to the withdrawal of Soviet weapons from Cuba. However, the Americans’ underestimation on U Thant was proved wrong when he soon displayed the extent of his mediation and intervention in the crisis.

        Advised by the forty-five delegations of non-aligned countries, U Thant sent two identical appealing messages on 24 th  October directly to Premier Nikita Khrushchev of the Soviet Union and President John F. Kennedy of the United States. The entreaty involved voluntary deferment of all quarantine measures and arms shipments to Cuba for three weeks. These written messages were the first evidence of U Thant’s peaceful, unbiased negotiation.

This is a preview of the whole essay

        The Americans’ initially responded to U Thant’s message with dissatisfaction.  Since his message did not request the deconstruction of the Cuban missile sites and removal of the weapons, the US dreaded that it would have to consent to remove the blockade without a parallel action to any military activity in Cuba. The US ambassador Adlai Stevenson even asked U Thant to delay sending the message for a day. Furthermore, U Thant was requested to restrain mentioning only “vague references to verification”   and without references to the Cuban missile sites by Secretary of State Dean Rusk in the speech which he had decided to deliver at the Security Council meeting the same day. All the more, the president himself ordered Stevenson to force U Thant to postpone his speech. To all these demands, U Thant refused since he might have perceived fruitful consequences and therefore, demonstrated his capability to make independent decisions as a Secretary-General.

        On 24th October, at the Security Council meeting, U Thant proclaimed the contents of the two messages as well as the possible negotiation through a common ground; that, with the US’s assurance of not invading Cuba, all weaponry would be removed. He further expressed his opinion that “moderation, self-restraint and good sense…above the anger of the moment or the pride of nations…will prevail over all other considerations.”  This statement reflected his understanding of overcoming war with negotiation and peace.

        U Thant’s public statement was strongly criticized by the Soviet Union ambassador Valery Zorin, for not vigorously disapproving the US’s quarantine on Cuba. Irritated by his persistent censure, U Thant suggested to Zorin to make this claim at the Security Council meeting, which he did so.  Taking Zorin as an example, it could be possible that most Russians would have initially thought his statement was unsatisfying. Yet, U Thant’s instruction to Zorin further proved that a Secretary-General stood as a neutral independent figure. Moreover, U Thant sent a message to Moscow explicating the efforts he had undertaken to be unbiased and requested the explanation of the objection.  Two days later, Khrushchev notified the Secretary-General that Vasily Kuznetsov, First Deputy Foreign Minister, would arrive to head the Soviet Delegation. Here, U Thant displayed the authority of a Secretary-General, going to such an extent as to relegate Zorin in order to solve the issues with a more impartial negotiator.

        In the evening, on 25 th  October, U Thant received a cable from Khrushchev with a positive response to his appeal. It read: “I understand your concern…I agree to your proposal, which is in the interest of peace.”  Khrushchev’s reply was a critical evidence of U Thant’s success in his very first initiative. The New York Times praised his achievement in its article: “Thant Bids U.S. and Russia Desists 2 Weeks.”  Ambassador Stevenson expressed his admiration for U Thant’s accomplishment by claiming that it was “the indispensable first step in the peaceful resolution of the Cuba crisis.”

• Second Phase: Negotiation Peak

U Thant’s peaceful agreement improved the crisis at sea when Khrushchev ordered several of his ships to withdraw. However, “freighters and tankers,”  including a Soviet tanker (Bucharest), were still approaching the interception area where a war could erupt upon intervention by the US navy. The superpowers were still challenging each others’ rights. Khrushchev had sent a cable to Kennedy saying, “We will not simply be bystanders with regard to piratical acts by American ships on high seas…to protect our rights.”  The solemnity of the crisis had yet to pass.

Right then, the US requested U Thant to make another appeal to the Soviet even though it had not agreed to his first message yet. Kennedy said to Stevenson, “See if U Thant on his own responsibility will ask Mr. Khrushchev not to send his ships pending modality.”  Seeing an opportunity, U Thant agreed to include the contents, which he contemplated as bases of achieving peace, in his message:

• Concern over an imminent war between the confronting nations
• Fear of previous discussions turn into futility
• Plea to delay the Soviet shipments to Cuba
• Assurance of the US withholding the attack to advancing Soviet ships

        On 25 th  October, U Thant sent this cable to Khrushchev and at the same time, sent another to Kennedy, advising him to strain his forces from directly antagonizing the Soviet navy.  In this way, being an unbiased Secretary-General, U Thant had verified his action by appealing to both nations instead of only the USSR. Moreover, he had anticipated that Khrushchev would be able to avoid embarrassment, giving him an honorable way out without displaying weakness by momentarily stopping the advancement for peaceful negotiations.

All this time, Kennedy was convinced that U Thant would bring light to the problem; “U Thant is supposedly arranging for the Russians to stay out. So we have to let some hours to by…”  Therefore, he immediately agreed to U Thant’s second appeal. This showed that the US had acknowledged U Thant’s efforts by having high expectations from him.

The Secretary-General once again made a feat when both leaders replied in agreement to his appeal. Once again, U Thant’s achievement made the front page on the New York Times: “Moscow Agree to Avoid Blockade Zones after New Plea from Thant on Talks.”

        The matter then progressed to uprooting the offensive arms in Cuba. With the standstill of the Soviet ships as well as the US’s assurance of non-violence movement, the US delegation, led by John J. McCloy, and the Soviet delegation, led by Vasily Kuznetsov, along with U Thant himself, discussed over the issue of dismantling the Cuban missiles. The Security Council meetings from 25 th  October to 28 th  October were probably the most significant ones in bringing peace to the crisis.

        During these meetings, U Thant proposed a crucial offer, a ‘non-invasive pledge formula,’ which would become the backbone of the resolution. A few weeks ago, on 8 th  October, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos delivered a speech in which he pledged to remove his ‘defensive’ weapons in return for the US’s guarantee of non-aggression against his country.  U Thant took full advantage of this communist propaganda to form a feasible solution in the crisis; pressing on a deal for exchanging the American invasion of Cuba with dismantling its missile sites.  The Secretary-General had used a brilliant tactic to turn the Cubans back on their words. With a new hope of ending the crisis arisen, both Khrushchev and Kennedy accepted this new proposal to discuss with their respective advisors.

        On 26 th  October, U Thant once again, proposed another agreement; that, he would lead a UN team to Cuba in order to discuss about the dismantling of the missiles. During this period of negotiation, he requested Cuba to halt all of its military construction. At the same time, he proposed a pretense UN observation of the English Thor missiles so as to “save the Russians’ face,” in order to present his impartiality. He then sent a cable to inform Premier Castro of Cuba and in turn, received an invitation to Havana.  The crisis was swiftly expected to come to an end.

• Third Phase: Mission to Cuba

All optimism was shattered when Khrushchev sent an agreement on 27 th  October to fulfill U Thant’s deal only if the Americans withdrew their Jupiter Missiles in Turkey.  Rejected by the Turkish Government to follow Khrushchev’s demand, the US had no other choice but to agree with the Joints Chief of Staff’s plan to invade Cuba on 28 th  or 29 th  of October.

To make matters worse, on 28 th  October, Premier Fidel Castro sent a cable to Kennedy stating that the president’s guarantees were inadequate unless he included the following: “cessation of the piratical acts from Puerto Rico, economic blockade, subversive activities, violation of Cuban airspace, and withdrawal of US forces from Guantanamo.”  Furthermore, a U-2 American pilot had been reported to be missing after being attacked over Cuba.  In fact, Castro even appeared to be forcing the Russians to commence a nuclear invasion against the US.

        Due to the rising tension, U Thant decided to make an immediate trip to Havana to consult with Castro himself. The New York Times quoted: “Thant’s Cuba Talks Fruitful; He Will Fly to Havana Today; Blockade Halted during Trip.”

The Secretary-General organized two groups of UN personnel: the first group with seventeen important security officers, while the second group comprised nineteen people including military staff and communication officers.  U Thant had planned thoroughly to leave with the first team and would summon the second team upon achieving permission from Castro to observe the dissembling of the missiles in Cuba as soon as possible.

        Unfortunately, without informing the Secretary-General, the UN people had arranged twenty-eight pieces of luggage of “communications equipment, supplies, typewriters and other paraphernalia,”  to carry out a UN supervision in Cuba. Bringing in such materials without consent from Castro would evolve into a conflict between the UN negotiators and the Cubans. Despite being furious, U Thant did not reveal his anger as he had always controlled his feelings no matter how dire the consequences he faced. Remaining calm, he brought an end to the confusion by revealing the truth to the Cubans; that, the equipment had been brought without his authorization and that, they would be returned to the plane.  Without this instant action, the entire mission could have failed immediately.

        On 30 th  October, U Thant’s first meeting in Havana with Castro was a failure. Even though Thant had stressed on the plea for trading the US’s pledge of not invading Cuba for UN’s supervision of dismantling the Cuban missile sites, as agreed by Khrushchev, Castro bluntly rejected this offer. This might be due to Castro’s desire to gain power as a strong military leader of Cuba by possessing these offensive weapons. In addition, he might not believe the US’s promise of not invading Cuba, and so, could not accept U Thant’s proposal.

The very same day, U Thant received good news from a Soviet general; that, the Soviet had begun disassembling the missiles in Cuba and would complete the operation by 2 nd  November.  This was encouraging news not only for the national security of the US, but also for the world to avoid a nuclear warfare.

        On 31 st  October, despite Thant's second meeting with Castro remaining futile, he still managed to persuade Castro to return the body of the US pilot, Major Rudolph Anderson.  Returning to New York, U Thant could conclude that his trip to Cuba had been fairly successful; he had acquired direct information of withdrawal of missiles in Cuba as well as retrieved the US pilot’s body.

From 1 st  to 20 th  November, U Thant continued to serve as a mediator to ensure an absolute cessation of the crisis. During this time, he achieved consent from Castro, in agreement from both the US and the USSR, to send the ICRC (International Committee of Red Cross) to verify the uprooting of missiles in Cuba, instead of the UN observers.  On 20 th  November, after the US air surveillance of the withdrawal of Soviet bombers in Cuba, Kennedy lifted the quarantine. The Cuban missile crisis had come to an end.

The following results have been obtained from the UN’s intervention in the Cuban missile crisis:

• Dismantle of the Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba
• US’s pledge with USSR of not invading Cuba
• Fidel Castro became a stronger military leader of Cuba due to the disappearance of foreign invasion
• Peace prevailed regionally and globally preventing nuclear warfare
• Reputation of U Thant acknowledged by the world

From this historical event, we can learn the lesson that resolving a crisis by peaceful means such as table-talks, negotiations and political discussions, mediated by the United Nations, are better than military option. An early UN intervention prevented the eruption of war unlike U Thant’s late intercession during the Vietnam War (1 st  November 1955-30 th  April 1975). Due to numerous battles between the US and the Communists, there were thousands of Vietnamese and Americans causalities along with the downfall in the economic activities of the country. Cuba, Russia and the United States had all managed to avoid unnecessary casualties as a result of the third Secretary-General’s endeavor to achieve world peace.

         Throughout the whole crisis, the Secretary-General had taken thorough approaches to resolution. By announcing his statements publicly or sending unbiased, effective appeals to the respective leaders, a great impact had been made on the result of the negotiation. The contents of these messages, in which he requested both the United States and the Soviet Union leaders to perform certain actions, indicated his neutral position when mediating between the superpowers. No matter the consequences he faced, such as when the nations reached the brink of war even during the negotiation, U Thant managed to deescalate the tension. He even travelled to Cuba to negotiate personally with its leader, Fidel Castro, when the latter rejected the plan of dismantling the missile sites, and also went to the extent of persuading Castro to return the body of the U-2 American pilot. All these events presented U Thant’s unyielding efforts in bringing peace to the conflict.

         However, the Soviets, including the Soviet Union Ambassador Valery Zorin, had argued that they had their rights to bring shipments to Cuba as they were travelling on an international route, and claimed that the United States was manipulating the Secretary-General to gain their advantage in the crisis.  On the other hand, the Americans protested that they, too, had their rights to protect their country from the threat of nuclear weapons in Cuba. Despite these biased claims, the duty of a UN Secretary-General was to solve the crisis requested by the nations' leaders, as U Thant had accomplished to do so and had received much praise for it.

On 7 th  January 1963, Ambassadors Stevenson and Kuznetsov sent a joint letter of gratitude to U Thant stating that they wished to express to him their gratitude for his efforts in helping their Governments to escape the threat to peace which previously occurred in the Caribbean area.  Stevenson would also pointed out that the solution to the crisis “was a classic example of performance by the United Nations in the manner contemplated by the Charter…It provided through the Secretary-General…the means of conciliation, of mediation and of negotiation.”  Truly, U Thant’s exertions in facilitating tactful and ingenious unbiased proposals as well as transmitting de-escalating messages have influenced the negotiations overpoweringly.

Though U Thant had received support from both superpowers while bringing end to the conflict, it would not have been possible to overcome the real possibility of war without the Secretary-General himself. As President John F. Kennedy quoted, “U Thant has put the world deeply in his debt.”  As a result, U Thant had played a crucial part as a neutral figure in keeping the peace and preventing the nuclear warfare between the United States and the Soviet Union.

• Bibliography

Abram Chayes, International Crises   and the Role of Law: The Cuban Missile Crisis, London, 1974.

Ernest R. May, Philip Zelikow , eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Harvard University Press (HUP), 1997 .

Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National

Security Archive Document Reader, New York: The New Press, 1992.

James G. Hershberg, “Russian Documents,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin, n.p., n.d.

Ramses Nassif, U Thant in New York, 1961-1971, A Portrait of the Third UN Secretary-General, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1988.

Richard Ned Lebow, “Domestic Politics and the Cuban Missile Crisis: The Traditional and Revisionist Interpretations Reevaluated,” Journal of Diplomatic History , 14 (Fall 1990).

Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, W. W. Norton & Company, 1969.

U Thant, View from the UN, Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1978.

Editorial New York Times, October 25; October 27; October 30, 1962.

Gertrude Samuels, “The Meditation of U Thant,” New York Times Magazine , December 13, 1964.

Websites-URLs

A. Walter Dorn and Robert Pauk, The Cuban Missile Crisis Resolved: "Untold Story of an Unsung Hero," Ottawa Citizen. Walter Dorn, 22 Oct. 2007: A12. Web. 6 Jan. 2010

(< http://www.walterdorn.org/pub/8>).

Edward C. Keefer and Erin R Mahan, eds.  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976:  SALT I, 1969-1972.  Volume XXXII.  Washington, DC: United States Government Publication Office, 2010

(< >).

Graham Allison - Foreign Affairs - The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: “Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy Today,” July/August 2012

(< http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137679/graham-allison/the-cuban-missile-crisis-at-50>).

Hla Oo's Blog - 1974 U Thant Uprising - Former UNSG U Thant (< >).

Michael Dobbs - The National Security Archive - One Minute to Midnight: "Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War," 18th June 2008 (< >).        

Oracle Education Foundation - The Cuban Missile Crisis- Fourteen Days in October                                          (< >).                        

October 27, 1962: U.S. and U.S.S.R. in confrontation at U.N. Security Council (< >).                                        

Picture of U Thant - Havel's House of the History: Autographs of Leaders of the United Nations, 6 (< >).                        

Picture of Poltava on its way to Cuba - About Facts Net - Cuban Missile Crisis Pictures 1 (<http://aboutfacts.net/DocsCubanMissleCrisisPictures1.htm>).

Sergei Khrushchev - “How My Father and President Kennedy Saved the World,” n.d., 26 February 2010

(<http://www.americanheritage.com/content/how-my-father-and-president-kenedy-savedworld>).

Appendix 1: Dr. Than Naing Personal Interview Transcript

11 th  September, 2012

39, Kyauk Myaung Township, Yangon

Z.K.Z: What do you understand by the UN's Secretary-General?

T.N: According to some books, the article (1) 4 of the UN Charter states that he or she is one who handles administration, gathers human resources, peacekeeping and mediation. In my point of view, I believe the last two features that define a Secretary-General are most significant. After all, the need for that person is to minimize international conflicts, that is, to maintain peace for as much as possible.

Z.K.Z: Even as a Burmese citizen, U Thant managed to become a Secretary-General. Can you explain how he had achieved this distinguished position?

T.N: To start with, I want to explain briefly about U Thant’s life from his birth in 1909. Although he had been born into a wealthy Burmese merchant family and became a high school headmaster, he could not, of course, attempt to accomplish this feat alone. He needed support, which was given by his friend, U Nu, who was then Burma’s prime minister. First, he became secretary to the prime minister and then, received the honor of being the Burmese representative to the United Nations.

After the death of the second Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjold, in a plane crash on his mission to Congo on 18 th  September 1961, the Soviet Union under Khrushchev proposed the Troika plan to the UN to appoint three UN Secretary-Generals to precede Hammarskjold, one representing the Communist world, one for the West, and one for the group of non-aligned nations. But, the United States opposed the plan and immediately decided to choose the third Secretary-General, one from a neutral nation. On 3 rd  November 1961, U Thant of Burma was appointed the position of an acting UN Secretary-General and then on 30 th  November 1962, the third permanent Secretary-General. He was chosen due to his previous efforts in giving birth to the Non-Aligned Movement, as well as his contributions in the Congo Crisis, working under Hammarskjold.

Z.K.Z: Among his greatest accomplishments, which do you think has revealed U Thant’s strength to maintain the role as the head of the United Nations?

T.N: It is true that he has tackled numerous disputes and wars such as the West Iranian problem, the Borneo problem, the Cyprus crisis, the Prague Spring, the Congo civil war, and the India-Pakistan war, but, his contribution in ending the Cuban Missile crisis is the most well-recognized. During this crisis, which was also one of the most challenging problems encountered by the Secretary-General, he exposed his potential of mediating between the two adversaries, the US and the USSR, as well as maintained peace throughout the discussions to overcome the imminent calamity of a nuclear warfare.

So, I think it is acceptable for him to be awarded the title ‘Maha Thray Sithu,’ by the Burmese government in 1961, and also the ‘Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding,’ by the Indian government in 1965. He lived up to these titles when he demonstrated his strenuous efforts in the Cuba crisis, and therefore, is appointed to serve the second term at the United Nations.

Z.K.Z: Can you say that U Thant has acted as an important figure in solving the Cuban missile crisis?

T.N: The Secretary-General was, of course, a very significant person since he acted as a medium through which the conflicting nations had communicated. Without him, I am sure that a nuclear war…the third World War would have started then.

Z.K.Z: Do you believe U Thant remained as a neutral figure all this time?

T.N: Some people, especially the Russians, claim that U Thant was being controlled by the US government while the Americans stated that he was just acting independently. I agree with what the Americans say because according to many books and articles I have read about him, he is an impartial person and does not follow others’ biased orders if he doesn’t see any benefit to the situation.

Z.K.Z: How do you think the world, including you, view this man?

T.N: U Thant, through bringing resolutions to international conflicts, has gained immense popularity from many nations. However, with the disappointment he has caused in the Arab-Israel conflict and his negative view towards the Americans' attack on Vietnam, his relationships with Israel and the US deteriorated rapidly.

Despite his strengths and weaknesses, I am still proud to be a Burmese citizen to know that another of us has climbed to the peak of the world and has been awarded praise for handling numerous critical international conflicts.

Z.K.Z: Do you think that he has achieved his role as a peace keeper till his death?

T.N: An irony is present in this case. On 25 th  November 1971, three years after his resignation from the UN, U Thant passed away due to lung cancer. While he has accomplished the role as a conciliator throughout his personal life as well as his terms as a Secretary-General at the UN, his death leads to a civil war in his native land, Burma. Since he is a friend of U Nu, the military leader General Ne Win planned to make a common funeral for the late Secretary-General and even decided to bury him at a distant cemetery in Kyandaw. Raged and inflamed, thousands of demonstrators, including monks and University students, rampaged around Yangon, setting fire to buildings. Sadly, many of these rioters were arrested by the Burmese military government and the remains of U Thant were sealed in a mausoleum near the Shwedagon Pagoda. Such tragedy happened to the body of a person who had embraced peace and loathed violence throughout his life.

Figure I: U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations (1961–1972)

Figure II: US Ambassador Adlai Stevenson displays photos of Soviet missiles in Cuba at the UN Security Council meeting of October 25, 1962.

Fig III: Location of Soviet missile sites and airfields in Cuba (1962)

Fig V: U Thant’s mausoleum on Shwedagon Pagoda Rd., Yangon

List of Weaponry on the Indigirka bound for Mariel, Cuba on 4th October:

 Abram Chayes, International Crises and the Role of Law: The Cuban Missile Crisis,   London, 1974, p. 84.

 Richard Ned Lebow, “Domestic Politics and the Cuban Missile Crisis: The Traditional and Revisionist Interpretations Reevaluated,” Journal of Diplomatic History, 14 (Fall 1990): pp. 471–92.

Ramses Nassif, U Thant in New York, 1961-1971, A Portrait of the Third UN Secretary-General, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1988, p. 26.

Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, W. W. Norton & Company, 1969, pp. 163–71.

Graham Allison - Foreign Affairs - The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50: “Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy Today,” July/August 2012.

Ernest R. May, Philip Zelikow , eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Harvard University Press (HUP), 1997 , pp. 372–88.

Ibid. , p. 372.

Ramses Nassif, U Thant in New York, 1961-1971, A Portrait of the Third UN Secretary-General, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1988, pp. 28, 29.

U Thant, View from the UN, Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1978, p. 164.

Ramses Nassif, U Thant in New York, 1961-1971, A Portrait of the Third UN Secretary-General, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1988, p. 30.

U Thant, View from the UN, Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1978, p. 165.

New York Times, October 25, 1962, p. 1.

 Adlai Stevenson, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organization Affairs,

Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 88th Congress, 1st Session   (March 13, 1963): p. 7.

 Sergei Khrushchev, “How My Father and President Kennedy Saved the World,” n.d., 26 February 2010.

 Edward C. Keefer and Erin R Mahan, eds.  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976:  SALT I, 1969-1972. Volume XXXII.  Washington, DC: United States Government Publication Office, 2010,pp. 185–87.(< >).

 Ibid., pp. 191–92.

Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, W. W. Norton & Company, 1969, pp. 190–91.

Ibid., pp. 187–88.

Ernest R. May, Philip Zelikow , eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Harvard University Press (HUP), 1997 , pp. 428-29.

New York Times, October 27, 1962, p. 8.

U Thant, View from the UN, Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, 1978, p. 464.

Ramses Nassif, U Thant in New York, 1961-1971, A Portrait of the Third UN Secretary-General, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1988, p. 29.

Ernest R. May, Philip Zelikow , eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Harvard University Press (HUP), 1997 , pp. 484–85.

Ramses Nassif, U Thant in New York, 1961-1971, A Portrait of the Third UN Secretary-General, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1988, p. 31.

Edward C. Keefer and Erin R Mahan, eds.  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976:  SALT I, 1969-1972. Volume XXXII. Washington, DC: United States Government Publication Office, 2010, pp. 258-259.

Ramses Nassif, U Thant in New York, 1961-1971, A Portrait of the Third UN Secretary-General, C. Hurst &Company, London, 1988, p. 32.

Ernest R. May, Philip Zelikow , eds., The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Harvard University Press (HUP), 1997 , p. 520.

Ibid. , p. 688.

New York Times, October 30, 1962, p. 1.

Ramses Nassif, U Thant in New York, 1961-1971, A Portrait of the Third UN Secretary-General, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1988, p. 33.

Ramses Nassif, U Thant in New York, 1961-1971, A Portrait of the Third UN Secretary-General, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1988, p. 32.

Ibid., p. 33.

Ibid., p. 34.

Ibid., p. 35.

 “Russian Documents,” CWIHPB , p. 293.

Ramses Nassif, U Thant in New York, 1961-1971 , A Portrait of the Third UN Secretary-General, C. Hurst & Company, London, 1988, p. 37.

ABC-TV, “Adlai Stevenson Reports,” December 23, 1962.

 Gertrude Samuels, “The Meditation of U Thant,” New York Times Magazine , December13, 1964, p. 115.

Primary Resource: Interview with U Thant's grand-nephew, Dr. Than Naing

Picture of U Thant - Havel's House of the History: Autographs of Leaders of the United Nations, p 6.

(<http://www.havelshouseofhistory.com/Autographs%20of%20Leaders%20of%20the%20UN%20Page%206.htm>)

October 27, 1962: U.S. and U.S.S.R. in confrontation at U.N. Security Council (<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/October_1962>)

Oracle Education Foundation - The Cuban Missile Crisis- Fourteen Days in October                                          (<http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/index.html>)

Picture of Poltava on its way to Cuba - About Facts Net - Cuban Missile Crisis Pictures 1 (<http://aboutfacts.net/DocsCubanMissleCrisisPictures1.htm>)

Hla Oo's Blog - 1974 U Thant Uprising - Former UNSG U Thant

(< http://hlaoo1980.blogspot.com/2010/10/1974-u-thant-uprising.html>)

Michael Dobbs - The National Security Archive - One Minute to Midnight: "Kennedy, Khrushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War," 18th June 2008 (<http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/dobbs/warheads.htm>)

Document Details

• Author Type Student
• Word Count 6177
• Page Count 27
• Level International Baccalaureate
• Subject History
• Type of work Research assignment (e.g. EPQs)

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Course: US history   >   Unit 8

• John F. Kennedy as president
• Bay of Pigs Invasion
• Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis

• Lyndon Johnson as president
• Vietnam War
• The Vietnam War
• The student movement and the antiwar movement
• Second-wave feminism
• The election of 1968
• 1960s America
• In October 1962, the Soviet provision of ballistic missiles to Cuba led to the most dangerous Cold War confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union and brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.
• Over the course of two extremely tense weeks, US President John F. Kennedy and Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev negotiated a peaceful outcome to the crisis.
• The crisis evoked fears of nuclear destruction, revealed the dangers of brinksmanship , and invigorated attempts to halt the arms race.

The Cuban Revolution

Origins of the cuban missile crisis, negotiating a peaceful outcome, consequences of the cuban missile crisis, what do you think.

• Sergo Mikoyan, The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Missiles of November (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2012), 225-226.
• Strobe Talbott, ed. Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970), 494.
• See Michael Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: Random House, 2008); and Timothy Naftali and Aleksandr Fursenko, One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964: The Secret History of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997).
• See James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the Superpowers after the Cuban Missile Crisis (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002).
• Paul S. Boyer, Promises to Keep: The United States since World War II (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1999), 179.

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Cuban Missile Crisis

By: History.com Editors

Updated: April 20, 2023 | Original: January 4, 2010

During the Cuban Missile Crisis, leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union engaged in a tense, 13-day political and military standoff in October 1962 over the installation of nuclear-armed Soviet missiles on Cuba, just 90 miles from U.S. shores. In a TV address on October 22, 1962, President John F. Kennedy (1917-63) notified Americans about the presence of the missiles, explained his decision to enact a naval blockade around Cuba and made it clear the U.S. was prepared to use military force if necessary to neutralize this perceived threat to national security. Following this news, many people feared the world was on the brink of nuclear war. However, disaster was avoided when the U.S. agreed to Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s (1894-1971) offer to remove the Cuban missiles in exchange for the U.S. promising not to invade Cuba. Kennedy also secretly agreed to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey.

Discovering the Missiles

After seizing power in the Caribbean island nation of Cuba in 1959, leftist revolutionary leader Fidel Castro (1926-2016) aligned himself with the Soviet Union . Under Castro, Cuba grew dependent on the Soviets for military and economic aid. During this time, the U.S. and the Soviets (and their respective allies) were engaged in the Cold War (1945-91), an ongoing series of largely political and economic clashes.

Did you know? The actor Kevin Costner (1955-) starred in a movie about the Cuban Missile Crisis titled Thirteen Days . Released in 2000, the movie's tagline was "You'll never believe how close we came."

The two superpowers plunged into one of their biggest Cold War confrontations after the pilot of an American U-2 spy plane piloted by Major Richard Heyser making a high-altitude pass over Cuba on October 14, 1962, photographed a Soviet SS-4 medium-range ballistic missile being assembled for installation.

President Kennedy was briefed about the situation on October 16, and he immediately called together a group of advisors and officials known as the executive committee, or ExComm. For nearly the next two weeks, the president and his team wrestled with a diplomatic crisis of epic proportions, as did their counterparts in the Soviet Union.

A New Threat to the U.S.

For the American officials, the urgency of the situation stemmed from the fact that the nuclear-armed Cuban missiles were being installed so close to the U.S. mainland–just 90 miles south of Florida . From that launch point, they were capable of quickly reaching targets in the eastern U.S. If allowed to become operational, the missiles would fundamentally alter the complexion of the nuclear rivalry between the U.S. and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which up to that point had been dominated by the Americans.

Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev had gambled on sending the missiles to Cuba with the specific goal of increasing his nation’s nuclear strike capability. The Soviets had long felt uneasy about the number of nuclear weapons that were targeted at them from sites in Western Europe and Turkey, and they saw the deployment of missiles in Cuba as a way to level the playing field. Another key factor in the Soviet missile scheme was the hostile relationship between the U.S. and Cuba. The Kennedy administration had already launched one attack on the island–the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961–and Castro and Khrushchev saw the missiles as a means of deterring further U.S. aggression.

Watch the three-episode documentary event, Kennedy . Available to stream now.

Kennedy Weighs the Options

From the outset of the crisis, Kennedy and ExComm determined that the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba was unacceptable. The challenge facing them was to orchestrate their removal without initiating a wider conflict–and possibly a nuclear war. In deliberations that stretched on for nearly a week, they came up with a variety of options, including a bombing attack on the missile sites and a full-scale invasion of Cuba. But Kennedy ultimately decided on a more measured approach. First, he would employ the U.S. Navy to establish a blockade, or quarantine, of the island to prevent the Soviets from delivering additional missiles and military equipment. Second, he would deliver an ultimatum that the existing missiles be removed.

In a television broadcast on October 22, 1962, the president notified Americans about the presence of the missiles, explained his decision to enact the blockade and made it clear that the U.S. was prepared to use military force if necessary to neutralize this perceived threat to national security. Following this public declaration, people around the globe nervously waited for the Soviet response. Some Americans, fearing their country was on the brink of nuclear war, hoarded food and gas.

HISTORY Vault: Nuclear Terror

Now more than ever, terrorist groups are obtaining nuclear weapons. With increasing cases of theft and re-sale at dozens of Russian sites, it's becoming more and more likely for terrorists to succeed.

Showdown at Sea: U.S. Blockades Cuba

A crucial moment in the unfolding crisis arrived on October 24, when Soviet ships bound for Cuba neared the line of U.S. vessels enforcing the blockade. An attempt by the Soviets to breach the blockade would likely have sparked a military confrontation that could have quickly escalated to a nuclear exchange. But the Soviet ships stopped short of the blockade.

Although the events at sea offered a positive sign that war could be averted, they did nothing to address the problem of the missiles already in Cuba. The tense standoff between the superpowers continued through the week, and on October 27, an American reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba, and a U.S. invasion force was readied in Florida. (The 35-year-old pilot of the downed plane, Major Rudolf Anderson, is considered the sole U.S. combat casualty of the Cuban missile crisis.) “I thought it was the last Saturday I would ever see,” recalled U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara (1916-2009), as quoted by Martin Walker in “The Cold War.” A similar sense of doom was felt by other key players on both sides.

A Deal Ends the Standoff

Despite the enormous tension, Soviet and American leaders found a way out of the impasse. During the crisis, the Americans and Soviets had exchanged letters and other communications, and on October 26, Khrushchev sent a message to Kennedy in which he offered to remove the Cuban missiles in exchange for a promise by U.S. leaders not to invade Cuba. The following day, the Soviet leader sent a letter proposing that the USSR would dismantle its missiles in Cuba if the Americans removed their missile installations in Turkey.

Officially, the Kennedy administration decided to accept the terms of the first message and ignore the second Khrushchev letter entirely. Privately, however, American officials also agreed to withdraw their nation’s missiles from Turkey. U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy (1925-68) personally delivered the message to the Soviet ambassador in Washington , and on October 28, the crisis drew to a close.

Both the Americans and Soviets were sobered by the Cuban Missile Crisis. The following year, a direct “hot line” communication link was installed between Washington and Moscow to help defuse similar situations, and the superpowers signed two treaties related to nuclear weapons. The Cold War was and the nuclear arms race was far from over, though. In fact, another legacy of the crisis was that it convinced the Soviets to increase their investment in an arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the U.S. from Soviet territory.

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• Cuban Missile Crisis

Contextual Essay

Topic: How did the Cuban Missile Crisis affect the United States’ foreign policy in Cuba during the Cold War?

• Introduction

Despite the short geographical distance between the two countries, Cuba and the United States have had a complicated relationship for more than 150 years owing to a long list of historical events. Among all, the Cuban Missile Crisis is considered as one of the most dangerous moments in both the American and Cuban history as it was the first time that these two countries and the former Soviet Union came close to the outbreak of a nuclear war. While the Crisis revealed the possibility of a strong alliance formed by the former Soviet Union and Cuba, two communist countries, it also served as a reminder to U.S. leaders that their past strategy of imposing democratic ideology on Cuba might not work anymore and the U.S. needed a different approach. It was lucky that the U.S. was able to escape from a nuclear disaster in the end, how did the Cuban Missile Crisis affect the U.S. foreign policy in Cuba during the Cold War?

            To answer my research question, I searched on different academic databases related to Latin American studies, history, and political science. JSTOR, Hispanic American Historical Review, and Journal of American History were examples of databases that I used. I also put in keywords like “Cuban Missile Crisis,” “Cuba and the U.S.,” and “U.S. cold war foreign policy” to find sources that are related to my research focus. Furthermore, I have included primary and secondary sources that address the foreign policies the U.S. implemented before and after the Cuban Missile Crisis. In order to provide a more comprehensive picture of the impact of the Crisis on the U.S. foreign policy in Cuba, the primary sources used would include declassified CIA documents, government memos, photos, and correspondence between leaders. These sources would be the best for my project because they provided persuading first-hand information for analyzing the issue. I cut sources that were not trustworthy and did not relate to my topic. This research topic was significant because it reflected the period when Cuban-U.S. relations became more negative. By understanding the change in foreign policy direction after the Cuban Missile Crisis, we could gain a better understanding of the development of Cuban-U.S. relations since the Cold War. On top of that, it was also a chance for us to reflect upon the decision-making process and learn from the past. 

In my opinion, the Cuban Missile Crisis affected U.S. foreign policy in Cuba during the Cold War in three ways. First, the Crisis allowed the U.S. government to realize the importance of flexible and planned crisis management. Second, the Crisis reinforced the U.S. government’s belief in the Containment Policy. Third, the Crisis reminded the U.S. of the importance of multilateralism when it came to international affairs. 

In October 1962, the United States detected that the former Soviet Union had deployed medium-range missiles in Cuba. This discovery then led to a tense standoff that lasted for 13 days, which was later known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. In response to the Soviet Union’s action, the Kennedy administration quickly placed a “quarantine” naval blockade around Cuba and demanded the destruction of missile sites. [1] This decision was made carefully by the U.S. government because any miscalculation would lead to a nuclear war between Cuba, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. After weighing possible options, the former Soviet Union finally announced the removal of missiles for an American pledge not to reinvade Cuba. [2] On the other hand, the U.S. also agreed to secretly remove its nuclear missiles from Turkey in a separate deal. [3] The Crisis was then over and the three countries involved were able to escape from a detrimental nuclear crisis.

After World War II, the United States and the former Soviet Union began battling indirectly through a plethora of ways like propaganda, economic aid, and military coalitions. This was known as the period of the Cold War. [4] The Cuban Missile Crisis happened amid the Cold War then caused the escalation of tension between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Despite the removal of nuclear missiles by the U.S.S.R., Moscow still decided to upgrade the Soviet nuclear strike force. This decision allowed the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to further their nuclear arms race as a result. [5] The Cold War tensions only softened after the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty was negotiated and signed by both superpowers. [6] Additionally, both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. reflected upon the dangerous nuclear crisis and established the “Hotline” to reduce the possibility of war by miscalculation. [7]

• Crisis management

To begin, the success of solving the Cuban Missile Crisis has proven to the U.S. the importance of planning and flexibility when it came to crisis management with a tight time limit. This was supported by the CIA document “Major Consequences of Certain U.S. Courses of Action on Cuba” and the Dillon group discussion paper “Scenario for Airstrike Against Offensive Missile Bases and Bombers in Cuba.” Rather than devoting to existing plans, the Kennedy administration came up with flexible plans. Depending on the potential reactions of Cuba towards different hypothetical scenarios of the United States’ response after the deployment of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba, the CIA document listed several modes of blockade and warnings that the U.S. could use to avoid a nuclear war. [8] The CIA document also presented the meanings of different military strategies to the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and Cuba.[9] In addition, the Dillon group discussion paper included the advantages and disadvantages of using airstrikes against Cuba.[10] Not only did these documents reveal the careful planning process that the U.S. government underwent under a pressurized time limit, but they also allowed the U.S. government to realize the uncertainty in the U.S.-Cuban relations and the U.S.-Soviet relations. The U.S. would need to have flexible military plans prepared to protect itself from a similar crisis and to sustain harmonious relationships with the U.S.S.R. and Cuba in the long run.  

• Containment Policy

Furthermore, the Cuban Missile Crisis has allowed the U.S. government to reflect upon the extent of the application of the Containment Policy to prevent the spread of communism. Since the U.S. became a superpower after World War II, it seldom faced threat from countries that were close to its border. The Crisis then was an opportunity for the U.S. to learn that it was possible that itself could be trapped by the “containment policy” by other communist countries like the Soviet Union and Cuba. This could explain why the U.S. chose not to invade or attack Cuba but to compromise with the U.S.S.R. by trading nuclear missiles for those in Cuba, despite intended to actively suppress communism. [11]

As mentioned in the White House document, “two extreme views on the proper role of force in the international relations were wrong – the view which rejects force altogether as an instrument of foreign policy; and the view that force can solve everything,” the Crisis made the U.S. understand that forceful use of containment policy on communist countries might not work all the time. [12] The U.S. would need to change its focus and turn to other diplomatic strategies to better protect its national interest.

• Multilateralism

In addition, the success of solving the Cuban Missile Crisis allowed the United States to understand the importance of multilateralism when it came to international conflicts with communist countries. Amid the Crisis, the U.S. actively sought support from different countries. This was clearly noted in the CIA daily report “The Crisis USSR/Cuba” that many countries like Spain, France, and Venezuela showed public support for the U.S. quarantine blockade policy on Cuba.[13] On top of the support of other countries, the U.S. also sought justification of the quarantine through the Organization of American States and made good use of the United Nations to communicate with the Soviets on the size of the quarantine zone.[14] All these measures made it difficult for Moscow or Cuba to further escalate the Crisis or interpret American actions as a serious threat to their interests. With the clever use of multilateralism, the U.S. was able to minimize the danger of the Crisis smoothly before any escalation of tensions. This experience also served as a good resource for solving troubling diplomatic problems with Cuba or other communist countries in the future.

            In conclusion, the Cuban Missile Crisis has several effects on the United States’ foreign policy in Cuba during the Cold War. To begin, the success of solving the Cuban Missile Crisis has proven to the U.S. the importance of planning and flexibility when it came to crisis management with a tight time limit. Additionally, the Cuban Missile Crisis has allowed the U.S. government to reflect upon the extent of the application of the Containment Policy to prevent the spread of communism. Furthermore, the Cuban Missile Crisis provided the United States a chance to understand the importance of multilateralism when it came to solving international conflicts with communist countries. By understanding more about the effects that the Cuban Missile Crisis had on U.S. foreign policy in Cuba, we were able to realize the vulnerability and insecurity in Cuban-U.S. relations. This allowed us to gain a more diverse view of the causes of the conflicting U.S.-Cuban relations in the 20th and 21st centuries.

• Primary Sources (10-15 sources)

CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Major Consequences of Certain U.S. Courses of Action on Cuba,” October 20, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/19621020cia.pdf.

CIA daily report, “The Crisis USSR/Cuba,” October 27, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/621027%20The%20Crisis%20USSR-Cuba.pdf   

Dillon group discussion paper, “Scenario for Airstrike Against Offensive Missile Bases and Bombers in Cuba,” October 25, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/19621025dillon.pdf

White House, “Post Mortem on Cuba,” October 29, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/19621029mortem.pdf

John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. “Cuban Missile Crisis,” Accessed February 25, 2020. https://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/ .

The U-2 Plane. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/19.jpg

October 5, 1962: CIA chart of “reconnaissance objectives in Cuba.”

Graphic from Military History Quarterly of the U.S. invasion plan, 1962.

CIA reference photograph of Soviet cruise missile in its air-launched configuration.

October 17, 1962: U-2 photograph of first IRBM site found under construction.

[1] “The Cold War,” JFK Library, accessed May 5, 2020, https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/the-cold-war .

[3] “Cuban Missile Crisis.” JFK Library. Accessed May 5, 2020. https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/cuban-missile-crisis.

[4]  “The Cold War,” JFK Library, accessed May 5, 2020, https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/the-cold-war .

[8] CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Major Consequences of Certain U.S. Courses of Action on Cuba,” October 20, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/19621020cia.pdf .

[10] Dillon group discussion paper, “Scenario for Airstrike Against Offensive Missile Bases and Bombers in Cuba,” October 25, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/19621025dillon.pdf

[11] CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate, “Major Consequences of Certain U.S. Courses of Action on Cuba,” October 20, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/19621020cia.pdf .

[12]  White House, “Post Mortem on Cuba,” October 29, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/19621029mortem.pdf

[13] CIA daily report, “The Crisis USSR/Cuba,” October 27, 1962. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/621027%20The%20Crisis%20USSR-Cuba.pd

[14] “TWE Remembers: The OAS Endorses a Quarantine of Cuba (Cuban Missile Crisis, Day Eight).” Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed May 4, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/blog/twe-remembers-oas-endorses-quarantine-cuba-cuban-missile-crisis-day-eight.

• Modern History

Thirteen days that shook the world - The Cuban Missile Crisis

By 1962, the Cold War was in full swing. The Soviet Union and the United States were locked in a struggle for global supremacy.

Each side trying to outdo the other in terms of military power and political influence.

This led to a major standoff between the two superpowers, known as the Cuban Missile Crisis.

For thirteen days in October 1962, the world held its breath as it waited to see if a full-blown nuclear war would break out.

Ultimately, cooler heads prevailed and a diplomatic solution was reached.

The Cuban Revolution

Before the 1960s, Cuba was ruled by a corrupt dictator named Fulgencio Batista. Under Batista's rule, American businesses had a great deal of control over the Cuban economy. 

American businesses owned most of Cuba’s public railways, almost half the sugar industry, and 90% of the telephone and electric companies. 

In 1959, a revolutionary group led by Fidel Castro overthrew Batista's government.

Once in power, Castro wanted to minimise America’s control on Cuba's economy. 

His new Cuban government seized American businesses and nationalised them. 

The United States was not happy about this turn of events. The American government saw Castro's regime as a threat to its interests in the region.

In response, the U.S. began working to overthrow the Cuban government. 

The Bay of Pigs Invasion

In 1961, the CIA hatched a plan to overthrow Castro. The plan was to train and arm Cuban exiles and then send them back to invade their homeland.

The exiles were trained in Guatemala and then flown to Cuba in CIA-owned aircraft.

They landed in April 1961 at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba, but the invasion was a complete disaster.

The failure was largely due to the lack of support from the local population and the absence of the anticipated U.S. air support.

The exiles were quickly defeated, and many were captured or killed. The debacle served as a humiliating embarrassment for the United States.

Following the invasion, Castro turned to the Soviet Union for help. He knew that the Soviets had nuclear weapons, and he hoped that they would be deter the United States from trying to overthrow his regime.

Secret missiles to Cuba

In 1962, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev decided to take advantage of Castro's vulnerability.

He secretly ordered Soviet ballistic missiles to be placed in Cuba. The missiles were capable of reaching most of the United States, including major cities like Washington D.C., New York City, and Miami. 

In addition to the nuclear missiles, the USSR had also managed to send 40,000 Soviet troops to Cuba.

These were both combat-ready soldiers, but also the engineers and technicians required to assemble and fire the missiles.

These secret movements of missiles and men was in response to the U.S. stationing Jupiter ballistic missiles in Turkey, which was aimed at the Soviet Union.

These American missiles had been placed in Turkey in 1960, and the Soviets saw them as a direct threat, as they could strike the USSR within five minutes of being launched.

The Crisis Begins

On the 14th of October 1962, American spy planes discovered the Soviet missiles in Cuba and President John F Kennedy  was faced with a difficult decision: should he order a strike against the missile sites, or should he try to negotiate with the Soviets? 

Further plane photographs on the 15th of October showed they the build-up continued.

Kennedy convened a meeting of his top advisors to discuss what to do. The options were to do nothing, launch a military attack on Cuba, or impose a naval blockade on Cuba.

After much deliberation, Kennedy decided on the latter option. On the 22nd of October, he appeared on American TV and announced that the United States would impose a naval blockade of Cuba until the Soviet Union agreed to remove the missiles.

This was known as a "quarantine" rather than a blockade, so as not to provoke the Soviets into taking military action.

For a day and a half, during the 24th and 25h of October, some Soviet ships that were heading for Cuba were turned back from the U.S. quarantine line, but further spy photographs showed that the missiles were still in place on Cuba.

Kennedy's advisors said that all missiles would be operational within three days and were capable of reaching American targets within 10 minutes of launch.

The president asked for an estimated death toll if the US was hit. He was told that each missile was capable of killing 600,000 people each.

Then, on the morning of Saturday, October 27th, an American U-2 spy plane was shot down by a Soviet-operated surface-to-air missile as it flew over Cuba.

The pilot of the U-2, named Major Rudolf Anderson, was killed, and the US Joint Chiefs of Staff were outraged. They encouraged Kennedy to launch a retaliatory air strike on the missile bases.

However, fearing that such an attack would begin a nuclear war, Kennedy refused.

Instead, late on Saturday evening, the president sent an offer to Khrushchev. 

The Cuban Missile Crisis finally ended on the 28th of October with a secret agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The United States agreed to remove its nuclear missiles from Turkey and promised not to invade Cuba.

In return, the Soviet Union agreed to remove its missiles from Cuba and to not place any more nuclear weapons on the island.

The world breathed a sigh of relief, and the crisis was over.

Consequences

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a turning point in the Cold War. It showed that both sides were capable of destroying the other, and that diplomacy was necessary to avoid such a catastrophe.

The experience also led to increased cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in order to prevent future conflicts.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a watershed moment not just for American-Soviet relations, but for international politics as well.

Specifically, it led to the establishment of the Moscow-Washington hotline in 1963, which was a direct communication link between the leaders of the two nations.

The fact that two superpowers with such different ideologies were able to come to a diplomatic resolution in such a short amount of time is a testament to the power of communication and negotiation.

It is a reminder that, even in the darkest of times, cooler heads can still prevail.

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National Museum of Nuclear Science & History

Nuclear Close Calls: The Cuban Missile Crisis

• Cold War History

During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were largely prevented from engaging in direct combat with each other due to the fear of mutually assured destruction (MAD). In 1962, however, the Cuban Missile Crisis brought the world perilously close to nuclear war.

“Why not throw a hedgehog at Uncle Sam’s pants?”

Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to put nuclear missiles in Cuba was precipitated by two major developments. The first was the rise of the Cuban communist movement, which in 1959 overthrew President Fulgencio Batista and brought Fidel Castro to power. The Cuban Revolution was an affront to the United States, which took control of the island following the Spanish-American War of 1898. After granting Cuba its independence several years later, the United States remained a close ally. Under the directive of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the CIA prepared to overthrow the Castro government. The resulting Bay of Pigs Invasion, ordered by President John F. Kennedy in April 1961, saw the defeat of approximately 1,500 American-trained Cuban exiles at the hands of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces.

The Soviet Union, meanwhile, was motivated to assist the fledgling communist government that had somewhat surprisingly come to power without any support or influence from Moscow. Despite the Americans’ humiliating defeat at the Bay of Pigs, the Soviets feared that the United States would continue to oppose and delegitimize the Castro regime. As Khrushchev explained, “The fate of Cuba and the maintenance of Soviet prestige in that part of the world preoccupied me. We had to think up some way of confronting America with more than words. We had to establish a tangible and effective deterrent to American interference in the Caribbean. But what exactly? The logical answer was missiles” (Gaddis 76).

The other factor which led Khrushchev to his decision was the disparity between American and Soviet nuclear capabilities. According to physicist Pavel Podvig, Soviet bombers at the time “could deliver about 270 nuclear weapons to U.S. territory.” By contrast, the United States had thousands of warheads that it could deliver via 1,576 Strategic Air Command bombers as well as 183 Atlas and Titan intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 144 Polaris missiles via nine nuclear submarines, and ten newly-built Minuteman ICBMs (Rhodes 93).

The Soviets did not yet have a reliable source of ICBMs, but they did have effective medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs). If these weapons were deployed in Cuba, only 90 miles from the American mainland, it would in the eyes of Khrushchev equalize “what the West likes to call the ‘balance of power’” (Sheehan 438). From the Soviet perspective, nuclearizing Cuba would also serve as an effective response to the American Jupiter missiles deployed in Turkey. “Why not throw a hedgehog at Uncle Sam’s pants?” quipped Khrushchev at a meeting in April 1962 (Gaddis 75).

Operation Anadyr

From July to October 1962, the Soviets secretly transported troops and equipment to Cuba. If all went according to plan, the Americans would find out about the operation only after it was too late to stop it. 41,902 soldiers were deployed—most wearing civilian clothes and introduced to an unconvinced Cuban population as “agricultural specialists”—before the crisis started. Thirty-six R-12 missiles and twenty-four launchers were successfully deployed on the island as well as a number of tactical cruise missiles designed to stop an invading American force (Sheehan 441). After the end of the Cold War, Russian officials revealed that 162 nuclear weapons were stationed in Cuba when the crisis broke out (Rhodes 99).

The CIA was unaware of the operation until October, as it had little presence in Cuba following the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Furthermore, a series of international incidents involving U-2 spy planes had caused the United States to put a five-week moratorium on aerial reconnaissance over Cuba. The missions resumed on October 14, when Air Force Major Richard Heyser flew over the island and recorded video evidence of the R-12 sites. Coupled with information from Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, a CIA spy in the Soviet Military Intelligence, there was no denying the harsh truth: the Soviet Union was deploying missiles in Cuba.

Quarantining Nuclear Missiles

Kennedy wisely ruled out a military strike, noting that it was likely to miss at least some of the missiles and would prompt Soviet retaliation, probably against a vulnerable West Berlin. He ultimately chose the second option proposed by the CIA, but with one crucial difference. Rather than publicly calling it a “blockade,” which as McCone noted would have required a declaration of war, Kennedy instead termed it a “quarantine.” His military advisers nevertheless continued to push for an attack, to which Kennedy sardonically quipped, “These brass hats have one great advantage in their favor. If we listen to them, and do what they want us to do, none of us will be alive later to tell them that they were wrong” (Sheehan 445). Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara later affirmed that an American invasion would have prompted Soviet forces in Cuba “to use their nuclear weapons rather than lose them” (Rhodes 100).

Kennedy announced the blockade on October 22 in a speech that evoked the Monroe Doctrine, a nineteenth century policy which established the United States’ sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere by opposing any future European colonization in the Americas: “It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union.” Kennedy also ordered the Strategic Air Command (SAC) into Defense Condition 3 (DEFCON 3) and two days later upped it to DEFCON 2, only one step short of nuclear war. Among other preparations, 66 B-52s carrying hydrogen bombs were constantly airborne, replaced with a fresh crew every 24 hours.

The gambit was designed to exert maximum pressure on the Soviet Union. U.S. officials made sure that the Soviets would pick up the communications ordering the American nuclear forces on high alert. At the United Nations, American Ambassador Adlai Stevenson famously sparred with Soviet Ambassador Valerian Zorin over the crisis. “Well, let me say something to you, Mr. Ambassador—we do have the evidence [of missile sites],” asserted Stevenson. “We have it, and it is clear and it is incontrovertible. And let me say something else—those weapons must be taken out of Cuba” (Hanhimaki and Westad 485).

The B-59 Submarine

Perhaps the most dangerous moment of the Cuban Missile Crisis came on October 27, when U.S. Navy warships enforcing the blockade attempted to surface the Soviet B-59 submarine. It was one of four submarines sent from the Soviet Union to Cuba, all of which were detected and three of which were eventually forced to surface. The diesel-powered B-59 had lost contact with Moscow for several days, and thus was not informed of the escalating crisis. With its air conditioning broken and battery failing, temperatures inside the submarine were above 100ºF. Crew members fainted from heat exhaustion and rising carbon dioxide levels.

American warships tracking the submarine dropped depth charges on either side of the B-59 as a warning. The crew, unaware of the blockade, thought that perhaps war had been declared. Vadim Orlov, an intelligence officer aboard the submarine, recalled how the American ships “surrounded us and started to tighten the circle, practicing attacks and dropping depth charges. They exploded right next to the hull. It felt like you were sitting in a metal barrel, which somebody is constantly blasting with a sledgehammer.”

Unbeknownst to the Americans, the B-59 was equipped with a T-5 nuclear-tipped torpedo. It was capable of a blast equivalent to 10 kilotons of TNT, roughly two-thirds the strength of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Firing without a direct order from Moscow, however, required the consent of all three senior officers on board. Orlov remembered Captain Valentin Savitsky shouting, “We’re going to blast them now! We will die, but we will sink them all—we will not disgrace our Navy!” Political officer Ivan Semonovich Maslennikov agreed that they should launch the torpedo.

The last remaining officer, Second Captain Vasili Alexandrovich Arkhipov, dissented. They did not know for sure that the ship was under attack, he argued. Why not surface and then await orders from Moscow? In the end, Arkhipov’s view prevailed. The B-59 surfaced near the American warships and the submarine set off north to return to the Soviet Union without incident.

Armageddon Averted

Although the Americans and the Soviets ultimately reached an agreement, it took almost a week of tense negotiations following the institution of the blockade. Meanwhile, the fate of the world continued to hang in the balance. On October 26, Khrushchev sent a private letter to Kennedy proposing a resolution to the crisis: “We, for our part, will declare that our ships, bound for Cuba, will not carry any kind of armaments. You would declare that the United States will not invade Cuba with its forces and will not support any sort of forces which might intend to carry out an invasion of Cuba. Then the necessity for the presence of our military specialists in Cuba would disappear.” A deal was on the table—the Soviet Union would remove the missiles if the United States was willing to accept Castro’s communist regime in Cuba.

Once again, Kennedy refused to retaliate. Unbeknownst to many of his advisors, the President instructed his brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, to meet secretly with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. The United States was willing remove the missiles from Turkey within five months, but under the condition that it not be part of any public resolution to the conflict. Given that Turkey was a member of NATO, an admission that the United States was trading missiles in Turkey to resolve the situation in Cuba would have undermined the alliance. The secret agreement was not revealed until decades later.

The next day, Khrushchev sent a letter to Kennedy agreeing to the terms and announced an effective end to the crisis on Radio Moscow: “The Soviet government, in addition to previously issued instructions on the cessation of further work at building sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you describe as ‘offensive,’ and their crating and return to the Soviet Union.” Kennedy hailed the decision as “an important and constructive contribution to peace” while warning of “the compelling necessity for ending the arms race and reducing world tensions.”

The Soviet Union began to dismantle the nuclear sites in Cuba within a day of the agreement. Fidel Castro—furious with Khrushchev’s decision to give in to American demands—refused to let in any U.N. inspectors to verify the removal of the missiles. The Soviets had to resort to loading missiles on ship decks and uncovering them at sea, where they could be photographed by American planes. The United States lifted the blockade on November 20 and removed the Jupiter missiles from Turkey by April 1963. In the end, however, the removal of the missiles was a fairly meaningless gesture as the new Minuteman ICBMs had rendered the Jupiters obsolete.

The shock of the Cuban Missile Crisis was a highly influential factor in the success of future arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, such as the ban on atmospheric testing. As Khrushchev affirmed only days after the end of the crisis, “We fully agree with regard to three types of tests or, so to say, tests in three environments. This is banning of tests in atmosphere, in outer space and under water” (Hanhimaki and Westad 488). Less than a year later, the two superpowers signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) , which included the principles outlined by Khrushchev. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) followed in 1968.

Nevertheless, the years after the crisis also saw a massive increase in the construction of nuclear weapons in the Soviet Union. The Soviet stockpile tripled by the end of the decade and peaked at over 40,000 warheads during the 1980s. This phenomenon can be explained in part by the fact that Soviet leaders felt they had little choice but to capitulate during the crisis given the comparative weakness of their nuclear arsenal. As Soviet lieutenant general Nikolai Detinov explained, “Because of the strategic [imbalance] between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union had to accept everything that the United States dictated to it and this had a painful effect on our country and our government…. All our economic resources were mobilized [afterward] to solve this problem” (Rhodes 94).

The crisis also prompted the creation of the Moscow-Washington hotline, a direct telephone link between the Kremlin and the White House designed to prevent future escalations. Kennedy also ordered the creation of the nuclear “football” which would give him and future presidents the means to order a nuclear strike within minutes.

U.S. invasion plan of Cuba, 1962

A U.S. Navy Lockheed P-2 Neptune flies over a Soviet freighter, 1962

CIA map of “reconnaissance objectives in Cuba,” October 5, 1962

NPIC Deputy Director David Parker shows photographic evidence of missiles in Cuba at the UN, October 25, 1962

​Hanhimaki, Jussi M. and Odd Arne Westad, eds. The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts . Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Gaddis, John Lewis. The Cold War: A New History . New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2005.

Rhodes, Richard. Arsenals of Folly . New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007.

Sheehan, Neil. A Fiery Peace in a Cold War . New York, NY: Random House, 2009.

"The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962:" Documents from the National Security Archive

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Lesson Plan

The Cuban Missile Crisis and Its Relevance Today

Sixty years ago, the world teetered on the brink of nuclear war. Today, we face a new nuclear threat as events in Ukraine escalate. What are the lessons of the Cuban missile crisis for us now?

By Jeremy Engle

Lesson Overview

Sixty years ago this week, the United States and the Soviet Union narrowly averted catastrophe over the installation of nuclear-armed Soviet missiles on Cuba, just 90 miles from U.S. shores. During the standoff, President John F. Kennedy believed that the chances the crisis would escalate to war, he later confided , were “between 1 in 3 and even.”

How did the crisis begin? How did it end? And what lessons can it provide today, as another nuclear threat looms over the war in Ukraine?

In this lesson, students will learn how and why the United States and the Soviet Union came to the brink of nuclear war in 1962 by closely examining a curated selection of primary and secondary sources — photographs and original news reporting, letters and telegrams, newsreels and newspaper headlines — from the archives of The New York Times and beyond. Then, you will consider the lessons from that tense showdown and what they can provide today.

The front page of The New York Times on Oct. 23, 1962

The front page of The New York Times on Oct. 24, 1962

The front page of The New York Times on Oct. 25, 1962

The front page of The New York Times on Oct. 26, 1962

The front page of The New York Times on Oct. 27, 1962

The front page of The New York Times on Oct. 28, 1962

The front page of The New York Times on Oct. 29, 1962

What do you know about the Cuban missile crisis?

How did it begin? How did it end? Which nations and leaders were involved? And why are the events of 60 years ago still studied today by students and world leaders alike?

Look closely at the collection of headlines above from New York Times reporting on the crisis from 1962. Then, in writing or through discussion with a partner, respond to the following prompts:

What do you notice about the headlines — the language, style, tone and point of view?

What can you learn about the Cuban missile crisis from the collection? What story do these headlines tell?

How do you think you would have reacted to the Times headlines had you been alive at the time?

What questions do you have about Times headlines or the Cuban missile crisis in general?

Write a catchy headline to capture the story of the entire collection of Times front pages.

Explore Primary and Secondary Sources From The Times and Beyond

Below we have curated a collection of primary and secondary sources from The Times and elsewhere, including photos, original news reporting, newsreels and historical analyses, for students to examine and investigate, to better understand what it was like to live through these events as well as what really happened during these tumultuous 13 days.

Teachers might use some or all of these resources as part of a jigsaw or stations activity, so students can interact with multiple primary and secondary source collections. We also offer a set of questions for writing and reflection.

Documents Collection A: A photographic record, published on the 50th anniversary

President John F. Kennedy addressed Americans by television and radio on Oct. 22, 1962, telling the country for the first time about Soviet nuclear missiles being installed in Cuba. He proclaimed that the United States would impose a naval blockade of Cuba to prevent the Soviets from shipping any more missiles there. The president’s desk, cleared of all ornaments, was covered with felt for the broadcast.

Headlines from British newspapers on Oct. 23, 1962. The day after Kennedy’s nationally televised speech, newspapers around the world reported on the missile crisis.

The United States Navy evacuated all American dependents and noncombatants from its Guantánamo Bay base on the southeastern end of Cuba on Oct. 22, 1962, in the hours before Kennedy first spoke to the nation about the missile crisis. In this photograph, an unidentified baby was evacuated by Marines. Several hundred dependents were evacuated by air, while more than 2,000 were evacuated by sea.

A Marine with his weapon across his knees in Key West, Fla., on Oct. 25, 1962, waited for a ride as the Cuban crisis boiled.

On Oct. 25, the Cuban government showed this photograph on Cuban television, purportedly of Cuban militiamen in Havana on their way to alert posts the day after Kennedy proclaimed the naval blockade.

A couple inspected aerial reconnaissance photos of Cuba at the United Nations headquarters in New York on Oct. 25. Adlai Stevenson, the American ambassador to the United Nations, introduced the photos earlier in the day at a Security Council emergency meeting to prove the existence of ballistic missile bases in Cuba.

The missile crisis set off protests in major cities around the world. In this Oct. 27 photo from Tass, the Soviet news agency, young people gathered in front of the United States Embassy in Moscow to demonstrate against the blockade of Cuba.

Demonstrations also took place in some American cities. In this photograph, a group protested against the blockade at San Francisco’s Civic Center on Oct. 27.

Residents and tourists gathered on Smathers Beach in Key West on Oct. 28 to look at the Army’s Hawk antiaircraft missiles. The United States also had hundreds of bombers and ballistic missiles on alert during the crisis. 

An American P2V Neptune patrol plane flew over a Soviet freighter during the Cuban missile crisis in this 1962 photograph.

Schoolchildren in St. Petersburg, Fla., practiced the “duck and cover” method of protection during a disaster drill on Oct. 25, 1962.

First graders at Miles Elementary School in Tampa, Fla., showed off the jugs of water they brought to school for use in an emergency on Oct. 25. Schoolchildren were asked to bring water and canned food as part of Civil Defense preparations during the missile crisis. 

Brig. Gen. Jack J. Catton, left, head of the honor guard, saluted as the body of Maj. Rudolph Anderson, a U-2 pilot shot down over Cuba, was put on an Air Force jet for shipment to Washington, D.C. The downing of Major Anderson’s U-2 on Oct 27, 1962, heightened the tension between the Soviet Union and the United States, though historians later learned that the decision to fire the missile was made by a Soviet commander on the ground in Cuba and disapproved of by his superiors in Moscow. 

On Oct. 28, 1962, Kennedy and the Soviet premier, Nikita S. Khrushchev, ended the standoff after secret negotiations. The Soviets agreed to remove the missiles and related equipment from Cuba, while the United States secretly agreed to remove ballistic missiles from Italy and Turkey. In the weeks that followed, the Soviets allowed the United States to verify that they were removing the missiles from Cuba. In this photo, fuselage crates on the Soviet ship Kasimov were being opened by the Soviet crew for American air inspection in December 1962.

A deactivated V-75 surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile on display at a site with Soviet-made cold war relics at La Cabana, a fortress in Havana, on Oct. 15, 2012. 

It is often said that “a picture is worth a thousand words.” What can images from the Cuban missile crisis reveal and evoke that words cannot?

Scroll through the Times photo collection and look at the images and their captions. What do you notice and wonder? What image stands out most? What questions would you ask the people in them or the photographer who took them?

Documents Collection B: Times original reporting

What’s it like to read about a crisis unfolding in real time?

Below, we provide links to five original Times articles featured in the front page collection from the warm-up activity. (You can find all seven articles featured in the front page collection here .) Choose at least ONE article from the collection to read closely and take notes, paying close to the language, sources used, and point of view:

U.S. Imposes Arms Blockade on Cuba on Finding Offensive Missile Sites; Kennedy Ready for Soviet Showdown (Oct. 23, 1962)

Soviet Challenges U.S. Right to Blockade; Interception of 25 Russian Ships Ordered; Cuba Quarantine Backed by United O.A.S. (Oct. 24, 1962)

U.S. Finds Cuba Speeding Buildup of Bases, Warns of Further Action; U.N. Talks Open (Oct. 27, 1962)

U.S. Gets Soviet Offer to End Cuba Bases, Rejects Bid to Link It to Those in Turkey (Oct. 28, 1962)

U.S. and Soviet Reach Accord on Cuba; Kennedy Accepts Khrushchev Pledge to Remove Missiles Under U.N. Watch (Oct. 29, 1962)

Documents Collection C: Letters between Fidel Castro, Nikita Khrushchev and President Kennedy

Much of the Cuban missile crisis unfolded away from the public view. Examine communications between the leaders of the United States, Soviet Union and Cuba from the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum . Skim the four letters below and choose ONE to read in-depth. What did you learn about the intentions and psychology of the leaders? What was most surprising or illuminating?

Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, (Oct. 22, 1962)

Chairman Khrushchev’s Letter to President Kennedy (Oct. 23, 1962)

Letter from Fidel Castro to Chairman Khrushchev (Oct. 26, 1962)

Letter from Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy (Oct. 27, 1962)

Documents Collection D: Universal Studios Newsreels

In 1962, many Americans received their news each week in their neighborhood movie theaters from newsreels that were shown before feature films.

Below are three newsreels devoted to the Cuban missile crisis. Watch the first minute of each, then choose ONE to watch in its entirety. How do you think you would have reacted to the film had you watched in your local theater at the time? In what ways is it similar or different to The Times’s coverage? In what ways might it be considered propaganda?

“ The Red Threat: President Orders Cuban Blockade ” (Released on Oct. 22, 1962)

“ The Cuban Missile Crisis ” (Released Oct. 25, 1962)

“ Cuban Missile Crisis Eases: Awaiting Missile Removal ” (Released on Oct. 29, 1962)

Documents Collection E: Secondary sources from The Times

Mythology surrounds the Cuban missile crisis. Today, conventional wisdom is that the crisis was a triumph of U.S. brinkmanship: that Kennedy and Khrushchev faced each other “eyeball to eyeball” and the Soviet leader blinked. However, historians now believe the peaceful resolution to the standoff was really a triumph of behind-the-scenes diplomacy — away from the press and the public’s view.

Read ONE of the following secondary sources from the pages of The Times to learn more about what the public — and even the principle actors — didn’t know at the time. How does this new information add to or change your understanding of the Cuban missile crisis? How does it challenge the myths or conventional wisdom of the dangerous standoff?

Gaps in the Missile Crisis Story (1989)

At Cuba Conference, Old Foes Exchange Notes on 1962 Missile Crisis (2002)

What You Think You Know About the Cuban Missile Crisis is Wrong (2008)

The Price of a 50-Year Myth (2012)

Questions for Reflection and Discussion

After students have explored their document collection or collections, they might respond in a small group or whole class discussion to some or all of the following prompts:

What did you learn about the Cuban missile crisis from your document collection? What did you find most informative, surprising, provocative or affecting? Which resources and documents stood out to you and why?

What are strengths and limitations of primary sources? Secondary sources? Which collection was most informative? Engaging?

What understanding of the Cuban missile crisis would you have gained had you been following the events through the images and pages of The New York Times in 1962? Do you think it would have been accurate?

How might your understanding have been different had you been a reader of Cuban or Russian newspapers?

Why did the United States and the Soviet Union come to the brink of nuclear war in 1962? What factors contributed to the crisis?

What factors contributed to ending the crisis without a war? What role did leadership play in averting disaster?

What questions do you still have about the Cuban missile crisis? What other kinds of primary and secondary sources would you most like to explore further?

Make Connections Between the Cuban Missile Crisis and Today

What do you know about the Russia-Ukraine war ? Have you been following the news since Russia’s invasion of the smaller Eastern European country last February?

The threat of nuclear war has hummed in the background of the conflict for over seven months now . Now, it’s impossible to ignore. In a recent televised speech, President Vladimir Putin warned that should Western forces endanger the “integrity” of Russian territory — which, as Putin defines it, may now include the four regions of Ukraine that he illegally annexed — “we will certainly use all the means at our disposal.” He added, “This is not a bluff.”

In response, President Biden warned that Mr. Putin’s threats could devolve into a nuclear conflict, saying: “We have not faced the prospect of Armageddon since Kennedy and the Cuban missile crisis.”

In “ In Dealing With Putin Threat, Biden Turns to Lessons of Cuban Missile Crisis ,” David Sanger writes:

President Biden’s declaration on Thursday night that the world may be facing “the prospect of Armageddon” if President Vladimir V. Putin uses a tactical nuclear weapon in Ukraine included a revealing side note: that Mr. Biden has been looking to help the Russian president find an “off-ramp” that might avert the worst outcome. His logic came right out of the Cuban Missile Crisis, to which Mr. Biden referred twice in his comments at a Democratic fund-raiser in New York, a good indication of what is on his mind. In that famous case — the closest the world came to a full nuclear exchange, 60 years ago this month — President John F. Kennedy struck a secret bargain with Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet premier, to remove American missiles from Turkey. With that deal, which came to light only later, a disaster that could have killed tens of millions of Americans and untold numbers of Soviet citizens was averted. For weeks now, Mr. Biden’s aides have been debating whether there might be an analogous understanding, a way for the wounded Russian leader to find an out. They have offered no details, knowing that secrecy may be the key to seeking any successful exit and avoiding the conditions in which a cornered Mr. Putin reaches for his battlefield nuclear weapons. Karine Jean-Pierre, the White House press secretary, reiterated on Friday that Mr. Biden had no new intelligence about nuclear weapons use and said she “saw no indications” the Russians were “preparing to use them.”

In the guest essay “ I’ve Studied 13 Days of the Cuban Missile Crisis. This Is What I See When I Look at Putin ,” Michael Dobbs, a historian and former foreign correspondent, looks at the parallels between the current conflict in Ukraine and the one in Cuba 60 years ago:

Two nuclear-armed states on a collision course with no obvious exit ramp. An erratic Russian leader using apocalyptic language — “if you want us to all meet in hell, it’s up to you.” Showdowns at the United Nations, with each side accusing the other of essentially gambling with Armageddon. For six decades, the Cuban missile crisis has been viewed as the defining confrontation of the modern age, the world’s closest brush with nuclear annihilation. The war in Ukraine presents perils of at least equal magnitude, particularly now that Vladimir Putin has backed himself into a corner by declaring large chunks of neighboring Ukraine as belonging to Russia “forever.” As two countries proceed up an escalatory ladder, mistakes become increasingly likely — as the Cuban missile crisis made clear. In a conventional war, it is possible for political leaders to make significant mistakes and for the human race to survive, battered but intact. In a nuclear standoff, even a minor misunderstanding or miscommunication can have catastrophic consequences. In October 1962, it was President John Kennedy who declared a naval blockade, or quarantine, of Cuba to prevent reinforcement of the Soviet military position on the island. This put the onus on his Kremlin counterpart, Nikita Khrushchev, to either accept the clearly signaled American condition for ending the crisis (a full withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba) or risk nuclear war. This time, the roles are reversed: Mr. Putin is seeking to enforce a red line by insisting he will use “ all available means ,” including his nuclear arsenal, to defend the newly, unilaterally expanded borders of Mother Russia. President Biden has promised to support Ukraine’s attempts to defend itself. It is unclear how Mr. Putin will react to his red line being ignored.

Read one or both of the above articles. Then, in writing or discussion with a partner, respond to these prompts:

What’s your reaction to Mr. Putin’s threats? What do you think of Mr. Biden’s warning about the “prospect of Armageddon”?

How worried should we be about the use of nuclear weapons in the Russia-Ukraine war?

Compare the two crises: How are they similar and different? Compare the leaders, then and now, Mr. Biden and Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Khrushchev and Mr. Putin. How are their personalities, experiences and ambitions similar and different?

How is the Times reporting similar or different, then and now? Do you think we are getting all of the information from the press, or do you think, as with the Cuban missile crisis, there is behind-the-scenes diplomacy we do not know of? Do you think there are perspectives and viewpoints we are not being exposed to?

Going Further Activity

Imagine you are an adviser to President Biden: What approach would you recommend he take with Mr. Putin and his war in Ukraine? Based on your understanding of the Cuban missile crisis, what advice would you give?

Consider the following questions as a guide:

What are the lessons of the Cuban missile crisis? What did the leaders get right? What did they get wrong? Which of these lessons are applicable to today?

Should Mr. Biden be seeking to find an “off-ramp” for Mr. Putin to avert nuclear war? What might one look like?

If Mr. Putin uses nuclear weapons in his war with Ukraine, how should the United States respond — or not respond?

What do you think Mr. Kennedy would do if he were president today?

To help you formulate your recommendations to Mr. Biden, you might consider these additional articles and essays from The Times:

A Time of Unease and Challenge for Democracy

If Putin Uses a Nuclear Weapon, How Should the World Respond? (Opinion)

How Seriously Should We Take Putin’s Nuclear Threat in Ukraine? (Opinion)

How Do You Handle a Wounded Putin? (Opinion)

Or, these further resources beyond The Times:

The Cuban Missile Crisis Was 60 Years Ago, but It’s Urgently Relevant Today (The Nation)

How Not to Talk About Nuclear War (Commentary Magazine)

The Most Important Lesson of the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston Globe)

60 Years After Cuban Missile Crisis, Activists Demand World Leaders “Defuse Nuclear War” (Democracy Now!)

Jeremy Engle joined The Learning Network as a staff editor in 2018 after spending more than 20 years as a classroom humanities and documentary-making teacher, professional developer and curriculum designer working with students and teachers across the country. More about Jeremy Engle

Cuban Missile Crisis: A Historical Perspective

JOHN SHATTUCK : Good afternoon. It’s a beautiful afternoon, and we all have a spectacular view. As a special incentive for having us all be inside on this lovely day, we've opened up the-- you can see what we rarely do-— the screen. And only our speakers, unfortunately, will not be able to see it. But afterwards, we’ll give them a special treat.

I’m John Shattuck, the Chief Executive Officer of the John F. Kennedy Library Foundation. And on behalf of myself and Deborah Leff, the Director of the Kennedy Library, I want to especially welcome you here today to this wonderful second in our series of discussions of an event that took place 40 years ago, but is very much alive today in many, many dimensions as you will hear.

I want to thank the sponsors of these forums, Boston Capital and the Lowell Institute, and our media partners who will help project far beyond the walls of this forum on the radio and in the Internet, the Boston Globe , WBUR and Boston.com.

I also want to commend the former historian of the Kennedy Library, Sheldon Stern, who many of you have probably seen, who is in the audience today and has a piece on this Cuban Missile Crisis in today’s Boston Globe .

This afternoon, we will look at something that took place 40 years ago and something that historians have all agreed were 13 of the most perilous days in world history. The Cuban Missile Crisis was in many ways the event more than any other that shaped the course of the Kennedy presidency and the way it would be remembered for generations to come. It was also the event above all that defined the nature of the Cold War and demonstrated how to survive it.

And it was one of the events in a stream of events that took place over those thousand days in the Kennedy administration that perhaps best defined the character and the qualities of leadership of President Kennedy.

The background of the Missile Crisis is very simple, and you will hear much more about this from our distinguished panel of historians.

Nikita Khrushchev expected the United States to invade Cuba and drive Fidel Castro from office before the end of 1962. Khrushchev thought he had a daring idea about how to deter the invasion while, at the same time, demonstrating to the world that the Soviets could compete with the United States in missile power. And so, he decided secretly to send offensive nuclear missiles to Cuba and then to call Kennedy’s bluff when they were installed.

As we know, President Kennedy did not let that happen. But the means he used to achieve that end were extremely complex and subtle. And his leadership in that regard especially speaks across the decades as Americans today confront another crisis under a different President with the world again on the brink of war, apparently.

President Kennedy’s approach to the Cuban Missile Crisis is important to understand today perhaps more than at any time in the 40 years since these events occurred. In his biography of JFK, Ted Sorensen wrote that, and I quote: "Above all, Kennedy believed in retaining a choice, not a choice between red or dead or Holocaust or humiliation, but a variety of military options in the event of aggression and an opportunity for time and maneuver in the instruments of diplomacy, and a balanced approach to every crisis which combined both defense and diplomacy"

To help us understand that essence of decision, we have an extraordinary panel of historians who will guide us through this most dangerous moment in world history.

Our moderator today in many ways owns the very title, essence of decision, because his seminal book by that name is still the best-selling account of the Crisis 31 years after it was  first published. Professor Graham Allison directs Harvard’s Center for Science and International Affairs. He served as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the first Clinton administration and before that, as Dean of the Kennedy School at Harvard, where he was credited with building one of the country’s best schools of government. Professor Allison is a long-time Russian expert and authority on nuclear policy and weapons of mass destruction. In recent years, he has been instrumental in assembling teams of scholars to analyze terrorism in its multiple dimensions.

Professor James Blight is a professor of international relations at Brown University and an expert of the Cuban Missile Crisis. He is the co-author of a new book with Robert McNamara who spoke here last week, Wilson’s Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21 st Century , and of another new book with Philip Brenner which is on sale in our bookstore, and I will shamelessly publicize it to you, Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba’s Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis . Professor Blight has also published many other books on U.S.-Cuban relations, Vietnam, and other areas of international relations.

Svetlana Savranskaya is Director of Russia Programs at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C. She has a distinguished academic background, having received her diploma with highest academic honors from Moscow State University in 1988 and the best dissertation in the year in international relations in 1998 from Emory University. She is a specialist on Russian Affairs. Two years ago, she was appointed adjunct professor in international relations at  American University in Washington, D.C.

Julia Sweig is Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Latin American Program at the Council on Foreign Relations, where she also directs a roundtable series on U.S.-Cuba relations. And her book, Inside the Cuban Revolution: Fidel Castro and the Urban Underground, will be published next summer by Harvard University Press. It was published. It’s out front. There’s another book  to shamelessly promote to you, and it will be on sale afterwards, and I’m sure Dr. Sweig, as Phil Brenner and Professor Blight, would be willing to sign her book as well. She is a professorial lecturer at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.

And finally, Philip Brenner is a professor of international relations at American University specializing in U.S. foreign policy process with an emphasis on Congress and U.S. policy toward Latin America and, as you’ve heard, he is the co-author with James Blight of the new book that will be available after this for your purchase and his signature. He has published widely on U.S. policy toward Cuba and Central American and on the Cuban Missile Crisis, and is a member of the Advisory Board of the National Security Archive.

So please join me in welcoming this distinguished panel of historians to discuss and elucidate for us the Cuban Missile Crisis then and now.

GRAHAM ALLISON : I think we’re going to start with five minutes from Phil and Jim, particularly focused on their book. Then I’m going to try to put that in a little bit larger perspective. We’re going to have five minutes of our other two members of the panel. And then, after a little bit of conversation here, we’ll go to questions from the audience.

PHILIP BRENNER : Thanks very much, Graham. Thanks to the Kennedy Library. Thank you all for coming out on such wonderful day. At the Library here, I particularly want to thank Kiki Helffenstein and Tom Putnam who've made coming here just a pleasure, and very easy. Two of the nicest people I've ever worked with.

John Shattuck may be too modest. Other people may not tell you this, but the whole process of getting information about the Missile Crisis very much owes a debt to him. He was very much involved in helping to create the National Security Archive, which has been very important in declassifying or getting declassified government documents. And John was the Chairman of the Board for a number of years. So it was really a pleasure to see him again here.

History, as he suggested, is very important to all of us. And we often use the cliché about understanding history so we won't make mistakes again. But it’s interesting that also history can be either misused or, in this case, I want to help us see that history can be understood very differently from different perspectives.

We know from reading Essence of Decision how important the Munich analogy was to President Kennedy. The notion that if you give anything essential to a rapacious dictator, it won't satisfy their appetite. It will only make them more hungry, and they won't be appeased. It will only bring on more war. And that lesson hung over much of the decision-making in the Missile Crisis.

So listen to Fidel Castro talking on October 30. On October 28, as you know, the Missile Crisis, from our perspective, is over. The 13 days has ended. But in order to verify that the Soviets have taken missiles out of Cuba, we’re demanding that we be allowed to inspect inside Cuba the missiles being removed. And we’re also demanding they remove some other weaponry. Soviets are willing to oblige, but Cuba is not.

And so, the Secretary General -- the Acting Secretary General goes to Cuba to meet with Fidel Castro. And this is what Castro says to him. He said, "The road to the last world war was the road that included the toleration of German’s annexation of Austria and its dissolution of Czechoslovakia. That’s what led to the war. These dangers are a warning to us. We know the course that aggressors like to follow. In our case, we can foresee the course that the United States wants to follow."

Munich was important to Cuba. But they took exactly the opposite lesson. The United States was the aggressor from his perspective. He was not going to give in to this rapacious aggressor, because it was surely going to lead to war. A very interesting use of that. And in some sense, the whole point of our book, Sad and Luminous Days , is to try to get inside the head of the other side so that you can understand how they think so you don't make mistakes before it’s too late. Because those kinds of mistakes, when you're dealing with nuclear weapons, can be devastating.

Let me give you just one small sense of this, how differently each of the three countries thought about the Missile Crisis. You know, in the United States, we call it the Cuban Missile Crisis. This was a crisis between the superpowers about the missiles in Cuba that occurred in Cuba. Cuban Missile Crisis. Thirteen days is the focus of this and because that’s the period from which Kennedy learned about it to the time that Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the missiles.

The Soviets call the Missile Crisis the Caribbean Crisis. They focus on the fact that this was a superpower confrontation in the Caribbean. They wanted to de-emphasize Cuba. This was between the United States and the Soviets. Cuba wasn’t really involved in this. And it was not about missiles, but it was about the Cold War. This is sort of like a teenager’s acne. You never know where it’s going to pop up. That pimple. This time it popped up in the Caribbean. Okay. But the Caribbean wasn’t the place that caused it. It was the Cold War.

And from their perspective, what was most important probably was the U.S. military build-up in 1961 after Kennedy’s elected -- elected on the notion that there is a missile gap. And then discovers that the missile gap is in the U.S., favoring continues to build up a kind of threat to the Soviet Union. The generals there fear that there's going to be a first strike by the United States. They're pressing Khrushchev. Part of the motive was to save Cuba, but part of the motive was to get medium-range missiles closer to the United States so that they could have a deterrent effect.

Cuba’s perspective. Cuba calls this the October Crisis. They had had a lot of crises with the U.S. This one happened to occur in October. This was about the United States trying to overthrow Cuba. The Cuban Missile Crisis for them begins at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. And it’s a period when afterwards they experience a covert war that the United States is waging against them. They're sure there will be yet another invasion, this time with U.S. troops. And so their concern is about their devastation.

It’s very interesting the notion of sad and luminous days that comes out of this. Just as Svetlana’s going to help us understand something about the Soviet perspective, let me just give you a final glimpse into the Cuban perspective. We along with the Soviets thought this was great relief, a moment when the world came to the brink and we were saved. Only one U.S. solider died and he was the pilot of the U2.

Who could imagine that this would be called Sad and Luminous Days ? But that’s how the Cubans think about it. Che Guevara, in a famous letter to Fidel Castro, talks about the sad and luminous days -- he called it the Caribbean Crisis, actually -- of the Caribbean Crisis. And how could anyone imagine that it would be sad not to blow up the world? What would be luminous about going to Armageddon?

From a Cuban perspective, what was luminous was that they were arm in arm. They were ready to do battle with the United States. They were ready to defend themselves. Castro says to U Thant, "We won't be like Austria and Czechoslovakia. We will defend ourselves to the very last person."

So there was that kind of adrenaline rush of what was said. What was said was that they'd been betrayed by their friend, their ally, the people they trusted, the Soviet Union. They were prepared to put themselves on the front line for the cause of international socialism. The Soviets weren’t. The Soviets were willing to sell them out. To take not only the missiles out, but every last piece of weaponry they were going to use to defend themselves from U.S. attack. And this sad and luminous sensibility remains today. From the Cuban perspective, the crisis actually never ended. War was avoided, but the crisis continues. I’ll let Jim pick up with that.

JAMES BLIGHT : I was told once by one of my professors to watch out for professors standing in back of podiums, because they will speak for at least 50 minutes. And possibly for an hour-and-a- half because that’s how long their classes are. So I’m velcroed to this chair.

Before I say something about the Missile Crisis, I want to say something about this fellow over here to my left who's now my mentor with regard to the Missile Crisis. I spent close to ten years at the Kennedy School when Graham was Dean. But he’s everybody’s.

In the 1960s, this guy got the Kennedy administration together on many occasions when the memories were still fresh and was able to put that into one of the great scholarly works of the history of American foreign policy, The Essence of Decision , which is now out in a new edition. And I would say worth re-reading, except it’s not re-reading. You’d have to read it as a new book, because so much has happened in the interim. I will also say that Graham and I had a lunch on the date I can't remember, somewhere in 1985 or ’86. And my proposal was to study the Cuban Missile Crisis. And he said, "That’s kind of a dumb idea. There's a guy here named Graham Allison who did this. And,well, I don't think there'll be anything new."

But who could tell in 1985 that by the late 1980s, this country called the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev would open up. And by January 1989, we were all together -- Phil, Graham, and I -- in Moscow, treated to the most amazing array of people from Andrei Gromyko and Anatoly Dobrynin to generals to other people who were telling us basically everything they remembered and knew about the crisis. So, thank you, Graham. And I’m glad that absolutely nobody has followed your advice, including yourself.

To get inside the view of the Cubans is not so easy. And one of the things that one has to do, I think, in regard to the Missile Crisis is kind of set aside most of what we -- if you're at least my age -- remember about the crisis or think we know about the crisis. That it was two superpowers banging heads. And either we won or they lost, or a more charitable and more accurate description from their point of view is that, instead of one side backing down, both sides backed off. But just barely in time. This has absolutely no relationship to the ways the Cubans see the crisis.

And what I would ask you to do as I give you essentially what is a composite of Fidel Castro’s objects to the way the crisis was handled from the standpoint of the Soviet behavior. Just ask yourself, in anticipation of the question and answer period, whether this situation reminds you of anything going on in the world right now. Somebody might have weapons of mass destruction. Somebody who’s not nearly as large as we are. And obviously there's some problem because they think differently than we do about these weapons and about a lot of other things.

Number one, Khrushchev refused to make a public announcement of the missile deployment. Kennedy’s speech on October 22, 7:00 p.m., 1962 is about lying. It’s about deceit. That is the principle message in that speech. People who lie and deceive about nuclear weapons cannot be trusted and this is a grave situation that has arisen. Because it's not only a secret deployment, it is a deceptive deployment. The Cubans recommended, right from the very beginning, that they do it publicly. I think that speech would have been a lot harder for Ted Sorensen to write if that deployment had happened publicly.

Second, the Soviets refused properly to camouflage the sites where the missiles were to be deployed. When the Cubans said, "How are you going to keep the Americans from finding out? Don't you know that Key West is 91 miles north of here?" They said, "We’ll move them in where the palm trees are. The Cuban palm trees were only roughly half to two-thirds as tall as the missiles. [laughter] But it’s this sort of cavalier treatment of all this stuff that bothered the Cubans.

The Soviets refused to publish what the Cubans regarded as a legal and binding treaty between the two countries that defined the terms of employment that would have justified it. We had missiles in Turkey. We had missiles in Italy. We had missiles in Great Britain. We had nuclear weapons in West Germany. What's wrong with this? Just go public and say that this a fact, and that’s the way it is. Validate this. Legitimate this. "No," the Soviets said, "We have to do this secretly."

Well, the Soviets refused on all occasions to challenge the United States at the blockade line which went up, the quarantine line which went up at 10:00 a.m. on the 24 th , Wednesday, the 24 th of October. The Cubans really and truly were hoping that those Soviet ships would try to crash through that line. Many of us are glad that they didn’t.

I remember watching Walter Cronkite and a very young-looking Dan Rather, who was moving around little pieces of paper on a map with a semicircle roughly 500 miles North-Northeast of Cuba. And when those ships stopped, they seemed almost to be touching the U.S. ships, the pink pieces of paper representing it, that is. And many of us breathed deeply for the first time in quite a while.

Charles Collingwood, who was covering this for CBS, said shortly afterwards, "This was the time that I and all of us thought that World War III would begin." The Cubans were furious that the Soviets didn’t try to crash through the line, because it indicated to them that the Soviets perhaps had already given up and were already going to cave in to the Americans.

The Soviets refused to consider in the resolution of the crisis any of Cuba’s interests. Cuba wanted Guantanamo Bay back. Cuba wanted no more flights over their territory. Cuba wanted guarantees that the base CIA back to bases in Central America that were being used for attacks on Cuba by Cuban exiles would be ended. They wanted this, and they wanted more. And none of this figured in the resolution of the crisis.

Six, the Soviets refused to consult with or even properly to inform the Cubans of the Soviet decision to terminate the crisis and the deployment. Fidel Castro heard about it on the radio. He is reported to have -- depending on the orientation of who was reporting -- to have gone berserk, to have thrown things. But what it said to him was two things.

One is, "They're treating us like children. You get this constantly in Cuba in regard to the Soviet what they call ‘the Soviet imperialists’. They treated us like children."

And secondly, because our interests were never involved in this, what is going to happen is that the Soviets will withdraw all those missiles which the Americans say are offensive, namely everything, including the Soviet troops in Cuba. And Khrushchev won't make it a condition that the Americans stand down their forces -- their nuclear forces and their conventional forces.

So the minute these weapons are gone, the Americans will invade. They’ll occupy the country. They’ll destroy the Cuban Revolution. And they’ll put in a puppet regime that’s probably locked up in a hotel room somewhere in Miami right now. Because that’s exactly the situation during the Bay of Pigs invasion: there were some people locked up in hotel rooms in Miami who were not transported to Cuba.

Finally, seven, the Soviets refused to leave all but a faint residue of a tripwire to deter a U.S. invasion. There were 43,000 Soviet fighting men on that island by late October 1962. Three, four, five times what the CIA was recommending. And the only troops that were left, once the deployment was undone, was a couple of thousand Soviet soldiers that actually wound up in a rather humiliating fashion, calling themselves "a training brigade," not much of a tripwire at all.

So from the Cuban point of view, they found out a lot about the Soviet Union. And what this book contains, Sad and Luminous Days , chapter 2 is a speech by Fidel Castro in January 1968 to the Central Committee that was kept secret until now. It’s never been published even in Cuba until now. And it is the most scathing attack on the Soviet Union I have ever read. And if any of this had gotten out, the Soviets would undoubtedly have broken relations with Cuba, cut off their oil in 1968, and essentially strangled Cuba. But Fidel wanted these people to know that, even though we need them, you must never ever trust them.

GRAHAM ALLISON : Thank you, gentleman. I think that, from both Jim’s and Phil’s initial comments, one sees how the wonderful complexity of the Missile Crisis continues to fascinate historians and analysts as we try to understand both what happened in that specific instance and also as we think about what the lessons may be.

So let me step back with these few comments to put just a little bit larger perspective and then we’ll have two more comments. And then I’m going to put a question to the panel about similarities and difference between what we see in the Missile Crisis and Iraq.

John has already rightly said that the events of October 1962, whose 40 th anniversary we're just now on the edge of. Next week will be the 40 th anniversary of these famous 13 days with the most dangerous moments in recorded history.

President Kennedy said at the time, and afterwards reflecting on the crisis, that he thought the odds of war were somewhere between 1-3 and even in this confrontation. That was dismissed by some people immediately afterwards as an exaggeration.

And I think, thanks to the work that Jim did, he did not take my advice and pursued, as we did, these postmortems, and kept digging the documents out, and it became more evident that there were so many possibilities in the confrontation that even were not known to President Kennedy at the time. For example, the extent of the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba by the Soviets. Tactical nuclear weapons that would have almost certainly been used against American troops who would have been invading in the aftermath of an air strike, which was a very, very likely outcome in the events that actually occurred. So I would say, myself, that President Kennedy’s estimate is a quite sensible, a quite justifiable estimate.

Had such an event in the worst of wars, within a day, 100 million could have died. Mostly not Americans. But 5-10 million Americans could have been among them. Mostly Soviets and Europeans. But this could have been the worst event in recorded history.

And as a consequence, this crisis, I think, has continued to have a hold on the imagination of commentators, and historians, and analysts, and even policy-makers. Any of you that have been reading the newspapers lately will notice that the Bush administration talks almost every week, indeed sometimes almost every day, about the Missile Crisis.

And Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Rice, has said that the President, President Bush seems to keep going back to the Missile Crisis to try to locate himself, or to have some point of reference for what he sees as going on in the current Iraqi situation.

But because the crisis has so many dimensions, and has so many layers, once seen in the historical efforts to better understand it, a number of almost successive waves in which, in the first instance, books that came out immediately afterwards by the insiders which were discussed here last week including books by Ted Sorensen and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., named this "Kennedy’s finest hour". And that has stuck. There followed after that a number of scholarly works trying to analyze the crisis, of which my book, Essence of Decision , was one of the earlier versions.

The next wave of risk activity, Jim Blight and his colleague, Bruce Allyn, instigated as we had postmortems in which participants from the U.S. and the Soviet Union, and then ultimately participants from the U.S. and Cuba, plus documents, cross-examined each other about what people were saying and thinking in order to dig up layers and layers of additional ...(inaudible). The standard histories of the Cold War in which the Missile Crisis is characterized as the defining event of the cold, the defining crisis of the Cold War.

And, finally, there's the latest efforts which is represented by the book that Phil and Jim are just now publishing, which is to see that there were a lot of other parties who were interested, with interests at stake, but whose part of the story hasn’t been told. So this is, I think, kind of coming round in a circle here as we try to bring in yet another set of interests. In the documentation, I want to call out just for special note, one very interesting fact for people who are interested in trying to learn more about this.

In the development of the documentation, there emerged a book called The Kennedy Tapes , which were the secret tapes that Kennedy made of the deliberations during the Missile Crisis, which have now been transcribed in a book by my colleague at Harvard, Ernest May and Philip Zelikow called The Kennedy Tapes . So you can actually go sit in a National Security Council meeting. Here at the library, you can actually listen to the tapes. But since they're a bit scratchy and people are talking at the same time, it’s helps to have the transcript, the Reader’s Guide .

And here to talk to you about making decisions that they think could lead to a nuclear war. So this is actually a wonderful microcosm for both trying to understand a very dangerous moment of history, but also to ask what the lessons of these events are, or events and issues like the confrontation over Iraq.

So the members of the panel will be forewarned about the first question. Let me turn now, I think, to Svetlana.

SVETLANA SAVRANSKAYA : I’ll try to be brief. And I will try to make just several points about the Soviet view of the crisis, and I hope I will be able to come to those points later in the discussion.

The first important point that I’d like to raise is what were the causes of the crisis. And several speakers before me touched upon this issue, and said that there are three very different perspectives. So for the Soviet Union, of course, the cause -- the source of the crisis was not the fact that missiles were in Cuba.

The Soviet Union, by deploying missiles in Cuba, thought it was performing quite a legal act of assistance to Cuba, which was threatened by the United States. And for the Soviet Union and for Cuba, of course, the seriousness of that threat was shown in the Bay of Pigs invasion. So the cause was the U.S. threat to Cuba.

Of course, another cause was the strategic imbalance which was felt very acutely by Khrushchev and, of course, his desire to adjust the military balance. Both sides, the United States and the Soviet Union were forced through the intelligence data to realize that there was a military build-up going on in the summer of 1962 around Cuba.

The Soviet intelligence was aware of U.S. contingency plans, or training exercises which were perceived as training or preparation for an immediate invasion of Cuba. That’s how it looked from the Soviet side.

Therefore, the act of putting the missiles in Cuba was seen as an act of legitimate assistance to an ally. Of course, projecting the influence in Latin America is nice, too. So this is the first point I wanted to make. Review of the causes is very different. The immediate crisis for the United States starts on October 14, when the missiles are discovered. But the Soviet Union -- the Soviet Union asked the question, "Why Kennedy reacted in the way he reacted? Why missiles in Cuba were unacceptable? Why missiles in Turkey, then, were acceptable to the Soviet Union?"

Because for the Soviet Union, the missiles in Cuba were the direct equivalent to the U.S. missiles in Turkey and Italy. The  Soviet  Union  sort  of  felt  surrounded  by  U.S.  bases  at  the  time.  My second point, how dangerous was the crisis? I think we will return to this question again and again and again. And more and more documents are being declassified and coming out now. The public has access to these in the Soviet Union, in Cuba. And based on the reading of the newer declassified documents, I can say that it was even more dangerous than we thought. Even more dangerous than we thought a couple of years ago.

What about the tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba? The United States, at the time, did not realize that the Soviet Union actually deployed nuclear-capable bombers, cruise missiles, and short- range launchers that could carry nuclear warheads and nuclear warheads in Cuba.

The standard procedure was that the commanders on the island could use both the strategic and the tactical nuclear weapons, only with authorization from the Soviet Premier. However, it was not exactly like that on the ground. We know that the Defense Ministry in the Soviet Union prepared draft orders to the Commander of the Soviet forces in Cuba, pre-delegating authority to use tactical nuclear weapons in two cases: U.S. air strikes or U.S. invasion landing on Cuba. The order was never signed by Khrushchev himself or by Defense Minister Myunorvsky (?). But...(inaudible) was informed of that order, was ...(inaudible) so what? He did not get the final authorization.

But we also know that the U2 spy plane was shot down over Cuba without any authorization from Moscow. And Moscow was quite unhappy with that fact, but could do nothing about it. So based on the reading of the new documents and on my interviews with Russian military officials -- and I underline here, military officials, who were in Cuba at that tim e-- I would say that the probability of use of tactical nuclear weapons in case of either U.S. air strikes or land invasion of Cuba was very, very high.

And the third point that I want to raise is what is there to learn? What’s interesting is what remained. Returning to Jim’s point that there’s nothing we can learn about the Cuban missile crisis.

JAMES BLIGHT : No, no, that was Graham’s point. [Laughter.]

SVETLANA SAVRANSKAYA : Oh, sorry, that’s right. Graham Allison’s point, that there’s nothing to learn about it. Well, I think there is a whole new chapter opening right now. First of all, it’s the Cuban perspective. But secondly, because I am speaking from this perspective, it’s the November crisis. We think, Cuban missile crisis, what is that? We know that in October there were 13 days. Right. Well, there was a second crisis that happened in November. What we did not know up until very recently is that the Soviet Union intended to leave other, other than strategic nuclear weapons, and other weapons, and the mentors of 43,000 people in Cuba.

We know that even in early November, the expectation was in Cuba and the decision was in Moscow, that Cubans were being trained to use the Soviet technology, and that the technology will be transferred, the weapons will be transferred to the Cubans. And then over the course of November, in negotiations with the Cubans and with the United States, the Soviet Union realized that it had a real crisis on its hands. And the crisis was not in the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union; it was in the relations between the Soviet Union and its own ally, Cuba. And apparently Khrushchev realized that it was easier for him to negotiate with the Americans and control the situation in the relations with the Americans than it was with the Cubans.

And the final decision was made to withdraw the L-28 bombers, nuclear capable bombers, the short range, dual-use launchers, and the cruise missiles that could carry nuclear weapons. So this, I think, is the next chapter in our study of the Cuban missile crisis and also the chapter that raises the question: what about those small allies, small countries? Do they matter? And how can they affect what’s going to happen in the world overall? And I hope we can talk about it a little.

GRAHAM ALLISON : Good question. Thank you.

JULIA SWEIG : I think I was asked to participate in this panel because I’ve spent a great deal of time in Cuba, and my book is based on documents from Fidel Castro’s Presidential Archive. And it’s a book that deals with the period of time in the 1950s when Castro and others in Cuba were fighting to overthrow Batista. And it’s given me a very strong sense of several elements of who Cubans were that the Soviets were dealing with in the 1960s that I’ll try to share with you and try to make some of this dynamic of the missile crisis current in today’ relationship that the United States has with Cuba.

And I would tell you that one of the most important things that I learned about Fidel Castro and about the core people around him that took power in 1959 was of their absolute allergy to alliances with groups or individuals on whom they depended excessively for money or weapons when they were fighting the dictator. And among those that the Castro movement, the 25 th of July movement, was deeply allergic was, in fact, the Communist Party of Cuba, the Popular Socialist Party.

And it was really only out of a necessity that after 1959 the local Communists came to play the kind of role that they did domestically in helping to run the economy and to serve as a liaison with the Soviets in the 1960s. But fundamentally, Castro and his core group of people that made the Revolution distrusted the Cuban Communists and saw them as highly unreliable allies. So that is a bit of background to what follows.

The speech that is published in this book, Fidel Castro makes a number of references to concessions and he talks about the imperialist attitude vis-à-vis concessions. And he’s absolutely struck by the notion that there is an expectation that Cubans would make concessions in order to get the world out of this impending war, and humiliated -- deeply humiliated -- that the Soviets have negotiated a settlement with the United States on the missiles that prevents Cuba from negotiating a couple of key matters directly and bilaterally with the United States: specifically, the return of the Guantanamo naval base to Cuban possession.

He believed that the Soviets themselves had made a number of concessions themselves without getting anything back from the Americans until he later found out about the missiles in Turkey and Italy, and comes away incredibly dumbfounded that there’s an expectation that by the great powers that Cuba will sit back and take all of this. And of course his obsession with not making concessions without getting something back, his obsession with reciprocity, is deeply intertwined-- it’s not only about how to conduct itself in international relations, but also very much about domestic politics and about his job as the new leader of the country to maintain a coherent and legitimate base on ...(inaudible). And I’ll just read to you a couple of sentences to give you a sense of who Fidel Castro was at this time.

And he’s talking about the over flights and how the Cubans could not permit Americans to fly overhead during the crisis.

“No revolutionary, no soldier, no one can get used to such infamy, such passivity. In that case it’s better to throw down your weapons and quit being a revolutionary soldier, abandon everything. I don’t think that any nation with an iota of dignity would be willing to accept such humiliation, and we were face-to-face with the terrible reality of their total obliviousness to these truths and circumstances.”

Now the "their" to whom he’s referring at the time is the Soviets. But of course now, especially since 1989 -- if I can just skip ahead -- it’s the obliviousness of the Americans that Fidel Castro must contend with habitually in trying to map out a relationship; I wouldn’t say a better relationship. It’s just not always clear that that’s always been a priority for Cuba. But clearly, it  was politically demoralizing at home to tolerate the over flights.

And if we think to 1996 when there was the shoot-down, when the Cuban government shot down two civilians who were making over flights into Cuban territory, it was hard for many of us to believe that the Cuban government would risk throwing away what seemed to be a rapprochement coming from the Clinton administration for the sake of maintaining domestic political, revolutionary fervor and avoiding that humiliation. But indeed, I think, the missile crisis does give us a sense of the crucial point about not being seen as making a concession -- which doesn’t mean that today and in the last ten years the Cubans don’t make concession -- but rhetoric and how things are framed are extraordinarily important in the bilateral relationship.

And as you know, today we can’t understand why the Cubans won’t make a concession and have an election, or allow human rights inspectors, or allow inspections of their bio-weapons facilities, or amend their constitution, or etc. etc.-- all the sorts of demands that the United States continues to make. And it’s interesting, because when those demands are made as demands that incite capitulation by the Cuban government, the wall goes up. But if you think of what’s happened, though, since the collapse of the Soviet block and the ending of the Soviet aid to Cuba, in fact, there has been what could be construed to be a long string of concessions from the Cuban government, though we’re not allowed to connect the dots because that would be humiliating.

But think of it: the withdrawal from Latin America, from Africa; the beginning of economic reforms on the island. It is a very different Cuba today than it was in 1989, and one that I think what we’ll see is a continued obliviousness in Washington. And I guess I would throw out a question here, which is: with all of this documentation that we now have about the missile crisis with the focus in Washington on the lessons of the missile crisis, would those thinking about the missile crisis think about the perspective of the smaller country -- which is similar to yours? And I think the answer is no. My question is why.

And the final thing is Phil and all of you, if you could answer fundamentally, why is it that you think that the Cubans accepted the missiles, given their allergy toward a close alliance with the Soviets? And did they think they could really maneuver under those circumstances?

GRAHAM ALLISON : Good, good. Well, I think this is a great set of opening comments. We’re going off in several different directions. But let’s take just either Phil or Jim, quickly, in answer to this question.

PHILLIP BRENNER : Quick answer to why did the Cubans accept it. They were actually very concerned about this. They were fearful that in Latin America they would be seen as pawns of the Soviet Union -- this would undermine their standing in the non-aligned movement. But whether we want to give credence to what Castro says about this, he said the danger, first, was so great coming from the United States, but also they had been asking from the Soviets to join the Warsaw Pact. And this, in effect, made them a de facto member of the Warsaw Pact.

It showed that Cuba was willing to put its own self on the line, making themselves the frontier, a strategic threat to the United States, so that they would be a first target of the United States. It showed their willingness to do battle for the socialist cause. And, therefore, they hoped the Soviet Union would come to their aid.

JAMES BLIGHT : Take us back to the lessons, for a second, which we’ve already begun. I mentioned, as John Shattuck did in his introduction, that if you listen to the debate that’s now emerging about Iraq, as Dr. Rice has said, President Bush, when he’s speaking of an example, speaks often of the missile crisis. And let me just offer a couple of quotes from the administration for perspectives on lessons.

Condie says, thinking about the events of 1962, quote, "They settled on a strategy that actually was pre-emptive, but didn’t use military force to do it, and thereby preserved the possibility for the Soviets to back down." Colin Powell says, quote, “President Kennedy did not negotiate out of the Cuban missile crisis, didn’t negotiate the missiles out, because he and Khrushchev got along well. Khrushchev didn’t have the cards, and President Kennedy had the power, and he made it clear that he was not going to tolerate this." Close quotes.

And finally, Donald Rumsfeld, at the Pentagon, quote:

Now what would you call the Cuban missile crisis action by President Kennedy? In my view, establishing what he called a quarantine what the world thought of as a blockade, and preventing the Soviet Union from placing additional nuclear missiles in Cuba, that was certainly self-defense. It was certainly anticipatory self-defense. It was certainly preventive, and we were very, very close to a crisis of historic proportions. And I think it’s not unfair or inaccurate to say that he took a pre-emptive action.  

Close quotes.

So let me turn to the panel and say, in terms of similarities and differences between the missile crisis and Iraq, whatever you think are the one or two most important similarities or differences -- and we’ll go down the row. Phil?

PHILIP BRENNER : Well, Jim and I have talked about this and it’s very frightening to us the way in which the missile crisis has been misused and misunderstood. Precisely the wrong lessons have been articulated and very much based on misinformation that’s being conveyed about what the missile crisis is. So let me highlight one or two points.

First, we are dealing with a country that, if it’s true, has weapons of mass destruction. If it doesn’t, then we are really being quite misled. The talk in Washington is that we can manage this; we can get every last SCUD that they have. It’s so reminiscent of what we hear in the tapes, the sense of being able to control every last thing in Cuba, which we now know they had no idea what the full - scale operation was. The simple number of 43,000 Soviet troops versus -- they believed there were 10,000 Soviet troops on the island; they thought there were 100,000-armed Cubans, and in reality there were 270,000 armed Cubans. And they weren’t sure. In fact, they were pretty sure the warheads hadn’t gotten to the island. We know there were more than 100 on the island.

And so just those simple things were out of their control. But here are the three things that we’ve come to realize that are most important, that are really misleading people. First, this sense that Kennedy was inflexible, that Kennedy had a plan and went forward with it, without any sense that there were other options. Well, it’s clear now, as both John Shattuck and Graham Allison have pointed out, that flexibility was very important. And in fact, quarantine is very different than a pre- emptive attack. What Kennedy tried to do was find ways to be flexible, even to the point of giving up the missiles in Turkey so that we wouldn’t go to war.

The second point is that he understood it was very important not to box your opponent into a corner; to give your opponent some way of getting out, short of blowing itself up or blowing us up. And that understanding of giving your opponent some way out was extraordinarily important, that this administration doesn’t seem to follow.

The third is it’s very important to talk and continue to have conversations throughout a crisis. In the November crisis with the Soviets, Kennedy was quite respectful of being able to deal with the other superpower. The problem is he didn’t bring that to Cuba. There was a sense that Cuba didn’t matter, that it was a lesser power. And it’s that attitude that’s conveyed today about Iraq. When we deal with Iraq, we try to deal with the other powers -- Russia, China: if we can get them on our side we can just go in. We don’t deal with the lesser power that is also our adversary -- in this case Iraq or in that case Cuba. And after the missile crisis there were severe dangers as a result of our not talking to Cuba.

GRAHAM ALLISON : Jim, to do you want to follow up on that point?

JAMES BLIGHT : I just want to … I’ll say something about the way the history’s being used here by people in the administration. And what I’m going to say is my own view, and none of the distinguished people with me here should be held to it. But what we’re hearing is rubbish. This is not …

GRAHAM ALLISON : I’ll subscribe to that. [Laughter.]

JAMES BLIGHT : The view that the missile crisis is an example of pre-emptive action that is somehow analogous to pre-emptive military attack is not only rubbish, it’s perverse. But it’s exactly the option that President Kennedy worked very hard and ultimately successfully to avoid. The transcript of the three meetings on October 27, 1962, show a President almost uniquely trying to bring his people along toward some kind of negotiated settlement. He was able to do that.

Secondly, just before the very first retrospective that we ever had -- Graham and I were there -- Dean Rusk, who had in January of 1987 had a cardiac event and couldn’t attend, wrote a letter to me which Mac Bundy read into the transcript, which said that in the event of those discussions that Kennedy was breaking down or the Russians somehow stonewalled and Khrushchev didn’t remove the missiles, that Rusk should call Andrew Cordiay at Columbia University, who formerly worked for the United Nations, and he should call U Thant, the United Nations Secretary-General the acting Secretary-General. And he should say to him that he should call a press conference -- U Thant should call a press conference -- and suggest an open public trade of NATO missiles in Turkey for Soviet missiles in Cuba, and that were he to suggest this, the Kennedy administration would look favorably on this, so long as it was clear that this idea did not come from where it really came from, which was John F. Kennedy himself. That is more or less what happened, except that the trade of the missiles was kept secret. And those missiles, by the middle of the spring of 1963, were destroyed.

Now, this is a negotiated settlement. You give something and you get something. This is not a pre-emptive attack. And as Graham said, and as all of us, I think, believe up here, if a pre- emptive strike had occurred, followed by a land and sea invasion, it would have resulted in the total demolition of the Republic of Cuba, of millions of dead Americans in the southeastern part of the United States, and if escalation continued, probably the end of civilization as we know it. That’s where you would have gotten in 1962 with a pre-emptive attack.

JULIA SWEIG : I’m going to draw the parallels or lack thereof. I’m passing.

SVETLANA SAVRANSKAYA : I’d like to add something which does not directly relate to the question. First of all, Jim just made a wonderful comment. If we ever think about any pre-emptive action in the Cuban missile crisis, then ask this question of yourself. If there was a pre-emptive strike on Cuba, where we would all be now? And it’s a terrifying question.

And the second interesting point here, I think that Russia today is not the Soviet Union of 1962. Khrushchev deployed the missiles in Cuba, and then from the pressure from the United States, although in a negotiated way, he brought these missiles and all other troops back home. And he told his politburo comrades and the public that, "We actually scored a victory. What we got is Kennedy’s pledge not to invade Cuba. Therefore, our mission is justified. We did the right thing. We put the missiles there, we removed them, but we achieved our goal to protect Cuba." And the public was happy with it.

Well, right now Russia is a democratic state. Well, maybe it’s not a mature democracy, but there are differences of opinion. And if Putin is seen to retreat under the U.S. pressure and sell out Russian -- maybe not the most beloved -- but sell the ally who owes Russia a lot of money, Iraq, an ally where Russia has some real interest, not just ideological interest, Putin’s political future might not be as bright as Khrushchev’s was. Although we know that part of the reason why Khrushchev was removed was his failure to deal with the United States in a more successful way during the missile crisis.

So if we use the analogy of the Cuban missile crisis, yes, there are definite parallels. Maybe it is easier for Putin now to negotiate with the United States and get some mutual benefits and kind of leave Iraq aside. But it would not be accepted in Russia in the same way as it was accepted after Khrushchev brought the missiles back.

GRAHAM ALLISON : Let me offer a comment on that question, and then I’m going to go to the audience for questions that you might have, where you want to pursue any of these points. I’d say three points of similarity and difference, because I mainly agree with what’s been said.

First, similarities between Iraq today and 1962: an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation with war in the offing. In ’62 about 100 times more dangerous, but nonetheless, eyeball-to-eyeball, and war in the offing.

Secondly -- and it goes to this new book that Jim and Phil have done -- many small state bystanders whose interests may be trampled, but who have little say in the matter. That was true for Cuba in 1962 and it’s true for most of the regional states today, whether the Egyptians, as Mr. Mubarek has been complaining recently, or the Saudis, or the Turks, not to speak of the Iraqis.

Thirdly -- and this goes to Jim’s point because I think you can do this layer by layer -- there’s a strong similarity between the Bush administration’s announced policy on Iraq and the beginning of the Cuban missile crisis, where one sees an initial attraction to a military first strike in order to eliminate the problem. And as Bobbie Kennedy says on the tapes to President Kennedy at one stage, "Well, I guess if we had decided in the first 48 hours, we would have gone with the air strike."

But now a very striking difference: in the missile crisis, one sees a President who doesn’t take his first answer as his best answer, who keeps pushing people about the uncomfortable questions and forcing his best advisers and even himself to reconsider his views and ask how might he be wrong and how might things go wrong, and why does this view differ from that view? So he thinks he can destroy all the missiles in a first strike, but as he keeps picking at it he hears from his best advisers that they’re not sure they can get all of them. And then he hears other information that makes him uncomfortable.

So the course of exploring the uncomfortable avenues or the unsettled, unanswered questions, or the uncertainties, leads him then to a different course of action: to the blockade, called a quarantine initially, and then in the second week to what is ultimately a threat to use an attack, which is communicated clearly, but a carrot in terms of the withdrawal of U.S. equivalent missiles in Turkey as part of a negotiated settlement, as has been said.

Now, about Iraq the story is not over yet. And if at the end of this process, I would say, if President Bush were to take a page out of President Kennedy’s book, one could imagine now some flexibility. And why doesn’t Mr. Hussein go live in some other country? Well, he could be exiled to Egypt like Idi Amin evidently lived happily in Egypt, even though he’s also guilty of many horrible things in the past, just as one for example. But there are probably three or four other examples if President Kennedy were working the problem.

So if you look at the lesson President Kennedy took away from the crisis, which is here in the Library and in his famous American University speech, it was in such confrontations, never leave your adversary with only two choices: humiliating defeat, on the one hand, or catastrophic war on the other. And I think that’s a pretty good lesson for this one, too.

Well, let’s go now to the audience. There’s a microphone there and please introduce yourself and put your question. Disagreements are invited, please.

AUDIENCE MEMBER : My name is Jason Barlett, and I’m a graduate student at Providence College. I would like the panel to comment briefly, if they would, on the role of Robert Kennedy, with particular attention to back channel negotiation in dissolving this crisis, and the Russian reaction to his message.

JAMES BLIGHT : I’ll give a quick answer to that and see if we agree or disagree. Bobby Kennedy’s role throughout the crisis was crucial. In fact, if we go back, just if I can take one step back on the question of the air strike, a preventive air strike, a first strike to eliminate the problem, Bobby Kennedy was very attracted to that option to begin with. And as he began to think of it, he also says, "Now, I know how Tojo felt when he was planning the attack on Pearl Harbor." And the more he thought about that, the less attractive that seemed as an option. So this is an interesting story of him and his brother.

Also, the device that they developed, this Executive Committee of the National Security Council, President Kennedy was absent from a lot of the meetings and Bobby Kennedy therefore was kind of his rep at the meetings, because they found that people would talk a little more freely when the President wasn’t there. So that was an interesting element.

Finally, at the end game, as you referred to, Bobby Kennedy went to see Dobrynin, who was the Soviet Ambassador in Washington and communicated the terms of, in effect, the secret proposition -- which remained a secret for 25 years after the missile crisis until it was finally confirmed by six of the participants who were part of the internal deal. He said to Dobrynin:

Tell Khrushchev the following. First, the missiles are going to leave Cuba for sure, and if necessary, they’ll be destroyed by an attack. And we need to hear from you within 24 hours whether you’re going to act, because early next week we’re going to act. But secondly, if the missiles are withdrawn from Cuba within six months, our U.S. equivalent missiles in Turkey will be gone.  

That secret, in private, but that’s a fact. So Kennedy told us -- Robert Kennedy to Dobrynin. Dobrynin sent a telegram to Khrushchev, and the rest of is part of the story of how the game was resolved. It’s especially an interesting fact because while there were about 16 or 17 people sitting around the table of the Ex Comm, there were only seven who knew what had been decided privately. And that’s an uncomfortable fact, but in the circumstances, after the fact, it looks pretty good to me.

GRAHAM ALLISON : Great summary.

AUDIENCE MEMBER : My name is Rosemarie Vigueros. I’m a professor of Latin American history at the University of Rhode Island. And what strikes me about what’s going on now, the difference between Kennedy and his advisers and Bush and his advisers, is that Bush has a reputation of not second-guessing himself. And not only second-guessing; I almost get the sense he doesn’t think about things more than twice. And that in terms of the way that they deal with their advisers, it seems like Bush has this kind of management style that, you know, the executive makes a decision, everybody goes with it, but he’s not the expert in these matters.

And so he’s listening to advice from Condoleezza Rice, who was a Soviet scholar, if I remember correctly, and didn’t have much experience in terms of government, to Karl Rove and to others who are his political advisers, and to Rumsfeld and Cheney. Well, you can think of them however you like; I don’t think much of them.

But the point that I’m making is that with Kennedy you had the sense of that he was thinking about things, that he was working it out, that he was listening, that he was waiting. And what you have with Bush is that he’s going around, like putting pressure on the French to go with him and putting pressure on the English to get them to agree with us, and that actually staying our hand isn’t a real possibility. And it seems to me that this is one of the major problems of what’s happening now with this incident. So could you comment, please?

GRAHAM ALLISON : Let me make one disagreement, so we won’t be such an agreeable panel. I think that if you look at President Kennedy and his administration during the missile crisis, when they wanted to get a vote from the OAS for a resolution that made a naval blockade a quarantine, they got the votes every way they could get them. That is, it was not only sweet reason. They were perfectly happy to twist arms or even to pay some modest price in terms of negotiation.

When they were trying to get the Security Council to line up with them, they sent people to talk to Charles de Gaulle. And when the envoy arrived, de Gaulle said "Have you come to consult me or advise me?" And the envoy said, "To advise you." And he said, "Thank you very much for the candor." So it was not a … So the administration was quite, I think, tough about trying to line up allies for its position and point of view. So that’s just a small point of difference in terms of the characterization. I won’t go further. Jim?

JAMES BLIGHT : Yeah. Graham pointed out that President Kennedy, during the 13 days of tension, during what we consider to be the missile crisis, evolved. As Graham said, he didn’t think the first solution necessarily was the best solution, and he worked -- everybody worked hard to preserve as much as time as possible to talk this over and to explore the options. And I think everybody that I ever interviewed from that group said that they were very grateful that the Bay of Pigs invasion occurred before and not after the missile crisis. Let’s not forget the humiliation to which this president was submitted by April 20, 1961.

Were it not for one of the most amazing press conferences ever held or televised,  where Kennedy took sole responsibility for this unbelievable fiasco where the greatest superpower in the history of the world had been slapped around by these bearded revolutionaries who had barely been in power two or three years, I mean the whole thing was just absolutely absurd. It would have been hilarious if it weren’t so tragic -- in terms of not only who died on the beaches and that sort of thing, but in terms of the reputation of this particular president. Now the outcome of that, as I have understood it, was that John F. Kennedy became incredibly skeptical of the advice given to him by experts, particularly intelligence experts and military experts.

I think he’s still the only president in history who did anything remotely like firing the top two executives form the CIA. Allen Dulles and Dick Bissell were gone when this was over, and Allen Dulles was the only head the CIA had ever had, and he was out as was Bissell who was the mastermind of the operation. Now that is a very important disanalogy, as we say in academia, to the present situation. President Kennedy knew one hell of a lot about foreign affairs before he became President. It was his favorite subject. It was where he considered his expertise to be, and it probably had something to do with why Dean Rusk, rather than a more hands-on person, was chosen as Secretary of State. He wanted to do it himself.

But he really screwed up royally in ways that the current President never has. He’s a governor; he didn’t do foreign policy until quite recently. And one wonders whether this will be, in effect, something like his Bay of Pigs, rather than, as his advisers keep telling us, his Cuban missile crisis.

AUDIENCE MEMBER : I’m John Sullivan; I’m a history teacher. One of the things, though, I think that needs to be brought out is that in the late summer of 1962 and into the early fall, Senator Keating in New York had made constant charges against the Kennedy administration. He had suggested there was a build-up in Cuba. He felt the administration wasn’t doing anything about it. And I think we need to remember that this was a very political crisis as well as a great coup for the Kennedy administration. That came later. I think President Kennedy was very much afraid of the political consequences of what might happen if something wasn’t done. And I want to make just one other quick thing, and I’ll sit down.

I think one of the things that Kennedy would never have done is use a phrase -- which is a terrible phrase -- called "regime change," which is another way of saying overthrow of a government. And that is something, it seems to me, that’s fundamentally against what the United States has stood for since its beginning. And why this hasn’t been probed more, I can’t understand it, because that kind of euphemism is, to me, unacceptable. And yet the vast majority of Americans tend to accept it, or believe that they should accept it. I don’t think a government of ours should be doing this kind of thing. That’s what Bobby Kennedy saw, I think, and which you just talked about. A country as large as the United States, with its reputation, could never do that kind of thing to Cuba.

GRAHAM ALLISON : I think we have two questions here, and they’re both very good ones. Do you want to do the second one?

JULIA SWEIG : I want to respond to the gentleman, yes. And I want to talk about the domestic politics today of this issue, and raise a question, which is: there’s a real tension in this administration over Iraq, clearly, and in general, between the traditional internationalist wing of the Republican party and a neo-conservative wing of the Republican party that very much does see Iraq today as Munich, and regards this as elemental to go and seize it as Germany and as Japan, and that we should dedicate 25 years to reconstructing Iraq once the regime change is effected.

I think I wonder whether at the end of the day -- you know, I’m not sure if it’s what you read, Graham, or another comment I read that Ms. Rice made, where she compared the blockade in Cuba to an act of war, and as Kennedy administration’s definition of preemption. Does Karl Rove perhaps understand that the Republican party can go very far toward placating the neo- conservative components who are arguing for force and forcefulness in Iraq by a rhetorical and a military and an international community build-up, stopping short of actual deployment; that the domestic politics can be covered with what we’re seeing today, but that there is a line over which, because of Colin Powell and the others that have chimed in on this debate, they in fact will not follow?

PHILIP BRENNER : May I make one comment on the earlier 1962 event? Because again, this helps us to remember. This was a president in his second year in office, just coming up to the mid-term elections. So just like in the same month … Now, President Kennedy did not choose to have a crisis in October. This was not an October surprise. Or if it was, he was surprised, or the administration was surprised. The Republicans had made Cuba the principal issue in the mid- term election. And it wasn’t just Keating who was, as you said rightly, making the decisions. But also just in the general campaign, because of what Jim mentioned, the terrible failure in the Bay of Pigs just a year before. And here was this problem right on our door.

So President Kennedy felt politically quite sensitive about this, and this may actually have affected Khrushchev’s calculations about whether he would be likely to enter into a confrontation. He may have been actually -- this might have been timed in such a way -- and certainly, he wasn’t unaware of that element. In this instance, unless some new piece of evidence comes forward, the event is forced by the U.S. hand, not by some action that Saddam has taken.

JAMES BLIGHT : You know, one way to think about this is not only November elections, but to see that Congressional pressure, linked with the misinformation Kennedy had got … actually he boxed himself in ways that President Bush seems to calculate to box himself in. What happened was that because of Keating and Kapart’s statements, which it seems they got from dissidents in the CIA -- There was a debate during the summer as to whether or not missiles were being put in Cuba. There were reports from Cuban exiles, "We see these huge things going down the road. They’re moving houses to move these things." I mean, and so that was one piece of information.

Except that the CIA had been getting that kind of information since 1960: Cuban exiles were coming in with that kind of information. So they tended to discount these reports. And on top of that, the analysis was the Soviets had never put missiles like this outside. So the summary judgment was they are not putting missiles in. The dissidents felt they were; seems to have leaked this information to Keating and Kapart, who then demanded that Kennedy do something about it.

So early in September, Kennedy says "There are no missiles in Cuba. And if we find there are, we’ll take any and all means to get rid of them." Theodore Sorensen in 1989 said a very interesting thing. He said "Had Kennedy known that they were putting in 42 missiles, I think he might have said: ‘And if they put in more than 50, we’ll do anything to’"-- because he did not want this kind of confrontation. And so it was partly the pressure from the Congress that made him feel he had to do something. Doing nothing was no longer an option, because he had boxed himself in, and I think he learned a lesson in that: presidents shouldn’t exclude their own options.

And it almost feels as if President Bush has boxed himself in, in a calculating way, so that he has to do something that he doesn’t have to do. As Graham quite well said, this was precipitated by our own actions here, not by a discovery of missiles.

AUDIENCE MEMBER : Hi. My name is Donna DuPlorio. I’m retired but I’m a computer specialist by trade. I lived through both crises in the Cuban crisis, and that’s why I’m retired, I guess. [Laughter.] But one of you said earlier that the Cuban crisis was 100 times more dangerous than what’s going on right now. I’m not sure I feel that way, and maybe you can talk a little bit about that.

GRAHAM ALLISON : I made the statement, so let me try to defend it, and then maybe somebody will disagree. But I was trying to think how to think of the comparison. Certainly now the danger of war is very great. The President has said that absent something that he doesn’t think is very likely to happen, that he thinks it’s highly probable that the U.S. will lead military air strikes and then a military invasion to Iraq to change that regime.

Now, if I play out that scenario and ask how does it unfold, I can imagine in the worst case -- maybe not the very worst case -- but I can imagine some hundreds of thousands of people dying. I can maybe even imagine a million people dying. But I can’t imagine a hundred million people dying. Whereas in the Cuban missile crisis, incredible as it seems, and especially as we get away from it, it just -- oh well, of course there could never have been a nuclear war.

But in the missile crisis, if as Jim said, the U.S. had had an air strike and then an invasion, and if the troops that were there -- the Soviet troops -- had used their tactical nuclear weapons against the American invading forces and even against American homeland, and if indeed, some of the missiles might have been fired against the U.S. homeland, and if then the U.S. had fired our missiles against Cuba and theirs against us, at the end of that story I can tell you how in 24 or 48 hours, maybe a hundred million people could have died. So it was just in terms of the potential casualties, not in terms of the probability of it getting to a war that I was thinking.

JAMES BLIGHT: Just a quick follow-up. On October 26 -- I guess we both remember it, then -- the U.S. went to Defense Condition II, Def Con II, the last step before actually initiating nuclear war. This involves keeping one-third of your B-52 bomber force in the air at all times so it doesn’t get hit on the ground. It involves flying up to the -- and possibly over -- the border of the Soviet Union, beginning to target radar and this sort of thing. It involves the lids coming off the missile silos in North Dakota for the first and only time. It involves Strategic Air Command taking over part of Miami International Airport. It involves activating the nuclear weapons that were at Guantanamo. There were nuclear weapons on the island before the Soviets put them there, and they were ours. It involves taking the entire military establishment of the time -- and at the time there were many times the mega-tonnage of potential destructiveness as there are now -- and winding it up to the point where it is just on a hair trigger. And it’s very difficult under those circumstances, I am told by people who study systems, to imagine a small event occurring once you push that button and go to nuclear war.

Just a final comment. Of course, that knowledge that was present on both sides has got to be one of the main reasons why basically nothing happened. Here we don’t have that situation. I don’t think we feel threatened here the way we did in 1962. I don’t think people are buying Campbell’s soup cans and putting them underground as they were in Detroit where I grew up during this period. And that may be one of the things that liberates an administration to go ahead with something rather than to look for every conceivable possible route short of that.

GRAHAM ALLISON : Svetlana, did you want to comment on that?

SVETLANA SAVRANSKAYA : I would just comment about the danger. I spoke with the Soviet KGB resident in Mexico, and he said that according to the information, based on the information that they were collecting, they were prepared to a large-scale evacuation of your citizens in southern states through Mexico. And one of the questions that they had to deal with is what do they do if it actually happens, in the event if things got out of control? And that was a serious expectation. They were cabling Moscow about that. So the level of danger, I think, or at least danger as it was perceived by the public, was much higher in the Cuban missile crisis.

GRAHAM ALLISON : I think that unfortunately we had told people that we had to stop by 5:30, so we’ll be happy to take your questions after, if we can.

I think we’ve had a good panel. This is an issue that deserves much more consideration, but it seems to me that it’s only fair to let President John F. Kennedy have the last word. So a quotation with him with reference to the missile crisis:

He says, quote:

The essence of ultimate decision remains impenetrable to the observer, often indeed to the decider himself. There will always be the dark and tangled stretches in the decision making process, mysterious even to those who may be most intimately involved.  

So let’s thank our panel very much for illuminating the mystery.

[Audience applause.]

JOHN SHATTUCK : I want to thank our panel personally and John F. Kennedy Library would like to thank them for this marvelous afternoon alternative to that beautiful sunlight out there. And I think the sunlight that has been cast on the Cuban missile crisis by these historians is wonderful and disturbing and chilling, which is, I know, why all of you have come out.

But let me personally thank Svetlana Savranskaya, Julia Sweig, our wonderful moderator, my friend Graham Allison, James Blight, and my old colleague, Phil Brenner. And let me also, in closing, direct your attention to the fliers that you have on the seats in front of you, because we have three more of these explorations of the Cuban missile crisis in various dimensions coming up. On Sunday, October 20 th we will have Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Ted Sorensen will be back, along with Nikita Khrushchev’s son, Sergei Khrushchev and a Cuban diplomat, Josefina Vidal, who will look at the brink from their personal perspectives.

And then we will turn on October 24 th to the more contemporary issue which I thank this panel for exploring as extensively as they have: curbing Iraq’s use of weapons of mass destruction, with the obvious question of how much of a parallel is there and what are the options and the decision points in that? And we will have a number of experts, including a former United Nations weapons inspector, Scott Ritter, and several others -- a former conservative member of Congress, Mickey Edwards, who has grave concerns about the nature of the Congressional debate, which he thinks has been far too limited, and others.

And then finally on Monday, October 28 th The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Media , which should be very interesting. Judy Woodruff will be here to chair that panel, and we will have a number of distinguished media experts who were active in the time reporting on the Cuban missile crisis: Sandy Vanocur, Robert Pierpont, network news Moscow Bureau Chief Marvin Kalb, and the former Chair of the Federal Communications Commission, Newton Minow. So please join us for all of these. But thank you again to this wonderful panel. Please join me in thanking them personally.

National Archives News

Cuban Missile Crisis

At the height of the Cold War, for two weeks in October 1962, the world teetered on the edge of thermonuclear war. Earlier that fall, the Soviet Union, under orders from Premier Nikita Khrushchev, began to secretly deploy a nuclear strike force in Cuba, just 90 miles from the United States. President John F. Kennedy said the missiles would not be tolerated and insisted on their removal. Khrushchev refused. The standoff nearly caused a nuclear exchange and is remembered in this country as the Cuban Missile Crisis. For 13 agonizing days—from October 16 through October 28—the United States and the Soviet Union stood on the brink of nuclear war. The peaceful resolution of the crisis with the Soviets is considered to be one of Kennedy’s greatest achievements.

Events in October 2022

• Friday, October 14, at 1 p.m.: The Abyss: Nuclear Crisis Cuba 1962 (author lecture, online only)
• Saturday, October 22, at 1 p.m. and 3 p.m: The Cuban Missile Crisis: Lessons for Today (conference, in person and online)

Research Resources

• Military Resources: Bay of Pigs Invasion & Cuban Missile Crisis
• John F. Kennedy Library Research Subject Guide: Cuban Missile Crisis
• Cuban Missile Crisis Chronology
• Department of Defense Cuban Missile Crisis Briefing Materials
• CIA-prepared personality studies of Nikita Khrushchev and Fidel Castro
• Satellite images of missile sites under construction
• Secret correspondence between Kennedy and Khrushchev
• National Archives Catalog Subject Finding Aid for Cuban Missile Crisis (Still Picture Branch)
• JFK’s doodles from October 1962
• Aerial Photograph of Missiles in Cuba (1962) , Milestone Documents

President John F. Kennedy signs the Cuba Quarantine Order, October 23, 1962. ( Kennedy Library )

Audio and Video

• President Kennedy’s radio and television address to the American people on the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba, October 22, 1962 
• President Kennedy’s radio and television remarks on the dismantling of Soviet missile bases in Cuba, November 2, 1962
• Telephone conversation between President Kennedy and former President Eisenhower, October 28, 1962
• Telephone recordings, Cuban Missile Crisis Update, October 22, 1962
• Atomic Gambit: JFK Library podcast for 60th anniversary
• Poise, Professionalism and a Little Luck, the Cuban Missile Crisis 1962 (panel discussion)
• Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis (author lecture)

Kennedy Library Forums

• Cuban Missile Crisis: An Historical Perspective (October 6, 2002)
• On the Brink: The Cuban Missile Crisis (October 20, 2002)
• The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Eyewitness Perspective (October 17, 2007)
• Presidency in the Nuclear Age: Cuban Missile Crisis and the First Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (October 12, 2009)
• 50th Anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis (October 14, 2012)

Articles and Blog Posts

• One Step from Nuclear War - The Cuban Missile Crisis at 50  (Prologue)
• Forty Years Ago: The Cuban Missile Crisis  (Prologue)
• Cuban Missile Crisis, Revisited (Text Message blog)

Education Resources

• The Cuban Missile Crisis: How to Respond?  (high school curriculum resource)
• World on the Brink: JFK and the Cuban Missile Crisis (online exhibit)

Find answers to your questions on History Hub

The Cuban Missile Crisis Essay

The Cuban Missile Crisis The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was the closest the world has ever come to nuclear war. The crisis was a major confrontation between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The confrontation was caused by the Soviets putting missiles in Cuba , just 90 miles off the coast of the United States of America. The world was in the hands of President John F. Kennedy and Premier Nikita Khruchchev. These two men would have to reach a compromise or else the results would be fatal. During the cold war John F. Kennedy and the Soviet premier met to discuss the was between the east and west but they resolved nothing and Khrushchev left thinking that Kennedy was a weak leader. The Soviets …show more content…

Kennedy was informed the the missiles that very same day and his advisors told him that they wanted an air strike followed by an invasion put up in Cuba. Kennedy knew that if the US invaded the Soviets would use their missiles. On one of the following days, Kennedy asked if the Air Force could take out all of the missiles in Cuba. The Air Force then told the President that with that process there would be 10-20,000 civilian casualties. Kennedy then decided to set up a blockade around Cuba. US ships prepared for a quarantine. The press then learned about the nuclear missles and questioned them about it, the President asked the reporters not to reveal the news so he could announce it to the American people on TV. The Soviets had instrustion to launch the missiles within minutes of Kennedy’s speech. After Castro listened to the President’s speech he moblized all of Cuba’s military forces. The Organization of American States approved the US quarantine of Cuba and by the end of the day the US ships were in line and were prepared to destroy and ship that failed to stop at that line. On Wednesday, October 24th the Soviets ships approached the quarantine line. Soviets ship stopped when they received a radio message from Moscow. On Thursday, October 25th the Military alert was raised to DEFCON 2, the highest ever in US history. At any moment the US could launch an attack on Cuba or the

Pros And Cons Of Brinkmanship During The Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis all started in October, 1962, when an American spy plane spotted and secretly photographed missile sites being built on the island of Cuba by the Soviet Union. President Kennedy did not tell the Soviet Union right away that we had found their nuclear missile site. But days later, President Kennedy meet secretly with his advisors to discuss the situation. President Kennedy and his advisors though long and hard about what to do and the finally came up with an idea. Kennedy decided to put a naval blockade around the island of Cuba. The purpose of this was so Cuba could not get anymore military supplies for the Soviet Union. President Kennedy demanded that the missiles that were already there be disabled and that the sit be destroyed. Later on, Kennedy told America what was happening on a televised address. Everyone was anxious about what the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, would say about the naval blockade. But both President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev recognized that the devastation that a nuclear war will bring is too much.

Cuban Missile Crisis Essay examples

• 6 Works Cited

In 1962, Cuba was convinced that the USA was planning to attack them and asked the Soviet Union for military assistance. The USSR sent Cuba materials to build missile bases and launch sites. When President Kennedy realized that Cuba could launch missiles into America, he demanded that the USSR remove its weapons and troops. The Americans formed a naval blockade as the world stood nervously on the edge of a nuclear war. The USSR removed its weapons despite protests from Cuban leader Fidel Castro.

The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Minute Towards Countdown

People on both sides wondered if this would cause World War III. On October 22, 1962, President Kennedy appeared on national television to speak about the crisis; the people need to know what was going on directly (Edwards, 9). President Kennedy said the missiles stationed in Cuba could strike Washington, DC, or the Panama Canal. They could also strike Cape Canaveral, Florida, or Mexico City; nowhere in the US was safe. He explicated that he warned Cuba not to strike any American cities; this meant cities in Central American and South America, too (Edwards, 9). President Kennedy also shared with the American people his plan of surrounding Cuba with the US Navy. Now, it was just a matter a

The Pros And Cons Of The Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis began October 16, 1962. It was at the height of the Cold War that this potentially lethal confrontation arose between the United States and the Soviet Union. A United States reconnaissance plane discovered a military stockpile of Soviet nuclear missiles and bombers in Cuba. Some historians point out that Khrushchev's real intention in deploying the missiles into Cuba was to control West Berlin. They would be used in this context as a sufficient reason for the Western powers (The USA, UK, and France) to allow him to achieve his plan. However, The government of Washington, along with President John F. Kennedy at its head, believed this to be a threat and was not willing to tolerate such a threat so close to home.

Americans and Cubans Approaches to the Platt Amendment

On October 15, 1962, a photograph proved the existence of the missile being constructed on Cuba, and for the U.S., the nightmare began. After a week of intense debating with his closest advisors, President Kennedy made a decision. He decided to impose quarantine, of sorts, around Cuba to ensure there were no more missiles arriving. The Soviet Union demanded the

John F Kennedy: America's Greatest President

There was a suspicious report that there was a nuclear threat from Soviet that might've been based on Cuba with missiles aiming to bomb America. On 29 August President John F. Kennedy ordered periodic flights over to Cuba by high-speed, high-altitude U-2 spy planes. A quote that relates and explains more about this is "Although U-2 flights through 7 October showed Soviet antiaircraft missile (SAM) sites under construction and the introduction of Soviet-built patrol boats, they turned up no hard evidence of offensive missile sites or introduction of such missiles" (The Cold War Continued: The Cuban Missile Crisis). The evidence shows that the prior statement confirms Kennedy's swift action to protect the safety of the American people. This led Kennedy to send forces to examine if Cuba actually had missiles; which they didn't. He always made sure that this country was protected. His priorities was straight and he knew exactly what had to be

How Did Kennedy Handled The Cuban Missile Crisis

He revealed the evidence of Soviet missiles in Cuba and how he called for their removal. During Kennedy’s speech he “imposed a naval blockade on Cuba and declared that any missile launched from Cuba would warrant a full-scale retaliatory attack by the United States against the Soviet Union” (Cuban Missile Crisis). Until the Soviet Union agreed to dismantle the missile sites, there should be no additional missiles shipped to Cuba. On day eight the ships of the naval quarantine fleet move into place around Cuba. Soviet submarines threaten the quarantine by moving into the Caribbean area. In the evening Robert Kennedy meets with Ambassador Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy. After the quarantine is endorsed, President Kennedy asks Khrushchev to halt any Russian ships heading toward Cuba. On day nine Chairman Khrushchev replies to President Kennedy's October 23 letter and states that he thinks Kennedy is trying to threaten him or Kennedy will use force. Day ten Kennedy knows that some missiles in Cuba are now operational and this pushes JFK to personally draft a letter to Khrushchev again urging him to change the course of events. Day eleven more photographic evidence is found showing accelerated construction of the missile sites. In a private letter, Fidel Castro urges Nikita Khrushchev to initiate a nuclear first strike against the United States in the event of an American invasion

John F Kennedy Assassination

The photographs were shown to Kennedy two days later on October 16, and a general consensus was reached by the president and his committee that the missile sites being built in Cuba by the U.S.S.R were offensive in nature and therefore posed an immediate nuclear threat to the United States and its Allies. President John F. Kennedy faced a major dilemma: if he gave the authorization for the United States to attack the sites, it may have lead to a global nuclear conflict with the U.S.S.R., but if he did nothing then the United states would be confronted with the greatly increased threat from the medium range nuclear missiles, as well as the United states would appear to the rest of the world to be less committed to the defence of the western hemisphere. In late October 1962, president Kennedy authorized a quarantine of all offencive weapon imports bound for Cuba, which lead to the U.S.S.R. backing down and removing the missile sites from Cuba. The implementation of the blockade effectively blocked the installment of the medium range missiles, and eventually helped lead to the the Nuclear test ban treaty, and resulted in one of JFK’s many great achievements as

John F Kennedy's Quarantine

President John F. Kennedy yesterday ordered a naval Quarantine of Cuba. Such measures are to be put in place in order to prevent any further Soviet Missiles reaching Cuban shores. The quarantine comes after the U.S. recently discovered the existence of missile sites and launch pads in Cuba that, although seemed to be not yet operational would soon harbour the ability to fire at American shores. This announcement came as a shock to many as the possibility of a nuclear war has now arisen. The world will today be waiting on the result of the quarantine knowing that the fate of America rests solely on the success of the quarantine. President Kennedy condemned the course of action undertaken by the soviets referring to it as a ‘clandestine, reckless,

Argumentative Essay On The Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the only devastating event in U.S. to ever bring the country into DEFCON-2. Ever since World War 2, the U.S. and the Soviet Union have been rivals(Jeffery, Riley, 4). The Soviets later aligned themselves with the small country of Cuba. It is a small piece of land in enemy territory, but it is very important to them because they have to protect their allies at all times. For this reason, The USSR placed missiles in Cuba to keep them prepared for an invasion. In 1962, The two huge superpowers brought the Cold War to a nuclear crisis in Cuba which led to DEFCON-2, the closest point to a nuclear war(The Choices Program)

How Did The Cold War Turn Hot

invaded the Bay of Pigs in April of 1961. The two nations decided to place nuclear missiles in Cuba to stop further advances from the United States. President Kennedy and ExCom decided that missiles being in Cuba was unacceptable, so the decision was made to deploy a naval blockade around Cuba to prevent the Soviet Union from sending more missiles and other military equipment to Cuba, and JFK issued an ultimatum that the missiles needed to be removed or military force would be used. On October 22nd, 1962 President Kennedy notified the American public about the presence of missiles in Cuba, explained the blockade, and assured the citizens that the U.S. Military was prepared to neutralize the threat to the nation. Two days later the Soviet Union ships attempted to break through the Naval blockade, but stopped just short of the barrier.

How To Solve The Cuban Missile Crisis

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a 13-day political and military standoff occurring in October of 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis came about after the Bay of Pigs. Krushchev gave Castro some of the Soviet military equipment to avoid a follow-up American invasion of Cuba causing Americans to become alarmed. In September 1962, the Soviets said they had no intention of placing nuclear missiles in Cuba; which was a lie. The Cuban Missile Crisis was over the installation of nuclear-armed soviet missiles on Cuba, just 90 miles away from U.S. shores. This tense political and military standoff include leaders of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. On October 22, 1962 president John F. Kennedy told Americans about the missiles, he also explained his decision to enact a naval blockade around Cuba and he also made it clear that the United States would use military force if needed.

Fidel Castro's Role in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962

• 10 Works Cited

It is evident that the US had been flagrantly deceived. Then Kennedy called for a naval blockade of Cuba. Kennedy used political negotiations with Khrushchev to come to an agreement in the removal of the weapons. Throughout negotiations, there were incidents that occurred which amplified tensions. Such as on the noon of October 27th, a U-2 reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba. In those moments, both the US and the Soviet Union assumed that it was Castro who commanded the fire of low-flying U.S. planes on October 27th. Although Castro had certainly commanded Cuban antiaircraft artillery to fire, there is no indication that he had also ordered Soviet artillery to fire. Another occurrence is Castro’s letter to Khrushchev insisting that the Soviet Union should launch a first-strike nuclear attack on the United States.

What Are The Causes Of The Cuban Missile Crisis

A 13-day political and military standoff on October 1962 over the installation of nuclear armed Soviet missiles on Cuba, just 90 miles from U.S. shores was the Cuban Missile Crisis. The US responded after news that Cuba obtained nuclear power the US performed a naval blockade making it clear that the US was prepared to use military force to neutralize the threat if necessary. Huge tensions were created because of this as the idea of a nuclear war was very possible. Both superpowers the US and USSR wanted more nuclear capabilities than the other and were reluctant to give out their advantage over. However through the enormous tensions that were built up both sides managed to make a deal. Khrushchev sent a message to Kennedy in which he offered

Realist Perpective on the Cuban Missile Crisis Essay

In October of 1962, the United States and the Soviet Union reached a near-nuclear experience when in a short fourteen days; Russia was caught building nuclear missile bases in Cuba. With the Second World War just barely in the past, the United States was still on their toes making sure they were in the clear. When they sent the U-2 spy plane to monitor Cuba they found missile bases that were armed and ready to wipe out the western hemisphere. Considering the military, economy, and diplomacy of the U.S., Kennedy could take no chances.

Related Topics

• Cuban Missile Crisis
• Soviet Union
• Nikita Khrushchev
• John F. Kennedy

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Cuban Missile Crisis Theory Essay Collection

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Cuban Missile Crisis Management Essay

Introduction, managing of cuban missile crisis, reference list.

The Cuban Missile Crisis was a battle that arose between the United States, Cuba and Soviet Union in 1962. United States unsuccessful efforts to overthrow Cuban regime (Operation Mongoose) prompted Soviet to furtively erect bases in Cuba to provide medium and intermediate range of airborne nuclear artilleries to prove to the world its military supremacy.

The artilleries had a capability of striking continental America. The installation of missiles in Cuba was a Soviet mission done privately to facilitate surprise attack to continental America (White, 1997, p.69).

The US administration of the time believed that Moscow‘s activities in Cuba were a threat to International security, hence; the ballistic missiles deployed in Cuba enhanced a major security blow to the leadership of United States. To curb potential danger caused by the situation, John F. Kennedy effected strategies which proved useful in calming the situation

Managing the Cuban Missile Crisis was a complex issue by John F. Kennedy administration. Perhaps, the United States intelligence was convinced that Soviet would not succeed in installing nuclear missiles in Cuba. However, this was not the case; the Soviet had gone ahead and installed the missiles without prior knowledge of United States security intelligent.

To mitigate the risk, the Kennedy administration discussed various options to reduce the likelihood of a full blown crisis. Mitigation measures adopted included; military, quarantine and diplomacy among other measures

The John Kennedy administration embraced using military to designate Missile sites in Cuba by using military prowess. United States Military interventions were well developed thus the Kennedy administration found it easy to order posting to strategic sites on the Atlantic Ocean. Besides, the Army, marine, and navy had a tough program if they were not engaged; they were systematically ordered to the sea (White, 1997, p.79).

Concentrated air monitoring in Atlantic was instigated, tracking more than 2,000 foreign ships in the area. The government was determined in case the Soviet Union launched nuclear assault; United States military was standby to answer.

Beginning 20th October, 1962, The United States’ Strategic Air Command began diffusing its aircraft, fully equipped on an upgraded alert. According to White (1997, p.109), heavy aircraft such as B-52 began a significant aerial vigilance that involved 24 hour flights and instant standby response for every aircraft that landed.

Besides, Intercontinental Ballistic Missile troops assumed analogous vigilant authority. Moreover, the POLARIS submarines were deployed to reassigned locations in the sea bordering United States and Cuba. The supreme nuclear weapons of Kennedy administration were installed to forestall any hasty battle poised by the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Divine (1998,p.97) points out that United States air defense troops, under the operational control of North America Defense Command, were also organized. Combatant interceptors, NIKE-HERCULES and HAWK missile hordes, were tactically relocated to southeast part to enhance local air defense (White, 1997, p.118).

The John Kennedy constituted its Air Force, Army and Navy in October. When command organizations were officially constituted, the Commander in Chief Atlantic was chosen to lead the team and provide a unified authority.

The John F. Kennedy administration implemented all these plans through the Joint Chiefs of Staff who later named Chief of Naval Operations to administer all necessary actions and subsequent execution.

Military intervention instituted by John Kennedy administration deterred Soviet Union intention of installing Missile center in Cuba of which would have posed a serious threat not only to America but entire America’s continent (Divine, 1998, p.123).

The John F. Kennedy administration imposed a quarantine to exert more pressure on Soviet Union with a view of subverting possible war. This was one of the flexible methods unlike others that US government embraced. Quarantine was aimed at constraining buildup of offensive military weapons en-route to Cuba.

To thoroughly execute the strategy, all kinds of ships en-route to Cuba from whichever country or port were scrutinized to confirm the presence of aggressive artilleries. Byrne (2006, p.29) explains that if toxic artillery were located, the ship was forced to unwind the voyage or risk being confiscated.

This quarantine was stretched to other kinds of cargoes and carriers. Quarantine provided more opportunity to Soviet Union to reconsider their position and destroy all offensive military apparatus in Cuba. Quarantine was believed as a precise strategy in solving the Cuban Missile Crisis because, the US government thought that it will be easier to start with a limited steps towards stringent measures for implementation (Byrne, 2006, p 86).

Though it started at a low pace, it exerted more pressure on Soviet Union thus yielding to United States demands. This proved to be an effective strategy. Soviet Union sentiment was that United States was contravening international law.

However, it was hard for the Soviet to test the applicability of this strategy. They knew if they dare rise the situation at hand would become even worse. The Soviets acknowledged installing missiles in Cuba to secure it against the US invasion. The Kennedy administration accordingly accepted to invade Cuba.

John Kennedy and ExComm (John F. advisers) team prodded every probable diplomatic system to truncate a nuclear holocaust. The Cuban Missile Crisis deepened diplomatic relations between the United States and Soviet Union with a choice of evading more emergency or perhaps war.

According to Byrne (2006, p.125), Kennedy himself was skillful and embraced compulsion to gain a diplomatic success. He sustained emphasis upon Khrushchev vehemently but adeptly. Potency was used shrewdly by Kennedy administration as a powerful, discreet component to urge Soviets cede the plan without embarrassment. His persistence was unwavering.

United States and the Soviet exchanged letters and intensified communication both formal and informal. The Soviet through Khrushchev dispatched letters to Kennedy administration explaining the circumstances of Missiles in Cuba and peaceful intention of Soviet Union.

Further, diplomatic efforts were strengthened by more letters from Soviet Union explaining the intent of dismantling the missile installations in Cuba and subsequent personnel relocation. This was only after United States dismantled its missile it had installed in Italy and Turkey.

Kennedy’s respond to crisis diplomacy is lauded as a contributory factor which barred the Cuban Missile Crisis resulting in nuclear conflict.

Byrne (2006, p.132) alleges that, if Kennedy’s responses were altered, it would have led to another world war. hence his diplomatic finesse succeeded in convincing Soviet Union to dismantle its Missiles in Cuba under United Nations supervision whereas the honoring its commitment in removing its missile installations in the continental Europe.

John F. Kennedy administration amicably responded to Cuban Missile Crisis in an effective way. Measures undertaken such as; military intervention, quarantine and skillful diplomacy necessitated subversion of the crisis.

Failure of which would have resulted in another World War. Besides, the plans facilitated the Kennedy administration to effectively prove to the world it was capable of handling similar magnitude of threats to enhance world peace and security.

Byrne, P. J. (2006). The Cuban Missile Crisis: To the Brink of War , Minneapolis: Compass Point Books

Divine, R. A. (1988). The Cuban Missile Crisis. New Jersey: Markus Wiener Publishers

White, M. J. (1997). Missiles In Cuba: Kennedy, Khrushchev, Castro, And The 1962 Crisis , Texas: University of Texas

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IvyPanda. (2022, April 13). Cuban Missile Crisis Management. https://ivypanda.com/essays/cuban-missile-crisis-essay/

"Cuban Missile Crisis Management." IvyPanda , 13 Apr. 2022, ivypanda.com/essays/cuban-missile-crisis-essay/.

IvyPanda . (2022) 'Cuban Missile Crisis Management'. 13 April.

IvyPanda . 2022. "Cuban Missile Crisis Management." April 13, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/cuban-missile-crisis-essay/.

1. IvyPanda . "Cuban Missile Crisis Management." April 13, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/cuban-missile-crisis-essay/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Cuban Missile Crisis Management." April 13, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/cuban-missile-crisis-essay/.

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History EE - Berlin Blockade/Cuban Missile Crisis

By Sabs44 November 28, 2011 in Extended Essay

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Hey guys, I've decided on a topic that I think I need to refine: a game theoretical analysis of the similarities (maybe differences) between the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Berlin Blockade.

Could someone give me some pointers as to how to make sure it doesn't turn into a narrative essay, but rather sticks to analysis based? For example, should I maybe compare primary sources at the time from both places?

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Award Winning Boss

I think that topic is really overdone

Really? Weird... even game theory based?

Anyone else with some advice?

• 2 weeks later...

If you're making it game theory based, it doesn't take away from the fact that it is still an overdone area of history. Furthermore, I don't think you appreciate how extensive a good game theory analysis is. I know 4,000 words seems like a lot when you have nothing, but that word count just whips by you when you start writing. 4,000 words is nowhere near enough for an adequate analysis and comparison of these two precipitous events in history that have an incalculable number of links and decisions from differing and varied sources that culminated into the event.

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