essay on ukraine and russia war 2022

A nation must think before it acts.

• America and the West
• Middle East
• National Security
• Central Asia
• China & Taiwan
• Expert Commentary
• Directory of Scholars
• Press Contact
• Upcoming Events
• People, Politics, and Prose
• Briefings, Booktalks, and Conversations
• The Benjamin Franklin Award
• Event and Lecture Archive
• Intern Corner
• Simulations
• Our Mission
• Board of Trustees
• Board of Advisors
• Research Programs
• Audited Financials
• PA Certificate of Charitable Registration
• Become a Partner
• Corporate Partnership Program

Understanding Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

• Aaron Stein
• Maia Otarashvili
• February 24, 2022
• Eurasia Program

Introduction 

On February 24, 2022 Russia began its invasion of Ukraine. 

In times of crisis, balanced, in-depth analysis and trusted expertise is paramount. The Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) remains committed in its mission to provide expert analysis to policy makers and the public on the most pressing foreign policy challenges.

To help you understand this evolving crisis, we have compiled a list of publications, event recordings, and podcasts to help explain current events in Ukraine. FPRI has also included resources about other protracted conflicts, the neighboring Baltic states, and the role of NATO in managing the fallout from the war.

If you have not already done so, be sure to follow the FPRI fellows listed below for further reading and resources. For press inquiries, please contact [email protected]

Russian Aggression in Ukraine & Russian Defense 

• Moscow’s Mind Games: Finding Ideology in Putin’s Russia – February 2023
• The Confrontation with Russia and US Grand Strategy – February 2023
• Tanks a Lot (Well, Actually Not That Many for Ukraine) – February 2023
• Wagner Group Redefined: Threats and Responses – January 2023
• ‘Let’s Make a Deal’? Ukraine and the Poor Prospects for Negotiations with Putin – January 2023
• Will Russia Survive Until 2084? – December 2022 
• How the Battle for the Donbas Shaped Ukraine’s Success – December 2022 
• Ecological Path to Peace Is Possible in Ukraine – November 2022 
• Putin’s Philosophers: Reading Vasily Grossman in the Kremlin – November 2022 
• The Russian-Ukrainian War Triggers an Energy Revolution – September 2022 
• Ukraine’s Defense Industry and the Prospect of a Long War – September 2022
• Understanding Russia’s Efforts at Technological Sovereignty – September 2022
• Watching the War on Russian Television – August 2022
• War Crimes in Ukraine: In Search of a Response – August 2022
• Why Russian Elites Are Standing By Putin – July 2022
• Climate Action Meets Energy Security: The Russian Invasion of Ukraine Adds a New Dimension to Energy Transition – June 2022
• The War’s Impact on Russia’s Economy and Ukrainian Politics – June 2022
• The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days   – June 2022
• How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine has Affected Kazakh Politics – June 2022
• Russia’s Use of Cyberattacks: Lessons from the Second Ukraine War – June 2022
• What’s Next for Ukraine’s (and its Neighbors’) Domestic and Foreign Policy? – June 2022
• Reviving the Prospects for Coercive Diplomacy in Ukraine – May 2022
• Food Prices, Elections, and the Wagner Group in Africa – April 2022
• Appraising the War in Ukraine and Likely Outcomes – April 2022
• Ukraine War Sparks Suspicion over Russia’s Designs on Kazakhstan – April 2022
• Do Russians Really “Long for War” in Ukraine? – March 2022
• Kadyrov’s Ukraine Gamble – March 2022
• Lukashenka’s Fatal Mistake – March 2022
• What We Can Learn about Russian Strategy from Ivan III – March 2022
• The Russian Navy in the Russia-Ukraine War Scare – February 2022
• How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis? – January 2022
• Moscow’s Compellence Strategy – January 2022
• Zapad 2021 and Russia’s Potential for Warfighting – September 2021 
• Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy – August 2021 
• Russia’s Forever Wars: Syria and Pursuit of Great Power Status – September 2021
• Understanding Russia’s Cyber Strategy – July 2021
• Russia’s Nuclear Strategy: A Show of Strength Despite COVID-19 – May 2021
• Even Thieves Need a Safe: Why the Putin Regime Causes, Deplores, and Yet Relies on Capital Flight for its Survival – November 2021
• Five Years of War in the Donbas – October 2019 
• Coal Mines, Land Mines and Nuclear Bombs: The Environmental Cost of the War in Eastern Ukraine – September 2019
• ​​ Volodymyr Zelensky: Ukraine’s Servant of the People? – September 2019 
• Russia’s Tragic Great Power Politics – March 2019
• Ukraine’s Presidential Election and the Future of its Foreign Policy – March 2019
• Bond of War: Russian Geo-Economics in Ukraine’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring – September 2018
• The Ukrainian Military: From Degradation to Renewal – August 2018
• Reflecting on a Year of War – February 2023
• Will Russia Survive Until 2084? – January 2023
• The Russia-Ukraine War and Implications for Azerbaijan – July 2022
• Russia’s War in Ukraine: Uncompromising Objectives and an Uncertain Future – June 2022 
• The State of Play in Ukraine – May 2022
• Russia’s War in Ukraine: Nukes, Negotiations, and Neutrality – April 2022 
• Russia’s War in Ukraine: Implications for China  – March 2022
• What the West Needs to Know About Russia’s War in Ukraine – March 2022
• Russia’s War in Ukraine: Analyzing the Western Military and Economic Response – March 2022
• Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Humanitarian Crisis and Prospects for Resolution – March 2022
• Russia’s Long Shadow and the Future of Europe – February 2022
• Russia-Ukraine Tensions: Will Moscow’s Compellence Strategy Work? – January 2022 
• Interview with Russian Dissident Ilya & Former Duma Member Ilya Ponomarev – January 2022
• Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy  – August 2021
• FPRI Special Briefing: U.S. Sanctions Against Russia – March 2021
• FPRI Special Briefing: Alexeyi Navalny and U.S.-Russia Relations – February 2021
• Don’t Mention the War – April 2023
• Torn in the USA: How Important is the War in Ukraine for the United States? – March 2023
• Ukraine One Year In: The Helpers – March 2023
• Reflecting on a Year of War – February 2023 
• Mobilize This – January 2023
• War in Ukraine: A Firsthand Account – December 2022 
• Public Opinion in Russia: What Do We Know, What Can We Know? – November 2022
• Russia’s War in Ukraine: The Strategic Picture – September 2022
• Russia’s Manpower Conundrum in Ukraine – May 2022
• The Air War Over Ukraine – March 2022 
• Debating a No Fly Zone: The Risk of Escalation with Moscow – March 2022
• Examining Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine – March 2022
• The Risk of War: Russia’s Options for War in Ukraine – February 2022
• The Risk of War in Ukraine: Moscow’s Military Posture – February 2022
• Tensions Over Ukraine: Russia’s Rationale for War – February 2022
• Russian Perceptions of Military AI and Automation – February 2022
• Russia’s Anti-Satellite Weapon: Understanding Russia’s ASAT Test – November 2021
• How Do You Solve a Problem Like Navalny? – September 2021
• Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy: Looking Back at the Ukraine Crisis – August 2021
• Russian-Turkish Relations and Their Implications for the West – May 2021
• Learning From Our Adversaries: Russian Aerial Operations in Syria – April 2021

Protracted Conflicts: Moldova and Georgia

• War As a Neighbor: Moldova and the Challenges of Facing Russian Aggression in Ukraine – April 2023
• Strategic Connectivity in the Black Sea: A Focus on Georgia – December 2021
• Taking Stock of U.S. Military Assistance to Georgia – December 2021 
• Georgia’s Democracy is in Trouble, It’s Time for Closer Engagement – November 2021 
• Russia’ Permanent War Against Georgia – March 2021
• Georgia’s Doomed Deep-Sea Port Ambitions: Geopolitics of the Canceled Anaklia Project – October 2020
• Anatomy of a Fraud: The Moldovan Parliamentary Elections – March 2019
• Geopolitical Games Expected Ahead of Moldova’s 2018 Elections – October 2017 
• The Future of US Strategic Interests in the South Caucasus: Challenges and Opportunities for the Biden Administration – October 2021
• Tug of War in the Black Sea: Defending NATO’s Eastern Flank – July 2021
• The Turkish Veto: Why Erdogan Is Blocking Finland and Sweden’s Path to NATO – March 2023
• Article 5 for the Next Decade of NATO – December 2022 
• The Art of the Possible: Minimizing Risks as a New European Order Takes Shape – November 2022 
• The Baltics Predicted the Suspension of the Ukraine Grain Deal — and Contributed to its Resumption – November 2022
• Good and Bad Neighbors: Perceptions in Latvian Society – September 2022
• Europe’s Wait for Turkmen Natural Gas Continues – September 2022 
• From the Migrant Crisis to Aggression in Ukraine: Belarus is Still on the Baltic Agenda – July 2022 
• Two Less Obvious Lessons for Baltic Defense from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine – June 2022
• The Baltic Road to Energy Independence from Russia Is Nearing Completion – May 2022
• America Needs a Comprehensive Compellence Strategy Against Russia – April 2022
• Baltic Sea Mining as an Extension of the Russian Gray Zone – April 2022
• The Significance of the Turkish Straits to the Russian Navy – March 2022
• Fear, Solidarity, and Calls for Further Action in the Baltics as Russia Invades Ukraine – March 2022
• Latvia’s First Response to Russia’s War in Ukraine – March 2022
• Turkey’s Careful and Risky Fence-Sitting between Ukraine and Russia – February 2022
• At the Double: Poland’s Military Expansion – January 2022 
• Turkey’s Response to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis – January 2022 
• Afghanistan was a Turbulent NATO Proving Ground for the Baltic States – December 2021
• Crowded Pond: NATO and Russian Maritime Power in the Baltic Sea – December 2021 
• Baltic Perspectives on U.S. and Transatlantic Nuclear Negotiations with Russia – October 2021
• Namejs vs. Zapad: Military Exercises on Both Sides of the Frontline – September 2021 
• Reconceptualizing Lithuania’s Importance for U.S Foreign Policy – July 2021
• Russian-Turkish Relations and Their Implications for the West – April 2021
• Nord Stream 2: Germany’s Faustian Bargain with Gazprom and Why it Matters for the Baltics – December 2020
• Cooperation, Competition, and Compartmentalization: Russian-Turkish Relations and Their Implications for the West – May 2021
• America’s Approach to the Three Seas Initiative – May 2021
• The Baltic States as NATO Heavyweights – March 2023 
• The Future of European Energy – February 2023
• What’s Happening With Russian Speakers in Latvia? – January 2023
• We Can France if We Want To: What Does Paris Want for Ukraine and Europe? – November 2022 
• Giorgia on My Mind: Italy’s Rightward Turn and Its Implications – October 2022 
• Stuck in the Magyar: Why is Hungary the “Bad Boy” of Europe? – October 2022 
• Bloc Party: The EU and the War in Ukraine – September 2022 
• The View from Ukraine: An interview with Dr. Volodymyr Dubovyk – August 2022 
• What Does Erdogan, Erdo-want? – July 2022
• Baltic Power Hour – July 2022
• No More Niinistö Nice Guy: Has Finland’s Security Calculus Changed? – June 2022
• Swedening the Deal: Stockholm Turns to NATO – June 2022
• The Energy Trilemma: An interview with Dr. Andrei Belyi – May 2022
• The Sejm Difference? Poland and the New, Old Europe – May 2022
• Bundes-where? Germany’s Politics and Security in Changing Times – May 2022
• Ukrainian Refugees in Latvia: An interview with Agnese Lāce  – April 2022
• Who Speaks For Eastern Europe? – February 2022
• Foreign Minister Edgars Rinkēvičs on Latvia’s Foreign Policy Challenges – November 2021 
• Reframing the Baltic states: An Interview with Dr. Andres Kasekamp – October 2021

FPRI Experts to Follow 

• Rob Lee – @RALee85   Eurasia Senior Fellow, PhD Student at King’s College, London
• Bob Hamilton – @BobHam88   Black Sea Fellow, Research Professor at the U.S. Army War College  
• Maia Otarashvili – @MaiaVanRijn Deputy Director of Research
• Aaron Stein – @aaronstein1  
• Chris Miller – @crmiller1 Director of Eurasia Program, Assistant Professor at The Fletcher School, Tufts University
• Nikolas Gvosdev @FPRI_Orbis   Editor, Orbis: FPRI’s Journal of World Affairs, Captain Jerome E. Levy Chair in Economic Geography and National Security at the U.S. Naval War College
• Clint Watts – @SelectedWisdom Distinguished Research Fellow , National Security Contributor for NBC News and MSNBC
• Indra Ekmanis – @indraekmanis Baltic Sea Fellow and Editor of the Baltic Bulletin
• Una Bergmane @UnaBergmane Baltic Sea Fellow, Researcher at the University of Helsinki
• Mitchell Orenstein @m_orenstein   Eurasia Senior Fellow, Professor of East European and Russian Studies, University of Pennsylvania
• Stephanie Petrella @sdpetrella  Eurasia Fellow
• Sara Ashbaugh @sara_ashbaugh Editor in Chief, BMB Russia
• Eilish Hart @EilishHart    Eurasia F ellow, Eurasia Program
• Clara Marchaud @ClaraMarchaud Editor of BMB Ukraine

You May Also be Interested in

Engaging russia over syria: managing peripheral conflict and narrowing interests.

  Executive Summary The United States is examining how to narrow core objectives in the Middle East to focus...

Russia’s Forever Wars: Syria and the Pursuit of Great Power Status

September 2021 marks the sixth anniversary of the Russian Federation’s intervention in the Syrian civil war. A patient, flexible...

Zapad 2021 and Russia’s Potential for Warfighting

  According to press information, on 10 September 2021, the Russian Armed Forces plan to start the one-week-long active...

On February 24, 2022, the world watched in horror as Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, inciting the largest war in Europe since World War II. In the months prior, Western intelligence had warned that the attack was imminent, amidst a concerning build-up of military force on Ukraine’s borders. The intelligence was correct: Putin initiated a so-called “special military operation” under the  pretense  of securing Ukraine’s eastern territories and “liberating” Ukraine from allegedly “Nazi” leadership (the Jewish identity of Ukraine’s president notwithstanding). 

Once the invasion started, Western analysts predicted Kyiv would fall in three days. This intelligence could not have been more wrong. Kyiv not only lasted those three days, but it also eventually gained an upper hand, liberating territories Russia had conquered and handing Russia humiliating defeats on the battlefield. Ukraine has endured unthinkable atrocities: mass civilian deaths, infrastructure destruction, torture, kidnapping of children, and relentless shelling of residential areas. But Ukraine persists.

With support from European and US allies, Ukrainians mobilized, self-organized, and responded with bravery and agility that evoked an almost unified global response to rally to their cause and admire their tenacity. Despite the David-vs-Goliath dynamic of this war, Ukraine had gained significant experience since  fighting broke out  in its eastern territories following the  Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 . In that year, Russian-backed separatists fought for control over the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in the Donbas, the area of Ukraine that Russia later claimed was its priority when its attack on Kyiv failed. Also in 2014, Russia illegally annexed Crimea, the historical homeland of indigenous populations that became part of Ukraine in 1954. Ukraine was unprepared to resist, and international condemnation did little to affect Russia’s actions.

In the eight years between 2014 and 2022, Ukraine sustained heavy losses in the fight over eastern Ukraine: there were over  14,000 conflict-related casualties  and the fighting displaced  1.5 million people . Russia encountered a very different Ukraine in 2022, one that had developed its military capabilities and fine-tuned its extensive and powerful civil society networks after nearly a decade of conflict. Thus, Ukraine, although still dwarfed in  comparison  with  Russia’s GDP  ( $536 billion vs. $4.08 trillion ), population ( 43 million vs. 142 million ), and  military might  ( 500,000 vs. 1,330,900 personnel ;  312 vs. 4,182 aircraft ;  1,890 vs. 12,566 tanks ;  0 vs. 5,977 nuclear warheads ), was ready to fight for its freedom and its homeland.  Russia managed to control  up to  22% of Ukraine’s territory  at the peak of its invasion in March 2022 and still holds 17% (up from the 7% controlled by Russia and Russian-backed separatists  before the full-scale invasion ), but Kyiv still stands and Ukraine as a whole has never been more unified.

The Numbers

Source: OCHA & Humanitarian Partners

Civilians Killed

Source: Oct 20, 2023 | OHCHR

Ukrainian Refugees in Europe

Source: Jul 24, 2023 | UNHCR

Internally Displaced People

Source: May 25, 2023 | IOM

As It Happened

During the prelude to Russia’s full-scale invasion, HURI collated information answering key questions and tracing developments. A daily digest from the first few days of war documents reporting on the invasion as it unfolded.

Frequently Asked Questions

Russians and Ukrainians are not the same people. The territories that make up modern-day Russia and Ukraine have been contested throughout history, so in the past, parts of Ukraine were part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Other parts of Ukraine were once part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Poland, among others. During the Russian imperial and Soviet periods, policies from Moscow pushed the Russian language and culture in Ukraine, resulting in a largely bilingual country in which nearly everyone in Ukraine speaks both Ukrainian and Russian. Ukraine was tightly connected to the Russian cultural, economic, and political spheres when it was part of the Soviet Union, but the Ukrainian language, cultural, and political structures always existed in spite of Soviet efforts to repress them. When Ukraine became independent in 1991, everyone living on the territory of what is now Ukraine became a citizen of the new country (this is why Ukraine is known as a civic nation instead of an ethnic one). This included a large number of people who came from Russian ethnic backgrounds, especially living in eastern Ukraine and Crimea, as well as Russian speakers living across the country. 

See also:  Timothy Snyder’s overview of Ukraine’s history.

Relevant Sources:

Plokhy, Serhii. “ Russia and Ukraine: Did They Reunite in 1654 ,” in  The Frontline: Essays on Ukraine’s Past and Present  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2021). (Open access online)

Plokhy, Serhii. “ The Russian Question ,” in  The Frontline: Essays on Ukraine’s Past and Present  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, 2021). (Open access online)

Ševčenko, Ihor.  Ukraine between East and West: Essays on Cultural History to the Early Eighteenth Century  (2nd, revised ed.) (Toronto: CIUS Press, 2009).

“ Ukraine w/ Kimberly St. Julian-Varnon  (#221).” Interview on  The Road to Now   with host Benjamin Sawyer. (Historian Kimberly St. Julian-Varnon joins Ben to talk about the key historical events that have shaped Ukraine and its place in the world today.) January 31, 2022.

Portnov, Andrii. “ Nothing New in the East? What the West Overlooked – Or Ignored ,” TRAFO Blog for Transregional Research. July 26, 2022. Note:  The German-language version of this text was published in:  Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte , 28–29/2022, 11 July 2022, pp. 16–20, and was republished by  TRAFO Blog . Translation into English was done by Natasha Klimenko.

Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenal in exchange for the protection of its territorial sovereignty in the Budapest Memorandum.

But in 2014, Russian troops occupied the peninsula of Crimea, held an illegal referendum, and claimed the territory for the Russian Federation. The muted international response to this clear violation of sovereignty helped motivate separatist groups in Donetsk and Luhansk regions—with Russian support—to declare secession from Ukraine, presumably with the hopes that a similar annexation and referendum would take place. Instead, this prompted a war that continues to this day—separatist paramilitaries are backed by Russian troops, equipment, and funding, fighting against an increasingly well-armed and experienced Ukrainian army. 

Ukrainian leaders (and many Ukrainian citizens) see membership in NATO as a way to protect their country’s sovereignty, continue building its democracy, and avoid another violation like the annexation of Crimea. With an aggressive, authoritarian neighbor to Ukraine’s east, and with these recurring threats of a new invasion, Ukraine does not have the choice of neutrality. Leaders have made clear that they do not want Ukraine to be subjected to Russian interference and dominance in any sphere, so they hope that entering into NATO’s protective sphere–either now or in the future–can counterbalance Russian threats.

“ Ukraine got a signed commitment in 1994 to ensure its security – but can the US and allies stop Putin’s aggression now? ” Lee Feinstein and Mariana Budjeryn.  The Conversation , January 21, 2022.

“ Ukraine Gave Up a Giant Nuclear Arsenal 30 Years Ago. Today There Are Regrets. ” William J. Broad.  The New York Times , February 5, 2022. Includes quotes from Mariana Budjeryn (Harvard) and Steven Pifer (former Ambassador, now Stanford)

What is the role of regionalism in Ukrainian politics? Can the conflict be boiled down to antagonism between an eastern part of the country that is pro-Russia and a western part that is pro-West?

Ukraine is often viewed as a dualistic country, divided down the middle by the Dnipro river. The western part of the country is often associated with the Ukrainian language and culture, and because of this, it is often considered the heart of its nationalist movement. The eastern part of Ukraine has historically been more Russian-speaking, and its industry-based economy has been entwined with Russia. While these features are not untrue, in reality,  regionalism is not definitive in predicting people’s attitudes toward Russia, Europe, and Ukraine’s future.  It’s important to remember that every  oblast  (region) in Ukraine voted for independence in 1991, including Crimea. 

Much of the current perception about eastern regions of Ukraine, including the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk that are occupied by separatists and Russian forces, is that they are pro-Russia and wish to be united with modern-day Russia. In the early post-independence period, these regions were the sites of the consolidation of power by oligarchs profiting from the privatization of Soviet industries–people like future president Viktor Yanukovych–who did see Ukraine’s future as integrated with Russia. However, the 2013-2014 Euromaidan protests changed the role of people like Yanukovych. Protesters in Kyiv demanded the president’s resignation and, in February 2014, rose up against him and his Party of Regions, ultimately removing them from power. Importantly, pro-Euromaidan protests took place across Ukraine, including all over the eastern regions of the country and in Crimea. 

Filed under:

• 9 big questions about Russia’s war in Ukraine, answered

Addressing some of the most pressing questions of the whole war, from how it started to how it might end.

Share this story

• Share this on Facebook
• Share this on Twitter
• Share this on Reddit
• Share All sharing options

Share All sharing options for: 9 big questions about Russia’s war in Ukraine, answered

The Russian war in Ukraine has proven itself to be one of the most consequential political events of our time — and one of the most confusing.

From the outset, Russia’s decision to invade was hard to understand; it seemed at odds with what most experts saw as Russia’s strategic interests. As the war has progressed, the widely predicted Russian victory has failed to emerge as Ukrainian fighters have repeatedly fended off attacks from a vastly superior force. Around the world, from Washington to Berlin to Beijing, global powers have reacted in striking and even historically unprecedented fashion.

What follows is an attempt to make sense of all of this: to tackle the biggest questions everyone is asking about the war. It is a comprehensive guide to understanding what is happening in Ukraine and why it matters.

1) Why did Russia invade Ukraine?

In a televised speech announcing Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine on February 24 , Russian President Vladimir Putin said the invasion was designed to stop a “genocide” perpetrated by “the Kyiv regime” — and ultimately to achieve “the demilitarization and de-Nazification of Ukraine.”

Though the claims of genocide and Nazi rule in Kyiv were transparently false , the rhetoric revealed Putin’s maximalist war aims: regime change (“de-Nazification”) and the elimination of Ukraine’s status as a sovereign state outside of Russian control (“demilitarization”). Why he would want to do this is a more complex story, one that emerges out of the very long arc of Russian-Ukrainian relations.

Ukraine and Russia have significant, deep, and longstanding cultural and historical ties; both date their political origins back to the ninth-century Slavic kingdom of Kievan Rus. But these ties do not make them historically identical, as Putin has repeatedly claimed in his public rhetoric. Since the rise of the modern Ukrainian national movement in the mid- to late-19th century , Russian rule in Ukraine — in both the czarist and Soviet periods — increasingly came to resemble that of an imperial power governing an unwilling colony .

Russian imperial rule ended in 1991 when 92 percent of Ukrainians voted in a national referendum to secede from the decaying Soviet Union. Almost immediately afterward , political scientists and regional experts began warning that the Russian-Ukrainian border would be a flashpoint, predicting that internal divides between the more pro-European population of western Ukraine and relatively more pro-Russian east , contested territory like the Crimean Peninsula , and Russian desire to reestablish control over its wayward vassal could all lead to conflict between the new neighbors.

It took about 20 years for these predictions to be proven right. In late 2013, Ukrainians took to the streets to protest the authoritarian and pro-Russian tilt of incumbent President Viktor Yanukovych, forcing his resignation on February 22, 2014. Five days later, the Russian military swiftly seized control of Crimea and declared it Russian territory, a brazenly illegal move that a majority of Crimeans nonetheless seemed to welcome . Pro-Russia protests in Russian-speaking eastern Ukraine gave way to a violent rebellion — one stoked and armed by the Kremlin , and backed by disguised Russian troops .

The Ukrainian uprising against Yanukovych — called the “Euromaidan” movement because they were pro-EU protests that most prominently took place in Kyiv’s Maidan square — represented to Russia a threat not just to its influence over Ukraine but to the very survival of Putin’s regime. In Putin’s mind, Euromaidan was a Western-sponsored plot to overthrow a Kremlin ally, part of a broader plan to undermine Russia itself that included NATO’s post-Cold War expansions to the east.

“We understand what is happening; we understand that [the protests] were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration,” he said in a March 2014 speech on the annexation of Crimea. “With Ukraine, our Western partners have crossed the line.”

Beneath this rhetoric, according to experts on Russia, lies a deeper unstated fear: that his regime might fall prey to a similar protest movement . Ukraine could not succeed, in his view, because it might create a pro-Western model for Russians to emulate — one that the United States might eventually try to covertly export to Moscow. This was a central part of his thinking in 2014 , and it remains so today.

“He sees CIA agents behind every anti-Russian political movement,” says Seva Gunitsky, a political scientist who studies Russia at the University of Toronto. “He thinks the West wants to subvert his regime the way they did in Ukraine.”

Beginning in March 2021, Russian forces began deploying to the Ukrainian border in larger and larger numbers. Putin’s nationalist rhetoric became more aggressive: In July 2021, the Russian president published a 5,000-word essay arguing that Ukrainian nationalism was a fiction, that the country was historically always part of Russia, and that a pro-Western Ukraine posed an existential threat to the Russian nation.

“The formation of an ethnically pure Ukrainian state, aggressive towards Russia, is comparable in its consequences to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us,” as he put it in his 2021 essay .

Why Putin decided that merely seizing part of Ukraine was no longer enough remains a matter of significant debate among experts. One theory, advanced by Russian journalist Mikhail Zygar , is that pandemic-induced isolation drove him to an extreme ideological place.

But while the immediate cause of Putin’s shift on Ukraine is not clear, the nature of that shift is. His longtime belief in the urgency of restoring Russia’s greatness curdled into a neo-imperial desire to bring Ukraine back under direct Russian control. And in Russia, where Putin rules basically unchecked, that meant a full-scale war.

2) Who is winning the war?

On paper , Russia’s military vastly outstrips Ukraine’s. Russia spends over 10 times as much on defense annually as Ukraine; the Russian military has a little under three times as much artillery as Ukraine and roughly 10 times as many fixed-wing aircraft. As a result, the general pre-invasion view was that Russia would easily win a conventional war. In early February, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Mark Milley told members of Congress that Kyiv, the capital, could fall within 72 hours of a Russian invasion .

But that’s not how things have played out . A month into the invasion, Ukrainians still hold Kyiv. Russia has made some gains, especially in the east and south, but the consensus view among military experts is that Ukraine’s defenses have held stoutly — to the point where Ukrainians have been able to launch counteroffensives .

The initial Russian plan reportedly operated under the assumption that a swift march on Kyiv would meet only token resistance. Putin “actually really thought this would be a ‘special military operation’: They would be done in a few days, and it wouldn’t be a real war,” says Michael Kofman, an expert on the Russian military at the CNA think tank.

This plan fell apart within the first 48 hours of the war when early operations like an airborne assault on the Hostomel airport ended in disaster , forcing Russian generals to develop a new strategy on the fly. What they came up with — massive artillery bombardments and attempts to encircle and besiege Ukraine’s major cities — was more effective (and more brutal). The Russians made some inroads into Ukrainian territory, especially in the south, where they have laid siege to Mariupol and taken Kherson and Melitopol.

But these Russian advances are a bit misleading. Ukraine, Kofman explains, made the tactical decision to trade “space for time” : to withdraw strategically rather than fight for every inch of Ukrainian land, confronting the Russians on the territory and at the time of their choosing.

As the fighting continued, the nature of the Ukrainian choice became clearer. Instead of getting into pitched large-scale battles with Russians on open terrain, where Russia’s numerical advantages would prove decisive, the Ukrainians instead decided to engage in a series of smaller-scale clashes .

Ukrainian forces have bogged down Russian units in towns and smaller cities ; street-to-street combat favors defenders who can use their superior knowledge of the city’s geography to hide and conduct ambushes. They have attacked isolated and exposed Russian units traveling on open roads. They have repeatedly raided poorly protected supply lines.

This approach has proven remarkably effective. By mid-March, Western intelligence agencies and open source analysts concluded that the Ukrainians had successfully managed to stall the Russian invasion. The Russian military all but openly recognized this reality in a late March briefing, in which top generals implausibly claimed they never intended to take Kyiv and were always focused on making territorial gains in the east.

“The initial Russian campaign to invade and conquer Ukraine is culminating without achieving its objectives — it is being defeated, in other words,” military scholar Frederick Kagan wrote in a March 22 brief for the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) think tank.

Currently, Ukrainian forces are on the offensive. They have pushed the Russians farther from Kyiv , with some reports suggesting they have retaken the suburb of Irpin and forced Russia to withdraw some of its forces from the area in a tacit admission of defeat. In the south, Ukrainian forces are contesting Russian control over Kherson .

And throughout the fighting, Russian casualties have been horrifically high.

It’s hard to get accurate information in a war zone, but one of the more authoritative estimates of Russian war dead — from the US Defense Department — concludes that over 7,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in the first three weeks of fighting, a figure about three times as large as the total US service members dead in all 20 years of fighting in Afghanistan. A separate NATO estimate puts that at the low end, estimating between 7,000 and 15,000 Russians killed in action and as many as 40,000 total losses (including injuries, captures, and desertions). Seven Russian generals have been reported killed in the fighting, and materiel losses — ranging from armor to aircraft — have been enormous. (Russia puts its death toll at more than 1,300 soldiers, which is almost certainly a significant undercount.)

This all does not mean that a Russian victory is impossible. Any number of things, ranging from Russian reinforcements to the fall of besieged Mariupol, could give the war effort new life.

It does, however, mean that what Russia is doing right now hasn’t worked.

“If the point is just to wreak havoc, then they’re doing fine. But if the point is to wreak havoc and thus advance further — be able to hold more territory — they’re not doing fine,” says Olga Oliker, the program director for Europe and Central Asia at the International Crisis Group.

3) Why is Russia’s military performing so poorly?

Russia’s invasion has gone awry for two basic reasons: Its military wasn’t ready to fight a war like this, and the Ukrainians have put up a much stronger defense than anyone expected.

Russia’s problems begin with Putin’s unrealistic invasion plan. But even after the Russian high command adjusted its strategy, other flaws in the army remained.

“We’re seeing a country militarily implode,” says Robert Farley, a professor who studies air power at the University of Kentucky.

One of the biggest and most noticeable issues has been rickety logistics. Some of the most famous images of the war have been of Russian armored vehicles parked on Ukrainian roads, seemingly out of gas and unable to advance. The Russian forces have proven to be underequipped and badly supplied, encountering problems ranging from poor communications to inadequate tires .

Part of the reason is a lack of sufficient preparation. Per Kofman, the Russian military simply “wasn’t organized for this kind of war” — meaning, the conquest of Europe’s second-largest country by area. Another part of it is corruption in the Russian procurement system. Graft in Russia is less a bug in its political system than a feature; one way the Kremlin maintains the loyalty of its elite is by allowing them to profit off of government activity . Military procurement is no exception to this pattern of widespread corruption, and it has led to troops having substandard access to vital supplies .

The same lack of preparation has plagued Russia’s air force . Despite outnumbering the Ukrainian air force by roughly 10 times, the Russians have failed to establish air superiority: Ukraine’s planes are still flying and its air defenses mostly remain in place .

Perhaps most importantly, close observers of the war believe Russians are suffering from poor morale. Because Putin’s plan to invade Ukraine was kept secret from the vast majority of Russians, the government had a limited ability to lay a propaganda groundwork that would get their soldiers motivated to fight. The current Russian force has little sense of what they’re fighting for or why — and are waging war against a country with which they have religious, ethnic, historical, and potentially even familial ties. In a military that has long had systemic morale problems, that’s a recipe for battlefield disaster.

“Russian morale was incredibly low BEFORE the war broke out. Brutal hazing in the military, second-class (or worse) status by its conscript soldiers, ethnic divisions, corruption, you name it: the Russian Army was not prepared to fight this war,” Jason Lyall, a Dartmouth political scientist who studies morale, explains via email. “High rates of abandoned or captured equipment, reports of sabotaged equipment, and large numbers of soldiers deserting (or simply camping out in the forest) are all products of low morale.”

The contrast with the Ukrainians couldn’t be starker. They are defending their homes and their families from an unprovoked invasion, led by a charismatic leader who has made a personal stand in Kyiv. Ukrainian high morale is a key reason, in addition to advanced Western armaments, that the defenders have dramatically outperformed expectations.

“Having spent a chunk of my professional career [working] with the Ukrainians, nobody, myself included and themselves included, had all that high an estimation of their military capacity,” Oliker says.

Again, none of this will necessarily remain the case throughout the war. Morale can shift with battlefield developments. And even if Russian morale remains low, it’s still possible for them to win — though they’re more likely to do so in a brutally ugly fashion.

4) What has the war meant for ordinary Ukrainians?

As the fighting has dragged on, Russia has gravitated toward tactics that, by design, hurt civilians. Most notably, Russia has attempted to lay siege to Ukraine’s cities, cutting off supply and escape routes while bombarding them with artillery. The purpose of the strategy is to wear down the Ukrainian defenders’ willingness to fight, including by inflicting mass pain on the civilian populations.

The result has been nightmarish: an astonishing outflow of Ukrainian refugees and tremendous suffering for many of those who were unwilling or unable to leave.

According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees , more than 3.8 million Ukrainians fled the country between February 24 and March 27. That’s about 8.8 percent of Ukraine’s total population — in proportional terms, the rough equivalent of the entire population of Texas being forced to flee the United States.

Another point of comparison: In 2015, four years into the Syrian civil war and the height of the global refugee crisis, there were a little more than 4 million Syrian refugees living in nearby countries . The Ukraine war has produced a similarly sized exodus in just a month, leading to truly massive refugee flows to its European neighbors. Poland, the primary destination of Ukrainian refugees, is currently housing over 2.3 million Ukrainians, a figure larger than the entire population of Warsaw, its capital and largest city.

For those civilians who have been unable to flee, the situation is dire. There are no reliable estimates of death totals; a March 27 UN estimate puts the figure at 1,119 but cautions that “the actual figures are considerably higher [because] the receipt of information from some locations where intense hostilities have been going on has been delayed and many reports are still pending corroboration.”

The UN assessment does not blame one side or the other for these deaths, but does note that “most of the civilian casualties recorded were caused by the use of explosive weapons with a wide impact area, including shelling from heavy artillery and multiple-launch rocket systems, and missile and airstrikes.” It is the Russians, primarily, who are using these sorts of weapons in populated areas; Human Rights Watch has announced that there are “early signs of war crimes” being committed by Russian soldiers in these kinds of attacks, and President Joe Biden has personally labeled Putin a “war criminal.”

Nowhere is this devastation more visible than the southern city of Mariupol, the largest Ukrainian population center to which Russia has laid siege. Aerial footage of the city published by the Guardian in late March reveals entire blocks demolished by Russian bombardment:

In mid-March, three Associated Press journalists — the last international reporters in the city before they too were evacuated — managed to file a dispatch describing life on the ground. They reported a death total of 2,500 but cautioned that “many bodies can’t be counted because of the endless shelling .” The situation is impossibly dire:

Airstrikes and shells have hit the maternity hospital, the fire department, homes, a church, a field outside a school. For the estimated hundreds of thousands who remain, there is quite simply nowhere to go. The surrounding roads are mined and the port blocked. Food is running out, and the Russians have stopped humanitarian attempts to bring it in. Electricity is mostly gone and water is sparse, with residents melting snow to drink. Some parents have even left their newborns at the hospital, perhaps hoping to give them a chance at life in the one place with decent electricity and water.

The battlefield failures of the Russian military have raised questions about its competence in difficult block-to-block fighting; Farley, the Kentucky professor, says, “This Russian army does not look like it can conduct serious [urban warfare].” As a result, taking Ukrainian cities means besieging them — starving them out, destroying their will to fight, and only moving into the city proper after its population is unwilling to resist or outright incapable of putting up a fight.

5) What do Russians think about the war?

Vladimir Putin’s government has ramped up its already repressive policies during the Ukraine conflict, shuttering independent media outlets and blocking access to Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram . It’s now extremely difficult to get a sense of what either ordinary Russians or the country’s elite think about the war, as criticizing it could lead to a lengthy stint in prison.

But despite this opacity, expert Russia watchers have developed a broad idea of what’s going on there. The war has stirred up some opposition and anti-Putin sentiment, but it has been confined to a minority who are unlikely to change Putin’s mind, let alone topple him.

The bulk of the Russian public was no more prepared for war than the bulk of the Russian military — in fact, probably less so. After Putin announced the launch of his “special military operation” in Ukraine on national television, there was a surprising amount of criticism from high-profile Russians — figures ranging from billionaires to athletes to social media influencers. One Russian journalist, Marina Ovsyannikova, bravely ran into the background of a government broadcast while holding an antiwar sign.

“It is unprecedented to see oligarchs, other elected officials, and other powerful people in society publicly speaking out against the war,” says Alexis Lerner, a scholar of dissent in Russia at the US Naval Academy.

There have also been antiwar rallies in dozens of Russian cities. How many have participated in these rallies is hard to say, but the human rights group OVD-Info estimates that over 15,000 Russians have been arrested at the events since the war began.

Could these eruptions of antiwar sentiment at the elite and mass public level suggest a coming coup or revolution against the Putin regime? Experts caution that these events remain quite unlikely.

Putin has done an effective job engaging in what political scientists call “coup-proofing.” He has put in barriers — from seeding the military with counterintelligence officers to splitting up the state security services into different groups led by trusted allies — that make it quite difficult for anyone in his government to successfully move against him.

“Putin has prepared for this eventuality for a long time and has taken a lot of concerted actions to make sure he’s not vulnerable,” says Adam Casey, a postdoctoral fellow at the University of Michigan who studies the history of coups in Russia and the former communist bloc.

Similarly, turning the antiwar protests into a full-blown influential movement is a very tall order.

“It is hard to organize sustained collective protest in Russia,” notes Erica Chenoweth, a political scientist at Harvard who studies protest movements . “Putin’s government has criminalized many forms of protests, and has shut down or restricted the activities of groups, movements, and media outlets perceived to be in opposition or associated with the West.”

Underpinning it all is tight government control of the information environment. Most Russians get their news from government-run media , which has been serving up a steady diet of pro-war content. Many of them appear to genuinely believe what they hear: One independent opinion poll found that 58 percent of Russians supported the war to at least some degree.

Prior to the war, Putin also appeared to be a genuinely popular figure in Russia. The elite depend on him for their position and fortune; many citizens see him as the man who saved Russia from the chaos of the immediate post-Communist period. A disastrous war might end up changing that, but the odds that even a sustained drop in his support translates into a coup or revolution remain low indeed.

6) What is the US role in the conflict?

The war remains, for the moment, a conflict between Ukraine and Russia. But the United States is the most important third party, using a number of powerful tools — short of direct military intervention — to aid the Ukrainian cause.

Any serious assessment of US involvement needs to start in the post-Cold War 1990s , when the US and its NATO allies made the decision to open alliance membership to former communist states.

Many of these countries, wary of once again being put under the Russian boot, clamored to join the alliance, which commits all involved countries to defend any member-state in the event of an attack. In 2008, NATO officially announced that Georgia and Ukraine — two former Soviet republics right on Russia’s doorstep — “ will become members of NATO ” at an unspecified future date. This infuriated the Russians, who saw NATO expansion as a direct threat to their own security.

There is no doubt that NATO expansion helped create some of the background conditions under which the current conflict became thinkable, generally pushing Putin’s foreign policy in a more anti-Western direction. Some experts see it as one of the key causes of his decision to attack Ukraine — but others strongly disagree, noting that NATO membership for Ukraine was already basically off the table before the war and that Russia’s declared war aims went far beyond simply blocking Ukraine’s NATO bid .

“NATO expansion was deeply unpopular in Russia. [But] Putin did not invade because of NATO expansion,” says Yoshiko Herrera, a Russia expert at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Regardless of where one falls on that debate, US policy during the conflict has been exceptionally clear: support the Ukrainians with massive amounts of military assistance while putting pressure on Putin to back down by organizing an unprecedented array of international economic sanctions.

On the military side, weapons systems manufactured and provided by the US and Europe have played a vital role in blunting Russia’s advance. The Javelin anti-tank missile system, for example, is a lightweight American-made launcher that allows one or two infantry soldiers to take out a tank . Javelins have given the outgunned Ukrainians a fighting chance against Russian armor, becoming a popular symbol in the process .

Sanctions have proven similarly devastating in the economic realm .

The international punishments have been extremely broad, ranging from removing key Russian banks from the SWIFT global transaction system to a US ban on Russian oil imports to restrictions on doing business with particular members of the Russian elite . Freezing the assets of Russia’s central bank has proven to be a particularly damaging tool, wrecking Russia’s ability to deal with the collapse in the value of the ruble, its currency. As a result, the Russian economy is projected to contract by 15 percent this year ; mass unemployment looms .

There is more America can do, particularly when it comes to fulfilling Ukrainian requests for new fighter jets. In March, Washington rejected a Polish plan to transfer MiG-29 aircraft to Ukraine via a US Air Force base in Germany, arguing that it could be too provocative.

But the MiG-29 incident is more the exception than it is the rule. On the whole, the United States has been strikingly willing to take aggressive steps to punish Moscow and aid Kyiv’s war effort.

7) How is the rest of the world responding to Russia’s actions?

On the surface, the world appears to be fairly united behind the Ukrainian cause. The UN General Assembly passed a resolution condemning the Russian invasion by a whopping 141-5 margin (with 35 abstentions). But the UN vote conceals a great deal of disagreement, especially among the world’s largest and most influential countries — divergences that don’t always fall neatly along democracy-versus-autocracy lines.

The most aggressive anti-Russian and pro-Ukrainian positions can, perhaps unsurprisingly, be found in Europe and the broader West. EU and NATO members, with the partial exceptions of Hungary and Turkey , have strongly supported the Ukrainian war effort and implemented punishing sanctions on Russia (a major trading partner). It’s the strongest show of European unity since the Cold War, one that many observers see as a sign that Putin’s invasion has already backfired.

Germany, which has important trade ties with Russia and a post-World War II tradition of pacifism, is perhaps the most striking case. Nearly overnight, the Russian invasion convinced center-left Chancellor Olaf Scholz to support rearmament , introducing a proposal to more than triple Germany’s defense budget that’s widely backed by the German public.

“It’s really revolutionary,” Sophia Besch, a Berlin-based senior research fellow at the Centre for European Reform, told my colleague Jen Kirby . “Scholz, in his speech, did away with and overturned so many of what we thought were certainties of German defense policy.”

Though Scholz has refused to outright ban Russian oil and gas imports, he has blocked the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline and committed to a long-term strategy of weaning Germany off of Russian energy. All signs point to Russia waking a sleeping giant — of creating a powerful military and economic enemy in the heart of the European continent.

China, by contrast, has been the most pro-Russia of the major global powers.

The two countries, bound by shared animus toward a US-dominated world order, have grown increasingly close in recent years. Chinese propaganda has largely toed the Russian line on the Ukraine war. US intelligence, which has been remarkably accurate during the crisis, believes that Russia has requested military and financial assistance from Beijing — which hasn’t been provided yet but may well be forthcoming.

That said, it’s possible to overstate the degree to which China has taken the Russian side. Beijing has a strong stated commitment to state sovereignty — the bedrock of its position on Taiwan is that the island is actually Chinese territory — which makes a full-throated backing of the invasion ideologically awkward . There’s a notable amount of debate among Chinese policy experts and in the public , with some analysts publicly advocating that Beijing adopt a more neutral line on the conflict.

Most other countries around the world fall somewhere on the spectrum between the West and China. Outside of Europe, only a handful of mostly pro-American states — like South Korea, Japan, and Australia — have joined the sanctions regime. The majority of countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America do not support the invasion, but won’t do very much to punish Russia for it either.

India is perhaps the most interesting country in this category. A rising Asian democracy that has violently clashed with China in the very recent past , it has good reasons to present itself as an American partner in the defense of freedom. Yet India also depends heavily on Russian-made weapons for its own defense and hopes to use its relationship with Russia to limit the Moscow-Beijing partnership. It’s also worth noting that India’s prime minister, Narendra Modi, has strong autocratic inclinations .

The result of all of this is a balancing act reminiscent of India’s Cold War approach of “non-alignment” : refusing to side with either the Russian or American positions while attempting to maintain decent relations with both . India’s perceptions of its strategic interests, more than ideological views about democracy, appear to be shaping its response to the war — as seems to be the case with quite a few countries around the world.

8) Could this turn into World War III?

The basic, scary answer to this question is yes: The invasion of Ukraine has put us at the greatest risk of a NATO-Russia war in decades.

The somewhat more comforting and nuanced answer is that the absolute risk remains relatively low so long as there is no direct NATO involvement in the conflict, which the Biden administration has repeatedly ruled out . Though Biden said “this man [Putin] cannot remain in power” in a late March speech, both White House officials and the president himself stressed afterward that the US policy was not regime change in Moscow.

“Things are stable in a nuclear sense right now,” says Jeffrey Lewis, an expert on nuclear weapons at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies. “The minute NATO gets involved, the scope of the war widens.”

In theory, US and NATO military assistance to Ukraine could open the door to escalation: Russia could attack a military depot in Poland containing weapons bound for Ukraine, for instance. But in practice, it’s unlikely: The Russians don’t appear to want a wider war with NATO that risks nuclear escalation, and so have avoided cross-border strikes even when it might destroy supply shipments bound for Ukraine.

In early March, the US Department of Defense opened a direct line of communication with its Russian peers in order to avoid any kind of accidental conflict. It’s not clear how well this is working — some reporting suggests the Russians aren’t answering American calls — but there is a long history of effective dialogue between rivals who are fighting each other through proxy forces.

“States often cooperate to keep limits on their wars even as they fight one another clandestinely,” Lyall, the Dartmouth professor, tells me. “While there’s always a risk of unintended escalation, historical examples like Vietnam, Afghanistan (1980s), Afghanistan again (post-2001), and Syria show that wars can be fought ‘within bounds.’”

If the United States and NATO heed the call of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to impose a so-called “no-fly zone” over Ukrainian skies, the situation changes dramatically. No-fly zones are commitments to patrol and, if necessary, shoot down military aircraft that fly in the declared area, generally for the purpose of protecting civilians. In Ukraine, that would mean the US and its NATO allies sending in jets to patrol Ukraine’s skies — and being willing to shoot down any Russian planes that enter protected airspace. From there, the risks of a nuclear conflict become terrifyingly high.

Russia recognizes its inferiority to NATO in conventional terms; its military doctrine has long envisioned the use of nuclear weapons in a war with the Western alliance . In his speech declaring war on Ukraine, Putin all but openly vowed that any international intervention in the conflict would trigger nuclear retaliation.

“To anyone who would consider interfering from the outside: If you do, you will face consequences greater than any you have faced in history,” the Russian president said. “I hope you hear me.”

The Biden administration is taking these threats seriously. Much as the Kremlin hasn’t struck NATO supply missions to Ukraine, the White House has flatly rejected a no-fly zone or any other kind of direct military intervention.

“We will not fight a war against Russia in Ukraine,” Biden said on March 11 . “Direct conflict between NATO and Russia is World War III, something we must strive to prevent.”

This does not mean the risk of a wider war is zero . Accidents happen, and countries can be dragged into war against their leaders’ best judgment. Political positions and risk calculi can also change: If Russia starts losing badly and uses smaller nukes on Ukrainian forces (called “tactical” nuclear weapons), Biden would likely feel the need to respond in some fairly aggressive way. Much depends on Washington and Moscow continuing to show a certain level of restraint.

9) How could the war end?

Wars do not typically end with the total defeat of one side or the other. More commonly, there’s some kind of negotiated settlement — either a ceasefire or more permanent peace treaty — where the two sides agree to stop fighting under a set of mutually agreeable terms.

It is possible that the Ukraine conflict turns out to be an exception: that Russian morale collapses completely, leading to utter battlefield defeat, or that Russia inflicts so much pain that Kyiv collapses. But most analysts believe that neither of these is especially likely given the way the war has played out to date.

“No matter how much military firepower they pour into it, [the Russians] are not going to be able to achieve regime change or some of their maximalist aims,” Kofman, of the CNA think tank, declares.

A negotiated settlement is the most likely way the conflict ends. Peace negotiations between the two sides are ongoing, and some reporting suggests they’re bearing fruit. On March 28, the Financial Times reported significant progress on a draft agreement covering issues ranging from Ukrainian NATO membership to the “de-Nazification” of Ukraine. The next day, Russia pledged to decrease its use of force in Ukraine’s north as a sign of its commitment to the talks.

American officials, though, have been publicly skeptical of Russia’s seriousness in the talks. Even if Moscow is committed to reaching a settlement, the devil is always in the details with these sorts of things — and there are lots of barriers standing in the way of a successful resolution.

Take NATO. The Russians want a simple pledge that Ukraine will remain “neutral” — staying out of foreign security blocs. The current draft agreement, per the Financial Times, does preclude Ukrainian NATO membership, but it permits Ukraine to join the EU. It also commits at least 11 countries, including the United States and China, to coming to Ukraine’s aid if it is attacked again. This would put Ukraine on a far stronger security footing than it had before the war — a victory for Kyiv and defeat for Moscow, one that Putin may ultimately conclude is unacceptable.

Another thorny issue — perhaps the thorniest — is the status of Crimea and the two breakaway Russian-supported republics in eastern Ukraine. The Russians want Ukrainian recognition of its annexation of Crimea and the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions; Ukraine claims all three as part of its territory. Some compromise is imaginable here — an internationally monitored referendum in each territory, perhaps — but what that would look like is not obvious.

The resolution of these issues will likely depend quite a bit on the war’s progress. The more each side believes it has a decent chance to improve its battlefield position and gain leverage in negotiations, the less reason either will have to make concessions to the other in the name of ending the fighting.

And even if they do somehow come to an agreement, it may not end up holding .

On the Ukrainian side, ultra-nationalist militias could work to undermine any agreement with Russia that they believe gives away too much, as they threatened during pre-war negotiations aimed at preventing the Russian invasion .

On the Russian side, an agreement is only as good as Putin’s word. Even if it contains rigorous provisions designed to raise the costs of future aggression, like international peacekeepers, that may not hold him back from breaking the agreement.

This invasion did, after all, start with him launching an invasion that seemed bound to hurt Russia in the long run. Putin dragged the world into this mess; when and how it gets out of it depends just as heavily on his decisions.

Will you help keep Vox free for all?

At Vox, we believe that clarity is power, and that power shouldn’t only be available to those who can afford to pay. That’s why we keep our work free. Millions rely on Vox’s clear, high-quality journalism to understand the forces shaping today’s world. Support our mission and help keep Vox free for all by making a financial contribution to Vox today.

We accept credit card, Apple Pay, and Google Pay. You can also contribute via

In This Stream

Russia-ukraine crisis.

• There are now more land mines in Ukraine than almost anywhere else on the planet
• What, exactly, is a “neutral” Ukraine?

Could Republican resignations flip the House to Democrats?

Truth social just made trump billions. will it solve his financial woes, why biden’s fundraising dominance could save his campaign, sign up for the newsletter today, explained, thanks for signing up.

Check your inbox for a welcome email.

Oops. Something went wrong. Please enter a valid email and try again.

Introduction

On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, igniting the most significant conflict Europe has experienced since the end of the Second World War. [1]   Many politicians, defence leaders and military analysts expected the Russian Federation Armed Forces (RFAF) to be ruthlessly effective, with a meticulously planned military campaign proportionate with the immense risk the campaign imposed on Russia, not only in the theatre of operations, but also within the international community. [2]  However, the size, scale and extent of the military failures experienced by the RFAF in the nine months since it commenced this historic invasion have left many in the international community surprised. [3] Shortcomings have included poor equipment; low morale; ineffective communications; breakdowns in logistics support; confusing command and control; a divergence from basic doctrine and military principles and serious failures of military planning. [4] As the Russia-Ukraine War enters its tenth month, analysts worldwide work to evaluate the RFAF military campaign, its objectives, shortfalls, and successes. This paper will focus on the first thirty days of the invasion, as it is assessed that these initial days are critical to achieving operational and military campaign objectives. This raises the question of how effective was the initial RFAF campaign? And what can the Australian Defence Force (ADF) learn from their failures when planning future military operations and campaigns?

This paper argues that the RFAF initial military campaign was ineffective due to a lack of flexibility and foresight in operational planning. This will be demonstrated through an examination of three of the eight elements for the arrangement of military operations, [5] which are assessed as having the greatest impact during the initial phase of a military campaign: risk, operational reach, and culminating point. First, it will be important to establish the initial objectives of the RFAF so that the selected elements of military operations can be utilised to evaluate and demonstrate how ineffective the initial military campaign was. Second, this paper will examine the importance of understanding and planning for potential risk, demonstrating that the RFAF either did not identify or blatantly ignored identified risk resulting in needless casualties and destruction of equipment. Third, this paper will examine the importance of understanding and determining when a military force will reach its culminating point, as this is critical for planning sequencing, phasing, resources and risk. The RFAF did not understand their culminating point, forcing them to withdraw from one of their key operational objectives. Finally, this paper will discuss the importance of understanding the ability to successfully project and sustain military forces and capabilities, which will demonstrate that the RFAF afforded little consideration to their supply lines, limiting their ability to sustain operations and the overarching military campaign. Throughout each of these elements, this paper will demonstrate why understanding these key concepts is important to current ADF planners. These arguments show that a lack of flexibility and foresight in operational planning caused the RFAF initial military campaign to become ineffective.

Objectives of the Initial Campaign

To evaluate the RFAF initial military campaign as ineffective, it is important to first understand the initial objectives. This will then allow the selected elements of military operations to be utilised to evaluate and thus demonstrate that due to a lack of flexibility and foresight, the RFAF initial military campaign was ineffective. When the RFAF commenced their invasion on 24 February 2022, President Putin declared Russia’s strategic objectives as “the denazification and demilitarisation of Ukraine” [6] . Whilst the objectives of the RFAF military campaign may never truly be known, from the outside, it seemed as if the RFAF planned the campaign to be a short blitzkrieg-style operation, in which the RFAF would seize and capture the centre of national power, Kyiv, allowing for the deposal of the Ukrainian president and key leadership. [7]

After months of build-up on Ukraine’s borders, the RFAF invaded on several fronts with what seemed to be two distinct operational objectives. In the east and southeast, the objective was capturing the Donbas region, which would establish a land corridor between Crimea and Donbas; on the northwest, the objective was to capture Kyiv. After thirty days, Russia had secured neither of these objectives. Operations in the Donbas region appeared to progress much slower than the RFAF anticipated, and the Kyiv campaign was an outright failure. This led the RFAF to withdraw from the Kyiv region and reinforce operations in the Donbas region. The RFAF’s failure to achieve these objectives will now be examined, utilising the previously selected elements for the arrangement of military operations.

Australian Defence Force Philosophical Doctrine -5 Series – Planning (ADF-P-5 Planning) clearly articulates that “all military action involves risk”. [8]   For this reason,  “risk management is a necessary component of military planning”. [9] Whilst it may never be known what the RFAF assessed as risks to their operations and overall campaign, it is highly likely that the RFAF underestimated Ukraine’s cohesion and will to fight, [10] and thus did not effectively plan for a lengthy campaign, resulting in needless casualties and the destruction of equipment. As repeated attacks on Kyiv were thwarted, and the RFAF in Donbas could not break through the Ukrainian defences, it become clear that Ukraine forces had prevented the RFAF from achieving the quick victory it had planned. [11] By not identifying or blatantly ignoring this key risk, the RFAF failed to treat this risk. There were no subsequent branch plans or sequels, just a rinse and repeat of the same assault. In essence, they continued with their original plan for a short sharp invasion that would achieve its objectives within the first month. By failing to identify or treat the risk, it became apparent that the RFAF had no plan B. Ultimately, the RFAF failed to identify key risks whilst conducting their planning and as such, they failed to achieve their main objective, and are now still engaged in a military campaign nine months after the initial invasion.  By not identifying key risks, militaries will produce an operational plan that is unable to achieve its identified objectives due to limited flexibility and foresight. What can the ADF learn from the RFAF failure to identify and effectively plan for potential risks in future operations?

The ADF is a small defence force with a finite number of unique capabilities. If planners do not adequately identify risks to commanders during the conduct of planning, not only will the operation fail, but there is the potential that niche and finite capabilities, such as bulk fuel assets or tanks, will be destroyed. Planning for failure is a hard concept for many ADF officers to understand and adapt to, but this is essential when identifying risk. Arguably, our training systems are not established to engrain a culture of tolerating failure. [12] Staff officers want to present a gold-plated solution to their commander, and the current training environment allows planners to ‘wish away’ some of the potential risks. However, as demonstrated by the RFAF operation and overall campaign, if planners fail to identify potential risks as described in ‘ADF-P 5 Planning’, it will result in a plan that lacks flexibility and foresight and ultimately will not be effective.

Culminating Point

ADF-P-5 Planning states that “a successful campaign or operation should achieve its objectives before reaching its culminating point”. [13]   But what is meant by the term culminating point? And how can it cause your operation to become ineffective? By understanding this term and its importance to achieving success in military operations and campaigns, observers of the Ukraine conflict can deduce the RFAF did not understand nor effectively plan for their culminating point, forcing them to withdraw from one of their key operational objectives within thirty days. Military doctrine defines a culminating point as “the point in time and space beyond which a force lacks the means to achieve an objective or the desired end state”. [14] Whilst this may be due to “reduced combat power, attrition, or dwindling national support”, [15] this paper will focus on logistics, as without fuel, ammunition, rations, and medical support, a force will have no ability to continue offensive actions. This is what happened to the RFAF; with shortages of fuel, ammunition and rations widely reported before their withdrawal from Kyiv. [16]

Twenty-five days after the RFAF commenced its invasion of Ukraine, Retired U.S. Lieutenant General Mark Hertling reflected, “all indicators are that Russia has not kept up with their operations. If they don't keep up logistically, the operation stalls. That's where we've come to. It's called, in military terms , a culminating point  of the offense”. [17] With forces culminating within the first thirty days, Russia had planned for a short war, shaped around rapid operations conducted by elite combat units. [18] The operational plan was focused on speed with limited consideration given to logistics, affecting the RFAFs ability to resupply or sustain further tactical actions once they were delayed. This ultimately caused culmination and withdrawal from Kyiv. The culmination of RFAF, whilst attempting to capture Kyiv demonstrates that a campaign will be ineffective if there is no flexibility or foresight in its operational plan. Further, it illustrates that logistics and understanding your forces culminating point are highly critical. What then can the ADF learn from this?

General Dwight D. Eisenhower reflected, “You will not find it difficult to prove that battles, campaigns, and even wars have been won or lost primarily because of logistics.” Stated during the Second World War, his message remains highly relevant for the ADF today and demonstrates the importance of understanding where and when your force will culminate.  The Defence Strategic Update 2020 acknowledges that whilst the chances of Australia contributing to a high-intensity conflict in the Indo-Pacific Region are unlikely, the chances are less remote than ever before. [19] As such it behoves ADF planners to ensure they understand not only the ADF force structure but likely culmination points during an operation or campaign. Whilst there is no doubt that ADF doctrine clearly articulates the requirements to do so, [20] an all too familiar theme that runs through the ADF is that training exercises never fully test or push their forces to culmination.

 In 2017, the 3 rd Brigades Ready Battalion Group spent 12 days ‘in the box’ on Exercise Talisman Sabre. They deployed with 10 days of combat supplies and were easily resupplied on the tenth day, just in time for the final assault. Whilst this exercise has its merits and is highly important for deepening interoperability with foreign partners, ‘bounded’ timeframes and significant logistical pre-positioning (outside the exercise scenario) do not promote the requirement for flexibility or foresight in operational planning. If current ADF training does not work to truly stretch and force culmination of our forces, not only is the ADF failing to provide challenging real-world issues to their logisticians, but they will also never establish where the weak points lie in the ADF logistic system. Ultimately there will be no ability to truly fix and improve the system. It befits the ADF to break the logistics system and force logisticians to not just ‘make it happen’ in support of the manoeuvre plan, despite knowing that it is not feasible. Staff planners must be forced to identify culminating points, otherwise as demonstrated in the Russian-Ukraine War, any future military campaign will be ineffective due to a lack of flexibility and foresight.  “Fundamentally linked to a force’s culminating point” [21] is operational reach, which is the next element to be discussed.

Operational Reach

Carl von Clausewitz observed, “There is nothing more common than to find considerations of supply affecting the strategic lines of a campaign and a war”. [22] As the RFAF conducted their operational planning for the assault and capture of Kyiv, did they truly consider their operational reach? The pictures of a Russian logistic convoy, backed up for over sixty kilometres on a road to the south of Kyiv, that were famously flashed around the world by media outlets, demonstrates they did not. What is operational reach and why is it so important? By defining operational reach, it will demonstrate the importance of this key element in arranging military operations whilst also highlighting the limited consideration the RFAF gave to this element, which affected their ability to effectively sustain their military campaign. Operational reach is defined as “the distance and duration across which a force element can successfully employ military capabilities, whilst it is possible to extend a force’s operational reach through the forward position of capabilities and resources”, [23] this is not always achievable, as was the case for the RFAF. It is clear the RFAF had a focus on quickly capturing their objective, demonstrating they did not effectively consider nor quantify their operational reach.

With limited access to rail and roads congested with RFAF vehicles, the RFAF was unable to push fuel, rations, or ammunition to its ground forces, resulting in an ability to adequately resupply troops forcing them to culminate. The failure to achieve operational reach has arguably increased the RFAF death toll unnecessarily, as there is limited ability to transport wounded and ill soldiers to the required level of health care. [24] Arguably, this has been a contributor to declining morale amongst the RFAF, further compounding problems with combat effectiveness. The inability of RFAF to resupply its forces throughout the area of operations demonstrates the importance of understanding and effectively planning the ability to achieve operational reach. As demonstrated by the RFAF in the Russian-Ukraine War, if this is not achieved, a military campaign will be ineffective due to limited flexibility and foresight in its operational plan. What then, can the ADF learn from this?

The Russian-Ukraine War has highlighted the importance of logistics in military planning, yet arguably the ADF still does not train as it would be required to fight. Further examination of Exercise Talisman Sabre provides examples of our inability to actually test our operational reach, but also opportunities to achieve this. Every time the ADF deploys on Exercise Talisman Sabre, it not only force projects overwhelming reliant on ground lines of communication, but it ‘white boxes’ the deployment and redeployment. Why is the ADF not deploying how it would deploy to a region within the Indo-Pacific? Why is the ADF not using ADF sea and air assets to arrive at the exercise area? This would also stop units from stockpiling and hoarding stores and combat supplies, placing stress on the logistic chain and forcing planners to consider in detail its operational reach.

Finally, a key factor in operational reach is distance. In every Talisman Sabre, the majority of the ADF's logistic capabilities are placed within fifty kilometres of the exercise area, with the Brigade Maintenance Area never more than twenty kilometres from the fighting force. The Russian-Ukraine War has demonstrated that this is not always practical and potential, and not always achievable. Australia is a massive island; why is the ADF not utilising this geographic size to their advantage and testing the abilities of their logistics systems and units to achieve operational reach? As an organisation, the ADF must not just identify operational reach in doctrine and then provide exercises that do not truly force planners to produce flexible plans that have the required foresight to achieve this. Future military exercises must force the ADF to truly test its operational reach, otherwise as demonstrated in the Russian-Ukraine War, any future military campaign will be ineffective due to a lack of flexibility and foresight in its operational planning.   

This paper has argued that RFAF initial military campaign was ineffective due to a lack of flexibility and foresight in operational planning, and narrowed its focus to the initial thirty days, as it assessed these initial days as the most critical, and ultimately contributed to and continues to affect the RFAFs shortcomings. First, this paper established that the initial objective of the RFAF campaign was to overrun Ukraine in a blitzkrieg military operation, allowing them to swiftly capture the capital city and depose the Ukrainian Government. This paper then utilised three of the eight elements for the arrangement of military operations to demonstrate that the initial military campaign had been ineffective. Second, it discussed the importance of identifying risks to the commander when planning. This allows the commander to treat the risk, the will of the people to fight was clearly not identified by the RFAF in their planning, and as such, they failed to achieve their main objective and are still engaged in a military campaign nine months after the initial invasion.

This paper then demonstrated that RFAF did not understand nor effectively plan for their culminating point, causing them to withdraw from one of their key operational objectives within thirty days. Finally, the importance of operational reach was discussed, which demonstrated that if this is not carefully considered and planned for forces will culminate.

Throughout these arguments, comparisons were drawn to the ADF to demonstrate that to successfully plan and execute operations or military campaigns in our near region, as specified in the Defence Strategic Update 2020 , the ADF must learn from the hard lessons of the RFAF during this conflict. The ADF must develop a culture of failure tolerance, it must utilise exercises to break the logistic systems so that it can test the ADF's operational reach and culminating point; if they do not, like the RFAF, they will become ineffective in future operations and military campaigns. Finally, this paper demonstrated that the RFAF initial military campaign was ineffective due to a lack of flexibility and foresight in its operational planning.

This essay was written for the War College. Minor corrections for spelling, punctuation and grammar have been applied to enhance the readability of the essay, however, it is presented fundamentally unchanged from how it was submitted in 2022.

Bibliography

Clausewitz, Carl von. On War / Carl Von Clausewitz; Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret; Introductory Essays by Peter Paret, Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie; with a Commentary by Bernard Brodie. Edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1976.

CNN. "Cnn Live Event/Special." 21 March 2022. https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/se/date/2022-03-21/segment/01 .

Dalsjö, Robert, Michael Jonsson, and Johan Norberg. "A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War." Survival 64, no. 3 (2022/05/04 2022): 7-28. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2078044 . 

Dibb, Paul. "China Will Be Watching and Learning from Russia’s Poor Performance in Ukraine." Australian Strategic Policy Institute  (03 May 2022). https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-will-be-watching-and-learning-from-russias-poor-performance-in-ukraine/ .

Dougherty, Christopher. "Strange Debacle: Misadventures in Assessing Russian Military Power." (16 June 2022).

Dwyer, James. "3 Ways Russia Has Shown Military ‘Incompetence’ During Its Invasion of Ukraine." (14 March 2022).

Ellyatt, Holly. "Russia’s Chaotic and Confusing Invasion of Ukraine Is Baffling Military Analysts." CNBC , 04 March 2022.

Force, Australian Defence. Adf-P-5 Planning 2021.

Freedman, Lawerence. "Why War Fails: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and the Limits of Military Power." (July 2022). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-06-14/ukraine-war-russia-why-fails .

Galocha, Bonnie Berkowitz and Artur. "Why the Russian Military Is Bogged Down by Logistics in Ukraine." Washington Post , 30 March 2020. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/30/russia-military-logistics-supply-chain/ .

Gould-Davies, Nigel. "Putin's Strategic Failure." Survival 64, no. 2 (2022/03/04 2022): 7-16. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2055818 .

Government, Australia. The Defence Strategic Update , 2020.

Jones, Seth G. "Russia's Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine." (June 2022).

Lo, Bobo. Turning Point? Putin, Xi, and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine. Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2022. Report. https://apo.org.au/node/317995 .

Murch, Darren. "Learning from Our Mistakes: Tolerating Failure Versus Allowing Failure."  (12 December 2019). https://cove.army.gov.au/article/learning-our-mistakes-tolerating-failure-versus-allowing-failure .

O'Brien, Phillips Payson. "How the West Got Russia's Military So, So Wrong." (31 March 2022).

Putin, President of Russia Vladimir. "Address by the President of the Russian Federation." 24 February 2022 http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 .

Robert Dalsjö, Michael Jonsson & Johan Norberg. "A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War." Survival , 63:3 (2022): 7/28. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2078044 .

Sweeney, Rebecca Armitage and Lucy. "Vladimir Putin's War Has Not Gone to Plan. Here Are Russia's Three Biggest Failures in Ukraine So Far." (18 May 2022).

Ti, Ronald. "Russia's War in Ukraine: Russian Military Logistics."Series No.3. (June 2022).

———. "Russian Military Logistics." (June 2022). https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2022/06/ICDS_Brief_Russias_War_in_Ukraine_No3_Ronald_Ti_June_2022.pdf .

Zagorodnyuk, Andriy. "Ukrainian Victory Shatters Russia’s Reputation as a Military Superpower." (13 September 2022 ).

1 Bobo Lo, Turning point? Putin, Xi, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine (Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2022), Report. https://apo.org.au/node/317995 .

2 Michael Jonsson & Johan Norberg Robert Dalsjö, "A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War," Survival , 63:3 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2078044; Ronald Ti, "Russia's War in Ukraine: Russian Military Logistics, "Series No.3 (June 2022); Phillips Payson O'Brien, "How the West Got Russia's Military So, So Wrong," (31 March 2022); Andriy Zagorodnyuk, "Ukrainian victory shatters Russia’s reputation as a military superpower," (13 September 2022 ).

3 Christopher Dougherty, "Strange Debacle: Misadventures in Assessing Russian Military Power," (16 June 2022); Holly Ellyatt, "Russia’s chaotic and confusing invasion of Ukraine is baffling military analysts," CNBC 04 March 2022.

4 Robert Dalsjö, Michael Jonsson, and Johan Norberg, "A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War," Survival  64, no. 3 (2022/05/04 2022), https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2078044 ; Rebecca Armitage and Lucy Sweeney, "Vladimir Putin's war has not gone to plan. Here are Russia's three biggest failures in Ukraine so far," (18 May 2022); Paul Dibb, "China will be watching and learning from Russia’s poor performance in Ukraine," Australian Strategic Policy Institute   (03 May 2022), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/china-will-be-watching-and-learning-from-russias-poor-performance-in-ukraine/ ; James Dwyer, "3 ways Russia has shown military ‘incompetence’ during its invasion of Ukraine," (14 March 2022); Seth G. Jones, "Russia's Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine," (June 2022).

5 Australian Defence Force, ADF-P-5 Planning 15-18 (2021).

6 President of Russia Vladimir Putin, "Address by the President of the Russian Federation," (24 February 2022 ). http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843 .

7 Jones, "Russia's Ill-Fated Invasion of Ukraine," 1-4.

8 Force, Short ADF-P-5 Planning 56.

9 Force, Short ADF-P-5 Planning 59.

10 Nigel Gould-Davies, "Putin's Strategic Failure," Survival 64, no. 2 (2022/03/04 2022): 7, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2022.2055818 .

11 Dalsjö, Jonsson, and Norberg, "A Brutal Examination: Russian Military Capability in Light of the Ukraine War," 14-15.

12 Darren Murch, "Learning from our Mistakes: Tolerating Failure versus Allowing Failure,"  (12 December 2019), https://cove.army.gov.au/article/learning-our-mistakes-tolerating-failure-versus-allowing-failure .

13 Force, Short ADF-P-5 Planning 58.

14 Force, Short ADF-P-5 Planning 58.

15 Force, Short ADF-P-5 Planning 58-59.

16 Ronald Ti, "Russian Military Logistics," (June 2022): 1. https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2022/06/ICDS_Brief_Russias_War_in_Ukraine_No3_Ronald_Ti_June_2022.pdf .

17 CNN, "CNN Live Event/Special," (21 March 2022). https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/se/date/2022-03-21/segment/01 .

18 Lawerence Freedman, "Why War Fails: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine and the Limits of Military Power," (July 2022). https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-06-14/ukraine-war-russia-why-fails .

19 Australia Government, The Defence Strategic Update, 1-16 (2020).

20 Force, Short ADF-P-5 Planning 10-60.

21 Force, Short ADF-P-5 Planning 59.

22 Carl von Clausewitz, On war / Carl von Clausewitz; edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret; introductory essays by Peter Paret, Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie; with a commentary by Bernard Brodie , ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1976).

23 Force, Short ADF-P-5 Planning

24 Bonnie Berkowitz and Artur Galocha, "Why the Russian military is bogged down by logistics in Ukraine," Washington Post 30 March 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/30/russia-military-logistics-supply-chain/ .

War College Papers 2022

Content provided by

Australian War College

The Australian War College is responsible for the delivery of Joint Professional Military Education. The College provides a range of courses in both residential and distance learning format.

Students attending the War College comprise of Australian Defence Force personnel, Australian Public Servants from Defence and other agencies and international military personnel.

• The Australian War College delivers the following Courses:
• ​Defence and Strategic Studies Course​ (DSSC)
• ​Australian Command and Staff Course (Remote) (ACSC-R)​
• Australian Command and Staff Course (ACSC)​
• ADF Joint Warrant Officer Course (JWOC)​​
• Operations Based on Experience (OBOE) Seminar​
• Public Policy and Communications​ (PPC) Course ​
• Advanced Technology for Strategists (ATS) Course​
• Thinking Strategically (TS) Course​

MAJ Brooke Swift

Major Brooke Swift is a Royal Australian Electrical and Mechanical Engineering Officer in the Australian Army. She is an Australian War College graduate and is currently the Military Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Army.

Essay: Ukraine’s War Has Already Changed the World’s Economy

Create an FP account to save articles to read later and in the FP mobile app.

ALREADY AN FP SUBSCRIBER? LOGIN

• World Brief
• Editors’ Picks
• Africa Brief
• China Brief
• Latin America Brief
• South Asia Brief
• Situation Report
• Flash Points
• War in Ukraine
• Israel and Hamas
• U.S.-China competition
• Biden's foreign policy
• Trade and economics
• Artificial intelligence
• Asia & the Pacific
• Middle East & Africa

The Return of Great Powers

Ones and tooze, foreign policy live.

Winter 2024 Issue

Print Archive

FP Analytics

• In-depth Special Reports
• Issue Briefs
• Power Maps and Interactive Microsites
• FP Simulations & PeaceGames
• Graphics Database

Her Power 2024

The atlantic & pacific forum, principles of humanity under pressure, optimizing global health, fp global health forum 2024.

By submitting your email, you agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms of Use and to receive email correspondence from us. You may opt out at any time.

Your guide to the most important world stories of the day

Essential analysis of the stories shaping geopolitics on the continent

The latest news, analysis, and data from the country each week

Weekly update on what’s driving U.S. national security policy

Evening roundup with our editors’ favorite stories of the day

One-stop digest of politics, economics, and culture

Weekly update on developments in India and its neighbors

A curated selection of our very best long reads

Ukraine’s War Has Already Changed the World’s Economy

Global economics will never be the same—but not in the ways you might think., russia’s war in ukraine.

Understanding the conflict two years on .

More on this topic

For NATO and the West’s relations with Moscow, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine is clearly a historic turning point. The atrocities committed in occupied Ukrainian communities mark a ghastly breach of international law. But does Putin’s war mark a break in the development of the world economy?

Some have gone so far as to speculate that this war might mark a turning point in the history of globalization, on a par with 1914. Conflict and lack of trust, they surmise, will undercut investment and trade and unleash a general retreat from international interdependence. Others see Russia’s efforts to open channels for trade with India and China as harbingers of a new multipolar order.

It is very early to be making such prognoses. So far, the most remarkable thing about the war is, after all, Russia’s military frustration. Given Russia’s performance, it is far from obvious why anyone, even those once counted as Putin’s allies, would want to associate themselves more closely with his regime.

What demands more urgent attention than long-range prognosis is the shock wave that the war has triggered across the world economy, starting with the combatants, the wider region of Eastern and Central Europe, and global energy and food markets. One lasting story of this war could be the way that Europe uses it to launch its next stage of integration.

And yet it’s important to note that some of the deepest and potentially most consequential economic effects are being felt much farther from the theater of battle. Taken together with the uneven recovery from COVID-19, the surge in inflation, and the tightening of monetary policy, the war adds to an already inhospitable environment for fragile, heavily indebted low-income and emerging market economies. For the future shape of the world economy, how the world deals with debt crises triggered by this war in places as far apart as Sri Lanka and Tunisia are likely to be at least as important as Russia’s desperate efforts to circumvent sanctions in its trade with China and India. Rather than fretting about potential alternatives to the currency systems of the West, we should be concentrating on making those systems work.

A man walks past a currency exchange office in central Moscow on Feb. 28, as the Russian ruble collapsed against the dollar and the euro in response to Western sanctions over the invasion of Ukraine. ALEXANDER NEMENOV/AFP via Getty Images

From the point of view of the combatants—with a population of 190 million all told—the war is an unmitigated disaster. Ukraine’s economy shrank 16 percent in the first quarter of 2022 compared to last year’s first quarter, and it could be down by 40 percent by the end of the year. To survive, it will have to rely on outside aid.

Russia is reeling under dramatic economic sanctions. Though energy trade continues, Russia has been effectively cut off from global financial system. The ruble exchange rate may have nominally recovered to its prewar level. But the actual market value of the Russian currency is anyone’s guess. There no longer is a free market in rubles or in Russian financial assets. The Kremlin will be lucky if output contracts by only 10 percent this year. The withdrawal of Western companies from Russia has compounded the shock. And even if a cease-fire is reached, the prospects for Russia’s long-term development are dark indeed.

Beyond the two combatants, Europe will have to absorb a huge flow of refugees. The European Union will also have to deal with dramatic uncertainty with regard to both energy supplies and prices. Gas prices have of late fluctuated by as much as 70 percent on a single day. Economists estimate that if German imports of gas were cut off, which is now a distinct possibility, the economy may contract by somewhere between 2 and 4 percent. That would be a recession on the scale of the COVID-19 crisis.

Listen to Ones & Tooze , Foreign Policy ‘s weekly economics podcast with Adam Tooze and Cameron Abadi. Follow the show wherever you get your podcasts.

Germany is a rich country. Even in the event of a severe recession, it would have the resources to cope. Its Eastern European neighbors would be in a more difficult position. They have lower incomes. They are absorbing the majority of the refugees and they are more dependent on Russia for trade and energy. They would look for help from their richer partners in the EU. Mario Draghi, Italy’s prime minister, has been pushing since the start of the war for a collective spending package to cushion the crisis, speed up investments in energy independence, and reinforce Europe’s defenses that might run to more than $1.5 trillion. A package of anything like those dimensions would be a giant leap forward for the EU and would require months of high-stakes diplomacy to negotiate.

Europe is committed to breaking its dependence on oil and gas imported from Russia. In the medium term, the crisis will hopefully accelerate the push into renewable energy and away from the global trade in fossil fuels. But in the short run, the impact is not deglobalization but a search for new sources of supply. Liquefied natural gas tankers from around the world are plowing their way toward terminals in France and Spain. Robert Habeck, Germany’s minister for the economy and climate, recently inked a deal with Qatar. It takes a supply chain to beat a supply chain. Even if Europe succeeds in reducing its fossil fuel consumption as rapidly as planned, that will entail new imports of solar panels and rare-earth elements to build battery systems.

Meanwhile, what both the U.S. Federal Reserve and the European Central Bank (ECB) will be concentrating on is getting a grip on the problem of surging prices. On top of the dislocation to global supply chains caused by COVID-19, they are now facing a severe spike in energy prices and tight commodity markets generally. Medium- and long-term expectations of inflation are inching up. Both bond markets and voters are clamoring for action. A round of interest hikes is now inevitable. Against a backdrop of years of low or zero interest rates and with debt levels at historic highs, any increase in interest rates is a delicate operation. It will squeeze heavily indebted governments and corporations. And the effect will be felt worldwide.

For all the stresses they face, Europe and the United States have wealth that means ultimately any stresses triggered by the shock of the Ukraine war can be cushioned by public spending. As they demonstrated when COVID-19 hit, rich countries have the means, if necessary, to support large parts of the workforce for months on end. By contrast, in emerging markets and low-income countries, especially those with large debts denominated in dollars or euros, the trade-offs are more painful.

Even before COVID-19, there were worries about increasingly unsustainable levels of debt. In 2019, there were 33 countries eligible for concessional funding on grounds of poverty that were classified by the World Bank as in, or at high risk of, debt stress. The COVID-19 shock of 2020 saw Lebanon, Argentina, Ecuador, and Zambia tumble into default. But those countries were all troubled before the pandemic. On balance, the damage done in 2020-2021 was less severe than many of us anticipated. That, however, should not encourage complacency. The fact that we did not see a larger debt crisis in 2020 was a function both of the reserves built up by some of the stronger emerging market economies and the relief to lower-rated borrowers by the ultra-loose monetary policy pursued by the Fed. With interest rates in the United States and Europe at zero, money flooded across the world economy looking for a positive rate of return. Meanwhile, America’s dramatic fiscal stimulus helped to boost imports, providing markets for producers all over the world.

In 2022, the signals are set very differently. Both the Fed and the ECB have announced that they are tightening monetary policy and raising interest rates. So far, admittedly, their rate hikes have been modest, and the yields on long-term borrowing are rising more slowly than those for short-term loans. But the direction of travel is clear. The era of zero rates or even negative rates is over. Together with rising energy prices and food prices, that presents a huge challenge to stressed debtor countries.

Right now, the World Bank is warning that the number of countries at imminent risk of debt distress has risen to 35 and as many as 12 countries may be unable to make debt payments by the end of the year. The U.N. Development Program’s list of countries at risk of immediate debt problems includes Belize, Grenada, Angola, Laos, and Gabon, all of which have considerable debts outstanding to private creditors.

Low-income countries today make up only 9 percent of the world’s population. They account for a negligible fraction of the world economy. But all told they are home to 700 million people, and their distress would send shock waves through their regions. The vast majority of the world’s population live in middle-income countries, and several of these countries have been in distress as well. Argentina, Lebanon, Venezuela, Zambia, and Ecuador have all already defaulted.

Pakistan is living from IMF program to IMF program. Tunisia is widely tipped by bank analysts to need to enter debt negotiations in coming months. Its foreign reserves are rapidly depleting. The cost of living is surging. Tunisia’s debts owed to foreign investors are overwhelmingly in foreign currency, which exposes it to huge financial pressures when its currency devalues. Negotiations with the IMF are not progressing as hoped for. The political system of Tunisia, once hailed as the sole democratic success story of the Arab Spring of 2011, is in turmoil.

Meanwhile, Sri Lanka is already at the point of no return. There are rolling 13-hour power cuts, rioting, and now the declaration of a nationwide curfew. The government has declared that it will continue to honor its debts. That is a mistake. To continue debt payments will further drain reserves while eventual default remains inevitable. It is good news that Sri Lanka has agreed to talk with the IMF over debt restructuring.

Whereas for the big economic powers such as China and India it may make sense to speculate about new patterns of globalization, for neither Tunisia nor Sri Lanka does a retreat from globalization offer attractive options. In the short run, they need concessions from their main creditors and a concerted effort to refloat their economies.

Were there actually an active competition for influence in the world economy right now between China and the West, debtor countries such as Tunisia or Sri Lanka might hope to play the sides against each other. But China is retrenching its foreign lending, and there is little appetite for public commitments from the West. The problem is not competition for influence but the fact that there is a vacuum where a global financial order ought to be.

The pandemic-related debt relief programs organized by the World Bank in 2020, known as the Debt Service Suspension Initiative, were derisory in scope and expired in 2021. The so-called Common Framework for debt restructuring agreed by the G-20 has attracted only three countries so far—Chad, Ethiopia, and Zambia—and progress on reducing their debts has been disappointing.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky addresses the United Nations Security Council via video link in New York on April 5. The European Union announced an import ban on coal in a wave of new sanctions in response to evidence of Russian atrocities in Bucha, Ukraine. Spencer Platt/Getty Images

In an ambitious new book, Kevin Gallagher and Richard Kozul-Wright make The Case for a New Bretton Woods . As they remark, “Almost eighty years since Bretton Woods, the world we live in bears an uncomfortable resemblance to the one its delegates hoped would be gone forever.” Responsibility for that unfortunate state of affairs—the suffering of heavily indebted countries and the unconstrained boom and bust of global credit—lies as they insist in the first instance not with populist politicians, or great power politics, but with the ordinary activity of capitalist political economy. Deeply vested interests dominate the architecture of the world economy. The increasing reliance on private credit for low-income countries has made it harder than ever to shape a rational regime for the rational restructuring of poor-country debt. To redress that balance is a matter not simply of uniting the West, or the other slogans triggered by the war in Ukraine. What they call for is a bottom-up push to renew public institutions and collective goals at the national level, as a preliminary to refounding a system of international cooperation and global leadership.

Frankly, the prospects of that seem slimmer even than when those lines were sent to press, a few months back. But they offer an important corrective to many commonplace constructions of our current moment. Putin’s war did not rudely disrupt an otherwise healthy and stable global economic order. The existing dollar system is a ramshackle improvisation that provides generous support to an inner core, while a large part of the world’s population is left to ride the terrifying rollercoaster of the global credit cycle.

Before the Ukraine crisis, one would have said that the G-20 was the only forum within which one might have hoped for leadership. To counter its rich-country bias, Gallagher and Kozul-Wright propose that it should be made answerable to the Economic and Social Council of the U.N. If that was ambitious before the crisis, it is well-nigh unthinkable now. It will be surprising if the G-20 manages to convene at the leadership level this year.

In the current impasse, it may well be that the most positive impetus for action on global economic problems actually comes from geopolitical competition rather than cooperation. Given Russian intrusion into Libya and Mali, Europe can hardly look complacently at Tunisia’s difficulties. If Washington aims to have an Indo-Pacific strategy that amounts to anything, it should surely be engaged with India in addressing Sri Lanka’s difficulties. Sri Lanka, after all, is the place where the Western critique of China’s aggressive debt diplomacy was first crafted. Might the looming weight of China, finally push Western governments into engaging in active debt diplomacy of their own?

This, to be clear, is not an attractive prospect. The entanglement of great-power politics and debts is dangerous. But what is the alternative? The risk from the point of view of the most fragile and endangered societies is less that the world economy is being reordered in a competitive fashion and more that the intolerable status quo continues and nothing is done at all.

Adam Tooze is a columnist at  Foreign Policy and a history professor and the director of the European Institute at Columbia University. He is the author of Chartbook , a newsletter on economics, geopolitics, and history. Twitter:  @adam_tooze

Join the Conversation

Commenting on this and other recent articles is just one benefit of a Foreign Policy subscription.

Already a subscriber? Log In .

Subscribe Subscribe

View Comments

Join the conversation on this and other recent Foreign Policy articles when you subscribe now.

Not your account? Log out

Please follow our comment guidelines , stay on topic, and be civil, courteous, and respectful of others’ beliefs.

Change your username:

I agree to abide by FP’s comment guidelines . (Required)

Confirm your username to get started.

The default username below has been generated using the first name and last initial on your FP subscriber account. Usernames may be updated at any time and must not contain inappropriate or offensive language.

More from Foreign Policy

China is selectively bending history to suit its territorial ambitions.

Beijing’s unwillingness to let go of certain claims suggests there’s more at stake than reversing past losses.

The United States Has Less Leverage Over Israel Than You Think

A close look at the foundations of U.S. influence—and the lack of it.

Khamenei’s Strategy to Dominate the Middle East Will Outlive Him

Iran’s aging supreme leader is ensuring that any successor will stay the course.

America Has a Resilience Problem

The chair of the Federal Trade Commission makes the case for competition in an increasingly consolidated world.

‘Anyone Who Dares Call Us Nazis Will Be Reported’

Israel is a strategic liability for the united states, tv’s new ‘game of thrones’ is set in 17th-century japan, why biden can’t force a truce on israel—or won’t, is this a revolution or are people just very ticked off, moscow terrorist attack undercuts putin’s strongman image, israel targets hezbollah in syria, lebanon, what in the world, washington wants in on the deep-sea mining game.

Sign up for World Brief

FP’s flagship evening newsletter guiding you through the most important world stories of the day, written by Alexandra Sharp . Delivered weekdays.

Find anything you save across the site in your account

Has Putin’s Invasion of Ukraine Improved His Standing in Russia?

By Joshua Yaffa

On its face, the reëlection of Vladimir Putin as Russia’s President seems a superfluous oddity, a ritual devoid of substance. Putin has ruled the country for nearly a quarter century, just a few years shy of Stalin’s epoch-spanning grip on the Soviet Union. No genuine opposition candidates have been allowed on the Presidential ballot in two decades. Since the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, in February, 2022, Putin’s authoritarian drift has accelerated into something resembling a full-blown military dictatorship. This February, the one credible outsider politician with a genuine, nationwide following, Alexei Navalny, died in a prison in the Russian Arctic.

Still, the latest election, which concludes on Sunday, provides an occasion to assess the state of Putin’s rule and how it has weathered two years of war. For much of its existence, the Putin system depended upon a disengaged citizenry. People stayed out of politics, and, unless you were one of the few people foolish enough to challenge the state directly, politics stayed out of your life. The war, in theory, could have been a pretext to galvanize Russian society. According to Western estimates, around three hundred and fifty thousand Russian troops have been killed or wounded in Ukraine. In September, 2022, Putin launched what he called “partial mobilization”—a military draft that, so far, has called up some three hundred thousand Russian men. Meanwhile, a series of repressive laws criminalized not only publicly criticizing the war but speaking truthfully about the invasion. Sanctions left the Russian economy isolated. In the wake of the invasion, the ruble crashed, inflation spiked, and real wages fell.

Yet, two years into the war, Russia’s position in Ukraine looks as advantageous as it’s ever been, and Putin’s hold on power feels, at least for the moment, entirely assured. A member of the country’s political élite told me that, during the Ukrainian Army’s counter-offensive last year, Putin was worried. “He couldn’t be sure that the front wouldn’t collapse like it did in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions,” the person said, referring to Ukraine’s retaking of its territory in the summer and early fall of 2022. But, in 2023, the Russian lines largely held, and Putin came to the conclusion that, given wobbly Western support, Ukraine was unlikely to achieve more on the battlefield in the near future. “He’s in a great mood,” the member of the élite said of Putin. “He’s waiting for the moment when the West says, ‘That’s enough, let’s stop this war,’ but he believes there’s no rush. Every month, the situation will get worse for Ukraine.”

In Russia, the shock of the invasion has long passed. Konstantin Remchukov, a newspaper publisher close to the Kremlin, told me that “there’s no more wavering” among the country’s ruling class: “Everyone understood it’s better to do as you’re told.” After the West sanctioned scores of prominent businessmen and severed economic ties with Russian companies, the country’s business élite saw their overseas prospects shrink, or disappear entirely. In Russia, however, the war effort created new money-making opportunities: assets as diverse as auto plants, formerly owned by Toyota and Renault, and Starbucks and IKEA franchises have been either seized outright or forcibly sold at steep discounts and parcelled out to loyal insiders. “Putin was clever,” one influential Russian businessman told me. “His message was, ‘See, they don’t accept you, but you’re welcome here.’ ” The businessman went on, “Many in my circle tell themselves, ‘If we’re going to be outcasts, better to be victorious outcasts than losers.’ ”

The response to the war among the Russian élite may not be all that remarkable—“This is not a very reflective class of people,” Remchukov said—but the evolution of the wider public’s attitude has been more complicated and surprising. A research project run by a group called the Public Sociology Laboratory has tracked public sentiment since the start of the war. One report asked respondents—educated, professional Russians from big cities—if they were troubled by the invasion. “I believed that we were making a terrible mistake, that we were evil,” a Russian I.T. specialist said, describing her emotions in the days after the war began. But, speaking eight months later, she said, “I see it as something inevitable, and very painful, a very difficult decision, but inevitable.” She justified Russia’s invasion as just the latest in a long line of human conflicts: “It turns out that there is always war, it always exists somewhere on the planet.”

A female business owner initially said that she tried to avoid news from Ukraine. “If I had the opportunity to somehow influence the situation, if something depended on me, of course I would do everything to stop it,” she said. “But tying yourself in knots, watching everything, discussing it with everyone—I don’t want to do that either. What’s the point? My duty is very simple—take care of myself, my family, and my close circle.” Half a year later, her views had hardened. “I get the feeling that my country is being unfairly bullied,” she said. “Now I am even more patriotic than ever.”

Russia’s G.D.P. grew more than the global average last year, even as an outsized portion of its economic activity was directed toward the war: in 2024, it is estimated that the state will spend more than eight per cent of its G.D.P. on the military and on national security, more than double the percentage of G.D.P. that the U.S. had allocated to defense during the Iraq War. At the same time, a bonanza of state spending has created a large-scale redistribution of resources which has strengthened Putin’s base of support among the poorer and more peripheral sectors of society. These groups have benefitted from populist measures, such as increased subsidies and other payments to families, and the expansion of wartime industry. In its dependence on state largesse, this rising middle class is distinct from the one that appeared during the past decade, which tended to be more educated, more urban, more likely to work in the private sector, and, it turned out, more mobile—its members were overrepresented among the hundreds of thousands of Russians who left the country after the invasion. (Putin may have had such a process in mind when, in March of 2022, he spoke of a “self-cleansing” of Russian society.)

For an upcoming paper, Alexandra Prokopenko, a former adviser to Russia’s Central Bank, calculated that, since the start of the war, the average monthly salary for a welder in a manufacturing plant has risen from twenty-five thousand rubles—around two hundred and seventy U.S. dollars—to a hundred thousand rubles today. Those working similar jobs in Russian-occupied Ukraine can earn three hundred thousand rubles a month. “These people have never seen such money in their lives,” Prokopenko told me. She added that the Kremlin can only afford to maintain such an economic policy for another year or so, at which point it will face some hard choices: will the state bring down wages for those in the military and the security services, or will it reduce shifts at factories that are working overtime to produce arms and equipment for the war? “That’s impossible to imagine politically,” Prokopenko told me. “But, in the long term, economic imbalances will only grow, as will the prospect of a real crisis.”

But for now, as Denis Volkov, the director of the Levada Center, an independent polling agency, told me, survey data suggest that Russians have a more positive outlook for their country than in any previous period of Putin’s Presidency. The share of Russians who report being able to make discretionary purchases, such as televisions and household appliances, is growing. The portion of respondents who think Russia’s economic prospects will continue to improve in the next five years has risen by some thirty-five percentage points since 2022. Even the number of those who said that the distribution of wealth has become more equitable rose by a record percentage. “If you look at the data,” Volkov said, “you’re left with the feeling that people believe they’ve never lived so well.”

The darker aspects of the war, including the deaths of tens of thousands of soldiers, are largely kept private, dealt with individually, out of the public sphere. The Kremlin has promised to send payments of five million rubles, around fifty-five thousand U.S. dollars, to the families of those killed in action—a significant sum, especially in the poorer regions from which most of Russia’s recruits are drawn. In a stage-managed meeting with mothers of Russian soldiers, Putin revealed his own attitude toward the country’s war dead. “Some people die of vodka, and their lives go unnoticed,” he told a woman whose son was killed in Luhansk. “But your son really lived and achieved his goal. He didn’t die in vain.”

Putin, for his part, sees himself not as an autocrat holding the country hostage but as a steward of Russia’s historical destiny. After decades in power, Putin’s logic functions as a tautology, a closed loop in which he never has to question or doubt the virtue of his political choices. As he sees it, he acts in the nation’s interests and therefore has the nation’s support; he has the right to rule however he wants because, in fact, he is serving and protecting the state. “Of course, that’s a very convenient position for Putin,” Abbas Gallyamov, a former speechwriter for Putin who is now a Putin critic, told me. “Seeing as that, by this point, he is the state.”

Still, in the past few months, Russia has seen two mass-scale, unscripted political events and, tellingly, neither was in support of Putin or the war. The first came in January, when lines of people spontaneously appeared across the country to provide their signatures in support of the candidacy of Boris Nadezhdin, a milquetoast, unthreatening, and unknown liberal politician. Nadezhdin made ending the “special military operation” the centerpiece of his campaign and called for freeing political prisoners. The Kremlin ultimately refused to put him on the Presidential ballot—a sign that it was rattled by images of people standing in the freezing cold to register their support for an alternative to Putin. According to reporting by Meduza, a Russian news outlet based abroad, internal Kremlin metrics forecast that Nadezhdin would have won as much as ten per cent of the vote. That would have clashed with Putin’s rhetoric of a unified country. A source close to the Kremlin told Meduza that such an outcome would “suddenly give the impression that a sizable share of the population is eager for the special military operation to end.”

The second event was Navalny’s funeral. Navalny was not necessarily popular in an electoral sense. His approval rating in Russia peaked at twenty per cent, in 2021, shortly after he was poisoned by Kremlin agents. But he had a powerful resonance in Russian society. With his plainspoken criticism of official corruption, his sense of humor, and his remarkable lack of fear, he became an avatar for an alternative, more optimistic future. He built a nationwide network of field offices and consistently drew thousands to protests across the country. “Autocracies like Russia’s don’t like the idea of progress,” Ekaterina Schulmann, a Russian political scientist based in Berlin, told me. “They are intently focussed on the past, maintain a cult of history, and use these ideas to try and keep the present forever.” Navalny represented the opposite, which made his existence unbearable to the state. “His entire stance centered on how tomorrow can be different from today if only we all follow some consistent action,” Schulmann said.

On March 1st, crowds lined a street in Moscow as the hearse carrying Navalny’s body drove past. Thousands more flocked to Borisovsky Cemetery, where they covered Navalny’s grave in a bulging mound of flowers. People chanted “Russia without Putin,” “No to war,” and even “Ukrainians are good people”—a remarkable display of civic courage given that, during the past two years, police have arrested people holding posters with asterisks in place of the words “No war,” and even those with blank posters with no words at all. Analysis of the Moscow metro system by Mediazona, an independent news site, showed a surge of twenty-seven thousand passengers to the station nearest to the cemetery. I spoke to a friend who had attended. “We hadn’t been among so many people who think like us in years,” the friend said. “The occasion was terrible, but the mood felt energized.”

The Russian investigative site Proekt, which the Russian state has labelled “undesirable,” recently tallied the number of people who have faced criminal prosecution in politically motivated cases in the course of Putin’s current six-year Presidential term. It was more than ten thousand, surpassing the comparable figures under the Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev. “In addition to the widely discussed repression of oppositionists and anti-war activists, Russia has a system of social pressure where citizens are severely punished for the most insignificant misdemeanors,” the Proekt report said. Still, the current repressions are tough enough for everyone to get the message, but not so tough that they infringe on the public’s sense of normalcy. Aleksei Miniailo, an activist and co-founder of a sociological research project called Chronicles, who has chosen to remain in Moscow, told me, “If these were really Stalinist times, I would have been shot a year ago.” He went on, “This regime relies on one per cent repressions, ninety-nine per cent propaganda.”

One should not confuse the absence of dissent with heartfelt support. The Kremlin cannot fill stadiums with rabid, committed supporters. (It can bus them in or otherwise twist the arms of state employees, but genuine passion is exceedingly hard to muster.) Tatiana Stanovaya, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center, referenced Putin’s annual state-of-the-nation address from late February, during which he spoke of people who “send letters and parcels, warm clothes, and camouflage nets to the front; they donate money from their savings.” Putin, she said, needs to see the war not as something he alone launched—as is the case—but as an endeavor supported and demanded by the people. Stanovaya quoted the Soviet battle hymn, “Sacred War,” known for its opening line: “Arise great country!” But now, Stanovaya said, “The country doesn’t feel like rising.”

Last fall, in a moment of rare candor, Valery Fedorov, the head of a state-run polling agency, admitted that the so-called party of war—hawks who advocate for victory at any price—represents only ten to fifteen per cent of society. “The majority of Russians do not demand to take Kyiv or Odesa,” he said. “They don’t enjoy the fighting. If it were up to them, they would not have started a military operation, but since the situation has already developed this way, then we must win.” This is not quite opposition to the war, but it’s certainly something far less than enthusiasm for it.

Putin has largely accepted this reality. His government has set out to rewrite school history textbooks to portray Russia as perpetually defending itself against outside enemies and to link the war in Ukraine to the Soviet Union’s victory in the Second World War. Now Russian troops are fighting for “goodness and truth” just like their grandfathers. But, on the whole, as Volkov, of the Levada Center, put it, “The state lets people live as they want.” Putin has attempted to calm fears of another mass-mobilization order. “There is no such need,” he said last summer. If people are so moved, as he noted, to sew camouflage nets for the soldiers at the front, the state will celebrate their efforts. But if people want to busy themselves with children’s playgroups and Moscow restaurants—Remchukov, the newspaper publisher, spoke of new supply chains that provide exquisite crab legs and sea urchins from Murmansk, on the Barents Sea—that’s fine, too.

There is no great strategy or vision; unlike the ideology of the Soviet period, Putinism offers no sweeping values against which particular actions or policies can be measured. This fact, along with Putin’s disinterest in the nitty-gritty of governance, means there is ever more room for improvisation and freelancing at all levels of the state apparatus. Many high-profile arrests and criminal cases are launched without Putin’s direct awareness—the F.S.B. long ago received carte blanche to act as it pleases. Last fall, Putin ended up in a mildly awkward position when regional governments moved to restrict abortion rights and Putin, aware of the general discomfort in society with such restrictions, stepped in to block them.

But, when the system faces a real crisis, the state’s institutions and would-be protectors go silent. Such was the case, for example, last June, during the short-lived mutiny led by Yevgeny Prigozhin and his Wagner mercenaries. Many officials in regional government and the security services froze and watched as Prigozhin and his men sped toward Moscow. A similar dynamic played out last October, when an antisemitic mob ran wild through an airport in Dagestan, and it took hours to chase them off the tarmac. In such situations, no one wants to claim responsibility or rush to the regime’s defense. “How can you claim to have total control,” the member of the élite said, “and yet look so powerless.”

To the extent that wartime Putinism has an identifiable doctrine, it’s that Russia is engaged in a protracted struggle with the West. In Putin’s address in February, he said, “The so-called West, with its colonial practices and penchant for inciting ethnic conflicts around the world, not only seeks to impede our progress but also envisions a Russia that is a dependent, declining, and dying space where they can do as they please.” Remchukov told me, “He’s made up his mind. If earlier on in the conflict there were different scenarios and time lines for how things might be resolved, now we see a qualitative change: he’s decided the confrontation between Russia and the West is here for a while—several decades at least.” Now, Remchukov went on, the state has to explain to the public the ways in which Russia is not the West, thus the emphasis on traditional values and Putin’s increasing interest in culture-war topics such as gay marriage and trans rights.

Schulmann, the political scientist, told me, “We see a picture of the world in which the West hates Russia and always attacks it because their values are incompatible.” She went on, “And those values are innate and unchanging. The West will never stop attacking. Russia will never be defeated. Confrontation is eternal.” Conveniently for Putin, unlike a “special military operation,” this kind of struggle has no end. It continues forever, meaning his rule must, too.

Putin will surely be inaugurated for a fifth term in the spring. But is he popular? And does it even matter? Recent Levada Center polling shows his approval rating is above eighty per cent. But Miniailo, of the Chronicles project, cautioned against taking such figures too seriously. “It makes little sense to try to understand what people want solely by asking which candidate they will vote for,” he said. “Politics simply doesn’t exist in Russia, so this question has little relevance.”

Miniailo relayed the results of a recent survey that his group conducted which showed a growing disparity between which policies people would like to see (more spending on social programs) and which policies they expect Putin to enact (more spending on the military). The same was true for the question of reaching a truce with Ukraine, for example, or restoring relations with the West; some twenty per cent more respondents favor these policies for Russia’s future than expect Putin to carry them out. For now, these data suggest only a latent, passive dissatisfaction that may or may not turn into something larger.

The continued stability of Putin’s rule rests not on his popularity but, rather, on the lack of mechanisms people have to act on their malaise, discontent, and frustrations. In the past two decades, the Kremlin has dismantled those instruments: there is no longer a muckraking independent media to hold the state accountable; there are no credible opposition parties to channel dissatisfaction into real politics; and there is no judicial system capable of acting as a check on power. And, so, if feelings of resistance have no credible outlet, then the feelings themselves are repressed. “I always hear at my talks in the West: if people aren’t happy, then there should be crowds in the streets,” Greg Yudin, a Russian political philosopher at Princeton, told me. “But what are these crowds going to do?”

Yudin mentioned Navalny’s funeral and the crowds that keep coming, day after day, to lay flowers. “Of course, in a country of a hundred and forty million there are plenty of brave people,” he said. “But that was never the problem. The more relevant point is that it’s entirely unclear what to do with this bravery, where to direct it, and for what end.” People are neither foolish nor suicidal, he noted; moreover, this is not an exclusively Russian condition.

The future of the Putin system, then, in large measure depends on the appearance—or continued absence—of instruments or avenues to challenge it in any meaningful way. “It’s not that you change your attitude and then take action,” Yudin said. “If you see an opportunity for action, then you might rethink your attitude.” Yudin and I discussed the idea, widely accepted by most Russian sociologists and political scientists, that the Russian public would react with relief, even joy, if Putin declared tomorrow that he was ending the war. (The member of the élite noted that Putin could do so rather easily: “He will say we gained four new territories, secured a land bridge to Crimea, and defeated NATO . It’s easy to sell.”) But if Putin were to appear on television to announce, say, that the West left him no choice but to launch nuclear warheads aimed at Washington, London, and Berlin, “People would also take this in stride,” Yudin said. A CNN report revealed that, in the summer of 2022, the Biden Administration was “preparing rigorously” for a Russian nuclear strike in Ukraine.

Since then, the situation on the battlefield in Ukraine has greatly improved for Russia. Putin now believes that Ukraine’s leaders—or, really, its Western backers—should have come to their senses and effectively capitulated long ago. But that’s not happening, and likely won’t, regardless of the exact composition of future aid packages from the U.S. and Europe. “Putin believes that Russia outplayed the West in Ukraine,” Stanovaya said. “And now there should be a threshold after which they begin to act sensibly.” Instead, as Putin sees it, Western capitals are choosing escalation. “This is an escalation he doesn’t want but one he feels he has to respond to,” Stanovaya said. For an autocratic regime such as Putin’s, the President’s strength depends on everyone’s belief in that strength. In the absence of strong public opinion, elections—even those of a thoroughly undemocratic nature—provide an image of cohesion and unquestioned power. “He needs a certification of this world view,” Stanovaya told me. “Proof he can hold up and say, yet again, ‘The country is behind me.’ ” ♦

New Yorker Favorites

Why facts don’t change our minds .

How an Ivy League school turned against a student .

What was it about Frank Sinatra that no one else could touch ? 

The secret formula for resilience .

A young Kennedy, in Kushnerland, turned whistle-blower .

The biggest potential water disaster in the United States.

Fiction by Jhumpa Lahiri: “ Gogol .”

Sign up for our daily newsletter to receive the best stories from The New Yorker .

By signing up, you agree to our User Agreement and Privacy Policy & Cookie Statement . This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.

By Benjamin Wallace-Wells

By Adam Gopnik

By John Cassidy

• IAS Preparation
• UPSC Preparation Strategy
• Russia Ukraine Conflict UPSC Notes

Russia - Ukraine Conflict [UPSC Notes]

Latest Developments in Russia – Ukraine Conflict

On Feb 24, 2022, Russia launched a full-fledged invasion of Ukraine . Know more about this in the link given. This page gives a background of the issue with an analysis of the developments before the invasion.

The tensions on Ukraine’s border with Russia are at their highest in years. Fearing a potential invasion by Russia, the US and NATO are stepping up support for Ukraine. In this article, we explain the reason for tensions between Russia and Ukraine, the latest developments, the stand of various stakeholders in the region, and the way forward for the UPSC exam IR segment.

Russia – Ukraine Conflict Background

Post the disintegration of the Soviet Union , Ukraine gained independence in 1991.

• Ukraine was a member of the Soviet Union until 1991 when it disintegrated, and Russia has tried to maintain the country in its orbit since then.
• In 2014, a separatist insurgency started in Ukraine’s eastern industrial heartland, Donetsk Basin, also known as,
• Russia further gained a maritime advantage in the region due to its invasion and annexation of Crimea.
• As a result, both the US and the EU have pledged to safeguard the integrity of Ukraine’s borders.

Image Source: Al Jazeera

Importance of Ukraine to Russia

• Ukraine and Russia have shared cultural and linguistic ties for hundreds of years.
• Ukraine was the most powerful country in the Soviet Union after Russia.
• Ukraine has been a hub for commercial industries, factories and defence manufacturing.
• Ukraine also provides Russia with access to the Black Sea and crucial connectivity to the Mediterranean Sea.

Reasons for Russian Aggression

The chief reasons for Russian aggression are discussed below.

• Russia, considering the economic significance of Ukraine, sought Ukraine’s membership in the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), which is a free trade agreement that came into being in 2015.
• With its huge market and advanced agriculture and industrial output, Ukraine was supposed to play an important role. But Ukraine refused to join the agreement.
• Russia claims that the eastward expansion by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) which they call “ enlargement ”, has threatened Russia’s interests and has asked for written security guarantees from NATO.
• NATO, led by the U.S., has planned to install missile defence systems in eastern Europe in countries like Poland and the Czech Republic to counter Russia’s intercontinental-range missiles.

Russia – Ukraine Latest Developments

Russia has been indulging in military build-up along its border with Ukraine, an aspiring NATO member. Russia has stated that its troop deployment is in response to NATO’s steady eastward expansion. Russia argues that its moves are aimed at protecting its own security considerations.

• Russia has mobilised around 1,00,000 troops on its border with Ukraine.
• Russia seeks assurance from the US that Ukraine shall not be inducted into NATO.
• This has resulted in tensions between Russia and the West which have been supportive of Ukraine. The U.S. has assured Ukraine that it will “respond decisively” in case of an invasion by Russia.

Image Source: The Hindu

Russia’s demands

• Russia has demanded a ban on further expansion of NATO that includes countries like Ukraine and Georgia that share Russia’s borders.
• Russia asked NATO to pull back its military deployments to the 1990s level and prohibit the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in the bordering areas.
• Further, Russia asked NATO to curb its military cooperation with Ukraine and other former Soviet republics.

The response from the West

• The U.S. has ruled out changing NATO’s “open-door policy” which means, NATO would continue to induct more members.
• The U.S. also says it would continue to offer training and weapons to Ukraine.
• The U.S. is said to be open to a discussion regarding missile deployment and a mutual reduction in military exercises in Eastern Europe.
• Germany has also warned Russia that the Nord Stream 2 pipeline would be stopped if Russia were to invade Ukraine.
• The U.S. threatens Russia by imposing new economic sanctions in case of attempts of invasion against Ukraine.

Russia – Ukraine Crisis: Implications on India

What implications does the Russia – Ukraine crisis have on India? This is discussed in this section.

• Maintaining strong relations with Russia serves India’s national interests. India has to retain a strong strategic alliance with Russia as a result, India cannot join any Western strategy aimed at isolating Russia.
• There is a possibility of CAATSA sanctions on India by the U.S. as a result of the S-400
• A pact between the US and Russia might affect Russia’s relations with China. This might allow India to expand on its efforts to re-establish ties with Russia.
• The issue with Ukraine is that the world is becoming increasingly economically and geopolitically interconnected. Any improvement in Russia-China ties has ramifications for India.
• There is also an impact on the strong Indian diaspora present in the region, threatening the lives of thousands of Indian students.

Also read: India – Russia relations

India’s stand

• India called for “a peaceful resolution of the situation through sustained diplomatic efforts for long-term peace and stability in the region and beyond”.
• Immediately after the annexation, India abstained from voting in the UN General Assembly on a resolution that sought to condemn Russia.
• In 2020, India voted against a Ukraine-sponsored resolution in the UN General Assembly that sought to condemn alleged human rights violations in Crimea.
• India’s position is largely rooted in neutrality and has adapted itself to the post-2014 status quo on Ukraine.

Way forward

• The US along with other western countries is expected to revive the peace process through diplomatic channels in mitigating the tensions between Ukraine and Russia which would be a time-consuming process.
• Experts recommend more dialogues between the west and Russia that exert emphasis on the issue surrounding Ukraine.
• Ukraine should approach and focus on working with its Normandy Format allies, France and Germany, to persuade the Russian government to withdraw assistance for its proxies and allow for the region’s gradual safe reintegration into Ukraine.
• The Russian military expansion in Ukraine can be prevented on the geoeconomic grounds that will hamper its trade in the region especially with the Nord Stream pipeline that can carve out a way of resolving the ongoing crisis as pointed out by an expert.
• Ukraine’s internal disturbances need to be addressed to revive the Minsk II agreement for the development of peace in the region and dissolve the ongoing tensions.

UPSC Questions related to Russia – Ukraine Conflict

What is the relation between russia and ukraine.

Ukraine was a member of the Soviet Union until its disintegration in 1991. Post the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Ukraine gained independence in 1991 and Russia has tried to maintain its influence on the country in its orbit since then.

Why did Ukraine not join NATO?

Although Ukraine has no membership offer from NATO, it has been closer to the alliance since its establishment in 1997. Plans for NATO membership were dropped by Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych, who preferred to keep the country non-aligned.

Is Crimea a part of Russia?

The majority of the world considers Crimea to be a part of Ukraine. Geographically, it is a peninsula in the Black Sea that has been battled over for ages due to its strategic importance. In 2014, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea which was a part of Ukraine due to its declining influence over the region and emerging insecurities.

Russia – Ukraine Conflict [UPSC Notes]:- Download PDF Here

Leave a Comment Cancel reply

Your Mobile number and Email id will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Request OTP on Voice Call

Post My Comment

IAS 2024 - Your dream can come true!

Download the ultimate guide to upsc cse preparation.

• Share Share

Register with BYJU'S & Download Free PDFs

Register with byju's & watch live videos.

Navigation for News Categories

Photo essay: russia's invasion of ukraine.

In the past week, the world order has been shattered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the first major military action between European nations in decades.

Refugees from Ukraine are seen after crossing Ukrainian-Polish border due to Russian military attack on Ukraine. Medyka, Poland on February 25, 2022. Photo: AFP or licensors

Here are some of the most stirring images of both the fighting and scenes from Ukraine, and protests around the world, including New Zealand.

People hold cards with free accommodation and transport offer for Ukrainian citizens who arrive with a bus to a supermarket parking lot after crossing Ukrainian-Polish border in Medyka due to ongoing Russia's attacks on Ukraine. Photo: AFP / Andalou

People hold up placards during a march to protest against the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in Melbourne on February 27, 2022. Photo: AFP or licensors

A woman is crying after arriving on a train from Ukraine to the railway station in Przemysl, Poland on February 25, 2022. Photo: AFP or licensors

A woman holds her sleeping child while sitting on the ground at Lviv central train station in Western Ukraine on February 26, 2022. Photo: AFP or licensors

Children are sleeping on the floor at Lviv central train station in Western Ukraine on February 26, 2022. Photo: AFP or licensors

Smoke rises from a Russian tank destroyed by Ukrainian forces in Lugansk region on February 26, 2022. Photo: AFP or licensors

Oksana Zelanik, of Seattle and born in Ukraine, holds a "pray for Ukraine sign" during a "Rally Against the War With Ukraine" event in Seattle, Washington on February 26, 2022. Photo: AFP or licensors

Photo: 2022 Getty Images

Firefighters work at a damaged residential building at Koshytsa Street, a suburb of the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, where a military shell allegedly hit, on February 25, 2022. Photo: AFP / Genya Savilov

Helga Tarasova hugs her daugther Kira Shapovalova as they wait in a undergound shelter during bombing alert in the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv on February 26, 2022. Photo: AFP

A woman clears debris at a damaged residential building at Koshytsa Street, a suburb of the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, where a military shell allegedly hit, on February 25, 2022. Photo: AFP or licensors

Ukrainians in Paris protest against Russia's invasion today. Photo: AFP or licensors

Photo: RNZ / Samuel Rillstone

Photo: AFP/ Radio RMF Poland/ Mateus Zchlystun

A fragment of a destroyed Russian tank is seen on the roadside on the outskirts of Kharkiv on February 26, 2022, following the Russian invasion. Photo: AFP or licensors

Photo: AFP / Facebook account of Volodymyr Zelensky

The body of a rocket stuck in a flat after recent shelling on the northern outskirts of Kharkiv on February 24, 2022. Photo: AFP / Sergey Bobok

Damage to the upper floors of a building in Kyiv after it was reportedly struck by a Russian rocket. Photo: AFP

People in Wellington's Civic Square to protest against Russia's offensive in Ukraine. Photo: RNZ/Jake McKee

A woman walks in front of a damaged residential building at Koshytsa Street, a suburb of the Ukrainian capital Kyiv, where a military shell allegedly hit, on February 25, 2022. Photo: AFP or licensors

Activists hold placards and flags as they gather in Lafayette Square to protest Russia's invasion of Ukraine in Washington, DC. Photo: AFP or licensors

Ukrainians carry babies after arriving with a bus from the Ukrainian-Polish border crossing in Medyka. Photo: AFP or licensors

Russia President Vladimir Putin meets with permanent members of the Security Council on the Ukraine situation at Kremlin, Moscow, on Friday Feb 25, 2022. Photo: AFP or licensors

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky addresses the nation in Kyiv early on February 25, 2022. Photo: Handout / UKRAINE PRESIDENCY / AFP

Drone image of heavy traffic on a road heading out of the Ukrainian capital Kyiv as people flee the capital city in anticipation of Russian military operations. Photo: AFP or licensors

Photo: Getty Images

Ukrainian military vehicles move past Independence square in central Kyiv on February 24, 2022. Photo: AFP / Daniel Leal

Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations Sergiy Kyslytsya during the United Nations security councils emergency meeting to discuss the threat of a full-scale invasion by Russia of Ukraine. Photo: 2022 Getty Images

Firefighters work on a fire on a building after bombings on the eastern Ukraine town of Chuguiv on February 24, 2022. Photo: AFP / Aris Messinis

Copyright © 2022 , Radio New Zealand

Related Stories

Russia invades ukraine in europe's 'darkest hours' since wwii.

Russian forces invaded Ukraine by land, air and sea on Thursday, confirming the worst fears of the West with the biggest attack by one state against another in Europe since World War II.

Timeline: From Ukraine's independence in 1991 to latest conflict

A look back at the main events in Ukraine's political history since it won independence from Moscow in 1991.

How Ukraine's armed forces shape up against Russia's

Ukraine's armed forces are heavily outnumbered and outgunned by Russia's, but military experts say they would be capable of mounting significant resistance and inflicting heavy casualties.

NZ announces bans on Russia in response to Ukraine invasion

In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, New Zealand's government is implementing a range of measures, including a travel ban on Russian officials and limiting diplomatic engagements.

• Lizzo says she 'quits' after 'lies' against her
• Australian reportedly among UN observers wounded by shelling in Lebanon
• Man arrested as hostage situation in Dutch nightclub ends

Get the RNZ app

for ad-free news and current affairs

Top News stories

• How to MP: Tips from a 'great parliamentarian'
• 'Fast Track Bill' could breach free trade deals, environmentalists claim
• Sighting of second 'bolshy' myna bird in Christchurch sparks hunt
• Better urban planning could avoid future environmental risks - professor

Follow RNZ News

Russia-Ukraine war: List of key events, day 758

As the war enters its 758th day, these are the main developments.

Here is the situation on Saturday, March 23, 2024.

• At least five people were killed and more than one million were left without power after Russia launched a wave of drone and missile strikes on Ukraine, targeting the country’s energy infrastructure.
• Eight of the Russian missiles hit Dnipro Hydroelectric Station, Ukraine’s largest hydroelectric power plant, causing “significant damage” to the facility, the office of Ukraine’s prosecutor general said.
• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Russia had hit Ukraine with 90 missiles and 60 Iranian-made drones in a “ war with people’s everyday lives ”, and repeated his urgent appeal for Kyiv’s allies to supply air defence systems.
• The commander of Ukraine’s ground forces, Lieutenant General Oleksandr Pavliuk, warned Russia was building a group of more than 100,000 soldiers ahead of a possible major summer offensive.

Politics and diplomacy

• The Kremlin said for the first time that Russia regards itself to be “ in a state of war ” with Ukraine. When it launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it said it was a “special military operation”.
• Russia’s FSB security service said it arrested seven Moscow residents linked to a pro-Ukraine militia accused of raiding Russia’s border regions, according to state news agencies.
• Li Hui, China’s special envoy for Ukraine, said there remained a “ significant gap ” between Moscow and Kyiv on peace talks to end the war, although both agreed negotiations were the best way to resolve the crisis.
• The European Commission said it would impose “ prohibitive tariffs ” on cheap imports of grain from Russia and Belarus. The move is also designed to limit Russia’s ability to fund its war in Ukraine and sell grain stolen from Ukraine, the commission said.

Advertisement

Ukraine Says Russia’s Speculation It Was Behind Attack Is Meant to Rally War Support

Kyiv has accused Russia of falsely suggesting it was to blame for the terrorist attack in Moscow and of using the assault to escalate the fighting in Ukraine.

• Share full article

By Andrew E. Kramer

• Published March 23, 2024 Updated March 24, 2024

Ukraine has accused Russia of falsely suggesting that Kyiv was to blame for Friday night’s terrorist attack in Moscow and of using the deadly episode to rally support for the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine and to escalate the fighting there.

Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement that Russian officials were making such accusations “with the goals of stirring up anti-Ukrainian hysteria in Russian society and creating conditions to boost mobilization of Russian citizens into the criminal aggression against our state.”

Russia’s speculations, the foreign ministry said, were an attempt at “discrediting Ukraine in the eyes of the international community.”

Russia is now on the offensive along the entire front line in Ukraine, but its advances have come at a creeping pace and at tremendous cost in dead and wounded soldiers . Military analysts have said that any more significant breakthrough would require a large mobilization of fresh troops.

The Ukrainian ministry issued its statement after Dmitri Medvedev, a former Russian president who is now the deputy secretary of Russia’s national security council, floated the possibility late Friday that Ukraine had been involved in the attack on the concert hall in a Moscow suburb.

The ministry said that Kyiv “categorically denies” any involvement, and an adviser to Ukraine’s president also denied any role by the country.

The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack through an affiliated news agency on Friday, and the United States said it believed that a branch of the Islamic State that has been active in Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan was to blame.

Mr. Medvedev vowed that Russia would retaliate against those behind the attack. “If it’s determined these are terrorists of the Kyiv regime, it will be impossible to treat them and those who inspire them any differently,” he said, adding that those responsible for the violence would “be found and mercilessly destroyed, like terrorists. This includes official figures of the state committing such an evil act.”

Russia has in the past used violence at home as pivot points in its wars, Ukrainian officials pointed out after Friday’s attack.

The Ukrainian foreign ministry, in its statement, pointed to explosions in apartment buildings in Russia in 1999 that set off the second of the two post-Soviet wars in Chechnya. A Russian security service defector later blamed his agency for orchestrating the attacks to galvanize public support for renewed military action in Chechnya, something that Moscow vehemently denies.

Ukraine’s military intelligence agency and the presidential adviser, Mykhailo Podolyak, also referred in their statements to the apartment bombings as examples of the risk of Russia’s blaming Ukraine for the concert attack.

In the days before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, Russian officials accused Kyiv of blowing up the car of a leader of one of the Kremlin’s client states in eastern Ukraine, and of firing artillery at a chemical plant. Ukraine denied being involved in either of those episodes.

Andrew E. Kramer is the Kyiv bureau chief for The Times, who has been covering the war in Ukraine since 2014. More about Andrew E. Kramer

• International edition
• Australia edition
• Europe edition

Ukraine war briefing: ‘Third of Russia’s Black Sea fleet sunk or crippled’

Poland warns Russian missiles coming too close may be shot down; how Ukraine has ramped up making its own weapons. What we know on day 763

• See all our Russia-Ukraine war coverage

Ukraine’s navy claims it has sunk or disabled a third of all Russian warships in the Black Sea in just over two years of war. Dmytro Pletenchuk from the navy said the latest strike on Saturday night hit the Russian amphibious landing ship Kostiantyn Olshansky , which was resting in dock in Sevastopol in Russia-occupied Crimea. The ship was Ukrainian before being captured by Russia in 2014.

Pletenchuk previously announced that two other landing ships of the same type, Azov and Yamal, also were damaged in Saturday’s strike along with the Ivan Khurs intelligence ship. He said the weekend attack, using Ukraine-built Neptune missiles, also hit Sevastopol port facilities and an oil depot . “Our ultimate goal is complete absence of military ships of the so-called Russian Federation in the Azov and Black Sea regions,” Pletenchuk said.

Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelenskiy , has replaced the secretary of Ukraine’s national security council, Oleksiy Danilov, with Oleksandr Lytvynenko, 51, head of the foreign intelligence service . Danilov had been secretary of the council since October 2019. Zelenskiy said Danilov was being transferred to new duties, with details to be made public later. “The strengthening of Ukraine and the renewal of our state system in all sectors will continue.”

Ukraine has staged further air attacks on Belgorod, just over the border inside Russia . The regional governor, Vyacheslav Gladkov, reported damage on the ground and claimed air defence engaged 18 incoming targets.

Nato is considering shooting down Russian missiles that stray too close to its borders, Poland’s deputy foreign minister, Andrzej Szejna , has told Polish media outlet RMF24 . “[Russia] knew that if the missile moved further into Poland, it would be shot down. There would be a counterattack.” Poland’s armed forces said Russia violated Poland’s airspace on Sunday morning with a cruise missile launched at targets in western Ukraine.

Ukraine’s government is flooding money into its defence industry , budgeting nearly $1.4bn in 2024 to develop weapons at home – 20 times more than before Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Associated Press has reported. A huge portion of weapons are being bought from privately owned factories sprouting up across the country, such as a mortar factory in western Ukraine making roughly 20,000 shells a month. To help with labour shortages, the government has exempted defence industry workers from military service .

Compared with last year, Ukraine’s output of mortar shells is about 40 times higher and its production of ammunition for artillery has nearly tripled, said Oleksandr Kamyshin, Ukraine’s minister of strategic industries. There has also been a boom in drone startups , with the government committing roughly $1bn on top of its defence budget.

There are about 200 companies in Ukraine now focused on drones , delivering 50 times more of them in December compared with a year earlier, according to Mykhailo Fedorov, the minister of digital transformation. Ukrainian-made sea drones have proven to be an effective weapon against the Russian fleet in the Black Sea.

Ukraine’s surge in military spending has occurred against a backdrop of $60bn in US aid being held up by Congress and with European countries struggling to deliver enough ammunition. Ukraine couldn’t defeat Russia without massive support from the west, said Trevor Taylor, a research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based thinktank. “Ukraine is not capable of producing all the munitions that it needs for this fight .”

Ukrainian security officers arrested two people suspected of acting on behalf of Russia as they tried to blow up a railway line used to supply weapons to the front, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) said. The detainees, from the Kyiv and Kharkiv regions, planted an explosive device by the line in central Poltava region and planned to detonate it remotely but were caught red-handed, the SBU said.

In Kharkiv and parts of the south-eastern Zaporizhzhia region, 200,000 people remained without electricity after last Friday’s attacks on the country’s energy infrastructure. Emergency power outages have also reportedly been introduced in Ukraine’s Black Sea port city of Odesa.

Russia is trying to expand its forces in its own north-west , the UK’s Ministry of Defence has said in an update, adding that most of Russia’s troops remain dedicated to fighting in Ukraine .

• Russia-Ukraine war at a glance

Most viewed

The Ukraine-Russia war needs to end now, at the conference table

It’s painful to admit that the war in ukraine has turned out as putin might have expected..

Last month, at a California fund-raising event, President Biden called President Vladimir Putin of Russia a “ crazy S.O.B .”

To which one can only respond: Yes, crazy like a fox.

It’s almost impossible for Americans to get a reliable fix on Putin through the dense propaganda fog of the Russia-Ukraine war. Biden has also branded Putin a “butcher” and, of course, a “ war criminal.”

It seems like only yesterday that we were assured that Putin was dying from inoperable cancer or would be ousted in a Kremlin coup by powerful rivals , channeling Russians’ widespread disgust with Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

Advertisement

These suggestions proved to be poppycock. Putin seems to be in fine shape. He can speak coherently about international affairs for hours at a time , which is more than you can say about the two men currently vying for the US presidency. The only discernible threat to the Kremlin dictatorship, Yevgeny Prigozhin , commander of the rebellious Wagner Group mini-army, vanished in an airplane “accident” shortly after raising his hand against Putin.

Even Putin’s detractors concede that Russians approve of, or at least tolerate, his wartime regime. Opinion polling in a totalitarian state is a parlous venture, yet the Kyiv Independent newspaper recently reported that 77 percent of Russians support the war.

According to the Christian Science Monitor’s Moscow correspondent, Fred Weir , the positive poll numbers are “fraught with ambiguity. Outside of official publicity, there is little enthusiasm for the war effort, but neither does there seem to be much overt opposition.”

It’s painful to admit that the war in Ukraine has turned out as Putin might have expected. After Kyiv successfully parried Russia’s initial, hapless attempt to seize the capital city and “decapitate” the regime, Russia began to take territory. After two years of bloody fighting, Russia now controls about 20 percent of Ukraine, which finds itself locked in a war of attrition with a larger, stronger adversary.

Enthusiasm for the war among Ukraine’s allies is waning. After pumping $75 billion worth of aid into Ukraine, Congress is less eager to rubber stamp more appropriations for the stalemated conflict. The much-ballyhooed sanctions imposed on Russia have harmed , but not crippled, the Russian economy. Globalism is real; Russian oil that can’t be sold to Europe can be sold to India. “Yes, [the sanctions] create temporary problems for us,” Putin recently said . “But everything, of course, will be done anyway.”

I wish the odious Henry Kissinger were running American foreign policy right now, in place of the current secretary of state, rock ’n’ roll savant Antony Blinken. Sounding a lot like Putin, Kissinger argued a decade ago that “to Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country. … Ukraine has been part of Russia for centuries, and their histories were intertwined.”

It’s shocking and hypocritical that US policy makers still invoke the Monroe Doctrine to justify US meddling in the affairs of our Central and South American neighbors but have turned a deaf ear to Putin’s consistent warnings, dating back to the Clinton administration, not to lure Ukraine into the NATO fold . Healthy, prosperous democracies have enjoyed neighborly relations with Russia. For instance, Finland “peacefully co-existed” with Russia from 1945 until just last year, when, shocked by the Ukraine invasion, it joined NATO.

Where are we now? It is deemed semi-treasonous to state the obvious: This bloody, avoidable war, which has claimed the lives of at least 90,000 Ukrainian and Russian soldiers, needs to end now, at the conference table. There is zero chance that Ukraine will emerge even partially restored in a cease-fire. At a minimum, Crimea and swathes of the fake “ people’s republics ” in eastern Ukraine will become Russia-controlled.

Does that mean Putin “won”? Not really. Russia is a pariah nation and likely to remain one for a long time. A younger Putin dreamed of Russia allying with the civilized industrial democracies of Europe. Now he’s currying favor with the likes of North Korea and a contemptuous China. That’s not what he had in mind.

And yes, his brutal dictatorship will live another day. He’s an S.O.B. — Biden’s right about that. The Russian president’s rivals “end up dead, or close to it,” as Chris Wallace indelicately noted in a famous 2018 sit-down with Putin.

But he’s not crazy. If only he were.

Alex Beam’s column appears regularly in the Globe. Follow him on Twitter @imalexbeamyrnot .

Globe Opinion