define virtue ethics essay

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Virtue Ethics

Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as “Do unto others as you would be done by” and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent.

This is not to say that only virtue ethicists attend to virtues, any more than it is to say that only consequentialists attend to consequences or only deontologists to rules. Each of the above-mentioned approaches can make room for virtues, consequences, and rules. Indeed, any plausible normative ethical theory will have something to say about all three. What distinguishes virtue ethics from consequentialism or deontology is the centrality of virtue within the theory (Watson 1990; Kawall 2009). Whereas consequentialists will define virtues as traits that yield good consequences and deontologists will define them as traits possessed by those who reliably fulfil their duties, virtue ethicists will resist the attempt to define virtues in terms of some other concept that is taken to be more fundamental. Rather, virtues and vices will be foundational for virtue ethical theories and other normative notions will be grounded in them.

We begin by discussing two concepts that are central to all forms of virtue ethics, namely, virtue and practical wisdom. Then we note some of the features that distinguish different virtue ethical theories from one another before turning to objections that have been raised against virtue ethics and responses offered on its behalf. We conclude with a look at some of the directions in which future research might develop.

1.2 Practical Wisdom

2.1 eudaimonist virtue ethics, 2.2 agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, 2.3 target-centered virtue ethics, 2.4 platonistic virtue ethics, 3. objections to virtue ethics, 4. future directions, other internet resources, related entries, 1. preliminaries.

In the West, virtue ethics’ founding fathers are Plato and Aristotle, and in the East it can be traced back to Mencius and Confucius. It persisted as the dominant approach in Western moral philosophy until at least the Enlightenment, suffered a momentary eclipse during the nineteenth century, but re-emerged in Anglo-American philosophy in the late 1950s. It was heralded by Anscombe’s famous article “Modern Moral Philosophy” (Anscombe 1958) which crystallized an increasing dissatisfaction with the forms of deontology and utilitarianism then prevailing. Neither of them, at that time, paid attention to a number of topics that had always figured in the virtue ethics tradition—virtues and vices, motives and moral character, moral education, moral wisdom or discernment, friendship and family relationships, a deep concept of happiness, the role of the emotions in our moral life and the fundamentally important questions of what sorts of persons we should be and how we should live.

Its re-emergence had an invigorating effect on the other two approaches, many of whose proponents then began to address these topics in the terms of their favoured theory. (One consequence of this has been that it is now necessary to distinguish “virtue ethics” (the third approach) from “virtue theory”, a term which includes accounts of virtue within the other approaches.) Interest in Kant’s virtue theory has redirected philosophers’ attention to Kant’s long neglected Doctrine of Virtue , and utilitarians have developed consequentialist virtue theories (Driver 2001; Hurka 2001). It has also generated virtue ethical readings of philosophers other than Plato and Aristotle, such as Martineau, Hume and Nietzsche, and thereby different forms of virtue ethics have developed (Slote 2001; Swanton 2003, 2011a).

Although modern virtue ethics does not have to take a “neo-Aristotelian” or eudaimonist form (see section 2), almost any modern version still shows that its roots are in ancient Greek philosophy by the employment of three concepts derived from it. These are arête (excellence or virtue), phronesis (practical or moral wisdom) and eudaimonia (usually translated as happiness or flourishing). (See Annas 2011 for a short, clear, and authoritative account of all three.) We discuss the first two in the remainder of this section. Eudaimonia is discussed in connection with eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics in the next.

A virtue is an excellent trait of character. It is a disposition, well entrenched in its possessor—something that, as we say, goes all the way down, unlike a habit such as being a tea-drinker—to notice, expect, value, feel, desire, choose, act, and react in certain characteristic ways. To possess a virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. A significant aspect of this mindset is the wholehearted acceptance of a distinctive range of considerations as reasons for action. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, practices honest dealing and does not cheat. If such actions are done merely because the agent thinks that honesty is the best policy, or because they fear being caught out, rather than through recognising “To do otherwise would be dishonest” as the relevant reason, they are not the actions of an honest person. An honest person cannot be identified simply as one who, for example, tells the truth because it is the truth, for one can have the virtue of honesty without being tactless or indiscreet. The honest person recognises “That would be a lie” as a strong (though perhaps not overriding) reason for not making certain statements in certain circumstances, and gives due, but not overriding, weight to “That would be the truth” as a reason for making them.

An honest person’s reasons and choices with respect to honest and dishonest actions reflect her views about honesty, truth, and deception—but of course such views manifest themselves with respect to other actions, and to emotional reactions as well. Valuing honesty as she does, she chooses, where possible to work with honest people, to have honest friends, to bring up her children to be honest. She disapproves of, dislikes, deplores dishonesty, is not amused by certain tales of chicanery, despises or pities those who succeed through deception rather than thinking they have been clever, is unsurprised, or pleased (as appropriate) when honesty triumphs, is shocked or distressed when those near and dear to her do what is dishonest and so on. Given that a virtue is such a multi-track disposition, it would obviously be reckless to attribute one to an agent on the basis of a single observed action or even a series of similar actions, especially if you don’t know the agent’s reasons for doing as she did (Sreenivasan 2002).

Possessing a virtue is a matter of degree. To possess such a disposition fully is to possess full or perfect virtue, which is rare, and there are a number of ways of falling short of this ideal (Athanassoulis 2000). Most people who can truly be described as fairly virtuous, and certainly markedly better than those who can truly be described as dishonest, self-centred and greedy, still have their blind spots—little areas where they do not act for the reasons one would expect. So someone honest or kind in most situations, and notably so in demanding ones, may nevertheless be trivially tainted by snobbery, inclined to be disingenuous about their forebears and less than kind to strangers with the wrong accent.

Further, it is not easy to get one’s emotions in harmony with one’s rational recognition of certain reasons for action. I may be honest enough to recognise that I must own up to a mistake because it would be dishonest not to do so without my acceptance being so wholehearted that I can own up easily, with no inner conflict. Following (and adapting) Aristotle, virtue ethicists draw a distinction between full or perfect virtue and “continence”, or strength of will. The fully virtuous do what they should without a struggle against contrary desires; the continent have to control a desire or temptation to do otherwise.

Describing the continent as “falling short” of perfect virtue appears to go against the intuition that there is something particularly admirable about people who manage to act well when it is especially hard for them to do so, but the plausibility of this depends on exactly what “makes it hard” (Foot 1978: 11–14). If it is the circumstances in which the agent acts—say that she is very poor when she sees someone drop a full purse or that she is in deep grief when someone visits seeking help—then indeed it is particularly admirable of her to restore the purse or give the help when it is hard for her to do so. But if what makes it hard is an imperfection in her character—the temptation to keep what is not hers, or a callous indifference to the suffering of others—then it is not.

Another way in which one can easily fall short of full virtue is through lacking phronesis —moral or practical wisdom.

The concept of a virtue is the concept of something that makes its possessor good: a virtuous person is a morally good, excellent or admirable person who acts and feels as she should. These are commonly accepted truisms. But it is equally common, in relation to particular (putative) examples of virtues to give these truisms up. We may say of someone that he is generous or honest “to a fault”. It is commonly asserted that someone’s compassion might lead them to act wrongly, to tell a lie they should not have told, for example, in their desire to prevent someone else’s hurt feelings. It is also said that courage, in a desperado, enables him to do far more wicked things than he would have been able to do if he were timid. So it would appear that generosity, honesty, compassion and courage despite being virtues, are sometimes faults. Someone who is generous, honest, compassionate, and courageous might not be a morally good person—or, if it is still held to be a truism that they are, then morally good people may be led by what makes them morally good to act wrongly! How have we arrived at such an odd conclusion?

The answer lies in too ready an acceptance of ordinary usage, which permits a fairly wide-ranging application of many of the virtue terms, combined, perhaps, with a modern readiness to suppose that the virtuous agent is motivated by emotion or inclination, not by rational choice. If one thinks of generosity or honesty as the disposition to be moved to action by generous or honest impulses such as the desire to give or to speak the truth, if one thinks of compassion as the disposition to be moved by the sufferings of others and to act on that emotion, if one thinks of courage as mere fearlessness or the willingness to face danger, then it will indeed seem obvious that these are all dispositions that can lead to their possessor’s acting wrongly. But it is also obvious, as soon as it is stated, that these are dispositions that can be possessed by children, and although children thus endowed (bar the “courageous” disposition) would undoubtedly be very nice children, we would not say that they were morally virtuous or admirable people. The ordinary usage, or the reliance on motivation by inclination, gives us what Aristotle calls “natural virtue”—a proto version of full virtue awaiting perfection by phronesis or practical wisdom.

Aristotle makes a number of specific remarks about phronesis that are the subject of much scholarly debate, but the (related) modern concept is best understood by thinking of what the virtuous morally mature adult has that nice children, including nice adolescents, lack. Both the virtuous adult and the nice child have good intentions, but the child is much more prone to mess things up because he is ignorant of what he needs to know in order to do what he intends. A virtuous adult is not, of course, infallible and may also, on occasion, fail to do what she intended to do through lack of knowledge, but only on those occasions on which the lack of knowledge is not culpable. So, for example, children and adolescents often harm those they intend to benefit either because they do not know how to set about securing the benefit or because their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is limited and often mistaken. Such ignorance in small children is rarely, if ever culpable. Adults, on the other hand, are culpable if they mess things up by being thoughtless, insensitive, reckless, impulsive, shortsighted, and by assuming that what suits them will suit everyone instead of taking a more objective viewpoint. They are also culpable if their understanding of what is beneficial and harmful is mistaken. It is part of practical wisdom to know how to secure real benefits effectively; those who have practical wisdom will not make the mistake of concealing the hurtful truth from the person who really needs to know it in the belief that they are benefiting him.

Quite generally, given that good intentions are intentions to act well or “do the right thing”, we may say that practical wisdom is the knowledge or understanding that enables its possessor, unlike the nice adolescents, to do just that, in any given situation. The detailed specification of what is involved in such knowledge or understanding has not yet appeared in the literature, but some aspects of it are becoming well known. Even many deontologists now stress the point that their action-guiding rules cannot, reliably, be applied without practical wisdom, because correct application requires situational appreciation—the capacity to recognise, in any particular situation, those features of it that are morally salient. This brings out two aspects of practical wisdom.

One is that it characteristically comes only with experience of life. Amongst the morally relevant features of a situation may be the likely consequences, for the people involved, of a certain action, and this is something that adolescents are notoriously clueless about precisely because they are inexperienced. It is part of practical wisdom to be wise about human beings and human life. (It should go without saying that the virtuous are mindful of the consequences of possible actions. How could they fail to be reckless, thoughtless and short-sighted if they were not?)

The second is the practically wise agent’s capacity to recognise some features of a situation as more important than others, or indeed, in that situation, as the only relevant ones. The wise do not see things in the same way as the nice adolescents who, with their under-developed virtues, still tend to see the personally disadvantageous nature of a certain action as competing in importance with its honesty or benevolence or justice.

These aspects coalesce in the description of the practically wise as those who understand what is truly worthwhile, truly important, and thereby truly advantageous in life, who know, in short, how to live well.

2. Forms of Virtue Ethics

While all forms of virtue ethics agree that virtue is central and practical wisdom required, they differ in how they combine these and other concepts to illuminate what we should do in particular contexts and how we should live our lives as a whole. In what follows we sketch four distinct forms taken by contemporary virtue ethics, namely, a) eudaimonist virtue ethics, b) agent-based and exemplarist virtue ethics, c) target-centered virtue ethics, and d) Platonistic virtue ethics.

The distinctive feature of eudaimonist versions of virtue ethics is that they define virtues in terms of their relationship to eudaimonia . A virtue is a trait that contributes to or is a constituent of eudaimonia and we ought to develop virtues, the eudaimonist claims, precisely because they contribute to eudaimonia .

The concept of eudaimonia , a key term in ancient Greek moral philosophy, is standardly translated as “happiness” or “flourishing” and occasionally as “well-being.” Each translation has its disadvantages. The trouble with “flourishing” is that animals and even plants can flourish but eudaimonia is possible only for rational beings. The trouble with “happiness” is that in ordinary conversation it connotes something subjectively determined. It is for me, not for you, to pronounce on whether I am happy. If I think I am happy then I am—it is not something I can be wrong about (barring advanced cases of self-deception). Contrast my being healthy or flourishing. Here we have no difficulty in recognizing that I might think I was healthy, either physically or psychologically, or think that I was flourishing but be wrong. In this respect, “flourishing” is a better translation than “happiness”. It is all too easy to be mistaken about whether one’s life is eudaimon (the adjective from eudaimonia ) not simply because it is easy to deceive oneself, but because it is easy to have a mistaken conception of eudaimonia , or of what it is to live well as a human being, believing it to consist largely in physical pleasure or luxury for example.

Eudaimonia is, avowedly, a moralized or value-laden concept of happiness, something like “true” or “real” happiness or “the sort of happiness worth seeking or having.” It is thereby the sort of concept about which there can be substantial disagreement between people with different views about human life that cannot be resolved by appeal to some external standard on which, despite their different views, the parties to the disagreement concur (Hursthouse 1999: 188–189).

Most versions of virtue ethics agree that living a life in accordance with virtue is necessary for eudaimonia. This supreme good is not conceived of as an independently defined state (made up of, say, a list of non-moral goods that does not include virtuous activity) which exercise of the virtues might be thought to promote. It is, within virtue ethics, already conceived of as something of which virtuous activity is at least partially constitutive (Kraut 1989). Thereby virtue ethicists claim that a human life devoted to physical pleasure or the acquisition of wealth is not eudaimon , but a wasted life.

But although all standard versions of virtue ethics insist on that conceptual link between virtue and eudaimonia , further links are matters of dispute and generate different versions. For Aristotle, virtue is necessary but not sufficient—what is also needed are external goods which are a matter of luck. For Plato and the Stoics, virtue is both necessary and sufficient for eudaimonia (Annas 1993).

According to eudaimonist virtue ethics, the good life is the eudaimon life, and the virtues are what enable a human being to be eudaimon because the virtues just are those character traits that benefit their possessor in that way, barring bad luck. So there is a link between eudaimonia and what confers virtue status on a character trait. (For a discussion of the differences between eudaimonists see Baril 2014. For recent defenses of eudaimonism see Annas 2011; LeBar 2013b; Badhwar 2014; and Bloomfield 2014.)

Rather than deriving the normativity of virtue from the value of eudaimonia , agent-based virtue ethicists argue that other forms of normativity—including the value of eudaimonia —are traced back to and ultimately explained in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents.

It is unclear how many other forms of normativity must be explained in terms of the qualities of agents in order for a theory to count as agent-based. The two best-known agent-based theorists, Michael Slote and Linda Zagzebski, trace a wide range of normative qualities back to the qualities of agents. For example, Slote defines rightness and wrongness in terms of agents’ motivations: “[A]gent-based virtue ethics … understands rightness in terms of good motivations and wrongness in terms of the having of bad (or insufficiently good) motives” (2001: 14). Similarly, he explains the goodness of an action, the value of eudaimonia , the justice of a law or social institution, and the normativity of practical rationality in terms of the motivational and dispositional qualities of agents (2001: 99–100, 154, 2000). Zagzebski likewise defines right and wrong actions by reference to the emotions, motives, and dispositions of virtuous and vicious agents. For example, “A wrong act = an act that the phronimos characteristically would not do, and he would feel guilty if he did = an act such that it is not the case that he might do it = an act that expresses a vice = an act that is against a requirement of virtue (the virtuous self)” (Zagzebski 2004: 160). Her definitions of duties, good and bad ends, and good and bad states of affairs are similarly grounded in the motivational and dispositional states of exemplary agents (1998, 2004, 2010).

However, there could also be less ambitious agent-based approaches to virtue ethics (see Slote 1997). At the very least, an agent-based approach must be committed to explaining what one should do by reference to the motivational and dispositional states of agents. But this is not yet a sufficient condition for counting as an agent-based approach, since the same condition will be met by every virtue ethical account. For a theory to count as an agent-based form of virtue ethics it must also be the case that the normative properties of motivations and dispositions cannot be explained in terms of the normative properties of something else (such as eudaimonia or states of affairs) which is taken to be more fundamental.

Beyond this basic commitment, there is room for agent-based theories to be developed in a number of different directions. The most important distinguishing factor has to do with how motivations and dispositions are taken to matter for the purposes of explaining other normative qualities. For Slote what matters are this particular agent’s actual motives and dispositions . The goodness of action A, for example, is derived from the agent’s motives when she performs A. If those motives are good then the action is good, if not then not. On Zagzebski’s account, by contrast, a good or bad, right or wrong action is defined not by this agent’s actual motives but rather by whether this is the sort of action a virtuously motivated agent would perform (Zagzebski 2004: 160). Appeal to the virtuous agent’s hypothetical motives and dispositions enables Zagzebski to distinguish between performing the right action and doing so for the right reasons (a distinction that, as Brady (2004) observes, Slote has trouble drawing).

Another point on which agent-based forms of virtue ethics might differ concerns how one identifies virtuous motivations and dispositions. According to Zagzebski’s exemplarist account, “We do not have criteria for goodness in advance of identifying the exemplars of goodness” (Zagzebski 2004: 41). As we observe the people around us, we find ourselves wanting to be like some of them (in at least some respects) and not wanting to be like others. The former provide us with positive exemplars and the latter with negative ones. Our understanding of better and worse motivations and virtuous and vicious dispositions is grounded in these primitive responses to exemplars (2004: 53). This is not to say that every time we act we stop and ask ourselves what one of our exemplars would do in this situations. Our moral concepts become more refined over time as we encounter a wider variety of exemplars and begin to draw systematic connections between them, noting what they have in common, how they differ, and which of these commonalities and differences matter, morally speaking. Recognizable motivational profiles emerge and come to be labeled as virtues or vices, and these, in turn, shape our understanding of the obligations we have and the ends we should pursue. However, even though the systematising of moral thought can travel a long way from our starting point, according to the exemplarist it never reaches a stage where reference to exemplars is replaced by the recognition of something more fundamental. At the end of the day, according to the exemplarist, our moral system still rests on our basic propensity to take a liking (or disliking) to exemplars. Nevertheless, one could be an agent-based theorist without advancing the exemplarist’s account of the origins or reference conditions for judgments of good and bad, virtuous and vicious.

The touchstone for eudaimonist virtue ethicists is a flourishing human life. For agent-based virtue ethicists it is an exemplary agent’s motivations. The target-centered view developed by Christine Swanton (2003), by contrast, begins with our existing conceptions of the virtues. We already have a passable idea of which traits are virtues and what they involve. Of course, this untutored understanding can be clarified and improved, and it is one of the tasks of the virtue ethicist to help us do precisely that. But rather than stripping things back to something as basic as the motivations we want to imitate or building it up to something as elaborate as an entire flourishing life, the target-centered view begins where most ethics students find themselves, namely, with the idea that generosity, courage, self-discipline, compassion, and the like get a tick of approval. It then examines what these traits involve.

A complete account of virtue will map out 1) its field , 2) its mode of responsiveness, 3) its basis of moral acknowledgment, and 4) its target . Different virtues are concerned with different fields . Courage, for example, is concerned with what might harm us, whereas generosity is concerned with the sharing of time, talent, and property. The basis of acknowledgment of a virtue is the feature within the virtue’s field to which it responds. To continue with our previous examples, generosity is attentive to the benefits that others might enjoy through one’s agency, and courage responds to threats to value, status, or the bonds that exist between oneself and particular others, and the fear such threats might generate. A virtue’s mode has to do with how it responds to the bases of acknowledgment within its field. Generosity promotes a good, namely, another’s benefit, whereas courage defends a value, bond, or status. Finally, a virtue’s target is that at which it is aimed. Courage aims to control fear and handle danger, while generosity aims to share time, talents, or possessions with others in ways that benefit them.

A virtue , on a target-centered account, “is a disposition to respond to, or acknowledge, items within its field or fields in an excellent or good enough way” (Swanton 2003: 19). A virtuous act is an act that hits the target of a virtue, which is to say that it succeeds in responding to items in its field in the specified way (233). Providing a target-centered definition of a right action requires us to move beyond the analysis of a single virtue and the actions that follow from it. This is because a single action context may involve a number of different, overlapping fields. Determination might lead me to persist in trying to complete a difficult task even if doing so requires a singleness of purpose. But love for my family might make a different use of my time and attention. In order to define right action a target-centered view must explain how we handle different virtues’ conflicting claims on our resources. There are at least three different ways to address this challenge. A perfectionist target-centered account would stipulate, “An act is right if and only if it is overall virtuous, and that entails that it is the, or a, best action possible in the circumstances” (239–240). A more permissive target-centered account would not identify ‘right’ with ‘best’, but would allow an action to count as right provided “it is good enough even if not the (or a) best action” (240). A minimalist target-centered account would not even require an action to be good in order to be right. On such a view, “An act is right if and only if it is not overall vicious” (240). (For further discussion of target-centered virtue ethics see Van Zyl 2014; and Smith 2016).

The fourth form a virtue ethic might adopt takes its inspiration from Plato. The Socrates of Plato’s dialogues devotes a great deal of time to asking his fellow Athenians to explain the nature of virtues like justice, courage, piety, and wisdom. So it is clear that Plato counts as a virtue theorist. But it is a matter of some debate whether he should be read as a virtue ethicist (White 2015). What is not open to debate is whether Plato has had an important influence on the contemporary revival of interest in virtue ethics. A number of those who have contributed to the revival have done so as Plato scholars (e.g., Prior 1991; Kamtekar 1998; Annas 1999; and Reshotko 2006). However, often they have ended up championing a eudaimonist version of virtue ethics (see Prior 2001 and Annas 2011), rather than a version that would warrant a separate classification. Nevertheless, there are two variants that call for distinct treatment.

Timothy Chappell takes the defining feature of Platonistic virtue ethics to be that “Good agency in the truest and fullest sense presupposes the contemplation of the Form of the Good” (2014). Chappell follows Iris Murdoch in arguing that “In the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego” (Murdoch 1971: 51). Constantly attending to our needs, our desires, our passions, and our thoughts skews our perspective on what the world is actually like and blinds us to the goods around us. Contemplating the goodness of something we encounter—which is to say, carefully attending to it “for its own sake, in order to understand it” (Chappell 2014: 300)—breaks this natural tendency by drawing our attention away from ourselves. Contemplating such goodness with regularity makes room for new habits of thought that focus more readily and more honestly on things other than the self. It alters the quality of our consciousness. And “anything which alters consciousness in the direction of unselfishness, objectivity, and realism is to be connected with virtue” (Murdoch 1971: 82). The virtues get defined, then, in terms of qualities that help one “pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the world as it really is” (91). And good agency is defined by the possession and exercise of such virtues. Within Chappell’s and Murdoch’s framework, then, not all normative properties get defined in terms of virtue. Goodness, in particular, is not so defined. But the kind of goodness which is possible for creatures like us is defined by virtue, and any answer to the question of what one should do or how one should live will appeal to the virtues.

Another Platonistic variant of virtue ethics is exemplified by Robert Merrihew Adams. Unlike Murdoch and Chappell, his starting point is not a set of claims about our consciousness of goodness. Rather, he begins with an account of the metaphysics of goodness. Like Murdoch and others influenced by Platonism, Adams’s account of goodness is built around a conception of a supremely perfect good. And like Augustine, Adams takes that perfect good to be God. God is both the exemplification and the source of all goodness. Other things are good, he suggests, to the extent that they resemble God (Adams 1999).

The resemblance requirement identifies a necessary condition for being good, but it does not yet give us a sufficient condition. This is because there are ways in which finite creatures might resemble God that would not be suitable to the type of creature they are. For example, if God were all-knowing, then the belief, “I am all-knowing,” would be a suitable belief for God to have. In God, such a belief—because true—would be part of God’s perfection. However, as neither you nor I are all-knowing, the belief, “I am all-knowing,” in one of us would not be good. To rule out such cases we need to introduce another factor. That factor is the fitting response to goodness, which Adams suggests is love. Adams uses love to weed out problematic resemblances: “being excellent in the way that a finite thing can be consists in resembling God in a way that could serve God as a reason for loving the thing” (Adams 1999: 36).

Virtues come into the account as one of the ways in which some things (namely, persons) could resemble God. “[M]ost of the excellences that are most important to us, and of whose value we are most confident, are excellences of persons or of qualities or actions or works or lives or stories of persons” (1999: 42). This is one of the reasons Adams offers for conceiving of the ideal of perfection as a personal God, rather than an impersonal form of the Good. Many of the excellences of persons of which we are most confident are virtues such as love, wisdom, justice, patience, and generosity. And within many theistic traditions, including Adams’s own Christian tradition, such virtues are commonly attributed to divine agents.

A Platonistic account like the one Adams puts forward in Finite and Infinite Goods clearly does not derive all other normative properties from the virtues (for a discussion of the relationship between this view and the one he puts forward in A Theory of Virtue (2006) see Pettigrove 2014). Goodness provides the normative foundation. Virtues are not built on that foundation; rather, as one of the varieties of goodness of whose value we are most confident, virtues form part of the foundation. Obligations, by contrast, come into the account at a different level. Moral obligations, Adams argues, are determined by the expectations and demands that “arise in a relationship or system of relationships that is good or valuable” (1999: 244). Other things being equal, the more virtuous the parties to the relationship, the more binding the obligation. Thus, within Adams’s account, the good (which includes virtue) is prior to the right. However, once good relationships have given rise to obligations, those obligations take on a life of their own. Their bindingness is not traced directly to considerations of goodness. Rather, they are determined by the expectations of the parties and the demands of the relationship.

A number of objections have been raised against virtue ethics, some of which bear more directly on one form of virtue ethics than on others. In this section we consider eight objections, namely, the a) application, b) adequacy, c) relativism, d) conflict, e) self-effacement, f) justification, g) egoism, and h) situationist problems.

a) In the early days of virtue ethics’ revival, the approach was associated with an “anti-codifiability” thesis about ethics, directed against the prevailing pretensions of normative theory. At the time, utilitarians and deontologists commonly (though not universally) held that the task of ethical theory was to come up with a code consisting of universal rules or principles (possibly only one, as in the case of act-utilitarianism) which would have two significant features: i) the rule(s) would amount to a decision procedure for determining what the right action was in any particular case; ii) the rule(s) would be stated in such terms that any non-virtuous person could understand and apply it (them) correctly.

Virtue ethicists maintained, contrary to these two claims, that it was quite unrealistic to imagine that there could be such a code (see, in particular, McDowell 1979). The results of attempts to produce and employ such a code, in the heady days of the 1960s and 1970s, when medical and then bioethics boomed and bloomed, tended to support the virtue ethicists’ claim. More and more utilitarians and deontologists found themselves agreed on their general rules but on opposite sides of the controversial moral issues in contemporary discussion. It came to be recognised that moral sensitivity, perception, imagination, and judgement informed by experience— phronesis in short—is needed to apply rules or principles correctly. Hence many (though by no means all) utilitarians and deontologists have explicitly abandoned (ii) and much less emphasis is placed on (i).

Nevertheless, the complaint that virtue ethics does not produce codifiable principles is still a commonly voiced criticism of the approach, expressed as the objection that it is, in principle, unable to provide action-guidance.

Initially, the objection was based on a misunderstanding. Blinkered by slogans that described virtue ethics as “concerned with Being rather than Doing,” as addressing “What sort of person should I be?” but not “What should I do?” as being “agent-centered rather than act-centered,” its critics maintained that it was unable to provide action-guidance. Hence, rather than being a normative rival to utilitarian and deontological ethics, it could claim to be no more than a valuable supplement to them. The rather odd idea was that all virtue ethics could offer was, “Identify a moral exemplar and do what he would do,” as though the university student trying to decide whether to study music (her preference) or engineering (her parents’ preference) was supposed to ask herself, “What would Socrates study if he were in my circumstances?”

But the objection failed to take note of Anscombe’s hint that a great deal of specific action guidance could be found in rules employing the virtue and vice terms (“v-rules”) such as “Do what is honest/charitable; do not do what is dishonest/uncharitable” (Hursthouse 1999). (It is a noteworthy feature of our virtue and vice vocabulary that, although our list of generally recognised virtue terms is comparatively short, our list of vice terms is remarkably, and usefully, long, far exceeding anything that anyone who thinks in terms of standard deontological rules has ever come up with. Much invaluable action guidance comes from avoiding courses of action that would be irresponsible, feckless, lazy, inconsiderate, uncooperative, harsh, intolerant, selfish, mercenary, indiscreet, tactless, arrogant, unsympathetic, cold, incautious, unenterprising, pusillanimous, feeble, presumptuous, rude, hypocritical, self-indulgent, materialistic, grasping, short-sighted, vindictive, calculating, ungrateful, grudging, brutal, profligate, disloyal, and on and on.)

(b) A closely related objection has to do with whether virtue ethics can provide an adequate account of right action. This worry can take two forms. (i) One might think a virtue ethical account of right action is extensionally inadequate. It is possible to perform a right action without being virtuous and a virtuous person can occasionally perform the wrong action without that calling her virtue into question. If virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for right action, one might wonder whether the relationship between rightness/wrongness and virtue/vice is close enough for the former to be identified in terms of the latter. (ii) Alternatively, even if one thought it possible to produce a virtue ethical account that picked out all (and only) right actions, one might still think that at least in some cases virtue is not what explains rightness (Adams 2006:6–8).

Some virtue ethicists respond to the adequacy objection by rejecting the assumption that virtue ethics ought to be in the business of providing an account of right action in the first place. Following in the footsteps of Anscombe (1958) and MacIntyre (1985), Talbot Brewer (2009) argues that to work with the categories of rightness and wrongness is already to get off on the wrong foot. Contemporary conceptions of right and wrong action, built as they are around a notion of moral duty that presupposes a framework of divine (or moral) law or around a conception of obligation that is defined in contrast to self-interest, carry baggage the virtue ethicist is better off without. Virtue ethics can address the questions of how one should live, what kind of person one should become, and even what one should do without that committing it to providing an account of ‘right action’. One might choose, instead, to work with aretaic concepts (defined in terms of virtues and vices) and axiological concepts (defined in terms of good and bad, better and worse) and leave out deontic notions (like right/wrong action, duty, and obligation) altogether.

Other virtue ethicists wish to retain the concept of right action but note that in the current philosophical discussion a number of distinct qualities march under that banner. In some contexts, ‘right action’ identifies the best action an agent might perform in the circumstances. In others, it designates an action that is commendable (even if not the best possible). In still others, it picks out actions that are not blameworthy (even if not commendable). A virtue ethicist might choose to define one of these—for example, the best action—in terms of virtues and vices, but appeal to other normative concepts—such as legitimate expectations—when defining other conceptions of right action.

As we observed in section 2, a virtue ethical account need not attempt to reduce all other normative concepts to virtues and vices. What is required is simply (i) that virtue is not reduced to some other normative concept that is taken to be more fundamental and (ii) that some other normative concepts are explained in terms of virtue and vice. This takes the sting out of the adequacy objection, which is most compelling against versions of virtue ethics that attempt to define all of the senses of ‘right action’ in terms of virtues. Appealing to virtues and vices makes it much easier to achieve extensional adequacy. Making room for normative concepts that are not taken to be reducible to virtue and vice concepts makes it even easier to generate a theory that is both extensionally and explanatorily adequate. Whether one needs other concepts and, if so, how many, is still a matter of debate among virtue ethicists, as is the question of whether virtue ethics even ought to be offering an account of right action. Either way virtue ethicists have resources available to them to address the adequacy objection.

Insofar as the different versions of virtue ethics all retain an emphasis on the virtues, they are open to the familiar problem of (c) the charge of cultural relativity. Is it not the case that different cultures embody different virtues, (MacIntyre 1985) and hence that the v-rules will pick out actions as right or wrong only relative to a particular culture? Different replies have been made to this charge. One—the tu quoque , or “partners in crime” response—exhibits a quite familiar pattern in virtue ethicists’ defensive strategy (Solomon 1988). They admit that, for them, cultural relativism is a challenge, but point out that it is just as much a problem for the other two approaches. The (putative) cultural variation in character traits regarded as virtues is no greater—indeed markedly less—than the cultural variation in rules of conduct, and different cultures have different ideas about what constitutes happiness or welfare. That cultural relativity should be a problem common to all three approaches is hardly surprising. It is related, after all, to the “justification problem” ( see below ) the quite general metaethical problem of justifying one’s moral beliefs to those who disagree, whether they be moral sceptics, pluralists or from another culture.

A bolder strategy involves claiming that virtue ethics has less difficulty with cultural relativity than the other two approaches. Much cultural disagreement arises, it may be claimed, from local understandings of the virtues, but the virtues themselves are not relative to culture (Nussbaum 1993).

Another objection to which the tu quoque response is partially appropriate is (d) “the conflict problem.” What does virtue ethics have to say about dilemmas—cases in which, apparently, the requirements of different virtues conflict because they point in opposed directions? Charity prompts me to kill the person who would be better off dead, but justice forbids it. Honesty points to telling the hurtful truth, kindness and compassion to remaining silent or even lying. What shall I do? Of course, the same sorts of dilemmas are generated by conflicts between deontological rules. Deontology and virtue ethics share the conflict problem (and are happy to take it on board rather than follow some of the utilitarians in their consequentialist resolutions of such dilemmas) and in fact their strategies for responding to it are parallel. Both aim to resolve a number of dilemmas by arguing that the conflict is merely apparent; a discriminating understanding of the virtues or rules in question, possessed only by those with practical wisdom, will perceive that, in this particular case, the virtues do not make opposing demands or that one rule outranks another, or has a certain exception clause built into it. Whether this is all there is to it depends on whether there are any irresolvable dilemmas. If there are, proponents of either normative approach may point out reasonably that it could only be a mistake to offer a resolution of what is, ex hypothesi , irresolvable.

Another problem arguably shared by all three approaches is (e), that of being self-effacing. An ethical theory is self-effacing if, roughly, whatever it claims justifies a particular action, or makes it right, had better not be the agent’s motive for doing it. Michael Stocker (1976) originally introduced it as a problem for deontology and consequentialism. He pointed out that the agent who, rightly, visits a friend in hospital will rather lessen the impact of his visit on her if he tells her either that he is doing it because it is his duty or because he thought it would maximize the general happiness. But as Simon Keller observes, she won’t be any better pleased if he tells her that he is visiting her because it is what a virtuous agent would do, so virtue ethics would appear to have the problem too (Keller 2007). However, virtue ethics’ defenders have argued that not all forms of virtue ethics are subject to this objection (Pettigrove 2011) and those that are are not seriously undermined by the problem (Martinez 2011).

Another problem for virtue ethics, which is shared by both utilitarianism and deontology, is (f) “the justification problem.” Abstractly conceived, this is the problem of how we justify or ground our ethical beliefs, an issue that is hotly debated at the level of metaethics. In its particular versions, for deontology there is the question of how to justify its claims that certain moral rules are the correct ones, and for utilitarianism of how to justify its claim that all that really matters morally are consequences for happiness or well-being. For virtue ethics, the problem concerns the question of which character traits are the virtues.

In the metaethical debate, there is widespread disagreement about the possibility of providing an external foundation for ethics—“external” in the sense of being external to ethical beliefs—and the same disagreement is found amongst deontologists and utilitarians. Some believe that their normative ethics can be placed on a secure basis, resistant to any form of scepticism, such as what anyone rationally desires, or would accept or agree on, regardless of their ethical outlook; others that it cannot.

Virtue ethicists have eschewed any attempt to ground virtue ethics in an external foundation while continuing to maintain that their claims can be validated. Some follow a form of Rawls’s coherentist approach (Slote 2001; Swanton 2003); neo-Aristotelians a form of ethical naturalism.

A misunderstanding of eudaimonia as an unmoralized concept leads some critics to suppose that the neo-Aristotelians are attempting to ground their claims in a scientific account of human nature and what counts, for a human being, as flourishing. Others assume that, if this is not what they are doing, they cannot be validating their claims that, for example, justice, charity, courage, and generosity are virtues. Either they are illegitimately helping themselves to Aristotle’s discredited natural teleology (Williams 1985) or producing mere rationalizations of their own personal or culturally inculcated values. But McDowell, Foot, MacIntyre and Hursthouse have all outlined versions of a third way between these two extremes. Eudaimonia in virtue ethics, is indeed a moralized concept, but it is not only that. Claims about what constitutes flourishing for human beings no more float free of scientific facts about what human beings are like than ethological claims about what constitutes flourishing for elephants. In both cases, the truth of the claims depends in part on what kind of animal they are and what capacities, desires and interests the humans or elephants have.

The best available science today (including evolutionary theory and psychology) supports rather than undermines the ancient Greek assumption that we are social animals, like elephants and wolves and unlike polar bears. No rationalizing explanation in terms of anything like a social contract is needed to explain why we choose to live together, subjugating our egoistic desires in order to secure the advantages of co-operation. Like other social animals, our natural impulses are not solely directed towards our own pleasures and preservation, but include altruistic and cooperative ones.

This basic fact about us should make more comprehensible the claim that the virtues are at least partially constitutive of human flourishing and also undercut the objection that virtue ethics is, in some sense, egoistic.

(g) The egoism objection has a number of sources. One is a simple confusion. Once it is understood that the fully virtuous agent characteristically does what she should without inner conflict, it is triumphantly asserted that “she is only doing what she wants to do and hence is being selfish.” So when the generous person gives gladly, as the generous are wont to do, it turns out she is not generous and unselfish after all, or at least not as generous as the one who greedily wants to hang on to everything she has but forces herself to give because she thinks she should! A related version ascribes bizarre reasons to the virtuous agent, unjustifiably assuming that she acts as she does because she believes that acting thus on this occasion will help her to achieve eudaimonia. But “the virtuous agent” is just “the agent with the virtues” and it is part of our ordinary understanding of the virtue terms that each carries with it its own typical range of reasons for acting. The virtuous agent acts as she does because she believes that someone’s suffering will be averted, or someone benefited, or the truth established, or a debt repaid, or … thereby.

It is the exercise of the virtues during one’s life that is held to be at least partially constitutive of eudaimonia , and this is consistent with recognising that bad luck may land the virtuous agent in circumstances that require her to give up her life. Given the sorts of considerations that courageous, honest, loyal, charitable people wholeheartedly recognise as reasons for action, they may find themselves compelled to face danger for a worthwhile end, to speak out in someone’s defence, or refuse to reveal the names of their comrades, even when they know that this will inevitably lead to their execution, to share their last crust and face starvation. On the view that the exercise of the virtues is necessary but not sufficient for eudaimonia , such cases are described as those in which the virtuous agent sees that, as things have unfortunately turned out, eudaimonia is not possible for them (Foot 2001, 95). On the Stoical view that it is both necessary and sufficient, a eudaimon life is a life that has been successfully lived (where “success” of course is not to be understood in a materialistic way) and such people die knowing not only that they have made a success of their lives but that they have also brought their lives to a markedly successful completion. Either way, such heroic acts can hardly be regarded as egoistic.

A lingering suggestion of egoism may be found in the misconceived distinction between so-called “self-regarding” and “other-regarding” virtues. Those who have been insulated from the ancient tradition tend to regard justice and benevolence as real virtues, which benefit others but not their possessor, and prudence, fortitude and providence (the virtue whose opposite is “improvidence” or being a spendthrift) as not real virtues at all because they benefit only their possessor. This is a mistake on two counts. Firstly, justice and benevolence do, in general, benefit their possessors, since without them eudaimonia is not possible. Secondly, given that we live together, as social animals, the “self-regarding” virtues do benefit others—those who lack them are a great drain on, and sometimes grief to, those who are close to them (as parents with improvident or imprudent adult offspring know only too well).

The most recent objection (h) to virtue ethics claims that work in “situationist” social psychology shows that there are no such things as character traits and thereby no such things as virtues for virtue ethics to be about (Doris 1998; Harman 1999). In reply, some virtue ethicists have argued that the social psychologists’ studies are irrelevant to the multi-track disposition (see above) that a virtue is supposed to be (Sreenivasan 2002; Kamtekar 2004). Mindful of just how multi-track it is, they agree that it would be reckless in the extreme to ascribe a demanding virtue such as charity to people of whom they know no more than that they have exhibited conventional decency; this would indeed be “a fundamental attribution error.” Others have worked to develop alternative, empirically grounded conceptions of character traits (Snow 2010; Miller 2013 and 2014; however see Upton 2016 for objections to Miller). There have been other responses as well (summarized helpfully in Prinz 2009 and Miller 2014). Notable among these is a response by Adams (2006, echoing Merritt 2000) who steers a middle road between “no character traits at all” and the exacting standard of the Aristotelian conception of virtue which, because of its emphasis on phronesis, requires a high level of character integration. On his conception, character traits may be “frail and fragmentary” but still virtues, and not uncommon. But giving up the idea that practical wisdom is the heart of all the virtues, as Adams has to do, is a substantial sacrifice, as Russell (2009) and Kamtekar (2010) argue.

Even though the “situationist challenge” has left traditional virtue ethicists unmoved, it has generated a healthy engagement with empirical psychological literature, which has also been fuelled by the growing literature on Foot’s Natural Goodness and, quite independently, an upsurge of interest in character education (see below).

Over the past thirty-five years most of those contributing to the revival of virtue ethics have worked within a neo-Aristotelian, eudaimonist framework. However, as noted in section 2, other forms of virtue ethics have begun to emerge. Theorists have begun to turn to philosophers like Hutcheson, Hume, Nietzsche, Martineau, and Heidegger for resources they might use to develop alternatives (see Russell 2006; Swanton 2013 and 2015; Taylor 2015; and Harcourt 2015). Others have turned their attention eastward, exploring Confucian, Buddhist, and Hindu traditions (Yu 2007; Slingerland 2011; Finnigan and Tanaka 2011; McRae 2012; Angle and Slote 2013; Davis 2014; Flanagan 2015; Perrett and Pettigrove 2015; and Sim 2015). These explorations promise to open up new avenues for the development of virtue ethics.

Although virtue ethics has grown remarkably in the last thirty-five years, it is still very much in the minority, particularly in the area of applied ethics. Many editors of big textbook collections on “moral problems” or “applied ethics” now try to include articles representative of each of the three normative approaches but are often unable to find a virtue ethics article addressing a particular issue. This is sometimes, no doubt, because “the” issue has been set up as a deontologicial/utilitarian debate, but it is often simply because no virtue ethicist has yet written on the topic. However, the last decade has seen an increase in the amount of attention applied virtue ethics has received (Walker and Ivanhoe 2007; Hartman 2013; Austin 2014; Van Hooft 2014; and Annas 2015). This area can certainly be expected to grow in the future, and it looks as though applying virtue ethics in the field of environmental ethics may prove particularly fruitful (Sandler 2007; Hursthouse 2007, 2011; Zwolinski and Schmidtz 2013; Cafaro 2015).

Whether virtue ethics can be expected to grow into “virtue politics”—i.e. to extend from moral philosophy into political philosophy—is not so clear. Gisela Striker (2006) has argued that Aristotle’s ethics cannot be understood adequately without attending to its place in his politics. That suggests that at least those virtue ethicists who take their inspiration from Aristotle should have resources to offer for the development of virtue politics. But, while Plato and Aristotle can be great inspirations as far as virtue ethics is concerned, neither, on the face of it, are attractive sources of insight where politics is concerned. However, recent work suggests that Aristotelian ideas can, after all, generate a satisfyingly liberal political philosophy (Nussbaum 2006; LeBar 2013a). Moreover, as noted above, virtue ethics does not have to be neo-Aristotelian. It may be that the virtue ethics of Hutcheson and Hume can be naturally extended into a modern political philosophy (Hursthouse 1990–91; Slote 1993).

Following Plato and Aristotle, modern virtue ethics has always emphasised the importance of moral education, not as the inculcation of rules but as the training of character. There is now a growing movement towards virtues education, amongst both academics (Carr 1999; Athanassoulis 2014; Curren 2015) and teachers in the classroom. One exciting thing about research in this area is its engagement with other academic disciplines, including psychology, educational theory, and theology (see Cline 2015; and Snow 2015).

Finally, one of the more productive developments of virtue ethics has come through the study of particular virtues and vices. There are now a number of careful studies of the cardinal virtues and capital vices (Pieper 1966; Taylor 2006; Curzer 2012; Timpe and Boyd 2014). Others have explored less widely discussed virtues or vices, such as civility, decency, truthfulness, ambition, and meekness (Calhoun 2000; Kekes 2002; Williams 2002; and Pettigrove 2007 and 2012). One of the questions these studies raise is “How many virtues are there?” A second is, “How are these virtues related to one another?” Some virtue ethicists have been happy to work on the assumption that there is no principled reason for limiting the number of virtues and plenty of reason for positing a plurality of them (Swanton 2003; Battaly 2015). Others have been concerned that such an open-handed approach to the virtues will make it difficult for virtue ethicists to come up with an adequate account of right action or deal with the conflict problem discussed above. Dan Russell has proposed cardinality and a version of the unity thesis as a solution to what he calls “the enumeration problem” (the problem of too many virtues). The apparent proliferation of virtues can be significantly reduced if we group virtues together with some being cardinal and others subordinate extensions of those cardinal virtues. Possible conflicts between the remaining virtues can then be managed if they are tied together in some way as part of a unified whole (Russell 2009). This highlights two important avenues for future research, one of which explores individual virtues and the other of which analyses how they might be related to one another.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Bibliography on Virtue Ethics (in PDF, listed alphabetically), and Bibliography on Virtue Ethics (in PDF, listed chronologically), by Jörg Schroth.

Aristotle | character, moral | character, moral: empirical approaches | consequentialism | ethics: deontological | moral dilemmas

Acknowledgments

Parts of the introductory material above repeat what was said in the Introduction and first chapter of On Virtue Ethics (Hursthouse 1999).

Copyright © 2022 by Rosalind Hursthouse Glen Pettigrove < glen . pettigrove @ glasgow . ac . uk >

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Ethics is an important area of philosophy that deals with the principles of right and wrong. It can help us to understand our own values and determine how to act in various situations. Three of the most common ethical theories are virtue ethics, utilitarianism, and deontology. These theories each have their own approach to determining what is right and wrong and provide guidance for making ethical decisions. Virtue ethics focuses on building good character traits , such as integrity and compassion, as the basis for making ethical decisions.

Utilitarianism looks at the consequences of an action to determine if it is right or wrong. Deontology looks at the intentions behind an action and whether it follows a moral law. In this article, we will explore the three main ethical theories – virtue ethics, utilitarianism, and deontology – in more detail. We will look at their similarities and differences, how they are applied in practice, and how they can help us make more informed ethical decisions. The first theory is Virtue Ethics . This theory focuses on the character traits of an individual as the basis of moral decisions.

This means that an action should be judged not by its intention, but by its results. Finally, deontology is a non-consequentialist ethical theory which states that there are certain moral obligations that people have regardless of their consequences. According to this theory, an action is only considered morally right if it follows certain moral rules or duties. It is important to note that these ethical theories are not mutually exclusive. In many cases, it can be difficult to determine which theory is the most applicable to a given situation. For example, when deciding whether or not to donate money to a charity, a person may consider both utilitarianism and deontology.

Utilitarianism might suggest that donating the money will bring more happiness to the greatest number of people, while deontology could suggest that donating money is a moral obligation regardless of its consequences. To illustrate how these theories can be applied in different scenarios, consider a situation in which a person must decide whether or not to lie. Using virtue ethics, the decision should be based on whether or not lying goes against the individual’s moral character. Utilitarianism might suggest that lying would produce the greatest amount of pleasure or happiness for everyone involved. Finally, deontology might suggest that lying would go against a moral obligation or duty. It is important to remember that these ethical theories are not rigid rules which must be followed in every situation.

Virtue Ethics

It is important to understand these virtues and strive to embody them in order to make moral decisions. An individual's character is seen as the key factor in making ethical decisions. In addition, Virtue Ethics acknowledges that each person is unique, and that there is no one-size-fits-all answer when it comes to determining what is ethical. Virtue Ethics can be applied in various scenarios.

For example, when faced with a difficult decision, an individual can use their understanding of what makes up a good character to inform their choices. This could involve considering whether or not a course of action would lead to a more virtuous character, or if it would have a negative impact on their character. Virtue Ethics also emphasizes the importance of considering the consequences of one's actions, as well as the motivations behind them. Ultimately, Virtue Ethics encourages individuals to strive for moral excellence by developing their character and understanding of the virtues that make up good character.

It can be used to justify decisions that may be seen as counterintuitive or unpopular, as long as they bring about the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people. For example, utilitarianism may be used to justify certain government policies, such as raising taxes in order to fund social welfare programs or increasing safety regulations in order to reduce the risk of accidents or injuries. Similarly, it can be used to make decisions about how resources should be allocated, such as deciding which medical treatments should be funded or which areas of research should be prioritized. Utilitarianism can also be applied in everyday life.

This means that the morality of an action should be judged solely on whether it conforms to ethical codes and principles, not on the consequences it produces. This theory is important in making ethical decisions because it provides a clear set of moral principles that can be used to guide decision-making. By adhering to these principles, individuals can ensure that their decisions are in line with their moral values and responsibilities. For example, if one is considering whether or not to lie, a deontologist would evaluate the action based on whether it violates an ethical principle such as 'do not lie'.

Deontology can also be applied in various scenarios. For example, if an individual is considering whether to participate in a particular activity that could potentially harm another person, they would evaluate their decision based on whether it violated a moral principle such as 'do not hurt others'. Similarly, if an individual is considering whether or not to donate money to a charity, they would evaluate their decision based on whether it violated a moral principle such as 'do not neglect those in need'. Overall, deontology is an important ethical theory in making decisions because it provides a clear set of moral principles that can be used to guide decision-making.

The purpose of this article was to explain three major ethical theories – virtue ethics , utilitarianism , and deontology – and how they can be applied in various scenarios. It is important to remember that these theories are not rigid rules which must be followed in every situation but can help individuals make more informed decisions. Each theory provides a unique perspective on ethical decision-making, and understanding their differences and similarities can help people navigate complex ethical issues.

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Virtue Ethics

Virtue Ethics is a normative philosophical approach that urges people to live a moral life by cultivating virtuous habits.

Virtue ethics is a philosophy developed by Aristotle and other ancient Greeks. It is the quest to understand and live a life of moral character.

This character-based approach to morality assumes that we acquire virtue through practice. By practicing being honest, brave, just, generous, and so on, a person develops an honorable and moral character. According to Aristotle, by honing virtuous habits, people will likely make the right choice when faced with ethical challenges.

To illustrate the difference among three key moral philosophies, ethicists Mark White and Robert Arp refer to the film The Dark Knight where Batman has the opportunity to kill the Joker. Utilitarians, White and Arp suggest, would endorse killing the Joker. By taking this one life, Batman could save multitudes. Deontologists, on the other hand, would reject killing the Joker simply because it’s wrong to kill. But a virtue ethicist “would highlight the character of the person who kills the Joker. Does Batman want to be the kind of person who takes his enemies’ lives?” No, in fact, he doesn’t.

So, virtue ethics helps us understand what it means to be a virtuous human being. And, it gives us a guide for living life without giving us specific rules for resolving ethical dilemmas.

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Integrity is an indispensable moral virtue that includes acting with honesty, fairness, and decency.

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Moral Philosophy studies what is right and wrong, and related philosophical issues.

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Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology

DePaul, Michael and Linda Zagzebski (eds.), Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology , Oxford University Press, 2003, 306 pp, $55.00 (hbk), ISBN 0199252734.

Reviewed by Jennifer Lackey, Northern Illinois University

While there is a vast amount of writing on the concept of a virtue and its role in various areas of philosophy, this literature is fairly fragmented, with historians, ethicists, and epistemologists rarely engaged in direction conversation with one another. In light of this, Intellectual Virtue: Perspectives from Ethics and Epistemology is a most welcome collection of essays in which virtue epistemologists and virtue ethicists—including ethicists grounded in the history of philosophy—for the first time take up various issues in consultation with each other. The volume is divided into five parts and contains eleven articles by some of the leading scholars in both ethics and epistemology; the overall quality of the contributions is very high. Since there is not a single theme uniting all of the articles (other than focusing on virtue), I shall begin by providing a brief summary of each contribution to the volume. I shall then offer some critical remarks on a thesis that is espoused, both directly and indirectly, by several of the authors included in this collection.

In the first essay of the volume, “The Structure of Virtue,” Julia Annas focuses on two aspects of virtue as they figure in the virtue ethics tradition: skill and success. She shows that unlike Aristotle, the majority of the ancient tradition regarded virtue as a kind of skill. Moreover, though virtue requires success, there is the overall aim of an action and the immediate aim. While the Stoics claimed that success requires the attainment of the ultimate aim, Annas points out that knowledge requires the attainment of the immediate aim of forming a true belief. Because of this, Annas concludes that there is reason to doubt that virtue can be used as a basis for a definition of knowledge.

Nancy Sherman and Heath White argue in “Intellectual Virtue: Emotions, Luck, and the Ancients” that virtue epistemologists have neglected some of the central resources of classical virtue ethics; most notably, the role of affect in intellectual virtue, and the role of luck in acquiring knowledge. They defend the Aristotelian view that even though beliefs are not fully voluntary because the emotions that influence them are not, we can still be held responsible for our beliefs because we are not fully passive regarding our emotions. With respect to luck, Sherman and White argue that while the Stoics were largely correct that happiness is not a matter of luck, they were wrong to extend this view to knowledge. Because of this, they conclude that at least on this issue, virtue epistemology should be kept separate from virtue ethics.

In “Virtue Ethics: Radical or Routine?” David Solomon argues that there is an important distinction between two different kinds of virtue ethics. The routine approach focuses on the ordering of evaluative concepts and claims that the concept of virtue is more basic than the concepts of a right act or a good state of affairs that dominate traditional ethical theories. The radical form focuses on deeper questions about the nature and aim of ethics, including themes such as a suspicion of rules and principle and a focus on the importance of the whole life as the primary object of ethical evaluation. Solomon argues that a failure to appreciate this distinction between routine and radical forms of virtue ethics has led to confusion and misunderstanding among moral philosophers, and he urges virtue epistemologists to be sensitive to this type of distinction in epistemology so as to avoid similar confusion.

Jorge Garcia argues in “Practical Reason and its Virtues” that the instrumentalist conception of practical reasoning embraced by consequentialists is not capable of protecting humanity from the moral horrors of the twentieth century. Instead, Garcia proposes a theory of the moral life that has four characteristics: (1) it is role-centered, (2) virtue-based, (3) patient-focused, and (4) input-driven. According to Garcia, this approach, unlike that favored by consequentialists, has the resources to protect against tyranny.

In “Knowledge as Credit for True Belief,” John Greco attempts to resolve two central problems for fallibilistic epistemology—the lottery problem and Gettier problems—by focusing on the link between knowing that p and deserving credit for truly believing that p. Greco holds that S’s reliable cognitive character must be the most salient part of the cause explaining why S holds the true belief in question. In lottery scenarios, a subject does not know that she will lose the lottery because it is “just a matter of chance that S believes the truth”; accordingly, salient chance undermines deserving credit for getting things right about the outcome of the lottery (p. 124). In Gettier cases, Greco claims that “there is something odd or unexpected about the way that S comes to believe the truth” and, hence, that this kind of abnormality trumps the salience of S’s otherwise reliable cognitive character (p. 131). Thus, in both cases, we can explain why S fails to have the knowledge in question within the constraints of fallibilism.

Linda Zagzebski, in “Intellectual Motivation and the Good of Truth,” argues that the value of a motive can contribute value to the overall act that it motivates. Applying this to the cognitive realm, Zagzebski argues that an act of believing that is motivated by the love of the truth is more valuable than both an act of believing that has the aim of the love of truth but without the motive and an act of believing that brings about the consequence at which the love of truth aims but without the motive. Zagzebski then suggests that the value of the relevant motive can explain the additional value that knowledge has over mere true belief; in particular, it is only in the case of knowledge that a subject gets credit for believing the truth.

In “The Place of Truth in Epistemology,” Ernest Sosa takes up this same issue: what makes knowledge more valuable than mere true belief? He answers that a state of knowing, unlike that of mere true believing, is one in which the truth is grasped in a way that is creditable or attributable to the subject’s own skills and virtues, and thus to the agent herself. But then how do we explain the value of the beliefs possessed by an evil demon victim who conducts her epistemic life impeccably? In response, Sosa introduces the notion of “performance value,” which, in the epistemic realm, is the value of a belief performance that would normally produce true beliefs when operating in a suitable environment. So, even though performance value is understood in a truth-connected way, a state of believing can have this epistemic value even when it misses the mark of truth. This allows for a full account of epistemic value within an epistemology in which truth is the only fundamental value.

In “How to be a Virtue Epistemologist,” Christopher Hookway argues that virtue epistemology is currently distinguished from other epistemologies only by the thesis that knowledge and justification should be analyzed in terms of the virtues. This is in contrast to many virtue ethicists, who have launched a more dramatic critique by urging a shift away from focusing on the moral “ought” and toward what is needed for living well. Hookway then shows that virtue epistemologists could make a similar critique by urging a shift away from focusing on justification and knowledge and toward evaluating the activities of inquiry and deliberation.

Wayne Riggs argues in “Understanding ’Virtue’ and the Virtue of Understanding” that the highest epistemic good is a state that includes more than the achievement of true beliefs and the avoidance of false ones—it requires an understanding of important truths. Moreover, he argues that reliable success in leading to the truth cannot be a component of the intellectual virtues, since intellectual giants such as Newton and Galileo had many false beliefs. According to Riggs, the import of the virtues can be more fully appreciated when we move beyond a mere truth-directed epistemology in these ways.

Christine McKinnon argues in “Knowing Cognitive Selves” that the kinds of knowledge claims that we make of both other persons and ourselves do not meet the ideals of objectivity, impartiality, and value-neutrality traditionally required by epistemologists. Since these kinds of knowledge are important aspects of our cognitive lives, McKinnon urges us to rethink epistemology so as to accommodate them. To this end, she suggests that responsibilism has a methodological advantage over reliabilism since the latter assumes that reliability can be determined independently of the ways in which agents employ methods of belief-acquisition.

In the last article of the volume, “Humility and Epistemic Goods,” Robert Roberts and Jay Wood take a different direction than the other contributors by providing a detailed treatment of a single virtue: intellectual humility. They begin by situating humility in relation to its opposing vices, particularly vanity and arrogance. They then argue that, unlike those who are vain, humble people are not concerned with how they appear to others and, unlike those who are arrogant, humble people are interested in entitlements only insofar as they serve some valuable purpose. Roberts and Wood then consider several ways in which intellectual humility leads to various epistemic goods.

Now, since a review of this length does not permit a detailed discussion of each of these papers, I shall instead focus my evaluation on a theme that is found in several of the articles—namely, that knowledge is something for which we deserve credit. More precisely:

CREDIT: S knows that p only if S deserves credit for truly believing that p.

This thesis is espoused explicitly by Greco, Sosa, and Zagzebski (and Riggs in other works), and it is also one to which some of the other authors, such as Sherman and White and McKinnon, seem implicitly committed. Thus, focusing on CREDIT will make for a fairly comprehensive treatment of the book as whole.

I shall proceed as follows. I shall first formulate what I take to be the most plausible account of credit to support this thesis. I shall then argue that even with this plausible account in hand, some of the most ordinary and uncontentious cases of knowledge show CREDIT to be false.

Greco’s piece provides a nice place to begin since not only does he offer an explicit account of what he calls intellectual credit , his conception of credit also seems to be operative in the views of some of the other authors, such as Zagzebski, Riggs, and McKinnon. According to Greco:

IC: S deserves intellectual credit for believing the truth regarding p only if

a. believing the truth regarding p has intellectual value,

b. believing the truth regarding p can be ascribed to S, and

c. believing the truth regarding p reveals S’s reliable cognitive character.

The key condition of IC is (c), and there are at least two important aspects to this requirement. First, S’s deserving credit for truly believing that p requires that such a state of believing reveal S’s reliable cognitive character. Otherwise put, S’s reliable cognitive character must be the most salient part of the cause explaining why S holds the true belief in question. For instance, suppose that Martin comes to truly believe that drinking Bacardi rum enhances one’s sex appeal, but only because of the subliminal suggestions contained in their ads. Now, in order to even be properly receptive to the subliminal suggestions, at least some of Martin’s cognitive faculties—such as sense perception and memory—must be functioning reliably. But if asked why he truly believes that drinking Bacardi rum enhances one’s sex appeal, we would point not to the reliable functioning of his cognitive faculties, but to the subliminal suggestions of Bacardi’s ads. For though the former is a necessary condition of Martin’s holding the true belief in question, only the latter carries the explanatory burden of why he holds it. Hence, Martin’s belief about Bacardi’s rum fails (c)—that is, it fails to reveal his reliable cognitive character—despite the necessity of the reliability of his cognitive faculties.

Second, in order for S to deserve intellectual credit for truly believing that p, the belief in question must reveal S’s reliable cognitive character . To illustrate this general aspect of condition (c), Greco provides an example of “…a poor fielder [who] makes a spectacular catch. In this case he will be given credit of a sort—he will get pats on the back from his teammates and applause from the crowd. But it won’t be the same kind of credit that Griffey gets. Griffey makes spectacular catches all the time— his catches manifest his great skills. Not so when Albert Belle makes such a catch. If the catch is difficult, it is almost just good luck that he makes it” (p. 122). Applying this reasoning to the topic at hand, it looks as though Greco would deny knowledge to the intellectual analogue of Albert Belle because such a subject would be undeserving of the requisite kind of intellectual credit.

But why does Greco think that the right sort of credit is absent in this type of case? The reasoning underlying this assessment seems to go as follows:

(1) A mediocre fielder (thinker) who makes a spectacular catch (intellectual achievement) is acting out of his fielding (intellectual) character.

(2) If S’s accomplishment of Øing is out of S’s character, then S’s Øing is “almost just good luck.”

(3) If S’s accomplishment of Øing is the result of good luck, then S does not deserve credit for Øing.

(4) Therefore, a mediocre fielder (thinker) does not deserve credit for making a spectacular catch (intellectual achievement).

Premise (2), however, is surely not generally true, for acting out of character is not always due to good luck . For instance, compare the following:

Case 1: Because of his laziness and average abilities, Oliver has always been a mediocre chemist, receiving just passing grades in graduate school in chemistry, securing a dead-end job after graduation, and struggling to publish papers that are nearly entirely derivative from the work of others. But yesterday the fates were smiling down on Oliver: while he was in the lab doing work, Oliver stumbled upon a truly brilliant discovery through the purely lucky combination of two errors of reasoning.

Case 2: Because of her lack of self-confidence and average abilities, Dorothy has always been a mediocre chemist, receiving just passing grades in graduate school in chemistry, securing a dead-end job after graduation, and struggling to publish papers that are nearly entirely derivative from the work of others. Recently, however, Dorothy found herself in a very happy relationship that quite dramatically affected her perception of herself. This, in turn, gave her more confidence in her abilities as a chemist. As a result, yesterday was an incredible day for Dorothy: while she was in the lab doing work, she made a truly brilliant discovery through her own hard work, powers of reasoning, and skills as a researcher.

In cases 1 and 2, we have subjects who both, so to speak, “act out of their cognitive character”. In particular, both Oliver and Dorothy make brilliant discoveries in chemistry which are quite unexpected in light of their past mediocrity in this area. But while Oliver’s finding is primarily the result of luck and error, Dorothy’s emerges from her own faculties and skills combined with overcoming prior doubts and limitations. This type of phenomenon is common enough—an average tennis player has an outstanding game through intense concentration, an otherwise timid and cowardly person performs an act of incredible heroism out of profound love, a mediocre composer creates a sublime sonata after experiencing exquisite beauty. In all of these cases, a person’s accomplishment is not a matter of luck in any problematic way, despite being quite significantly out of character.

To be sure, there may be important differences between the intellectual credit that a subject such as Dorothy deserves and that found in the following:

Case 3: Meredith has always been regarded as an extraordinary chemist, receiving the highest possible grades in graduate school in chemistry, securing an outstanding job after graduation, and publishing articles in top ranked journals that are nearly entirely original and uniformly profound. While she was in the lab last week, Meredith made yet another truly brilliant discovery through her own powers of reasoning and skills as a researcher.

Notice: the cases of Dorothy and Meredith do not represent the difference between merely apparent credit and genuine credit, respectively. Rather, unlike Oliver whose discovery is primarily a matter of good fortune, the intellectual achievements of both Dorothy and Meredith result from the working of their own faculties and skills, and are thus creditable to them in a substantive sense. Of course, because Meredith’s accomplishment reflects a more richly developed cognitive character, the kind of intellectual credit that she deserves may be deeper than that had by Dorothy. But it should be clear that even if there are two different kinds of intellectual credit represented in these cases, only the weaker kind found in Case 2 could plausibly be said to be necessary for knowledge. For, surely Dorothy can know the content of the discovery she makes through her own hard work, powers of reasoning, and skills as a researcher, despite the fact that her lack of confidence has led her to produce only mediocre work in chemistry in the past. Thus, contrary to what is suggested by Greco’s example of Albert Belle, not only does Dorothy properly deserve intellectual credit for the true belief in question, it also represents the kind of credit that must be at issue when talking about knowledge.

There is, however, an even stronger conclusion that I think we can draw from these considerations; namely, that it is a mistake to follow Greco and other virtue theorists and analyze intellectual credit—at least the kind said to be necessary for knowledge—in terms of revealing a subject’s cognitive character . We think of a person’s character as being fairly stable; when significant changes occur in someone’s character, they usually evolve over a long period of time or are the result of a dramatic event. Because of this, when a person makes an unexpectedly spectacular achievement, it may be natural to regard it as being out of character and thereby incapable of revealing the person’s character. Accordingly, when credit is analyzed in terms of revealing a person’s character, such unexpectedly spectacular achievements turn out to be ones for which the subject in question fails to deserve credit, thereby leading to the consequence that mediocre thinkers cannot have knowledge of outstanding intellectual discoveries. But surely it is not just great people who deserve credit for or can have knowledge of great things. A person’s achievement can result from the working of her own faculties and skills and thus be properly creditable to her without necessarily revealing her character .

Thus, a more plausible account of the kind of intellectual credit said to be necessary for knowledge—one that seems to be what Sosa has in mind in his essay—should replace (c) of IC with the following:

c*. believing the truth regarding p reveals S’s relevant reliable cognitive faculties .

Otherwise put, S’s reliable cognitive faculties must be the most salient part of the cause explaining why S holds the true belief in question.

Even with (c) replaced with (c*), however, I shall now argue that CREDIT is false. To see this, consider the following:

Case 4: Having just arrived at the train station in Chicago, Morris wishes to obtain directions to the Sears Tower. He looks around, randomly approaches the first passerby that he sees, and asks how to get to his desired destination. The passerby, who happens to be a Chicago resident who knows the city extraordinarily well, provides Morris with impeccable directions to the Sears Tower.

There is nothing that is particularly unusual about Case 4, and it is nearly universally accepted that a situation such as Morris’s not only can but often does result in testimonial knowledge. Yet it is precisely this sort of case that shows CREDIT to be false. For notice: are Morris’s reliable cognitive faculties the most salient part of the cause explaining why he truly believes that the Sears Tower is, say, six blocks east? Not at all. Indeed, what explains why Morris got things right has nearly nothing of epistemic interest to do with him and nearly everything of epistemic interest to do with the passerby. In particular, it is the passerby’s experience with and knowledge of the city of Chicago that explains why Morris ended up with a true belief rather than a false belief. Moreover, notice that Morris “randomly” chose the passerby that he did, and so even the fact that he received the information from one source rather than another cannot be attributed to Morris. Thus, though it is plausible to say that Morris acquired knowledge from the passerby, there seems to be no substantive sense in which Morris deserves credit for holding the true belief that he does. Hence, CREDIT is false.

Nevertheless, although cases of this sort pose a difficulty for CREDIT, I suspect that something in the neighborhood is not only correct, but also expresses one of the features that makes knowledge more valuable than mere true belief. Moreover, despite the fact that I followed tradition and focused on problems with some of the views expressed in this volume, let me close by saying that Intellectual Virtue is a superb collection of essays that anyone interested in either epistemology or ethics should find both extremely valuable and engaging.

Virtue Ethics A Basic Introductory Essay, by Dr. Garrett Latest minor modification November 28, 2005 Some students would prefer not to study my introductions to philosophical issues and approaches but learn directly from the source. I have no objection to this procedure if it works for you. Others may wish to consult the source before or after hearing or reading my introductions. Here is the horse's mouth himself, Aristotle, discussing the nature of moral virtue, in Book II of the Nicomachean Ethics . I have added some lecture notes from the Fall 2002 lectures on virtue ethics. See below . There may be some overlap between the two parts of this webpage, but materials from the one section may add to your understanding of the other.

1) dispositions or habit-like tendencies that are deeply entrenched or engrained. They have been referred to as second nature--"first nature" referring to tendencies with which we are born. Character traits are not innate--we were not born with them. Thus infants are neither virtuous nor vicious. 2) formed as a result of more or less freely selected actions of a certain kind. We are not born honest or liars, but we become so by repeatedly telling the truth or by repeatedly lying.

1) are admirable character traits; generally desirable dispositions, which contribute, among other things, to social harmony Craft knowledge is a technical virtue specific to a particular line of work (rhetoric or the art of effective persuasion, the housebuilder's art, the computer programmer's art, the accountant's art). The moral virtues have a more general scope.

You cannot be morally reasonable in the fullest sense, you cannot have the virtue called prudence, unless you are morally virtuous. The person who is not morally virtuous is sometimes ruled by his or her appetites or passions. Her emotions get in the way of doing the reasonable thing or even recognizing what the reasonable thing might be.

The person whose character is less than virtuous may do what looks, from the outside, like the right thing to do, but her motives will leave something to be desired. A truthful person will usually tell the truth, and he will do so because it is the right thing to do, not because he fears the negative consequences of being found out.

In Aristotle's famous study of character, a frequent theme is the fact that a virtue lies between two vices. The virtue of courage, for example, lies between the vices of rashness and cowardice. The coward has too much fear, or fear when he should have none. The rash person has too little fear and excessive confidence. The courageous person has the right amount. While courage is the virtue related to the emotions of fear and confidence, mildness is the virtue related to anger. A person who gets angry too quickly will be irascible; a person who never gets angry, even when she should, is inirascible (the term does not matter). The virtuous person will get angry when she should, but not excessively and not contrary to reason. Aristotle calls the virtue of appropriate anger mildness or gentleness.

An act or choice is morally right if, in carrying out the act, one exercises, exhibits or develops a morally virtuous character. It is morally wrong to the extent that by makiing the choice or doing the act one exercises, exhibits or develops a morally vicious character.

VIRTUE ETHICS (Fall 2002)

* Do you want to be liked or loved by good people for what kind of a person you are? Or would you rather just be liked or loved because of your money or your good looks which nature gave you and you did not create? * Do you want to be the kind of person who can stand on her or his own two feet and who, after examining an issue carefully, can be fairly confident of his own moral judgments? Or do you want to be someone who needs constant approval of his actions from people around you even though they disagree among themselves and do not remain consistent even in their own judgements? * Do you want to be able to do the courageous thing, the honorable thing, honest thing, and enjoy doing it, even if most other people would find it uncomfortable or painful? Or do you want to do the courageous or honest thing reluctantly--as if it really hurts, as if you would rather be doing the opposite? If you have answered yes to the first question in each of these pairs, then you want to develop the good character traits known as moral virtues.

Another reason to pay attention to virtue ethics, which centers on character, is that often we are concerned with evaluating persons and their enduring moral characteristics (their character) rather than on a single action and how it relates to a rule or what sort results it produces. We are then not chiefly concerned with what rule one follows or what consequences you produce, but what kind of person you are, e.g. generous or stingy, courageous or cowardly, moderate or weak-willed or self-indulgent. Moreover, we often cannot evaluate an action unless we know something about the psychology of the person who is acting. But to understand motive it is helpful to know about character. Finally, one of the best ways to foster social cooperation and harmony is to promote and solidify the better sides of humanity. Rules by themselves may give guidelines, but they cannot make people good. Concern with consequences is important but without a reform of persons we are not likely to produce greater total satisfaction or more substantial freedom for people.

This analysis is derived from Plato and Aristotle. Other Greek philosophers had somewhat different analyses. The mental side of the human person consists of several capacities. * The soul--roughly, the mental side of the person--has capacities for many kinds of activities, calculating, deliberating, wishing or intending something, fear, anger, hate, jealousy, love of victory, love of honor, anxiety, hunger, thirst, sexual desire, love of money, etc. * These can be grouped into two or three "faculties," as Plato and Aristotle did: 1) reason 2) passions     A. The spirited part (social emotions: fear, anger, hate, jealousy, love of victory, love of honor)      B. The appetitive part (love of money, hunger, thirst, sexual desire, desire for other physical pleasures, aversion to physical pain)

Aristotelian definition of virtue: A moral virtue is a disposition to act as the morally reasonable person would act (=according to reason) and to feel emotions and desires appropriately.

It's possible to err morally by going too far and also by not going far enough. The virtue of generosity is a mean between stinginess and a tendency to give excessively or to the wrong kings of people. The virtue of distributive justice is a mean between rewarding a person excessively and rewarding the person deficiently. The virtue of courage stands between cowardliness, which involves excessive fear, and a sort of foolhardiness, which involves a deficiency of fear. Mildness, the virtue related to anger, stands between the habitual tendency to fly off the handle and the habitual tendency of accepting just any abuse.

Moderate person (virtuous in relation to pleasure) -- Knows and wishes to do the moderate thing, and does it Self-controlled person -- Knows and wishes to do the moderate (correct) thing, but has to struggle against strong appetites in order to do the moderate thing. Weak-willed person -- Knows and wishes to do the moderate (correct) thing but often loses to strong appetites which overpower reason. Immoderate or self-indulgent person (vicious in relation to pleasure) -- Has no wish to do the moderate thing and does not do it.

We try to determine what state of character is exhibited by the persons in the case. The externals of the action do not give us much guidance. We need to understand the action from outside but also to get inside the person, and understand the situation as it developed from that person's perspective. We need to be able to judge whether the person's motives were appropriate, including whether her feelings were appropriate or not (whether they were excessive or deficient). Good novels, novels that are not merely about physical actions, can help us develop that sensitivity. We can rarely be certain that a person is vicious or virtuous on the basis of one action alone, viewed from outside. At the very least we should be willing to specify what type of vice or virtue is exhibited in the action. Stinginess, cowardice, irascibility? To be sure about that we have to follow the person across time. Evaluate Nick from the "cheating" case. He seems to have immoderate appetites, and a strong tendency toward self-indulgence, sexual intemperance, or immoderation. If we want to be charitable, we might say that we are unsure whether his conduct expresses the vice of self-indulgence or weakness of the will. But weakness of the will supposes that he recognizes that what he is doing is wrong.

Aristotle’s Definition of Virtue Essay

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle provides a definition of virtue which has been discussed and disputed by many thinkers.

In particular, he writes that virtue is “a state that decides, consisting in a mean, relative to us, which is defined by reference to a reason, that is to say, to the reason by reference to which the prudent person would define it” (Aristotle as cited in Cahn 273).

This paper is aimed at discussing this interpretation in more detail because Aristotle highlights very important aspects of ethics.

First of all, Aristotle emphasizes the point that virtue is a temporary state of mind, and it is not an inherent quality of an individual. This definition may imply that vice and virtue may be characteristics of every human being.

Secondly, the philosopher sets stress on the idea of the mean or balance. This is probably the most crucial part of his argument because Aristotle extremism is not appropriate for ethical judgment.

Provided that this section had been absent, this definition might have led to the belief that there is a sharp distinction between ethical and unethical judgments or decisions. This section highlights the necessity of moderation and ability to avoid intolerance.

Furthermore, in the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle adds the phrase “relative to us” (Aristotle as cited in Cahn 273).

This part of the definition should not be disregarded, because it implies that there is not universal standard of virtue since ethical norms are set by different individuals and communities and they may not be the same.

This is one of the key issues that should be taken into consideration by people who speak about ethics.

Apart from that, Aristotle adds two important components to his definition of virtue. In particular he mentions that virtue always refers to reason. Although this argument seems self-evident, for many people ethics is based on emotions, rather than rationality.

This is why the philosopher chose to include this point in the definition. Finally, it is important to mention that Aristotle refers to such a concept as prudence.

In this case, the word prudence means the ability to understand ones interests and goals. Again in this way, Aristotle shows the strong connection between the rationality of a human being and virtue.

Overall, by defining virtue in this way, Aristotle strived to explain how people should think about ethics, moral norms. He emphasizes such aspects as rationality, prudence, and absence of universal standards. These are the main points to which the philosopher attracts the readers’ attention in his works.

Works Cited

Cahn, Steven. Classics of Western Philosophy , New York: Hackett, 2002. Print.

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The Importance of Virtue Ethics

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Personal development, professional conduct, societal well-being.

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Virtue ethics and the New Testament

Which matter most: virtues or duties bob harrison thinks the early christians had the answer..

For some time, now, moral philosophers have been scratching their heads over an intriguing problem. This has been going on for something like half a century, and it will no doubt keep us perplexed until well into the new millennium, if not beyond. The really curious thing is, though, that the first generation of Christians, who included only a few who would call themselves philosophers, found, if not the solution, at least a solution to the puzzle . And, not being philosophers, they weren’t even aware of what they had done.

The story begins with Aristotle. His idea of ethics was in an important respect different from ours. Heirs as we are to Kant’s idea of duty – there is a right thing that one ought to do, as rational beings who respect other persons – and to Mill’s idea of utility – the right thing to do is that which produces the greatest good for the greatest number – we see ethics as concerned with actions. The function of ethics is to help me see what I ought to do in a given situation. Aristotle’s approach was different. His ethic is not so much concerned about helping me to see what I ought to do, as about what sort of person I ought to be.

Aristotle was concerned with character, and with the things that go to make up good and bad character; virtues and vices. His sort of ethic does not look at my action to see if it fulfils my duty, or produces a certain outcome, such as the greatest good of the greatest number, and therefore merits approval. Instead, it looks at me; at the character behind the actions, to see whether I merit approval.

Comparing Aristotle with more modern philosophers such as Kant and Mill, we are able to divide ethical theories into two kinds; act-centred theories and agent-centred theories. Kant’s and Mill’s approaches are act centred, because they concern themselves with our actions, whilst Aristotle’s is agent centred because it concerns itself with ourselves, and the character dispositions that prompt our actions.

Both approaches have ardent present-day advocates, and so both are alive and well. Aristotle’s supporters are dissatisfied with the answers ‘modern’ act-centred philosophy offers, and look for a more flexible, person-centred approach that takes more account of the subtle varieties of human motivation. These ‘virtue ethicists’ see ethics as being about people – moral agents – rather than merely about actions. Of course, your actions matter. But, for Aristotle and his present day advocates alike, they matter as expressions of the kind of person you are. They indicate such qualities as kindness, fairness, compassion, and so on, and it is these qualities and their corresponding vices that it is the business of ethics to approve or disapprove.

All this seems simple and uncontroversial; there are two ways of looking at an action to evaluate it morally. You can take the action in isolation and judge it, or take the agent and judge him or her. The complication is that the advocates of each approach tend to see their way as the right way (not an entirely unprecedented situation in philosophy, politics, cookery or chrysanthemum growing…). The present day virtue ethicists are sometimes especially uncompromising. In a seminal paper on virtue ethics, entitled ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ 1 , G E M Anscombe writes:

‘… the concepts of obligation, and duty – moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say – and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of ‘ought’, ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible.’

and goes on to recommend that we jettison substantial chunks of the moral theories of Butler, Hume, Kant, Bentham and Mill, and adopt in preference a more Aristotelian approach to ethics.

Why should there be such rivalry? Why not a sort of pluralism, where you use one or the other approach as seems appropriate? The problem goes something like this. Virtue ethicists argue that act-centred ethics are narrow and bloodless. What is needed is a richer moral vocabulary than just ‘right and wrong’. There are subtle but important differences between actions that are good because they are kind and those that are good because they are generous, and those that are good because they are just. Likewise, there are subtle but important differences between actions that are bad because they are selfish and those that are bad because they are cruel and those that are bad because they are unfair. These, and many other, distinctions are lost when we talk simply about doing one’s duty, or promoting utility. Questions of motive and of character are lost, in these asceptic terms. Modern Moral Philosophy, in the pejorative sense in which Anscombe uses the term, won’t do: it is cold, technical and insensitive to the many kinds and degrees of value expressed in human actions.

On the other hand, Moderns argue that it is all very well saying that the important thing is to be a kind person, but we are only too familiar with occasions when two people will have very different ideas of what is the kind thing or the generous or fair thing to do in the situation. Virtue ethics and its warm human dimension, they could say, is all very well as an added quality on top of ethics, but you need cool ethical reasoning to determine the right thing to do: perhaps virtue ethics can point to the sensitive way to go about doing it, but there will always need to be something more precise, some less subjective guideline, to determine the right action.

How, then, do we reconcile the two positions? Do we let the philosophers fight it out until one side wins? (Wins? That would be an unprecedented outcome in philosophy…) Or is there some way of making effective use of the two insights in some kind of teamwork?

This is where the early Christians stumble in; stumble, because they were not setting themselves a philosophical exercise; merely trying to express the ethical implications of their spiritual experience.

The world of the early Christians already had virtue philosophy. Although for many centuries the writings of Aristotle were lost to us, his ideas were current in the Hellenistic world – part of the cultural legacy of old Greece in the Roman Empire.

The first Christians, however, were by birth heirs to an actcentred ethic, for they were Jews. The Ten Commandments and much more of the same ilk were their ethical environment. At first sight this was a Divine Command ethic, and in a sense it was. But it was not a Divine Command ethic if by that we mean something arbitrary; thrown out of the mind of God like something drawn out of a hat, so that he could have drawn out commands that endorsed adultery and murder as readily as commands that prohibited them. For one thing, there was the belief that God was essentially benevolent; he loved his creation and his every intention was for its good. Further, there is a clear strand of what today we could call respect for persons in, for example, the Ten Commandments. The prohibitions against murder, theft, adultery, and so forth can all be understood in such a light. Even the religious commandments – against idolatry, and enjoining religious duties – become clearly related to respect for persons when we bear in mind that to the Jew God was a person, and a unique person worthy of a unique kind of respect.

I mention all this, not because the respect for persons interpretation of the Old Testament is at all central to this discussion, but because I want to point out that the Jewish people did have, not a mere collection of randomly-generated divine fiats, but a coherent act-centred ethic. This was the ethic the Christians inherited.

But the ethic the Christians developed and passed on was different. When Jesus said ‘Blessed are the meek… the merciful’, he was not commenting on the value of certain specified acts. He was urging us to be a certain kind of person, exhibiting certain character dispositions. His ethic was agent centred; a virtue ethic.

One example of the way in which this ethic differs from, say, a Kantian act-centred ethic is the way in which we might expect a Kantian and a Christian to approach the question of cruelty to animals. The Kantian would most likely argue that one should not be cruel to animals, since doing so reinforces character dispositions that would make the agent more likely to be cruel to human beings. (‘A child who enjoys torturing small animals had better not be left alone with the baby’ 2 ) Although the animal, not being a rational agent, does not have rights, the outcome of ill-treating it might indirectly be cruelty to humans who, as rational agents, do have rights. The Christian, on the other hand, might not address the question of rights at all, but argue instead that we should not act cruelly to the animal, simply because it is wrong to be cruel, and good to be kind. The reasoning of the Christian in this case would be more direct than that of the Kantian, but in any case quite a different kind of argument; one concerned at at least as much with being as with doing.

There were both similarities and differences between Aristotle and Jesus. For Aristotle, the character dispositions, or virtues, were partly cultivated by oneself and this would be the major part, which would bring glory to the agent, for having cultivated them as well as practising them. They were also partly contributed from the outside, in the form of parental teaching, the example of respected peers, and so on. For Jesus, the contribution from outside was of paramount importance. It was the divinely-given religious experience of New Birth, which would bring glory to God, and which had profound life-changing implications for its recipient, whilst the self-cultivation aspect consisted in simply co-operating with the Holy Spirit in the working out of these implications.

St Paul developed these ideas. The relative importance of the active role of God, qua Holy Spirit, is reflected in Paul’s insistent doctrine of Justification by Faith. It is not our good works that save us, he says, but the work of the Holy Spirit, making of us new creatures. Our role in this is to believe, and accept new creation as God’s gift. What is especially interesting to us here, is what Paul does in handling the relationship between the Born Again person’s role in cultivating the virtues and the work of the Spirit. The initiative and the glory are both shifted away from the human agent, and (s)he becomes the recipient of a divine activity. The Christian equivalent of a list of virtues, in Paul’s letter to the Galatians, is described as ‘fruits of the spirit’. This expression, which seems pretty easy to understand at first reading is notoriously difficult on closer inspection, owing to the ambiguity of the word ‘spirit’, which could mean either God as Holy Spirit or the ‘spirit in which we act’. On either interpretation, I take the expression to mean the results of a work of God’s grace in a person’s life.

This, then, is the New Testament virtue-ethic; an agentcentred ethic: what matters is not merely fulfilling certain commandments, but being a certain kind of person, the person that you can only be with the help of a particular Godgiven religious experience, namely the New Birth.

But how does this solve the problem of reconciling an actcentred ethic with an agent-centred one? As I’ve already intimated, we must not look for a philosophical solution. The Biblical writers didn’t sit down and do a self-consciously philosophical exercise, for this was not what they were concerned with. They were concerned to give practical instruction to disciples of the new Faith. Instead of a breakthrough in philosophy, they sought, and seem to have found, a solution to the question: How do I balance the claims of a historic law whose moral principles I still believe in, against the invitation to live a liberated life whose motivating force will be not a code of rules, but an inner spiritual experience?

This essentially practical project led them to two courses of action. One was to live the new path of virtue, whilst using the standards dictated by the Old Law as reference points by which to check out their progress. A life of virtue would achieve results much the same as if one had succeeded, against all human weakness, in keeping the precepts of the old law.

An example of the way Paul uses the Old Testament to illuminate the New in this way is found in his letter to the Ephesians. 3 Urging his readers to ‘be made new in the attitude of your minds’ and ‘put on the new self, created to be like God in true righteousness and holiness’, all of which being good agent-centred stuff, he looks to the old rules for examples of what the new self’s behaviour will be like. The new self will eschew falsehood, and will not steal. (S)he will, indeed, go further than the old law demands. For example, where it demands that we abstain from taking God’s name in vain, the renewed person’s speech will be occupied with “what is helpful for building others up according to their needs.” It was expected, then, that the Christian would have an inner experience that would make a new person of him/her. But to check out whether it was the real thing, you could compare the results with the standards of behaviour expected by the old law. It should at least come up to those standards, since it was aiming at the same objective; a life pleasing to God.

The other course of action was to see the New Testament religious experience as the means to fulfil the objectives of the Old Testament law, in a way that conscious attempts to observe the law itself could not. The Christians saw the old rule-observing way as arduous, painful and ultimately selfdefeating. It was much less painful – and was ultimately more effective – to let your religious experience transform you so that you lived, in effect, the kind of life that the old law had aimed at. The Old Testament law had required obedience to the letter, which we, in our human frailty, could not achieve. The Christian’s new life, on the other hand, offered the opportunity to fulfil God’s moral objectives in spirit. ‘The letter kills’, says Paul, ‘but the spirit gives life.’ 4 And it gives life by attaining the objectives we sought vainly in legalism. ‘The commandments… are summed up in this one rule: “Love your neighbour as yourself”.’ Love does no harm to its neighbour, therefore love is the fulfilment of the law. 5

Their solution, then, consisted in raising a creative tension between the two approaches. The Old Testament act-centred approach says: Do certain acts and abstain from certain other acts and you will qualify as righteous in God’s sight, but it leaves the problem: How can we mere mortals live up to this exacting standard? The Christian’s answer is: by letting God work an inward transformation, a gradual renewal that can effect more than unaided human effort could. The New Testament agent-centred approach says: ‘Act in the way that exhibits the virtues which the Holy Spirit develops in you, the way of love, and you will find yourself fulfilling the ideals of the Old Testament.’ and in answer to the question: ‘What do I do if I don’t know what that entails?”, it says: “You can always flash back to the (Old Testament) Scriptures, with their guidelines.’ 6

In short, they found a place for both approaches. This is something we are not averse to ourselves. At the level of normative ethics, i.e. trying to decide on whether to unplug the life-support machine, on what is the right way to treat our employees and colleagues, on how I should treat my spouse in a certain situation, or perhaps a mere million or so other practical questions, we balance and trade off duty, utility and considerations of virtue, fairness and so forth. If we are philosophers we arrive at this mix at least partly by a process of philosophical enquiry. The early Christians arrived at a similar mix, but from their particular religious experience.

© Bob Harrison 1998

Bob Harrison is a former Pentecostal minister with a philosophy degree from Edinburgh University.

1 Philosophy , January 1958 2 Mary-Anne Warren, Moral Status (OUP 1997) p.51 3 Ephesians 4.22ff 4 II Corinthians 3.6 5 Romans 13.9,10 6 II Timothy 3.16,17

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