Published on Voices

The way out of poverty and corruption is paved with good governance, sri mulyani indrawati, this page in:.

Woman speaks to World Bank MD and COO Sri Mulyani Indrawati in the Nyabithu District of Rwanda. © Simone D. McCourtie/World Bank

But, in some ways, corruption is only a symptom. Anti-corruption must be paired with efforts to enable governments to govern openly and fairly, to provide services and security to their citizens, and create an environment that fosters jobs and economic growth. These are the attributes of good governance and effective institutions, and helping countries achieve them is a major focus of our work in low-income countries around the world. Here are three ways we are going about it.

  • We focus on institution-building. Prosperity and the quality of a country’s institutions typically go hand in hand. Governments with well-run, accountable institutions are better able to deliver public goods and support an environment that can generate jobs and growth.  Public sector performance is particularly important to the world’s poorest people, who rely disproportionately on government services, and improving service delivery is essential to leaving poverty behind. World Bank specialists in nearly 100 countries provide expertise and training to governments to strengthen public administration and public financial management -- systems that are the key to ensuring fiscal resources are spent efficiently, effectively, and accountably. We’ve seen significant results. Between 2011 and 2015, 50 million people in the poorest countries gained access to better water services, 413 million people received essential health services, and 102,000 kilometers of roads were constructed or improved. In Comoros , we’ve helped the government strengthen economic management, so that more information on national finances is available to the public than ever before. In Côte d'Ivoire , our support has helped the government bring in the private sector and prepare energy , transport and port infrastructure projects. Impending reforms of the financial sector promise to promote investment in agriculture , agribusiness and manufacturing. Data is crucial, and one of our priorities is building the statistical capacity of our client countries. Last year, we helped 32 countries (including 11 fragile states) do this; 18 countries now use statistics to design and monitor policies and promote accountability and transparency.  For example, Bolivia has completed agricultural and housing censuses and three rounds of household surveys to strengthen the planning and evaluation of public programs and policies.  
  • We help countries mobilize the resources necessary for delivering services. Fifty percent of low-income countries raise less than 15% of their gross domestic product in taxes. By contrast,  the OECD average is about 34% . The reason for this discrepancy? The poorest countries grapple with a wide range of problems: businesses — both foreign and domestic — that avoid paying taxes, large numbers of informal businesses that aren’t on the books, weak revenue administrations, poor governance, lack of international tax cooperation and the public’s mistrust. This is not just a question of raising taxes, but of designing tax systems that are fair and accountable and don’t hinder economic growth. We’ve supported tax reforms and improved tax administration for years, both within countries and in international fora such as the G20. And we just launched a Global Tax Team to expand this work.   From 2012 to 2014, Mauritania increased the amount it collects in taxes by nearly 50 percent through reforms to improve public resources management. In Pakistan , tax collection in the Sindh province increased by 24 percent in a single year. While development assistance will remain critical in the fight against poverty, it won’t be enough to achieve the ambitious goals we have set. We must help countries mobilize domestic resources – the largest untapped resource for development - to become self-sufficient and to provide quality services to citizens.  
  • We promote transparency and accountability. Openness about the use of public resources builds trust between citizens and their governments. It can make public spending more targeted and effective. This is why we work with governments to make their budgets and the way resources are used more transparent, This also reduces fraud and corruption, and makes citizen voices heard. Tunisia is among 40 countries using our public expenditure database tool to make detailed public spending data more open and accessible. Also in Tunisia, our research quantifying the value of illicit trade and identifying the scope and cost of state capture has helped increase transparency and improved the ability of Tunisians to hold their government accountable. In Moldova , more than 2,200 public servants and other employees received e-government training. People can now access more than 880 government datasets and 131 electronic public services. In Nigeria , the number of public contracts awarded through open competition grew by 85 percent in 2015, up from 20 percent growth in 2009. The three-pronged approach of improving institutions, raising more domestic resources, and engaging citizens is the closest thing to a development silver bullet. Chronic mismanagement and corruption demoralizes citizens and undermines their trust in the state; corruption deepens poverty, leaving the poor vulnerable to exploitation and bribery in return for services such as health care and education; denying citizens participation in their governments stunts their full potential. For all of these reasons, the World Bank considers strong governance and effective institutions essential to putting the poorest countries on the path to self-sufficiency.

Sri Mulyani Indrawati's picture

Former Managing Director and COO

Cookies on GOV.UK

We use some essential cookies to make this website work.

We’d like to set additional cookies to understand how you use GOV.UK, remember your settings and improve government services.

We also use cookies set by other sites to help us deliver content from their services.

You have accepted additional cookies. You can change your cookie settings at any time.

You have rejected additional cookies. You can change your cookie settings at any time.

corruption kills good governance essay

  • Government efficiency, transparency and accountability

Against Corruption: a collection of essays

  • Prime Minister's Office, 10 Downing Street

Published 12 May 2016

corruption kills good governance essay

© Crown copyright 2016

This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except where otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3 or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or email: [email protected] .

Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned.

This publication is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/against-corruption-a-collection-of-essays/against-corruption-a-collection-of-essays

1. Foreword by David Cameron, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Corruption is the cancer at the heart of so many of our problems in the world today. It destroys jobs and holds back growth, costing the world economy billions of pounds every year. It traps the poorest in the most desperate poverty as corrupt governments around the world syphon off funds and prevent hard-working people from getting the revenues and benefits of growth that are rightfully theirs. It steals vital resources from our schools and hospitals as corrupt individuals and companies evade the taxes they owe. It can even undermine our security, as Sarah Chayes argues in her essay, if the perceived corruption of local governments makes people more susceptible to the poisonous ideology of extremists.

The longer I have been Prime Minister, and the more I have seen in this job, the more I believe that we cannot hope to solve the big global challenges of our time without making a major dent in the whole cycle of corruption. If we continue to hide from this problem, how will developing countries blessed with natural resources ever break out of the poverty trap? How will we stop people from risking their lives to cross the Mediterranean unless we enable them to build a better life back at home? In the end, we have to deal with corruption if we are to have any hope of a truly prosperous and secure future.

Furthermore, people actually want us to deal with this problem, every bit as much as they want us to tackle issues like poverty and migration. They want the law to be upheld and they want the corrupt to be punished, with justice and recompense for those who have suffered.

Yet while corruption is such a huge problem, the national and global efforts to deal with it are often weak. No country has a perfect record on these issues – and so there is a hesitation in raising them. For too long there has been something of an international taboo over stirring up concerns. For too long it has just been too easy for those in authority to ignore or pretend not to know what is going on. As David Walsh puts it in his essay: this “longing to indulge the irresponsibility of not knowing” has been the rock upon which corruption is built. I profoundly believe that this has to change – and it has to change in every country. Make no mistake, corruption affects us all, Britain included. From tax evasion and overseas territories who have been accused of hiding the proceeds of corruption, to an MPs’ expenses scandal that tore at the fabric of the world’s oldest democracy, we have our own problems and we are very much still dealing with them.

That is why I have made tackling corruption such a political priority. From the 2010 Bribery Act to becoming the first major country in the world to establish a public central registry of who really owns and controls companies, I am determined that we should do everything we can to demonstrate leadership on these issues and put our own house in order.

Through our chairmanship of the G8 and the Summit at Lough Erne, I put tax, trade and transparency on the global agenda and sought agreement on a global standard for the automatic exchange of information over who pays taxes where. While many said it would never happen, today 129 jurisdictions have committed to implementing the international standard for exchange of tax information on request and more than 95 jurisdictions have committed to implementing the new global common reporting standard on tax transparency by 2018.

Through our chairmanship of the United Nations High Level Panel, Britain secured the inclusion of tackling corruption at the heart of the new Sustainable Development Goals to eradicate absolute poverty from our world. On my watch, the UK has signed up to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative – and we’re leading a global drive to get other countries on board and clean up a sector which has for too long been vulnerable to corruption. We are going further still. I am determined that the UK must not become a safe haven for corrupt money from around the world. We know that some high-value properties – particularly in London – are being bought by people overseas through anonymous shell companies, some of them with plundered or laundered cash. So we are consulting on ways to make property ownership by foreign companies much more transparent – and considering whether to insist that any non-UK company wishing to bid on a contract with the UK government should publically state who really owns it.

Yet all of these measures address only parts of the problem. As the Panama Papers show, corruption is a truly global challenge. Criminal networks operate across borders. And wealth that is plundered from the poorest countries can end up hidden away in the richest countries. So nations need to tackle this issue in partnership, developing a truly comprehensive, sustained and coherent international agenda to defeat the causes of corruption. That is why we are holding the Anti-Corruption Summit in London and why I have compiled this book. The essays in this book are not about trying to claim the moral high ground, nor about telling others what to do. Neither do they claim to be a comprehensive guide to tackling corruption. But they are an attempt to bring together some of the most pioneering thinkers on this issue to begin a frank and informed global debate over how to tackle what I believe is one of the most pernicious enemies of progress in our time.

While the essays cover a wide range of perspectives and experiences, there are a number of consistent themes. For a start, we can be clear about the scale and extent of the problem. José Ugaz tells us that every year one in four people around the world pay a bribe to access public services. While in Mexico, a family spends on average 14% of its income on bribes for basic services to which they are already entitled – including water, medicine and education.

Christine Lagarde sets out the indirect economic costs of corruption, including the way corruption can act like a tax on investment and stifle the creation of new business. She also highlights its impact on the poorest and its damaging effect on the moral fabric of our society.

Many of the essays bring home the sheer extent of corruption, reaching every country and affecting so many areas of life – from the desperate stories of the vulnerable paying bribes to get treatment for a sick child, to the world of sport which was for so long indulged with a special status that left some of its participants behaving as if they were exempt from the rules that everyone else was expected to follow.

Some of the essays are very clear about the definitions of corruption. Francis Fukuyama, in particular, analyses the origins of corruption, providing a strong historical and intellectual underpinning to the challenges we face. Running through the essays is the sense that not only do you need the right rules and enforcement but you need to change the underlying culture too. There is a clear message here. We cannot have one or the other; we need both. New Zealand Prime Minister John Key offers us his perspective when he uses a cricketing analogy to describe the national character of his country and its intolerance of “underarm deliveries”. He argues that you have to promote a culture which makes it close to impossible for the corrupt to prosper or escape detection. There is also a striking frankness and directness in the politicians who are writing about the history of corruption in their own countries.

President Ghani describes Afghanistan as, by any measure, “one of the most corrupt countries on earth”. In his essay on tackling corruption in Estonia, Mart Laar says that corruption was so ingrained that it had become a way of life. He writes: “we didn’t even understand that it wasn’t normal.” President Buhari uses that same concept to describe corruption in Nigeria as a “way of life” under “supposedly accountable democratic governments” and points to evidence suggesting that between $300 billion and

$400 billion of public funds have been lost to corruption since Nigeria’s independence in 1960.

But that frankness about the problem will only deliver real change if there is true political leadership. Without that leadership, many of the rules, institutions and mechanisms to address corruption will never actually bite. For years Nigeria had the laws and the anti-corruption agencies, but as President Buhari explains, there was “a complete lack of political will to strengthen these agencies and to faithfully enforce the laws.” These laws were ignored with impunity and procurements were made with a complete disregard for due process. He cites one example of a provision to allow courts to treat unexplained wealth as evidence of corruption. There is a similar provision in Singapore, the use of which is explored in the essay by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. But the difference is that in Nigeria’s case, neither the Code of Conduct Bureau nor the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission has ever invoked such provisions in their decades of existence.

Above all, when I read through the essays I feel both depressed and uplifted. Depressed because the scale of this problem is truly frightening and the human costs are so desperate. It is hard not to pause on Jim Yong Kim’s essay when he describes the situation in Sierra Leone where corruption stopped some mothers from immunising their infant children because nurses demanded rice in exchange for ‘free’ shots.

But I am also uplifted because there is a consistent theme that we can crack this and there are so many encouraging stories of measures that have already had an impact.

Angel Gurría tells us that between 1999 – the year the OECD convention tackling transnational bribery came into force – and 2014, 361 individuals and 126 companies were sanctioned for foreign bribery in 17 countries, with at least $5.4 billion imposed in combined monetary sanctions and 95 people put behind bars.

José Ugaz describes some of the ways that new technologies have already been employed to bring about real change. In Guatemala, a public campaign over a customs fraud scandal forced the resignation of the president and vice- president. In Brazil, 40 civil society organisations mobilised two million Brazilians to use online actions and events to successfully campaign for a new law that prevents candidates who have been convicted of corruption from standing for public office for at least eight years.

When El Salvador gave citizens the right to ask for information about public officials’ assets, 6,000 citizen requests helped to uncover cases where the wealth of public officials had grown by 300% during their time in office. In Venezuela, a new smart phone app is allowing ordinary citizens to report on instances of bribery and any irregularities during elections, with more than 400 complaints registered for follow-up in the most recent parliamentary elections.

Christine Lagarde also cites an example from Indonesia where the then Minister of Finance partnered with business to create ‘new rules of the game’. These meant that the government delivered a streamlined customs approval process in exchange for a commitment from business not to offer any bribes to officials.

Jim Yong Kim describes how publishing school funding allocations in local newspapers in Uganda transformed the proportion of funds that made it through to the schools, with one study concluding that the amount of funds diverted away by local officials correlated to the distance of a school from a town where there was a newspaper outlet.

All of these examples and more mean that the biggest message of this book is one of optimism. This battle can be won. Furthermore, there are clear lessons coming through that can help us to win it by shaping an international agenda to defeat and deter corruption.

First, corruption should be exposed so there is nowhere to hide. We need to end the use of secret shell companies, so that the corrupt no longer have an easy and anonymous way to hide their loot and move it across borders. We need to drive out the rogue lawyers, estate agents and accountants who facilitate or tolerate corruption in commerce and finance. We need to expose the theft or misuse of taxpayers’ money by opening up budgets and procurement so that people can see exactly how their money is used and they can demand that people are held to account when it is stolen. And we need a sustained effort in those areas which Paul Collier describes as the “pockets of high corruption”, including corruption-prone sectors such as the extractive and construction industries.

At the heart of all of this is international co-operation on transparency. In the UK we have adopted legislation to give the public unrestricted access to beneficial ownership information on UK companies through a public central registry so that people can see who really owns and controls companies. But as Paul Radu argues, tracking international flows of finance requires international co-operation. Well-structured, transparent and accessible databases could allow automated searches of ever-larger, global datasets that could feed real-time alerts to journalists in every country. His vision offers a network of investigative journalists that could help make transparency the natural enemy of international organised crime gangs and corrupt officials all over the world. Given the sheer quantity of data to get through, networks of civil society, activists and journalists – working with law enforcement – will be critical to holding people to account.

Second, we need to deal properly and comprehensively with the corruption we expose. That means bringing the perpetrators to justice, actively enforcing anti-corruption laws and working together across international borders to hunt down the corrupt, prosecute them and send them to jail. One cutting-edge idea to explore here comes from Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong. In Singapore, instead of prosecutors having to prove the guilt of the corrupt, they reverse the burden of proof so the accused have to show that they acquired their wealth legally. The Prevention of Corruption Act also provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction, so that the actions of Singaporeans overseas are treated in the same way as actions committed in Singapore, regardless of whether the corrupt acts had consequences in Singapore itself.

It will be a while yet before everyone is as bold and as far- reaching as Singapore. But what I believe we can all agree is that we should send a clear message to the corrupt that there will be no impunity and that we will restrict their ability to travel and do business as usual in our countries. That’s why we in the UK are looking closely at the potential of Unexplained Wealth Orders, and why I urge other countries to do the same.

Dealing with the corruption we expose also means taking responsibility to support those who have suffered from corruption. I believe that should include doing everything we can to track down looted money and create a trusted system to return it to its rightful owners. The looting of public wealth has been on such a scale in some countries, that returning it safely would make an enormous difference to their development prospects. It would also begin to address the sense of injustice that many in this book have so powerfully described.

Third, we need more than just clear rules that are properly enforced. As so many of the contributors have argued, we also need to make it much harder for corruption to thrive by driving out the underlying cultures that have allowed this cancer to fester for so long. This means tackling head on what John Githongo describes as the ‘pirate sector’ by creating a culture where the corrupt are (in Lesotho vernacular) “bobolu” and made to feel a social stigma that shames them for what they do.

It means challenging corrupt behaviours globally by embracing the vast possibilities that Paul Collier highlights around the twinning of different countries’ institutions and professions. From tax collection agencies, treasuries and civil services to professions such as accountancy and law, twinning can begin to build a newly shared culture of probity and honesty.

Changing the culture of corruption also means embracing the power of new technologies to deliver greater accountability for public money and public services. In India, for example, welfare smartcards are helping to prevent corrupt officials taking a cut of payments to the poor. Technologies like this can provide the information to enable government agencies, businesses, campaigning NGOs and individual citizens to come together in a comprehensive movement against corruption.

But all of this will only really work if political leaders have the courage to stand together, to speak up where previously there was silence, and to demand the strengthening and co- ordinating of international institutions that are needed to put fighting corruption at the top of the international agenda where it belongs. We cannot and must not fail this test of political leadership. As David Walsh writes: “No longer in the dark, we now have the opportunity for change. It would be a crime not to seize it.”

I intend to seize it, with the support of all the authors in this book and together with the widest possible coalition of leaders from politics, business and civil society.

Together we are against corruption. And together we can defeat it.

2. Francis Fukuyama: What is Corruption?

Corruption has in many ways become the defining issue of the 21st century, just as the 20th century was characterised by large ideological struggles between democracy, fascism and communism. Today a majority of the world’s nations accept the legitimacy of democracy and at least pretend to hold competitive elections. What really distinguishes political systems from one another is the degree to which the elites ruling them seek to use their power in the service of a broad public interest or simply to enrich themselves, their friends and their families. Countries from Russia and Venezuela to Afghanistan and Nigeria all hold elections that produce leaders with some degree of democratic legitimacy. What distinguishes them from Norway, Japan or Britain is not so much democracy as the quality of government which, in turn, is greatly affected by levels of corruption.

Corruption hurts life outcomes in a variety of ways. Economically, it diverts resources away from their most productive uses and acts like a regressive tax that supports the lifestyles of elites at the expense of everyone else. Corruption incentivises the best and the brightest to spend their time gaming the system, rather than innovating or creating new wealth. Politically, corruption undermines the legitimacy of political systems by giving elites alternative ways of holding onto power other than genuine democratic choice. It hurts the prospects of democracy when people perceive authoritarian governments to be performing better than corrupt democratic ones and undermines the reality of democratic choice.

However, the phenomenon labelled ‘corruption’ comprises a wide range of behaviours whose economic and political effects vary greatly. It is remarkable that, for all of the academic effort put into the study of corruption, there is still no broadly accepted vocabulary for distinguishing between its different forms. Before we can tackle corruption, we need some conceptual clarity as to what it is and how it relates to the broader problem of good government.

2.1 Corruption as a modern phenomenon

Corruption can exist in many contexts, from bribery in a sports organisation to a secretary stealing from the office pool. I am here going to focus on political corruption, which concerns the abuse of public office for private gain (see Johnston 2005, p. 11).

The first point to note is that corruption is a modern phenomenon. The very terms ‘public’ and ‘private’ did not always exist. In the European medieval era, virtually all regimes were what Max Weber labelled ‘patrimonial’ – that is, political authority was regarded as a species of private property which could be handed down to descendants as part of their patrimony. In dynastic times, a king could give away an entire province with all of its inhabitants to his son or daughter as a wedding present, since he regarded his domain as a private possession. Under these circumstances, it made no sense to talk about public corruption [footnote 1] .

The concept that rulers did not simply own their domains but were custodians of a broader public interest was one that emerged gradually in the 16th and 17th centuries. Theorists such as Hugo Grotius, Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes and Samuel von Pufendorf began to argue that a ruler could be legitimately sovereign not by right of ownership, but out of a kind of social contract by which he protected public interest – above all, the common interest in peace and security. The very notion that there was a potential conflict between public and private interest emerged with the rise of modern European states. In this respect, China beat Europe to the punch by nearly 1,800 years, having been one of the earliest civilisations to develop a concept of an impersonal state that was the guardian of a collective public interest.

Today no rulers dare assert publicly that they ‘own’ the territories over which they exercise authority; even traditional monarchs such as those in the Arab world claim to be serving a broader public interest. Hence we have the phenomenon that political scientists label ‘neo-patrimonialism’ – in which political leaders pretend to be modern servants of the common good in political systems with modern trappings like parliaments, ministers and bureaucracies. But the reality is that elites enter politics to extract rents or resources and enrich themselves and their families at the expense of everyone else.

A modern state which seeks to promote public welfare and treats its citizens impersonally is not just a recent phenomenon, but also one that is difficult to achieve and inherently fragile. The reason for this has to do with human nature. Human beings are social creatures, but their sociability takes the very specific forms of favouritism towards family and friends.

The demand that we treat people on an impersonal basis, or hire a stranger who is qualified rather than a relative or a friend, is not something that comes naturally to human beings. Modern political systems set up incentives and try to socialise people into different forms of behaviour. But because favouritism towards friends and family is a natural instinct, there is a constant danger of relapse – something I have elsewhere labelled ‘repatrimonialisation’ (Fukuyama 2011).

People who live in rich developed countries often look down on countries pervaded by systemic corruption as if they are somehow deviant cases. But the truth of the matter is that, up until a few centuries ago, there were virtually no modern uncorrupt states. Making the transition from a patrimonial or neo-patrimonial state to a modern impersonal one is a difficult and historically fraught process, much more difficult in most respects than making the transition from an authoritarian political system to a democratic one.

But if most countries throughout most of human history were patrimonial or neo-patrimonial, there were still large differences between them with regard to the quality of government. So we need to make some finer distinctions between types and levels of corruption.

2.2 Types of corruption

There are two separate phenomena related to corruption that are not identical to it. The first is the creation and extraction of rents, and the second is patronage or clientelism.

In economics, a rent is technically defined as the difference between the cost of keeping a good or service in production and its price. One of the most important sources of rents is scarcity: natural resource rents exist because the selling price of oil far exceeds the cost of pumping it out of the ground.

Rents can also be artificially generated by governments. Many of the most common forms of corruption revolve around a government’s ability to create artificial scarcities through licensing or regulation. Placing tariffs on imports restricts imports and generates rents for the government; one of the most widespread forms of corruption around the world lies in customs agencies, where the customs agent will take a bribe to reduce the duties charged or expedites the clearance process so that the importer will have their goods on time.

The ease with which governments can create rents through their taxation or regulatory powers has led many economists to denounce rents in general as distortions of efficient resource allocation by markets and to see rent creation and distribution as virtually synonymous with corruption. The ability of governments to generate rents means that many ambitious people will choose politics rather than entrepreneurship or the private sector as a route to wealth.

But while rents can be and are abused in the fashion described, they also have perfectly legitimate uses, which complicate any blanket denunciation. The most obvious type of a ‘good’ rent is a patent or copyright – by which the government gives the creator of an idea or creative work the exclusive right to any resulting revenues for some defined period of time. Economists Mushtaq Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram (2000) point out that many Asian governments have promoted industrialisation by allowing favoured firms to generate excess profits, provided they were ploughed back into new investment. While this opened the door to considerable corruption and abuse, it also worked as a means of stimulating rapid growth at a rate possibly higher than market forces on their own would have produced.

All government regulatory functions create artificial scarcities and therefore rents. But while we can argue about the appropriate extent of regulation, few people would like to see these functions simply abandoned. The creation and distribution of rents by governments have a high degree of overlap with corruption, but are not simply the same phenomenon.

The second phenomenon that is often identified with corruption is that of patronage or clientelism. A patronage relationship is a reciprocal exchange of favours between two individuals of different status and power, usually involving favours given by the patron to the client in exchange for the client’s loyalty and political support. The favour given to the client must be a good that can be individually appropriated, such as a job in the post office, a Christmas turkey or a get-out-of-jail card for a relative, rather than a public good or policy that applies to a broad class of people (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984). Patronage is sometimes distinguished from clientelism by scale; patronage relationships are typically face-to-face ones between patrons and clients and exist in all regimes whether authoritarian or democratic, while clientelism involves larger-scale exchanges of favours between patrons and clients, often requiring a hierarchy of intermediaries (see Scott 1972). Clientelism thus exists primarily in democratic countries where large numbers of voters need to be mobilised (Piattoni 2001, pp. 4–7).

Clientelism is considered a bad thing and a deviation from good democratic practice in several respects. In a modern democracy, citizens are supposed to vote based on the politician’s promises of broad public policies or a ‘programmatic’ agenda. Such choices are supposed to reflect general views of what is good for the political community as a whole and not just what is good for one individual voter.

Of course, voters in advanced democracies cast their ballots according to their self-interest; programmes targeted at one group of citizens are nonetheless justified in terms of broad concepts of justice or the general good. Moreover, targeted programmes must apply impartially not to individuals but to broad classes of people. Targeted benefits to individuals are bad from the standpoint of social justice. In clientelistic systems, redistributive programmes that are supposed to help all poor people, for example, end up benefiting only those poor people who support a particular politician. This weakens support for effective universal policies and preserves existing social inequalities.

Nevertheless, there is reason to think that clientelism is actually an early form of democratic participation. In the United States and other countries, it was a way of mobilising poor voters and therefore encouraging them to participate in a democratic political system. It was suboptimal when compared to programmatic voting, yet provided a degree of accountability insofar as the politician still felt obligated to provide some benefits in return for political support. In that respect, clientelism is quite different from a more destructive form of corruption in which a politician simply steals from the public treasury for the benefit of his or her family, without any obligation to provide a public service in return. The problem with clientelism is that it usually does not remain confined to a mechanism for getting out the vote, but morphs into misappropriation.

A final conceptual distinction that needs to be made is between corruption and low state capacity.

‘Anti-corruption and good governance’ has become an often-repeated slogan in the development community and some people treat good governance and the absence of corruption as equivalents. Yet they are very different: a squeaky-clean bureaucracy can still be incompetent or ineffective in doing its job, while corrupt ones can provide good services [footnote 2] . Beyond low levels of corruption, good governance requires state capacity – that is, the human, material and organisational resources necessary for governments to carry out their mandates effectively and efficiently. It is linked to the skills and knowledge of public officials and whether they are given sufficient autonomy and authority to carry out their tasks.

Corruption, of course, tends to undermine state capacity (for example, by replacing qualified officials with political patronage appointees); conversely, highly professional bureaucracies tend to be less subject to bribery and theft. Low levels of corruption and high state capacity therefore tend to be correlated around the world. But getting to good governance is a much larger task than simply fighting corruption.

The distinction between corruption and low state capacity allows us to better understand differences between the effects of corruption in countries around the world. In the World Bank Institute’s Worldwide Governance Indicators for 2014, China ranks in the 47th percentile with respect to control of corruption, behind Ghana and just ahead of Romania (World Bank 2014). On the other hand, China has a great deal of state capacity. In the government effectiveness category, it is in the 66th percentile, while Romania is in the 55th and Ghana is in the 44th (World Bank 2014). This validates the common perception that the Chinese Government has a great deal of capacity to achieve the ends it sets, despite strong perceptions of pervasive corruption. The predictability and scale of corruption are also important; if a business owner expects to pay 10% of the transaction value in bribes, they can regard that as a kind of tax, which is less damaging to investment than a bribery level of 75% or one that varies arbitrarily from year to year.

2.3 Overcoming corruption

The first generation of anti-corruption measures taken in the mid-1990s by development finance institutions involved ambitious efforts to overhaul civil service systems along Weberian lines: incentivising officials by increasing wage dispersion and setting formal recruitment and promotion criteria. These measures had very little effect; the problem lay in the fact that corrupt governments were expected to police themselves and to implement bureaucratic systems developed over long periods in rich countries with very different histories. More recent efforts have focused on fighting corruption through transparency and accountability measures – that is, increasing the monitoring of agent behaviour and creating positive and negative incentives for better compliance with the institution’s goals. This has taken a variety of forms: cameras placed in classrooms to ensure that teachers show up for work; participatory budgeting where citizens are given a direct voice in budgeting decisions; and websites where citizens can report government officials taking bribes. Since governments cannot be trusted to police themselves, civil society has often been enlisted in a watchdog role and mobilised to demand accountability. Mechanisms like anti-corruption commissions and special prosecutors have, if given enough autonomy, also shown some success in countries such as Indonesia and Romania.

These later efforts, however, have also had uneven success (see, for example, Kolstad and Wiig 2009; Mauro 2002). In particular, transparency initiatives by themselves do not guarantee changes in government behaviour. For example, in countries where clientelism is organised along ethnic lines, co-ethnics are frequently tolerant of leaders who steal. Elsewhere, citizens may be outraged by news of corruption, but then have no clear way of holding individual politicians or bureaucrats accountable. In other cases, successes in punishing individual politicians are not sufficient to shift the normative framework in which virtually everyone in the political class expects to profit from office. Finally, anti-corruption campaigns may disrupt informal understandings and personal relationships that underpin investment and trade: without formal property rights and contract enforcement under a system of independent courts, the paradoxical short-term effect of prosecuting corrupt officials may be to deter new investment and thereby lower growth.

There is a single truth underlying the indifferent success of existing transparency and accountability measures to control corruption. The sources of corruption are deeply political. Without a political strategy for overcoming this problem, any given solution will fail. Corruption in its various forms – patronage, clientelism, rent-seeking and outright theft – all benefit existing stakeholders in the political system, who are generally very powerful players.

Lecturing them about good government or setting up formal systems designed to work in modern political systems will not affect their incentives and therefore will have little transformative effect. That is why transparency initiatives on their own often fail. Citizens may be outraged by news about corruption, but nothing will happen without collective-action mechanisms to bring about change. The mere existence of a democratic political system is no guarantee that citizens’ anger will be translated into action; they need leadership and a strategy for displacing entrenched stakeholders from power. Outside pressure in the form of loan conditionality, technical assistance or moral pressure is almost never sufficient to do the job. Anti- corruption commissions and special prosecutors who have had success in jailing corrupt officials have done so only because they receive strong grassroots political backing from citizens.

2.4 The American experience

The political nature of corruption and the necessarily political nature of the reform process can be illustrated by the experience of the United States in the 19th century (as I describe in Fukuyama 2014, chapters 9–11). American politics in that period was not too different from politics in contemporary developing democratic countries such as India, Brazil or Indonesia. Beginning in the 1820s, American states began extending the franchise to include all white males, vastly expanding the voter base and presenting politicians with the challenge of mobilising relatively poor and poorly educated voters. The solution, which appeared particularly after the 1828 presidential election that brought Andrew Jackson to power, was the creation of a vast clientelistic system. Elected politicians appointed their supporters to positions in the bureaucracy or rewarded them with individual payoffs like Christmas turkeys or bottles of bourbon. This system, known as the spoils or patronage system, characterised American government for the next century, from the highest federal offices down to local postmasters in every American town or city. As with other clientelistic systems, patronage led to astonishing levels of corruption, particularly in cities such as New York, Boston and Chicago where machine politicians ruled for generations.

This system began to change only in the 1880s as a consequence of economic development. New technologies like the railroads were transforming the country from a primarily agrarian society into an urban industrial one. There were increasing demands from business leaders and from a newly emerging civil society for a different, more modern form of government that would prioritise merit and knowledge over political connections. Following the assassination of the newly elected President James A. Garfield in 1881 by a would-be office seeker, Congress was embarrassed into passing the Pendleton Act. It established a US Civil Service Commission for the first time and the principle that public officials should be chosen on the basis of merit. Even so, expanding the number of classified (i.e. merit- based) officials met strong resistance and did not become widespread until after the First World War. Individual municipal political machines such as Tammany Hall in New York were not dismantled completely until the middle of the 20th century.

The American experience highlights a number of features of both corruption and the reform of corrupt systems. First, the incentives that led to the creation of the clientelistic system were deeply political. Politicians got into office via their ability to distribute patronage; they had no incentive to vote in favour of something like the Pendleton Act that would take away those privileges. The only reason it passed was a tragic exogenous event – the Garfield assassination – which mobilised public opinion in favour of a more modern governmental system.

Second, reform of the system was similarly political. The Progressive Era saw the emergence of a vast reform coalition made up of business leaders, urban reformers, farmers and ordinary citizens who were fed up with the existing patronage system. It required strong leadership from politicians like Theodore Roosevelt who was himself head of the US Civil Service Commission. It also required a clear reform agenda pointing towards modern government, formulated by intellectuals such as Frank Goodnow, Dorman Eaton and Woodrow Wilson. Finally, reform was helped along by economic development. Industrialisation in the US produced new social groups such as business leaders who needed efficient government services, a broad and better-educated middle class who could mobilise for reform, and a grassroots organisation of civil society groups.

2.5 Conclusions

The American experience is suggestive of how progress in the fight against corruption may be waged in contemporary societies suffering from it. Reform is always a political matter that will require formation of a broad coalition of groups opposed to an existing system of corrupt politicians. Grassroots activism in favour of reform may emerge spontaneously, but such sentiments will not be translated into real change until it receives good leadership and organisation. Reform also has a socio-economic basis: economic growth often produces new classes and groups that want a different, more modern politics.

America points to another feature of anti-corruption efforts. Control of corruption was very much bound up with efforts to increase state capacity. The period that saw the emergence of an industrial economy was also characterised by huge increases in levels of education – particularly higher education, which produced an entirely new class of professionals who worked for both private businesses and the government. One of the first government agencies to be modernised in the late 19th century was the US Department of Agriculture, which benefited from a generation of professional agronomists trained in the numerous land-grant universities that sprang up around the United States. The latter, in turn, were the product of the far-sighted Morrill Act of 1862 that sought to increase agricultural productivity (among other things) through higher education.

It would not have been possible to reform the old patronage-based bureaucracy without access to the human capital represented by this entire generation of university- educated officials. Every important reform effort undertaken to create modern state bureaucracies – in Germany, Britain, France, Japan and elsewhere – was accompanied by parallel efforts to modernise the higher education system in ways that would benefit public administration. Today development finance institutions focus on helping to provide universal primary and secondary education to poor countries and have largely given up on supporting elite education. The reasons for this are understandable, but do not correspond to the historical experience of state modernisation in countries that became rich in earlier eras.

These general observations about historical efforts to build modern uncorrupt administrations suggest that the process will be an extended one, characterised by prolonged political struggle. Fortunately, having a modern bureaucracy is not a sine qua non of economic development. No existing rich country had a squeaky-clean government in its early stages of economic growth – neither Britain, nor the United States in the 19th century, nor China today. Corruption and weak governance are obstacles to economic growth, but economic growth can happen also in poorly governed societies and will produce, over time, social conditions and resources that will make government reform more feasible. This is perhaps a pessimistic conclusion, given the fact that rentier states and kleptocratic governments are the source of international conflict and instability in today’s world. But it is also a realistic assessment derived from the historical record.

2.6 References

Eisenstadt, S. N. and Roniger, L. 1984. Patrons, Clients and Friends: Interpersonal Relations and the Structure of Trust in Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fukuyama, F. 2011. The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Fukuyama, F. 2014. Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of Democracy. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Johnston, M. 2005. Syndromes of Corruption. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Khan, M. H. and Jomo, K. S. 2000. Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kolstad, I. and Wiig, A. 2009. Is Transparency the Key to Reducing Corruption in Resource-Rich Countries? World Development, 37(3), pp. 521–32.

Mauro, P. 2002. The Persistence of Corruption and Slow Economic Growth. Washington DC: International Monetary Fund. Working Paper No. 02/213.

Piattoni, S. 2001. Clientelism, Interests and Democratic Representation: The European Experience in Historical and Comparative Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Scott, J. 1972. Comparative Political Corruption. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. World Bank. 2014. Worldwide Governance Indicators. Available online .

Francis Fukuyama is a Senior Fellow at Stanford University and Director of its Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law. His book, The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press 1992), has appeared in more than 20 foreign editions. More recently, he is the author of Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of Democracy (Profile Books 2014).

3. Paul Collier: How to change cultures of corruption

Corruption does not happen everywhere, it is concentrated in pockets: in particular industries, in particular societies and in particular times. Among industries, natural resource extraction and construction have long been seen as exceptionally prone to corruption. This is partly because projects in these sectors are idiosyncratic and difficult to scrutinise.

Some European countries such as Italy and Greece perform markedly worse than some African and Asian countries, according to Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (Transparency International 2015). Places where grand corruption is perceived to be flourishing are rare, but Afghanistan and Angola are examples of these extreme conditions.

As to periods, Britain in the 18th century exemplified the behaviours that would now lead to a miserable ranking in corruption indices. More pertinently, there is good reason to think that, globally, there has been an upsurge in corruption in recent decades. Reversing this upsurge calls for concerted effort.

Alongside these pockets of high corruption, other industries, other societies and other times are virtually corruption-free. Denmark is currently seen as the least corrupt place in the world and many non-Western countries such as Botswana are also viewed as relatively untainted (Transparency International 2015). In most societies, corruption is not normal: it is therefore potentially avoidable everywhere.

Corruption is concentrated in pockets because it depends upon common expectations of behaviour. Where corruption is the norm, getting rid of it poses a co-ordination problem: if I expect those around me to continue to be corrupt, why should I change my behaviour? Because of this, pockets of corruption have proved to be highly persistent: the same industries and the same societies remain corrupt for many years.

Similarly, honesty is persistent. In the first TI survey conducted in 1995, Denmark was rated second globally. This persistence is not a matter of chance. Danes are born into an honest society and so inherit the expectation that they themselves will be trustworthy. Being trusted is a valuable asset: it makes many aspects of life much easier. In consequence, individual Danes have a strong incentive not to squander this valuable asset through behaving opportunistically. Because people have rationally chosen to protect their reputation for honesty, the entire society has stayed honest.

But change is possible. Until well into the 19th century, the British public sector was very corrupt. Positions were bought and sold and contracts were awarded in return for bribes. Crises such as military humiliation in the Crimean War helped to shock governments into change. Opportunities for corruption were curtailed: recruitment and promotion were opened to competitive examinations. A new purposive ethic was promoted and serving the nation became the pinnacle of social prestige and self-worth. By the late 19th century, the British Civil Service had become honest and competent. This transformation was largely fortuitous rather than the result of a properly thought-through strategy. But its success reveals the key components of how change can be brought about.

Societies do not have to wait for military humiliation and a moral revival: corruption can be tackled effectively.

In Britain, two key things – closing off the major opportunities for corruption and making working for the public good more prestigious and satisfying than abusing office for private gain – happened together. These two approaches are jointly critical in breaking cultures of corruption. Just as 19th-century Britain implemented both of them without international help, there is much that societies currently beset by corruption can do for themselves. However, the globalisation of business and social networks has created an important role for international action. Countries such as Britain can contribute to encouraging both internal and international initiatives. There is enormous scope for international actions that close off opportunities for corruption. Equally, there is much that can be done to make behaviours that promote the public good more prestigious and satisfying than those that sacrifice the public interest for private gain. This is because corruption, like honesty, tends to persist. Corrupt behaviour is self-reinforcing, and breaking out of it is not easy. A co-ordinated push for international action thus makes national initiatives more likely to succeed and more worthwhile to attempt. It can help those societies that are still struggling with the problems that Britain faced in the 19th century.

Britain has already done much to make global corruption more difficult. One contribution has been to ‘follow the money’. In recent decades, international lawyers and bankers created walls of secrecy that enabled corrupt officials to hide money away in ‘shell’ companies and offshore bank accounts. The Government has led the way in dismantling this labyrinth of deceit: the true ownership of British companies must now be revealed in a public register, and British Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies are also taking action to improve company transparency. Britain has rapidly changed from being part of the problem to being a pioneer of the solution, but quite evidently following the money is subject to a weakest-link problem.

Corrupt money will hide wherever it can, so it is vital that all the major legal and financial centres close the loopholes. There is scope to extend transparency beyond bank deposits to other major assets such as property. There is also considerable scope for those governments that adopt effective measures for following the money to require all companies that wish to do business with them to comply with these standards, providing global reach for national efforts.

A second contribution has been to increase transparency in key sectors. In 2013, Britain and four other G7 countries signed up to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), helping to bring daylight to a corrupt sector. In North America and Europe, what began as voluntary revenue transparency is now evolving into a legal requirement. Meanwhile the EITI is becoming the established international standard-setting entity for the sector, extending voluntarism beyond simple revenue reporting to matters such as contracts. There is now an equivalent voluntary initiative for the construction sector and it warrants similar co-ordinated propulsion.

A third contribution has been to increase accountability: the Bribery Act 2010 greatly tightened the legal liability of companies and their employees for bribing their way into contracts. Clamping down on bribery is a classic instance of the free-rider problem: no government wants its own companies to be disadvantaged. This is why the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has been encouraging a co-ordinated international approach. The alternative to such co-operation is a race to the bottom that the businesses of no decently governed country can win.

There is, equally, plenty of scope for contributing to the complementary approach of making public good more prestigious and satisfying than the private gains generated by abuse of office. Take, for example, tax administration, which is fundamental to effective government.

In many poor countries, tax administration is an epicentre of corruption. As a specific example, consider the administration of Value-Added Tax (VAT), which is a means of revenue-raising encouraged globally by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) because it is less distorting than most other taxes. But in several poor societies that followed IMF advice, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, VAT is actually reducing revenue rather than raising it. Even before VAT, many tax inspectors were corrupt, using their power to tax firms as a means of extorting money for themselves: ‘pay me or pay tax’ (Collier 2016). VAT has reduced revenue, because it expanded the options available to corrupt tax officials. It works by firms initially paying tax on their gross sales, but then getting a rebate on the inputs they have purchased, so that they end up only paying tax on the value they have added to those inputs. But in a country that introduces a VAT, a corrupt tax official can now sell a firm phoney tax receipts on inputs, in addition to the standard extortion racket. As a result, the rebate system ends up paying out more than the sales tax component of VAT is paying in. Clearly at the core of this phenomenon are norms of behaviour among tax officials, such that seizing opportunities for private gain is seen as both more prestigious and more satisfying than contributing to the public good of generating tax revenue and the public services it can finance.

How might Britain, and other countries in which VAT collection does not face such problems, help to change this perception?

Social prestige and personal satisfaction are largely set within peer groups: most people want to be respected by those they see as their peers and they find satisfaction in adhering to group norms. Hence a practical way of changing the behaviour of corrupt officials is to alter the group of people they regard as their peers. Currently, a corrupt tax official is likely to have two key networks in which they seek prestige: their extended family and fellow tax inspectors. Their family will honour them for helping relatives who lack opportunities to earn a large income: he or she becomes the patron of the family. Their fellow tax inspectors, subject to the same family pressures, may see corruption as reasonable. They may even regard honest behaviour as a threat to their own conduct and therefore disloyal.

A useful way of changing this state of affairs is to twin those tax administrations in which corruption is endemic with administrations in countries that are not corrupt. Twinning could involve regular secondments of staff in both directions and the potential for accreditation to international professional associations at various ranks. The purpose would not primarily be a transfer of technical skills, although that could clearly be a component, but rather a gradual transfer of attitudes and behaviours. The new network exposes the official to the potential of a new identity as a member of a prestigious international peer group of modern tax officials, working to global, not local, standards. It exposes the official to a new narrative circulating in the network: that tax officials are vital for the provision of core public services. And it exposes the official to a new norm of ‘good’ conduct. A ‘good’ tax inspector is no longer one who raises a lot of money for their family, but one who rigorously implements the tax code to make the rest of government feasible.

Exposure to these new attitudes creates a tension between the behaviour that would generate prestige and self-worth in the old networks and the behaviour that would generate prestige and self-worth in the new network. Creating this tension is not the end of the story, but it is an essential step. The other key step is to tackle the co-ordination problem: why should I change my behaviour, if nobody else is going to change theirs? Social psychologists have shown that successful co-ordination depends upon generating ‘common knowledge’ (Thomas et al. 2014). A new fact becomes ‘common’ if it is not only widely shared, but also crucially if everybody knows that everybody else knows it.

One way to create the common knowledge that yesterday’s behaviour is unlikely to persist tomorrow is to close an entire organisation and rehire those staff judged to have reasonable integrity into a new one under different management and higher standards. For example, many governments have closed corrupt tax departments within their ministries of finance and replaced them with independent revenue authorities, a change that has usually been reasonably successful. An analogous way for international twinning to overcome the co-ordination problem is for all the staff in an entire unit to be exposed to the international network at the same time. Each official in the unit would then realise that their colleagues were facing the same tension between old and new networks and hence the same choice.

There are already a few examples of institutional twinning. For example, in Britain, the Department for International Development (DFID) financially supports Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC), the British tax authority, to work with tax authorities in some low-income countries. Also, until a decade ago, governors of the Bank of England used to host an annual meeting for governors of African central banks. But the scope for twinning is vast, relative to what is, as yet, happening both in governments and in the wider society.

Around the world, governments have similar structures. For example, virtually all governments in low-income countries have a ministry of transport, a ministry of health and a ministry of finance. OECD governments have been liaising with these ministries for half a century, but the entities that are linked to them are their aid agencies not their counterpart ministries. Direct links with counterpart ministries have the potential for a very different form of relationship based on peer-group networks, rather than on money with conditions. Often ministries in low-income countries try to keep donor agencies ‘out of their hair’, whereas they would value direct links with their peers. An important example is the regulation of utilities such as electricity. Many governments of low-income countries are now establishing regulatory agencies, which is a vital step in attracting private finance for infrastructure. But the regulation of utilities faces intense pressures for corruption: the decisions of regulators affect both the profitability of companies and voter support for politicians. In the OECD, regulatory agencies have been operating for two or three decades. The OECD has also built peer group networks that have evolved peer standards of independence, transparency and impartiality. New regulatory agencies would benefit from becoming part of this distinctive culture.

Such specialised inter-government peer groups are indeed the core activity of the OECD. But membership of the OECD is confined to the governments of high-income countries. Admirably, the organisation is now trying to broaden its engagement with the governments of poor countries, for example, by the new initiative ‘Tax Inspectors Without Borders’ (OECD 2015). This is designed to embed tax inspectors for OECD governments in the tax authorities of poor countries on secondment for several months: not to train but to work on the job. An obvious extension would be to make this a two-way exchange of staff. The branding of ‘Tax Inspectors Without Borders’ neatly taps into the potential for such secondments to be glamorous: a survey of young French singles found that the ‘ideal spouse’ was a doctor with Médecins Sans Frontières!

More seriously, while the OECD initiative is excellent it is a drop in the ocean. The restricted membership of the OECD limits its scope to forge global links and there is no other international institution with the remit to build peer- group links across government departments between rich countries and poor ones. Perhaps this role should become a core function of national aid agencies such as DFID, but it would benefit from a co-ordinated kick-start by several heads of government.

Twinning has the potential to be extended well beyond government: part of the ‘big society’ can be direct links between the civil society organisations and their counterparts in poor countries. Again, historically such links have largely been confined to development non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as Oxfam, which channel donations to needs. But an important part of tackling corruption is resetting the cultures of professions, including accountancy, law, medicine and teaching. For example, in many poor countries, it is socially acceptable for teachers not to show up for lessons. Twinning involving things like teacher exchanges between schools could help to shift these dysfunctional values. The global explosion of social media has made this far more feasible. The two approaches of closing off opportunities for corruption and reducing the prestige and satisfaction generated by corrupt behaviour reinforce each other. As the difficulties and risks of corrupt behaviour rise, fewer people will behave corruptly. This directly reduces the esteem from being corrupt because it is no longer so normal. Similarly, as more people start to get their esteem from being honest, those who remain corrupt are easier to spot and so find themselves running bigger risks.

National actions against corruption complement international actions. One major way of squeezing out corruption is to remove obvious sources of rent-seeking such as rationed access to foreign exchange and the award of government contracts through secret negotiation rather than open bidding. Competition within rule-based markets is an important part of the system of checks and balances that constrain public officials from the abuse of office. Another is to prosecute some prominent senior officials. For example, in Ghana, 20 judges were sacked in late 2015 for accepting bribes based on video evidence gathered by an investigative journalist (BBC News 2015). Being based on independent evidence, such sackings cannot be misinterpreted as government attempts to crush political opposition. Further, as high-profile events, they generate common knowledge among officials that all other officials are reflecting on whether they should change their behaviour.

Not all corruption is directly financial. Electoral corruption is highly damaging. New research finds that, under normal conditions, governments that deliver good economic performance enhance their prospects of retaining office, but that the discipline of accountability breaks down when elections are not free and fair (Collier and Hoeffler 2015). Twinning national electoral commissions with their international peers, along with twinning local and international election monitors, can help to raise standards of electoral conduct.

An international initiative against corruption provides an opportunity for national actions and international actions to cohere. As people recognise that the calculus of risks and rewards and the sources of prestige and satisfaction are changing both for themselves and their colleagues, previously entrenched patterns of behaviour could become unstable. Mass shifts in cultures of corruption do happen and it is possible to make them happen.

Paul Collier is Professor of Economics and Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government and one of the world’s leading and award-winning development experts. His latest book is Exodus: How Migration is Changing our World (Oxford University Press 2013).

4. John Githongo: An African perspective on corruption

Sebolu is the Sotho word for a ‘spoilt thing’. It is a derogatory word used in Lesotho’s national language and vernacular to mean, among other things, corruption. Someone who is corrupt is described as being bobolu and people have deep disdain for such a person. [footnote 3]

In most of Africa though, there are few similar words of such powerful home-grown cultural resonance. Indeed, the word ‘corruption’ doesn’t exist in many indigenous African languages. It never has – it wasn’t needed. The idea of stealing communal goods was literally taboo. The concept of shuffling papers in a government office in a far-off capital, ‘making good’ and then coming home rich and wearing the ‘corrupt’ tag is, however, more obscure. Indeed, the local son or daughter ‘made good’ who demonstrates generosity back in the village is often lionised. Generosity of heart, even to strangers, but especially to relatives (no matter how distant), is a quality much admired by Africans generally.

East Africa’s lingua franca, Kiswahili, gives us ufisadi (meaning corruption) or mfisadi (corrupt one); terms cleverly engineered post-independence. Ufisadi brings to mind ‘hyena-like’ derived from the reputation of the hyena; fisi for being unscrupulous, greedy and ruthless. However, it does not have the same resonance for citizens of the region as sebolu does in Lesotho, which is one of the least corrupt African countries according to Transparency International’s (TI) annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (Transparency International 2015).

That said, ‘perceptions of corruption’, or better put ‘perceptions of leaders involved in theft’, is one of the most resented attributes of officialdom to Africans at large. Recent research on the experiences and perceptions of Africans in 28 countries regarding corruption indicates that a majority (58%) felt that corruption had increased over the last 12 months. And in 18 of the 28 countries, the feeling was that their governments were doing badly in the fight against corruption. The report said that, despite these disappointing findings, the bright spots across the continent were in Botswana, Burkina Faso, Lesotho and Senegal. Citizens in these countries were some of the most positive in the region when discussing corruption (Transparency International and Afrobarometer 2015).

In environments where corruption is systemic but lacks cultural resonance, creating a climate where social sanction can be applied against corrupt practices has been challenging. People understand the terms ‘theft’ and ‘thief’, but corruption is a modern and ambiguous concept to many Africans. As a Nuer elder once told me, “My daughter cannot be married into a family of thieves.”

The task therefore is two-fold: we need to embed a clear legal framework to deter and punish corruption, and we need to actually change the culture, so that the concept of corruption is both understood and recognised as anathema. The war against graft (political corruption) has reached the point where the shame and social sanctions directed against this kind of theft and thief need to be given greater prominence in the arsenal used to fight corruption. This applies especially in developing countries where its consequences can be – and often are – deadly. In its culturally most compelling form, the social sanction is about ensuring, for example, that the thief is too embarrassed to go to church on Sunday because of the looks they’ll get.

As such, the whole approach to corruption needs to be re-examined: from local cultural assumptions and preconceptions to the legal conventions, constitutions, statutes and, especially, the prosecution-related instruments brought to bear on it at the national and global levels. Integral to this are the principles of legal authority and equality before the law. The equality component is essential: the rule of law must be seen to apply equally to all citizens without fear or favour, regardless of race, creed or class.

The following complementary but separate factors in a society are critical: culture, ethos, ethics and traditions, and legal processes and practices. Each derives its legitimacy from history and the traditional ways in which meaning is made. By their very nature, they are far more negotiable – existing as they do in a constant state of flux in a dynamic world. Our success depends on how effectively we bring and use them together in the fight against corruption. We do this cognisant of the fact that grand corruption, when compared to the drug trade, human trafficking, terrorism finance and other global evils, is the most easily rationalisable major felonious activity on the planet.

4.1 The global anti-corruption agenda

During the years 1993 to 2003, corruption was at the centre of the global development agenda. In 1993, Transparency International was founded. In the mid-to-late 1990s, corruption was adopted as a key development issue by the multilateral and bilateral development institutions. This culminated, in 2003, in the drafting and ratification by a host of countries of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) (UNODC 2015).

The following decade saw the rise of the BRIC nations2 and rapid economic growth across much of the developing world, as well as globalisation and its associated technologies assisting the expansion of trade and commerce. At the same time, the struggle against Islamic extremism captured the attention of policy makers in the international community. Alongside it, unfortunately, has also come a rapid growth in the scale and complexity of corruption. So much so, that anti-corruption work needs to be returned urgently to the heart of the global development agenda. It needs to be part of the DNA of modern nation-states, multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and even religious organisations and how they interact on the global stage.

This urgency comes from the fact that graft has served to hollow out key governance institutions in some countries. This includes the defence and security sector and areas of social policy such as health and education, with dire consequences for the public services they are supposed to offer the poor, in particular.

The crippling impact of corruption on the delivery of these essential services has deepened economic inequalities, undermining faith in political processes, parties and politicians. In turn, this increases political volatility as politicians retreat to identity and personality politics with its complex web of non-negotiable irrationalities. It also feeds fundamentalism of all kinds – for example, ethnic, religious and sectarian.

4.2 BRIC nations – Brazil, Russia, India and China

The impunity that accompanies crony capitalism results in what I might call both a private sector and a ‘pirate’ sector, causing citizens – especially younger people who increasingly view elections as a pointless game of musical chairs among crooks – to begin to question capitalism in its current form and democracy itself. This also does serious damage to the independence, legitimacy and integrity of the service sector – in particular, banks, law firms and auditing firms – and deepens the challenges corruption poses.

4.3 The ‘pirate’ and private sectors

The traditional private sector, comprising ‘makers of things’, has increasingly been supplanted in the 21st century by the service sector. The growth of the latter has been buoyed by the dramatic expansion and sophistication of the internet and an increasing variety of communication platforms. This has energised traders, who remain vital to the ‘old economy’ where the world’s products are created, built, sold and moved. At the same time, however, we’ve seen a distinct ‘pirate’ sector gaining in influence, particularly over the last two decades.

By design, the ‘pirate’ sector is as virtual as possible, unencumbered by the traditional obligations and processes of rents, payrolls, medical schemes, pensions and so on. Although it can involve an individual or group of individuals, this sector forms itself into sophisticated entities. These can operate with the same ‘apparent’ legitimacy in multiple countries, even if it means they must use vexatious litigation – such as injunctions, court orders and delayed hearings – to allow them to act outside the law for the duration of their business in a country.

The ‘pirate’ sector often chooses to corporatise itself in offshore tax havens, using the skills of professionals, especially lawyers, bankers and auditors. As a result, it has become apparent that even seemingly reputable companies and professional firms sometimes contain ‘pirate units’. The units are able to move unhindered across borders and traverse the legal world like ghosts who disappear as quickly as these so-called ‘special purpose vehicles’ can be shut down.

Theirs is the euphemistic language of ‘commissions’; ‘conclusion’ and ‘success bonuses’; ‘consultancy’ fees; ‘facilitation payments’; ‘philanthropic’ contributions to the relations of ‘politically exposed persons’ (PEPS); and the use of complex financial instruments to move resources around the world at the touch of a button. As I pointed out previously, businesses find corruption the easiest felonious activity to rationalise, especially in cross-cultural contexts. They are the entities that ‘get things done’ in a complex world. For them, relationships are tradable products that can be leveraged for a profit and not a social currency that helps make trade and commerce flow more smoothly within the law.

4.4 Renewing and reinvigorating international action

So how do we fight these piratical shadows? Corruption is defined as the abuse of vested authority for private gain. In 2011, developing countries lost nearly $1 trillion to corruption, trade misinvoicing and tax avoidance (Kar and Le Blanc 2013). Leading global advocacy organisations such as ONE have even made efforts to quantify the cost of graft in lives (McNair et al. 2014). Estimates show that the cost of corruption equals more than 5% of global gross domestic product (GDP) (OECD 2016).

As the recent FIFA scandal has demonstrated, unconstrained corruption also threatens valued cultural institutions and traditions that we all hold dear. At the same time, the complexity of the legal compliance environment – vis-à-vis anti-corruption, anti-money laundering and other illicit activities – that the genuine private sector has to contend with has increased exponentially. Indeed there is almost an unspoken ‘compliance paralysis’ as large numbers of lawyers, risk advisors and auditors apply expensive time to scrutinising transactions complicated by the web of demands that compliance has placed upon business.

As a result, the temptation for some businesses to rely on the ‘pirate’ sector and/or aggressively ignore or cover up compliance risks has risen. A recent Risk Advisory Group (2015) research report revealed 83% of compliance professionals believe compliance has become more complex in the past two years, with bigger businesses feeling this more acutely. The Risk Advisory Group CEO Bill Waite said, “Worryingly, compliance has become so elaborate that 78% of compliance professionals say that it now represents a risk in itself” (Cassin 2015).

This means we are at a critical juncture. It calls for a renewed global partnership against corruption to match, and even exceed, the concentrated and successful advocacy that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Corruption’s resurgence and complexity threatens not only global security and equitable development but also international trade and commerce, and people’s confidence in freedoms and systems of governance taken for granted since the Second World War.

For example, there has been a debate about creating an International Anti-Corruption Court (IACC). It’s proposed this could have the kind of powers granted to international weapons inspectors to target specific transactions and institutions that, when riddled with corruption, escape investigation and prosecution and cause citizens to lose confidence in public institutions and the rule of law and democracy.

The new push needs to identify, disrupt and delegitimise the global networks of corruption in money laundering; terrorism finance; drug, people and environmental trafficking; and other illicit activities.

This requires new global partnerships that target the information-era entities and domiciles that these networks rely on. They may be offshore tax havens or low-compliance jurisdictions where the ever-expanding raft of international regulations aimed at dealing with graft and illicit flows have limited currency. At the same time, the new regime should robustly incentivise self-reporting vis-à-vis corporate compliance, allowing for a ‘cleaning out of the stables’.

4.5 Culture, tradition and social sanction

To be fully effective, however, this reinvigoration of the rule of law must go hand in hand with action to create a cultural climate in which the corrupt – the thieves – are shamed for what they do.

Indeed, effecting change in the culture and traditions – which inform what is acceptable behaviour – is perhaps even more important in societies where legal institutions based on the Western model are nascent, or where their existence is being energetically contested, as it is in important parts of the developing world.

The release by WikiLeaks of US diplomatic cables in 2010 was a controversial episode of unofficial transparency and a powerful interrupter to the global status quo regarding corruption in relations between nation-states. It revealed the corrupt practices that ruling elites are capable of to the growing youth populations of regions such as the Middle East. The reverberations of this are still being felt.

Across Latin America and in the developed world, revelations of inappropriate, corrupt and unethical behaviour by leaders – in both the private and corporate sectors – have created a level of criticism from the public that is unprecedented in some countries. This is especially the case for the ‘millennial’ generation who appear to mistrust politicians and political parties the most.

Presidents have been forced to step down and others turned into lame ducks while still in office by dramatic mass expressions of discontent boosted by social media.

In this sense the change has already begun – untidily, noisily, chaotically and even bloodily – in many places. The outcome is uncertain. But, in the long term, it will be dramatically different from the status quo. This is, in part, because political leaders and ruling elites increasingly recognise the public’s lack of trust and confidence in them, especially that of their younger citizens. They also now appreciate that, in this networked world, a spotlight can be shone on corrupt and unethical relationships with the ‘pirate’ and private sectors.

In addition to institutions such as an International Anti- Corruption Court as a further step towards increasing transparency, strengthening enforcement and securing restitution, the tools of visa revocations, personalised financial sanctions and more harmonised extradition mechanisms could actually be cheaper and more effective in tackling corruption than prosecutions – which are always tortuous. However, for these measures to enjoy legitimacy around the world, they must be applied, and be seen to apply, with equal force across the different regions of both the developed and developing world.

To conclude, a successful international anti-corruption campaign requires co-operation on a global scale and specific legal measures that help transform attitudes towards corruption and the ability to prosecute the corrupt. Although it may take longer, embedding a culture of social sanction and censure for anyone found guilty of engaging in, facilitating or condoning corrupt activity, even to the extent that those holding office lose public trust, would support these measures.

They need to be seen as bobolu. They need to feel the social stigma when they attend family gatherings, visit the golf club or step into the supermarket – as much to set an example to others as to punish the individual, impressing on the whole community that corruption will not be tolerated.

John Githongo is the CEO of Inuka Kenya Ni Sisi Ltd, a non-governmental organisation focused on promoting good governance. Previously he served as Vice-President of Policy and Advocacy at World Vision International. John has been involved in anti-corruption research, advisory work and activism in Kenya, Africa and the wider international community for 19 years. This includes work in civil society, media, government and the private sector.

4.6 References

Cassin, R. L. 25 November 2015. Risk Advisory Group Report: Compliance is so complex, it’s now its own risk. FCPA Blog. Available online .

Kar, D. and Le Blanc, B. 2013. Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2002–2011. Washington DC: Global Financial Integrity. Available online .

McNair, D., Kraus, J., McKiernan K. and McKay, S. 2014. The Trillion Dollar Scandal Study. London: ONE.

OECD. January 2016. The CleanGovBiz Initiative. Available online .

The Risk Advisory Group. 2015. The Compliance Horizon Survey. Available online .

Transparency International. 2015. Corruption Perceptions Index – Lesotho. Available online .

Transparency International and Afrobarometer. 2015. People and Corruption: Africa Survey 2015 – Global Corruption Barometer. Berlin: Transparency International. Available online .

United Nations – Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2015. United Nations Convention against Corruption: Signature and Ratification Status as of 1 December 2015. Available online .

5. Paul Radu: Follow the money: how open data and investigative journalism can beat corruption

The early spring of 2015 saw thousands of angry people on the streets of Chisinau, capital of the tiny Republic of Moldova. While calling loudly for the resignation of the Government and the Parliament, they were shouting, “We want our billion back!” (Calugareanu and Schwartz 2015).

The demonstrators believed the politicians were to blame for the theft of almost $1 billion from Moldovan banks, which had left this poor country’s financial affairs in disarray.

Investigations are ongoing. But the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project’s (OCCRP) research indicates that this $1 billion was the tip of the iceberg, in a country where many more billions of dollars in ‘black’ money appear to have flowed through a flawed banking system – with the help of corrupt politicians and organised crime as well as untrustworthy judges and law enforcement officers (Radu, Munteanu and Ostanin 2015).

We believe that the citizens of Moldova were victims of a transnational web of corruption, benefiting politicians and criminals who used complex multi-layered company structures to conceal both their identities and their activities. Regrettably, this story is not unique.

At the OCCRP, we have identified a number of cross- border money laundering schemes in Eastern Europe, serving criminal groups as diverse as Mexican drug cartels and Vietnamese and Russian organised crime gangs (OCCRP 2011).

The power of these crime groups stems primarily from their ability to operate with ease across national frontiers. They complete a detailed risk assessment at the country level and then choose the least vulnerable approach to conduct their illicit activities, whether in narcotics, refugee trafficking or the massive money laundering exercises that follow such crimes. The problem for national law enforcement is that, by definition, it cannot follow this type of crime easily or quickly across borders. Data exchanges between states and law enforcement agencies take time. Modern crime schemes are designed to have very short lives to avoid detection, lasting sometimes just months before the associated companies and bank accounts are wound up and replaced by new ones.

Yet alongside the advantages available for criminals of operating on this global scale, making it inherently harder to track them down, there are also disadvantages that the clever journalist or law enforcement official can exploit to expose them.

So how do we do this? How do we stop criminal gangs and the corrupt politicians they rely on – conducting business as usual? Firstly, I will argue, through data: more data means more transparency, provided the quality of information is there and supported by tools that allow proper analysis. Secondly, by journalists using advanced investigative techniques, including the emerging discipline of data journalism, to identify the patterns and practices inherent in corrupt activity.

Criminals can’t predict the future of open data Transparency is the natural enemy of international organised crime gangs and corrupt officials. Opaque systems allow them to thrive. And some of them go to great lengths to disguise their wrongdoing, using financial and company structures that span the world.

At OCCRP, we’ve found and exposed networks of companies based in New Zealand, with bank accounts in Riga, Latvia, that were transferring money to companies set up in the US state of Delaware, Cyprus or the United Kingdom. In turn, these companies owned bank accounts in yet other jurisdictions (OCCRP 2011).

Such criminal schemes are designed by creative and intelligent, if misguided, people. Some of them could have been the next Steve Jobs, but found crime more appealing. They often work for what we call the ‘criminal services industry’ – the lawyers, registration agents, business intelligence firms and other legitimate businesses that earn lucrative income from servicing the needs of criminal clients. But no matter how clever they are, they can’t predict the future; transparency rules change. For years, from the early 1990s, Russian, Ukrainian, Romanian and many other Eastern European mobsters and politicians were using Cyprus as a place to hide their activities behind labyrinthine corporate structures.

It reached the point where Cyprus, with a population of little more than one million, became one of the main investors in Eastern and Central Europe. Not all of these investors were criminal enterprises as many used Cyprus for tax optimisation purposes. But there is hardly a country in the region – from the former Yugoslavia to Russia and beyond – where Cyprus-based companies were not involved in huge, rigged privatisation scandals. [footnote 4]

In 2004, when Cyprus joined the European Union (EU) and started opening databases, including a registry of locally based companies, things began to change. Investigative reporters began combing through millions of records and, in many instances, came across the names of beneficial owners the real owners of the company – who thought they were sheltered from public scrutiny.

Politicians and criminals were caught off guard and exposed in press articles that led to arrests and resignations. Their past misdemeanours made future involvement in business problematic. However, they started fighting back almost immediately, substituting their names in company documents with those of professional proxies – usually Cypriot lawyers who would lend their name to just about anyone who wanted to conceal their identity.

In addition to this, the Cyprus registry is relatively expensive to use and searchable only by company name. This poses a serious problem for investigators, who often embark on an enquiry with only an individual’s name, be it a member of the local parliament or a controversial business owner. As a result, Cyprus still offers only partial transparency.

Yet even in countries with a stronger record, you can hit barriers. For example, New Zealand – ranked fourth in Transparency International’s (TI) anti-corruption index – has a well-organised register of companies that is free of charge and allows for name-based searches (Transparency International 2015). But, as with the UK’s Companies House database, it’s more difficult for investigative researchers to identify nominee shareholders and directors, especially in cases where they are proxies – not beneficial owners – acting for criminal groups and corrupt politicians.

And in the past few years, OCCRP investigations have revealed the involvement of an Auckland-based company (that was run by a nominee) in obscuring the ownership of companies across Eastern Europe. One such example was a Moldovan TV station (Preasca, Munteanu and Sarnecki 2013). Secretive media ownership is a huge problem across the region where, in many instances, the general public has no idea who is delivering the news. Once OCCRP exposed this non-transparent structure, its ownership was just moved to British companies that were again meant to obscure the identity of the real owners of the television station (Media Ownership Project 2015).

In a global economy, this isn’t just an issue for New Zealand. In 2016, the UK Government is implementing a new central registry of company beneficial ownership to enable researchers and other interested parties to access information on individuals with an interest in more than 25% of a company’s shares or voting rights, or who otherwise control the way it is run.

It matters because well-structured and accessible databases can be goldmines for investigators and members of the public. In 2008, British computer programmer Dan O’Huiginn reshaped the Panama registry of companies and built a simple interface that, for the first time, allowed name-based searches (Government of Panama 2015). This was the catalyst for investigative articles that exposed corrupt dictators, criminals and their close associates all over the world. This simple technical adjustment opened their activities up to public scrutiny, costing them untold millions of dollars. [footnote 5] :

The same principle applies to other official databases. For example, court records, government spending and tenders databases vary greatly in their organisation, accessibility and quality of data. In many jurisdictions, it takes investigators a lot of navigating, mining and shopping for data to find the evidence they are looking for. The opening up of company information and databases has to be accompanied by effective policies that ensure their accessibility, integrity, security and usefulness. Civic hacker collectives, journalists and civil society groups should be consulted to help determine the most useful access to data that also mitigates any privacy concerns. Governments requiring offshore companies operating in a country to identify their true beneficial ownership would also greatly reduce the space in which criminals can work and increase the costs they incur.

5.1 Fighting from within borders

Law enforcement must also jump on board the open data train and take advantage of advances in technology in order to keep pace with the criminals. Just like journalists, police officers and intelligence analysts need to master cross-border, multi-language, open-source intelligence to fight sophisticated serious crime. While it is true that data obtained in informal ways cannot always be used to build strong court cases, it can greatly shorten the time required for the investigative process.

Obtaining documents sequentially through official channels from other countries can take months or even years. Say, for example, that the police in the UK need information on a company based in Russia. They have to file requests and wait, sometimes for a year, only to find out that the Russian company is owned by a Cyprus limited firm. It might take another year to identify the next owner in a nested structure. Finally, the trail might end with bearer shares: where the owner of the stocks is not registered or is a proxy who doesn’t know the real owner (Funk 2014, p. 14).

Compare this with the adaptability of organised crime, which – albeit operating under no formal constraint – broke free from the nation-state mindset long ago. In the international space governed by weak international protocols and bilateral agreements, organised crime at present has no natural enemy. While criminals recognise no borders and are not bound by strict local rules, national and legal boundaries, a lack of resources continues to hamper law enforcement. Geopolitics can also deter cross-border collaborative initiatives between nation-states, which may find themselves at odds with their neighbours or dealing with governments that are themselves riddled with corruption.

There are, to be sure, examples of criminal networks being disbanded in a number of countries as a result of co- operation between law enforcement agencies. This did not necessarily prevent the mobsters from re-forming elsewhere outside those jurisdictions. Nevertheless, increased access to open data could help to boost cross-border co-operation and journalists can play an increasingly important role in it.

5.2 It takes a network to fight a network

Investigative reporting is – and can be even more – the natural enemy of criminal networks and, when practised collaboratively, it acts as an effective watchdog. It can change the status quo in innovative ways that are not immediately obvious.

Journalists and the public alike expect prosecutors to act after each journalistic exposé, with the desired result being arrests, convictions, repatriation of lost assets and other positive outcomes. Owing to limited human resources and a lack of skills, interest or even competence, this expectation is not always realised. However, regardless of law enforcement action or inaction, public exposure can adversely affect, and even stop, criminal businesses operating in other jurisdictions. Such exposure can also influence long-term changes in public attitudes, which can lead, in turn, to protests against, and even election defeats for, discredited parties or politicians.

With the stakes so high, it is essential that the journalism itself is rigorous, credible and transparent. Investigative articles must be linked to evidence, well- designed databases and ‘how we did it’ guidance, so that readers can recreate the investigative process if they want to. Governments, banks and financial institutions in general rely on open source information when deciding whether to give loans, enter business deals or accept money transactions. Effective data journalism can also help expose financial irregularity or illegality and prevent crime figures or oligarchs securing loans, opening accounts or making other transactions.

Using advanced investigative techniques, journalism can degrade international organised crime and corrupt networks even before they are firmly established within a jurisdiction. Corrupt politicians, officials and criminals view the proceeds of their illicit schemes as commodities to be repeatedly imported and exported and are always looking for new territories in which to generate profit.

When journalists work collaboratively across frontiers, sharing data, this practice can be identified and compromised. It takes a network to monitor a network.

International reporting groups such as the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ), OCCRP and others already co-operate on individual stories or sporadically share datasets. However, such is the scale of the problem and the ubiquity of organised crime that these efforts can seem to be only scratching the surface.

What journalists can do is share with colleagues in other countries details of the patterns of crime they have already detected in their own. This would enable wider cross-border investigations to determine whether the same criminal groups are setting up shop in other jurisdictions.

For example, a criminal group sets up Limited Liability Partnerships (LLPs) that are all owned by a set of companies with their headquarters on a particular street in Belize City, Belize. Replications of this simple pattern can be searched for in the company registries of other countries or in related datasets, potentially revealing the group’s activities in those territories too.

In future, with the proper resources, this kind of pattern recognition could be facilitated and automated through the development of specific algorithms. Crime groups will inevitably react by altering their activities to avoid detection. But, crucially, this will hamper their operations and cost them more in money and time.

Automated searches of ever-larger, global, transparent datasets can feed real-time alerts to journalists all over the world. The result could be that the public has earlier and reliable information about who the real corrupt beneficiaries of crimes are, such as the $1 billion bank theft that left the Republic of Moldova with an uncertain future.

To conclude, a key component to fighting future crime is increased cross-border co-operation between journalists and programmers, who need to employ and create new advanced investigative techniques on top of massive amounts of data. At the same time, activists and governments need to push for more transparency, quality and common standards in open data.

Paul Radu is the Executive Director of the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (www.reportingproject.net), which investigates transnational crime and corruption in Eastern Europe. He is also a board member of the Global Investigative Journalism Network (http://gijn.org) and has received many international awards for his journalism.

5.3 References

Calugareanu, V. and Schwartz, R. 4 May 2015. Spring again in the Republic of Moldova – mass protest against corruption. Deutsche Welle. Available online .

Funk, T. M. 2014. Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties and Letters Rogatory: A Guide for Judges. US: Federal Judicial Center. Available online .

Government of Panama. January 2015. Panama Registry of Companies. Available online .

OCCRP. 22 November 2011. The Proxy Platform. The Reporting Project. Available online .

Media Ownership Project. January 2015. Media Ownership Project: Moldova. Available online .

Preasca, I., Munteanu, M. and Sarnecki, M. 26 March 2013. Taylor Network Back in Business. Rise Project. Available online .

Radu, P., Munteanu M. and Ostanin, I. 24 July 2015. Grand Theft Moldova. Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP). Available online .

Transparency International. 2015. Corruption Perceptions Index. Available online .

6. Sarah Chayes: Corruption and terrorism: the causal link

It’s February 2015 and I am in Kano, northern Nigeria. Not three months back, in the midst of Friday prayers, Boko Haram struck the Grand Mosque in the old fortress-like centre of town. The dead and the bloodied lay strewn in their hundreds across the public square.

I’m sitting with some lawyers – a prosecutor, the chairman of the state bar association and a court administrator – trying to work out the mechanics of corruption in the justice sector, in this most corrupt of countries. We’re talking details: how judges rarely demand bribes directly, their clerks collect the money; and how lawyers collude, blaming judicial corruption for the extra fees they pocket.

“Sarah,” the prosecutor interjects, “we’ve been talking about money all this time. But this isn’t just about money …”

“The saying goes,” he resumes awkwardly, “if you want to win your case, go to the judge with a beautiful girl.” [footnote 6]

I’m stopped cold. I imagine the girl. She may be 14 or 15. She returns home from school each day with her friends, the white veils of their school uniforms fluttering like matched plumage. I picture the glistening eyes of some overfed judge as he reaches for her. My stomach turns.

Abruptly another image comes to mind: the girl’s brother, a lanky young Nigerian man. Already disillusioned, he is pushed right over the edge. He would kill that judge if he could.

And Boko Haram, all around this town, would like nothing more than to help him do it. I could suddenly understand how it happens. I could see how the corruption perpetrated by officials of the then Nigerian administration – like that of many governments around the world – was itself helping to generate the terrorist threat.

The problem, I realised, is far more severe than white elephants or poor service delivery. Corruption entails a violation of a person’s basic humanity that can spur an enraged response.

It is these connections – between government corruption and terrorism or other violence – that this essay explores.

Corruption is one of those consensual topics. No one would argue it’s a good thing. International charities and multilateral organisations have worked hard to combat it, racking up impressive achievements in recent years. Anti- bribery laws, once unheard of, have spread well beyond their initial US–UK beachhead. Major arrests and asset seizures are increasingly common, as are citizen-led anti-corruption protests. Such protests have resulted in the resignation of senior officials or their ousting through the ballot box. That’s what happened in Nigeria, where a hard-nosed reformer – who has penned an essay in this volume – gained an upset victory in March 2015 elections over the administration those Kano legal practitioners were criticising.

And yet, when push comes to shove in bilateral relations, Western governments, businesses and charities are still most likely to prioritise other imperatives ahead of corruption. If an international aid agency or philanthropic organisation has set its sights on delivering health programming to rural villages, its government may be reticent to act against corruption in the host country for fear the precious permissions to operate will be cancelled. If the objective is a major extension of electrical power across a whole region or a trade foray into an emerging market, corruption may be seen as a ‘cost of doing business’. Corruption helps facilitate economic activity and growth, some maintain. Others cite culture: “It’s just the way people do things over there. Who are we to impose our norms?” These and other excuses are proffered to rationalise looking the other way or outright collusion.

Upon closer inspection, it thus appears that corruption is not so consensual after all. A remarkable number of Westerners actually argue in favour of it.

Of all the competing priorities, the one that most swiftly trumps anti-corruption is security. Co-operating with this or that corrupt leader is seen as critical, because he is our partner in the war against terrorism. His is the only military worth its salt in the region, troops that actually go on the attack against militants. He provides us with intelligence or bases or overflight rights. And so the kleptocratic practices of his network of cronies are overlooked. The way they have bent state functions, wired the whole economy to their own benefit, given free rein to low-level officials to rake in extorted bribes and blocked off every avenue of recourse – none of that matters, so long as they are ‘with us’ in the fight against terrorists.

This common framing is particularly ironic given the growing evidence that corruption is helping to drive many people into the folds of extremist movements and indeed lies at the root of many of today’s security crises (Chayes 2015; Sky 2015). The purported trade-off between security and corruption is a false dichotomy. Take southern Afghanistan, the former Taliban heartland, where I lived for nearly a decade. In the spring of 2009, a delegation of elders came to visit from Shah Wali Kot district, just north of Kandahar. This happened often. I was one of the only foreigners in Kandahar with no guards at my gate. When I asked why, with the Taliban killing people, the villagers don’t fight back, a man retorted, “How can they work with this Government? The Government doesn’t hear them. The Government doesn’t do anything for them. It’s just there to fill its pockets, nothing else. If the Government isn’t fixed, no matter how many soldiers the foreigners bring, the situation won’t improve.” [footnote 7]

A few days later in the border town of Spin Boldak, community leader Hajji Manan Khan concurred, “This Government … no one likes it. Ministers have huge palaces in Kabul, while the people have nothing. The foreigners should announce that the current Government is thieves. They should put the screws in them, call them on the carpet and demand accounts.” [footnote 8]

I heard this refrain again and again. Out of a hundred Taliban, elders would tell me, fewer than a quarter were ‘real’. The rest had taken up arms in disgust with the Government. This assessment was corroborated by interviews with Taliban detainees in international military custody. Explaining their motivations for joining the insurgency, they cited government corruption more often than any strictly religious rationale.

A similar picture emerges from Nigeria. When Boko Haram launched its first large-scale violent attacks in July 2009, police stations were the first targets. By all accounts, the Nigerian police is one of the most venal and abusive in the world (Human Rights Watch 2010). [footnote 9] And, during a November 2015 conversation in Maiduguri, where Boko Haram first emerged, local residents voiced a sentiment I had heard often: “People were very happy [with those first attacks]. Boko Haram was saying the truth about the violations by government agencies against the people. Finally they could stand up and challenge. They were claiming their rights.” [footnote 10]

Extremism isn’t the only form that backlash against corruption takes. Across the Arab world in 2011, populations took to the streets demanding an end to autocratic governments, the prosecution and imprisonment of corrupt officials, and the return of stolen assets. As the catastrophic situation in today’s Middle East demonstrates, revolutions rarely end peacefully. Some analysts see the expansion of extremism, from Daesh in Syria to a tenacious insurgency in Egypt, as a reaction to the failure of those initially non- violent efforts to break the grip of kleptocratic governing elites (Muasher 2015).

Ukraine seems as culturally and historically different from the Middle East as a country can be, yet its 2014 revolution was fuelled by similar motivations. While anti-Russian sentiment and a cultural affinity with Western Europe were important drivers of the Maidan protests, so was disgust at the corrupt Yanukovich Government. Photos of the deposed president’s pleasure palace went viral after his fall. The sequel to that revolution has been the first major East–West stand-off since the end of the Cold War, complete with the forcible annexation of territory and the displacement of more than a million people.

In these cases and others, corruption has helped generate some of today’s most dire security crises. The difficult question, especially regarding religious violence, is why? What is it about corruption that should drive people to such extremes?

Four elements of corruption in its current form help to provide an explanation: the humiliation inflicted on victims; their lack of recourse; the structure and sophistication of corrupt networks; and the truly colossal sums being stolen. Firstly, what we in the West often underestimate in thinking about corruption is the assault on victims’ human dignity that accompanies it. Recall the example of the judge’s ‘sextortion’, when the only way of gaining a hearing may be to allow a daughter or a sister to be violated.

Abuses of this nature can spark a burning need for retribution. In studies of violence ranging from Palestinian uprisings to gang shootings in the United States, insult or humiliation is found to be a key factor (Longo, Canetti and Hite-Rubin 2014; Black 2011). [footnote 11]

Given the obvious connections between religion and morality, the moral depravity underlying the abuse is frequently understood in religious terms. “Our leaders are bound by religious duty to do the right thing,” Kano’s then Bar Association Chairman Ibrahim Nassarawa told me, “so when they don’t, people hate them.” [footnote 12] At that point, a religious argument may be persuasive: “If our government were based on the Islamic system,” said Maiduguri residents, summarising Boko Haram’s preaching, “all these things wouldn’t be happening. We would have a fair and just society.” [footnote 13]

Secondly, with government perpetrating the crimes, there is no earthly hope of recourse. As Sardar Muhammad – who cultivates grapes and pomegranates west of Kandahar – put it in defining the word ‘corruption’, “If the district governor takes all the development budget and only gives the people a tiny bit, and I want to complain, and his gunmen keep me from complaining because they are his kept dogs, that’s corruption.” [footnote 14]

Deprived of any peaceful means of redress against an abusive government, even the founders of our own Western democracies rebelled. The 16th-century Dutch Revolt, the English Civil War and the American and French revolutions were all bloody affairs. Period documents from these milestones in democratic development indicate that in none of them did protagonists and ordinary citizens turn to violence gladly, but felt compelled to it after exhausting every other avenue and obtaining not the slightest concession (Robertson 2006). [footnote 15]

The unassailable impunity that Sardar Muhammad was lamenting derives from the third important feature of corruption as it currently exists in dozens of countries – how deeply it is embedded in state machinery. It’s not the work of a few venal officials, who might be rooted out or challenged in court. The kind of severe corruption that is common today is systemic. It is the practice of sophisticated networks armed with all the instruments of state function. They use those instruments to serve their aims – which largely boil down to personal enrichment. In many cases, these entities should not be thought of as governments at all, much less fragile or failing ones, but rather as savvy and successful criminal organisations.

Weaknesses in state function examined in this light may prove to be deliberate, especially in agencies with autonomous power. Judges or specialised prosecutors are underpaid. Armies are hollowed out to reduce the likelihood of a coup and because defence budgets and military assistance are juicy revenue streams. The results of this latter trend were on vivid display in 2014 as the cannibalised militaries of Iraq and Nigeria collapsed at the first sign of a challenge.

In other cases, apparently innocuous state agencies such as tax authorities or water departments are fashioned into bludgeons to force compliance. A Tunisian tax collector explained to me how, under the regime of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, certain people were accorded a tax holiday as long as they cut members of the ruling clique into their action. But “assessors would rarely make someone’s file go away completely. The permissiveness could always be revoked.” Taxes, he said, could be used “to punish someone who was too independent.” [footnote 16]

A trade union representative in Uzbekistan described a similar system to me in 2014: “There are so many taxes it is impossible to pay them all. So people make a connection in the tax office to pay less. But then you’ve broken the law and they know it, and you are afraid of the Government. The whole Government is set up that way, to make you do wrong, so then they have you on the hook.” [footnote 17]

These kleptocratic networks are horizontally integrated. They comprise government officials, businesses such as banks or construction companies, and so-called non- governmental organisations (NGOs) and implementers of aid – which may in fact be owned by relatives of government officials. But they also include outright criminals such as smugglers, drug-traffickers and even terrorists. Some within the government service in Algeria in the 1990s, and also officials in Pakistan today, are believed to have maintained operational links with extremists (Waldman 2010; Garçon 2003). [footnote 18]

For foreign governments, charities or businesses seeking to operate in such environments, this horizontal integration makes for particularly difficult navigating. The familiar distinctions between public and private sectors, licit and illicit actors, simply do not apply.

Finally, the amounts of money in play are truly obscene. Former FBI special agent Debra Laprevotte, who worked kleptocracy cases for years, says that the increase has been palpable: “For the longest time, we had a single billion-dollar case. Now there are at least five billion-dollar investigations underway.” [footnote 19]

According to two separate biannual surveys, ‘petty bribery’ in Afghanistan rakes in between £1.3 billion and £2.6 billion per year (UNODC 2012; Integrity Watch Afghanistan 2014).

This is in a country whose licit government revenue is barely estimated to top £1 billion (SIGAR 2015).

The development implications of such sums are obvious. Imagine if even a fraction were devoted to a country’s healthcare or water and sewage system, or to building a reliable and affordable public transport network in a burgeoning megacity, or to paying teachers a living wage. Imagine the impact on sustainable economic growth.

But when obtained through practices this corrupt, vast wealth in a sea of poverty also has a moral component – hence the easy link to religion. In the midst of the 16th- century Protestant revolt against the Habsburg ‘Divine Right’ monarchy, an anonymous Dutch pamphleteer complained, “They put robes of silk on their idols made of old wood, leaving us brethren of Christ naked and starving” (Arnade 2008, p. 99).

Then, as now, militant puritanical religion, imposed if necessary by force, was seen by some as the only remedy.

The picture painted here is a sobering one, particularly for governments, investors and humanitarian organisations that cannot avoid working in such countries. And especially when security concerns are so severe as to trump other considerations. Still, even in a world in which trade-offs are real and cannot simply be wished away, there are some important lessons to be considered.

Governments that ostensibly fight against terror may actually be generating more terrorism than they curb. The international community must do a better job of weighing up the pluses and minuses of partnering with acutely corrupt governments, and thus reinforcing them and facilitating their practices.

If alliances are too close, or pay too little attention to the corruption of host governments, the abused populations may come to associate the international community with the misdeeds of their own rulers. As 14th-century churchman William of Pagula admonished King Edward III, “He takes on the guilt of the perpetrator who neglects to fix what he can correct” (Nederman 2002, p. 82).

A more precise understanding of network structures and real dynamics of power must inform planning processes ahead of engagement. It is costly in human and other resources, not to mention politically uncomfortable, to draw up network diagrams – like the ones intelligence or police agencies regularly develop in their study of terrorists or criminals – that map members of ostensibly friendly governments and their cut-outs in business or the criminal world. But these costs should be weighed against the proven and often disastrous price of blind engagement in such complex environments.

A new, broader understanding of ‘corporate social responsibility’ is required. Across sectors, companies whose business models actually depend on servicing kleptocratic officials – such as some banks, lawyers, estate agents, registered agents, various extractive and other resource- based businesses, and international construction contractors – are contributing to significant security threats in their own countries.

It is in this light that they should consider their ‘corporate social responsibility’ – rather than as a synonym for donations to localised humanitarian work. Should their public-spiritedness remain wanting, then sanctions applied to them for colluding with illegal corrupt practices should be stiffened, commensurate with the harm they are doing.

Western citizens should begin pressurising such businesses. And above all, Western governments should cease viewing corrupt money flows, or good trade deals extracted from kleptocrats at the expense of their populations, as a necessary component of their nations’ economies.

6.1 References

Arnade, P. 2008. Beggars, Iconoclasts and Civic Patriots: The Political Culture of the Dutch Revolt. Ithica: Cornell University Press.

Black, D. 2011. Moral Time. New York: Oxford University Press, p.73.

Chayes, S. 2015. Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security. New York: W.W. Norton.

Garçon, J. 15 November 2003. Les GIA sont une creation des services de securite algeriens. Liberation. Available online .

Human Rights Watch. 17 August 2010. Everyone’s in on the Game: corruption and human rights abuses by the Nigeria Police Force. Available online .

Integrity Watch. 28 May 2014. Afghanistan, National Corruption Survey. Available online .

Longo, M., Canetti, D. and Hite-Rubin N. 2014. A Checkpoint Effect? Evidence from a natural experiment on travel restrictions in the West Bank. American Journal of Political Science, 58(4), pp. 1006–1023.

Muasher, M. 2015. Thalatha Safarat Indhar Lam Yasma’ha Ahad. Alghad (Afkar wa Mawaqaf). Available online .

Nederman, C. ed. and trans. 2002. Political Thought in Early Fourteenth Century England: Treatises by Walter of Milemete, William of Pagula and William of Ockham. Of Pagula, W., The Mirror of Edward III. Tempe: Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, p. 82.

Robertson, G. 2006. The Tyrannicide Brief: The Story of the Man Who Sent Charles I to the Scaffold. New York: Pantheon.

Sky, E. 2015. The Unravelling: High Hopes and Missed Opportunities in Iraq. London: Atlantic Books. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). 5 March 2015. Letter to Generals Lloyd Austin, John Campbell and Todd Semonite. Available online .

United Nations – Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). December 2012. Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Trends. Vienna: UNODC. Available online .

Waldman, M. 2010. The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship Between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents. London School of Economics, Crisis States Working Group Paper, 2(18).

7. David Walsh: The irresponsibility of not knowing – corruption in sport

Being a sports writer was all I wanted.

Thirty-eight years, the only job I’ve ever had. Good times mostly. Not what I thought they would be. When I glance in the rear-view mirror, there is more cynicism, more corruption, more of sport’s dark side. It seems hard to believe now that the journey began with the expectation of standards higher than would ever be found in civilian life.

There is, of course, much to recall that was glorious, exciting and uplifting, sporting stuff that makes you think anything is possible. Hard to imagine that a boy who grew up on the potholed roads of Kenya could become a Tour de France champion, but that’s what Chris Froome did.

Or that a boy from Rosario in Argentina who was diagnosed with a growth hormone deficiency at age ten should become the greatest footballer we’ve ever seen. Well that’s Lionel Andres Messi’s story. How many winter evenings has he brightened? But even in the beautiful game, bad things were happening. Our obsession with football created a global popularity that would lead to extraordinary riches pouring into the game.

That money needed to be managed and those in control needed to be accountable. We are speaking of systems of good governance, but greed got a head start and governance never caught up. With great wealth comes power and that attracts the corruptible. Over the last 15 years, there has been the International Olympic Committee (IOC) scandal behind the awarding of the Winter Olympics to Salt Lake City in 2001, the FIFA scandal that simmered for more than ten years before boiling over in 2015 and, most recently, the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) scandal involving high-up officials in the international federation.

Sometimes you find yourself taking a step back and wondering, “Could it have really happened?” Could custodians of the sport really have blackmailed an athlete in a €450,000-deal, covering up a doping violation so that the athlete could compete in the Olympics? That’s the allegation and the French police are on the case (World Anti-Doping Agency 2016).

I’d been a sports reporter for ten years when attending my first Olympics. That was Seoul 1988. A run along a busy promenade in South Korea’s capital city on the final Sunday of those Games remains a cherished memory. I never saw such an outpouring of national pride. Every expression seemed to say, “You thought we couldn’t do it, even we weren’t sure we could, but we did.”

Before those Games started, there had been student protests in Seoul and the world’s media highlighted the potential for the Olympics to be overshadowed by unrest. That never happened. The trouble came from inside the stadium, down there on the track or, more accurately, in the room where the Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson peed into what anti-doping personnel call ‘the collection vessel’.

The thing about watching something live is that it leaves a deeper, more lasting impression. Inside your living room, you see the story unfold. Inside the stadium, you feel it. It’s the difference between having your face painted and having your forehead tattooed. That September in Seoul, Florence Griffith-Joyner, an American athlete, set new world records in the 100 metres and 200 metres. They will stand for a long time yet, those records.

They called her ‘Flo-Jo’. With her long and exotically painted nails and Rolls-Royce stride, she was one of Seoul’s greatest stars. I saw her get the 200-metre record, decelerating in the home straight. It was a heart-sinking moment. There were allegations of doping, unproven. Florence Griffith-Joyner died at 38, far too soon (Walsh 2013).

Ben Johnson was a different story. He got caught. Can you imagine being awoken by a loud knock on your apartment door at 3.30 in the morning and being pleased about it? Doug Gillon, from The Glasgow Herald, stood there. “Johnson’s tested positive,” he said. The words landed like ice-cold water on a sleepy face. Other than tell our offices back home that we were up and on the case, I don’t know what we could have done to advance the story at that hour, but it was a watershed moment. Ben Johnson changed the landscape. Some of the things that had drawn us as kids to sport were being crushed by a will to win that recognised no boundaries.

How bad was it? How bad is it? It was bad. It’s gotten worse.

Part of that summer of ’88 was spent following the world’s greatest bike race, the Tour de France. A few days from the end, there was another drug controversy when Pedro Delgado, the Spanish-born race leader, provided a urine sample that contained the drug probenecid, used by athletes to mask their use of proscribed substances.

A strange case for sure. Probenecid was banned by the International Olympic Committee, but wasn’t yet banned by the body that governed world cycling. Delgado, it was initially speculated, would be docked ten minutes but not thrown off the race. The Dutch rider, Steven Rooks, would then be the new leader and, with the race almost complete, the certain winner. [footnote 20]

I met Rooks before the start, on the morning after Delgado’s bad news.

“How do you feel about taking the yellow jersey?” “I don’t want it in these circumstances,” he said.

“But if he’s been cheating, and why would anyone use probenecid, you will be the deserving leader.”

“He has been the strongest rider in the race and deserves the victory.”

Rooks saw my righteousness for what it was. Innocence. What I believe he was telling me, in code, of course, was that athletes in the Tour de France do what they have to do, and no one is guiltier or more innocent than another. Strange how crushing that moment seemed. Over the years that followed, I became a different kind of sports writer – less gullible, even aggressively sceptical.

Something Albert Camus wrote strikes a chord: “Every act of rebellion expresses a nostalgia for innocence” (Camus 1956, p. 54). We want sport to be believable. In the world of our imagination, sport doesn’t just mirror life but offers something more principled, more idealistic, more inspiring than the world of business. Alas, the reality is far from that and there is a rebellion.

Folk are tired of the corruption. We want our innocence back. You can bet that when the news emerged that FIFA executive committee members were arrested on corruption charges, football fans around the world were silently cheering. At last. Same reaction from athletics fans when news that high-ranking members of the IAAF suffered the same fate.

Whether police investigations in both sports lead to charges doesn’t matter as much as knowing that men who once saw themselves as untouchable were mistaken.

With so much cheating on the field and so much corruption off it, you may think this is a bleak time for sport. On the contrary, this is what sport has needed: scrutiny, exposure of wrongdoing, punishment for those who have done wrong. No longer in the dark, we now have the opportunity for change. It would be a crime not to seize it.

From where did the malaise come? Do we blame the athlete because it is their body and what they put into it is ultimately their responsibility? Or the trusted coach who says that, without doping, victory is unattainable? Or the governing body that publicly says doping is a scourge, but privately accepts its existence as an irrepressible evil? From where does the corruption come?

What of the institutional corruption? Why did we get the IOC scandal, the FIFA scandal and the IAAF scandal? Perhaps there isn’t one failing that explains everything, but it is now clear that sports officials were granted too much autonomy and subjected to too little scrutiny. Members of the IOC and FIFA were treated like royalty and many of them embraced the world of privilege before abusing it. Now US federal officers and the Swiss and French police are pursuing cases of suspected fraud in sport, and they do so with fans worldwide urging them on.

Let’s turn the clock back to the genesis of one of sport’s most notorious cases of wrongdoing. It was July 1999. We were all at Le Puy du Fou, a theme park set among the trees and beauty of the Vendée in western France. It was the start of the Tour de France. The race began with a short individual race against the clock, each rider hurtling round a 4-mile circuit in pursuit of the first yellow jersey.

That race launched Lance Armstrong as an embryonic global icon. He won that short test by a staggering eight seconds and had done this after recovering from life-threatening testicular cancer. His domination of that year’s Tour was absolute and his performance seemed to many the most life-affirming story that sport had ever delivered.

Surviving cancer is one thing, but to follow recovery with victory in perhaps the toughest athletic challenge of all is quite another.

Armstrong cheated because he believed others were cheating and that it was the only way he could win. On both counts, he was almost certainly correct. But that merely explains his rationale – it cannot excuse it. A great number of his competitors in that race were not using drugs and so were put at an insurmountable disadvantage by those who did cheat.

The fact that Armstrong had been so seriously ill made it hard for people to believe that he would then use drugs that could be dangerous to his health. He never saw it like that. Many of the drugs used in restoring him to health, after he’d undergone four rounds of chemotherapy, were the same drugs that would give him greater endurance in the Tour de France. And they weren’t that dangerous.

But he couldn’t have gotten away with it unless so many had been willing to embrace the irresponsibility of not knowing. The truth is that the truth was there, an inch or so beneath the surface. “If a misdeed arises in the search for truth, it is better to exhume it rather than conceal the truth,” Saint Jerome wrote in the fifth century (cited in Ballester and Walsh 2004, p.1). That’s not bad advice.

In the surge of the feel-good factor that came with Armstrong’s first victory in the Tour de France, everyone had their reasons for clinging to the irresponsibility of not knowing and leaving the truth resting beneath the surface. His sponsors would sell bikes and clothing – and dreams – off the miracle of his comeback. Those entrusted with the duty to protect the sport, the world-governing cycling body (the Union Cycliste Internationale [UCI]) saw in him a saviour bearing the gifts of increased popularity and, of course, revenue.

As fans, we want our heroes to be angels on wheels, simon- pure, somehow immune to the uppers and downers of our own pill-popping society. In the maelstrom of Armstrong’s wondrous victory, we engaged in what the poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge called ‘the willing suspension of disbelief’. All the reasons why this story had to be questioned were suppressed. Those who tried to protest were shouted down.

Let us try to explain how easy it would have been for the fraud of Armstrong to have been stopped before it had begun. The drug of choice in 1999 was erythropoietin (EPO), which promotes the production of red cells and allowed those using it an almost endless supply of oxygen. With it, a rider could fly up mountains. Angels on wheels indeed. At that time, there was no anti-doping test to identify it in urine. So EPO was a godsend for those who wished to cheat, and there were plenty.

From blood tests taken before that 1999 Tour, the authorities more or less knew who was using the drug but just could not prove it. They also knew that an EPO test was imminent. All they had to do was freeze the urine samples from ’99 and re-examine them when the EPO test was approved, which happened in 2000. It would have been simple and it would have exposed those who were cheating. But those who should have been protecting the sport were the same people who were promoting it, and Lance Armstrong was good for business.

It was not co-incidental that when Armstrong the Legend became Armstrong the Cheat, US federal investigators had gotten involved. The Feds have powers that allow them to dig deeper than journalists, and Armstrong’s former teammates quickly learned that while they could tell little white lies to journalists, they couldn’t lie under oath.

Only when the police got interested in the minutiae of football’s governing body, FIFA, and the athletics federation, IAAF, did we discover the extent of the corruption in both organisations. Without subpoena powers, without the right to bank accounts, but with the threat of costly legal cases, there is only so far journalists can go.

We came to know how rotten things were in the state of the Tour de France when French customs pulled over a team car on the Franco–Belge border at 6 am on a July morning in 1998. With FIFA, it was the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) arrest of US delegate Chuck Blazer that proved to be the turning point. Blazer spilt the beans and plenty of barons were in trouble. French police are now doing the same for the IAAF, showing the most powerful that they’re not as untouchable as they might have thought.

How did it get to this? Good people stayed quiet when they should have spoken up. Anyone who pushed for good governance in these organisations was putting themselves in an uncomfortable position. Few were prepared to do that. It was easier to look the other way, to travel on the gravy train and not pull the emergency cord. This longing to indulge the irresponsibility of not knowing has been the rock upon which the corruption was built.

Those who said nothing – they and their sports have paid a high price. Paul Simon wrote about this a long time ago in ‘The Sound of Silence’: “Fool, said I, you do not know. Silence, like a cancer grows” (Simon 1964).

How we have needed courageous people. Take the IOC and the privileges of its members. Forget the courtesy cars and five-star hotels, the access to the best tickets and the lavish banquets. Instead, consider the daily allowance. Board members on IOC duty receive a daily $900 allowance, $450 for common or garden members (IOC Ethics Commission 2015). It adds up when you spend maybe two and a half weeks at the Olympics, which even an IOC member wouldn’t dare to call hard work.

As much as there is an urge to say that these allowances are far too much, it is worth pointing out that, among the major sports bodies, the IOC is the only one that publicly discloses information such as per diem allowances to its members. This level of compensation does beg the question, ‘Who is serving whom?’ Is it the IOC members who serve the Olympics or the Olympics that serves its committee members?

There is a culture of entitlement that needs to end, because excessive privilege can often be the precursor to corruption: “If I am entitled to this, perhaps I can also get that.” Somewhere along the way, a lot of FIFA administrators came to see not much difference between privilege and wrongdoing – like one was the logical extension of the other.

Let me tell you about Vitaly Stepanov, the courageous whistle-blower who did so much to bring to light the doping secrets in Russian sport. He was recently asked to meet IAAF officials in a major city. To get there, he had to take a six-hour flight. IAAF booked the ticket and when it landed in Stepanov’s email, he realised it was a first-class flight (Walsh 2014).

Surprised and unimpressed to have found himself immediately drawn into this world of privilege, Stepanov rang his IAAF contact and said he had no wish to travel first- class. He considered the excessive cost could be far better spent on fighting the doping culture that he had exposed. Will sports officials ever get the message? (Walsh 2014).

For inspiration, they might care to turn their eyes to the example being set by Pope Francis, leader of the Catholic Church. When he turned up in Washington to meet President Obama, it was easy to pick out his car in the motorcade of more than 20 SUVs and police cars. He was inside the charcoal grey Fiat 500L, which was maybe a tiny step up, or down, from the Ford Focus he drives around the Vatican.

“I’m visible to people and I lead a normal life,” Pope Francis has said. “Public Mass in the morning, I eat in the refectory with everyone else, etc. All this is good for me and prevents me from being isolated. I’m trying to stay and act the same as I did in Buenos Aires because, if you change at my age, you just look ridiculous” (Pope Francis 2013, paraphrased).

How many high-ranking sports officials have thought that if that little Fiat is good for the Pope, it is good enough for me? How many believe they should have lives somewhat akin to the lives of fans upon whose loyalty their games are built? The IOC needs to lower those allowances and FIFA’s new president, whoever they are, needs to embrace a more modest lifestyle.

Transparency must become the norm and proper governance needs to be at the top of every agenda. For too long, good governance has been nothing but a PR sound bite. Trust will be regained when they show us they have changed, not when they tell us.

We need governments to lead as well, to say to sport’s wrongdoers that you are not part of some separate untouchable state. Do wrong and you will be held accountable. The Wild West is no more. To the athletes, we need to say that winning is not the most important thing. How you try to win is what matters.

Would you rather be top of the medal table with cheats or bottom with a group of totally honest athletes? Governments need to stop seeing the prowess of their athletes as a sign of national strength. For that too is another road leading to corruption. Better in my view for a government to understand that what truly matters is how many of its citizens are active.

We need to stop wearing our country’s success in sport like a badge of honour, for it matters not a whit whether we’re first or second in the medals table. It is Vitaly Stepanov, the Russian whistle-blower, to whom we should listen. He reminds us of what matters, and what doesn’t.

“Personally, I don’t like this whole idea of countries and nationalism and all of that. Things must be done that serve the planet not for the country. Same in sport, I don’t care that a Russian wins or an American wins. If the competition is fair, if the best one wins, that’s good. If a person is honest, talented, has a good coach and he is raised properly and he becomes an Olympic champion then he will be a hero. And it really will not matter what country he is from. Jesse Owens became a hero for the whole world.

“I went to the Olympic museum in Lausanne. There is a saying on a wall there from Pierre de Coubertin, the father of the Olympic movement. Let me just say it. ‘The important thing in life is not the triumph but the fight. The essential thing is not to have won but to have fought well.’ This is my view of what sport should be” (Walsh 2015).

7.1 References

Ballester, P. and Walsh, D. 2004. L.A. Confidentiel: Les Secrets de Lance Armstrong. France: La Martinière.

Camus, A. 1956. The Rebel: An Essay on a Man in Revolt. New York: First Vintage International, p. 54.

International Olympic Committee (IOC) Ethics Commission. 2015. Agenda 2020: Indemnity Policy. Switzerland: IOC. Available from: http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Agenda2020/Ethics_ Commission_to_IOC_Members_IOC_Indemnity_Policy. pdf

Pope Francis. 2013. Letter to Father Enrique Rodriguez. Available online .

Simon, P. 1964. The Sound of Silence. New York: Columbia Records.

Walsh, D. 2013. Seven Deadly Sins: My Pursuit of Lance Armstrong. UK: Simon & Schuster.

Walsh, D. 14 December 2014. Russian doping whistleblower fears for his safety. The Sunday Times. Available from: http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/sport/athletics/ article1495850.ece

Walsh, D. 29 November 2015. Husband and wife who brought down Russia. The Sunday Times. Available from: http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/sport/athletics/ article1638611.ece

World Anti-Doping Agency. 2016. Independent Commission Report – Part 2. Available online .

8. President Muhammadu Buhari: My plan to fight corruption in Nigeria

In the run-up to the general elections in March 2015, I campaigned on the platform of addressing the challenges of security, the economy, power, infrastructure and fighting corruption. Of these, removing the cancer of corruption from the system is the key not only to restoring the moral health of the nation, but also to freeing our enormous resources for urgent socio-economic development.

Nigerians never cease to ask, for example, why it is that, at independence in 1960, Nigeria’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was higher at $559 than that of Singapore’s at $476, but today Singapore’s GDP has grown to $55,182 and Nigeria’s has increased to just $3,005 (World Bank 2016).

For sure, there are many variables to explain this paradox of a city-state with a small population outperforming Nigeria so dramatically. But the most important single factor, to my mind, is our two countries’ contrasting leadership visions and attitudes to corruption. As Alan Greenspan (2007) has observed, “Corruption, embezzlement, fraud, these are all characteristics which exist everywhere. It is regrettably the way human nature functions, whether we like it or not. What successful economies do is to keep it to a minimum.” Unfortunately, successive Nigerian governments have simply been unable to contain the monster.

8.1 Corruption in Nigeria

Oil and gas are the second largest contributors to our GDP and account for more than 80% of our foreign exchange earnings. Yet this is the most corruption-ridden sector of our economy. By some industry estimates, 232,000 barrels of crude oil worth on average $6.7 billion per annum are lost by the Nigerian state to oil thieves (Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2010). This illicit trade thrives as a result of collaboration among politicians, security agencies, criminal gangs and even multinational oil company employees. As the Financial Times reported, the enormity of the problem is captured in satellite imageries showing the illicit oil trade “expanding exponentially between 2008 and 2013, at the same time as artisanal [illegal] refining was mushrooming across the Niger Delta on an industrial scale” (Wallis 2015).

The abuse and misuse of public office for private gain has been a constant feature of governance in Nigeria for the past 30 years. In the last two decades especially, corruption – with its corresponding devastating socio-economic consequences on national development and the well-being of our people – escalated rapidly and with even greater intensity. Our recent history has been one of predatory and rapacious political, military, public and private sector elites competing and alternating as the drivers of corruption. Paradoxically, corruption flourished and eventually became a way of life under the supposedly accountable democratic governments of the past 16 years during which, by one calculation, the nation earned more revenue than in all the previous 80 years combined.

Even as far back as the 1980s, procurement and contract costs in Nigeria were three times higher than those in East and North Africa, and four times higher than those in Asia. Studies suggest that public funds of between $300 billion and $400 billion have been lost to corruption since Nigeria became independent in 1960 (Ezekwesili 2012). According to the African Union’s high-level panel on illicit flows, Nigeria alone accounted for $217 billion of the African continent’s total $850 billion loss to illicit flows between 1970 and 2008 (UNECA 2015).

Despite anti-corruption agencies and laws introduced in recent years, there was a complete lack of political will to strengthen these agencies and to faithfully enforce the laws. As one commentator observed, across the entire spectrum of government, rules and regulations were ignored with impunity. Procurements were made with a total disregard for due process, inflated by billions of dollars and poorly executed, and payments were made for jobs not even done. No wonder then that Nigeria consistently scored below the African average in virtually all the categories considered by various transparency and good governance agencies: safety and the rule of law, ease of doing business, participation and human rights, sustainable economic opportunities and human development (Transparency International 2016).

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2016) has correctly identified that pervasive corruption undermines democratic institutions, slows economic development and contributes to governmental instability. Corruption erodes the moral fabric of society and violates the social and economic rights of citizens, particularly the poor and the vulnerable. Actually it creates poverty and hurts the poor disproportionately, because resources are diverted away from those who need government protection and services the most.

Indeed corrupt politicians, in collusion with electoral officials, have consistently distorted our electoral processes and perverted the rule of law, thereby undermining our democracy. Corrupt practices such as illegal duty and tax waivers lead to loss of revenue. Corruption drives away foreign direct investment with its consequential loss of opportunities for increased government revenue, job creation and skills acquisition. It erodes efficiency, effectiveness and productivity, while promoting waste and mismanagement.

The resultant inequality in society – with extreme mass poverty living side by side with islands of stupendous unearned riches – has led to frustration, hopelessness and despair, and laid the foundation for militancy and insurgency. Corruption in Nigeria has resulted in the decay of infrastructure, a lack of social services and the collapse of the institutions to fix them. The question then arises as to why and how Nigeria descended to become such a sorry example of a rich yet poor country.

8.2 How did this happen?

There are many predisposing factors to corruption in Nigeria. First, there is the distortion of values and the cultural context. In many communities, as indeed everywhere else in the world, material success is celebrated and emulated. In Nigeria, however, a further weakening of values occurred somewhere down the line, eroding the traditional mechanism of checks on the illegal, primitive and ostentatious accumulation and display of wealth. Dislocation of communities and urbanisation partly account for this.

Second, a strong culture of ethnicity and nepotism encourages corruption because it influences the irrational allocation of resources and the protection of culprits.

Third, there is a culture of elite exceptionalism whereby high public-office holders and the wealthy feel that, by virtue of their status, stature or position, they are exempted from the laws and rules regulating society.

Fourth, and most insidious, is the pervasive culture of impunity across the social strata, which is, in turn, fuelled by a legal system bedevilled by delays. The egregious culture of impunity has itself sabotaged and stultified the growth of the rule of law.

Finally, the single biggest contributor to corruption in Nigeria is the lack of political will among the leadership of the country in the past to tackle it. There are sufficient laws in the statute books, and robust rules, regulations and clearly set out procedures throughout the public service. But the institutions established to fight corruption either lacked the desire, the capacity and drive to tackle it or were deliberately subverted or circumvented.

8.3 Proposals to curb corruption in Nigeria

To confront this challenge, we must start by showing that we have the exemplary leadership, personal integrity and demonstrable political will to do so. Democratic governance based on individual liberties, human rights, a free press and the rule of law requires us to be fair and just in dealing with all cases of corruption. There must be transparency and a strict adherence to due process – however painstaking the effort and however slowly the wheel of justice turns under this setting. At the same time, we must be accountable and remain faithful to our oath of office whereby we swore to do justice to all manner of people without fear or favour. We must, like Caesar’s wife, be seen at all times to be beyond reproach in order to cast the first of any stones. Thus, though not required by law, my vice-president and I began my tenure by publicly declaring our assets, to be compared with our net worth on leaving office.

As I noted earlier, there exists a plethora of laws, rules and regulations to ensure good governance in Nigeria. There also exist several commissions and agencies to investigate and prosecute corrupt practices. We need not create any new ones unless absolutely necessary. We only need to strengthen, adequately fund and motivate the existing ones to do their jobs.

We shall also encourage independence of action and avoidance of self-censorship by anti-corruption agencies. No one will be presented as a ‘sacred cow’ beyond the reach of the law.

In the fight against corruption, citizen involvement and demand side activism are key components. Most of our people, especially those in the rural areas who are poor, ignorant and illiterate, do not make the link between corruption and their lack of access to healthcare, education and other facilities, even where they exist. They are too poor, too dependent and too powerless to demand accountability from their State or local governments. We shall therefore encourage the civil society, faith-based groups and community associations to challenge corruption within their communities. In this regard, we shall review our communication strategy towards a more open and transparent government by sharing information, encouraging citizen empowerment and supporting social actions to challenge corrupt practices by public officials at the federal state and local government levels.

In our model of democracy, there is a clear separation of powers between the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary. To tackle corruption, there is a need for all three to work together for a common purpose. Towards this end, we are ready to engage with the Legislature and the Judiciary, state governments and all organs of government to ensure the necessary synergy towards effectively combating corruption.

Early in the life of this administration, I constituted a Presidential Advisory Committee on Anti-Corruption – made up of experts and persons of integrity – to oversee our anti-corruption effort, promote the reform agenda of the Government and co-ordinate the implementation plan for anti-corruption legislation and other interventions. Among other things, the Committee will also articulate and report on strategies towards repositioning and strengthening our agencies. These include the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), the Code of Conduct Bureau (CCB) and the Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT), and the ways in which our criminal justice administration may be improved.

Given the transnational operations of criminals and the multi-jurisdictional effect of corruption, we will also intensify our collaboration with the international community. This includes international anti-corruption agencies and institutions such as the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and other development partners. We also commit ourselves to compliance with the country’s international obligations under international treaties and conventions such as the United Nations Convention on Anti- Corruption (UNCAC) (UNODC 2015).

8.4 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission

Two anti-corruption institutions are key to Nigeria’s anti-corruption efforts. These are the EFCC and the ICPC. We are aware that both are presently not working at maximum potential owing to a myriad of challenges, which include overlaps in mandate, gaps in operational legislation and funding, a human capital deficiency, leadership inadequacy and internal corruption.

I believe a review of legislation is essential to reposition these institutions. For example, currently the ICPC can only begin anti-corruption investigations in response to petitions from the public. We want to change that, revising the ICPC Act to increase the Commission’s powers to initiate investigations into cases of corruption (ICPC 2016).

This would include:

  • Granting the ICPC the power to commence assets forfeiture proceedings, as is the case in the US, UK and South Africa. Illegally acquired properties may then be seized where the suspected owner is a fugitive, disclaims ownership or cannot be located despite diligent efforts.
  • Streamlining the jurisdiction of the ICPC by reducing areas of overlap with the EFCC, thus giving each agency areas of primary jurisdictional responsibility.
  • Giving the ICPC power to accept material assistance from international institutions and development partners, as well as to access funds from global anti-corruption agencies, which the present ICPC Act prohibits.

Similarly, as part of the EFCC legislative review, we will focus on:

  • Empowering the Commission to presume that a person has illegally enriched themselves where such a person owns, possesses or controls an interest in any property that cannot be justified by present or past emoluments or circumstances.
  • Streamlining the jurisdiction of the EFCC to reduce overlap with the ICPC mandate.
  • Securing the forfeiture of illegally acquired properties where the suspected owner is a fugitive, disclaims ownership or cannot be located despite diligent efforts.
  • Separating the agency for financial intelligence gathering from the EFCC. The Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit, which operates as an arm of the EFCC, needs to be independent in order to enhance its operational autonomy.

We intend to work with the Legislature to implement all these necessary reforms. It’s also critical that these two agencies charged with fighting corruption and financial crimes collaborate closely with development partners for technical assistance, staff training and data sharing.

As international co-operation continues to reduce the number of havens for hiding the proceeds of crime, new havens are emerging. We need therefore to enhance the scope of our mutual legal assistance agreements to widen the net we cast to recover illicit funds and secure the forfeiture of unexplainable assets.

In this regard, the agencies will also need to be more proactive in leveraging the legislations of foreign jurisdictions such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (US Department of Justice 2015). Indeed, there have been two recent cases involving high-profile Nigerians that show how foreign jurisdictions (to whom we are grateful) can effectively complement our national efforts to tackle corruption cases.

Pursuant to action taken by the US under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Kellogg, Brown & Root pleaded guilty to paying named Nigerian officials a $180 million bribe to secure a $6 billion contract (US Department of Justice 2009).

In another notorious case, all numerous counts of corruption filed against a former governor of a state were dismissed by a court in Nigeria only for the same politician to be convicted in the UK – based on the same evidence!

These kinds of prosecution lapses in major corruption cases arise because of the slow nature of trials, especially of corruption cases, in our system. Typically, corruption trials involving high-profile public officers last an average of 8 to 10 years or, if they go to appeal, 15 years. In such a situation, prosecution and judicial fatigue set in.

It’s standard practice for senior defence lawyers to use legal technicalities such as preliminary objections to challenge the jurisdiction of the court, requesting stay of proceedings and appealing interlocutory or preliminary matters, or for courts to oblige the accused with injunctions (sometimes perpetual), restraining anti-corruption agencies from investigating, arresting or prosecuting the suspected persons!

However, with the passage of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) 2015, which seeks to limit such abuses, we hope to see significant progress (Federal Ministry of Justice 2015). The ACJA contains several innovations with the potential to significantly improve criminal justice administration in Nigeria. For example, it states that an application for a stay of proceedings shall not be entertained, that all preliminary objections shall be considered along with the substantive issues and that a ruling shall be made thereon at the time of delivery of judgment.

8.5 The Code of Conduct Bureau

The CCB was created 36 years ago to ensure probity and accountability. This includes setting out a comprehensive code of conduct for public officers such as declaring their assets and liabilities, and those of members of their families, when they assume and subsequently leave public office. It has powers to apprehend offending public officers and arraign them before the CCT. Yet in spite of the glaring and widespread corruption by political appointees and other public servants, the Bureau has hardly used its powers and, where it has, only low-level public officers have been apprehended and brought before the CCT.

Lee Kuan Yew (2000), writing on corruption in his book, From Third World To First, The Singapore Story: 1965– 2000, stated that: “The most effective change we made in 1960 was to allow the courts to treat proof that an accused was living beyond his or her means or had property or income they could not explain as corroborating evidence of corruption.”

Nigeria has had a similar provision at paragraph 11(3) of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, which provides that any property acquired by a public officer that is not fairly attributable to his income shall be deemed to have been acquired in breach of the Code (International Centre of Nigerian Law [ICNL] 1999). In its 36 years of existence, the CCB has never invoked this provision. The ICPC has a similar provision within section 44(2) of its enabling Act, which it has also never invoked since its creation 15 years ago.

The CCB is fundamentally hampered by the fact that there is no requirement for public officers’ asset declarations to be published. So to lead by example, my vice-president and I voluntarily submitted our assets declaration, hoping that other members of my Government would do the same.

But beyond this, the CCB simply lacks the capacity to verify the claims made in the thousands of assets forms submitted. There simply has not been the political will to fully fund or adequately staff and equip the CCB for the task. In co-operation with the National Assembly, we shall look for ways and means to make the required appropriation. We shall also seek co-operation and assistance from our development partners in the areas of computerisation of the operations of the CCB and Land Registries, with links to the operations of the Nigerian Stock Exchange, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Corporate Affairs Commission (our Companies Registry) to enhance and facilitate assets tracing. Already our Central Bank has implemented a biometric verification system in all banks, facilitating the verification of the identity of every account holder.

8.6 The Code of Conduct Tribunal

Like the CCB, the CCT was established more than three decades ago. Its purpose was to adjudicate on breaches of the Code of Conduct by public officers, which were referred to it by the CCB. In the absence of a functioning CCB, the CCT too has been doomed to failure, applying its powers to impose sanctions – such as removal from office, bans from holding public office and the forfeiture of corruptly acquired property – only to minor cases.

8.7 The Nigeria Police

The Nigeria Police, like the police everywhere, are primarily tasked with maintaining law and order. Its involvement with corruption cases and financial crimes is peripheral except in cases like theft. But the potential for compromised anti- corruption operatives remains a problem across our public sector. And the police are no exception. Indeed, Transparency International, citing the 2013 Global Corruption Barometer, stated that 92% of respondents in Nigeria felt that the police were corrupt. We are aware of this general perception of the Nigeria Police and we shall take steps for its reform.

8.8 The Judiciary

The other institution that is critical to our ability to successfully combat corruption is the adjudicating agency or the Judiciary. Yet our Judiciary itself is perceived to be corrupt. As in other areas, it’s a difficult allegation to prove. From their pronouncements, it’s clear that the leadership of the Judiciary is aware of this general perception. It cannot be swept under the carpet, especially given the odious nature of many decisions from the Bench. These include granting perpetual injunctions, restraining the police and anti-corruption agencies from investigating, arresting or prosecuting high-profile politicians and the other examples I have already cited.

Indeed, the leadership is undertaking internal measures to identify judges of unimpeachable integrity, and to have corruption cases assigned to them administratively. They are similarly making efforts to cleanse the system by identifying compromised judges for disciplinary measures, including retirement. The discipline of judges, however, is the responsibility of the National Judicial Council established by the Constitution. There have been observations about the Council’s composition, the mode of appointment to it and how to make it broader-based in representation. These are matters for the Judiciary to consider.

Finally, we are undertaking administrative measures in the following areas to strengthen our anti-corruption crusade more generally:

Addressing poor remuneration in the public service

Alongside our wider reforms of the public sector, we need to look into appropriate remuneration for some categories of civil servants. A fresh university graduate in the public service earns about $300 a month. Unfortunately, inflationary pressures and increases in the cost of living make corrupt ways of supplementing legitimate income more attractive.

Again, Lee Kuan Yew (2000) said that one of the ways he dealt with corruption in the public service was to drastically increase the salaries of the accounting officers, putting them almost on a par with similar heads of private sector organisations. While this isn’t an immediate possibility for us, given our current economic circumstances, we do propose to finance some increases in critical functions related to public service wages, using part of the freed-up funds gained from recovered looted assets, reductions in waste and the plugging of leaks. However, there may also be need for a downward review of the emoluments, allowances and entitlements of certain public officers.

Reforming the oil sector

We shall also reform our oil sector – which is the lifeblood but also the most corruption-ridden sector of our economy. To that end, we will:

  • Publish quarterly audits of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation.
  • End the opacity in the swapping of crude oil for refined products, which has created avenues for corruption.
  • Improve internal refining capacity with a view to ending, in 2016, the clearly unsustainable 1 trillion Naira (N) subsidy on imported petroleum products.
  • Engender transparency in the purchase of all refined products by publishing purchases and reconciling the amounts against consumption figures.
  • Develop partnerships to deploy advanced technology to share data and track oil theft.
  • Increase the participation of Nigeria in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).

Improving financial management

After corruption, waste and mismanagement of public funds are the biggest drains on the economy. Even before the present economic downturn, reducing them had become imperative. For years, recurrent expenditure had been at 70 - 80% of the national budget with emoluments of senior public officers being the major expenditure heads.

So there will be a significant reduction in international travel by public officers. We will ensure that public officers travel only when absolutely necessary and, when they do, there will be a restriction placed on classes of travel.

In addition, the Federal Ministry of Finance has now established an Efficiency Unit to monitor all ministries, departments and agencies. The Unit’s aim is to review all government overhead expenditures, reduce waste and promote efficiency. We shall also vigorously enforce the Public Procurement Act to ensure that due process is followed in government procurements (Bureau of Public Procurement 2012).

Following decades of a lack of oversight over government revenues, receipts and income flow, we have recently reverted to constitutionalism and consolidated all government accounts into a Treasury Single Account maintained by the Central Bank of Nigeria. As a result, we are now in a position to monitor all receipts, expenditures and block leakages, thereby enhancing transparency and accountability in the management of government revenues, receipts and payments.

We will run a leaner Government, reducing the number of ministries and reviewing the proliferation of parastatals and agencies. Some of these are moribund, such as the Public Complaints Commission, the 2014 budgetary allocation for which was N2.927 billion – all of it was spent on salaries.

Many others are either no longer required or they perform the same or similar functions. These include the National Office for Technology Acquisition and Promotion, with its 2014 budget allocation of N466 million to boost locally generated technology. In the same vein, the Nigeria Information Technology Development Agency had a 2014 budget allocation of N339.01 million to develop information technology.

Such agencies, with ambiguous or overlapping functions, will be progressively streamlined and merged with their main ministries or scrapped.

I will conclude by reiterating that the immediate and long- term benefits of curbing corruption in Nigeria are pretty obvious to us. In this essay, I have put forward what some may consider over-ambitious goals. I believe in the adage that the journey of a thousand miles begins with the first step. I have the will to take this first step. And with sustained effort, we shall reach our target of freeing-up sufficient funds to accelerate the development of critical infrastructure such as railways, roads and power; invest in health and education consistent with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals; pursue our social programmes such as skills acquisition and poverty alleviation; and create an enabling environment for the diversification of our economy, with investments in agriculture, solid minerals, petrochemicals and allied industries.

These outcomes will encourage local and foreign direct investments, job creation, and reductions in poverty, crime and insecurity. As Sarah Chayes has observed, “Corruption has helped fuel most of the serious crises the world has witnessed in the past decade. It swells the ranks of terrorist movements, weakens local opposition to them, facilitates their activities and hollows out militaries tasked with combating them. It sparks angry protests that can turn into revolutions with unknown second and third order effects such as those in the Arab world in 2011” (Kirkpatrick 2015).

It is therefore in our national interest, and that of the international community, to fight corruption not only within national boundaries but also globally, through concerted international action.

8.9 References

Bureau of Public Procurement. 2012. Bureau of Public Procurement. Available online .

Ezekwesili, O. 28 August 2012. Corruption, National Development, the Bar and the Judiciary. Abula: 52nd Annual General Meeting (AGM) of the Nigerian Bar Association.

Federal Ministry of Justice. 2015. Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015. Available online .

Greenspan, A. 24 September 2007. Alan Greenspan vs. Naomi Klein. Democracy Now! Available [online] (http://www.democracynow.org/2007/9/24/alan_greenspan_ vs_naomi_klein_on).

Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC). 2016. The Establishment Act. Available [online] (http://icpc.gov.ng/the-establishment-act/).

International Centre of Nigerian Law (ICNL). 1999. Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. Available online

Kar, D. and Cartwright-Smith, D. 2010. Illicit Financial Flows From Africa: Hidden Resource for Development. Washington DC: Global Financial Integrity. Available [online] (http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/reports/ gfi_africareport_web.pdf).

Kirkpatrick, J. 30 September 2015. Interview – Sarah Chayes. E-International Relations. Available [online] (http://www.e-ir.info/2015/09/30/interview-sarah-chayes/).

Transparency International. 2013. Global Corruption Barometer. Available [online] (http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013).

Transparency International. 2016. Corruption by Country – Nigeria. Available [online] (https://www.transparency.org/country/#NGA).

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA). February 2015. Track it. Stop it. Get it: Report of the High Level Pane on Illicit Finance Flows from Africa. Africa: UNECA. Available [online] (http://www.uneca.org/sites/default/files/PublicationFiles/ iff_main_report_26feb_en.pdf).

United Nations – Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2015. United Nations Convention against Corruption: Signature and Ratification Status as of 1 December 2015. Available [online] (https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories. html).

United Nations – Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2016. UNODC’s Action against Corruption and Economic Crime. Available online .

US Department of Justice. 11 February 2009. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million Criminal Fine. Available online .

US Department of Justice. 23 September 2015. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Available [online] (http://www.justice.gov/criminal-fraud/foreign-corrupt- practices-act).

Wallis, W. 26 May 2015. Nigeria: The big oil fix. Financial Times. Available [online] (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/be2a72de-f30f-11e4-a979- 00144feab7de.html#axzz3yeg9x1Nz)

World Bank. 12 January 2016. GDP per Capita: Nigeria and Singapore (1960–2014). Available [online] (https://goo.gl/LNl6ez).

Yew, L. K. 2000. From Third World to First, The Singapore Story: 1965–2000. UK: Harper Collins.

9. President Ashraf Ghani: Driving corruption out of procurement

9.1 introduction.

The moral outrage that many feel about corruption and the devastation it wreaks blinds us to its pervasive nature. But it is imperative we recognise that, in a number of countries, corruption is not an aberration within an otherwise well- functioning system of public governance. It is part and parcel of the system itself – reinforced by the fragmented nature of these countries’ governments, producing predictable, self- perpetuating costs for national development.

If we’re to tackle corruption effectively, we must identify and understand the systemic drivers that enable corrupt practices to thrive and reproduce. This essay argues that corruption is, at its core, a failure of individual and institutional accountability that allows officials to divert public resources from their intended uses.

But if the problem to solve in a country like Afghanistan is a lack of accountability, the actions needed to change it must overcome the fact that the government institutions, which are expected to carry out the reforms, are themselves highly fragmented. Reforms from outside the system can make some progress, but fragmentation means that these reforms will always be partial and temporary. In fragmented systems, only strong, national political leadership can tackle corruption at its roots. This is because only the top political leadership can look across the different arenas and ministries where corruption happens, in order to provide an effective agenda for reform. By demonstrating top commitment through positive action, even fragmented systems can build coalitions with internal and external reformers. But somebody must open the door.

9.2 Classifying accountability

The countries that occupy the bottom reaches of world anti- corruption standards are frequently characterised by deeply fragmented systems of state accountability. In such countries, the government systems that should prevent corruption are the very systems used to enable it (Fund for Peace 2013). This includes core operations such as procurement, financial management, recruitment, audit, legislation and justice.

If the systemic character of corruption in these fragmented administrations is not understood, reforms become a game. Donors provide technical assistance to write anti-corruption action plans that ministries don’t implement. Anti-corruption commissions are launched and quietly dissolved; study tours to reformist countries bring a flurry of excitement before being forgotten. None of these exercises make a serious dent in the fundamental problem of institutionalised corruption, because they assume that corruption can be tackled by suppressing its symptoms and they thus fail to address its structural drivers. Although some sections of the government may indeed be committed to reform, frequently they are kept there for appearances only, not to achieve any actual progress in the fight against corruption.

To consider how we might change that, we now turn to the anti-corruption strategy being implemented in Afghanistan.

9.3 Reforming corruption in fragmented accountability systems: the case of Afghanistan

By any measure, Afghanistan is one of the most corrupt countries on earth. Fifty years of near constant conflict have destroyed both social and institutional controls. The flood of money that poured into the country for reconstruction after the overthrow of the Taliban in late 2001 further fragmented and reduced its systems of accountability.

When the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan took office in October 2014, we were united in our commitment to bring an end to corruption and the impunity that surrounded it. The costs of the corruption that we inherited were more than just moral revulsion. They had significant effects on national development. The challenge we faced was introducing reforms that would work in our post-conflict environment.

The departure of the international forces between 2012 and 2014 meant that the large volumes of financial support that accompanied the troops came to a sudden end. Government and donors agreed that the apparatus of corruption that had formed around the allocation of aid funding meant that, without reform, it would be impossible to switch into a private sector led growth strategy. Endless bribery would keep Afghanistan uncompetitive and poor.

As a country threatened by both internal violence and external attacks, establishing the government’s legitimacy is vital to maintain social order. But a history of state corruption has undermined the citizenry’s belief that government courts could credibly dispense justice; that government police would provide order; and that government agencies would represent the public’s interests fairly, rather than just hand out licences to rich bidders (Asia Foundation 2014).

9.4 Diagnosing where corruption happens

Just as long-distance travellers benefit from having a well-defined roadmap to reach their destination, our anti-corruption strategy began by mapping out the landscape of corruption in Afghanistan. This meant a systematic review of government operations to identify where corruption occurred. We found that state-sponsored corruption was everywhere. Particular areas of concern were:

Land grabbing Whereas in traditional Afghan society and under Islamic law, clear property rights provide strong social protections, land grabbing in Afghanistan had turned property into a source of discord, distrust and exclusion. As a result of land grabs, the private sector was denied access to property for investment, while the poor were driven into substandard and insecure housing.

Government appointments People widely believe that appointments to the government are secured through patronage and payment. The Ministry of Finance informed the Cabinet that national revenue could be doubled if civil servants were not paying back the costs of their appointments.

Banking The Kabul Bank became the emblem for the looting of public resources. Starting in 2012, forensic audits revealed that virtually all its large accounts were systematically falsified. Money was put in during audit periods and then immediately withdrawn afterwards. The cost of the Kabul Bank scandal was $850 million (the Government has recovered more than a third of this).

Customs Afghanistan has always relied on customs fees. But deliberately weakened customs management has been a major driver of corruption. Afghanistan’s Central Statistics Office records approximately $1.1 billion in imports from Pakistan – but statistics from Pakistan report $2.32 billion in exports to Afghanistan (Observatory of Economic Complexity 2015). Nor does the bribery stop at the border. Studies of transport routes reveal that over a 100-mile stretch there can be as many as 12 posts, each demanding bribes.

Natural resource exploitation Afghanistan is developing the early symptoms of the resource curse, the syndrome whereby rich natural resources, which could in principle make a poor country well off, instead end up becoming a locus for corruption and the capture of that natural wealth by small elites. The worst manifestation is in mining, where corrupt licensing and procurement produce rapacious and destructive mining practices.

Smuggling and narcotics As with the drug trade everywhere, regional and global networks make the illicit economy a significant driver of corruption. More recently, violent and dangerous narcotics smugglers have expanded their field of activity to cover human trafficking and control over irregular migration from Afghanistan to Eurasia.

9.5 Corruption, procurement and reform

There is no quick fix to end this type of systemic corruption. However, we can see some ways forward if we look beneath the surface of where corruption happens to the processes by which government can abet or control corruption.

In Afghanistan, instead of being the systems for government accountability, procurement, financial management, recruitment, audit, legislation and the administration of justice have become the drivers that explain how corruption persists. Within a fragmented system like this, a reformist government can only turn its commitment to reform into practical action if it rebuilds those systems from the inside out.

To demonstrate how that can work in practice, the remainder of this paper will explore the Afghan Government’s efforts to reform the procurement process.

At its most basic, public procurement is how the government uses competition to get the public the best value at the lowest cost. Reforming how governments go about buying goods and services may not seem an especially exciting place to start systems reform, especially when compared with high-profile prosecutions or investigative reporting and publication. But procurement lies at the heart of what governments ‘do’. Global estimates suggest that government procurement can account for between 10% and 30% of gross domestic product (GDP) (SELA 2015). And when public procurement is infected by corruption, the effect on government performance and value to the taxpayer is catastrophic.

Procurement in Afghanistan has traditionally exhibited all the symptoms of a fragmented and corrupt system of government accountability. Forensic reviews repeatedly show a systematic rigging of competitive bidding, usually through the inclusion of non-existent companies to give the appearance of competition when there is in fact none. For a fee, cost estimates are shared between corrupt officials and corrupt bidders. Rules to block conflicts of interest are routinely subverted by companies owned by the relatives of high-ranking officials whose only ‘business’ is to provide access.

Not all corruption in procurement takes place behind the scenes. Threats of violence, kidnapping and bribery are used to force legitimate competitors to withdraw or alter their bids. Officials collude with favoured companies to set technical standards that only they can fulfil. Corrupt practices do not end at contract negotiations. Manipulating procurement so that low-quality goods are delivered rather than the higher-quality supplies that were procured and invoiced is a pervasive practice that leads to collapsed infrastructure, massive overcharging and poor-quality services. Procurement therefore provides an acid test of whether the new Government’s commitments to bring about systemic change will really be backed by political will and structural change.

The two key reforms in the first stage of the Afghan Government’s strategy are the formation of a National Procurement Council (NPC) to review all high-value contracts and the consolidation of construction contracts through two specialised agencies.

Centralising procurement was not the only route to reform open to us, but it enabled us to tackle the structural issues that allowed corruption to thrive. Reforming corruption ministry by ministry was not only far beyond the limited capacities of the Government, but it would also have left untouched the underlying incentives that drove this corruption in the first place. Only through sustained top- level oversight to create the accountability needed, combined with technical expertise, could we ever hope to change the bureaucratic culture.

9.6 Building the machinery of reform

To underscore the top-level commitment of the national leadership to bring corruption to an end, the NPC is chaired by me, the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Afghanistan’s chief executive officer, the second vice- president and the ministers for finance, economy and justice also attend the weekly council meeting. Such high-levelparticipation is needed not just to send a symbolic message to the country at large, but also to present a unified front to the entrenched interests within the government itself that will resist reforms.

We are supported by an Office of Procurement staffed by Afghans who have been trained in professional procurement and who have the specialised expertise needed to understand the details of bids. Because such a large share of the Afghan budget is spent on security, the Government also gets technical support from the NATO military command to help review military contracts.

Public transparency is built into the process. Our weekly procurement review meetings include a representative of Integrity Watch (an international non-governmental organisation [NGO]), the US’s special oversight expenditure review body (SIGAR) and a rotating member of the Afghan Parliament’s Caucus on Integrity. Minutes of our meetings and all decisions are placed on an updated, publicly accessible website (Government of Afghanistan 2016), and our team provides regular briefings for journalists, donors and the Afghan media. Transparency has enabled us to begin to build trust in government.

The first major test of our work came in the security sector. Civil society and whistle-blowers had made serious allegations over a $400 million fuel contract awarded by the outgoing Government’s Ministry of Defence. In response to these allegations, the bid was reopened. A preliminary review found credible evidence of malfeasance. We suspended the contract and appointed a high-level commission of inquiry to review this and an additional nine major fuel contracts. The commission’s report revealed widespread subversion of the law. Unfortunately, a response was not going to be as simple as suspending the contract and starting over. Continuing the contract would have meant accepting the corruption. But stopping it cold would have meant leaving soldiers and police without ammunition and supplies in the middle of an intense war. This is a strong example of how corruption in procurement can have detrimental consequences for national security and the safety of our people. Given this dilemma, what were we to do?

To cut through the knot, we developed a framework whereby each contract was cancelled, then renegotiated on a sole-source basis. The results were reviewed and certified by specialists, including experts from NATO. The NPC then re-examined each case to confirm that the results met procedural and value-for-money standards, and the results were placed on its public website.

The same framework is now being applied to the Ministry of Interior. Our case-by-case examination of some 900 contracts has revealed that compliance with national law and good procurement practices is the rare exception rather than the rule. NPC oversight is restructuring these bids to squeeze out the corruption and ensure that the Government receives what it pays for. Our best estimates are that this system has saved the Government at least $350 million in its first year of operation.

Presidential hands-on management of the national procurement authority is meant to send the message to our people of the Government’s commitment to reform. But it is also a temporary measure, triggered by the need to restore credibility. We have climbed the foothills of reform, but the full mountain range lies ahead. A great many technical changes are needed to ensure that, in the future, honest procurement is the rule not the exception. Now that the political door has been opened to reform, internal and external reformers can embed a great many more changes across other government operations such as publishing contracts, benchmarking bids against known unit costs and reviewing procurement rules.

Better oversight and detailed reviews of processes can address corruption when and where it occurs, but it will not change the underlying structures that enable it. For that to happen, we must make the entire government system invulnerable to exploitation and manipulation. This is a significant challenge for us. Tackling the reform of large-scale procurement is technically complex. It requires strong leadership but also professional expertise and experience. Furthermore, the structure of aid partnerships in Afghanistan has meant that each ministry has built up its own project- financed wing for procurement and construction – another example of how fragmentation allows corruption to emerge.

Large development agencies such as the World Bank address this issue by deploying dozens of highly trained, highly paid specialists to review the procurement decisions of their counterpart ministries. Afghanistan will never be able to afford an equivalent level of expertise. We need an entirely different model of how procurement happens.

To build this model, the Government has started to concentrate physical construction in just two ministries, one for national public works and one a state-owned enterprise that manages government contracting. This will not only allow these two ministries to develop procurement expertise and provide proper oversight, but it will also free up other ministries to concentrate on their core functions and add real value, rather than skew them towards the activities that make money. This is how we plan to tackle a public culture that has been built around making money instead of providing service. For example, the education ministry can improve the quality of teachers and student learning instead of lobbying for more school construction. The health ministry can focus on reducing Afghanistan’s appalling maternal mortality rates rather than dreaming about building ever more clinics that lack trained staff and proper supplies.

9.7 Complementary reforms

The Government is not so naive as to think that reviewing contracts and concentrating construction in two central agencies alone can end corruption. Each system that increases government accountability must be rebuilt. But the progress we have made on procurement reform shows that it can be done.

What comes next? Even with improved planning, clearer rules and heightened oversight, corruption will keep occurring until the likelihood of punishment reaches a level that makes officials decide that it is no longer worth the risk.

Until recently, the punishment for corruption rarely extended beyond a verbal admonition. Fiduciary oversight was in any case largely left to the donor agencies. Our next task then is to make sure that punishments fit the crimes: reform must move to the courts, the judges, the police and the prosecutors.

Here we can frankly admit that progress is slower than we expected. The Government has not been able to move as quickly on justice sector reform as it would have liked. Justice reform is particularly difficult, because a balance must be struck between maintaining the independence of the judiciary and finding ways to reform what itself has become a core driver of institutionalised corruption.

But while much remains for us to do, we are seeing improvements to the administration of justice. Government’s actions are beginning to end the regime of impunity that protected high-level culprits. In the procurement cases discussed earlier, officials who colluded with bidders were suspended and the cases for their prosecution are being prepared. Personnel actions are similarly being used to transfer officials away from positions susceptible to bribery. Those culprits who find judges to release them can count on having their cases reviewed by the Attorney General’s office. But accelerating the pace of justice sector reform is clearly the Government’s next frontier.

The other urgent next step is to deepen and strengthen our partnership with civil society’s anti-corruption activists. Our experience shows that, to have any real chance of success fighting corruption in a post-conflict society, top- level engagement and strong accountability are needed to signal that the necessary local and national will to fight corruption exists. The more that Afghanistan’s people believe that the Government is taking reform seriously, the more the Government can count on whistle-blowers and an investigative media to end the atmosphere of impunity on which a culture of corruption thrives.

Over time, more and more ministry decisions and actions on budgets, contracts and expenditures will be made public and actively disseminated through traditional and modern media. Accepting citizen feedback and monitoring must become a core part of how the government conducts its business. As with procurement, top-level leadership is needed to crack open bureaucratic resistance, after which internal and external reformers can push forward a corruption reform programme of actions. But that first step remains critical.

9.8 Conclusions

This paper has argued an approach for how states can achieve transformational change in the fight against corruption, using procurement in Afghanistan as an example.

Firstly, it shows how top-level political commitment, an electoral mandate to end corruption and government actions can together enable a series of practical actions to bring about national level reform. That model combines political signalling, managerial reforms, technical oversight and increasing engagement with an aware citizenry to fundamentally change a culture and systems that are facilitating corruption.

Secondly, it details how successful high-level reform strategies need to begin with the understanding that corruption is not a phenomenon in and of itself, but the result of fragmented regimes that lack accountability. During the war in Afghanistan, responsibility for unprecedentedly large amounts of money fell to diverse control systems, none of which had the capacity or reach to compensate for the lack of state-managed oversight. Overcoming fragmentation could only begin from the top.

This is not the only route that countries can follow. But the Afghan Government’s procurement reforms offer many valuable lessons for how to bring an end to corruption in development. Procurement everywhere accounts for a very large share of government expenditure, but in post- conflict or post-disaster countries there will always be a sudden surge of new procurement into systems without the experience to manage it. Fragmentation is built into the reconstruction process. Properly managed reform, with high- level oversight, closes down opportunities for corruption and aligns procurement designs with the institutional capacities needed to control corruption.

Procurement is especially interesting, because it is an area where governments must have the political acumen and will to navigate the trade-offs that reform will entail. Governments cannot just stop procurement while they fix the system. As the Afghan case study shows, simply stopping the procurement of obviously flawed fuel contracts in the middle of a war would have meant losing the war. But, because the governance structures were in place to allow for a sufficiently senior level of decision making, an alternative arrangement could be developed.

Afghanistan has only just started implementing the fully fledged reform needed to root out corruption. It took decades to build up a system that systematised corruption at every level. It will be many years before the Government can claim success. But the strategy and roadmap for reform are clear, and the first round of hurdles has already been passed.

Government corruption has driven a three-decades-old conflict. Corruption has blocked Afghanistan from being self-reliant and free. And corruption has wasted a vast amount of precious resources that could otherwise have been spent reducing Afghanistan’s crushing levels of poverty. Afghanistan’s citizens voted for a Government that would have the courage and commitment to break the cycle of corruption. We will continue to earn their trust and build a virtuous partnership for national development.

9.9 References

Asia Foundation. 2014. A Survey of the Afghan People. San Francisco: Asia Foundation. Available online

Fund for Peace. 2013. Fragile States Index. Washington DC: FFP Publications. Available online

Government of Afghanistan. 2016. Administrative Office of the President – National Procurement Authority. Available online

Observatory of Economic Complexity. December 2015. Country profile: Afghanistan. Available online

SELA. 2015. Public Procurement as a Tool for Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Caracas: SELA.

10. Prime Minister John Key: New Zealand: a culture of fair play

It says a lot about the New Zealand psyche that one of the most notorious acts in our sporting history involved an underarm cricket delivery.

New Zealand needed six from the last ball to tie a 1981 one-day match against Australia when Trevor Chappell strode to the crease and rolled the ball down the pitch.

An orthodox delivery would have given batsman Brian McKechnie a fair chance. The underarm version did not. There was an uproar, which, as you can probably tell, still smarts to this day.

The reaction might have been outsized, and I have no doubt Chappell is sick of hearing about it, but it was telling.

The ploy went against one of the most intrinsic aspects of our national character – a sense that we all deserve a fair crack and that we must do what is right.

It is ingrained in our psyche – we are a fundamentally honest people.

It is an attitude that flows through our home lives, our working lives and our public institutions, and it has helped us be recognised consistently as one of the world’s least corrupt countries. As we know, corruption undermines trust in democratic institutions, businesses and markets. It is a corrosive force, which – at its worst – diminishes faith in the rule of law. All of this impacts on economic and social development, distorting the playing field, making it harder for fair-minded people to prosper and for a country to support its most vulnerable.

New Zealand is uniquely placed to protect itself from corruption and to work with its neighbours to combat it in their countries. We are a multicultural, outward-looking trading nation of just 4.5 million people, a long way from the markets where we sell our goods and services, and reliant on the rule of law in the places we sell them to. In order to prosper, we have always needed not just to be good at what we do but also to be honest in how we do it.

10.1 Our constitutional arrangements

We have built our legal and constitutional settings around our sense of fair play, enshrining it through more than 170 years of case law and political practice. So, while it is based on the Westminster system, our unwritten constitution has evolved in a pragmatic way. We tend to fix things when they need fixing, ‘without necessarily relating them to any grand philosophical scheme’ (Constitution Arrangements Committee 2005). And there is a strong sense that it operates effectively because of our sense of fairness. A good example of that is our ongoing recognition of the historical injustices perpetrated on Māori by the Crown through land seizures, Treaty of Waitangi breaches and other injustices (Ministry of Justice 2016a).

The Treaty of Waitangi is a founding document of New Zealand. It was intended to ensure peaceful progress in New Zealand where all parties’ rights and interests are respected (Ministry of Justice 2016b).

But the Treaty was not always honoured by the Crown. Successive governments have endeavoured to acknowledge those injustices through the return of land and resources, and through the delivery of apologies on behalf of the Crown.

Today this process takes place largely with near-universal public and political support, because it is the right thing to do.

It is this same embedded sense of fair play that makes it difficult for corruption to take hold in New Zealand. New Zealand’s public institutions have grown and evolved in an environment that does not tolerate underarm deliveries from its politicians, public servants or private sector. As Prime Minister, I am particularly well aware of that. I am regularly held to account not just in Parliament and in the media, but by everyday New Zealanders who are never shy to tell me of any issue that they have with my Government’s performance. That is how it should be.

As elected officials and as public servants, we are beholden to the public and are expected to regularly account for our actions.

New Zealand’s highly professional public service is expected to act in accordance with the law, to be imbued with the spirit of service to the community and to give free and frank advice to ministers.

The public service is politically neutral. That neutrality means that the Government, Parliament and the public can trust advice given by officials. Merit-based appointments, made on the recommendation of the State Services Commissioner, help ensure that senior public servants do not owe their jobs and their loyalty to any politician or political party. This culture, which has been enshrined in law, ensures that even as governments and ministers change, a professional body of experts is always on hand to deliver on the agenda of the elected government.

10.2 Scrutiny of government action

As is often said, the best disinfectant is sunlight. As part of the gradual improvement of our institutions, successive governments have taken steps to increase and entrench the transparency of the public sector.

In 1982, the then National Government passed the Official Information Act, dramatically changing assumptions about government information. The law means that ministers and officials have to provide any official information requested unless there is a compelling reason not to (Ministry of Justice 2015a). While there is always a degree of tension about where the line should be drawn, the oversight of the Office of the Ombudsman ensures that openness is maintained. (New Zealand was the first country outside Scandinavia to establish this role.)

Recognising that there were significant weaknesses in the way information on the state of the government’s finances were reported, the then Labour Government passed the Public Finance Act in 1989. This requires government to operate transparently and provide regular public reporting of its accounts (Ministry of Justice 2015b). For the past 25 years, this legislation has ensured that governments present an accurate picture of the public finances and the fiscal consequences of their policies.

As Prime Minister, I have taken steps to ensure greater transparency by, for example, proactively publishing details of spending on ministerial credit cards. Ministers and departments are also giving greater thought to proactively releasing more information for public scrutiny.

New Zealand has a range of independent bodies set up to audit and deal with allegations of corruption and misconduct. The Independent Police Complaints Authority (IPCA), the Judicial Conduct Commissioner (JCC) and the Office of the Ombudsman all have broad powers to investigate and report on the conduct of public officials. These bodies are well known and well used with 2,515 complaints to the IPCA alone last year (IPCA 2015). This independent oversight helps maintain public trust in our institutions, with 78% of New Zealanders surveyed reporting that they have trust and confidence in the police (Gravitas 2015).

Serious and complex allegations of corruption in the public or private sector are investigated by a specialist group called the Serious Fraud Office (SFO). The Director of the SFO has complete independence when it comes to operational decisions, while the SFO and New Zealand Police work closely together in the fight against fraud and corruption, and ensure that specialist knowledge and expertise can be used and information shared.

The police and SFO are further enabled by legislation, which ensures that all of New Zealand’s bribery and corruption offences apply both domestically and extra- territorially (Ministry of Justice 2013). This means that the SFO can bring a case against New Zealand citizens, residents and companies for acts of bribery and corruption that occur wholly outside of New Zealand.

Another important aspect is a free and independent press. As Prime Minister, I front the media almost every day, sometimes several times, on issues of the day. Questions will range from the performance of my Executive and MPs, to New Zealand’s position on international affairs and domestic policy, to what I had for breakfast.

My Government is well aware of the importance of fronting up, and of the fact that our media and the public would expect nothing less. They demand accountability and answers.

The upshot is that I, along with other ministers, am forced to defend every decision and mistake we make and every dollar we choose to spend or save.

Colleagues and staff are aware of what is expected of me and I have no doubt that they have no interest in seeing the Prime Minister having to defend an issue that they have caused.

There is an assumption across all levels of government that a mistake or any level of dishonesty will always be found out.

While mistakes happen and will usually be forgiven by reasonable people, corruption and cover-ups are never tolerated.

10.3 New Zealand’s support for anti-corruption in the Pacific region

Given the clear benefits that a low-corruption environment can have on economic growth and quality of governance, fighting corruption has been a key plank of New Zealand’s international development policies. As the only country outside northern Europe to regularly feature at the top of Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), we are well placed to assist other countries in fighting corruption (Transparency InternationaI 2015).

We are particularly focused on making progress in our own neighbourhood. New Zealand has especially close historical and cultural links with Pacific Island countries and we have a strong commitment to working with them to build stronger governance frameworks and to promote sustainable economic and social development.

While auditing doesn’t sound like a glamorous nation- building activity, it is a critical part of ensuring that governments are spending public money responsibly and effectively. New Zealand is working with Pacific Island countries to ensure that they complete regular and timely financial audits of public accounts to help improve transparency and accountability. The number of audits completed in Pacific Island countries over the past five years has more than doubled (PASAI 2015).

Promoting the importance of accountability in the eyes of the public has led to growing awareness of the role of auditing in holding government institutions to account. More public office holders are being held to account for their misconduct and misuse of public funds (PASAI 2015).

A high standard of public accountability is a critical element in preventing a culture of corruption from developing or taking hold. As we know from our own experience, when the public won’t tolerate corruption and have an expectation that their officials will be held to account, those in positions of power are less likely to abuse it. So the higher the standard of probity and accountability that figures in authority are held to, the more likely we are to prevent corruption and to detect and prosecute it when it occurs.

10.4 Public financial management

Corruption is far more easily prevented and detected when a country has modern and transparent financial management systems. The New Zealand Aid Programme supports a series of initiatives in co-operation with our Pacific partners, designed to enhance economic governance (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2015a). That work is helping to strengthen border management systems and levels of accountability in a key area of revenue collection (Oceania Customs Organisation Secretariat 2016).

New Zealand also provides support to Samoa, Kiribati and the Cook Islands, linked to reforms including improvements to public finance systems, better public procurement, stronger and more independent audit, and greater accountability and oversight of state-owned enterprises. Further support has assisted Samoa and the Solomon Islands to reform and modernise their revenue systems (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2015b).

Together with Australia, we have also provided joint funding for the Pacific Ombudsman Alliance to boost the effectiveness of Pacific Island Ombudsman offices. This has increased their ability to investigate complaints of maladministration by those in the public sector (Walter and Gordon 2013).

Pacific leaders also recognise the crucial role that civil society has to play in fighting corruption with advocacy, education and community-focused outreach. For close to a decade, the New Zealand Aid Programme has provided support to TI chapters in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. Our support has focused on efforts to improve the culture of transparency through initiatives such as ethics training for law enforcement agencies (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2015a).

10.5 The justice system

Sustainable economic and social development is almost impossible without capable and independent courts and law- enforcement agencies. These give people confidence that the law is enforced fairly and free from political influence. Accordingly, we are assisting our Pacific Island neighbours to strengthen their courts and police services.

Five years ago, we began supporting the Pacific Judicial Development Programme (PJDP) with Australia. This is focused on strengthening the professional competence of Pacific Island judicial officers and the court systems they use (PJDP 2015).

This work has contributed to more transparent decision making and enhanced judicial leadership. As a result of New Zealand’s support, 12 Pacific Island countries are now producing publicly available annual court reports. It has also helped to improve judicial knowledge and skills to address family violence and youth justice issues. New Zealand provides ongoing mentoring for Pacific judges, and funding to attend judicial conferences and other training opportunities through the Judicial Pacific Participation Fund (JPPF) activity (JPPF 2016).

New Zealand also sends a number of its own judges on request to preside in courts across the Pacific – for instance, in Vanuatu (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2016).

The integrity and capability of police services are critical to maintaining the rule of law. The overwhelming majority of New Zealanders have tremendous respect for our police because we know they can be trusted to treat us fairly and in accordance with the law. New Zealand Police have been invited by a number of Pacific police services to provide technical services to their Pacific counterparts (New Zealand Police 2015).

New Zealand Police provide training and mentoring across the Pacific in prosecutions, community policing, human rights, ethics, leadership and road policing. These kinds of interventions build public trust in the police and add to a culture of service, which is the front line against corruption (New Zealand Police 2015).

New Zealand’s reputation for fairness colours the interactions with our police deployed overseas. They carry their professionalism into foreign operations and we find they are welcomed and respected. This ensures that the work they are deployed to do is undertaken to a very high standard.

10.6 Staying ahead of corruption

As a country with solid anti-corruption foundations and a long history of assisting our neighbours in building their own anti-corruption capacity, the most significant risk we face is complacency. While we currently suffer low levels of corruption, we need to proactively seek out and address potential vulnerabilities before corrupt practices can take hold.

With that in mind, in 2014, the Government moved to address a weakness in our companies’ registration laws. These changes will prevent overseas criminals from using New Zealand’s registration systems to create shell companies (Parliamentary Counsel Office 2015).

We also draw on the expertise of civil society and the private sector in the fight against corruption. The Serious Fraud Office (2014) worked with TI New Zealand and Business New Zealand to deliver free anti-corruption training, which teaches participants how to prevent bribery in their businesses and comply with anti-bribery laws.

Recognising the importance of sport in our culture and the huge scope for corrupt sporting practices, we passed a law in 2014 to specifically criminalise match-fixing (New Zealand Parliament 2014). The new law provides that manipulation of sporting activities with intent to influence a betting outcome is a criminal activity. Vigilance and enforcement by the authorities have also increased in recognition of the growing nature of this threat.

10.7 Conclusion

Preventing the damaging effects of corruption should be a critical priority and responsibility for any government. Politicians and public servants have to focus on building and maintaining strong, independent institutions to guard against corruption, as well as promoting a culture that makes it close to impossible for corrupt individuals to prosper or escape detection.

As a country, we take great pride in our track record. But we know we must remain committed to ensuring that corruption does not gain a foothold, and open to views on how to prevent it. As a small part of an increasingly connected international community, we must be open to sharing our successes and our failures in order to stamp out corruption for good.

10.8 References

Constitutional Arrangements Committee. 2005. Inquiry to Review New Zealand’s Existing Constitutional Arrangements: Report of the Constitutional Arrangements Committee. Wellington: New Zealand House of Representatives, p.12.

Gravitas Research and Strategy Ltd. 2015 (updated 2016). New Zealand Police Citizens’ Satisfaction Survey. New Zealand: Gravitas, p.4. Available online .

Independent Police Conduct Authority (IPCA). 2015. Annual Report 2014–2015. Wellington: IPCA, p.4. Available online .

Judicial Pacific Participation Fund. 2016. Welcome to the Judicial Pacific Participation Fund. Available [online] (http://jppf.org.nz/welcome/).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2015a. New Zealand Aid Programme Strategic Plan 2015–19. Available online .

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2015b. New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade – Annual Report 2014–15. Available online .

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. 2016. Aid Partnership with Vanuatu. Available [online] (https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/aid-and-development/our- work-in-the-pacific/vanuatu/).

Ministry of Justice. 2013. Relevant Anti-corruption Legislation. Available [online] (http://www.justice.govt.nz/publications/global- publications/s/saying-no-to-bribery-and-corruption- 2013-a-guide-for-new-zealand-businesses/relevant-anti- corruption-legislation).

Ministry of Justice. 2015a. Official Information Act 1982. Available online .

Ministry of Justice. 2015b. Public Finance Act 1989. Available online .

Ministry of Justice. 2016a. Waitangi Tribunal. Available online .

Ministry of Justice. 2016b. The Treaty of Waitangi. Waitangi Tribunal. Available [online] (http://www.justice.govt.nz/tribunals/waitangi-tribunal/ treaty-of-waitangi).

New Zealand Parliament. 2014. Crimes (Match-fixing) Amendment Bill. Available online .

New Zealand Police. 2015. International Service Group. Available online .

Oceania Customs Organisation Secretariat. 2016. Oceania Customs Organisation Secretariat. Available [online] (http://www.ocosec.org/).

Pacific Association of Supreme Audit Institutions (PASAI). 2015. Annual Report for Year Ended 30 June 2015. Available online .

Pacific Judicial Development Programme (PJDP). 2015. The Programme. Available online .

Parliamentary Counsel Office. 2015. Companies Amendment Act 2014. Available [online] (http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2014/0046/latest/ DLM4094913.html).

Serious Fraud Office. 10 June 2014. Helping New Zealand’s Fight Against Corruption. Available online .

Transparency International. 2015. Corruption Perceptions Index 2015. Available online .

Walter, G. and Gordon, J. 2013. Independent Review of the Pacific Ombudsman Alliance. Available [online] (https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/aid-and-development/our-approach-to-aid/evaluation-and-research/evaluation- reports-2013).

11. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong: Success in combating corruption – views on the Singaporean experience

Corruption is a scourge that can never be tolerated. Countries have tried all ways to combat it. They create anti-corruption agencies. They pass strong laws. They promulgate codes of conduct for public officials. Companies pledge to conduct business cleanly. Yet often corruption remains endemic, a cancer in the society. How then has Singapore achieved some measure of success in eradicating corruption? I put it down to four factors.

First, we inherited a clean and working system from the British colonial government. We had many compelling reasons to want to end colonial rule and to be masters of our own destiny. But to their credit, the British left Singapore with a working system and sound institutions – English laws, a working Civil Service, and an efficient and honest judiciary. Importantly, the Colonial Service officers upheld high standards. People like Sir William Goode, our last Governor and first Head of State, had a sense of duty and stewardship. After Singapore, Goode served as Governor of North Borneo, now the state of Sabah in Malaysia. He left an impression in North Borneo, as in Singapore. Even a generation later, the people of Sabah still remembered him fondly.

Second, when the British left, our pioneer leaders were determined to keep the system clean. The People’s Action Party (PAP) first came to power in 1959, when Singapore attained self-government. However, it was by no means a no- brainer for the PAP to fight to win the 1959 General Election.

The country faced a myriad of problems: poverty, poor public health, an acute housing shortage, a stagnant economy and an exploding population. Did the PAP want to inherit these overwhelming problems? Why not become a strong opposition party, and let another party govern and fail?

In the end, what decided the issue for Mr Lee Kuan Yew, our founding Prime Minister, and his team, was the overriding need to prevent the public service from going corrupt. One term of an incompetent, corrupt government and Humpty Dumpty could never be put together again. So the PAP fought to win and formed the Government. When they took their oath of office, Mr Lee and his PAP colleagues wore white shirts and white trousers. It symbolised their determination to keep the Government clean and incorruptible. That set the tone for Singapore ever since.

Third, with strong political will, we institutionalised a robust, comprehensive anti-corruption framework that spans laws, enforcement, the public service and public outreach. We enacted the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA), which puts the burden of proof on the accused to show that he or she acquired their wealth legally. Any unexplained wealth disproportionate to known sources of income is presumed to be from graft and can be confiscated.

The PCA provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction, so that the actions of Singaporean citizens overseas are treated the same as actions committed in Singapore, regardless of whether such corrupt acts have consequences for Singapore (Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 2016a).

Our anti-corruption agency, the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), is well resourced and independent. It is empowered to investigate any person, even police officers and ministers, and conducts public outreach to raise public awareness and shape social norms (CPIB 2016b). We pay public servants fair and realistic wages benchmarked to private sector earnings and, in return, demand the highest standards of integrity and performance.

Fourth, we have over time developed a society and culture that eschews corruption. Singaporeans expect and demand a clean system. They do not condone giving or accepting ‘social lubricants’ to get things done. They readily report corrupt practices when they encounter them. Singaporeans trust that the law applies to all and that the Government will enforce the laws without fear or favour, even when it may be awkward or embarrassing. Businesses have confidence that, in Singapore, rules are transparent and fairly applied. The story is told of a businessman who visited Singapore from an Asian country used to different operating norms. He left puzzled and disturbed that he could not discover the going rate for bribes to officers at different levels of government. He concluded wrongly that the prices must be very high!

Singapore has achieved some success eradicating corruption, but we are under no illusions that we have permanently and completely solved the problem. Corruption is driven by human nature and greed. However strict the rules and tight the system, some individuals will sometimes still be tempted to transgress. When they do, we make sure they are caught and severely dealt with. Two years ago, we charged an Assistant Director from the CPIB itself with misappropriating (S)$1.7 million.

We keep our system clean not just for ourselves, but also to uphold our international reputation. Thus we deal strictly also with those who use financial institutions in Singapore to launder money or transact ill-gotten gains from corruption.

We are zealous in protecting the integrity of our financial centre and business hub.

There is a Chinese proverb: ‘If the top beam is askew, the bottom beams will be crooked.’ Keeping a system clean must start at the very top. A Singapore armed forces officer, on a course overseas, was once asked by his classmate how Singapore kept its system clean. He explained our arrangements and the central role of the CPIB. His classmate asked a follow-up question: but to whom does the CPIB report? The Singaporean ingenuously replied that the CPIB reported directly to the prime minister. This elicited further puzzlement. Much later the Singaporean understood why. The real question he was being asked was, who guards the guardian?

There is no formula to solve this ancient riddle, but we are determined to uphold the highest standards of integrity from the top level of the Government down. In 1996, rumours spread that Mr Lee Kuan Yew and I had received improper discounts on property purchases. The Prime Minister, then Mr Goh Chok Tong, ordered a full investigation, which found that there had been nothing improper. He brought the issue to Parliament, which held a full debate lasting three days (Parliament of Singapore 1996).

Both Mr Lee and I spoke. In his statement Mr Lee Kuan Yew said, “I take pride and satisfaction that the question of my two purchases and those of the Deputy Prime Minister, my son, has been subjected to, and not exempted from, scrutiny … It is most important that Singapore remain a place where no one is above scrutiny, that any question of integrity of a minister, however senior, that he has gained benefits either through influence or corrupt practices, be investigated” (National Archives of Singapore 1996).

Trust is slow to build, but fast to lose. We have spent more than 50 years building up confidence in Singapore. The integrity of the Government, the system and the men and women in charge has been key to Singapore’s success. We are determined that that integrity and reputation must never be undermined and will long remain a competitive edge and a source of pride for Singapore.

11.1 References

Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB). 2016a. Prevention of Corruption Act, Singapore. Available online .

Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB). 2016b. About CPIB. Available online .

National Archives of Singapore. 21 May 1996. Statement by Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew Nassim Jade and Scotts 28. Available online .

Parliament of Singapore. 21–23 May 1996. Purchase of Properties by Senior Minister and Deputy Prime Minister BG Lee Hsien Loong (Statement by the Prime Minister). Available online .

12. Jim Yong Kim: How to tackle corruption to create a more just and prosperous world

Corruption poses an enormous obstacle to international development and the global goal of ending extreme poverty. [footnote 21] Using public power for private gain is also unjust. It denies resources to the poor, undermines the delivery of services to the vulnerable and weakens the social contract, leading to exclusion, instability and conflict. I am committed to fighting corruption, because it is the right thing to do and because it is critical to achieving the World Bank Group’s twin goals of ending extreme poverty by 2030 and boosting shared prosperity for the poorest 40%.

More than 50 years of development experience has taught us that we can achieve these targets through inclusive growth, investing in people’s health and education and insuring them against risks, such as unemployment or illness, which threaten to plunge them into poverty. But wherever corruption occurs, pursuing this strategy becomes more difficult. In the Philippines, for example, corruption prevented the construction of high-quality roads in some areas, making it harder for goods to get to market and harming growth, incomes and job creation (World Bank 2011; Procurement Watch 2009). In Sierra Leone, it stopped some mothers from immunising their infant children, because nurses demanded rice in exchange for ‘free’ shots (World Bank 2012). In India, many poor people received less financial support from workfare initiatives because officials pocketed the proceeds (Muralidharan, Niehaus and Sukhtankar 2014).

Some countries have experienced growing inequality and lost billions of dollars for public services because of corruption, undermining their very foundations. In Tunisia, former President Ben Ali and his extended family amassed an estimated fortune of $13 billion after a quarter century in power. This amounted to more than a quarter of Tunisian gross domestic product (GDP) in 2011, the year he stepped down in response to mass protests. There were also 220 domestic companies – responsible for at least 21% of the country’s net private sector profits – connected to the family of the President, who had enacted regulations that gave them unfair economic advantages (Rijkers, Freund and Nucifora 2011).

During my tenure at the World Bank Group, I have seen that corruption affects countries regardless of development status and is often an international operation. According to some estimates, businesses and individuals pay between $1.5 trillion and $2 trillion in bribes alone each year (Kaufmann 2015). This is about ten times the value of overseas development assistance or approximately 2% of global GDP. Both domestic firms and multinational corporations make payoffs to public officials in exchange for access to commercial opportunities.

The World Bank Group and others have dedicated substantial effort to understanding and monitoring corruption, and developing experience and knowledge of how to tackle the problem. In 1996, at our annual meetings, one of my predecessors, James D. Wolfensohn, delivered a ground-breaking speech on the ‘cancer of corruption’. He seized the opportunity to take on an obstacle to reducing poverty that we, and others, had largely failed to address (Wolfensohn 1996).

Since that time, the World Bank has taken a new approach. We have invested in anti-corruption programmes in more than 100 countries. In 2007, we adopted an organisation-wide governance and anti-corruption strategy, which we updated in 2012. Today our global practices for Governance, and Finance and Markets, as well as our independent integrity group, spearhead work to share with clients our knowledge and experience in fighting corruption, though all parts of the organisation take responsibility for fighting misconduct.

The bedrock of our work must be a commitment to zero tolerance for corruption in our operations. Last year, the World Bank Group committed grants and loans amounting to approximately $56 billion to support projects, programmes and policies critical to reducing poverty and inequality in developing countries. Close scrutiny of how these funds are spent and sanctions for their misuse are critical to ensuring that corruption does not undermine the intended outcome, whether it is raising farmers’ crop yields or improving students’ reading, writing and arithmetic skills.

Working with developing countries, we assess project and loan plans for corruption risk, closely supervise activities and build in monitoring mechanisms, including hotlines to report misconduct. When alleged wrongdoing takes place, our independent integrity group investigates and takes vigorous action if it confirms corruption. We have excluded firms and individuals that engaged in misconduct from receiving contracts that we financed and compelled the return of misused financial support and the cancellation of contracts associated with tainted transactions.

Last year, these efforts rooted out misconduct in connection with 61 projects worth more than $500 million (World Bank 2015). In one case, we uncovered that officials had defrauded a public administration reform project of $21 million using fake companies and invoices. Our investigation has led to the recovery of stolen funds and the Government’s prosecution of its officials. Even with these successes, we understand that fighting corruption requires constant vigilance and that misconduct takes many forms and adapts to new opportunities.

Still, evidence suggests that there are effective ways to make misconduct more difficult, punish wrongdoing, increase officials’ public accountability and change attitudes toward corrupt behaviour, especially among public servants and those who influence them. These actions, which I outline below, are helping countries make critical development strides, including building better roads, improving access to education and medicine, and providing the poor with sufficient support from social safety nets.

12.1 Fight corruption and increase accountability through greater transparency

Experience shows that providing citizens with access to information about government operations and public servants’ assets can be an effective way to prevent officials from abusing their power when avenues exist to make authorities answerable to the public. In 1997, the Ugandan Government found that schools did not receive 80% of their allocated funding because local officials diverted the support. Officials responded by publishing in local newspapers each school’s allocation, empowering administrators and parents to demand that these transfers reach their schools. By 2001, schools reported receiving 80% of these allocations. A subsequent study concluded that the amount of funds that local officials diverted correlated to the distance of a school from a major town where there was a newspaper outlet (Reinikka and Svensson 2011).

Making transparent the flow of royalties and other financial transactions between governments and corporations can also reduce corruption, especially in oil, gas and mining operations. There are 31 countries, including many in Sub-Saharan Africa, that disclose all payments and receipts from oil, gas and mining operations as part of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). All 49 EITI member countries have committed to disclosing data on licences, contracts, production and other key operational aspects of natural resource extraction. The information that EITI distributes enables citizens and good government groups to monitor authorities’ relationships with extractive companies and hold officials accountable. In Nigeria, information that EITI published showed billions of dollars in underpayments by companies and their agents, sparking government efforts to recover missing funds to bolster public finances (EITI 2014).

Disclosing information in connection with EITI has correlated with reduced perceptions of corruption among businesses in several countries, including Peru, where indicators for abuses of public power dropped by 14%. Greater confidence in good governance makes companies more likely to undertake the long-term investments necessary for natural resource extraction, suggesting that transparency contributes to economic growth, job creation and higher incomes.

12.2 Use new technologies to increase scrutiny

Evidence suggests that new, inexpensive ways of verifying identities and executing payments using digital technology can reduce the impact of corruption on public service delivery to the poorest. In India, for example, some of its large social welfare programmes suffered from ineligible beneficiaries receiving payments and officials taking a cut of, or delaying, payments meant for the poor. To combat these problems, the government distributed smartcards based on the country’s biometric identification system to 19 million needy villagers in connection with the $5.5 billion National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. This substantially reduced the role of officials in the payment process, lessening the opportunities for misconduct. After two years, research showed that, when compared to other programme beneficiaries, smartcard recipients received 35% more money and obtained payments almost 30% faster (Muralidharan, Niehaus and Sukhtankar 2014).

Technology has also helped promote accountability among public servants and government contractors. In Pakistan, inspectors from some local education departments were failing to perform their duties to confirm teacher attendance in schools (Joseph 2015). Now they must take geo-tagged pictures of themselves on the job, which has proved to be an effective way to hold the inspectors accountable for countering instructor absenteeism. Rates of teacher attendance – above 93% in 2015 – have increased every year since the programme began and school-monitoring information is available to the public at http://open.punjab. gov.pk/schools .

In Mindanao, a conflict-riddled region of the Philippines, geo-spatial tracking and digital photography have contributed to timely construction of roads (Sta Ines 2014). Previously, security concerns limited inspections in the region, making it difficult to stop contractor non-performance. But now data and evidence of road construction in the Philippines is publicly available at www.openroads.gov.ph. Transportation infrastructure has improved, promoting the distribution of goods and economic activity.

12.3 Get citizens and companies involved

Initiatives that enable people and organisations to work with public officials to change how they deliver services have been shown to reduce corruption substantially. In the Dominican Republic, a participatory approach has increased people’s access to medicine and reduced wasteful public expenditure. Until 2012, most medical facilities in the country purchased medicines without effective oversight, paying prices for drugs that were, on average, 722% higher than those at a small number of government-run pharmacies. Patients were forced to absorb these high costs, because medicine buyers were receiving kickbacks from private suppliers (National Pharmaceuticals Management Unit 2013).

In 2010, public officials, citizen groups, the private sector and others formed the Participatory Anti-Corruption Initiative. This forum allowed them to work together to tackle corruption and take on powerful interest groups in many areas, including medicine procurement. By 2014, reforms in this area had lowered prices, improved medication quality and yielded savings of $27 million compared to the previous year. Public spending on drugs was reduced by 64%.

Participatory governance also helped people in poor rural villages in Indonesia fight the high level of corruption under the Suharto Government that was a major factor in cutting off their communities from public services and economic opportunities. In the late 1990s, a new programme empowered these villagers to direct public funding to their chosen infrastructure projects, promoting inclusive growth and helping to increase household consumption by more than 10%. Community oversight and financial audits have been critical to the efficient expenditure of $3.6 billion on infrastructure, including the construction of 100,000 km of rural roads, 17,000 small bridges and 40,000 clean-water systems, and the building or rehabilitation of 43,000 schools and health clinics. Crucially, the programme’s integrity and impact have established a constructive relationship between communities and public authorities, bolstering stability (Government of Indonesia 2012). [footnote 22]

12.4 Take on corruption at the global level

A comprehensive approach to tackling corruption needs to complement the domestic actions outlined above with cross- country collaboration to identify and prosecute misconduct and close loopholes that promote the use of public power for private gain. At present, developed and developing countries are not co-operating sufficiently to end the international catalysts for misconduct, with harmful consequences for developing countries’ fiscal wellbeing and development.

International trade in merchandise has increased by more than 500% over the last 25 years. Trade as a share of world GDP has increased by half over this period, from 40% in 1990 to about 60% today. As economic activity has become more globalised, so has corruption. Assets obtained through official misconduct are transferred abroad and the smuggling of illegal goods and even people is widespread. New avenues for wrongdoing have expanded the number and kinds of participants involved in corruption, which now encompass counterfeiters, pirates and armed groups.

Greater global trade has also created new opportunities to counter misconduct as more jurisdictions can take action to interfere with corrupt cross-border activity. Under the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), developed and developing countries that have signed the accord are obligated to work with other countries to prosecute misconduct and assist with the return of stolen assets (UNODC 2015).

Still, in countries afflicted by significant corruption, prosecutors are often unable to investigate and punish wrongdoing because of political interference or ineffectiveness. Countries with more independent and robust legal systems can help. Legislation such as the UK’s Bribery Act 2010, the US’s Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Brazil’s Clean Company Act give prosecutors the authority to pursue individuals or corporations who pay off foreign officials. In 2010, BAE Systems paid $400 million to the US Justice Department and £30 million to the UK Serious Fraud Office to settle bribery allegations arising out of the sale of equipment to Tanzania. The UK Department for International Development used some of these funds to refurbish classrooms in, and provide teaching materials to Tanzanian primary schools in co-ordination with national authorities (Gray, Hansen, Recica-Kirkbride and Mills 2014, p. 6).

Other countries’ punishment of the cross-border laundering of corruption’s proceeds is also important to making misconduct less lucrative. In 2014, for example, Teodoro Obiang, the son of Equatorial Guinea’s long-time leader, was forced to pay $30 million to settle US Government allegations that he had used money stolen from his country to buy a California mansion, a Ferrari and Michael Jackson memorabilia (US Justice Department 2014).

Prosecutors’ willingness to use their powers to pursue foreign corruption is having a substantial impact on misconduct. Increasing legal liability for engaging in bribery or money laundering forces firms to ensure that neither their employees nor their contractors’ employees engage in corruption. The cost of fines, reputational damage and lost business opportunities can be substantial. In 2008, Siemens AG agreed to pay $1.6 billion to the US Government and establish a $100 million anti-corruption fund at the World Bank Group to settle charges that it paid bribes to public officials in connection with its international business (World Bank 2009). Domestic firms that show they comply with anti-corruption requirements create a competitive advantage as trusted partners for global supply chains and are likely to see an increase in commercial opportunities. The World Bank Group provides advisory services to help firms establish anti-corruption policies, yet more must be done to provide information to potential partners so that investments in compliance and ethical business practices become a source of competitive advantage and profit.

Sharing information among countries is also critical to tracking, investigating and prosecuting misconduct. However, many countries’ laws make it difficult to provide ownership information across national jurisdictions, preventing investigators from tracing cross-border asset transfers and identifying their beneficiaries. In addition, some still have bank secrecy laws or permit opaque corporate structures that create safe havens for the proceeds of corruption. The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative, which is a partnership between the World Bank Group and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), is working to remove these obstacles to investigation and prosecution by proposing law and policy changes, providing expert advice on bringing cases and fostering co-operation across jurisdictions.

International co-operation is also vital to reducing illicit international trade, a scourge in its own right and a source of bribes to customs officials. Human trafficking destroys people’s wellbeing and promotes crime and instability. Trade in products resulting from illegal logging, fishing and hunting often damages the environment and economic growth. In Kenya, for example, outlawed commerce in ivory and endangered species has significantly harmed the tourism sector (UNWTO 2015).

Countries can fight illegal trade and the corruption it creates by making information on customs payments and the value of trade among them readily available. Governments can also pass laws that force companies and countries to prove the legitimacy of their products now that technology enables the easy creation of a chain of custody for goods through the use of microchips and satellite tracking. Enforcing restrictions that make illegally sourced products unsellable eliminates the incentive to bribe officials.

Harmonising cross-border trade rules related to customs, taxation and other fiscal matters can also reduce the economic benefit of a variety of corrupt activities. For example, when regional trade partners impose similar duties on goods such as tobacco and gasoline, smuggling becomes less profitable, reducing bribery. When governments empower companies to extract their countries’ natural resources, some of these corporations exploit differences in how countries tax corporate profits to reduce their tax burden through practices such as abusive transfer pricing, which fraudulently shifts the location of profits to jurisdictions where tax rates are lower. Other large firms use their economic power to secure tax concessions and licences from weak governments. Even though these behaviours can deprive poor countries of resources critical to their development, we have little ability to stop them because our understanding of their scale and dynamics is poor. When political elites collude with firms to rig these government licences and regulations to their benefit, public officials also create a business climate that favours politically influential firms, stifling competition, slowing innovation and reducing economic growth.

The World Bank Group is working at multiple levels to make international trade less vulnerable to this kind of illegitimate activity. In co-operation with the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), we are helping governments crack down on abusive transfer pricing using a toolkit that enables authorities to evaluate companies’ tax reporting, especially in the extractives sector. With the International Monetary Fund (IMF), we have established an initiative to help developing countries strengthen their tax systems, which will help make collection more efficient and policies fairer, and improve authorities’ ability to detect tax evasion. Analysis suggests that, with balanced tax systems, many lower-income countries can increase revenues from 2% to 4% of GDP (IMF 2011). Our support to countries such as Colombia and Ghana has already increased revenues and reduced tax evasion.

12.5 Conclusion

Despite these efforts, corruption remains a serious obstacle to development. Corruption can inhibit inclusive growth and job creation, stand in the way of new mothers and infants living healthy lives and prevent the vulnerable from receiving the social assistance they need. Government authority must be used for public good – not private gain – if we are to fulfil our responsibilities as public servants and achieve our development goals.

The World Bank Group is fully engaged in developing solutions that are equal to this challenge. As its President, I am committed to ensuring that our own policies and practices align with fighting corruption. The organisation is sharing the best global knowledge of what does and does not work to stop misconduct, from transparency and incentives to collective action and partnerships. We are helping countries take on corruption at the international level so they set rules that make it easier to trace assets and share information across jurisdictions, identify and prosecute corruption wherever it takes place, and promote fair and honest global competition.

Still, the international community must do more across all of these areas. For example, we must produce comprehensive information about cross-border financial activities such as tax evasion, smuggling and trafficking in stolen goods and money laundering. Governments must evaluate the effectiveness of their anti-corruption efforts based on their work’s impact on contributors to economic growth and development, such as the quality of public services, social safety nets and the investment climate.

We must fight corruption in communities, countries and globally. I strongly support leaders’ efforts to take on entrenched interests that force the poor to pay bribes or waste public resources. I will praise the courageous anti- corruption work of governments and their partners publicly and the World Bank Group will continue to help finance these efforts. We are committed to supporting bold actions, because the use of public power for private gain is morally wrong and, as the evidence shows, prevents the poor from reaching their full potential. There can be no doubt: tackling corruption is critical to creating a more just and prosperous world.

12.6 References

Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). 2014. Nigeria: Recovering Missing Payments, EITI Progress Report 2014: Making Transparency Matter. Norway: EITI. Available online .

Government of Indonesia. 2012. PNPM Rural Impact Evaluation April 2012. Jakarta: PNPM Support Facility.

Gray, L., Hansen, K., Recica-Kirkbride, P. and Mills, L. 2014. Few and Far: The Hard Facts on Stolen Asset Recovery. Washington DC: The World Bank, OECD and UNODC, p. 6.

International Monetary Fund – Fiscal Affairs Department. 2011. Revenue Mobilization in Developing Countries. International Monetary Fund, pp. 1–85. Available online .

Joseph, M. S. 2015. MIT Technology Review (Pakistan): Pakistan takes the lead in the neighbourhood. Available online .

Kaufmann, D. 2015. Corruption Matters. Finance & Development. International Monetary Fund. September 2015, pp. 20–23. Available online .

Muralidharan, K., Niehaus, P. and Sukhtankar, S. 2014. Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India. National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Working Paper No. 19999, pp. 1–53. Available online .

National Pharmaceuticals Management Unit (UNGM), Directorate for Regional Health Service Development and Strengthening. 2013. Technical Report: Baseline Study of the Status of the Supply of Medicines and Medical Supplies in Specialized Health Care Centers in the Dominican Republic. Dominican Republic: UNGM.

Olken, B. 2007. Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia. Journal of Political Economy, 115(2), pp. 200–248.

Procurement Watch Inc (PWI). 2009. A Study of Anti- Corruption Initiatives in the Philippines’ Construction Sector. Pasig City: PWI. Available online .

Reinikka, R. and Svensson, J. 2011. The Power of Information in Public Services: Evidence from Education in Uganda. Journal of Public Economics, (95), pp. 956–966.

Rijkers, B., Freund, C. and Nucifora, A. 2011. All in the Family: State Capture in Tunisia. Policy Research Working Paper 6810. World Bank, pp. 1–46. Available online .

Sta Ines, N. 2014. Geotagging in Isolated Areas, Philippines. In: S. Lippman, ed. Procurement for Complex Situations Challenge – Competition Winners. Washington DC: World Bank, pp. 1–5.

United Nations – World Tourism Organization (UNWTO). 2015. Towards Measuring the Economic Value of Wildlife Watching Tourism in Africa. Spain: UNWTO.

US Justice Department. 10 October 2014. Second Vice President of Equatorial Guinea Agrees to Relinquish More Than $30 Million of Assets Purchased with Corruption Proceeds. Available [online] (https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/second-vice-president- equatorial-guinea-agrees-relinquish-more-30-million- assets-purchased).

Wolfensohn, J. D. 1 October 1996. Annual Meetings Address. [online]. Available online .

The World Bank. 2 July 2009. Siemens to pay $100m to fight corruption as part of WBG Settlement. Available [online] (https://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/sites/ corruption-cases/files/Siemens_World_Bank_Settlement_ WB_PR_Jul_2_2009.pdf).

The World Bank, Integrity Vice Presidency. 2011. Curbing Fraud, Corruption, and Collusion in the Road Sector. Washington DC: World Bank. Available online .

The World Bank. 2012. Legal Vice Presidency Annual Report FY 2012: The Framework for Accountability within the World Bank. Report No. 75111. Washington DC: World Bank. Available online .

The World Bank. 2015. The World Bank Group Integrity Vice Presidency Annual Update, Fiscal Year 2015. Washington DC: World Bank. Available online .

13. Christine Lagarde: Addressing corruption – openly

Traditionally, public officials have been somewhat nervous about discussing corruption openly. Over the past several years, however, I have been struck by the extent to which world leaders are now willing to talk candidly about this problem. It is not just that the economic costs have become self-evident. It is also because there is an increasing demand for change. In a recent global survey, corruption was regarded as the ‘topic most frequently discussed by the public’, ahead of poverty and unemployment (survey cited by Klitgaard 2015, p. 15). Given that both poverty and unemployment can be symptoms of chronic corruption, my view is that the priority given to this problem by the public is entirely justified.

In this essay, I would like to share the IMF’s perspective on the economic impact of corruption and our experience in helping countries design and implement strategies to address it.

I recognise that there are many possible definitions of corruption, both broad and narrow. For the purposes of this essay, which is focused on the public sector, corruption includes any abuse of public office – whether it arises from financial incentives or political interference.

I would like to make three main points.

First, while the direct economic costs of corruption are well known, the indirect costs may be even more substantial and debilitating, leading to low growth and greater income inequality. Corruption also has a broader corrosive impact on society. It undermines trust in government and erodes the ethical standards of private citizens.

Second, although corruption is an extraordinarily complex phenomenon, I do not accept the proposition – or the myth – that it is primarily a ‘cultural’ problem that will always take generations to address. There are examples of countries that have managed to make significant progress in addressing it in a relatively short time.

Third, experience demonstrates that a holistic, multi- faceted approach is needed – one that establishes appropriate incentives and the rule of law, promotes transparency and introduces economic reforms that reduce opportunities for illicit behaviour. Perhaps the most important ingredient for a successful anti-corruption approach is the development of strong institutions, centred on a professional civil service that is sufficiently independent from both private influence and political interference.

13.1 The economic and social costs

Corruption afflicts countries at all stages of development. Indeed, some developing countries score better on corruption indices than many advanced countries. While there are no recent studies that quantify the overall global scale of corruption, a sense of how big a problem it is can be gauged from an estimate of the amount paid in bribes every year. A recently updated estimate points to $1.5 trillion to $2 trillion (or around 2% of global gross domestic product [GDP]) in bribes paid annually in both developing and developed countries. [footnote 23] Given that bribes are just a subset of all of the possible forms of corruption, the overall cost of corruption – in terms both of tangible losses and of lost opportunities – is a very high amount.

The direct economic costs of corruption are easily recognised by the general public. Two very clear examples are bribes given in order to evade taxes or to bypass public tender procurement. The first example results in a direct loss of public revenues; the second may result in both higher public expenditure and lower-quality public investment.

Corruption has a pernicious effect on the economy. Pervasive corruption makes it harder to conduct sound fiscal policy. For example, in data covering a range of countries, we find that low tax compliance is positively associated with corruption. By delegitimising the tax system and its administration, corruption increases tax evasion: if the granting of a tax exemption is perceived to be the product of a bribe, it is not surprising that the public are far less willing to comply with the tax laws. [footnote 24]

Corruption also undermines certain types of public expenditure to the detriment of economic performance. For example, it is associated with lower outlays on education and skewed public investment, driven by the capacity to generate ‘commissions’ rather than by economic justification (Mauro 1998). [footnote 25] The distortion in public investment spending is particularly harmful given the importance of promoting efficient public investment as a means of reducing infrastructure gaps and promoting growth.

The indirect economic costs of corruption may be even more consequential. [footnote 26] Clearly, causation is difficult to establish and, in quantitative analysis, a significant effect of corruption on growth has not been found (Svensson 2005). Nevertheless, in comparative studies of national data, corruption is associated with a number of key indicators. Countries with low per capita income tend to have higher corruption and countries with higher corruption tend to have lower growth. Studies have identified different ways in which corruption could affect growth.

First, corruption tends to impede both foreign and domestic investment. The higher costs associated with corruption are a form of tax on investment that, in turn, translates into less investment in business research and development and product innovation. Moreover, by creating uncertainty as to how the regulatory framework will be applied, it increases the ‘country risk’ associated with a particular investment project. [footnote 27] More generally, corruption generates an unfavourable business climate in which the creation of new enterprises is stifled, reducing the economy’s dynamism. [footnote 28]

Second, corruption undercuts savings. The illegal use of public funds to acquire assets abroad shrinks the economy’s pool of savings that could otherwise be used for investment.

Finally, corruption can perpetuate inefficiency. Because an over-regulated economy provides opportunities for regulators to demand bribes, corruption creates a strong incentive to delay economic liberalisation and innovation.

The impact of corruption on social outcomes is also consequential. Social spending on education and health is typically lower in corrupt systems. This, in turn, leads to higher child and infant mortality rates, lower birth-weights, less access to education and higher school dropout rates (Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson 2002).

These outcomes disproportionately affect the poor, since they rely more heavily on government services, which become more costly due to corruption. Moreover, corruption reduces the income-earning potential of the poor as they are less well-positioned to take advantage of it. For all these reasons, corruption exacerbates income inequality and poverty (Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme 2002).

Corruption also breeds public distrust in government. It undermines the state’s capacity to raise revenue and to perform its functions as a supplier of public goods and services, regulator of markets and agent for society’s redistributive goals. Where powerful business elites collude to control public institutions, corruption results in state capture and the ‘the privatisation of public policy’.

The fallouts are all too clear: higher inequality in political influence, deterioration of public values and, ultimately, a diminution in the overall quality of life. These non-economic costs create a vicious cycle of underperformance in the public sector that is harmful to the economy in the long term. The moral fabric of society is also put at risk. It is not just that bribery becomes part of one’s everyday life. In a society where success is more likely to depend on who you know rather than on personal merit, the incentives for young people to pursue higher education are undermined.

13.2 Strategies for addressing corruption

Given the potential impact of corruption on macroeconomic stability and sustainable economic growth, the IMF has been actively engaged in helping our members design and implement anti-corruption strategies. In 1997, the Fund adopted a policy on governance that provides guidance on the nature of its involvement in circumstances where issues of governance, including corruption, are judged to have a significant macroeconomic impact.

Since that time, we have gained considerable experience in helping members design and implement anti-corruption strategies. This is particularly important in the context of economic crises, where effective anti-corruption measures are critical to restore confidence. In some cases, the problem has been so severe that the Fund had no choice but to withhold support until a credible reform strategy was in place.

Clearly, any anti-corruption strategy must be tailored to the circumstances of the particular country. Yet we have found that success requires the existence of a number of mutually supporting features, which are briefly summarised here.

13.3 Creating the right incentives

As has been noted by one expert in this area, “Corruption is an economic crime, not a crime of passion. Givers and takers of bribes respond to incentives and punishments” (Klitgaard 2015, p. 37). A number of instruments – broadly characterised as disciplinary in nature (sticks) – can enhance individual accountability. Other instruments provide positive reinforcement (carrots). The Fund’s experience is that an effective anti-corruption approach needs both positive and deterrent measures.

Strengthening the rule of law is critical to increasing individual accountability. The Fund has taken an active role – including through its conditionality – to strengthen legal frameworks that are designed to increase such accountability. For example, Ukraine’s current Fund-supported programme provides for the enhancement of legislation in a number of areas, including, in particular, the law on corruption.

However, unless legislation is effectively enforced, it will not be credible in deterring corruption. Without effective law enforcement institutions – the police and other investigatory services, the public prosecutor’s office and, ultimately, the courts – even the most robust legal framework will be ineffective. So, the greatest challenge arises when corruption has permeated society to the point that these institutions themselves have become compromised. In these cases, it may be necessary to create specialised ‘bridging’ institutions in the hope that they can more effectively fight corruption, including in the traditional law enforcement institutions, while broader institutional reform is implemented. These ‘bridging’ institutions include independent anti-corruption commissions and specialised anti-corruption courts such as those currently being established in Ukraine and the earlier ones in Indonesia (IMF 2015b; IMF 2004).

In this context, the Fund has found that the establishment of Anti-Money Laundering Frameworks is central to the fight against corruption. Requiring banks to report on suspicious transactions provides a very effective means of deterring criminal activities. The fact that these laws generally require even closer scrutiny of transactions conducted by ‘politically exposed persons’ (PEP) makes them particularly relevant to an anti-corruption strategy.

Beyond the enforcement measures discussed above, an effective anti-corruption policy must also rely on transparency. Transparency shines a spotlight on government decisions and transactions, enabling citizens to monitor the actions of their governments which, in turn, deters corrupt behaviour. Publicising instances of corruption and the efforts taken to address them also serves as a disincentive to engage in corrupt activities and shores up public trust in government. For these reasons, the Fund has been actively engaged in promoting greater transparency in the overall economic and regulatory environment.

We have developed standards and codes of best practices in areas such as data dissemination, fiscal transparency and monetary and financial policies (IMF 1997). [footnote 29] Promoting transparency in the extractive industries is another area that the Fund has actively pursued in its technical assistance work. Under the aegis of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), a template is now available for reporting and monitoring government revenues from natural resources.

Transparency can only go so far. It needs accountability for it to become a powerful deterrent against corruption. It is critical that public officials and institutions be assigned with specific mandates and tasks upon which they are expected to deliver. Moreover, oversight mechanisms are needed to ensure that officials and institutions are delivering as expected. This is why the Fund has actively supported its members in strengthening those institutions that exercise oversight powers in the management of public funds and in enhancing the financial accountability of state-owned enterprises. It has also provided technical assistance to help members monitor the use of public resources and consolidate extra-budgetary funds into the budget.

Even well-meaning public officials will be tempted by corruption if they cannot earn a living wage. Research shows a correlation between increases in wages and improvements in a country’s ranking on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) (Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2002). This is why Fund- supported programmes have sometimes included increases in public salaries as part of an anti-corruption approach (IMF 2006). That said, there are two critical considerations. First, the remuneration of the public sector needs to be transparent and meritocratic; otherwise, it will be perceived as merely an instrument of political patronage. Second, studies show that an increase in remuneration will have little effect unless accompanied by clear signals that public officials will lose their jobs if they are caught engaging in corrupt acts.

13.4 Economic liberalisation and effective regulation

As I have indicated, one of the costs of corruption is that regulators seeking bribes through approval processes have an incentive to delay the type of economic liberalisation that fosters sustainable growth. Wherever discretion is granted to an official regarding the approval of an economic activity, there is a risk that this discretion will be abused. Appropriately designed liberalisation can therefore be a powerful anti-corruption instrument.

As part of its core mandate, the Fund has been actively engaged in encouraging liberalisation of trade, price and financial systems. We have also advocated free and fair market-entry regulations, as well as good statistics and transparency. Importantly, where liberalisation involves privatisation, it is critical that safeguards – such as adequate and transparent procedures – are in place so that the sale of assets is not compromised by corruption.

Of course, experience demonstrates that regulation in a market economy is essential for both sustained growth and financial stability. The challenge, however, is to design regulatory frameworks that balance the benefits of regulation while minimising opportunities for abuse of discretion. [footnote 30] For this reason, in its core areas of expertise, the Fund has promoted the adoption of rules, procedures and criteria that are as targeted, clear, simple and transparent as possible. These areas include public expenditure management, tax policy and administration, banking and foreign exchange systems, and data management (IMF 1997).

13.5 The role of the private sector

When people complain about corruption, they sometimes forget – perhaps conveniently – that for every bribe taken by a public official, one is given by a member of the private sector. Clearly then, addressing the behaviour of the private sector needs to be a key component of any effective anti- corruption strategy. How can this be done?

In some cases, this means using enforcement measures. For example, in those countries where bribery is a common way of facilitating foreign investment, it is critical that the country of the foreign investor enforces laws that prohibit foreign corrupt practices. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions can be invoked in this effort (OECD 1997).

However, experience also shows that the private sector can become effective partners in combating corruption. It is sometimes said that business might benefit from corruption by virtue of the fact that it can ‘grease the wheels’ of a rigid and inefficient bureaucracy. I disagree with that proposition. Based on my own experience, investors actually seek out countries that can give them the assurance that, once an investment is made, they will not be blackmailed into providing bribes. Because corruption creates an enormous amount of unpredictability for businesses, anti-corruption strategies can be designed to solicit their support.

I find Indonesia’s experience of implementing that partnership particularly illuminating. At a recent seminar hosted by the IMF on the topic, Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Indonesia’s former Minister of Finance (and currently Chief of Operations at the World Bank), described how she successfully partnered with businesses to provide a streamlined customs approval process in exchange for their commitment not to offer any bribes to officials – ‘new rules of the game’. [footnote 31]

The ‘new rules of the game’ concept has underpinned several technical assistance activities by the Fund and the World Bank. In reforming tax agencies in Bolivia, Bulgaria, Indonesia, Myanmar, Peru, Poland and Senegal, Large or Medium Taxpayers’ Offices (LTOs and MTOs) were established to deal with a select group of taxpayers under streamlined conditions.

Beyond the business community, civil society also has a role to play. Through the use of social media, civil society can become a powerful force in combating corruption. In addition to being a very effective means of monitoring government activities, social media can also greatly enhance the credibility of an anti-corruption campaign by linking new institutions that have a specific mandate in this area. [footnote 32]

13.6 Building values and institutions

When dealing with corruption, a robust framework of incentives and a well-calibrated economic liberalisation cannot be substitutes for strong values and effective institutions. Of course, developing values at a personal and institutional level may seem beyond the control of any government. It is clearly not something that can be legislated. Yet unless public officials take pride in their work – and their independence from both political and private influence – all other efforts will fail.

Building values among public officials requires sustained public education. Formal training can help but, ultimately, values are most effectively instilled through the education framework, societal pressure and – as I will discuss further below – the example of leaders. The key objective is to develop a cadre of public officials who are – and are perceived to be – independent from both private influence and political interference. This is the single most important feature of a strong institution. Indeed, it has been noted that one way to assess the strength of an institution is to assess the extent to which key employees are replaced at the time of elections.

There are other factors that lend support to effective operation, some of which – such as rules that establish transparency and clear accountability – have already been mentioned. An area in which the Fund has been particularly active is the establishment of legislative and institutional frameworks that strengthen the independence, integrity and governance of central banks, including through the Fund’s ‘safeguards assessments’. A recent example has been work in Tunisia in support of the Central Bank, which strengthened its independence, internal control mechanisms and powers. Of course, enhancing the overall technical competence of officials who work in these institutions is also critical. For this reason, the Fund has invested considerable resources in capacity-building in a broad range of areas, from public finance management to the strengthening of the financial intelligence units, that are responsible for applying anti- money laundering laws.

13.7 Political will

Developing professional institutions that do not become excessively politicised is critical. Yet the irony is that in circumstances where institutions have been completely compromised by corruption, active and sustained political will is essential. Powerful vested interests can only be effectively challenged when a country’s top leadership sends a clear signal that they are committed to do so.

In some cases, this may require wholesale dismissals within an agency that has a reputation for corrupt practices. Prosecuting the powerful ‘big fish’ – which is necessary in order to send a clear signal of commitment and change – can only be achieved if a country’s leaders visibly support the process. Moreover, political leaders play a unique role in setting an example of professional integrity. Lee Kuan Yew is a leader who was very effective in both signalling a zero- tolerance policy towards corruption and building competent institutions at a time when corruption was pervasive in Singapore.

13.8 Avoiding pitfalls

Although active and sustained political leadership is critical to the success of any anti-corruption campaign, it is important that reforms in this area are not hijacked to implement a political agenda. One way of assessing whether anti-corruption efforts are credible is to note whether enforcement is limited to the prosecution of political rivals, or instead also extends to the government’s political supporters.

In addition, care should be taken to ensure that an anti- corruption campaign does not create such fear that public officials are reluctant to perform their duties. For example, in circumstances where state-owned banks have extended a loan to a company that has become insolvent, it is often in the interest of the bank, the debtor and the economy more generally to restructure the loan (which might include principal write-downs) in a manner that enables the company to return to viability. Yet the Fund’s experience has been that, in some countries, the managers of state-owned banks are simply afraid to engage in such negotiations. They fear that, if they agree to any debt write-down, they will be prosecuted under the country’s corruption law for having wasted state assets – even though a restructuring might actually enhance the value of the bank’s claim relative to the alternative, the liquidation of the company.

Finally, although regulatory reform can promote simplicity and automaticity, there are certain functions, such as bank supervision, where discretion will always be essential. For these reasons, regulatory reform cannot be a substitute for the development of effective institutions.

13.9 Concluding observations

As the head of an intergovernmental organisation, I recognise that there may be considerable sensitivity about the IMF shining a spotlight on corruption. At the same time, the alternative – turning a blind eye to the problem – is not a viable option. As is recognised under its existing policies, it is not tenable for the IMF to assess a member’s economic prospects exclusively through the lens of monetary, fiscal or financial sector policies, when the problem of corruption is endemic and has a major impact on economic performance. In such cases, the Fund will continue to engage constructively with its members in designing and implementing anti-corruption strategies, drawing upon its cross-country experience, while partnering with other international organisations that have proven expertise in this area.

13.10 References

Gupta, S., Davoodi, H. and Alonso-Terme, R. 2002. Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty? Economics of Governance, (3), pp. 23–45. Available online .

Gupta, S., Davoodi, H. and Tiongson, E. 2002. Corruption and the Provision of Health Care and Education Services. In: G. T. Abed and S. Gupta, eds. Governance, Corruption & Economic Performance. Washington DC: IMF, pp. 245– 279. Available online .

IMF. 2 July 1997. The Role of the Fund in Governance Issues – Guidance Note. News Brief, No. 97/15. Washington DC: IMF. Available online .

IMF. 2004. Legal, Judicial and Governance Reforms Indonesia. Indonesia: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 04/189. Washington DC: IMF. Available online .

IMF. 2006. Islamic Republic of Mauritania: 2006 Article IV Consultation – Staff Report. Washington DC: IMF. Available online .

IMF. 2015a. Current Challenges in Revenue Mobilization. Washington DC: IMF.

IMF. 12 March 2015b. Ukraine – Request for Extended Arrangement. IMF Country Report No. 15/69. Washington DC: IMF. Available online .

IMF. 2015c. Republic of Mozambique – Fiscal Transparency Evaluation. Country Report No. 15/32. Washington DC: IMF. Available online .

Kaufmann, D. 2005. Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption. Washington DC: World Bank, pp. 81–98. Available online .

Klitgaard, R. 2015. Addressing Corruption Together. Paris: OECD. Available online .

Mauro, P. 1998. Corruption and the Composition of Government Expenditure. Journal of Public Economics, (69), pp. 263–279. Available online .

OECD. 1997. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. [online]. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available online .

Svensson, J. 2005. Eight Questions about Corruption. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(3), pp. 19–42. Available online .

Van Rijckeghem, C. and Weder, B. 2002. Bureaucratic Corruption and the Rate of Temptation: Do Wages in the Civil Service Affect Corruption and by How Much? In: G. T. Abed and S. Gupta, eds. Governance, Corruption & Economic Performance. Washington DC: IMF, pp. 59–88. Available online .

14. Angel Gurría: How to battle 21st-century corruption

Over the last two decades, we have made great progress in taking the fight against corruption to the highest global and political levels. Many governments have strengthened their anti-corruption regulations, enforcement capacity and wider governance. Several high-profile corruption cases have seen justice served. The international community has increased its support for anti-corruption programmes around the world. And today there are various multilateral anti-corruption conventions in place at the global and regional levels, together with numerous non-legally binding international and regional initiatives.

The OECD, working closely with its partners, has been prominent in this fight: setting standards across a range of areas from foreign bribery to public sector integrity, as well as on related issues such as tax evasion and bid rigging. And these initiatives have made a difference.

Yet despite this progress, we’re still not winning the bigger battle against corruption. Recent scandals involving national leaders and major corporations, the ongoing investigations into the sports sector, and the growing threat of terrorism and its links to corruption, also remind us that we need to do more, much more.

At the OECD, we believe that corruption’s harmful effects on growth, equality and trust are too big to ignore, and make tackling corruption not only a moral imperative but also an economic, social and political necessity.

Corruption allows for the financing of wars; it helps to smuggle people, guns and drugs; it channels public and private funds into illicit activities; and it undermines collective action against climate change and poverty. Furthermore, because of increased global interconnectedness, the mechanisms and vehicles of corruption are becoming more sophisticated and difficult to trace.

In this essay, I argue that, to deal with corruption and the devastation it causes, the international community must build coherent systems that focus on all stages of the anti-corruption process from prevention to detection and enforcement and, at the same time, ensure effective implementation by both governments and corporations. And we must boost global collaboration by fully engaging all countries – in the developed and the developing world – in the fight against corruption.

14.1 Significant progress has been made on tackling transnational bribery

Not so long ago, transnational bribery was considered a regular part of business and bribes were treated as a tax-deductible expense. In 1999, the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions entered into force. The Convention made it illegal for citizens and businesses of signatory countries to bribe foreign public officials while doing business abroad and our work continues to ensure it is fully effective (OECD 1997).

As such, the OECD Working Group on Bribery has established a rigorous monitoring and evaluation system to ensure that governments stick to their commitments (OECD 2015a). The private sector and civil society play an integral role in the group’s activities, providing input to regular consultations and the on-site visits that form part of a country’s evaluation.

The Convention has helped governments to push the fight against bribery up the agenda. Many of the 41 countries that make up the OECD Working Group on Bribery (which comprises all OECD countries and seven non-OECD countries) have made radical changes to their laws and institutions to comply with the Convention. One of the most recent and successful examples is the UK Bribery Act 2010, which entered into force in 2011. Between 1999 and 2014, 361 individuals and 126 companies were sanctioned for foreign bribery in 17 countries (OECD 2014). At least $5.4 billion was imposed in combined monetary sanctions and 95 people put behind bars (OECD 2014). The 2014 OECD Foreign Bribery Report showed that, among the 427 foreign bribery cases concluded, almost two- thirds of cases occurred in just four sectors: extractive (19%); construction (15%); transportation and storage (15%); and information and communication (10%). In the majority of cases, bribes were paid to obtain public procurement contracts and, in around half of cases, management or CEOs were involved (OECD 2014). As of December 2014, there were 393 ongoing investigations into alleged acts of foreign bribery in 25 of the countries party to the Convention and, even as I write, new cases are being brought to light (OECD 2014).

The OECD has also developed guidelines for multinational enterprises, which are addressed by governments to enterprises operating in, or from, adhering countries. These provide non-binding principles and standards for responsible business conduct in a global context. Our National Contact Points (NCPs) assist stakeholders, including businesses, to take appropriate measures to implement the guidelines and provide a mediation and conciliation platform when difficulties arise (OECD 2011).

For example, two non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Cameroon recently brought a case to the NCP in the United States, alleging that a company had not observed the guidelines on combating bribery. The US NCP offered mediation to help the parties involved achieve a mutually agreeable resolution. In June 2015, the company agreed to a request from the NGOs to investigate past cases of corruption and take action against any acts of corruption (US Department of State 2015).

Of course, the best way to combat corruption is to prevent it from happening altogether. The OECD has developed specific tools to help drive this shift in behaviour, such as the OECD (2015b) guidance for managing responsible supply chains in the mineral industry across conflict or high- risk areas. This provides, among other things, measures to mitigate the risk of bribery by companies and recommends indicators for measuring improvement.

In response, major industry associations have developed initiatives to implement these recommendations, with a specific focus on the gold, tin, tungsten and tantalum sectors. As a result, industry audit programmes designed to implement the due-diligence guidance now cover 90% of the refined gold, 95% of the smelted tantalum and 75–85% of the smelted tin produced every year (OECD 2015c). The Governments of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda have all integrated these initiatives into their legal systems (OECD 2015c).

In addition, the OECD adopted the 2010 Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics and Compliance. This is the first and only intergovernmental guidance for the private sector on how to prevent and detect foreign bribery through effective internal control, ethics and compliance programmes (OECD 2010a). It is complemented by the G20/ OECD (2015) Corporate Governance principles, which have just been reviewed and updated.

14.2 Improvements to national integrity systems

The OECD’s progress on tackling transnational bribery has been matched by extensive work on wider integrity systems at a national level. These include codes of conduct, effective competition, business integrity, and measures to secure greater value for money in public spending.

For example, the OECD has been examining the impact of bid rigging, which raises prices, reduces quality and restricts supply in the government procurement process and is often combined with bribery of public officials or unlawful kickbacks. Three years ago, we adopted a recommendation designed to help governments eliminate this type of corruption from their procurement processes and boost competition, forming the basis for numerous sets of national guidelines and advocacy materials (OECD 2012). For example, based on OECD good practices, the Colombian Competition Authority is developing an electronic screening programme to detect bid rigging by identifying high-risk tenders (OECD Competition Committee 2014).

The OECD has also conducted several country-specific projects in co-operation with national competition authorities to reduce bid rigging and increase transparency, starting with the Mexican Social Security Institute – which secured cost savings of around $700 million per annum and dramatically decreased its risks of corruption (IMCO 2012).

As the recent FIFA corruption scandal shows, government agencies such as tax authorities are essential players in the fight to deter, detect and disrupt national and global corruption. That is why the OECD has supported work to strengthen the reach of tax administrations in this area, including our 2010 recommendation to improve information sharing and collaboration across government agencies to combat corruption, tax evasion and other serious economic crimes (OECD 2010b). This led to the establishment of the Oslo Dialogue, a global forum to develop and promote a whole-of-government approach to tackling tax crimes and other serious financial crimes and is supported by the capacity-building programmes delivered through the OECD’s International Academy for Tax Crime Investigation (OECD 2015d).

In addition, we’re working with our members to target projects and industries that have traditionally been most at risk of corruption – issuing recommendations and guidance related to ethics, managing conflicts of interest and increasing transparency in lobbying, and very importantly, public procurement (OECD 2015e).[^33] Building on this, we’re successfully helping governments to pre-emptively identify and limit the risks of corruption and mismanagement in major infrastructure projects – as we did with the Milan Expo 2015 and the construction of Mexico City’s new airport.

14.3 Progress in extending international collaboration

Our effectiveness in curbing corruption depends on our ability to join forces and co-ordinate actions globally. As a result, we have been raising awareness of all the aforementioned initiatives in other international circles, and we are working to integrate emerging economies and developing countries in our work.

[^33]These include the 1998 Ethics Recommendation, the 2003 Recommendation on Guidelines for Managing Conflict of Interest, the 2010 Recommendation on Transparency and Integrity in Lobbying and the recently updated Recommendation on Public Procurement.

In particular, the OECD has actively supported the G20 to make the top standards in the fight against corruption count on a global scale. Based on OECD work and standards, the G20 has made a number of commitments and adopted principles and guidance on topics such as foreign bribery and solicitation, public procurement, asset disclosure, whistle-blower protection and private sector transparency and integrity (OECD/G20 2015).

We have also made progress in our dialogue with China on anti-corruption and the promotion of responsible business conduct, which is particularly timely as they take over the presidency of the G20 in 2016. Other emerging economies, in particular India, are also showing increasing signs of interest in the standards developed by our organisation.

Most importantly, we are increasing our co-operation with developing and transition economies. We have regional anti-corruption programmes across Africa, the Asia-Pacific region, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America (OECD 2015f). In addition, working with the Open Government Partnership (OGP), we are helping developing and transition economies to implement and monitor the OGP standards.

14.4 There is still a long road ahead

So what next? At the OECD, we believe we need to focus on four major areas in the future.

a) Corruption is every country’s problem

Every major economy must be active against corruption. It is still the case that 24 out of the 41 parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention have yet to issue a single sanction (OECD 2014). Everyone needs to step to the fore and contribute their share in tackling international corruption. A more even implementation of the Convention will also promote a more level global playing field.

And while the 41 countries make up approximately 66% of world exports, a number of significant economies have yet to join, including China, India and Indonesia. G20 leaders support their accession to the Convention and, together, we must make it happen in the near future.

As part of this, the OECD can and should play a bigger role in helping to strengthen anti-corruption practices across the world by integrating partner countries into its various initiatives. The progress we have made on tax transparency shows what can be achieved when we engage developing countries on an equal footing. Today there are 129 jurisdictions committed to implementing the international standard for exchange of tax information on request (OECD 2016). The new global common reporting standard on tax transparency agreed in 2014, which will be implemented by more than 95 jurisdictions by 2018, will ensure the automatic transmission of information about financial accounts held offshore by taxpayers (OECD 2016). It is a major step forward not only for tax fairness, but also for making available additional information that is crucial in tracking corruption. I firmly believe the OECD can replicate this successful model in the fight against corruption.

b) Implementation, implementation, implementation

As we have seen, many of the standards are in place. We must now focus on effective implementation. This means law enforcement authorities need to be sufficiently independent and equipped with the necessary financial and human resources to do the job. Professionals such as lawyers, accountants and auditors need to be much more aware of the risks they face when advising in business transactions, especially at the international level. Ratings agencies should include corruption risks in their analysis of companies. Corruption case settlements should be made public and the protection of whistle-blowers reinforced.

We also need to make an effort to embed integrity within the management of both public and private organisations, including in their general management, human resources, internal control and audit, and external audit systems. This would also improve the monitoring of progress and the effectiveness and coherence of integrity policies and practices. Further engagement with the private sector is imperative.

Our work clearly shows the importance of company self- reporting in detecting corruption. However, self-reporting is often not acknowledged or incentivised. We intend to undertake work to ensure good compliance is rewarded and self-reporting actively promoted, as well as to find innovative ways to protect companies from undue solicitation.

Finally, effective implementation will depend on how we are able to address corruption in organisations where corruption often occurs – such as state-owned enterprises, public/private partnerships and local governments – and sectors that need special attention, such as customs, health, education and law enforcement. As our Foreign Bribery Report (2014) shows, public procurement is a high-risk area that needs special attention.

c) Integrating and widening the integrity agenda

The effectiveness of our various tools and initiatives will also depend on how we are able to link them up, build synergies, provide consistency in our approaches and support co-ordination between institutions responsible for enhancing integrity and fighting corruption.

Such connections also need to be built by governments and the different stakeholders at the national level, strengthening the links between initiatives on foreign bribery and public sector integrity with those on tax evasion, bid rigging, money laundering and illicit financial flows.

The OECD is uniquely placed to assist countries in this respect. We’re ready to work on the necessary training and policy advice, as well as offering our expertise to specific situations, when required – as our successful work on large infrastructure projects with Italy and Mexico shows.

Beyond institutional solutions, we need to balance a rules-based compliance approach with greater attention to the political economy of corruption and to the values of public officials. This will require taking better account of the existence of vested interests when shaping policies by promoting transparency and integrity in political finance, elections and lobbying at various levels of government. Preventing public officials or policies from being swayed by powerful and narrow vested interests is crucial, if we are to strengthen trust in our governments.

d) The relationship between corruption and other global issues

Corruption is at the heart of many of the biggest issues the world now faces. As we know, the forced displacement of people due to conflict, persecution, violence and human rights violations is on the rise. The current refugee crisis has triggered a global discussion about migration and refugees. Corruption plays a significant role in this crisis in the wake of inadequate government services. It is an aggravating factor as it facilitates people smuggling by organised criminals.

Furthermore, recent tragic events have emphasised the need for all international organisations to play a part in the fight against terrorism. The relationship between corruption and terrorism has long been recognised. Evidence shows that corruption contributes to the financing of terrorism and creates inequalities that disenfranchise communities and promote the development and growth of terrorist groups.

This phenomenon is facilitated by the growing complexity of corruption in commodity trading and illicit trade, through crude oil swaps, trade mispricing and stolen resource trading. The OECD is looking to further explore these issues in order to best equip countries to fight these corrosive and dangerous practices.

We also know that corruption undermines the fight against climate change. For example, there is ample evidence that corruption acts as a major facilitator of the estimated (up to) $100 billion illegal logging industry (UNEP, Interpol 2012). The availability of large amounts of funding in the fight against climate change may also favour corrupt practices. But overall, this is an area that remains relatively unexplored. The OECD is well placed to undertake work in this area in the light of its expertise in environmental issues, trade (including analysis of illicit trade) and fighting corruption.

In 2015, we saw the emergence of major bribery scandals in sports. Apart from its economic importance, sport plays a major role in holding societies together and we cannot tolerate the ethical breaches that undermine its legitimacy. These scandals illustrate the limits of self-regulation. Global leadership is required in this area. The OECD’s knowledge and experience in lobbying, good public governance, public procurement and fighting corruption mean that the organisation is ready to play a key role on this topic.

Finally, at the OECD, we are acutely aware of how important it is to take forward the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda (UN 2015). Addressing corruption is vital in order to successfully achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). While corruption is explicitly mentioned only in Goal 16, it is clear that it cuts across all of the SDGs and will be a major hurdle to achieving them. Corruption has a significant impact on poverty, inequality, hunger, education, the availability of clean water and sanitation, economic growth, industry innovation and infrastructure. It thwarts resource mobilisation and allocation and diverts resources away from sustainable development and from efforts to eradicate poverty. International organisations, including the OECD, must work together to ensure the fight against corruption is made a priority in order to achieve the SDGs. The G20 could take a leading role in this respect.

We need to establish a common vision and a global agenda. The OECD stands ready to play its part and work hard to win the battle against the dark side of our economies by designing, promoting and implementing better anti- corruption policies for better lives.

14.5 References

G20/OECD. 2015. Principles of Corporate Governance. Available online .

Instituto Mexicano para la Competividad (IMCO). 2012. Evaluación del Acuerdo de Trabajo IMSS-OCDE-CFC. Available online .

OECD. 1997. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available online .

OECD. 2010a. Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics and Compliance. Available online .

OECD. 14 October 2010b. Recommendation of the Council to Facilitate Co-operation between Tax and Other Law Enforcement Authorities to Combat Serious Crimes. Available online .

OECD. 2011. National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. Available online .

OECD. 2012. Recommendation of the OECD Council on Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement. Available online .

OECD. 2014. OECD Foreign Bribery Report: An Analysis of the Crime of Bribery of Foreign Public Officials. Paris: OECD Publishing.

OECD. 2015a. Country Reports on the Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention. Available online .

OECD. 2015b. Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas. Available online .

OECD. 2015c. Implementing the OECD Due Diligence Guidance. Available online .

OECD. 2015d. Forum on Tax and Crime. Available online .

OECD. 2015e. Bribery and Corruption. Available online .

OECD. 2015f. Regional anti-corruption programmes. Available online .

OECD. 2016. Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes. Available online .

OECD Competition Committee. 2014. Fighting Bid Rigging in Public Procurement in Colombia. Paris: OECD Publishing. Available online .

OECD and G20. 2015. Anti-corruption. Available online .

United Nations. 2015. Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Available online .

UNEP, Interpol. 2012. Green Carbon, Black Trade. Norway: UNEP, Interpol. Available online .

US Department of State. 28 July 2015. US NCP Final Statement CED/RELUFA on the Specific Instance between the Center for Environment and Development (CED) with Network to Fight against Hunger (RELUFA) and Herakles Farms’ affiliate SG Sustainable Oils Cameroon (SGSOC) in Cameroon. Available online .

15. Mart Laar: The cancer of the modern world – a European perspective

Corruption is a cancer. At first, it can look small and harmless. Before you know it, it has taken over your entire body. Likewise, the losses from corruption can start small, but in the end the damage is enormous.

The problem of corruption around the world is well known. Dictators, arms smugglers and warlords rely on corruption to fund violence against their own populations. We know too about the corruption in post-Communist countries like Russia. It’s not just the corruption in the economy; it’s the corruption of the legal and political systems that sustains it, which is so damaging in so many countries.

Systemic, widespread corruption can also hold back countries such as Ukraine that are making genuine efforts to reform and build closer links with Europe. It undermines the inspiring campaigns and aspirations of reformers – as seen in Moldova, for instance – and saps the confidence of potential European partners. In Ukraine and Moldova, it is no coincidence that public dissatisfaction and protest appear to be as much about corruption as they are about anything else. And the public are right: corruption siphons off much- needed investment and slows the growth and progress of Eastern European economies. So I believe that we need a plan for Europe that places anti-corruption right at the heart of the process.

I know about corruption. I’ve seen it with my own eyes. You can no more eradicate it than you can abolish human greed. But that doesn’t mean that there is no hope. Estonia was deeply corrupted, just as other former Communist countries were as they made the transition to independence. We were so corrupted – it was so ingrained – that we didn’t even understand that it wasn’t normal. It had become a way of life. So for us, progress depended on a fundamental realisation: we could only cut ourselves off from the old Communist heritage if we cut out the cancer of corruption.

This was easy to say, of course, but harder to implement. European institutions stressed from the start of the integration process the importance of fighting corruption, but sometimes this seemed to us to be just warm words. To our surprise, as our economy and trade relations grew, several Western companies allegedly offered generous bribes in many common business deals. To them, corruption in Eastern Europe was normal. So, while the West finances campaigns against corruption abroad, it would be significantly more effective if all countries also dealt with the criminal activity and the bribes originating at home.

In many countries, corruption isn’t actually a negative word. It is connected with friendship and taking care of family. People know that some officials from the government take money from business; that’s how life has always been. How do you begin to unpick that? In Estonia, we knew that if we wanted to break free, we didn’t have any choice – we had to end corruption. Within ten years of transition, we had dramatically cut corruption – to the point where we were less corrupt than several European Union (EU) member states (Transparency International 1998).

How did we do it? A huge part of the answer was the European Union. We received vital encouragement from the EU, including as part of the negotiations on enlargement. Most importantly, we received a very clear message right from the start that the door to the EU would be closed to countries with the usual scale of post-Communist corruption. At first, it was thought that the EU was not serious. But then the Slovakian Government, under Vladímir Mečiar, was ousted from negotiations on enlargement (European Commission 1997). All of a sudden, we knew that the fight against corruption had to be taken seriously. Transparency was important too. Clear data enables you to see very similar countries, like Latvia and Estonia, with very different levels of corruption (Transparency International 2015). So if you could cut it in one country, why not the other? With the help of the EU, independent non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were also created, which aided the fight against corruption.

The EU shared with us, along with the other countries hoping to join, all of the best practice and legislation for tackling corruption. This allowed us to take big steps forward very quickly. An important part of this was to regularly publish key officials’ income and its sources, supported by criminal punishments for corruption in the penal code. Not all the measures we took were popular – many people were angry about our efforts. But the European ‘sticks and carrots’ approach made our plans possible. We could privatise public assets, in the knowledge that they could only be sold for legal money moved through European banks that had rules against money laundering and fraud. Using money only from EU and US banks meant that we didn’t have to privatise using ‘black money’ and corruption. When you cut corruption out of banking and the wider economy, it is much harder for corruption to take root in politics.

Helping to tackle corruption in Eastern Europe has also, of course, provided tangible benefits for people in Western Europe. It has helped open up new markets for trade and investment – based on a level playing field and open competition – therefore boosting the prosperity and security of all EU member states, including the big economies of the West.

Many people, including leaders, have asked for the secrets of Estonia’s success in tackling corruption. Every country is different, but here are my suggestions:

One – don’t become corrupt yourself. How can your citizens take anti-corruption programmes seriously if they suspect their government is corrupt? So you need to make it clear from the start: mistakes can be pardoned; corruption cannot. There can be no yellow cards – just red ones.

Two – let the market do the job. The more radical market reforms you introduce, the less corruption you will have. Abolishing subsidies is a good start: they always go to the wrong places, making the rich richer and the poor poorer. Simplifying the tax system and cutting taxes helps too – as does the abolition of custom tariffs, in which the EU plays a key role.

Three – make government smaller. This is often underestimated in the transition to a market economy. You can’t move your country to the future with the old machinery. So you need to break up the old structures that provide opportunities for corruption. A good way to start is to cut the government by half and double the salaries of those who remain. And then cut the size again by another 20%. Your new public service must be non-partisan and independent. As you go forward, keep government lean. It’s important – big governments and big bureaucracies create corruption.

Four – make everything public. Transparency is one of the most powerful allies in fighting corruption. When information on public spending, government agencies’ work and use of governmental benefits and privileges is freely available, it starts to reduce corruption. Modern technology can help a lot here. Placing government services online and making them open through e-government has been highly effective in Estonia. It doesn’t just cut the misuse of government credit cards and make sure government procurement is clean, it also cuts down on time and paper – and lets trees grow.

Five – let freedom reign. Freedom takes the state official out of the daily situations and transactions where corruption can occur. If you need to have a separate government document every time a house is built or renovated, there is a chance for corruption. When decisions – or the speed of decisions – depend on the will of a state official rather than the law of the land, you will have corruption. Abolish them and you find that nothing bad happens.

These conclusions are really quite simple. More freedom means less corruption, less freedom means more corruption. It’s just the same in sport. If you take away the competition and fair play, you will lose the spirit of sport. That’s what corruption does to all of our efforts, our dreams and our desires – in corrupt societies, they are thwarted and the human spirit is poorer as a result. We showed in Estonia that it doesn’t have to be like this. Together we can change it – together we can do it!

15.1 References

European Commission. 15 July 1997. Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Slovakia’s Application for Membership of the European Union. Brussels: European Commission. Available online .

Transparency International. 1998. Corruption Perceptions Index 1998. Available online .

16. José Ugaz: People’s power: taking action to demand accountability

16.1 introduction.

Over the past quarter of a century, the face of corruption has changed. And so has the anti-corruption movement.

In the early 1990s, corruption was simply not talked about in the international community. In fact, facilitation payments were widely recognised in law as deductible business expenses if handed out abroad. Back then, the focus of the emerging anti-corruption movement was to get corruption on the agenda: raising awareness of its devastating effects and showing its disproportionate impact on the poor. It is the most vulnerable people in our societies who too often have to make the hard choice to pay bribes to get the essential services they need, such as treatment for a sick grandparent or an education for their child.

This focus shifted in the late 1990s to creating ways to both measure corruption and develop the tools to prevent it. Launched in 1995, Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) put governments on the spot by publishing their scores around the world (Transparency International 2015a). By 2003, the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) – now ratified by 178 countries – outlined a solid framework of anti- corruption laws (UNODC 2015). This came six years after the OECD Convention Against Foreign Bribery and seven years after the ground-breaking Inter-American Convention against Corruption (OECD 1997; International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities 2012). The G20 has had an Anti-Corruption Action Plan since 2010 and the fight against corruption is now at the heart of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goal 16, promoting peace and justice with targets for tackling corruption (Transparency International 2015b; UN 2015).

Today many countries have solid anti-corruption legislation. But laws don’t work if they are not properly enforced. Corruption remains rife. Countries get used to failing scores and billions of dollars of illicit financial flows and money laundering provide luxury lifestyles for the corrupt. So what’s next? Pressure from the public is key.

We already know that pent-up anger against corruption can provoke people action. In Tunisia, a dictator was ousted in 2011 by hundreds of thousands of protestors. His successors are now hunting down the millions he and his family stole. In Guatemala, months of peaceful protests in 2015 forced out both the president and the vice-president. They are now in jail facing corruption charges. Marches against corruption in Brazil, Chile and Indonesia have also led to substantive changes to laws.

This shows how much can be achieved when people react to specific events, but the rejection of corruption needs to become more sustained. This essay explores the new tools that citizens can, and should, make use of to fight corruption both collectively and as individuals. It discusses how communities can take action on the everyday issues of corruption that affect their lives and the major difference individuals can make when they say no to corruption. It also looks at how we can and should act together against the phenomenon of grand corruption, something that our ever- more connected world is now making possible.

At TI, we define grand corruption as the abuse of high- level power that benefits the few at the expense of the many and causes serious and widespread harm to individuals and society alike. Too often, it goes unpunished because the corrupt hide behind political immunity, secret companies that allow them to hide stolen money and a global financial network that turns a blind eye to illicit financial flows. Even here, citizen action can make a difference to unmask the corrupt. I strongly believe that it will be pressure from people around the world – coming together, using new technologies and speaking with a united bold voice to demand justice – that will start to hold the grand corrupt to account. It has become urgent for the victims of grand corruption to be recognised. Together, we can all help to stop the current trend.

16.2 The power of the masses

Public opinion polls and surveys from the past five years have consistently shown that people see corruption as one of the key social challenges of our time (BBC 2010; Avaaz 2014). When a United Nations online poll consistently featured corruption as a top priority for the next generation of Sustainable Development Goals, this was translated into Goal 16, which commits all governments to “provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions” (UN 2016; UN 2015, p. 2).

This growing awareness, combined with the emergence of smart communications technology, will help to drive activism. Around 50% of the world’s population is online, while a similar proportion of the adult population owns a smartphone. By 2020, this is expected to rise to 80% (The Economist 2015).

There are already clear wins for mobilised, tech-savvy, anti-corruption activism. In Brazil, for example, a new law took effect in 2010 called Ficha Limpa, or Clean Record, which prevents candidates who have been convicted of corruption, mismanagement of public funds or electoral violations from standing for public office for at least eight years. It came about because more than 40 civil society organisations were able to mobilise two million Brazilian citizens to use online actions, together with events, to campaign for the legislation (Salas 2010). This is especially important in a country where TI studies show that 81% and 72% of people respectively feel that political parties and the legislature are corrupt or extremely corrupt (Transparency International 2013a).

Thanks to this law, Brazilian courts barred 317 mayoral candidates – who had criminal records – from running for office in the 2012 municipal election. In the 2014 general election, this rose to 497 (Alves 2014). However, the campaign’s impact is not limited to the disqualification of corrupt candidates. Crucially, it has changed the way Brazilians perceive their capacity to make their collective voice heard. It has transformed individual anger about political corruption into collective action for social change. In our latest survey, 81% of Brazilians now believe that ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption (Transparency International 2013a).

Use of social media helped ignite and organise the uprisings across North Africa and the Middle East. It allowed millions of people to share messages of civil resistance and collective activism. Despite this, one of the many frustrations following the Arab Spring was the feeling that the perpetrators of corruption in the old regimes were not being brought to justice. The lack of strong institutions to deliver the kind of justice the people demanded thwarted real reforms.

In Guatemala, a similar story of disaffected citizenry turned out differently, because three key factors came together: technology, people and an institutional pressure for accountability.

Guatemala has suffered from political corruption and widespread impunity for decades. The justice system was seen as weak and co-opted by powerful interests. Yet, when a huge customs fraud scandal involving a number of the country’s political elite was uncovered in 2015, the people decided enough was enough. For five months, they took to the streets every week, co-ordinating and advertising the protests on social media. Their numbers swelled. This, combined with pressure from emboldened national prosecutors who were working alongside international investigators from the UN, eventually forced the country’s president and vice- president to resign. They were arrested shortly afterwards. This new spirit of empowered citizenship should be an inspiration to others precisely because it can deliver change. It gives legitimacy to legal action in the spirit of democracy. It is the will of the people.

16.3 Communities taking action

Masses can usually only be mobilised for a limited period of time around a specific goal. Their successes are watershed moments for all involved, yet they signal the beginning rather than the end of a long process. Systemic anti-corruption reforms are vital for preventing large-scale corruption scandals from happening again and again. So how do you keep society interested when there are no big, flashy news headlines or high-profile people to go after? By showing it that engagement matters.

When we think of communities, we think of the basic services that people need: education, health, waste collection, public transport and roads. Often communities are one step removed from how these are funded. Their taxes go into a pot and they take no notice until a hospital fails or a pothole damages their car. But we can only know whether money is well spent if we have access to information about it. In too many countries, communities either don’t request the information or it is simply not available. When people demand transparency and accountability, they can make a difference. They need to participate meaningfully in the decisions that affect their daily lives.

This is what happened in a school just outside Dhaka, the capital of Bangladesh. Corruption in education is a significant challenge in Bangladesh and particularly affects the poor. Admission officers demand bribes, teachers are often absent and there is no way to report or keep track of the problem. One school decided to change the way things worked. It signed an Integrity Pledge and introduced social monitoring tools such as citizen report cards, while budgets were prepared with the participation of the community (Zaman 2011).

Within a year, the dropout rate fell from 30% to 7%, the collection of unauthorised payments stopped, scholarships were distributed transparently and 100% of students passed the annual final examination. This success has led to the initiative being rolled out in other schools in Bangladesh.

Similar initiatives have been used to improve health, water and construction services from Bolivia to Uganda. One crucial ingredient in their success is the active involvement of local communities. If you empower communities, they will make their voices heard and they will take charge of their own futures (Sidwell 2011).

The other crucial element is transparency. Having access to information is a precondition for making informed decisions and holding public officials and elected leaders to account. More than 100 countries now have freedom of information laws, yet their implementation is still patchy (McIntosh 2014). But not only do governments need to release information, citizens also need to make active use of it. This combination of information and activism can be a potent tool.

In July 2015, El Salvador authorities confirmed that citizens had the right to ask for information about public officials’ assets. This is important because, if you can track wealth over time, it can show whether officials are using their positions for illicit gain. In less than four months, Salvadoran citizens submitted close to 6,000 requests for information. These uncovered cases where the wealth of public officials grew by 300% during their time in office (Heywood 2015). Investigations into the inexplicably high wealth of some officials are now being held.

New technologies are facilitating this push for transparency. ‘Big data’ may be a buzzword, but its trickle- down effect can allow ordinary people to search and evaluate important information. There is no reason why local, regional and national governments cannot put their records online and create a platform for citizens to search data on public tenders, tax spending or any other part of the day-to-day running of communities.

Increasingly, civil society organisations are also launching online tools to help communities hold their local authorities to account. Through Fix My Street, people in Georgia can flag construction and infrastructure issues in their neighbourhood to the mayor’s office and track repairs (Transparency International 2013b). The online portal has triggered the fixing of hundreds of problems. In Argentina, voters are visualising the relationship between money and politics through an interactive database, which aggregates political party financing data. The site allows citizens to see where party funds are coming from and where they are going (Transparency International 2012). In Lithuania, manoSeimas (My Parliament) lets users find out how parliamentarians have been voting on policy issues (Transparency International 2016a).

The tools to hold elected officials to account are beginning to expand. It is up to people to start using them. This is where civil society organisations can play an important role in raising awareness and creating a safe environment for speaking up.

16.4 Individuals can make a difference

For too many people, the idea that a corrupt system can change is difficult to believe; they simply accept corruption as business as usual. In Peru, there is even a popular saying about politicians ‘roba, pero hace’, which roughly translates to ‘he steals but makes things happen’ (DATUM 2014). More than half of all Peruvians are willing to vote for corrupt politicians as long as they ‘do work’ (Ipsos Perú 2014). Sadly, every year, one in four people around the world pay a bribe to access public services (Hardoon and Heinrich 2013). In Cambodia, India and Kenya, this figure is even higher than one in two. In Mexico, a family spends on average 14% of its income on bribes for basic services they are entitled to, such as water, medicine and education (Transparencia Mexicana 2011).

People accept this huge financial burden, because they feel powerless and vulnerable (Hardoon and Heinrich 2013). They believe reporting corruption won’t make a difference and could put them or their family in danger. Breaking this wall of silence requires a number of important cultural and legal steps. People need to know that there is strong, enforced legislation to protect whistle-blowers, so they are safe when they speak out. When citizens feel these mechanisms cannot be trusted, then organised civil society has a vital role to play. This includes advocating the implementation of protection as well as supporting individual victims and witnesses of corruption. The results can be impressive.

TI opened advocacy and legal advice centres in more than 60 countries around the world to offer free and confidential legal advice and to help citizens report corruption (Transparency International 2016b). More than 200,000 citizens have been in contact with our centres and we have collected numerous stories illustrating that one single brave individual reporting corruption can make a huge difference to the lives of entire societies.

In the Czech Republic, a whistle-blower on environmental corruption helped to save the country more than €2 billion (Transparency International 2015c). In Nepal, money that was meant for women giving birth in remote regions but stolen by healthcare officials was returned and redistributed where it was needed most (Transparency International 2015d). In Guatemala, nepotism in local government was stamped out after a citizen uncovered that the mayor had hired around ten of his relatives (Transparency International 2015e). In March 2015, Transparencia Venezuela launched a smartphone app Dilo Aquí, which allows ordinary citizens to report instances of bribery and any irregularities during elections (Transparencia Venezuela 2015a). In the parliamentary elections in December 2015, more than 400 complaints of electoral abuse were registered via the app that were then channelled to the National Electoral Council and the Comptroller General for follow-up (Transparencia Venezuela 2015b).

The goal is to encourage, cajole, educate and empower more citizens to speak out and speak out safely. This affects us all. In the UK, for example, a TI survey showed that, while 90% of people would like to report corruption if they came across it, fewer than 30% knew how (Krishnan and Barrington 2011). Individuals everywhere need to take their responsibility as citizens seriously and speak up for their right to live in a society free of corruption. When they do that, governments and institutions have to listen and act.

16.5 The new challenge: bringing down grand corruption

Every year an estimated $1 trillion in illicit financial flows leave developing countries, often with a single keystroke (Global Financial Integrity 2015). The majority of these funds end up in developed countries. Be it in a property in London or a bank account in Switzerland, the effects on the local economies left behind are devastating. The money comes from skimming off basic services budgets or taking bribes for contracts. Such abuse of entrusted power for private gain has immediate consequences on people – victims are often left helpless.

We want to see behavioural and systemic change in the next ten years and we want victims to be recognised and taken into serious consideration. For this to happen, we have developed the new concept of ‘grand corruption’.

Unfortunately, examples of grand corruption are everywhere. The Chinaleaks documents showed how the country’s elite funnelled billions of dollars of corrupt money into so-called ‘safe havens’ such as the Bahamas using shell companies (Boehler 2014). The President of Equatorial Guinea, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, and his son Teodoro are estimated to have allegedly siphoned off more than $300 million from state coffers to buy a luxury lifestyle in Paris and the United States, while the majority of the country’s population lives in poverty. Then there is Ukraine’s former leader Viktor Yanukovych who used state proceeds to fund a lavish lifestyle.

Think also of the billions of dollars’ worth of fines the big banks, including household names such as Barclays, HSBC, Citibank and BNP Paribas, have had to pay for institutionalised corruption like rigging exchange rates, mis-selling products and helping clients avoid anti-money laundering rules and evade taxes.

We witness human rights abuses in cases of grand corruption. There are victims. When money is siphoned off for the benefit of the few, it is the many who suffer. Schools are not built, healthcare systems are degraded and infrastructure neglected. It exacerbates poverty and exclusion. Grand corruption also damages democracy and good governance. When a state is captured, such as allegedly happened in Guatemala under President Otto Pérez Molina, then insecurity and instability are high. It is the citizens that pay the price.

Unfortunately, grand corruption often goes unpunished. In the case of corporations, too often it is the shareholders who pay the fines, not the individuals who commit the crimes.

To change this, we need help from citizens. They have to use all the tools for fighting corruption outlined above – technology, community actions and mass movements - to demand justice and unmask the corrupt both in the countries where the corrupt money is generated and, just as importantly, in the countries where it ends up.

Money laundering is not just a term used to describe Mafia-style organised crimes. It might be the way your neighbour bought their flat via a secret offshore company, or the cash payments used to purchase a luxury watch. Citizens living in countries on the receiving end of corrupt money need to be part of the fight against grand corruption too. And this is where awareness raising is still in its infancy. We as civil society are calling on governments to put mechanisms in place that prevent dirty cash from entering their countries. But because this type of corruption is not obvious to citizens of dirty money destinations – in fact it can actually add to economic growth – there is still limited will from citizens to pressure their leaders or take action themselves.

The G20 has taken up this cause at a high level. It remains for the countries themselves to introduce the legislation and enforce it. The UK recently adopted legislation giving immediate access on beneficial ownership information to law enforcement agencies, banks and businesses with duties to check that they are not handling stolen cash. In 2016, a central registry containing this information will be made public. It is time for more countries to follow suit and for citizens to campaign to ensure that they do.

More and more, journalists and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – using new online search tools to follow money – are exposing cases of grand corruption and pressing for criminal investigations and indictments. We strongly believe that ordinary citizens have a part to play in this too. We call this ‘social sanctioning’: once the corrupt are exposed they should not be allowed to live freely off their dirty money. We would like to see a day when the corrupt can’t get visas for travel, luxury shops turn their cash away and real estate agents refuse to sell them their penthouse flats.

16.6 Conclusion

Without active citizens the fight against corruption cannot be won. People need to say no to corruption on every level. They need to speak out against extortion and denounce leaders and companies who are exposed as engaging in corruption. They need to take responsibility for their own actions and demand the same from their peers. Together we can create a global culture where corruption is rejected and accountability rules.

There are plenty of examples where this has happened.But the feeling of disempowerment is still too widespread. People need to turn the anger and helplessness they feel into active rejection of the status quo. Civil society organisations can help create awareness and mobilisation, but governments have to enforce laws that show the corrupt will be held to account.

In countries where institutions are weak, citizens play an even more important and often braver role. Those who speak out can be targets, but not everyone has to be on the front line. Take the example of the school in Bangladesh: it was parents and local organisers who asked the school to note who showed up to teach and to commit to not asking for admissions bribes. These small steps led to measurable improvements – the kids passed their exams.

Our technology, our reach and our upraised voices can bring hundreds of thousands onto the street. These things can also be used to simply draw attention to the inconsistencies between a local politician’s lifestyle and their publicly declared salary. It is the combination of our loud indignation and our quiet vigilance that will put an end to corruption, both grand and not so grand.

16.7 References

Alves, L. 16 September 2014. Ficha Limpa Law Forces Candidates to Withdraw. The Rio Times. Available online .

Avaaz. 2014. Where next for Avaaz in 2014? Setting the agenda. Available online .

BBC Press. 9 December 2010. Global poll: Corruption is world’s most talked about problem. Available online .

Boehler, P. 22 January 2014. ChinaLeaks: Exposé on Chinese elite’s offshore accounts comes at sensitive time. South China Morning Post – China Insider. Available online .

DATUM. 2014. Perú 21 – ELECCIONES 2016. Available online

Economist, The. 28 February 2015. Planet of the Phones. [online]. Available online .

Global Financial Integrity. 2015. Illicit Financial Flows. Available online .

Hardoon, D. and Heinrich, F. 2013. Global Corruption Barometer 2013: Report. Berlin: Transparency International. Available from: http://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/report Heywood, M. 13 November 2015. When Transparency Rules. Transparency International blog. Available online .

International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities. 15 February 2012. Organization of American States (OAS). Available online .

Ipsos Perú. September 2014. Informe de Opinión Data – Perú, septiembre de 2014. Available online .

Krishnan, C. and Barrington, R. 2011. Corruption in the UK: Overview and Policy Recommendations. UK: Transparency International.

McIntosh, T. 19 September 2014. Paraguay is 100th nation to pass FOI law, but struggle for openness goes on. The Guardian. Available online .

OECD. 1997. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Available online .

Salas, A. 22 June 2010. Aiming for a clean record in Brazil. Available online .

Sidwell, M. 25 August 2011. Race to the top. Transparency International blog. Available online .

Transparencia Mexicana. 10 May 2011. Índice Nacional De Corrupción Y Buen Gobierno. Available online .

Transparencia Venezuela. 19 March 2015a. Transparencia Venezuela lanzó ‘Dilo aquí’, una aplicación para denunciar. El Universal. Available online .

Transparencia Venezuela. 6 December 2015b. Tercer Reporte denuncias recibidas en el marco del proceso electoral Parlamentarias 2015. Available online .

Transparency International. 2012. Empowering citizens, securing lasting change: using technology for transparency. Berlin: Transparency International. Available online

Transparency International. 2013a. Global Corruption Barometer – Brazil. Available online .

Transparency International. 2013b. Fix My Street. Available online .

Transparency International. 2015a. Corruption Perceptions Index – Overview. Available online .

Transparency International. 2015b. Our work on the G20. [online]. Available online .

Transparency International. 2015c. True Stories – Hidden Costs. Available online .

Transparency International. 2015d. True Stories – Birth Rights. Available online .

Transparency International. 2015e. True Stories – Family Affairs. Available online .

Transparency International. 2016a. ManoSeimas.lt. Available online

Transparency International. 2016b. Get involved – Report Corruption. Available online .

United Nations – Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2015. United Nations Convention against Corruption: Signature and Ratification Status as of 1 December 2015. Available [online]((https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories. html).

United Nations. 2015. Goal 16: Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies; Sustainable Development Goals. Available online .

United Nations. 2016. Segments & Priorities – MY Analytics. Available online .

Zaman, I. 2011. Realising the MDGs by 2015: Anti- corruption in Bangladesh. Berlin/Bangladesh: Transparency International. Available online .

An important exception to this was the republican tradition, which started in Greece and Rome, and was adopted by numerous city states in Italy, the Netherlands and elsewhere. The very term ‘republic’ comes from the Latin res publica, or ‘public thing,’ denoting that the political order was representative of a larger public good.  ↩

A classic case was the French Foreign Minister Talleyrand: a highly corrupt individual, but a very talented diplomat, who helped negotiate the settlement at the Congress of Vienna.  ↩

Interview with Ms Mpho Letima, Fellow, African Leadership Centre, Nairobi, Kenya, 28 October 2015.  ↩

A search for the term ‘Cyprus’ on www.occrp.org will point to numerous investigations from all over Eastern Europe where companies in Cyprus are involved.  ↩

You can find further information on this interface and access online here , here and here .  ↩

Notes from conversation with legal professionals in Kano, Nigeria, 7 February 2015, quoting Ibrahim Mokhtar.  ↩

Notes from conversation with tribal elders from Shah Wali Kot District, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 24 May 2009; names withheld for security reasons.  ↩

Notes from trip to Spin Boldak, Afghanistan, 25 May 2009.  ↩

Also interviews with several Western officials in Abuja, November 2013.  ↩

Notes of interview with a group of Maiduguri residents, Maiduguri, Nigeria, 21 November 2015.  ↩

Longo, Canetti and Hite-Rubin reference the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005, and the wider violent unrest on the West Bank.  ↩

Ibid., notes Kano, Nigeria.  ↩

Ibid., notes Maiduguri, Nigeria.  ↩

Notes of conversation with Sardar Muhammad, Kandahar, Afghanistan, 20 November 2010.  ↩

See also numerous Dutch petitions to King Phillip II of Spain 1550–1580.  ↩

Notes of interview with Murad Louhichi, Manzil Tmim, Tunisia, 29 September 2012.  ↩

Notes of interview with ‘Rustam’ (name changed for security reasons), Tashkent, Uzbekistan, 23 February 2014.  ↩

This is a view I encountered frequently when covering the Algerian civil war for National Public Radio in the late 1990s.  ↩

Conversation with Debra Laprevotte, 15 September 2015.  ↩

In the event, the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI), the world cycling governing body, cleared Delgado. He was not docked ten minutes and went on to win the 1988 Tour de France.  ↩

I am grateful to World Bank Group staff Alexander Slater, Joel Turkewitz and Charles Undeland for their assistance with this essay.  ↩

See also Olken, B. 2007. Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia, Journal of Political Economy, 115(2), pp. 200– 248.  ↩

This 2015 estimate is an extrapolation by Daniel Kaufmann based on his work in Myths and Realities of Governance and Corruption (2005).  ↩

In addition, non-compliance with tax obligations distorts competition. See IMF. 2015a. Current Challenges in Revenue Mobilization. Washington DC: IMF.  ↩

See also, for example, Tanzi, V. and Davoodi, H. 2002. Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth. In: G. T. Abed and S. Gupta, eds. Governance, Corruption & Economic Performance. Washington DC: IMF, pp. 280–299. Military spending is, in addition, prone to corruption, because of secrecy and a lack of transparency (see Gupta, S., de Mello, L. and Sharan, R. 2002. Corruption and Military Spending. In: G. T. Abed and S. Gupta, eds. Governance, Corruption & Economic Performance. Washington DC: IMF, pp. 300–332).  ↩

While the analysis of the association between corruption and growth remains controversial, a meta-analysis of 52 cross-country studies found that a one-unit increase in the perceived corruption index is associated with a nearly 1 percentage-point decrease in the growth rate of per capita GDP (see Ugur, M. and Dasgupta, N. 2011. Evidence on the Economic Growth Impacts of Corruption in Low-Income Countries and Beyond: A Systematic Review. London: EPPI-Centre, Social Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London).  ↩

Over the past decade, risk-rating agencies have realised that their previous models, driven by economic variables alone, were unsatisfactory and have incorporated governance and corruption factors, such as the Worldwide Governance Indicators.  ↩

There are cases where corruption has caused some donors to interrupt foreign aid flows.  ↩

For example, the Fiscal Transparency Evaluation conducted by the Fund in Mozambique (the first in Sub-Saharan Africa) identified a need for greater transparency in public procurement and state-owned enterprises (see IMF. 2015c. Republic of Mozambique – Fiscal Transparency Evaluation). In Tunisia, the Fund has supported the development of a more transparent budget law that would strengthen budget preparation and execution procedures and introduce performance-based budgeting.  ↩

Many countries are taking the positive step of automating public services, which not only allows for simplification and efficiency, but also eliminates the potential for abuse of discretion.  ↩

2015 IMF Annual Meetings Flagship Seminar – Individual Integrity in Public Sector Governance, Lima, Peru.  ↩

A good example is the ‘I paid a bribe’ website in India (www.ipaidabribe. com). For other examples in Bhutan, Pakistan and Kenya, see Strom, S. 2012. Websites shine light on petty bribery worldwide. New York Times. 6 March 2012. Available from: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/ business/web-sites-shine-light-on-petty-bribery-worldwide.html?_r=0).  ↩

Is this page useful?

  • Yes this page is useful
  • No this page is not useful

Help us improve GOV.UK

Don’t include personal or financial information like your National Insurance number or credit card details.

To help us improve GOV.UK, we’d like to know more about your visit today. We’ll send you a link to a feedback form. It will take only 2 minutes to fill in. Don’t worry we won’t send you spam or share your email address with anyone.

Home

Good Governance and the Fight against Corruption

World Bank President Dr. Jim Yong Kim recently wrote an inspiring blog on LinkedIn about the critical importance of good governance for all countries, arguing that “when [good governance] doesn’t exist, many governments fail to deliver public services effectively; health and education services are often substandard; corruption persists in rich and poor countries alike, choking opportunity and growth.”

Fortunately for the world, Dr. Kim sees a new wave of progress, driven by “the spread of information technology and its convergence with grassroots movements for transparency, accountability, and citizen empowerment.” He subsequently provides a series of examples where progress indeed had been achieved. However, as “many challenges remain in fighting corruption and promoting good governance,” he concludes his blog with a call to people in both developed and developing countries to share their experiences with anti-corruption or governance programs.

Through our interactions with professional accountants and others working in the public sector around the world, IFAC recognizes the need for more effective public sector governance. I posted a comment on Dr. Kim’s blog citing the recently published International Framework: Good Governance in the Public Sector as a resource for other readers to encourage more effective public sector governance.

The Framework addresses many of the specific topics that Dr Kim talks about, for example, avoiding and tackling corruption; transparency and accountability; improving communication and information technology; and fighting poverty by ensuring that public sector entities achieve their intended outcomes while acting in the public interest at all times.

The Framework also emphasizes the fundamental importance for public sector entities to behave with integrity, demonstrate strong commitment to ethical values, and respect the rule of law. In addition, it urges public sector entities to:

  • implement effective arrangements for determining their desired outcomes and what interventions are needed to achieve those outcomes;
  • develop their leadership capacity;
  • manage their risks and performance through robust internal control and strong public financial management; and
  • implement good practices in transparency, reporting, and audit to deliver effective accountability.

No matter how good the Framework is, however, the proper application is the real challenge, because this is so often where the problems lie. To that end the Framework and its supplement also include application guidance, implementation tips, and examples.

We believe that the Framework will be a potent tool for public sector entities seeking to enhance their governance arrangements, win the battle against corruption, and reinforce transparency and accountability. What do think? What else can be done to enhance governance in the public sector?

corruption kills good governance essay

Vincent Tophoff

Former Senior Technical Manager

Vincent Tophoff was a senior technical manager at IFAC, working with the Professional Accountants in Business Committee. Previously, he was a partner at INTE-Q Integration Management, a management accountancy consulting firm in The Netherlands and senior lecturer at the postgraduate accountancy program of the Vrije University in Amsterdam. 

Doha Declaration

Education for justice.

  • Agenda Day 1
  • Agenda Day 2
  • Agenda Day 3
  • Agenda Day 4
  • Registration
  • Breakout Sessions for Primary and Secondary Level
  • Breakout Sessions for Tertiary Level
  • E4J Youth Competition
  • India - Lockdown Learners
  • Chuka, Break the Silence
  • The Online Zoo
  • I would like a community where ...
  • Staying safe online
  • Let's be respectful online
  • We can all be heroes
  • Respect for all
  • We all have rights
  • A mosaic of differences
  • The right thing to do
  • Solving ethical dilemmas
  • UNODC-UNESCO Guide for Policymakers
  • UNODC-UNESCO Handbooks for Teachers
  • Justice Accelerators
  • Introduction
  • Organized Crime
  • Trafficking in Persons & Smuggling of Migrants
  • Crime Prevention & Criminal Justice Reform
  • Crime Prevention, Criminal Justice & SDGs
  • UN Congress on Crime Prevention & Criminal Justice
  • Commission on Crime Prevention & Criminal Justice
  • Conference of the Parties to UNTOC
  • Conference of the States Parties to UNCAC
  • Rules for Simulating Crime Prevention & Criminal Justice Bodies
  • Crime Prevention & Criminal Justice
  • Engage with Us
  • Contact Us about MUN
  • Conferences Supporting E4J
  • Cyberstrike
  • Play for Integrity
  • Running out of Time
  • Zorbs Reloaded
  • Developing a Rationale for Using the Video
  • Previewing the Anti-Corruption Video
  • Viewing the Video with a Purpose
  • Post-viewing Activities
  • Previewing the Firearms Video
  • Rationale for Using the Video
  • Previewing the Human Trafficking Video
  • Previewing the Organized Crime Video
  • Previewing the Video
  • Criminal Justice & Crime Prevention
  • Corruption & Integrity
  • Human Trafficking & Migrant Smuggling
  • Firearms Trafficking
  • Terrorism & Violent Extremism
  • Introduction & Learning Outcomes
  • Corruption - Baseline Definition
  • Effects of Corruption
  • Deeper Meanings of Corruption
  • Measuring Corruption
  • Possible Class Structure
  • Core Reading
  • Advanced Reading
  • Student Assessment
  • Additional Teaching Tools
  • Guidelines for Stand-Alone Course
  • Appendix: How Corruption Affects the SDGs
  • What is Governance?
  • What is Good Governance?
  • Corruption and Bad Governance
  • Governance Reforms and Anti-Corruption
  • Guidelines for Stand-alone Course
  • Corruption and Democracy
  • Corruption and Authoritarian Systems
  • Hybrid Systems and Syndromes of Corruption
  • The Deep Democratization Approach
  • Political Parties and Political Finance
  • Political Institution-building as a Means to Counter Corruption
  • Manifestations and Consequences of Public Sector Corruption
  • Causes of Public Sector Corruption
  • Theories that Explain Corruption
  • Corruption in Public Procurement
  • Corruption in State-Owned Enterprises
  • Responses to Public Sector Corruption
  • Preventing Public Sector Corruption
  • Forms & Manifestations of Private Sector Corruption
  • Consequences of Private Sector Corruption
  • Causes of Private Sector Corruption
  • Responses to Private Sector Corruption
  • Preventing Private Sector Corruption
  • Collective Action & Public-Private Partnerships against Corruption
  • Transparency as a Precondition
  • Detection Mechanisms - Auditing and Reporting
  • Whistle-blowing Systems and Protections
  • Investigation of Corruption
  • Introduction and Learning Outcomes
  • Brief background on the human rights system
  • Overview of the corruption-human rights nexus
  • Impact of corruption on specific human rights
  • Approaches to assessing the corruption-human rights nexus
  • Human-rights based approach
  • Defining sex, gender and gender mainstreaming
  • Gender differences in corruption
  • Theories explaining the gender–corruption nexus
  • Gendered impacts of corruption
  • Anti-corruption and gender mainstreaming
  • Manifestations of corruption in education
  • Costs of corruption in education
  • Causes of corruption in education
  • Fighting corruption in education
  • Core terms and concepts
  • The role of citizens in fighting corruption
  • The role, risks and challenges of CSOs fighting corruption
  • The role of the media in fighting corruption
  • Access to information: a condition for citizen participation
  • ICT as a tool for citizen participation in anti-corruption efforts
  • Government obligations to ensure citizen participation in anti-corruption efforts
  • Teaching Guide
  • Brief History of Terrorism
  • 19th Century Terrorism
  • League of Nations & Terrorism
  • United Nations & Terrorism
  • Terrorist Victimization
  • Exercises & Case Studies
  • Radicalization & Violent Extremism
  • Preventing & Countering Violent Extremism
  • Drivers of Violent Extremism
  • International Approaches to PVE &CVE
  • Regional & Multilateral Approaches
  • Defining Rule of Law
  • UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
  • International Cooperation & UN CT Strategy
  • Legal Sources & UN CT Strategy
  • Regional & National Approaches
  • International Legal Frameworks
  • International Human Rights Law
  • International Humanitarian Law
  • International Refugee Law
  • Current Challenges to International Legal Framework
  • Defining Terrorism
  • Criminal Justice Responses
  • Treaty-based Crimes of Terrorism
  • Core International Crimes
  • International Courts and Tribunals
  • African Region
  • Inter-American Region
  • Asian Region
  • European Region
  • Middle East & Gulf Regions
  • Core Principles of IHL
  • Categorization of Armed Conflict
  • Classification of Persons
  • IHL, Terrorism & Counter-Terrorism
  • Relationship between IHL & intern. human rights law
  • Limitations Permitted by Human Rights Law
  • Derogation during Public Emergency
  • Examples of States of Emergency & Derogations
  • International Human Rights Instruments
  • Regional Human Rights Instruments
  • Extra-territorial Application of Right to Life
  • Arbitrary Deprivation of Life
  • Death Penalty
  • Enforced Disappearances
  • Armed Conflict Context
  • International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
  • Convention against Torture et al.
  • International Legal Framework
  • Key Contemporary Issues
  • Investigative Phase
  • Trial & Sentencing Phase
  • Armed Conflict
  • Case Studies
  • Special Investigative Techniques
  • Surveillance & Interception of Communications
  • Privacy & Intelligence Gathering in Armed Conflict
  • Accountability & Oversight of Intelligence Gathering
  • Principle of Non-Discrimination
  • Freedom of Religion
  • Freedom of Expression
  • Freedom of Assembly
  • Freedom of Association
  • Fundamental Freedoms
  • Definition of 'Victim'
  • Effects of Terrorism
  • Access to Justice
  • Recognition of the Victim
  • Human Rights Instruments
  • Criminal Justice Mechanisms
  • Instruments for Victims of Terrorism
  • National Approaches
  • Key Challenges in Securing Reparation
  • Topic 1. Contemporary issues relating to conditions conducive both to the spread of terrorism and the rule of law
  • Topic 2. Contemporary issues relating to the right to life
  • Topic 3. Contemporary issues relating to foreign terrorist fighters
  • Topic 4. Contemporary issues relating to non-discrimination and fundamental freedoms
  • Module 16: Linkages between Organized Crime and Terrorism
  • Thematic Areas
  • Content Breakdown
  • Module Adaptation & Design Guidelines
  • Teaching Methods
  • Acknowledgements
  • 1. Introducing United Nations Standards & Norms on CPCJ vis-à-vis International Law
  • 2. Scope of United Nations Standards & Norms on CPCJ
  • 3. United Nations Standards & Norms on CPCJ in Operation
  • 1. Definition of Crime Prevention
  • 2. Key Crime Prevention Typologies
  • 2. (cont.) Tonry & Farrington’s Typology
  • 3. Crime Problem-Solving Approaches
  • 4. What Works
  • United Nations Entities
  • Regional Crime Prevention Councils/Institutions
  • Key Clearinghouses
  • Systematic Reviews
  • 1. Introduction to International Standards & Norms
  • 2. Identifying the Need for Legal Aid
  • 3. Key Components of the Right of Access to Legal Aid
  • 4. Access to Legal Aid for Those with Specific Needs
  • 5. Models for Governing, Administering and Funding Legal Aid
  • 6. Models for Delivering Legal Aid Services
  • 7. Roles and Responsibilities of Legal Aid Providers
  • 8. Quality Assurance and Legal Aid Services
  • 1. Context for Use of Force by Law Enforcement Officials
  • 2. Legal Framework
  • 3. General Principles of Use of Force in Law Enforcement
  • 4. Use of Firearms
  • 5. Use of “Less-Lethal” Weapons
  • 6. Protection of Especially Vulnerable Groups
  • 7. Use of Force during Assemblies
  • 1. Policing in democracies & need for accountability, integrity, oversight
  • 2. Key mechanisms & actors in police accountability, oversight
  • 3. Crosscutting & contemporary issues in police accountability
  • 1. Introducing Aims of Punishment, Imprisonment & Prison Reform
  • 2. Current Trends, Challenges & Human Rights
  • 3. Towards Humane Prisons & Alternative Sanctions
  • 1. Aims and Significance of Alternatives to Imprisonment
  • 2. Justifying Punishment in the Community
  • 3. Pretrial Alternatives
  • 4. Post Trial Alternatives
  • 5. Evaluating Alternatives
  • 1. Concept, Values and Origin of Restorative Justice
  • 2. Overview of Restorative Justice Processes
  • 3. How Cost Effective is Restorative Justice?
  • 4. Issues in Implementing Restorative Justice
  • 1. Gender-Based Discrimination & Women in Conflict with the Law
  • 2. Vulnerabilities of Girls in Conflict with the Law
  • 3. Discrimination and Violence against LGBTI Individuals
  • 4. Gender Diversity in Criminal Justice Workforce
  • 1. Ending Violence against Women
  • 2. Human Rights Approaches to Violence against Women
  • 3. Who Has Rights in this Situation?
  • 4. What about the Men?
  • 5. Local, Regional & Global Solutions to Violence against Women & Girls
  • 1. Understanding the Concept of Victims of Crime
  • 2. Impact of Crime, including Trauma
  • 3. Right of Victims to Adequate Response to their Needs
  • 4. Collecting Victim Data
  • 5. Victims and their Participation in Criminal Justice Process
  • 6. Victim Services: Institutional and Non-Governmental Organizations
  • 7. Outlook on Current Developments Regarding Victims
  • 8. Victims of Crime and International Law
  • 1. The Many Forms of Violence against Children
  • 2. The Impact of Violence on Children
  • 3. States' Obligations to Prevent VAC and Protect Child Victims
  • 4. Improving the Prevention of Violence against Children
  • 5. Improving the Criminal Justice Response to VAC
  • 6. Addressing Violence against Children within the Justice System
  • 1. The Role of the Justice System
  • 2. Convention on the Rights of the Child & International Legal Framework on Children's Rights
  • 3. Justice for Children
  • 4. Justice for Children in Conflict with the Law
  • 5. Realizing Justice for Children
  • 1a. Judicial Independence as Fundamental Value of Rule of Law & of Constitutionalism
  • 1b. Main Factors Aimed at Securing Judicial Independence
  • 2a. Public Prosecutors as ‘Gate Keepers’ of Criminal Justice
  • 2b. Institutional and Functional Role of Prosecutors
  • 2c. Other Factors Affecting the Role of Prosecutors
  • Basics of Computing
  • Global Connectivity and Technology Usage Trends
  • Cybercrime in Brief
  • Cybercrime Trends
  • Cybercrime Prevention
  • Offences against computer data and systems
  • Computer-related offences
  • Content-related offences
  • The Role of Cybercrime Law
  • Harmonization of Laws
  • International and Regional Instruments
  • International Human Rights and Cybercrime Law
  • Digital Evidence
  • Digital Forensics
  • Standards and Best Practices for Digital Forensics
  • Reporting Cybercrime
  • Who Conducts Cybercrime Investigations?
  • Obstacles to Cybercrime Investigations
  • Knowledge Management
  • Legal and Ethical Obligations
  • Handling of Digital Evidence
  • Digital Evidence Admissibility
  • Sovereignty and Jurisdiction
  • Formal International Cooperation Mechanisms
  • Informal International Cooperation Mechanisms
  • Data Retention, Preservation and Access
  • Challenges Relating to Extraterritorial Evidence
  • National Capacity and International Cooperation
  • Internet Governance
  • Cybersecurity Strategies: Basic Features
  • National Cybersecurity Strategies
  • International Cooperation on Cybersecurity Matters
  • Cybersecurity Posture
  • Assets, Vulnerabilities and Threats
  • Vulnerability Disclosure
  • Cybersecurity Measures and Usability
  • Situational Crime Prevention
  • Incident Detection, Response, Recovery & Preparedness
  • Privacy: What it is and Why it is Important
  • Privacy and Security
  • Cybercrime that Compromises Privacy
  • Data Protection Legislation
  • Data Breach Notification Laws
  • Enforcement of Privacy and Data Protection Laws
  • Intellectual Property: What it is
  • Types of Intellectual Property
  • Causes for Cyber-Enabled Copyright & Trademark Offences
  • Protection & Prevention Efforts
  • Online Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
  • Cyberstalking and Cyberharassment
  • Cyberbullying
  • Gender-Based Interpersonal Cybercrime
  • Interpersonal Cybercrime Prevention
  • Cyber Organized Crime: What is it?
  • Conceptualizing Organized Crime & Defining Actors Involved
  • Criminal Groups Engaging in Cyber Organized Crime
  • Cyber Organized Crime Activities
  • Preventing & Countering Cyber Organized Crime
  • Cyberespionage
  • Cyberterrorism
  • Cyberwarfare
  • Information Warfare, Disinformation & Electoral Fraud
  • Responses to Cyberinterventions
  • Framing the Issue of Firearms
  • Direct Impact of Firearms
  • Indirect Impacts of Firearms on States or Communities
  • International and National Responses
  • Typology and Classification of Firearms
  • Common Firearms Types
  • 'Other' Types of Firearms
  • Parts and Components
  • History of the Legitimate Arms Market
  • Need for a Legitimate Market
  • Key Actors in the Legitimate Market
  • Authorized & Unauthorized Arms Transfers
  • Illegal Firearms in Social, Cultural & Political Context
  • Supply, Demand & Criminal Motivations
  • Larger Scale Firearms Trafficking Activities
  • Smaller Scale Trafficking Activities
  • Sources of Illicit Firearms
  • Consequences of Illicit Markets
  • International Public Law & Transnational Law
  • International Instruments with Global Outreach
  • Commonalities, Differences & Complementarity between Global Instruments
  • Tools to Support Implementation of Global Instruments
  • Other United Nations Processes
  • The Sustainable Development Goals
  • Multilateral & Regional Instruments
  • Scope of National Firearms Regulations
  • National Firearms Strategies & Action Plans
  • Harmonization of National Legislation with International Firearms Instruments
  • Assistance for Development of National Firearms Legislation
  • Firearms Trafficking as a Cross-Cutting Element
  • Organized Crime and Organized Criminal Groups
  • Criminal Gangs
  • Terrorist Groups
  • Interconnections between Organized Criminal Groups & Terrorist Groups
  • Gangs - Organized Crime & Terrorism: An Evolving Continuum
  • International Response
  • International and National Legal Framework
  • Firearms Related Offences
  • Role of Law Enforcement
  • Firearms as Evidence
  • Use of Special Investigative Techniques
  • International Cooperation and Information Exchange
  • Prosecution and Adjudication of Firearms Trafficking
  • Teaching Methods & Principles
  • Ethical Learning Environments
  • Overview of Modules
  • Module Adaption & Design Guidelines
  • Table of Exercises
  • Basic Terms
  • Forms of Gender Discrimination
  • Ethics of Care
  • Case Studies for Professional Ethics
  • Case Studies for Role Morality
  • Additional Exercises
  • Defining Organized Crime
  • Definition in Convention
  • Similarities & Differences
  • Activities, Organization, Composition
  • Thinking Critically Through Fiction
  • Excerpts of Legislation
  • Research & Independent Study Questions
  • Legal Definitions of Organized Crimes
  • Criminal Association
  • Definitions in the Organized Crime Convention
  • Criminal Organizations and Enterprise Laws
  • Enabling Offence: Obstruction of Justice
  • Drug Trafficking
  • Wildlife & Forest Crime
  • Counterfeit Products Trafficking
  • Falsified Medical Products
  • Trafficking in Cultural Property
  • Trafficking in Persons
  • Case Studies & Exercises
  • Extortion Racketeering
  • Loansharking
  • Links to Corruption
  • Bribery versus Extortion
  • Money-Laundering
  • Liability of Legal Persons
  • How much Organized Crime is there?
  • Alternative Ways for Measuring
  • Measuring Product Markets
  • Risk Assessment
  • Key Concepts of Risk Assessment
  • Risk Assessment of Organized Crime Groups
  • Risk Assessment of Product Markets
  • Risk Assessment in Practice
  • Positivism: Environmental Influences
  • Classical: Pain-Pleasure Decisions
  • Structural Factors
  • Ethical Perspective
  • Crime Causes & Facilitating Factors
  • Models and Structure
  • Hierarchical Model
  • Local, Cultural Model
  • Enterprise or Business Model
  • Groups vs Activities
  • Networked Structure
  • Jurisdiction
  • Investigators of Organized Crime
  • Controlled Deliveries
  • Physical & Electronic Surveillance
  • Undercover Operations
  • Financial Analysis
  • Use of Informants
  • Rights of Victims & Witnesses
  • Role of Prosecutors
  • Adversarial vs Inquisitorial Legal Systems
  • Mitigating Punishment
  • Granting Immunity from Prosecution
  • Witness Protection
  • Aggravating & Mitigating Factors
  • Sentencing Options
  • Alternatives to Imprisonment
  • Death Penalty & Organized Crime
  • Backgrounds of Convicted Offenders
  • Confiscation
  • Confiscation in Practice
  • Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA)
  • Extradition
  • Transfer of Criminal Proceedings
  • Transfer of Sentenced Persons
  • Module 12: Prevention of Organized Crime
  • Adoption of Organized Crime Convention
  • Historical Context
  • Features of the Convention
  • Related international instruments
  • Conference of the Parties
  • Roles of Participants
  • Structure and Flow
  • Recommended Topics
  • Background Materials
  • What is Sex / Gender / Intersectionality?
  • Knowledge about Gender in Organized Crime
  • Gender and Organized Crime
  • Gender and Different Types of Organized Crime
  • Definitions and Terminology
  • Organized crime and Terrorism - International Legal Framework
  • International Terrorism-related Conventions
  • UNSC Resolutions on Terrorism
  • Organized Crime Convention and its Protocols
  • Theoretical Frameworks on Linkages between Organized Crime and Terrorism
  • Typologies of Criminal Behaviour Associated with Terrorism
  • Terrorism and Drug Trafficking
  • Terrorism and Trafficking in Weapons
  • Terrorism, Crime and Trafficking in Cultural Property
  • Trafficking in Persons and Terrorism
  • Intellectual Property Crime and Terrorism
  • Kidnapping for Ransom and Terrorism
  • Exploitation of Natural Resources and Terrorism
  • Review and Assessment Questions
  • Research and Independent Study Questions
  • Criminalization of Smuggling of Migrants
  • UNTOC & the Protocol against Smuggling of Migrants
  • Offences under the Protocol
  • Financial & Other Material Benefits
  • Aggravating Circumstances
  • Criminal Liability
  • Non-Criminalization of Smuggled Migrants
  • Scope of the Protocol
  • Humanitarian Exemption
  • Migrant Smuggling v. Irregular Migration
  • Migrant Smuggling vis-a-vis Other Crime Types
  • Other Resources
  • Assistance and Protection in the Protocol
  • International Human Rights and Refugee Law
  • Vulnerable groups
  • Positive and Negative Obligations of the State
  • Identification of Smuggled Migrants
  • Participation in Legal Proceedings
  • Role of Non-Governmental Organizations
  • Smuggled Migrants & Other Categories of Migrants
  • Short-, Mid- and Long-Term Measures
  • Criminal Justice Reponse: Scope
  • Investigative & Prosecutorial Approaches
  • Different Relevant Actors & Their Roles
  • Testimonial Evidence
  • Financial Investigations
  • Non-Governmental Organizations
  • ‘Outside the Box’ Methodologies
  • Intra- and Inter-Agency Coordination
  • Admissibility of Evidence
  • International Cooperation
  • Exchange of Information
  • Non-Criminal Law Relevant to Smuggling of Migrants
  • Administrative Approach
  • Complementary Activities & Role of Non-criminal Justice Actors
  • Macro-Perspective in Addressing Smuggling of Migrants
  • Human Security
  • International Aid and Cooperation
  • Migration & Migrant Smuggling
  • Mixed Migration Flows
  • Social Politics of Migrant Smuggling
  • Vulnerability
  • Profile of Smugglers
  • Role of Organized Criminal Groups
  • Humanitarianism, Security and Migrant Smuggling
  • Crime of Trafficking in Persons
  • The Issue of Consent
  • The Purpose of Exploitation
  • The abuse of a position of vulnerability
  • Indicators of Trafficking in Persons
  • Distinction between Trafficking in Persons and Other Crimes
  • Misconceptions Regarding Trafficking in Persons
  • Root Causes
  • Supply Side Prevention Strategies
  • Demand Side Prevention Strategies
  • Role of the Media
  • Safe Migration Channels
  • Crime Prevention Strategies
  • Monitoring, Evaluating & Reporting on Effectiveness of Prevention
  • Trafficked Persons as Victims
  • Protection under the Protocol against Trafficking in Persons
  • Broader International Framework
  • State Responsibility for Trafficking in Persons
  • Identification of Victims
  • Principle of Non-Criminalization of Victims
  • Criminal Justice Duties Imposed on States
  • Role of the Criminal Justice System
  • Current Low Levels of Prosecutions and Convictions
  • Challenges to an Effective Criminal Justice Response
  • Rights of Victims to Justice and Protection
  • Potential Strategies to “Turn the Tide”
  • State Cooperation with Civil Society
  • Civil Society Actors
  • The Private Sector
  • Comparing SOM and TIP
  • Differences and Commonalities
  • Vulnerability and Continuum between SOM & TIP
  • Labour Exploitation
  • Forced Marriage
  • Other Examples
  • Children on the Move
  • Protecting Smuggled and Trafficked Children
  • Protection in Practice
  • Children Alleged as Having Committed Smuggling or Trafficking Offences
  • Basic Terms - Gender and Gender Stereotypes
  • International Legal Frameworks and Definitions of TIP and SOM
  • Global Overview on TIP and SOM
  • Gender and Migration
  • Key Debates in the Scholarship on TIP and SOM
  • Gender and TIP and SOM Offenders
  • Responses to TIP and SOM
  • Use of Technology to Facilitate TIP and SOM
  • Technology Facilitating Trafficking in Persons
  • Technology in Smuggling of Migrants
  • Using Technology to Prevent and Combat TIP and SOM
  • Privacy and Data Concerns
  • Emerging Trends
  • Demand and Consumption
  • Supply and Demand
  • Implications of Wildlife Trafficking
  • Legal and Illegal Markets
  • Perpetrators and their Networks
  • Locations and Activities relating to Wildlife Trafficking
  • Environmental Protection & Conservation
  • CITES & the International Trade in Endangered Species
  • Organized Crime & Corruption
  • Animal Welfare
  • Criminal Justice Actors and Agencies
  • Criminalization of Wildlife Trafficking
  • Challenges for Law Enforcement
  • Investigation Measures and Detection Methods
  • Prosecution and Judiciary
  • Wild Flora as the Target of Illegal Trafficking
  • Purposes for which Wild Flora is Illegally Targeted
  • How is it Done and Who is Involved?
  • Consequences of Harms to Wild Flora
  • Terminology
  • Background: Communities and conservation: A history of disenfranchisement
  • Incentives for communities to get involved in illegal wildlife trafficking: the cost of conservation
  • Incentives to participate in illegal wildlife, logging and fishing economies
  • International and regional responses that fight wildlife trafficking while supporting IPLCs
  • Mechanisms for incentivizing community conservation and reducing wildlife trafficking
  • Critiques of community engagement
  • Other challenges posed by wildlife trafficking that affect local populations
  • Global Podcast Series
  • Apr. 2021: Call for Expressions of Interest: Online training for academics from francophone Africa
  • Feb. 2021: Series of Seminars for Universities of Central Asia
  • Dec. 2020: UNODC and TISS Conference on Access to Justice to End Violence
  • Nov. 2020: Expert Workshop for University Lecturers and Trainers from the Commonwealth of Independent States
  • Oct. 2020: E4J Webinar Series: Youth Empowerment through Education for Justice
  • Interview: How to use E4J's tool in teaching on TIP and SOM
  • E4J-Open University Online Training-of-Trainers Course
  • Teaching Integrity and Ethics Modules: Survey Results
  • Grants Programmes
  • E4J MUN Resource Guide
  • Library of Resources
  • Anti-Corruption

Module 2: Corruption and Good Governance

  • {{item.name}} ({{item.items.length}}) items
  • Add new list

University Module Series: Anti-Corruption

corruption kills good governance essay

  This module is a resource for lecturers  

Corruption and bad governance.

Until the mid-1990s, scholars and practitioners were relatively oblivious to issues of bad governance and corruption. Many of them even argued that some types of corruption could have a functional impact on economic development since they could "grease the wheels". But ever since different indices and measurements became available, such as the World Bank's WGI, numerous studies have demonstrated that government institutions that are reasonably free from corruption and related practices have a strong positive impact on a large set of outcomes related to human well-being. Central to this discussion has been the link between the quality of government institutions that implement policies (control of corruption and the rule of law) and economic development (Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi, 2009).

Ineffective institutions undermine the provision of public services such as health care, education and law enforcement. When public officials do not act as bureaucrats delivering services as they are expected to do, people can try to obtain these services in other ways. In many countries, people are usually able to access public services without having to engage in any form of bribery, but the same cannot be said for every country. The role of the media in promoting good governance and contributing to perceptions about the quality of governance at the international, national and local level is also worth nothing. For a further discussion on the role of the media, see Module 10 of the E4J University Module Series on Integrity and Ethics and Module 10 of the E4J University Module Series on Anti-Corruption.

The concepts of corruption and good governance have a two-way causal relationship with each other and feed off each other in a vicious circle. If good governance principles and structures are not in place, this provides greater opportunity for corruption. Corruption, in turn, can prevent good governance principles and structures from being put in place, or enforced. Violations of the principles of transparency, accountability and rule of law appear to be most closely associated with corruption. In the end, corruption and poor governance are security challenges which undermine democracy, the rule of law and economic development. For a further discussion on how corruption relates to peace and security, see Module 11 of the E4J University Module Series on Anti-Corruption.

There is a large body of literature that reveals the negative consequences of bad governance, primarily in the form of corruption and lack of property rights, for areas such as population health and people's access to safe water (Swaroop and Rajkumar, 2002; Holmberg and Rothstein, 2011). The perception of poor quality of government, including authoritarian rule, corruption and economic downturn, affect whether people vote and participate in the political process (Hooghe and Quintelier, 2014; Kostadinova, 2009). Råby and Teorell (2010) show that measures of good governance are stronger in predicting the absence of violent interstate conflicts than measures for democracy, and Lapuente and Rothstein (2010) provide similar results for civil wars. Gilley (2006, p. 57) even demonstrates that "general governance (a composite of the rule of law, control of corruption and government effectiveness) has a large, even overarching importance in global citizen evaluations of states". He further states that these governance variables have a stronger impact on political legitimacy than variables measuring democratic rights and welfare gains.

Next: Governance reforms and anti-corruption

Back to top, supported by the state of qatar, 60 years crime congress.

U.S. flag

An official website of the United States government

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

  • Publications
  • Account settings
  • Advanced Search
  • Journal List
  • v.9(1); 2017

Logo of jamba

Social impacts of corruption upon community resilience and poverty

James lewis.

1 Datum International, South Gloucestershire, United Kingdom

Corruption at all levels of all societies is a behavioural consequence of power and greed. With no rulebook, corruption is covert, opportunistic, repetitive and powerful, reliant upon dominance, fear and unspoken codes: a significant component of the ‘quiet violence’. Descriptions of financial corruption in China, Italy and Africa lead into a discussion of ‘grand’, ‘political’ and ‘petty’ corruption. Social consequences are given emphasis but elude analysis; those in Bangladesh and the Philippines are considered against prerequisites for resilience. People most dependent upon self-reliance are most prone to its erosion by exploitation, ubiquitous impediments to prerequisites of resilience – latent abilities to ‘accommodate and recover’ and to ‘change in order to survive’. Rarely spoken of to those it does not dominate, for long-term effectiveness, sustainability and reliability, eradication of corrupt practices should be prerequisite to initiatives for climate change, poverty reduction, disaster risk reduction and resilience.

Résumé

Corruption , existing at all levels of all societies in varying degrees, is a behavioural consequence of power and greed in contexts of inadequate governance. With no published rulebook or formula with which to comply, corruption is covert, repetitively opportunistic and powerfully reliant upon dominance and fear within unwritten and unspoken codes. It is therefore an understatement that, consequently, corrupt practices do not readily lend themselves to scientific analysis. Instead, investigation of its consequences amongst the poor has to be necessarily ad hoc and gathered from relatively few published sources which have become available over time. For the purposes of this assessment of its social impacts upon resilience and poverty, extracts have been gathered of its variety of methods and pervasive consequences; as with corruption itself, its procedures are evasive and do not readily lend themselves to formal research.

Literature on the social impacts of corruption is limited, a definitive analysis of corruption and its social consequences being not, as yet, a practicable undertaking. This short contribution reflects some preliminary investigation of the social impacts of corrupt practices upon the poorer sectors of societies, where and when accessible literature has ensued.

Corrupt practices amongst high level political, commercial and industrial dealings, rightly receiving media attention, may become the commencement of long-term trickle-down consequences for the poor which, at society’s lower levels, are unlikely to attract either scientific or media notice. Whilst the scale of corruption on China, Italy and Africa here receive mention, the impacts of corruption upon the poor of these and other societies in Africa, Bangladesh and the Philippines, for example, reveal social consequences which are here examined and considered against required prerequisites for resilience. Those societies and communities most reliant upon their own resilience to crises of any kind are also the most prone to its erosion by consequences of opportunistic control and exploitation.

An introductory section outlines descriptions of how corruption and its effects are contrary to basic needs for resilience, focussing on erosion of personal capacities and abilities; its significance to poverty and development within less-developed countries being indicated. Detailed analysis of social prerequisites for resilience is described with reference to internationally adopted definitions as a basis for discussion of their interpretation and comparison, both historic and recent. Some worldwide corrupt practices and attitudes to them are described in contexts of resilience theory, its reality and its consequences. Discussion of economic and social consequences of corruption is based upon Transparency International definitions and their shortcomings. Conclusions highlight a relationship between corruption, poverty and their impacts of natural hazards and causes of disasters. Depletion of national incomes by corruption relates to causes of poverty and the need for removal of corrupt practices at all social levels. Improved quality of life may then permit emergence of required prerequisites for resilience.

Introduction

Investigated and published more often as a financial issue (e.g. Drury et al. 2006 ; Klein 2007 ; Transparency International 2016a , 2016b ; Zucman 2015 ), corruption in its various guises imposes wide-ranging social consequences, especially when established long-term to the extent of having become ‘normal’ and when its networks, influences and consequences reach community and domestic contexts.

Corruption is a cause of low development (Zucman 2015 :34–55) and exacerbates poverty where poverty prevails; corruption, therefore, needs to be included amongst causes of the consequences of poverty, such as debt, incapacity, mental despair and despondency (Ray 1986 ). Within influences as powerful as poverty, corrupt practices, in many forms and over long periods of time, may affect all and every exchange or transaction at every level of society, imposing additional insidious and negative influences upon the emergence of resilience. With little or no hard evidence for outsiders and rarely spoken of to those it does not dominate, in its numerous forms, the invisible, outwardly imperceptible practices of corruption are a cause of debilitating, pervasive and penetrating impacts upon day to day behaviours, ways of life and of well-being (Chabal & Daloz 1999 ; Hartmann & Boyce 1990 ; Hoogvelt 1976 ; Lewis 2008b , 2011b , 2011c ; Ray 1986 ).

Whatever resource and effort may be introduced for its purpose, resilience may be impeded, or may not materialise, where indigenous systems of control prevail and where social capacities are consequently inadequate.

Prevailing incapacities may have been caused by a variety of circumstances, such as: long-term political repression (Lewis 2013a ), ill-considered occupation or re-occupation of hazardous and damaged locations (Lewis 2013b ), direct experiences of catastrophe, deaths, injury, shock or other consequences, or long-term poverty of a degree to so seriously deplete initiative and well-being as to induce physical and mental inertia (Symons 1839 ). Poverty is commonly assumed to be because of a country being poor whilst, in reality, poverty exists in most societies (Lewis & Lewis 2014 ). Any or all of these consequences may have been, or may yet be, experienced over long periods of time, separately or simultaneously, repeatedly or continuously.

For the emergence and organisation of resilience in any context, prerequisites of individual capacity and ability (United Nations: International Strategy for Disaster Reduction [UN/ISDR] 2009 ) are identified as being necessary. Without capacity and without individual qualities ‘to reduce negative consequences’ of disasters and for application to ‘long-term strategies for societal change’ (UN/ISDR 2009 ), it is difficult to envisage how community and organisational resilience could gestate, emerge or formulate. In any context and at any level, if individuals are not resilient then how would community resilience come to prevail?

Many less developed countries are internally perceived as most corrupt (Transparency International 2016b ) and some of the most corrupt are amongst those most vulnerable to natural hazards; Bangladesh, Nepal and the Philippines, for example. For the 20-year period 1996–2015, almost half of all deaths because of all natural hazards occurred in low-income countries (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters [CRED]/United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction [UNISDR] 2016a ). In contexts such as these, it is pertinent to ask: how much is a country’s apparent poverty because of corruption in governance and commercial mismanagement, and how many basic components of resilience, such as well-being, capacity and ability could have, indeed should have, been induced and supported in the name of indigenous normal good governance and social development?

Social prerequisites for resilience

Resilience has been defined as:

The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions. (UN/ISDR 2009 :n.p.)

A definition which may be read either as an assumption that ability exists or as a caution that it may not (Lewis 2013a ).

Resilience theory originated in ‘late 20th century American cities’ (Davoudi et al. 2017 ), in which ‘radical self-sufficiency’, autonomy and ‘self-dependence’ are facts of life for all but the poorest (Lewis 2013a ). What is not known is what kind of ‘community or society’, or what personal, local and national resources, were assumed as the basis of its definition.

Nonetheless, requirements for resilience have come to assume a universal capability of people to absorb stress and to transform and adapt to managing risks. In short, to deal with crises and disasters, people’s capacity being dependent upon demographic, social, cultural, economic and political factors which may vary. Resilient societies are expected to be able to overcome the impact upon them of natural hazards ‘either through maintaining their pre-disaster social fabric, or through accepting marginal or larger change in order to survive’ (UN/ISDR 2009 :n.p.). Required is the capacity to adapt ability in the creation of capability for recovery (Wisner 2016 ). Thus, the concept of resilience is linked to the concept of change (Manyena 2006 ) which may be technological, economic, behavioural, social, cultural (Gaillard 2007 ) or political (Lewis 2013a ), but in conditions of pervasive poverty, there may not be the ability to ‘accommodate and recover’, or for ‘maintenance of social fabric’; least of all the ability, capacity and capability to ‘change in order to survive’ and ‘in a timely and efficient manner’ (UN/ISDR 2009 :n.p.).

The UN/ISDR definition goes further in recognising that resilience ‘is determined by the degree to which the community has the necessary resources and is capable of organising itself both prior to and during times of need’ (UN/ISDR 2009 :n.p.). Consequently, ‘resilience’, once a characteristic of individuals, has come to be widely applied to preventive motivations as well as to post-disaster contexts, and to being relevant to drought, flood, climate, infrastructure, industrial complexes, businesses, cities, communities and administrations and governments and their politically stated objectives (e.g. Resilience-Scan 2016 ). Poverty and resilience cannot be assumed to go together (Boubacar et al. 2017 ); moreover, in realities of the aftermath of any catastrophe, whether or not in conditions of prevailing poverty, is it not more than likely that ‘ability’ may be severely depleted or may not exist at all (Lewis 2013a )? Resilience theory is said to risk becoming ‘another carrier of neoliberal ideologies, politics and practices with negative implications for social justice and democracy’ (Davoudi et al. 2017 :n.p.).

External initiatives applied as preliminaries towards achievement of community resilience over time, for example, by the improvement of living conditions, healthcare and education as described in detail from Bangladesh (Ahmed et al. 2016 ), may assist contexts of socially comprehensive resilience in the short-term. Focus, however, on localised and current conditions may obscure suspected but hidden causes of those conditions and the consequent need for their cessation and prevention; they may be direct or indirect consequences of questionable influences or of corrupt governance nationally and locally (Lewis & Kelman 2012 ).

Notwithstanding inculcation prior to crises to achieve the social capacity resilience requires, capacity may be annihilated or severely depleted in ensuing catastrophe and its aftermath. Despondency, not resilience, may become the reality, expressing not ability but inert disability. Resilience may theoretically pre-exist as a basic human quality but cannot be assumed to prevail regardless of realities of physical, mental and psychological incapacities, especially in contexts of poverty.

Present in any society at any time (Lewis & Lewis 2014 ), an early analysis of poverty in Scotland, France, Belgium, Austria and Switzerland (Symons 1839 :147–148) realised that poverty has ‘… the same effect on the mind that drunkenness has upon the body’ and that poverty was:

… a main instrument in the debasement of mankind … It is not only the parent of ignorance, but it is the greater barrier to enlightenment. When a man’s whole faculties are strained to the utmost from sunrise to sunset to procure a miserable subsistence, he has neither the leisure, aptitude nor desire for information … (pp. 147–148)

It could be assumed from this description that the sufferer would not have had capacity for resilience.

Fifty-three years later, Friedrich Engels ( [1892] 2009 ) wrote of England:

Everything that the proletarian can do to improve his position is but a drop in the ocean compared with the floods of varying chances to which he is exposed, over which he has not the slightest control. He is the passive subject of all possible combinations of circumstances … (p. 144)

It may be impractical to assume resilience where, for example, many populations are striven by conflict and warfare, millions of people are on the move as refugees and migrants, where millions more are in abject poverty and more directly where people are immediate and longer-term victims of catastrophe. Peace and stability may have been achieved in the aftermath of similar experiences but populations may have been left in fear of recurrence, a fear not conducive to the emergence of ability (Lewis 2013a ; Lewis, Kelman & Lewis 2011e ) and a condition which may last for many years.

Whilst communities may be, or may become resilient, they may continue to be vulnerable and at high risk (Sudmeier-Rieux 2014 ), continuingly prevalent causes of their vulnerability (Lewis & Kelman 2010 ) having been bypassed and disregarded by priorities for achieving resilience. Whereas destruction and damage are described in terms of physical impacts, these may transfer as mental, emotional, social and economic impacts upon individuals and communities. For some time, primary resources of resilience, such as capabilities of creativity, energy and leadership, may therefore be scarce commodities. Resilience anywhere will be dependent upon conditions that prevailed before disaster as well as those created by it and upon programmes for development responsive to potential contingencies of environmental hazards and disasters (Lewis 2013b ). Prescribed characteristics of resilience rarely refer to preceding contexts (e.g. Twigg 2007 ), some least positive contexts being described by Lewis and Kelman ( 2012 ).

Resilience may not, therefore, emerge ‘on demand’, commensurately comparable with the origins of catastrophe from whatever source. This would require a different kind of resilience, not on-the-spot reactions to chaos but one that recognises resilience as a long-term process more compatibly aware of political, social and economic causative processes of inequality, vulnerability and poverty (e.g. Lewis 2013a ), of which the social, as well as economic, consequences of corruption and its associated practices are a significant cause.

But stable, equable, fair and considerate communities and their regional and national administrations are a rarity; poverty, expressed according to a country’s median income, exists virtually in all countries as, in its varying degrees and practices, does corruption (Transparency International 2016b ). Where politicians appear to be in power to facilitate their own incomes and lax administrative systems facilitate them to do so, corruption becomes a cause of poverty, a major impediment to equality and the ‘worm-in-the-bud’ of resilience.

Some economic and social consequences of corruption

Corruption, as ‘the abuse of entrusted power for private gain’, has been classified as ‘grand’, ‘political’ and ‘petty’, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector of governance in which it occurs (Transparency International 2016a ). International scales of corruption, reviewed annually, are based upon internal perceptions of corruption as it is indigenously observed and experienced, a methodology by which it is not possible to compare one perception with another or to know how they were arrived at. This means that whilst corrupt behaviours of politicians or large corporations are reported by the media, they may or may not influence those perceptions upon which international comparisons are based. The international definitions and comparisons by Transparency International are nevertheless a principal comparative scale of corruption and its definitions.

Most corrupt practices operate on, or create, a hierarchical scale of trading, a system that ensures that costs to top-level payers of bribes may be expected to be reimbursed by the receipt of bribes from others, those lower on the scale being recipients of backhanders to them for favours given. Payments would be expected and reimbursed similarly downwards to scales of petty corruption. That socially lowest payers have no-one upon which to claim is how millions of people find themselves in endless poverty – beholden and indebted victims for further exploitation by those richer and more powerful, at whatever level, than themselves. The poor become poorer to the advantage of the rich and poverty and inequality are perpetuated. Realities of corrupt practices upon those already in poverty cannot simply be classed as ‘petty’.

Of Africa, Chabal and Daloz ( 1999 ) argue in support of corruption being ‘the norm … constituting a substantial resource’ (Chabal & Daloz:xxi), taking the view that there has always existed a wide range of activities, inclusive of corruption, which, although illicit from a strictly constitutional or legal point of view, have been regarded as legitimate by the bulk of population (Chabal & Daloz:79). They emphasise however that corruption affects all social strata ‘from billionaires to the lowliest functionary’. Consequently, dichotomy between ‘high’ and ‘low’ or ‘small-’ and ‘large-’ scale corruption is not a determinant factor; neither are differences between financial malpractice, illegal commissions, small graft, open abuse of power, and petty pilfering. Nor do these authors believe some forms of corruption are more reprehensible than others, all forms of corruption being part of an interconnected whole (Chabal & Daloz:98).

Others (e.g. Hoogvelt 1976 ) see corruption as ‘the only means of integrating marginal groups into a disjointed social system’ (Hoogvelt 1976 :132) but where that is the case, corruption should not be allowed to be a licence for social injustice by forcefully keeping in power undeserving elites (Hoogvelt 1976 :137).

Grand corruption in governments’ higher echelons (Transparency International 2016a ), necessarily filters down, with its consequences, throughout all functions of all societies. Politicians and commercial operators, privately and corruptly, are known to have siphoned collectively enormous amounts of money, much of it from development funding, often from their own disaster-prone countries and very often into private bank accounts in the countries that were the origin of the aid (Ndikumana & Boyce 2011 ).

Known as ‘illicit financial flows’ and merged with corruption because of their secrecy, tax evasion and avoidance, and with sources possibly related to more strictly defined corruption, dishonest transactions on a huge scale (Zucman 2015 :34–55) have emerged as evidence of why some countries have remained ‘less-developed’. Money, illicitly taken from external funding intended for development purposes, is a likely cause of reduced domestic investment in basic needs of housing, sanitation, health and education, an explanation of why poverty has prevailed as the principal cause of vulnerability (Lewis 2015 ) and its associated disaster losses and social incapacities, and why such issues have not been matters of development priority by some national governments and indigenous organisations.

A report from the Philippines (Rey 2016 ) concludes that, from 1960 to 2011, approximately $410.5 billion left that country in ‘illicit financial flows’; a figure stated as being 154 times the national budget for health, 52 times that for social protection, 39 times that for education and 25 times that for infrastructure for the same period.

The overall cost to developing countries between 2000 and 2008, of corruption and trade mispricing (trade as a vehicle of monetary transfer), was approximately $6.5 trillion (Kar & Curcio 2011 ), a subsequent United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report indicating that $197bn, a significant share, had accrued from those countries categorised as least developed (UNDP 2011 ). A more recent report describes illicit financial flows from eight countries, including Bangladesh and Nepal, as a symptom of poor governance and dysfunctional regulation, and having the following consequences:

  • undermining of domestic resource mobilisation by eroding the tax base
  • causing greater dependency on official development assistance
  • reducing domestic investment and slowing poverty reduction efforts and worsening of inequality (UNDP 2014 ).

Illicit financial flows from developing countries worldwide in 2013 totalled $1.1 trillion, a figure greater than the combined total of foreign direct investment and net official development assistance received by those economies in that year. As examples, illicit financial flows between 2004 and 2013 from Bangladesh totalled $5588 million, from Nepal $567m, and from the Philippines $9025m (Kar & Spanjers 2015 ).

Political corruption is the manipulation of policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth (Transparency International 2016a ).

An investigation in Bangladesh of self-reported compliance with corporate governance, examined enforcement documents of the Securities and Exchange Commission against actual corporate governance compliance from 2007 to 2011 (Nurunnabi, Hossain & Al-Mosa 2016 ). The authors observe that corruption and lack of enforcement in Bangladesh induced falsification of formal financial reporting under both democratic and military governments (2007–2008). The extent of falsification of information is stated as a cause of alarm for both local and international policy-makers and local and international investors. One thousand one hundred and ninety-four Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission’s enforcement documents were evaluated and 20 semi-structured interviews were conducted.

In 2007, the government of China had more than 1200 laws, rules and directives against corruption, but implementation was ineffective. With only a 3% likelihood of a corrupt official being sent to jail, corruption was a low-risk high-return activity. Even low-level officials had the opportunity to amass an illicit fortune of tens of millions of yuan. The secretary to the Chinese Communist Party in Janwei county of Sechuan province acquired 34 million yuan (£3 467 952/$5 096 000) and the colleague of another Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secretary, his city’s anti-corruption chief, collected bribes worth more than 30 million yuan (£346 794 000/$4 497 000; Lewis 2008b ).

Corruption in China is concentrated in those sectors with extensive state involvement, such as infrastructure projects and government procurement, the consequent increased costs of which, during a 10-year period, were estimated as 10% of spending (ending in 2005). Such a depletion of funds contributed to environmental degradation, social instability and inadequate health care, housing and education:

To estimate roughly the direct costs of corruption, we can suppose that ten per cent of government spending, contracts, and transactions is used as kickbacks and bribes or is simply stolen. (Lewis 2008b :n.p.; Pei 2007 :n.p.)

In relative terms, developing countries are the most affected by volumes of wealth held abroad, calculated for 2014 as 30% for those of Africa (Zucman 2015 :53). But between 1970 and 2008, an examination of capital sent from 33 African countries concluded that over that 38-year period, ‘capital flight’ amounted to $735bn, a sum roughly equal to 80% of the combined GDP of those countries during that time. The period of this study indicated that the sum involved was ‘not a transitory product of unusual circumstances but rather an outcome of persistent underlying causes’ (Ndikumana & Boyce 2011 :46). An earlier study by the same authors concluded that this sum was ‘from assets belonging to a narrow, relatively wealthy stratum of populations while, in consequence, public external debts are born by the people through their governments’ (Ndikumana & Boyce 2008 quoted in Shaxson 2011 :158). Similar procedures making use of offshore tax-havens have operated on behalf of the rich and at the cost of the poor within many countries (Shaxson 2011 ). Overall, by its hierarchy of bribery and graft, corruption for the benefit of the few means continued and exacerbated poverty for the many and simultaneous breakdown or malfunction of hospitals, clinics and health care (Ndikumana & Boyce 2011 :74–83, cited in Lewis 2015 ). Corrupt practices are widespread within entire commercial sectors of some countries, and are known to have been causes of serious inadequacies such as building failure (Ambraseys & Bilham 2011 ; Lewis 2005 , 2008a , 2008b ).

Political elites of some developing countries are known to accumulate capital because of the fragility of their position and constant threat to their political survival (Hoogvelt 1976 :137); partly for that reason, large sums are transferred to safer European accounts or to the many global ‘tax-havens’ (Shaxson 2011 ).

In a large scale public works contract in Italy, endemic collusion between levels of administration, elected officials, bureaucrats and private contractors made it obvious that for such abuse of public office for personal gain to persist countrywide, elected officials are necessarily and regularly involved. Extensive and persistent corruption in any sector, could not be regarded as a phenomenon isolated from its broader political context; a political environment of corruption involves a non-benevolent principal rather than being a benign bureaucratic or institutional slippage from a benevolent one (Golden & Picci 2005 ).

Petty corruption refers to everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- and mid-level public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens, when seeking to access basic goods or services in hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies (Transparency International 2016a ). These corrupt practices are rarely spoken of and expectations of bribes are rarely applicable to anyone not known to the locality. Without long-term presence and discrete research (e.g. Hartmann & Boyce 1990 ; Ray 1986 ), assured evidence of ‘petty’ corruption remains obscure.

In 2013, a Philippines national survey (Office of the Ombudsman 2014 ) indicated fewer families to have given bribes or ‘grease money’ in 2013 than in 2010. The survey found that more people in ‘the lower income stratum’ were more likely to pay bribes or ‘grease money’ despite ‘their lower financial capacity’, assumed by the report as to ensure government social services essential to them were made available.

Of West Africa, Hoogvelt ( 1976 ), believes corruption affects everyone:

patients offering bribes to nurses in hospital to persuade them to pass on a bed-pan; traffic offenders bribing police officers to waive the fine; tax collectors adding their personal increment to inland revenue extractions; councillors awarding contracts to firms in which they (or their kin) have a financial stake; educational officers giving government scholarships to their cousins; and political candidates buying the votes of entire electoral districts. (pp. 128–129)

Hoogvelt adds that corruption at the law enforcement level, involving lower echelons of civil and public services, is where contact between administrations and the public are most frequent and where, therefore, the greatest volume of corruption occurs – though the amount of damage done and money involved may well be greater at higher levels (Hoogvelt 1976 :130).

Corruption retains society’s levels in place, corrupt behaviours at lower social levels being a microcosm of those at upper levels. Where larger landowners control most land of their district, consequences at lower levels impact upon minor landholders, share croppers and labourers who own little or no land (Hartmann & Boyce 1990 :7); a system that ensures those at each social level will remain at that level, the rich as well as the poor, and the poor will remain beholden to, and controlled by, the rich.

An exception from Bangladesh illustrates the generality: Mahmud was a poor student living in Johir Ali’s house and tutoring his children in exchange for a room and board. After Mahmud graduated from secondary school, Johir Ali is said to have paid a 500 taka bribe to secure him a job as a tahsildar , a government land-tax officer who records the amount of land which tenants held on lease. Tenants were often in arrears with their rent payments and at risk of dispossession, providing Mahmud opportunities to help himself by helping others with their payments. Mahmud charged a fee for his services, but since it was less than the going price of land, most tenants were happy to comply. During his years as a tax officer, Mahmud accumulated considerable capital, which he invested in land and later left his government job to take up the management of his sizeable holdings (Hartmann & Boyce 1990 :55).

Every service demands a kickback or backhander additional to any legal payment that may be required. Larger landholders in line for development aid, such as for the drilling of wells, will buy up numbers of offers to which they may be eligible to sell on to lesser landholders either as wells or as water from wells in their ownership. Larger land owners control lesser landholders and smaller crop growers. From development aid, the poor get temporary employment (e.g. from the use of water), the rich reaping repeated capital gains from the installation of a well (Hartmann & Boyce 1990 :257, 262, 272, 274).

As a consequence of ‘tremendous power’ wielded in Bangladesh by the rural rich, ubiquitous corruption pervades every sector at every level and is stated as being a principal hindrance to the achievement of self-reliance by the rural poor. Wealthy landowners, physicians, shopkeepers, chairmen or members of the union parishad (local government), have long-lasting connections and alliances with government in the capital, officials of all ranks, lawyers, judges and powerful politicians. Sustained by bribes, gifts, marriage and birth, these alliances, enable the rural rich to safeguard their narrow self-interest, ‘committing crimes if necessary and getting away’ (Ray 1986 :24–25).

A study in flash flood prone north-eastern Bangladesh (Choudhury & Haque 2016 ) identifies social power structures, imposed by local political and commercial elites, as serving to diminish local adaptive capacities and consequently as an impediment upon resilience. Petty corruption, in the form of bribery referred to in the study, emerges as an understated but consistent component of impositions upon those in poverty; expressed as the eponymous quotation: ‘We are more scared of power elites than the floods’.

Reports of occasional local optimism (e.g. Hossain 2016 ) need to be set against realities of corruption at all relevant levels and scales (Transparency International 2016b ) and of its social consequences.

Contexts of poverty may be created by corrupt practices at higher levels of government and commercial management (Transparency International 2016a ; UNDP 2014 ), exacerbated and perpetuated by social systems imposed upon people and their communities for purposes of domination and exploitation to facilitate ‘petty’ corrupt practices (Choudhury & Haque 2016 ; Hartmann & Boyce 1990 ; Ray 1986 ).

Contexts of poverty are known to be amongst the most vulnerable and the most disaster-prone (Lewis & Kelman 2012 ). Of countries lowest on the internally perceived international corruption scale (Transparency International 2016b ), several are amongst the poorest developing countries (Ambraseys & Bilham 2011 ). Of the 168 countries on the scale, Myanmar is 147th, Bangladesh is 139th, Nepal is 130th and the Philippines is 95th; of low-income and lower middle-income countries (CRED/UNISDR 2016b ), Myanmar is 147th and Pakistan is 117th. Whilst consistent correlation between corruption and disaster impacts is unlikely, disaster mortality is highest in Haiti, at 158th amongst the lowest on the corruption scale and highest for disaster mortality.

In these and numerous other countries, poverty persists for large numbers of people caused to be at risk by pernicious political, commercial and social realities which result from discrimination and displacement, impoverishment by others’ self-seeking expenditure, denial of access to resources, and corrupt siphoning of public money that may be otherwise spent to the public good (Lewis & Kelman 2012 ); sub-cultures working to favour the few but in opposition to the interests of the many (Lewis 2015 ).

As a perpetrator and perpetuator of poverty and inequality (Alexander 2016 ; Lewis 2011a ; Lewis & Kelman 2012 ), by its various guises and their consequences, corruption is a ubiquitous impediment of abilities to ‘accommodate and recover’, and ‘change in order to survive’, the basic functions of resilience (UN/ISDR 2009 ).

Further, where aspects of national income are diverted to private accounts and payments of bribes are set against declared company profits, the basis upon which national tax incomes are formed is reduced. Income which could have been spent for the benefit of society at large is depleted on such a scale that housing, education, sanitation, nutrition and healthcare (Ndikumana & Boyce 2011 ), for example, are threatened or rendered inadequate (Lewis 2011a ). Corrupt behaviours leading to depletion of national and local incomes are an explanation for why works for basic community development are perceived as necessary for preliminary projects to precede projected inputs for sustainability and resilience (e.g. Ahmed et al. 2016 ).

Until corrupt practices are traced and stopped, it may not be realistic to expect villagers in long-term poverty to turn to new activities merely by advising them to do so: ‘After all, decades of abject poverty has instilled in them a deep fear that trying anything new may be disastrous’ (Ray 1986 :4). Traditionally ingrained corrupt practices may seem inseparable from social norms, the introduction of new practices being seemingly ‘next to impossible’, however essential they may be for longer-term social development to succeed.

Only ‘rugged common sense’ enables the poor to survive decades of exploitation by a ruling urban elite. Famished villagers cannot work towards change to the system by which they are oppressed unless they have achieved a minimum of nutrition and physical strength, ill health being inextricably linked to illiteracy, malnutrition, superstition, unemployment and agricultural backwardness (Ray 1986 :vii–viii, 3–4) – a close comparison with statements made by Symons ( 1839 ) with reference to Edinburgh and European capitals.

Corruption is not only a financial issue; corruption creates social systems compliant to its practices and influences entire societies and the social relationships they contain. In these circumstances and where systemic corruption persists, attempts to induce and to inculcate resilience to hazards and crises, if successful in any short-term, may be unlikely to succeed in any longer-term.

The start of any programme for rural resilience has to be the depletion of those ‘traditionally ingrained corrupt practices’. If famished villagers who have not achieved a minimum of nutrition and physical strength, cannot work towards change to the system by which they are oppressed, then externally applied programmes for purposes of creating resilience are unlikely to succeed in any longer-term. Corruption and its consequences will make any kind of social development programme unsustainable and community resilience is unlikely until individual resilience amongst individuals is itself sustainable (Lewis 2015 ).

Repeatedly, necessary injections of programmes and projects for sustainability and resilience might suggest their temporary presence to be due not to unavailable financial resources but to indigenous illicit misappropriations of financial capital. Corruption denies and impedes personal and community empowerment for change, the basic requirement for disaster risk reduction (Von Meding & Forino 2016 ). How much less vulnerable, and how much more resilient would populations be, without social impediments and financial draining at all levels imposed by corruption in any and all its guises?

Development programmes of wider inclusivity are emerging from responses to climate change and its consequences (Ahmed et al. 2016 ; Kelman et al. 2016 ; Lewis 1999 ). Adjustments for this wider inclusivity could be made to go further and to incorporate measures for annihilation and prevention of corrupt practices which, with poverty reduction, disaster risk reduction and resilience, would be an inclusivity serving to ensure improved long-term developmental effectiveness, sustainability and reliability.

Social consequences of corruption have been examined and considered and found to be negatively influenced against the required prerequisites for resilience. A question that remains is not ‘can resilience exist in contexts of corruption?’ but rather, ‘would the inducement of resilience be less necessary in non-corrupt contexts?’

Acknowledgements

Competing interests.

The author declares that he has no financial or personal relationships that may have inappropriately influenced him in writing this article.

How to cite this article: Lewis, J., 2017, ‘Social impacts of corruption upon community resilience and poverty’, Jàmbá: Journal of Disaster Risk Studies 9(1), a391. https://doi.org/10.4102/jamba.v9i1.391

  • Ahmed B., Kelman I., Fehr K.H. & Saha M, 2016, ‘ Community resilience to cyclone disasters in coastal Bangladesh ’, Sustainability 8 ( 8 ), 805, viewed 24 September 2016, from http://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/8/8/805 [ Google Scholar ]
  • Alexander D.E, 2016, ‘ The game changes: “Disaster Prevention and Management” after a quarter of a century ’, Disaster Prevention and Management 25 ( 1 ), 2–10. https://doi.org/10.1108/DPM-11-2015-0262 [ Google Scholar ]
  • Ambraseys N. & Bilham R, 2011, ‘ Corruption kills ’, Nature 469 , 153–155, viewed 12 October 2016, from http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v469/n7329/abs/469153a.html [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
  • Boubacar S., Pelling M., Barcena A. & Montandon R, 2017, ‘ The corrosive effects of small disasters on household absorptive capacity in Niamey: A nested HEA approach ’, Environment and Urbanisation 29 ( 1 ), viewed 26 January 2017, from http://www.urbanark.org [ Google Scholar ]
  • Chabal P. & Daloz J.-P, 1999, Africa works: Disorder as a political instrument , The International African Institute, London. [ Google Scholar ]
  • Choudhury M.-U.-I. & Haque C.E, 2016, ‘ “We are more scared of the power elites than the floods”: Adaptive capacity and resilience of wetland community to flash flood disasters in Bangladesh ’, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 19 , 145–158, viewed 11 November 2016, from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2212420916301145 [ Google Scholar ]
  • CRED/UNISDR , 2016a, Poverty and death: Disaster mortality 1996–2015 , Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Brussels, viewed 08 November 2016, from http://cred.be/sites/default/files/CredCrunch44.pdf [ Google Scholar ]
  • CRED/UNISDR , 2016b, Poverty and death: Disaster mortality 1996–2015 , Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Brussels, viewed 23 October 2016, from http://www.preventionweb.net/files/50589_creddisastermortalityallfinalpdf.pdf [ Google Scholar ]
  • Davoudi S., Bohland J., Knox P. & Lawrence J, 2017, The resilience machine , Routledge, London, (Preview), viewed 25 February 2017, http://www.urbanresilienceresearch.net/2017/02/09/the-resilience-machine [ Google Scholar ]
  • Drury A.C., Krieckhaus J. & Lusztig M, 2006, ‘ Corruption, democracy, and economic growth ’, International Political Science Review 27 ( 2 ), 121–136 (Abstract), viewed 14 September 2016, from http://ips.sagepub.com/content/27/2/121.short [ Google Scholar ]
  • Engels F, [1892] 2009, The condition of the working class in England , First English Publication, Penguin Classics, London. [ Google Scholar ]
  • Gaillard J-C, 2007, ‘ Resilience of traditional societies in facing natural hazards ’, Disaster Prevention and Management 16 ( 4 ), 522–544. https://doi.org/10.1108/09653560710817011 [ Google Scholar ]
  • Golden M. & Picci L, 2005, ‘ Proposals for a new measure of corruption, illustrated with Italian data ’, Economics and Politics 17 ( 1 ), 37–75, viewed 15 May 2007, from http://didattica.spbo.unibo.it/picci/article.pdf [ Google Scholar ]
  • Hartmann B. & Boyce J.K, 1990, A quiet violence: View from a Bangladesh village , University Press, Dhaka. [ Google Scholar ]
  • Hoogvelt A.M.M, 1976, The sociology of developing societies , Macmillan, London. [ Google Scholar ]
  • Hossain A, 2016, ‘ What makes people resilient? Insights from a flood vulnerable community in Sirajganj ’, Practical Action , viewed 10 September 2016, from http://practicalaction.org/blog/programmes/climate_change/what-makes-people-resilient/
  • Kar D. & Curcio K, 2011, Illicit financial flows from developing countries: 2000–2009 , Global Financial Integrity, Washington, DC, viewed 20 October 2016, from http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/gfi_iff_update_report-web.pdf [ Google Scholar ]
  • Kar D. & Spanjers J, 2015, Illicit financial flows from developing countries 2004–2013 , Global Financial Integrity, Washington, DC, viewed 20 October 2016, from http://www.gfintegrity.org/report/illicit-financial-flows-from-developing-countries-2004-2013/ [ Google Scholar ]
  • Kelman I., Gaillard J.C., Lewis J. & Mercer J, 2016, ‘Learning from the history of disaster vulnerability and resilience research and practice for climate change’, Natural Hazards : Chapter in Vulnerability assessment in natural disaster risk: A dynamic perspective , Springer, viewed 10 October 2016, from http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11069-016-2294-0 [ Google Scholar ]
  • Klein N, 2007, The shock doctrine , Penguin Books, London. [ Google Scholar ]
  • Lewis J, 1999, Development in disaster-prone places: Studies of vulnerability , Intermediate Technology Publications (Practical Action), London. [ Google Scholar ]
  • Lewis J, 2005, Earthquake destruction: Corruption on the fault line , Global Corruption Report 2005, Corruption in Construction, Part 1, pp. 23–30, Transparency International, Berlin, viewed 28 August 2016, from http://archive.transparency.org/misc/migrate/publications/gcr/gcr_2005 [ Google Scholar ]
  • Lewis J, 2008a, ‘The worm in the bud’, in Bosher L. (ed.), Hazards and the built environment , pp. 238–263, Taylor & Francis, Abingdon. [ Google Scholar ]
  • Lewis J, 2008b, Corruption and earthquake destruction: Observations on events in Turkey, Italy and China , RADIX, 25.5.08 (Revised November 2010), viewed 12 October 2016, from http://www.datum-international.eu/node/26
  • Lewis J, 2011a, Corruption: The hidden perpetrator of under-development and vulnerability to natural hazards and disasters , The Pat Reid Lecture 2010, African Centre for Disaster Studies, North West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa, September 2010. [ Google Scholar ] Jàmbá 3 ( 2 ), viewed 24 October 2016, from http://acds.co.za/wp-ontent/PDF/PAT/2010/lewis_3_2.pdf [ Google Scholar ]
  • Lewis J, 2011b, Climate-proofing development: Corruption risks in adaptation infrastructure , Global Corruption Report 2011, Corruption & Climate Change, Part 5, Item 5.3, Transparency International, Berlin, viewed 07 August 2016, from http://archive.transparency.org/publications/gcr/gcr_climate_change2 [ Google Scholar ]
  • Lewis J, 2011c, Corruption costs lives: A guide for journalists covering disaster risk reduction, in Disaster through a distant lens: Behind every effect there is a cause , Annex III, pp. 183–185. United Nations: International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR), viewed 07 August 2016, from http://www.preventionweb.net/files/20108_mediabook.pdf [ Google Scholar ]
  • Lewis J, 2013a, ‘ Some realities of resilience: A case study of Wittenberge ’, Disaster Prevention and Management 22 ( 1 ), 48–62. https://doi.org/10.1108/09653561311301970 [ Google Scholar ]
  • Lewis J, 2013b, ‘ Some realities of resilience: An updated case study of storms and flooding at Chiswell, Dorset ’, Disaster Prevention and Management 22 ( 4 ), 300–311. https://doi.org/10.1108/DPM-03-2013-0053 [ Google Scholar ]
  • Lewis J, 2015, ‘Cultures and contra-cultures: Social divisions and behavioural origins of vulnerabilities to disaster risk’, in Krüger F., Bankoff G., Cannon T., Orlowski B. & Schipper L. (eds.), Cultures and disasters: Understanding cultural framings in disaster risk reduction , pp, 109–122, Routledge, London and New York. [ Google Scholar ]
  • Lewis J. & Kelman I, 2010, ‘ Places, people and perpetuity: Community capacities in ecologies of catastrophe ’, ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies 9 ( 2 ), 191–220, viewed 30 October 2016, from http://ojs.unbc.ca/index.php/acme/article/view/866 [ Google Scholar ]
  • Lewis J. & Kelman I, 2012, The good, the bad and the ugly: Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) versus Disaster Risk Creation (DRC) , PLoS Currents Disasters, Public Library of Science, San Fransisco, CA, viewed 30 October 2016, from http://currents.plos.org/disasters/article/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-disaster-risk-reduction-drr-versus-disaster-risk-creation-drc/ [ PMC free article ] [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
  • Lewis J., Kelman I. & Lewis S.A.V, 2011e, ‘ Is “Fear itself” the only thing we have to fear? Explorations of psychology in perceptions of the vulnerability of others ’, Australasian Journal of Disaster and Trauma Studies 89–103, viewed 03 November 2016, from http://trauma.massey.ac.nz/issues/2011-3/AJDTS_2011-3_03_Lewis.pdf
  • Lewis J. & Lewis S.A.V, 2014, ‘ Processes of vulnerability in England? Place, poverty and susceptibility ’, Disaster Prevention and Management 23 ( 5 ), 586–609. https://doi.org/10.1108/DPM-03-2014-0044 [ Google Scholar ]
  • Manyena S.B, 2006, ‘ The concept of resilience revisited ’, Disasters 30 ( 4 ), 434–450. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0361-3666.2006.00331.x [ PubMed ] [ Google Scholar ]
  • Ndikumana L. & Boyce J, 2008, New estimates of capital flight from sub-Saharan African countries: Linkages with external borrowing and policy options , Political Economy Research Institute, viewed 05 October 2016, from http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1137&context=peri_workingpapers [ Google Scholar ]
  • Ndikumana L. & Boyce J, 2011, Africa’s odious debts: How foreign loans and capital flight bled a continent , Zed Books, London. [ Google Scholar ]
  • Nurunnabi M., Hossain M.A. & Al-Mosa S.A, 2016, ‘ Ceci n’est pas une pipe! Corporate Governance practices under two political regimes in Bangladesh: A political economy perspective ’, International Journal of Disclosure , viewed 17 September 2016, from https://www.researchgate.net/publication/301340071_Ceci_n%27est_pas_une_pipe_Corporate_Governance_practices_under_two_political_regimes_in_Bangladesh_A_political_economy_perspective [ Google Scholar ]
  • Office of the Ombudsman , 2014, 2013 National household survey on experience with corruption in the Philippines , Office of the Ombudsman, Research and Special Studies Bureau, Public Assistance and Corruption Prevention Office, Manilla, viewed 27 October 2016, from http://www.ombudsman.gov.ph/docs/caravan/2013OMBCorruptionSurveyReport.pdf [ Google Scholar ]
  • Pei M, 2007, Corruption threatens China’s future , Policy Brief 55, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, viewed 27 September 2016, from http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=19628 [ Google Scholar ]
  • Ray J.K, 1986, Organizing villagers for self-reliance: A study of Gonoshasthya Kendra in Bangladesh , Orient Longman, Hyderabad. [ Google Scholar ]
  • Resilience-Scan , 2016, Overseas development institute , London, viewed 06 October 2016, from https://www.odi.org/resilience-scan [ Google Scholar ]
  • Rey A, 2016, In numbers: Impact of corruption on the Philippines , Rappler Social New Network, Pasig City, The Philippines, viewed 28 October 2016, from http://www.rappler.com/move-ph/issues/corruption/141391-impact-corruption-philippines [ Google Scholar ]
  • Shaxson N, 2011, Treasure islands: Tax havens and the men who stole the world , Bodley Head, London. [ Google Scholar ]
  • Sudmeier-Rieux K.I, 2014, ‘ Resilience – An emerging paradigm of danger or of hope? ’, Disaster Prevention and Management 23 ( 1 ), 67–80. https://doi.org/10.1108/DPM-12-2012-0143 [ Google Scholar ]
  • Symons J.C, 1839, Art and artisans at home and abroad , William Tait, Edinburgh. [ Google Scholar ]
  • Transparency International , 2016a, Definition of transparency , viewed 28 August 2016, from https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption/#define
  • Transparency International , 2016b, Corruption by country/territory , viewed 23 August 2016, from https://www.transparency.org/country/
  • Twigg J, 2007, Characteristics of a disaster resilient community , Department for International Development (DfID), London, viewed 25 October 2016, from http://practicalaction.org/reducing-vulnerability/docs/ia1/community-characteristics-en-lowres.pdf [ Google Scholar ]
  • UNDP , 2011, Illicit financial flows from the least developed countries: 1990–2008 , New York, viewed 23 October 2016, from http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/poverty-reduction/trade_content/illicit_financialflowsfromtheleastdevelopedcountries1990-2008.html [ Google Scholar ]
  • UNDP , 2014, A snapshot of illicit financial flows from eight developing countries: Results and issues for investigation , United Nations Development Programme, New York, viewed 23 October 2016, from http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/democratic-governance/anti-corruption/a-snapshot-of-illicit-financial-flows-from-eight-developing-coun.html [ Google Scholar ]
  • UN/ISDR , 2009, Terminology , United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), Geneva, viewed 14 October 2016, from http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology [ Google Scholar ]
  • Von Meding J. & Forino G, 2016, Hurricane Matthew is just the latest unnatural disaster to strike Haiti , The Conversation, London, viewed 05 October 2016, from https://theconversation.com/hurricane-matthew-is-just-the-latest-unnatural-disaster-to-strike-haiti-66766 [ Google Scholar ]
  • Wisner B, 2016, Vulnerability as a concept, metric, and tool , Natural Hazard Science, Oxford Research Encyclopedias, viewed 15 October 2016, from http://naturalhazardscience.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199389407.001.0001/acrefore-9780199389407-e-25 [ Google Scholar ]
  • Zucman G, 2015, The hidden wealth of nations: The scourge of tax havens , University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL. [ Google Scholar ]
  • Research article
  • Open access
  • Published: 08 June 2020

The influence of corruption and governance in the delivery of frontline health care services in the public sector: a scoping review of current and future prospects in low and middle-income countries of south and south-east Asia

  • Nahitun Naher 1 ,
  • Roksana Hoque 1 ,
  • Muhammad Shaikh Hassan 1 ,
  • Dina Balabanova 2 ,
  • Alayne M. Adams 3 &
  • Syed Masud Ahmed   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0001-5032-7181 1  

BMC Public Health volume  20 , Article number:  880 ( 2020 ) Cite this article

60k Accesses

37 Citations

3 Altmetric

Metrics details

A Correction to this article was published on 09 July 2020

This article has been updated

The dynamic intersection of a pluralistic health system, large informal sector, and poor regulatory environment have provided conditions favourable for ‘corruption’ in the LMICs of south and south-east Asia region. ‘Corruption’ works to undermine the UHC goals of achieving equity, quality, and responsiveness including financial protection, especially while delivering frontline health care services. This scoping review examines current situation regarding health sector corruption at frontlines of service delivery in this region, related policy perspectives, and alternative strategies currently being tested to address this pervasive phenomenon.

A scoping review following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) was conducted, using three search engines i.e., PubMed, SCOPUS and Google Scholar . A total of 15 articles and documents on corruption and 18 on governance were selected for analysis. A PRISMA extension for Scoping Reviews (PRISMA-ScR) checklist was filled-in to complete this report. Data were extracted using a pre-designed template and analysed by ‘mixed studies review’ method.

Common types of corruption like informal payments, bribery and absenteeism identified in the review have largely financial factors as the underlying cause. Poor salary and benefits, poor incentives and motivation, and poor governance have a damaging impact on health outcomes and the quality of health care services. These result in high out-of-pocket expenditure, erosion of trust in the system, and reduced service utilization. Implementing regulations remain constrained not only due to lack of institutional capacity but also political commitment. Lack of good governance encourage frontline health care providers to bend the rules of law and make centrally designed anti-corruption measures largely in-effective. Alternatively, a few bottom-up community-engaged interventions have been tested showing promising results. The challenge is to scale up the successful ones for measurable impact.

Conclusions

Corruption and lack of good governance in these countries undermine the delivery of quality essential health care services in an equitable manner, make it costly for the poor and disadvantaged, and results in poor health outcomes. Traditional measures to combat corruption have largely been ineffective, necessitating the need for innovative thinking if UHC is to be achieved by 2030.

Peer Review reports

The goal of Universal Health Coverage (UHC) is that everyone needing health care can access quality services without financial hardship, and attains sustainable health outcomes [ 1 ]. To facilitate the journey towards UHC in low- and middle income- countries (LMICs), improving Primary Health Care (PHC) through health systems strengthening is essential [ 2 ]. However, ‘corruption’ contributes to undermine the UHC goals of equity, quality, and responsiveness of health systems and ultimately results in high, sometimes catastrophic, health care expenditures [ 3 , 4 ]. Corruption, the ‘use, misuse or abuse’ of public office or resources for private gain [ 5 , 6 ] may be actual or potential, financial, or even political [ 7 ]. It represents an abuse of trust and intentional violation of duty [ 8 ], and results in negative impacts on population health outcomes especially for the poor and the disadvantaged. For example, corruption (according to Transparency International’s corruption perception index) is estimated to be responsible for 140,000 annual deaths globally among under five children [ 9 ]. Higher levels of corruption (according to the same index) has been found to be associated with self-reported poor general health of both men and women, within all socio-economic groups across the lifecycle, in 20 African countries [ 10 ]. Also, corruption has beenincriminated as a cause in deaths from road traffic accident crashes, and deemed to be a necessary condition for effectively tackling road safety problems [ 11 ].

Corruption is a usual consequence of poor governance characterized by lack of transparency, weak accountability and inefficiency, and lack of citizen participation [ 12 ]. The importance of governance on the delivery of effective health care services cannot be overemphasized, even in situations where greater investments in the public health sector are occurring in tandem with economic growth [ 3 ]. ‘Good governance’ facilitates better allocation and efficient use of available resources including better and effective targeting of priority population groups for intervention [ 13 , 14 ]. In a recent study based on national level panel data for ~ 148 countries, quality of government has been found to directly impact upon the infant and under-five child mortality, maternal mortality, and life expectancy [ 15 ]. The authors found that reducing corruption, one of the tenets of quality government, can significantly reduce infant and under-five child mortality.

The issue of corruption in the health sector is pervasive [ 16 ]. The particular susceptibility of the health sector to corruption arises from the asymmetry of information that characterizes the patient-provider relationship, the uncertainty that surrounds the illness experience, the multiplicity of actors and services involved in illness care, and the challenges of ensuring accountability in complex health systems [ 17 ]. Expensive hospital construction, high tech equipment and the increasing arsenal of medicines needed for treatment, combined with a powerful market of vendors and pharmaceutical companies present opportunities for corruption in the health sector. These opportunities increase when there is insufficient accountability for decisions or results in organisations. Organisational culture can further legitimize this behaviour by influencing individual attitudes and norms towards corruption and making it socially acceptable [ 18 ].

There is a rising trend of corruption in LMICs in the south and south-east Asian regions [ 19 ]. In these countries, the intersection between a pluralistic health system, a largely informal health market, and a poor regulatory regime have provided conditions favourable for corruption [ 20 ]. Besides, resource constraints in public sector resulting in poor salaries for the health care providers and inadequate supplies increase corruption such as informal payment and bribes [ 21 , 22 ]. The conventional top-down approach of reward and punishment based on strict implementation of rules and regulations combined with various incentives to curb corruption (‘carrot and stick’ measure), has largely been unsuccessful in these countries [ 23 ]. This is partly due to the fact that health sector corruption is most often manifested at the level of patient encounter where providers (as ‘street-level bureaucrats’) have the freedom to shape the type and quality of care provided in the privacy of the doctor’s office [ 24 ].

Given the fact that traditional top-down approach of combating corruption through regulatory mechanisms and incentives have largely failed in LMICs, alternative, innovative approaches are needed that make the ‘cost of corruption’ outweigh its benefits [ 23 , 25 ]. To identify bottom-up strategies that are perceived as ‘win-win’ for the stakeholders involved, an understanding of what is happening and why at the forefront of health care service delivery is necessary. Focusing on LMICs in the south/south-east Asian region, this scoping review documents and critically assesses relevant evidence on health sector corruption at the frontlines with the purpose of filling-in this knowledge gap. Study findings are expected to help policy makers and practitioners design innovative interventions that go beyond the traditional approaches to contain corruption.

A scoping review following the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) was conducted, using three search engines i.e., PubMed, SCOPUS and Google Scholar . A protocol was developed to guide the literature review process which specified study objectives, key research questions, inclusion/exclusion criteria, data sources (Table  1 ), and key search terms (Table  2 ). A PRISMA extension for Scoping Reviews (PRISMA-ScR) checklist was filled-in to complete this report (Additional File  1 ). Data were extracted using a pre-designed template and analysed by the ‘mixed studies review’ method [ 26 ].

Search strategy

We searched information from published articles and documents as shown in the PRISMA flow diagram (Fig.  1 ). The search strategy and terms were developed collaboratively with our study partners. Search strategy focused on following key words: corruption, informal payment, rent-seeking behaviors, bribery, anti-corruption strategy and/or behavior, governance/ good governance and/or accountability in frontline health workers/managers, service providers of health facilities/system, hospitals, etc. The literature search was conducted during Sept. – Oct. 2017 and the full search strategy is available on request from the authors. Citations for journal articles were managed using EndNote X7.7.1 software.

figure 1

PRISMA Flow Diagram

Operational definitions

For our purpose, the key concepts of the study are defined as follows (10): i) Corruption: the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (actual or potential, to be realized in the future), alternatively described as “irregularities and informal practices and/or rent-seeking;” also encompasses concepts of transparency (honesty and openness) and accountability (‘the extent to which people, groups and institutions are able to hold government and other power holders responsible for their actions’), the two pillars of ‘good governance’; ii) Informal payment: payments made to health providers for services supposed to be provided free of charge or payments made that are greater than official fees; (alternative terms used: ‘under the counter/table payment,’ ‘envelop payment,’ ‘unofficial fees’ etc.), payments made outside official channels, payments over and above fixed co-payments, and additional payments for entitled services [ 27 ] iii) Bribes: cash or kind exchanged with the health service providers/officials against an official action (e.g., posting and transfer to health facilities of choice); iv) Absenteeism: stealing time by not coming to work or doing private practice during working hours [ 28 ]; v) Frontline health care services and frontline health care workers: Essential health care services delivered by the doctors, nurses, paramedics, CHWs and lab and pharmacy technicians at the public sector sub-district ( upazila ) health facilities and below (the formal level of PHC); vi) Regulatory regime: arrangements of steering and control mechanisms that influence the operation of health systems e.g., statutory measures for controlling the practice of medical profession or health facilities, or marketing of medicines and medical devices etc. vii) Decentralisation: a socio-political process that transfers authority and responsibility in planning, management and decision-making from central government to local government bodies.

Data extraction and synthesis

Two researchers from the study team identified the articles independently from electronic databases, grey literature, and manual search. After excluding duplications, screening titles and abstracts, and applying eligibility criteria, a total of 36 articles and documents were included for data extraction and analysis (Fig. 1 ). A pre-designed template was used for extraction of data from the selected articles and documents. The two key themes of the study viz. corruption and governance, were subsequently disaggregated into sub-themes for further granularity: corruption (types and forms, practices, opportunities and incentives, impact) and governance (transparency, accountability, laws and regulations, citizen engagement) (Table  3 ). We used a ‘mixed studies review’ method to synthesize evidence from quantitative, qualitative and mixed methods studies, which is particularly effective when analyzing complex public health interventions [ 26 ]. Any confusion with categorization or data interpretation was resolved by discussion among research group members under the supervision of the PI.

Out of the 33 documents included for analysis, two were systematic reviews, nine were reviews,and 16 primary research papers. Two blogs and four reports identified through manual search were also included. Corruption related documents dealt with the types, causes and consequences of corruption while governance-related documents mostly focused on decentralization, e-governance, and the concept of ‘good governance’. Only six of the documents reviewed dealt with the issue of accountability as an essential element of good governance. Interestingly, literature fulfilling the search criteria for selected countries were limited in number, and the majority of relevant documents were from India. Given the wide prevalence of corruption in these countries (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Vietnam, Philippines) [ 19 ], the relatively small number of published materials in these countries suggest a substantial evidence gap in this area which hamper the design of informed interventions for its containment. To further enhance the depth, breadth and richness of the study findings, researchers developed and analysed relevant sub-themes and then grouped these into two key study themes namely, Corruption (Table  4 ) and Governance (Table  5 ), and are presented below.

‘Corruption’

In our review, a long list of irregularities and rule-breaking or rule-bending practices (i.e., ‘corruption’) were identified in the context of health care service delivery transactions including informal payments, bribery and absenteeism (Table 4 ).

Informal payment

In the reviewed literature, examples of informal payments include payments made at different stages of service use in the public health facilities ranging from availing a trolley for patient transport to getting admission and securing a hospital bed to availing subsidized medicines from the hospital. Even if admitted, patients and attendants were afraid that without extra payment (to mainly non-technical staff), they would either receive no treatment at all or would be subjected to neglect/slow treatment, as they had no connection to or recommendation from, influential people [ 29 ]. Furthermore, financial barriers and patient frustration arising from petty corruption may work to hinder access and utilization of public sector facilities [ 30 ]. For example, only 24% of households in Pakistan visited Government Public Health facilities in 2004, while 45% consulted private medical practitioners. Similarly, in Bangladesh, only 10% of households visited government health care facilities, while health care-seeking from nongovernment organization (NGO) clinics increased from 30 to 49% of household in 2003. For those who do avail services, many feel trapped and forced to make these payments. The literature identifies social audits as a potentially effective method for revealing petty corruption at service delivery points including the practice of informal payments [ 30 ]. However, in some resource-poor settings such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Cambodia and Vietnam, informal payments are viewed as a necessary source of financing health care and thus are rationalized and sustained within individual and organizational norms and practices [ 31 ]. Given the complexity and sensitivity of the practice, the literature recommends that information on informal payment is best elicited through self-administered questionnaires with anonymity [ 32 ].

Bribery is found to have a negative correlation with health outcomes in Vietnam including enrollment in health insurance programmes [ 33 ]. Again, in Vietnam, advice on choice of hospitals from social interactions with friends and relatives has been shown to increase the propensity of bribes to hospital staff and the size of the bribe amount [ 34 ]. Bribery has also been found to reduce immunization coverage, delay newborn vaccination, and thus discourage use of public sector health services in the Philippines’ [ 35 ]. In Bangladesh, the more remote the location, the greater the size of the bribe [ 36 ]. Here, bribery also occurs when recruiting doctors and in decisions regarding posting and transfer to a facility or region of choice [ 37 ]. In addition, practices like paying-off management authorities for taking unlawful leave, stealing government revenues such as patient registration fees, taking the salary of a deceased or “ghost” worker, and making false bills for events like training that didn’t occur or in which the incumbent didn’t participate, are common across the region [ 36 , 37 ].

Absenteeism

Reports of widespread absenteeism and negligence were common across the papers in this review. Absences from work without leave were most commonly reported among doctors in the public sector, followed by lab technicians and nurses [ 28 , 38 , 39 ]. In a district in southern India, it was found that around 30% of medical doctors were absent on the day of survey (in 30 selected community health centres) [ 28 ]. Only 19% of them were present at all times, although many reported making arrangements with other doctors so that patients were not left unattended. In urban community health centres in Indonesia (9 in a city in Sumatra), 26% of the doctors were absent [ 38 ]. In a review of absenteeism in developing countries in 2006, absenteeism was found to vary from 40 to 50% in LMICs of south/south-east countries (India, Bangladesh, Indonesia) [ 39 ]. Moreover, regulatory regimes to manage absenteeism are weak and fragmented, and alignment or coordination with laws related to various aspects of health is lacking [ 40 ]. Of further concern is the negative impact of absenteeism on the extent to which service seekers trust the health system, and its disproportionate effects on the disadvantaged whose access to health care is already compromised [ 41 ].‘Dual practice’ by health professionals is quite common in south/south-east Asia and its poor regulation also encourages absenteeism [ 42 ].

Underlying causes and consequences of corruption

The underlying causes of irregularities and informal practices emerging from our review were predominantly financial including poor salary and benefits, lack of/poor incentives, lack of autonomy of local authorities to hire and fix remuneration, and lack of accountability of doctors to local authorities [ 30 , 32 , 33 , 36 , 38 , 39 ]. The impacts of corruption are multiple, affecting service access, utilization and cost. Corruption practices associated with the misuse of available resources in resource-constrained settings and increased financial burden on the poorest [ 30 ], also lead to inefficient public expenditure [ 32 ]. Corruption can increase the cost of treatment to patients if a bribe is demanded or an informal payment is made in addition to the official payment, and thereby reduces demand for services and worsen health outcomes [ 35 ]. Other effects include failure to ensure timely and appropriate treatment care for those who can least afford costly services from the private sector [ 38 ], and wastage of resources [ 39 ].

Table 5 summarizes findings from the review of included papers (again, the majority from India and Bangladesh) related to the role of governance in curbing corruption. These are presented below under different sub-titles.

Transparency and accountability

Findings reveal that governance failure may occur due to an absence of long-term vision and planning, lack of a functioning regulatory regime, and limited attempts to assess performance of anti-corruption measures. This is especially apparent in the lack of effective accountability mechanisms guiding both private and public health care sectors in Bangladesh [ 43 , 44 ]. Dissemination of relevant information to the public is lacking which contributes to the public not being properly informed about what services are available, at what cost, and when. For example, in a qualitative study of three districts in Nepal, only 54% of the health facilities were found to have a properly displayed signboard, 47% displayed a citizen charter, and 40% displayed information about free health care services [ 45 ]. Moreover, the process of HRH management lacks transparency in LMICs such as India and Indonesia, thereby affecting accountability and trust in the system [ 46 , 47 ]. In the public sector, about 1/5th of the sanctioned posts in Bangladesh remain vacant, however, the posted doctors seem to be indifferent regarding attendance [ 48 ].

Citizen’s voice

One way to rectify the weak system of accountability is to adopt demand-side strategies such as increasing the engagement of the citizens and raising their voices as “watch dogs” to claim rights to quality health care services [ 49 , 50 ]. This may take various forms with varying degrees of effectiveness such as making service providers explain their activities in ‘public hearings’ as has been observed in India [ 51 ]. Public hearings as an accountability mechanism have potential to raise critical consciousness among disadvantaged groups such as poor women, and provide a floor in which they can raise their concerns. Better communicating and reconciling provider and citizen expectations is also important, helping improve the Quality of Care [ 52 ]. For this process to succeed, fiscal space at the local level is also necessary [ 53 ].

Decentralisation

In the reviewed literature from Nepal [ 54 ] and India [ 55 ], decentralization has been advocated as an effective measure to ensure and enhance transparency and accountability at the local level in a manner that addresses community’s needs and priorities. In Nepal, it has been shown to improve access to, utilisation of, and management of health care services [ 54 ]. Additionally, suggestions have been made to measure its effects in multiple dimensions while evaluating health outcomes in India [ 55 ]. Another qualitative paper from Nepal draws attention to elements such as the roles, rights and responsibilities of both citizens and local institutions in the decentralizing process [ 56 ], and how resource constraints at the local level may negatively impact service delivery as has been seen in the case of Indonesia [ 57 ].

  • Good governance

Finally, some of the literature sheds light on what constitutes good governance and what needs to be done to achieve it. For example, the use of information technology (IT) is suggested to reduce corruption in public transactions such as procurement of medical supplies as have been observed in India and Bangladesh [ 58 ]. On the other hand, insufficient institutional support can undermine people’s participation which is a crucial parameter of good governance. Administrative factors, bureaucratic norms, and motivational patterns are also emphasized as important determinants. In Bangladesh, good governance initiatives are limited and social accountability remains elusive [ 59 ]. Achieving good governance for health is the responsibility of citizens as well as political leadership. It requires concerted actions by the justice system and a committed media to mobilise necessary commitments as shown in India [ 60 ].

Regulatory regime

Over the last 12 years, attempts have been made to develop policies to contain corruption in the studied LMICs of the south and south-east Asian region. (Table  6 ). The six countries in this review signed and adopted the ‘United Nation Convention against Corruption (UNCAC)’ and initiated activities to comply with the Convention [ 69 ]. The Right to Information Act (RTI) has also been passed in Bangladesh [ 61 ], India [ 62 ] and Nepal [ 63 ] and Sri Lanka [ 64 ], however, implementation remains a challenge. In Bangladesh, for example, the RTI Act has been in place since 2008, yet 29% of citizens continue to face difficulties in accessing information, and 8% reportedly paid bribes to access information [ 61 ]. Part of this failure in implementation relates to lack of awareness about the legislation due to insufficient promotion by the government. The Whistle Blower Protection Act has been passed in Bangladesh [ 65 ] and India [ 66 ] in 2014, however, due to inadequate power of law-enforcing agencies to investigate complaints and impose penalties, implementation has been partial. This is also true for the Ombudsman act [ 67 ] and the prevention of corruption act (amendment) to punish bribery [ 68 ], both by India.

This scoping review identified different forms of corruption and its practices among health care providers delivering frontline (PHC) services in selected south/south-east Asian LMICs. Our findings reveal important insights regarding the types, causes, consequences and structural dimensions of such practices as they relate to health outcomes, especially for the poor and disadvantaged. We also reflected on the governance and regulatory arrangements in these countries, and the need for innovative measures for curbing corruption and improving governance, given the largely ineffective traditional (top-down) approaches [ 70 ]. The implications of these findings for achieving UHC by 2030 in the context of sustainable development goals (SDGs) are discussed.

The ‘pandemic’ of corruption in frontline health care service delivery is threatening the global goal of achieving UHC by 2030 and health-related SDGs [ 71 ]. It is responsible for an estimated loss of over US$500 billion every year, more than what is needed to implement UHC globally. LMICs in the south/south-east Asia region are no exception. Despite its cost to people and health systems in these countries, there exists substantial evidence gaps as shown by the relative scarcity of relevant literature except for India (and to some extent, Bangladesh) which provided the majority of the reviewed papers. This may be due to factors such as the sensitive nature of the topic, a consensus high up in the sector to maintain the ‘dirty secret,’ the ‘political correctness’ of pursuing the issue [ 72 ] and last but not the least, the methodological challenges of doing research on corruption [ 73 ].

The different forms and dimensions of corruption in south/south-east Asian countries revealed in this study are not new [ 73 , 74 ]. Whether the corruption is ‘petty’ or not, the cumulative impact on health outcomes is damaging, and affects the equity, quality and responsiveness of the services delivered. Another important consequence of corruption is the erosion of ‘trust’ in the system which reduces utilization and undermines actions to ‘prevent, detect and respond’ to major health crisis such as seen in case of Ebola [ 75 ]. Whatever the form and dimension of corruption, a main driver is the ubiquitous financial and structural problem of not offering appropriate incentives (monetary and non-monetary) to motivate the frontline health care providers. Irregularities are further enabled by weak health system characterized by poor governance e.g., poor supervision, victim-blaming, concentration of responsibilities and authorities at the centre, and almost no transparency and accountability [ 70 , 71 ].

Our review also found substantial gaps in the implementation of the traditional ‘top-down’ measures for containing corruption, resulting in substantial costs for health systems and health service recipients. Some of the existing laws and policies we documented (Table 6 ) were inconsistent with international standards. One of the reasons may be that the discretion and freedom enjoyed by the frontline providers (as ‘street-level bureaucrats’) [ 76 ] in a weak health system encourage them to bend the rules and laws in their favour, and make centrally designed anti-corruption measures largely in-effective. In extreme cases, communities may retaliate by imposing ‘rude accountability’ through social norms and actions that force the providers to deliver services [ 77 ].

What are the alternatives?

The ‘failure’ of traditional measures to contain corruption compels those at high levels of policy and practice to look elsewhere for a new vision which embraces innovative, demand-side, and community perspectives [ 23 ]. Whatever the approach adopted, it is essential that health care providers are held accountable to service users, and that systems and providers enable service responsiveness, quality and affordability for better health outcomes [ 78 ]. In order to amplify the ‘voice’ of the community, measures are needed that raise awareness about service entitlements and enable complaints to be received and addressed within a reasonable timeframe [ 79 ]. It is also imperative that corruption mitigation efforts be comprehensive (multi-pronged and multi-sectoral) and not stand-alone; that they focus on the most harmful practices first and are grounded in grassroots realities; that engage and empower the community and get their buy-in; and be part of a wider health systems reforms to achieve UHC [ 71 ].

It is encouraging to note that in a number of countries a variety of innovative bottom-up, and community-based, demand-side interventions are being tested to curb the harmful effects of corruption and make the system more accountable. Examples include: patients’ welfare committees and hospital management societies ensuring responsible use of funds and the provision of quality services in India [ 80 ]; primary health care (PHC) management committees that actively engage the community in improving quantity and the quality of services in Nepal [ 56 ]; and community monitoring of service provider’s attendance at facilities, especially by women who are the major consumers of the frontline services in Bangladesh [ 81 ] and public hearings to voice community’s grievances with health care services and demand remedial measures, again in Bangladesh [ 82 ]. However, until and unless these small-scale, local-level experiments are taken to scale, in combination with more effective and efficient traditional regulatory approaches, curbing corruption in the delivery of frontline PHC services will remain elusive.

Limitations

The search engine used for this scoping study was limited to PubMed, SCOPUS and Google Scholar databases and grey material search to institutional and government websites through Google, due to constraints in time and resources. Only articles and documents in English were searched. We limited our search to the delivery of health care services only and did not include other major areas of health sector corruption such as pharmaceutical procurement and construction of infrastructure. The study would have benefited from perspectives and experiences of the key actors involved at the top levels which was not logistically possible.

Implications

Interestingly, the countries studied are characterized by low levels of GDP, low levels of education, low levels of democratic values (e.g., freedom of press, speech and congregation etc.) in the political system, and societies organized along strong patriarchal norms. All of these may act as barriers to reduce corruption in these countries [ 76 ]. To tackle this situation, a two pronged strategy is recommended: alleviating the socioeconomic, normative and cultural barriers as mentioned above but at the same time, testing community-based, innovative micro-level interventions (such as public hearings, community monitoring of attendance of the health care providers etc.). This will help in the creation of a win-win situation for frontline health care workers as well as vested socio-political interests through improvement of community health and well-being and thereby goodwill for those in power who otherwise benefit from maintaining the status quo. Further research is needed to develop and refine such innovations on the ground and to test the feasibility of scaling up the successful ones. Being a sensitive issue, the methods for research on ‘corruption’ also need re-thinking regarding how the key actors of corruption can be challenged and engaged in divulging sensitive information without repercussion.

Corruption is “embedded” in the health sector [ 83 ] and is an open secret [ 84 ]. It undermines the development of a pro-poor, equitable and inclusive health system essential for achieving UHC by 2030. This study is first of its kind to document the levels, extents, causes and consequences of corruption in the health sector in the selected LMICs of the south and south-east Asian region. In addition, it explored alternative, bottom-up ways of combating health sector corruption which might guide future activities in this area to improve population health outcomes. Evidently, ‘business as usual’ will not do and given the limitation of traditional measures of containing corruption, strategic ‘out of box’ thinking will be needed. The historic opportunity provided by the SDGs should be seized, and used to push the UHC agenda forward. In the process, it is essential that key players in and around frontline service delivery points are not antagonized, that community is engaged, and that intervention(s) are in alignment with the prevailing political settlements such that efforts towards curbing corruption at the grassroots (e.g., PHC services) are embraced and sustained [ 85 ].

Availability of data and materials

All data relevant to the study are included in the article. Any additional data may be available from the corresponding author (SMA) on reasonable request.

Change history

09 july 2020.

An amendment to this paper has been published and can be accessed via the original article.

Abbreviations

Antimicrobial Resistance

Information technology

Information and Communications Technology

Low- and Middle Income-Countries

Non-GovernmentOrganisation

Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analysis

Primary Health care

Right to Information

Sustainable Development Goals

Universal Health Coverage

United Nation Convention against Corruption

Hogan DR, Stevens GA, Hosseinpoor AR, Boerma T. Monitoring universal health coverage within the sustainable development goals: development and baseline data for an index of essential health services. Lancet Glob Health. 2018;6(2):152–68..

Google Scholar  

Kutzin J, Sparkes SP. Health systems strengthening, universal health coverage, health security and resilience. Bull World Health Org. 2016;94(1):2.

PubMed   Google Scholar  

Lewis M. Governance and corruption in public health care systems. Center for Global Development Working Paper No. 78. https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/5967_file_WP_78.pdf . Accessed 24 Feb 2020.

Evans T, Whitehead M, Diderichsen F, editors. Challenging inequities in health: from ethics to action. New York: Oxford University Press; 2001.

Vian T. Review of corruption in the health sector: theory, methods and interventions. Health Policy Plan. 2008;23(2):83–94.

Factor R, Kang M. Corruption and population health outcomes: an analysis of data from 133 countries using structural equation modeling. Int J Public Health. 2015;60(6):633–41.

Transparency International (TI). ‘Bangladesh: overview of corruption and anti-corruption with a focus on the health sector’. Berlin: Transparency International; 2015. https://www.u4.no/publications/bangladesh-overview-of-corruption-and-anticorruption-with-a-focus-on-the-health-sector . Accessed 24 Feb 2020.

Mostert S, Sitaresmi MN, Njuguna F, van Beers EJ, Kaspers GJ. Effect of corruption on medical care in low-income countries. Pediatr Blood Cancer. 2012;58(3):325–6.

Hanf M, Van-Melle A, Fraisse F, Roger A, Carme B, Nacher M. Corruption kills: estimating the global impact of corruption on children deaths. PLoS One. 2011;6(11):e26990.

CAS   PubMed   PubMed Central   Google Scholar  

Witvliet MI, Kunst AE, Arah OA, Stronks K. Sick regimes and sick people: a multilevel investigation of the population health consequences of perceived national corruption. Tropical Med Int Health. 2013;18(10):1240–7. https://doi.org/10.1111/tmi.12177 .

Article   Google Scholar  

Hua LT, Noland RB, Evans AW. The direct and indirect effects of corruption on motor vehicle crash deaths. Accid Anal Prev 2010; 42(6): 1934–1942. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aap.2010.05.015 .

Ciccone DK, Vian T, Maurer L, Bradley EH. Linking governance mechanisms to health outcomes: a review of the literature in low-and middle-income countries. Soc Sci Med. 2014;1(117):86–95.

World Bank. Strengthening World Bank group engagement on governance and anticorruption. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en /426381468340863478/pdf/390550replacement.pdf. Accessed 4 July 2019.

Makuta I, O’Hare B. Quality of governance, public spending on health and health status in sub Saharan Africa: a panel data regression analysis. BMC Public Health. 2015;15:932. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-015-2287-z .

Article   PubMed   PubMed Central   Google Scholar  

Kim S, Wang J. Does quality of government matter in public health?: comparing the role of quality and quantity of government at the National Level. Sustainability2019;11(11): 3229 . https://doi.org/10.3390/su11113229 .

Hardoon D, Heinrich F. Global corruption barometer. UK: Transparency International; 2013. https://www.transparency.org/gcb2013 .

Vian T. Corruption in the health sector. U4 anti-corruption training course. Bergen: U4 Anti-corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute; 2011.

Hechanova MR, Melgar I, Falguera PZ, Villaverde M. Organisational culture and workplace corruption in government hospitals. J Pac Rim Psychol. 2014;8(2):62–70.

Transparency International (TI). Fighting corruption in South Asia: Building accountability. Berlin: Transparency International; 2014. https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/fighting_corruption_in_south_asia_building_accountability . Accessed 24 Feb 2020.

Ahmed SM, Evans TG, Standing H, Mahmud S. Harnessing pluralism for better health in Bangladesh. Lancet. 2013;382(9906):1746–55.

National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 2018. The critical health impacts of corruption (Chapter six). pp 203–26. In: Crossing the Global Quality Chasm: Improving Health Care Worldwide. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/25152 .

Liao MC, Lee MH. Corruption costs lives: a cross-country study using an IV approach. Int J Health PlannMgmt. 2016;31:175–90. https://doi.org/10.1002/hpm.2305 .

Hanna R, Bishop S, Nadel S, Scheffler G, Durlacher K. The effectiveness of anti-corruption policy: what has worked, what hasn’t, and what we don’t know–a systematic review. In: Technical report. London: EPPI-Centre, Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London; 2011.

Gilson L. Lipsky’s street level bureaucracy. In: Page E, Lodge M, Balla S, editors. Oxford handbook of the classics of public policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2015.

Mackey TK, Kohler JC, Savedoff WD, Vogl F, Lewis M, Sale J, et al. The disease of corruption: views on how to fight corruption to advance 21st century global health goals. BMC Med. 2016;14(1):149.

PubMed   PubMed Central   Google Scholar  

Pluye P, Hong QN. Combining the power of stories and the power of numbers: mixed methods research and mixed studies reviews. Ann Rev Public Health. 2014;18(35):29–45.

Cherecheş RM, Ungureanu MI, Sandu P, Rus IA. Defining informal payments in health care: a systematic review. Health Policy. 2013;110(2–3):105–14.

Nanjunda. Missing doctors? An investigative study on the absenteeism among medical workers in community health centers (CHCs) in rural South Karnataka, India. JLUMHS 2014;13(01):37–40.

Mannan MA. Access to public health facilities in Bangladesh: a study on facility utilisation and burden of treatment. Bangladesh Dev Studies. 2013;36(4):25–80.

Paredes-Solís S, Andersson N, Ledogar RJ, Cockcroft A. Use of social audits to examine unofficial payments in government health services: experience in South Asia, Africa, and Europe. BMC Health Serv Res. 2011;11(2):S12.

Lewis M. Informal payments and the financing of health care in developing and transition countries. Health Aff. 2007;26(4):984–97.

Stepurko T, Pavlova M, Gryga I, Groot W. Empirical studies on informal patient payments for health care services: a systematic and critical review of research methods and instruments. BMC Health Serv Res. 2010;10(1):273.

Matsushima M, Yamada H. Impacts of bribery in health care in Vietnam. J Dev Studies. 2016;52(10):1479–98.

Nguyen VH. Social interactions and the spread of corruption: evidence from the health sector of Vietnam. Montreal: Department of Economics, Concordia University; 2008. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.495.6497&rep=rep1&type=pdf . Accessed 20 Feb 2020.

Azfar O, Gurgur T. Does corruption affect health outcomes in the Philippines? Econ Govern. 2008;9(3):197–244.

Abdallah W, Chowdhury S, Iqbal K. Corruption in the health sector: evidence from unofficial consultation fees in Bangladesh. 2015. http://ftp.iza.org/dp9270.pdf . Accessed 24 Feb.2020.

Azad A. 2014. Health sector sickened with bribery and corruption (Blog). https://www.dhakatribune.com/uncategorized/2014/11/06/tib-health-sector-sickened-with-bribery-and-corruption . Accessed 24 Feb.2020.

Ramadhan AP, Santoso D. Health workers absenteeism: Indonesia urban public health centres. J Public Health. 2015;23(3):165–73.

Lewis MA. Tackling health care corruption and governance woes in developing countries. Washington DC: Center for Global Development; 2006. https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/7732_file_GovernanceCorruption.pdf Accessed 24 Feb.2020.

McDevitt A, Kelso C, Zaman I. Bangladesh: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption with a focus on the health sector U4, 2015. https://www.u4.no/publications/bangladesh-overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-with-a-focus-on-the-health-sector . Accessed 24 Feb. 2020.

Knox C. Dealing with sectoral corruption in Bangladesh: developing citizen involvement. Public Administration and Development. Int J Manag Res Prac. 2009;29(2):117–32.

Hipgrave DB, Hort K. Dual practice by doctors working in South and East Asia: a review of its origins, scope and impact, and the options for regulation. Health Pol Plan. 2013;29(6):703–16.

Rose J, Lane TM, Rahman T. Bangladesh governance in the health sector: a systematic literature review. 2014. http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/366061468004785129/Bangladesh-governance-in-the-health-sector-a-systematic-literature-review . Accessed 24 Feb. 2020.

Nurunnabi M, Kamrul IS. Accountability in the Bangladeshi privatized health care sector. Int J Health Care Qual Assur. 2012;25(7):625–44.

Ghimire J, Devkota A. Health governance at local level from human resource for health perspectives: the case of Nepal. J Nepal Health Res Counc. 2013;11(24):133–7.

Dieleman M, Shaw DM, Zwanikken P. Improving the implementation of health workforce policies through governance: a review of case studies. Hum Resource Health. 2011;9(1):10.

Kamal S, Iftekharuzzaman KS, Hassan M, Akram S. Governance challenges in the health sector and the way outs. Dhaka: Transparency International Bangladesh; 2014.

Garimella S, Sheikh K. Health worker posting and transfer at primary level in Tamil Nadu: governance of a complex health system function. J Fam Med Primary Care. 2016;5(3):663.

Cleary SM, Molyneux S, Gilson L. Resources, attitudes and culture: an understanding of the factors that influence the functioning of accountability mechanisms in primary health care settings. BMC Health Serv Res. 2013;13(1):320.

Roalkvam S. Health governance in India: citizenship as situated practice. Glob Public Health. 2014;9(8):910–26.

Papp SA, Gogoi A, Campbell C. Improving maternal health through social accountability: a case study from Orissa, India. Glob Public Health. 2013;8(4):449–64.

Lodenstein E, Dieleman M, Gerretsen B, Broerse JE. Health provider responsiveness to social accountability initiatives in low-and middle-income countries: a realist review. Health Pol Plan. 2016;32(1):125–40.

Islam MS, Ullah MW. People’s participation in health services: a study of Bangladesh’s rural health complex. Virginia: Bangladesh Development Research Center (BDRC); 2009. http://www.bangladeshstudies.org/files/WPS_no7.pdf . Accessed 24 Feb 2020.

Regmi K, Naidoo J, Greer A, Pilkington P. Understanding the effect of decentralisation on health services: the Nepalese experience. J Health Organ Manag. 2010;24(4):361–82.

Panda B, Thakur HP. Decentralization and health system performance–a focused review of dimensions, difficulties, and derivatives in India. BMC Health Serv Res. 2016;16(6):561.

Gurung G, Tuladhar S. Fostering good governance at peripheral public health facilities: an experience from Nepal. Rural Remote Health. 2013;13(2):2042. Available from: https://www.rrh.org.au . Accessed 17 July 2019.

Rauniyar G, Lim P, Melo-Cabuang V. Decentralized Health Services Project in Indonesia: Performance Evaluation Report. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/evaluation-document/36097/files/in15-14-0.pdf . Accessed 18 July 2019.

Millington K, Bhardwaj M. Evidence and experience of procurement in health sector decentralisation. 2017. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/59845568e5274a1707000065/108-Evidence-and-experiences-of-other-countries-health-procurement.pdf . Accessed 24 Feb.2020.

Roncarati M. Governance in the health-care sector: Experiences from Asia. NACC J, Special Issue. 2010;3(2). https://www.scribd.com/document/139040540/NACC-Journal-Special-Issue . Accessed 24 Feb.2020.

Huss R, Green A, Sudarshan H, Karpagam SS, Ramani KV, Tomson G, Gerein N. Good governance and corruption in the health sector: lessons from the Karnataka experience. Health Pol Plan. 2010;26(6):471–84.

The Bangladesh Gazette. Right to Information Ordinance, 2008: Ordinance No. 50 of 2008. https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/bd/bd023en.pdf . Accessed 24 Feb. 2020.

The Gazette of India. The right to information act, 2005:No. 22 of 2005. https://rti.gov.in/rti-act.pdf . Accessed 24 Feb. 2020.

Right to Information Act, 2064, 2007. http://www.lawcommission.gov.np/en/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/right-to-information-act-2064-2007.pdf accessed 24 Feb. 2020.

Gazette of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka. Right to information Act, no. 12 of 2016. https://www.media.gov.lk/images/pdf_word/2016/12-2016_E.pdf . Accessed 24 Feb. 2020.

Bangladesh Gazette. Public-interest Information Disclosure Act (Provide Protection) https://mrdibd.org/downloads/Whistleblower_protection_act_2011_English.pdf . Accessed 24 Feb. 2020.

The India Gazette. THE WHISTLE BLOWERS PROTECTION ACT, 2011NO. 17 OF 2014. https://www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Public%20Disclosure/Whistle%20Blowers%20Protection%20Act,%202011.pdf . Accessed 24 Feb. 2020.

The Gazette of India. The lokpal and lokayuktas act, 2013 (NO. 1 OF 2014). https://dopt.gov.in/sites/default/files/407_06_2013-AVD-IV-09012014_0.pdf . Accessed 24 Feb. 2020.

The Gazette of India. The prevention of corruption (amendment) act, 2018: NO. 16 OF 2018. http://www.egazette.nic.in/writereaddata/2018/187644.pdf Accessed 24 Feb. 2020.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. World Drug Report 2004. United Nations Publications; 2004. https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/WDR-2004.html . Accessed 24 Feb. 2020.

Rose-Ackerman S. The challenge of poor governance and corruption. 2004. Available from: https://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/sites/default/files/PP+-+Corruption1+FINISHED.pdf . Accessed 16 July 2019.

Bruckner T. The ignored pandemic: how corruption in health care service delivery threatens Universal Health Coverage. Berlin: Transparency International (TI); 2019. http://ti-health.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/IgnoredPandemic-WEB-v2.pdf . Accessed 24 Feb 2020.

Hutchinson E, Balabanova D, McKee M. We need to talk about corruption in health systems. Int J Health Pol Manag. 2019;8(4):191.

Gaitonde R, Oxman AD, Okebukola PO, Rada G. Interventions to reduce corruption in the health sector. Cochrane Database Syst Rev 2016(8). https://doi.org/10.1002/14651858.cd008856.pub2 .

Maduke T. Corruption in health sectors of low- and middle- income countries: a report on preliminary findings from a survey of health sector leaders and managers in 95 countries: Leadership, Management & Governance (LMG) Project, USAID. WAshington DC: USAID; 2013.

Evans T. Solidarity and security in global heath what can we learn from the Ebola crisis? Keynote speech at PMAC opening plenary. 2015. https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/speech/2015/01/29/solidarity-security-in-global-health-what-can-we-learn-from-ebola-crisis . Accessed 15 July 2019.

Lipsky M. Street-level bureaucracy: dilemmas of the individual in public services. New York: Russel Sage Foundation; 2010.

Hossain N. Rude accountability: informal pressures on frontline bureaucrats in Bangladesh. Dev Change. 2010;41(5):907–28.

Berlan D, Shiffman J. Holding health providers in developing countries accountable to consumers: a synthesis of relevant scholarship. Health Pol Plan. 2011;27(4):271–80.

Gurung G, Derrett S, Gauld R, Hill PC. Why service users do not complain or have ‘voice’: a mixed-methods study from Nepal’s rural primary health care system. BMC Health Servi Res. 2017;17(1):81.

Sudarshan H, Prashanth NS. Good governance in health care: the Karnataka experience. Lancet. 2011;377(9768):790–2.

Afrin S, Barpanda S, Das A. Women in the lead: Monitoring Health service. New Delhi: Naripokkho, Open Society Foundation, Centre for Health & Social Justice (CHSJ); 2013.

Alam W, Karim R, Islam S. ACC’s public hearing as a means of controlling corruption: effectiveness, challenges and way forward. Dhaka: Transparency International Bangladesh; 2017.

Šumah Š (February 21st 2018). Corruption, Causes and Consequences, Trade and Global Market, Vito Bobek, IntechOpen, DOI: https://doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.72953 . Available from: https://www.intechopen.com/books/trade-and-global-market/corruption-causes-and-consequences .

Garcia P. Corruption in global health: the open secret. Lancet. 2019;394:2119–24.

Kelsall T, Hart T, Laws E. Political settlements and pathways to universal health coverage, vol. 432. London: ODI Working Paper; 2016.

Download references

Acknowledgements

Authors acknowledge support from SamiunNazrinBente Kamal Tune, Senior Research Associate, BRAC James P. Grant BRAC School of Public Health, BRAC University for helping with organizing and formatting the references.

The study received funding from the Department of International Development (DfID) (Reference No.RC01).

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

BRAC James P. Grant BRAC School of Public Health, BRAC University, 5th Floor(Level-6), icddrb Building, 68 ShahidTajuddin Ahmed Sarani, Mohakhali, Dhaka, 1212, Bangladesh

Nahitun Naher, Roksana Hoque, Muhammad Shaikh Hassan & Syed Masud Ahmed

Department of Global Health and Development, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), Room TP 308, 15-17 Tavistock Place, London, WC1H 9SH, UK

Dina Balabanova

Department of Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, McGill University, 5858 Cote des Neiges, Room 332, Montréal, Québec, H3S 1Z1, Canada

Alayne M. Adams

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Contributions

SMA and NN conceptualised and designed the study protocol. NN, RH and MSH collected and analysed data. SMA and NN interpreted data and drafted the manuscript. AMA and DB critically reviewed the manuscript and contributed substantially for its improvement. SMA and NN prepared the final version for submission. All authors read and approved the final version for submission.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Nahitun Naher .

Ethics declarations

Ethics approval and consent to participate.

This study was approved by the ethics review committee of the BRAC JPG School of Public Health, BRAC University (Ethics Reference No. 2018–02 dated 14 January 2018).

Consent for publication

Not required.

Competing interests

None declared.

Additional information

Publisher’s note.

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Supplementary information

Additional file 1..

Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic reviews and Meta-Analyses extension for Scoping Reviews (PRISMA-ScR).

Rights and permissions

Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ . The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver ( http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/ ) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated in a credit line to the data.

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article.

Naher, N., Hoque, R., Hassan, M.S. et al. The influence of corruption and governance in the delivery of frontline health care services in the public sector: a scoping review of current and future prospects in low and middle-income countries of south and south-east Asia. BMC Public Health 20 , 880 (2020). https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-020-08975-0

Download citation

Received : 20 October 2019

Accepted : 24 May 2020

Published : 08 June 2020

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-020-08975-0

Share this article

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

  • Health-sector corruption
  • Frontline health care services
  • Frontline health care providers

BMC Public Health

ISSN: 1471-2458

corruption kills good governance essay

  • A-Z of Sri Lankan English
  • Banyan News Reporters
  • Longing and Belonging
  • LLRC Archive
  • End of war | 5 years on
  • 30 Years Ago
  • Mediated | Art
  • Moving Images
  • Remember the Riots
  • Site Guidelines

corruption kills good governance essay

Good Governance and Corruption

Lionel Bopage

on 01/31/2017 01/31/2017

Featured image courtesy Al Jazeera

Good Governance is a key challenge Sri Lanka has faced and spectacularly failed to deliver for most of its modern history. This challenge is not only about individuals, but is systemic, spread across all spheres: socio-economic, political, judicial, cultural, arts and science. Most countries across the world have also suffered the scourge of corruption. Some have succeeded in partially alleviating its pernicious influence; most, like Sri Lanka, have failed.

In December 2014, the presidential candidate Mr Maithripala Sirisena signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) [1] with 49 political parties and civil society organisations. This MOU refers to four immediate tasks and additional measures that are to be initiated in the first hundred days since formation of the new government. The first measure to be initiated was:

immediately prevent, through greater transparency and accountability, the present unprecedented large scale fraud, corruption, bribery and earning of commissions as well as the wastage of public funds; take action according to law to deal with abuses that have been committed.”

At an Anti-Corruption Summit held in London, President Sirisena assured the full commitment of the government of Sri Lanka in taking firm action against corruption. He also added that “corruption was a factor in promoting political and other forms of violence, as evidenced in Sri Lanka during the previous administration”, and that “it was the people, who acted democratically against corruption, by electing new leaders”.

Once in power, President Sirisena appointed a new Director General to the Commission on Bribery and Corruption. In the past, this commission hardly probed any bribe-related cases due to heavy political interference. Even under the new set up, institutional and political obstacles to effective legal action have been substantial. As evidenced by the President’s displeasure when the Commission brought ex-president’s sons, brothers, particularly the former defence secretary and top officials of the previous regime to court on corruption charges. The President declared [2] that he will have to take action, if the Bribery Commission and the two Police divisions investigating corruption were “working according to a political agenda”, and implied that these agencies were favouring the United National Party [3] . Following his allegations, the new Director General of the Commission on Bribery and Corruption tendered her resignation.

Given corruption is an international phenomenon, it requires global solutions. Certain countries have financial institutions with systems designed to accept laundered black money. They are abetted by certain lawyers, accountants and their consulting companies that facilitate such corrupt transactions. It is well-known that firms of wealthy nations offer large bribes to institutions and powerful politicians in many developing countries. Information available on international financial flow indicates that “money is moving from poor to wealthy countries in ways that fundamentally undermine development” [4] .

Corruption and bribery undermines the rule of law, impedes development, and promotes bad governance. Therefore, in any economy the greatest threat to development is endemic corruption. Corruption-free government is believed necessary for the development of a country. Corruption is considered a major challenge to ending extreme poverty by 2030 and achieving the sustainable development goals. According to the World Bank Group, annually about $1 trillion is paid in bribes around the world. The total economic loss is estimated to be many times this. [5] In addition, empirical studies have consistently shown that the poor pay the highest percentage of their income in paying bribes. Every stolen rupee robs the poor of an equal opportunity in life (World Bank, 2016).

Corruption diverts resources towards the corrupt entities and individuals, both in the private and public sectors; and away from the critical services needed such as education, healthcare, drinking water and so on. Notoriously crooked leaders continue to enjoy extravagance at the expense of those living in extreme poverty [6] . Transparency International (TI) indicates that five of the ten most corrupt countries also rank among the ten most violent countries in the world. Even in countries where there is no open conflict, the levels of inequality and poverty are extreme. Countries in Northern Europe are found to be the least corrupt. However, it does not mean they have no links to corruption elsewhere in the globe. Half of all OECD countries are found to violate their international obligations to crack down on corrupt activities of their companies abroad. [7]

For the purpose of our discussion here, the terms ‘bribery’ and ‘corruption’ are used interchangeably.

Corruption and Bribery

Corruption is generally defined as abuse of authority for personal and private gain [8] . Corruption includes both offering and taking bribes, civil servants dishonestly using their authority to influence decisions; fraud, blackmail, election bribery and illegal gambling (OTSI, 2010, 4) [9] . A bribe is “a sum of money, services etc. given or offered to somebody in return for some, often dishonest help”. A framework based on Corporate Strategic Responsibility (CSR) [10] provides an opportunity to not only curb corruption, but also benefit from managing the level of corruption. The degree of reporting on anti-corruption is a strong indicator of the quality and completeness of an entity’s efforts in addressing bribery and corruption.

According to TI, corruption can be classified as grand [11] , petty [12] and political [13] , ‘depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs’. Corruption manifests itself in diverse forms, such as embezzlement through theft of public resources [14] , extortion through threats and intimidations [15] , promoting favouritism [16] , and bribery [17] in the form of kickbacks, gratuities, pay-offs, grease money etc. Bribery is defined as “the act of promising, giving, receiving, or agreeing to receive money or some other item of value with the corrupt aim of influencing a public official in the discharge of his official duties. When money has been offered or promised in exchange for a corrupt act, the official involved need not actually accomplish that act for the offense of bribery to be complete.” [18]

The Anti-Corruption Summit held in London last May was intended to deal with major global corruption issues including secrecy in the movement of money around the financial system, fighting corruption in public contracting, health and sports. [19] Recognising the role of civil society and journalists in anti-corruption work, a commitment was made to see that governments provide them with greater protection. Despite forty countries signing up to general principles and a global declaration, with some countries making specific country commitments, many major economies, like Brazil and China did not make serious commitments.

Corruption in Sri Lanka

TI has rated Sri Lanka very high in its Corruption Perception Index (CPI). [20] Successive Sri Lankan regimes including the current one, have demonstrated their disregard and/or purposeful sabotage of any effective established frameworks to fight corruption. The law enforcement mechanisms in Sri Lanka itself appear corrupt. Successive governments have come to power pledging during the elections to eradicate bribery and corruption; in spite of this, corruption has penetrated the public sector from top to bottom. Despite some media sources exposing corruption scandals at times, authorities have not even bothered to respond to the allegations. In Sri Lanka, for a citizen, resident or a visitor to get anything done, it is credibly alleged that some form of monetary inducement is essential. Nepotism and cronyism prevail in making appointments to government and state-owned institutions. Certain sources have also described the procedure for prosecution on corruption charges is mostly difficult. [21]

Corruption is endemic. Such instances include getting a child admitted to a school, for a person being investigated to be treated leniently, for getting an application processed at a reasonable time, for winning contracts, for taking part in or securing a win in certain sports, for saving life during the times of enforced disappearances, etc., the need to pay a ransom has become the common experience. For six decades, major political parties have been engaged in corrupt practices [22] and bribing voters during election times by distributing food parcels, dry rations and liquor, and more recently applications for jobs, housing and bank loans, cement bags, zinc and asbestos sheets, and sil redhi [23] . These political parties have vastly contributed to making these corrupt practices reach the Olympian heights it has now reached.

In 2014 and 2015 the situation in Sri Lanka was quite similar to the above. In 2012 the CPI for Sri Lanka was 40 out of 100, in 2014 it was 38 [24] , and in 2015 it was 37 [25] . It ranked 91 among 177 in 2013, 85 among 175 in 2014, and 83 among 168 in 2015. Despite the marginal improvement shown during this period [26] , the CPI of Sri Lanka for 2016 has worsened to 95 among 176 countries. [27]

According to recent reports there are some 750,000 court cases pending in the lower courts of the Sri Lankan judiciary. The regime or its judicial bureaucracy do not appear to be interested in taking measures to expedite these cases. Legal redress is also expensive. There are many cases of land disputes running close to half a century and suspects are held with no charges for many years under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. One can say that this is a corrupt system designed to make more money at the expense of the poor. Judicial corruption has also placed the regime in an uncomfortable situation internationally. At the UNHRC, the regime conceded that the people have lost trust and confidence in the justice system [28] . Thus the Sri Lankan regime had to agree to set up a judicial mechanism with international dimension to try serious crimes committed against humanity.

It is safe to say that corruption has become a way of life in Sri Lanka, not only at the level of politicians and bureaucrats, but also at the grassroots level. Therefore, the political will at the highest levels of government to rectify the issues has been almost non-existent. Whenever charges of corruption have been laid, more often than not the cases do not succeed. In this environment, blatant and grand scale corruption and financial crimes carried out with impunity under the previous regime, does not only continue, but has reached new heights [29] under the new dispensation [30] .

Management of Corruption in Sri Lanka

If we cannot eliminate corruption given its deep entrenchment in the last six decades or so; we need to at least try and stop its exponential growth. At an individual level, there are people who at a high personal cost to themselves, do not engage in corruption. If as individuals offering and accepting bribes can be refused, and in work situations authority is not used to dishonestly influence decisions through fraud and blackmail, ultimately one could hold onto a good conscience of being ‘free of corruption’. This is an extremely difficult task given that certain professional organisations and individuals in the capitalist set up, assist those corrupt entities and individuals to hide without trace, their nefarious activities.

Bribery had been made a punishable offence in Sri Lanka under the Penal Code since 1883 [31] . In 1954, the Bribery Act was enacted to contain bribery in Public Service. In 1958, the Act No.40 established the Bribery Commissioner’s Department under the Ministry of Justice, as the main body responsible for investigating corruption allegations brought to its attention and instituting proceedings. In 1994, the Act no.19 created the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) [32] . It commenced its activities in December 1994, but it had no noticeable effect on the level of corruption. However, the CIABOC appears to have failed to conduct a credible and independent investigation into complaints made against it in the Supreme Court. The CIABOC was compelled to do so, when Supreme Court directed it to initiate an inquiry into one such complaint as expeditiously as possible [33] .

Sri Lanka has ratified the UN Anti-Corruption Convention. It also signed the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, but did not ratify it. Sri Lanka is also a signatory to the OECD-ADB Anti-Corruption Regional Plan. In February 2015, the government established the Financial Investigation Division (FCID) for investigating major financial crimes, frauds, unsolicited mega projects, major financial crimes against public property, money laundering, terrorist financing, illegal financial transactions, unlawful enrichments and offences on financial crimes against national security.

Despite, being generally considered to have adequate laws and regulations to combat corruption, the Country Report of the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor [34] indicated that corruption exists in the executive and legislative branches of the government. When previous regimes used anti-terrorism legislation to gag debates on corruption, the governance system degenerated. Even those who were usually critical of such issues became extremely silent on the issue. Concerns were raised at the time about promoting police officers accused of bribery, corruption and fraud. Yet, when all police promotions were later revealed to had been carried out on the President’s advice everybody went silent. Overseas firms identified corruption as a constraint on foreign investment, though it was not considered a major threat to operating in the country, at least once a contract was won.

Social Bribes and Growth of Corruption

Effective anti-corruption measures such as Right To Information, whistle blower protection and witness protection are needed to be in place to control corruption. Recently enacted Right to Information Act remain to be tested in practice to ascertain whether it would ensure access to information to all stakeholders in a timely manner and in sufficient detail. Elimination of corruption in the public sector requires CIABOC to have adequate human and infrastructure resources, be more independent and empowered.

The causes and effects of corruption and the strategies to prevent it have been in the agenda of government policy makers for a very long time (Hoi and Lin, 2012) [35] . Historically governments have been more powerful than business corporations, and could regulate the limits to the exploitation by corporations. However, it is a changed world now, where globalisation and corporatisation are predominant. Currently the neo-liberal urge for lower production costs to maximise profits drives the globalisation trend. So lower costs of labour, raw materials, logistics have become the prime driver. Consumerism heightened by artificially created demand underpins this neo-liberal trend. This process has swallowed up entire societies including most politicians. Those who could inject capital investments have become to govern all aspects of politics. Bribery and corruption have become one of the central tools in manipulating governments, its systems and politicians.

To elicit investment, national governments have to offer inducements to large transnational corporations such as guaranteed rates of return, viability gap financing [36] , tax exemptions, free land for projects, publicly developed infrastructure and opportunities for capital gains and immunity from labour laws in Free Trade Zones (FTZ), or Special Economic Zones (SEZ). Abolition of long-term capital gains tax exempts them from paying taxes on gains they make from stock-market speculation. These demands from large transnational corporations are becoming increasingly aggressive, for instance, the demands for zero taxation in FTZs and SEZs and exemptions from paying corporate income tax for manufacturing as a whole.

Simultaneously, offering tax concessions and other perks make national governments lose their revenue. Thus, funds available for spending on public education, public health, healthcare including sanitation and rural infrastructure become less. The marginalised are increasingly compelled to seek private sources to fulfil their educational and healthcare needs. So, people start paying high prices for such services. National governments are compelled to turn to financial agencies, who are in turn funded by large transnational corporations. Those agencies start offering assistance packages conditional to carrying out structural reforms. Hence, national governments impose measures to further reduce welfare provisions and introduce a user pays system, which penalises the poor.

At the same time, business corporations and local regimes have become experts not only at manufacturing consent, but also in manipulating dissent. So, corrupt cronies donate generously to programs led by major political parties, and in turn the campaigns of such political parties receive huge ICT backing. Thus, civil society needs to become aware of this fact, and then they will be able to pre-empt efforts to derail the anti-corruption movement from within.

From the above discussion, it is clear that corruption is not simply a moral question – it is also political. It requires concerted attention of governments and business firms, particularly in the developed world. Successful anti-corruption efforts need to be led by the joint efforts of both private and public sectors and the public – including politicians, senior public officials, citizens, communities, and civil society organisations. For this to succeed, capable, transparent, and accountable institutions need to be developed at the national, regional and global level to build, design and implement anticorruption programs.

Corruption thrives because those who are corrupt intimidate or deceive the general public by manipulating information. Both business corporations and governments extensively spin or frame information to manage perceptions. On many occasions, they have managed to convince the public not to question their bribery, corruption and unethical practices. Hence, educating ourselves to be vigilant is essential. When police officers ask for bribes to perform routine services, when tender boards unfairly and unethically determine the winners of government contracts, when public officials make awards favouring their friends or relatives, or when employees are simply paid for signing in a register and being idle, they must be exposed. It is an essential task for civic society.

This also requires a paradigm change in the orientation and mechanisms used for both growth and governance. This struggle needs to be directed not only against mega financial swindles like the Central Bank scam and other macro issues, but also against micro-level corruption that is all-pervasive in everyday life. This is an uphill task given the insidious way corruption has infected every layer of society and institutions both in the public and private sectors in Sri Lanka.

The working people of Sri Lanka and civil society organisations need to undertake this responsibility. Given the circumstances, only they can gather the courage, commitment, strength and momentum to fight the aggressive policies of large business corporations. Working people have to counter corruption starting at micro level against specific corrupt and fraudulent practices at their own work places. Fighting corrupt onslaughts of capital needs to establish participative democracy at work places. Yet, this could happen only with a major qualitative social transformation. If processes are transparent and open, corrupt practices become exposed, which makes it easier to manage, control and finally eliminate it. Hence the broad people’s movement must become the backbone against corruption. The working people need to become the most organised contingent to fight against the onslaught of corruption.

So, it becomes our responsibility to demand the confiscating of properties that politicians and bureaucrats have corruptly acquired, and banning corporate lobbying. The working people need to demand the establishment of effective anti-corruption legislation and a credible institutional mechanism to prosecute and punish the guilty. The people also need to demand maintaining an open register of the entities that utilise black money in their business transactions, using initiatives such as Double Taxation Avoidance Agreements with other states. The black money already stashed in foreign tax havens need to be returned for public investment. The black money hidden locally should be found and confiscated, and those involved in such scams including those in the bureaucracy and professional entities need to be brought to justice.

To quote “Unmask the Corrupt [37] ”:

Grand corruption is the abuse of high-level power that benefits the few at the expense of the many, and causes serious and widespread harm to individuals and society. It often goes unpunished. It concerns millions of victims around the world. It’s time the corrupt face the consequences for their crimes. Together we can make that happen!

Those who enjoyed this article may find “ Dilrukshi Dias Wickramasinghe’s resignation: The fallout ” and “ Are we progressing towards good governance? ” enlightening reads. 

[1] A Common People’s Agenda For Just, Democratic And People-Friendly Governance: http://srilankabrief.org/2014/12/mou-common-peoples-agenda-just-democratic-people-friendly-governance/

[2] In addition, when the Criminal Investigation Department of the Police probed the allegations against military intelligence, several military intelligence officers were remanded regarding certain cases of disappearances and killings (including the 2010 abduction of journalist Prageeth Eknaligoda and the suspicious 2012 death of rugby player Wasim Thajudeen) that occurred during and after the final stages of the war. The Rajapaksa’s were critical of the regime for these arrests. The current President also weighed in and most of the suspects, Rajapaksas and army intelligence officials who had been in remand custody, were released from custody.

[3] http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-sri-lanka-corruption-probe-idUKKBN12H2GA

[4] http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

[5] http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-corruption

[6] For example, 70 percent of the Angolan population lives on USD 2 a day or less. One in six children dies before the age of five. More than 150,000 children die each year. However, Forbes consider that Angola’s President’s daughter, Isabel dos Santos is the richest woman not only in Angola, but also the whole of Africa.

[7] For example, Sweden is the third in the index; however, the Swedish-Finnish firm TeliaSonera is alleged to have paid millions of dollars in bribes to secure business in Uzbekistan, which comes in at 153rd in the index. At the same time, half of all OECD countries are found to violate their international obligations to crack down on bribery by their companies abroad.

[8] Transparency International, 2015. Archive Link. Retrieved from: http://archive.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq

[9] OTSI, 2010. Fraud and Corruption Prevention Strategy. The Office of Transport Safety . Retrieved from: www.otsi.nsw.gov.au/access-to-info/OTSI-FraudStrategy.pdf

[10] https://www.researchgate.net/publication/309686425_Corruption_Corporate_Social_Responsibility_and_Financial_Constraints_International_Firm-level_Evidence_Corruption_CSR_and_financial_constraints

[11] Acts ‘ committed at a high level of government that distort policies or the central functioning of the state, enabling leaders to benefit at the expense of the public good ’.

[12] ‘ Everyday abuse of entrusted power by low- and mid-level public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens, who often are trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies .’

[13] Manipulation of ‘ policies, institutions and rules of procedure in the allocation of resources and financing by political decision makers, who abuse their position to sustain their power, status and wealth ’.

[14] Such as state officials stealing from the public institutions where they are employed, or regime leaders stealing from the treasury. In Indonesia, when Suharto was in power, he allegedly embezzled up to $US35 billion from the country (Hodess, Robin, Tania Inowlocki, Diana Rodriguez, and Toby Wolfe, eds. 2004. Global corruption report . London: Pluto Press).

[15] When the rule of law is weak, this may be carried out by mafia groups blackmailing state officials, or certain state officials threatening to take sort of punitive action.

[16] Disposition to favour and promote the interest of one person or persons to the disregard of others having equal claims. Privatisation, exploitation of natural resources, regulations provide ample opportunities to play favourites and extract personal gains. Nepotism is another form of favouritism, for example, hiring and promotion of individuals based on family or other personal relations rather than merit. In the public sector, this may take the form of authority to hire or promote someone, thus the person abusing authority benefitting from it, although not necessarily in monetary terms (Admundsen, Inge. 2000. Corruption: Definitions and concepts . Chr. Michelsen Institute Working Paper ).

[17] Individuals or organisations offering bribes to authorities who can make contracts on behalf of the state or make decisions on using public funds to influence their decisions regarding particular issues.

[18] https://anticorruptionsociety.com/about/

[19]   http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/anti_corruption_summit_now_the_hard_work_begins

[20] The perceived level of public sector corruption on a scale of 0 to 100, where 0 represents highly corrupt and 100 very clean. See http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/cpi_2015

[21] On September 20, the government indicted former Deputy Defence Minister on charges of bribery. Allegations have been levelled against the current Secretary to the Ministry of Defence. At the time, there was no law that provides for public access and retrieval of relevant government information. However, in June 2016, the Parliament enacted the Right to Information (RTI) bill.

[22] http://www.dailymirror.lk/article/Good-Governance-Deliver-what-you-promised-120098.html#sthash.9GzufXkV.dpuf

[23] Fabrics Buddhists wear for their religious observations.

[24] https://www.transparency.org/cpi2014/results

[25] https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015/

[26] http://www.tisrilanka.org/corruption-perceptions-index-2015/

[27] http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016

[28] Promoting reconciliation, accountability and human rights in Sri Lanka (A/HRC/RES/30/1) at: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/alldocs.aspx?doc_id=25680

[29] For example, the Central Bank Bond scam, where the very institution supposed to safeguard Sri Lanka’s finances appears to have been allowed to be robbed.

[30] http://www.sundaytimes.lk/161204/news/arjun-aloysius-the-james-bond-of-bond-business-218996.html

[31] http://www.ciaboc.gov.lk/web/

[32] The intent of the Act was “ to provide for the establishment of a permanent commission to investigate allegations of bribery or corruption and to direct the institution of prosecutions for offences under the Bribery Act and the Declaration of Assets and Liabilities Law No.1 of 1975… “.

[33] https://www.colombotelegraph.com/index.php/judicial-corruption-criminal-law-sets-into-motion/

[34] https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2014/227229.htm

[35] Hoi, Y.H., Lin, C.Y., 2012. Preventing corporate corruption: the role of corporate social responsibility strategy . International Journal of Business. Behavioural Science. 2, 12 – 22.

[36] the amount of grants made available to them by governments under the “public-private partnership” arrangements.

[37] https://unmaskthecorrupt.org/#section-contest

Related Articles

Official websites use .gov

Secure .gov websites use HTTPS

corruption kills good governance essay

Combating Corruption and Promoting Good Governance

Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

Corruption is one of the most pervasive types of crime: it fuels transnational crime, wastes public resources, destabilizes countries, and impedes good governance. Authoritarian countries and those veering towards authoritarianism increasingly weaponize corruption to perpetuate power at home and undermine democracy around the world.

While no country is immune to this threat and the United States approaches this challenge with humility, engaging other countries to promote integrity and accountability is a priority for INL, key to its mission to protect U.S. interests and safeguard U.S. citizens from crime and instability. To promote reform, INL is committed to advancing a holistic approach that establishes anti-corruption regimes which balance prevention and enforcement and empower internal (e.g., inspectors general) and external (e.g., legislative, journalistic, citizen) oversight. To sustain this effort, INL engages in high-level diplomacy, develops and funds projects to build partner capacity, and reinforces the important role played by civil society, the media, and the business community. INL has an important role in leading U.S. participation in major multilateral anti-corruption bodies to advance U.S. priorities and in mobilizing international political will (and resources) to address the most pressing corruption issues.

INL’s specific priorities to combat anti-corruption are:

Strengthen Regimes to Prevent Corruption and Bring Corrupt Actors to Justice

An anti-corruption regime refers to the legal frameworks, institutions, and capacities that countries enact and sustain to prevent, detect, and prosecute corruption. Legal reforms are insufficient without capacity to implement or enforce them, such as the ability to effectively investigate, prosecute, and adjudicate crimes. As corruption is increasingly transnational in nature, the ability of officials of individual countries to prevent and pursue corruption must be complemented by regional and global efforts and measures to support effective international cooperation and partnerships.

Enhance International Cooperation and Partnerships

INL’s efforts to strengthen country systems are enhanced by strengthening the abilities of countries to cooperate internationally and building up frameworks that facilitate such cooperation. This includes capacity building efforts related to strengthening international legal cooperation, complex case investigation, asset recovery, and multi-country networks of practitioners. These relationships and networks often benefit U.S. law enforcement in their pursuit of schemes with a nexus to the United States.

International treaties establish clear roadmaps for reform measures and benchmarks against which to hold countries to account. The United States helped negotiate the United Nations Convention against Corruption   (UNCAC) and is working around the world to assist governments fulfill their obligations under this comprehensive set of standards. UNCAC covers all aspects of combating corruption, and with over 189 States parties, it is nearly universal. Through UNCAC, as well as separate anticorruption treaties enforced through the Organization of American States (OAS) and Council of Europe’s Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO), the United States has led the effort to promote reforms in areas such as bribery, conflicts of interest, procurement, and independence of judges.

As one of the Department’s primary leads on multilateral anti-corruption policy, INL also coordinates U.S. participation in and engagement with a variety of high-profile multilateral bodies and initiatives, including within the auspices of the UNCAC, OAS, APEC, G7, and the G20, as well as the anti-corruption pillars of President Biden’s signature Summit for Democracy Initiative and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). Through this engagement, INL helps develop and promote strong international standards and encourage implementation of policies and practices necessary to effectively counter corruption around the world.

Denying Safe Haven

Denying corrupt individuals access to the United States and global financial systems sends a strong message about our values, and it demonstrates in meaningful ways that there are consequences for those who engage in corruption. INL manages visa restriction authorities that allow for publicly and privately designating corrupt officials and private citizens engaged in official corruption as ineligible for entry into the United States. INL also works with the U.S. Department of Justice and international organizations to help countries pursue the proceeds of corruption located abroad. For example, INL support has allowed INTERPOL to convene a global network of asset recovery practitioners and to train investigators and prosecutors from countries across Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia to track and recover stolen public assets. Both economic sanctions and visa restrictions have exposed corruption and blocked corrupt officials at all levels of government from visiting and spending their ill-gotten gains in the United States.

Recognize Reform

In addition to INL’s foreign assistance and diplomatic engagement to strengthen anticorruption efforts and promote action, some INL efforts to combat corruption focus on individual conduct. INL approaches balance the imposition of consequences with incentives for reform, recognizing that positive messaging can be equally consequential when it inspires action or extends protection. In addition to supporting individual leaders through the Bureau’s foreign assistance programs, INL coordinates the Secretary’s recognition of brave and impactful advocates and reformers through the Department’s global Anti-Corruption Champions Award .

Leverage Coordination and Learning to Combat Corruption

As a learning organization, INL is continually investing in means to improve the effectiveness of foreign assistance and policy approaches. INL supports the distillation of research to enhance its understanding of what is and is not effective in countering corruption, as well as undertakes or underwrites new research to address current evidence gaps. INL works closely with others in the U.S. government as well as the private sector and civil society organizations as they advance important elements of good governance and integrity, such as the Open Government Partnership Initiative , the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials , the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative .

U.S. Department of State

The lessons of 1989: freedom and our future.

We use cookies to enhance our website for you. Proceed if you agree to this policy or learn more about it.

  • Essay Database >
  • Essay Examples >
  • Essays Topics >
  • Essay on Government

Good Example Of Essay On ‘good Governance’ And Eradication Of Corruption

Type of paper: Essay

Topic: Government , Governance , Economics , Corruption , Social Issues , Development , Crime , Growth

Words: 1100

Published: 01/02/2021

ORDER PAPER LIKE THIS

‘Good Governance’ and Eradication of Corruption

Introduction Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan mentioned about the indivisibility of good governance and sustainable development (cited in BMZ, n.d.). I think this means that good governance together with eradication of corruption is closely tied with economic performance. It is hard to object that economic advancement can hardly exist if the country suffers from bureaucracy and bribery. Moreover, if there is no legislative base and policies adopted by the government are not sufficient to support economic processes in the country, this country is deemed to experience poor economic growth. Scholars argue whether achieving good governance and eradication of any kind of corruption lead to achieving economic advancement and whether the latter can be possible with bribes and no proper laws. My point is that economic development, good governance and eradication of corruption are so interrelated that one of them makes possible the others. Thus I agree that absence of corruption and good governance are preconditions for continuing economic advancement.

Transparency

The latest reports proved that good governance can add to local economic growth. According to Crowe (2014), clarity has the most important and pronounced effect on growth together with strong governance. I believe that transparency is exactly that aspect that relates both governance and corruption which undermines opportunity for effective dialogue between the government and the public (Patton, 2014). Instead, people must be entitled to know about the processes of governance as well as have equal rights and access to participate in economic activity. I think that transparency includes risk mitigation, choice facilitation, control over expenditures, and promotion of democracy. Moreover, good governance in terms of transparency shall include publication of data, participation in decision-making and collaboration between different branches of power. Clarity around central government funding is a pillar of good governance as well. Obviously, economic development plans should be made “more accessible and transparent” (Crowe, 2014). Otherwise, if there is no dialogue between those who make policies and those who make real economy, there is no opportunity for growth and development.

Good Governance and Developing Countries

Khan (2007, p. 2) pointed at the fact that the divergence in performance across developing countries can be explained by such critical factor as governance. Now we found that those countries which could not boast about having good governance, but demonstrated unprecedented success in economic development, now encounter some hardship related to governance and the ability to reach concensus (Derviş, 2014). That is why dictatorships or authoritative regimes cannot provide the country with sustainable economic development that lasts long. Despite the fact that China is used as a counterexample to the relation between good governance and economic performance, now it raises the question of importance of multi-party governance for economic growth. I would mention corruption is another enemy that precludes development and growth in countries with huge potential but poor governance. Kim, the World Bank Group President, called corruption as number one public enemy for the developing countries (cited in Cameron, 2013). Thus both good governance and eradication of corruption are necessary for achieving continuing economic advancement.

Global Governance

There were created some institutions that are devoted to ensure and facilitate economic development. One of such institutions is the IMF which concentrates its attention on those aspects of good governance that are related to financial and macroeconomic surveillance (Camdessus, 1997). I think that this is the evidence that effective multilateral governance is not only a precondition for economic advancement, but its necessary component. I consider it ti be integral part of the normal course of development of all countries around the globe and must be ensured by the world community. The IMF itself defines good governance as a key to economic success while corruption is believed to undermine “the public’s trust in its government” (IMF, 2015). It is considered to represent a real threat to market integrity, economic development and competition. The World Bank Group is another group of institutions whose purpose is to ensure financial assistance for those countries that need it under condition of structural reforms implementation. It is worth mentioning that it also constitutes an organization that seeks for global development and growth. The World Bank also serves as global database with all main economic and political indicators. Its official webpage contains all reports and indices that are important for proper economic analysis. Santiso (2001, p.4) notes, that if the Bank wants to improve good governance, it will need to influence power, politics and democracy in member States.

Economic advancement in any country indeed depends on good governance and eradication of corruption. However, they both are rather preconditions for its continuity than the possibility of achievement. Many countries around the globe proved that in order to achieve economic growth the governance may not be good enough and corruption may exist. Meanwhile, according to Shapiro (2013), in order to achieve economic advancement and to make this advancement sustainable and sound the governance should be improved and corruption eradicated.

Bibliography

Camdessus M (1997) Good Governance: the IMF’s Role. International Monetary Fund. Available at: <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/govern/govindex.htm> Cameron G (2013) World Bank President Calls Corruption “Public Enemy No. 1” Reuters. Available at: <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/19/us-worldbank-corruption-idUSBRE9BI11P20131219> Crowe J (2014) Good Governance Is the Key to Local Economic Growth. Guardian. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/public-leaders-network/2014/jun/10/good-governance-local-economic-growth> Derviş K (2014) Good Governance and Economic Performance. Brookings. Available at: <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2014/03/13-good-governance-dervis> Good Governance (n.d.) BMZ. Available at: <http://www.bmz.de/en/what_we_do/issues/goodgovernance/index.html?PHPSESSID=72295ef6ef921c4b493da5bc1d7ca038> Khan M (2007) Governance, Economic Growth and Development since the 1960s. DESA Working Paper, 54. Available at: <http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2007/wp54_2007.pdf> Patton M (2014) Investors Beware: the 21 Most Corrupt Nations. Forbes. Available at: <http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikepatton/2014/01/22/investors-beware-the-21-most-corrupt-nations/> Santiso C (2001) Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality. The Georgetown Public Policy Review, 7 (1): 1-22. Available at: <http://www.sti.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/Pdfs/swap/swap108.pdf> Shapiro G (2013) Six Ways to Create Economic Growth. Forbes. Available at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/garyshapiro/2013/01/23/six-ways-to-create-economic-growth/> The IMF and Good Governance (2015) International Monetary Fund. Available at <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gov.htm>

double-banner

Cite this page

Share with friends using:

Removal Request

Removal Request

Finished papers: 289

This paper is created by writer with

ID 264602824

If you want your paper to be:

Well-researched, fact-checked, and accurate

Original, fresh, based on current data

Eloquently written and immaculately formatted

275 words = 1 page double-spaced

submit your paper

Get your papers done by pros!

Other Pages

Dialogue book reviews, george washington book reviews, curiosity book reviews, ambition book reviews, corn book reviews, tradition book reviews, legend book reviews, north korea book reviews, discussion case studies, reveal literature reviews, resistance literature reviews, client literature reviews, involvement literature reviews, treat literature reviews, efficacy literature reviews, split literature reviews, exchange literature reviews, cycle literature reviews, reverse literature reviews, counsellor essays, circle essays, trailer essays, counterterrorism essays, progression essays, sake essays, zeal essays, strawberry essays, flavor essays, surround essays, william walton essays, sir christopher wren essays, semester argumentative essay example, employee essay example, reflective learning essay, figure2 uv absorbance peak area vs benzoic acid concentration mmol l report examples, example of book review on the upside down kingdom, essay on shy people vs outgoing people, free essay on the climate in america prior to pearl harbour, example of essay on effects of british weather over peoples daily life, the role of vaccines in prevention of influenza pandemics essay sample, peer review article review examples, example of research paper on financial statements.

Password recovery email has been sent to [email protected]

Use your new password to log in

You are not register!

By clicking Register, you agree to our Terms of Service and that you have read our Privacy Policy .

Now you can download documents directly to your device!

Check your email! An email with your password has already been sent to you! Now you can download documents directly to your device.

or Use the QR code to Save this Paper to Your Phone

The sample is NOT original!

Short on a deadline?

Don't waste time. Get help with 11% off using code - GETWOWED

No, thanks! I'm fine with missing my deadline

Why fighting corruption is key to addressing the world's most pressing problems

Amid food price inflation, corruption is expected to make food insecurity worse

Amid food price inflation, corruption is expected to make food insecurity worse Image:  Katie Godowski for Pexels

.chakra .wef-1c7l3mo{-webkit-transition:all 0.15s ease-out;transition:all 0.15s ease-out;cursor:pointer;-webkit-text-decoration:none;text-decoration:none;outline:none;color:inherit;}.chakra .wef-1c7l3mo:hover,.chakra .wef-1c7l3mo[data-hover]{-webkit-text-decoration:underline;text-decoration:underline;}.chakra .wef-1c7l3mo:focus,.chakra .wef-1c7l3mo[data-focus]{box-shadow:0 0 0 3px rgba(168,203,251,0.5);} Marlen Heide

Houssam al wazzan.

corruption kills good governance essay

.chakra .wef-9dduvl{margin-top:16px;margin-bottom:16px;line-height:1.388;font-size:1.25rem;}@media screen and (min-width:56.5rem){.chakra .wef-9dduvl{font-size:1.125rem;}} Explore and monitor how .chakra .wef-15eoq1r{margin-top:16px;margin-bottom:16px;line-height:1.388;font-size:1.25rem;color:#F7DB5E;}@media screen and (min-width:56.5rem){.chakra .wef-15eoq1r{font-size:1.125rem;}} Corruption is affecting economies, industries and global issues

A hand holding a looking glass by a lake

.chakra .wef-1nk5u5d{margin-top:16px;margin-bottom:16px;line-height:1.388;color:#2846F8;font-size:1.25rem;}@media screen and (min-width:56.5rem){.chakra .wef-1nk5u5d{font-size:1.125rem;}} Get involved with our crowdsourced digital platform to deliver impact at scale

Stay up to date:.

Listen to the article

  • Corruption is at the centre of many of the world's most pressing problems.
  • Current crises are likely to make corruption worse.
  • This year's Anti-Corruption Day should highlight how anti-corruption efforts can make crisis management more effective.

This Friday, International Anti-Corruption Day is a time to recognise that corruption is at the centre of many of the world’s most pressing problems. Economic, political, social, and environmental challenges can only be solved with good governance. The World Economic Forum’s Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI) serves as the leading business voice on anti-corruption and transparency. This year’s PACI Community Meeting is organized in conjunction with the International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC) and will focus on the role of anti-corruption in mitigating current crises.

“Tackling today’s global challenges requires concerted and systemic action involving all stakeholders. It is vital that our response is built on components of good governance – such as accountability, integrity and effective risk management. This will facilitate responsible decision-making thus enabling long-term business success and positive impact on people and planet.” Nicola Port, Chief Legal Officer, World Economic Forum

Have you read?

Here's the impact of employee-owned companies on worker wealth, can the data revolution drive good governance, 6 ways russia's invasion of ukraine has reshaped the energy world, corruption and the food crisis.

The world is expected to soon face the largest food crisis in modern history . Food price inflation remains high in almost all countries and the number of those facing acute food insecurity has soared . Corruption will make food insecurity worse . For instance, corruption in land and water services affect small-scale farmers in developing countries , which constitute the majority of agricultural providers. On the consumption side, households in low-income countries with high levels of corruption might need to reduce their food consumption to accommodate the costs of bribery .

Corruption might even affect programs that set out to remedy the effects of the current food crisis. The efforts of national and international bodies to combat famine and hunger could be undermined by corruption.

Corruption and the energy crisis

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, countries are reassessing their reliance on Russian oil and gas, and considering a speedier adoption of greener energies. This looks like good news for the global anti-corruption agenda, given that countries with large extractive industries are plagued by grand corruption and bribery (commonly known as the “resource curse”).

However, the transition to renewables also carries a myriad of corruption risks, due to the substantial capital investments involved. The future, decarbonized global energy sector is expected to need cumulative investments of at least $110 trillion between now and 2050, representing an average of 2% of global GDP per annum .

“Navigating towards a NET-ZERO society will require a permanent commitment to Integrity and Transparency. Organizations will be scrutinized to demonstrate their positive impact, their contribution to the society and to actively promoting an ethical and competitive business environment under increasingly challenging scenarios.” Salvador Dahan, Chief Governance & Compliance Officer, Petrobras

To manage corruption during the energy transition we need to assess the risks in different renewable energy technologies. Corruption might move across the non-renewable and renewable sectors, driven by the growing demand for critical minerals . Certainly, the renewable energy sector should draw on the lessons learned from mitigating corruption in extractive industries.

Corruption accelerates social vulnerabilities

Corruption is linked to inequality, poverty, discrimination, and social exclusion. There is strong evidence of a negative correlation between corruption and the level of GDP per capita. Waste or diversion of public funds due to corruption leaves governments with fewer resources to fulfil their human rights obligations, to deliver services and to improve the standard of living of their citizens . Consequently, corruption negatively impacts human development and increases social vulnerabilities.

The transition to renewable energy carries a myriad of corruption risks

Take the provision of basic services as an example: an estimated US$500 billion in public health spending is lost globally to corruption every year, undermining health services . Studies suggest that 50% of school children do not complete primary school in countries where bribery is common. Fighting corruption is thus considered a foundation for delivering the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda.

Geopolitical instability

Corruption is closely intertwined with geopolitical instability. Countries experiencing violent conflict show significantly higher rates of corruption, and corruption also makes countries more vulnerable to malign foreign influence. As the National Endowment for Democracy explains : “corrosive capital and strategic corruption differ from other forms of corruption in that they are backed, and sometimes orchestrated, by a state power for political rather than economic goals.”

“We live in a rapidly changing world with fluid and unpredictable geo-political risks. It is in times of crisis, when you don’t often have the luxury of time, that the true essence of an organization is revealed. Having an ethical culture and a proper risk management system in place is essential to operating with integrity and building trust with society. This is the purpose of the Ethics, Risk and Compliance function at Novartis - to support our associates to do the right thing. Doing what’s right for patients and society is, and must always be, our priority. It’s a journey, and we remain humble in our understanding that this will take time. But we are well on our way to building trust.” Klaus Moosmayer, Chief Ethics, Risk & Compliance Officer, Novartis

Anti-corruption measures are essential to reconstruct and stabilize countries in the aftermath of conflict; this is a hard lesson learned from Bosnia and Afghanistan , among others. They will be important for Ukraine in recovering from the current war.

The financial services industry is facing several future risks, including vulnerabilities to cyberattacks due to artificial intelligence and new financial products creating debt.

The World Economic Forum’s Centre for Financial and Monetary Systems works with the public and private sectors to design a more sustainable, resilient, trusted and accessible financial system worldwide.

Learn more about our impact:

  • Net zero future: Our Financing the Transition to a Net Zero Future initiative is accelerating capital mobilization in support of breakthrough decarbonization technologies to help transition the global economy to net zero emissions.
  • Green Building Principles: Our action plan for net zero carbon buildings offers a roadmap to help companies deliver net zero carbon buildings and meet key climate commitments.
  • Financing biodiversity: We are convening leading financial institutions to advance the understanding of risks related to biodiversity loss and the opportunities to adopt mitigation strategies through our Biodiversity Finance initiative.

Want to know more about our centre’s impact or get involved? Contact us .

The way forward

The International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC) , taking place from 6 to 10 December in Washington DC, offers the most important multi-stakeholder dialogue on corruption issues. At this year’s International Anti-Corruption Conference, the Forum’s Partnering Against Corruption Initiative is hosting several workshops to shape innovative solutions and pave the way forward for the fight against corruption. We will place more emphasis on the role of good governance – including anti-corruption – which is needed to achieve positive environmental and social change.

A second workshop, organized in cooperation with the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC), will shed light on the role of gatekeepers in mitigating illicit financial flows – a key topic in face of the current crisis in Ukraine . Finally, PACI will address how frontier technologies can help to bolster anti-corruption efforts, making detection, prevention, and investigations more efficient and effective.

Don't miss any update on this topic

Create a free account and access your personalized content collection with our latest publications and analyses.

License and Republishing

World Economic Forum articles may be republished in accordance with the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Public License, and in accordance with our Terms of Use.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and not the World Economic Forum.

Related topics:

The agenda .chakra .wef-n7bacu{margin-top:16px;margin-bottom:16px;line-height:1.388;font-weight:400;} weekly.

A weekly update of the most important issues driving the global agenda

.chakra .wef-1dtnjt5{display:-webkit-box;display:-webkit-flex;display:-ms-flexbox;display:flex;-webkit-align-items:center;-webkit-box-align:center;-ms-flex-align:center;align-items:center;-webkit-flex-wrap:wrap;-ms-flex-wrap:wrap;flex-wrap:wrap;} More on Corruption .chakra .wef-nr1rr4{display:-webkit-inline-box;display:-webkit-inline-flex;display:-ms-inline-flexbox;display:inline-flex;white-space:normal;vertical-align:middle;text-transform:uppercase;font-size:0.75rem;border-radius:0.25rem;font-weight:700;-webkit-align-items:center;-webkit-box-align:center;-ms-flex-align:center;align-items:center;line-height:1.2;-webkit-letter-spacing:1.25px;-moz-letter-spacing:1.25px;-ms-letter-spacing:1.25px;letter-spacing:1.25px;background:none;padding:0px;color:#B3B3B3;-webkit-box-decoration-break:clone;box-decoration-break:clone;-webkit-box-decoration-break:clone;}@media screen and (min-width:37.5rem){.chakra .wef-nr1rr4{font-size:0.875rem;}}@media screen and (min-width:56.5rem){.chakra .wef-nr1rr4{font-size:1rem;}} See all

corruption kills good governance essay

5 ways leaders can tackle corruption, according to an anti-corruption expert

Linda Lacina and David Elliott

December 13, 2023

corruption kills good governance essay

What is International Anti-Corruption Day – and why is it important?

Charlotte Edmond

December 4, 2023

corruption kills good governance essay

Does the potential for corruption in the mining sector threaten a just energy transition?

Helen Clark

April 20, 2023

corruption kills good governance essay

Why frontier technologies will drive the fight against corruption

Daniel Malan and Marlen Heide

March 9, 2023

corruption kills good governance essay

How to fight corruption most effectively by carefully studying the context

Maral Muratbekova-Touron, Camilla Lee Park and Mauro Fracarolli Nunes

November 25, 2022

corruption kills good governance essay

3 anti-corruption takeaways from the war in Ukraine

Delia Ferreira Rubio, Rachel Davidson Raycraft and Nicola Bonucci

June 16, 2022

  • Current Issue
  • Past Issues
  • Get New Issue Alerts
  • American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences

Seven Steps to Control of Corruption: The Road Map

corruption kills good governance essay

After a comprehensive test of today’s anticorruption toolkit, it seems that the few tools that do work are effective only in contexts where domestic agency exists. Therefore, the time has come to draft a comprehensive road map to inform evidence-based anticorruption efforts. This essay recommends that international donors join domestic civil societies in pursuing a common long-term strategy and action plan to build national public integrity and ethical universalism. In other words, this essay proposes that coordination among donors should be added as a specific precondition for improving governance in the WHO’s Millennium Development Goals. This essay offers a basic tool for diagnosing the rule governing allocation of public resources in a given country, recommends some fact-based change indicators to follow, and outlines a plan to identify the human agency with a vested interest in changing the status quo. In the end, the essay argues that anticorruption interventions must be designed to empower such agency on the basis of a joint strategy to reduce opportunities for and increase constraints on corruption, and recommends that experts exclude entirely the tools that do not work in a given national context.

ALINA MUNGIU-PIPPIDI is Professor of Democracy Studies at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin. She chairs the European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building (ERCAS), where she managed the FP7 research project ANTICORRP. She is the author of  The Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption  (2015) and  A Tale of Two Villages: Coerced Modernization in the East European Countryside  (2010).

T he last two decades of unprecedented anticorruption activity – including the adoption of an international legal framework, the emergence of an anticorruption civil society, the introduction of governance-related aid conditionality, and the rise of a veritable anticorruption industry – have been marred by stagnation in the evolution of good governance, ratings of which have remained flat for most of the countries in the world.

The World Bank’s 2017 Control of Corruption aggregate rating showed that twenty-two countries progressed significantly in the past twenty years and twenty-five regressed. Of the countries showing progress on corruption, nineteen were rated as either “free” or “partly free” by Freedom House (a democracy watchdog that measures governance via political rights and civil liberties); only seven were judged “not free.” 1 Our governance measures are too new to allow us to look further into the past; still, it seems that governance change has much in common with climate change: it occurs only slowly, and the role that humans play involuntarily seems always to matter more than what they do with intent.

External aid and its attached conditionality are considered an essential component of efforts to enable developing countries to deliver decent public services on the principle of ethical universalism (in which everyone is treated equally and fairly). However, a panel data set (collected from 110 developing countries that received aid from the European Union and its member states between 2002 and 2014) shows little evolution of fair service delivery in countries receiving conditional aid. Bilateral aid from the largest European donors does not have significant impact on governance in recipient countries, while multilateral financial assistance from EU institutions such as the Office of Development Assistance (which provides aid conditional on good governance) produces only a small improvement in the governance indicators of the net recipients. Dedicated aid to good-governance and corruption initiatives within multilateral aid packages has no sizable effect, whether on public-sector functionality or anticorruption. 2 Countries like Georgia, Vanuatu, Rwanda, Macedonia, Bhutan, and Uruguay, which have managed to evolve more than one point on a one-to-ten scale from 2002 to 2014, are outliers. In other words, they evolved disproportionately given the EU aid per capita that they received, while countries that received the most aid (such as Turkey, Egypt, and Ukraine) had rather disappointing results.

So how, if at all, can an external actor such as a donor agency influence the transition of a society from corruption as a governance norm , wherein public resource distribution is systematically biased in favor of authority holders and those connected with them, to corruption as an exception , a state that is largely independent from private interest and that allocates public resources based on ethical universalism? Can such a process be engineered? How do the current anticorruption tools promoted by the international community perform in delivering this result?

Looking at the governance progress indicators outlined above, one might wonder whether efforts to change the quality of government in other countries are doomed from the outset. The incapacity of international donors to help push any country above the threshold of good governance during the past twenty years of the global crusade against corruption seems over- rather than under-explained. For one, corrupt countries are generally run by corrupt people with little interest in killing their own rents, although they may find it convenient to adopt international treaties or domestic legislation that are nominally dedicated to anticorruption efforts. Furthermore, countries in which informal institutions have long been substituted for formal ones have a tradition of surviving untouched by formal legal changes that may be forced upon them. One popular saying from the post-Soviet world expresses the view that “the inadequacy of the laws is corrected by their non-observance.” 3

Explicit attempts of donor countries and international organizations to change governance across borders might appear a novel phenomenon, but are they actually so very different from older endeavors to “modernize” and “civilize” poorer countries and change their domestic institutions to replicate allegedly superior, “universal” ones? Describing similar attempts by the ancient Greeks – and also their rather poor impact – historian Arnaldo Momig­liano writes: “The Greeks were seldom in a position to check what natives told them: they did not know the languages. The natives, on the other hand, being bilingual, had a shrewd idea of what the Greeks wanted to hear and spoke accordingly. This reciprocal position did not make for sincerity and real understanding.” 4

Many factors speak against the odds of success of international donors’ efforts to change governance practices, especially government-funded ones. One such factor is the incentives facing donor countries themselves: they want first and foremost to care for national companies investing abroad and their business opportunities; reduce immigration from poor countries; and generate jobs for their development industry. Even if donor countries would prefer that poor countries govern better, reduce corruption, and adopt Western values, they also have to play their cards realistically. Thus, donor countries often end up avoiding the root of the problem: when the choice is between their own economic interests and more idealistic commitments to better governance, the former usually wins out.

T he first question a policy analyst should ask, therefore, is not how to go about altering governance in developing countries, but whether the promotion of good governance and anticorruption is worth doing at all, self-serving reasons aside. I have addressed these questions in greater detail elsewhere; this essay assumes a donor has already made the decision to intervene. 5 The evidence on the basis of which such decisions are made is often poor, but realistically, due to the other policy objectives mentioned above (such as the exigencies of participation in the global economy), international donors will continue to give aid systematically to corrupt countries. As long as one thinks a country is worth granting assistance to, preventing aid money from feeding corruption in the recipient country becomes an obligation to one’s own taxpayers. For the sake of the recipient country, too, ensuring that such money is used to do good, rather than actually to funnel more resources into local informal institutions and predatory elites, seems more of an obligation than a choice.

While our knowledge of how to establish a norm of ethical universalism is still far from sufficient, I will outline a road map toward making corruption the exception rather than the rule in recipient countries. To do so, I draw on one of the largest social-science research projects undertaken by the European Union, ANTICORRP, which was conducted between 2013 and 2017 and was dedicated to systematically assessing the impact of public anticorruption tools and the contexts that enable them. I follow the consequences of the evidence to suggest a methodology for the design of an anticorruption strategy for external donors and their counterparts in domestic civil societies. 6

Many anticorruption policies and programs have been declared successful, but no country has yet achieved control of corruption through the prescriptions attached to international assistance. 7 To proceed, we must also clarify what constitutes “success” in anticorruption reforms. Success can only mean a consolidated dominant norm of ethical universalism and public integrity. Exceptions, in the form of corrupt acts, will always remain, but if they are numerous enough to be the rule, a country cannot be called an achiever. A successful transformation requires both a dominant norm of public integrity (wherein the majority of acts and public officials are noncorrupt) and the sustainability of that norm across at least two or three electoral cycles.

Q uite a few developing countries presently seem to be struggling in a borderline area in which old and new norms confront one another. This is why popular demand for leadership integrity has been loudly proclaimed in headlines from countries such as South Korea, India, Brazil, Bulgaria, and Romania, but substantially better quality of governance has yet to be achieved there. While the solutions for each and every country will ultimately come from the country itself – and not from some universal toolkit – recent research can contribute to a road map for more evidence-based corruption control.

The first step is to understand that with the exception of the developed world, control of corruption has to be built from the ground up, not “restored.” Most anticorruption approaches are built on the concept that public integrity and ethical universalism are already global norms of governance. This is wrong on two counts, and leads to policy failure. First, at the present moment, most countries are more corrupt than noncorrupt. A histogram of corruption control shows that developing countries range between two and six on a one-to-ten scale, with some borderline cases in between (see Figure 1). Countries scoring in the upper third are a minority, so a development agency is more likely than not to be dealing with a situation in which corruption is not only a norm but an institutionalized practice. Development agencies need to understand corruption as a social practice or institution, not just as a sum of individual corrupt acts. Further, presuming that ethical universalism is the default is wrong from a developmental perspective, since even countries in which ethical universalism is the governance norm were not always this way: from sales of offices to class privileges and electoral corruption, the histories of even the cleanest countries show that good governance is the product of evolution, and modernity a long and frequently incomplete endeavor to develop state autonomy in the face of private group interests.

Figure 1 Particularism versus Ethical Universalism: Distribution of Countries on the Control of Corruption Continuum

Figure 1

Source: The World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, Control of Corruption, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home distribution . Distribution recoded 1–10 (with Denmark 10). The number of countries for each score is noted on each column.

Institutionalized corruption is based on the informal institution of particularism (treating individuals differently according to their status), which is prevalent in collectivistic and status-based societies. Particularism frequently results in patrimonialism (the use of public office for private profit), turning public office into a perpetual source of spoils. 8 Public corruption thrives on power inequality and the incapacity of the weak to prevent the strong from appropriating the state and spoiling public resources. Particularism encompasses a variety of interpersonal and personal-state transaction types, such as clientelism, bribery, patronage, nepotism, and other favoritisms, all of which imply some degree of patrimonialism when an authority-holder is concerned. Particularism not only defines the relations between a government and its subjects, but also between individuals in a society; it explains why advancement in a given society might be based on status or connections with influential people rather than on merit.

The outcome associated with the prevalence of particularism – a regular pattern of preferential distribution of public goods toward those who hold more power – has been termed “limited-access order” by economists Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast; “extractive institutions” by economist Daron Acemoglu and political scientist James Robinson; and “patrimonialism” by political scientist Francis Fukuyama. 9 Essentially, though, all these categories overlap and all the authors acknowledge that particularism rather than ethical universalism is closer to the state of nature (or the default social organization), and that its opposite, a norm of open and equal access or public integrity, is by no means guaranteed by political evolution and indeed has only ever been achieved in a few cases thus far. The first countries to achieve good control of corruption – among them Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Prussia – were also the first to modernize and, in Max Weber’s term, to “rationalize.” This implies an evolution from brutal material interests (espoused, for instance, by Spanish conquistadors who appropriated the gold and silver of the New World) to a more rationalistic and capitalistic channeling of economic surplus, underpinned by an ideology of personal austerity and achievement. The market and capitalism, despite their obvious limitations, gradually emerged in these cases as the main ways of allocating resources, replacing the previous system of discretionary allocation by means of more or less organized violence. The past century and a half has seen a multitude of attempts around the world to replicate these few advanced cases of Western modernization. However, a reduction in the arbitrariness and power discretion of rulers, as occurred in the West and some Western Anglo-Saxon colonies, has not taken place in many other countries, regardless of whether said rulers were monopolists or won power through contested elections. Despite adopting most of the formal institutions associated with Western modernity – such as constitutions, political parties, elections, bureaucracies, free markets, and courts – many countries never managed to achieve a similar rationalization of both the state and the broader society. 10 Many modern institutions exist only in form, substituted by informal institutions that are anything but modern. That is why treating corruption as deviation is problematic in developing countries: it leads to investing in norm-enforcing instruments, when the norm-building instruments that are in fact needed are quite different. Strangely enough, developed countries display extraordinary resistance to addressing corruption as a development-related rather than moral problem. This is why our Western anticorruption techniques look much like an invasion of the temperance league in a pub on Friday night: a lot of noise with no consequence. Scholars contribute to the inefficacy of interventions by perpetuating theoretical distinctions that are of poor relevance even in the developed world (such as “bureaucratic versus political” or “grand versus petty” corruption), which inform us only of the opportunities that somebody has to be corrupt. As those opportunities simply vary according to one’s station in life (a minister exhorting an energy company for a contract is simply using his grand station in a perfectly similar way to a petty doctor who required a gift to operate or a policeman requiring a bribe not to give a fine), such distinctions are not helpful or conceptually meaningful. In countries where the practice of particularism is dominant, disentangling political from bureaucratic corruption also does not work, since rulers appoint “bureaucrats” on the basis of personal or party allegiance and the two collude in extracting resources. Even distinguishing victims from perpetrators is not easy in a context of institutionalized corruption. In a developing country, an electricity distribution company, for instance, might be heavily indebted to the state but still provide rents (such as well-paid jobs) to people in government and their cronies and eventually contribute funds to their electoral campaigns. For their part, consumers defend themselves by not paying bills and actually stealing massively from the grid, and controllers take moderate bribes to leave the situation as it is. The result is constant electricity shortages and a situation to which everybody (or nearly everybody) contributes, and which has to be understood and addressed holistically and not artificially separated into types of corruption.

The second step is diagnosing the norm. If we conceive governance as a set of formal rules and informal practices determining who gets which public resources, we can then place any country on a continuum with full particularism at one end and full ethical universalism at the other. There are two main questions that we have to answer. What is the dominant norm (and practice) for social allocation: merit and work, or status and connections to authority? And how does this compare to the formal norm – such as the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), or the country’s own regulation – and to the general degree of modernity in the society? For instance, merit-based advancement in civil service may not work as the default norm, but it may in the broader society, for instance in universities and private businesses. The tools to begin this assessment are the Worldwide Governance Indicator Control of Corruption, an aggregate of all perception scores (Figure 1); and the composite, mostly fact-based Index for Public Integrity that I developed with my team (which is highly correlated with perception indicators). Any available public-opinion poll on governance can complete the picture (one standard measure is the Global Corruption Barometer, which is organized by Transparency International). Simply put, the majority of respondents in countries in the upper tercile of the Control of Corruption indicators feel that no personal ties are needed to access a public service, while those in the lower two-thirds will in all likelihood indicate that personal connections or material inducement are necessary (albeit in different proportions). Within the developed European Union, only in Northern Europe does a majority of citizens believe that the state and markets work impartially. The United States, developed Commonwealth countries, and Japan round out the top tercile. The next set of countries, around six and seven on the scale, already exhibit far more divided public opinion, showing that the two norms coexist and possibly compete. 11 In countries where the norm of particularism is dominant and access is limited, surveys show majorities opining that government only works in the favor of the few; that people are not equal in the eyes of the law; and that connections, not merit, drive success in both the public and private sectors. Bribery often emerges as a substitute for or a complement to a privileged connection; when administration discretion is high, favoritism is the rule of the game, so bribes may be needed to gain access, even for those with some preexisting privilege. A thorough analysis needs to determine whether favoritism is dominant and how material and status-based favoritism relate to one another in order to weigh useful policy answers. Are they complementary, compensatory, or competitive? When the dominant norm is particularistic, collusive practices are widespread, including not only a fusion of interests between appointed and elected office holders and civil servants more generally, but also the capture of law enforcement agencies.

The second step, diagnosis, needs to be completed by fact-based indicators that allow us to trace prevalence and change. Fortunately for the analyst (but unfortunately for everyone else), since corrupt societies are, in Max Weber’s words, status societies , where wealth is only a vehicle to obtain greater status, we do not need Panama-Papers revelations to see corruption. Systematic corrupt practices are noticeable both directly and through their outcomes: lavish houses of poorly paid officials, great fortunes made of public contracts, and the poor quality of public works. Particularism results in privilege to some (favoritism) and discrimination to others, outcomes that can both be measured. 12

Table 1 illustrates how these two contexts – corruption as norm and corruption as exception – differ essentially, and shows that different measures must be taken to define, assess, and respond to corruption in either case. An individual is corrupt when engaging in a corrupt act, regardless of whether he or she is a public or private actor. The dominant analytic framework of the literature on corruption is the principal-agent paradigm, wherein agents (for example government officials) are individuals authorized to act on behalf of a principal (for example a government). To diagnose an organization or a country as “corrupt,” we have to establish that corruption is the norm: in other words, that corrupt transactions are prevalent. When such practices are the exception, the corrupt agent is simply a deviant and can be sanctioned by the principal if identified. When such practices are the norm, corruption occurs on an organized scale, extracting resources disproportionately in favor of the most powerful group. Telling the principal from the agent can be quite impossible in these cases due to generalized collusion (the organization is by privileged status groups, patron-client pyramids, or networks of extortion) and fighting corruption means solving social dilemmas and issues around discretionary use of power. Most people operate by conformity, and conformity always works in favor of the status quo: if ethical universalism is already the norm in a society, conformity helps to enforce public integrity; if favoritism and clientelism are the norm, few people will dissent. The difference between corruption as a rule and corruption as a norm shows in observable, measurable phenomena. In contexts with clearer public-private separation, it is more difficult to discover corrupt acts, requiring whistleblowers or some time for a conflict of interest to unfold (as with revolving doors, through which the official collects benefits from his favor by getting a cushy job later with a private company). In contexts where patrimonialism is widespread, there is no need for whistleblowers: officials grant state contracts to themselves or their families, use their public car and driver to take their mother-in-law shopping, and so forth – all in publicly observable displays (see Table 1).

Table 1 Corruption as Governance Context

Efforts to measure corruption should aim at gauging the prevalence of favoritism, measuring how many transactions are impersonal and by-the-book, and how many are not. Observations for measurement can be drawn from all the transactions that a government agency, sector, or entire state engages in, from regulation to spending. The results of these observations allow us to monitor change over time in a country’s capacity to control corruption. Even anecdotal evidence can be a good way to gauge changes to corruption over long periods: twenty years ago, for example, it was customary even in some developed countries for companies bidding for public contracts to consult among themselves; today this is widely understood to be a collusive practice and has been made illegal in many countries. These indicators signal essential changes of context that we need to trace in developing countries and indeed to use to create our good governance targets. If in a given country it is presently customary to pay a bribe to have a telephone line installed, the target is to make this exceptional.

In my previous work, I have given examples of such indicators of corruption norms, including the particularistic distribution of funds for natural disasters, comparisons of turnout and profit for government-connected companies versus unconnected companies, the changing fortunes of market leaders after elections, and the replacement of the original group of market leaders (those connected to the losing political clique) by another well-defined group of market leaders (those connected with election winners). The data sources for such measurements are the distribution of public contracts, subsidies, tax breaks, government subnational transfers; in short, basically any allocation of public resources, including through legislation (laws are ideal instruments to trade favors for personal profit). If such data exist in a digital format, which is increasingly the case in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and even China, it becomes feasible to monitor, for example, how many public contracts go to companies belonging to officials or how many people put their relatives on public payrolls. Ensuring that data sources like these are made open and universally accessible by public or semipublic entities (such as government and Register of Commerce data) is itself a valid and worthy target for donors. The method works even when data are not digitized: through simple requests for information, as most countries in the world have freedom of information acts. Inaccessibility of public data opens an entire avenue for donor action unto itself: supporting freedom-of-information legislation also supports anticorruption efforts, since lack of transparency and corruption are correlated.

N ow that targets have been established, the fourth step is solving the problem of domestic agency. By and large, countries can achieve control of corruption in two ways. The first is surreptitious: policy-makers and politicians change institutions incrementally until open access, free competition, and meritocracy become dominant, even though that may not have been a main collective goal. This has worked for many developed countries in the past. The second method is to make a concerted effort to foster collective agency and investment in anticorruption efforts specifically, eventually leading to the rule of law and control of corruption delivered as public goods. This can occur after sustained anticorruption campaigns in a country where particularism is engrained. Both paths require human agency. In the former, the role of agency is small. Reforms slip by with little opposition, since they are not perceived as being truly dangerous to anybody’s rents, and do not therefore need great heroism to be pushed through; just common sense, professionalism, and a public demand for government performance. The latter scenario, however, requires considerable effort and alignment of both interests favoring change and an ideology of ethical universalism. Identifying the human agency that can deliver the change therefore becomes essential to selecting a well-functioning anticorruption strategy.

Changing governance across borders is a difficult task even under military occupation. Leaving external actors aside, a country’s governance can push corruption from norm to exception either through the actions of an enlightened despot (the king of Denmark model beginning in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries), an enlightened elite (as in the British and American cases), or by an enlightened mass of citizens (the famous “middle class” of political modernization theory). Enlightened despots do appear periodically (the kingdom of Bhutan is the current example of shining governance reforms, after the classic example of Botswana, where the chief of the largest tribe became a democratically elected president). Enlightened elites can perhaps be engineered (this is what George Soros and the Open Society Foundation have tried to do, with one of the results being a great mobilization against elites in less democratic countries), and countries that have them (like Estonia, Georgia, Chile, and Uruguay) have evolved further than their neighbors. Enlightened and organized citizens must reach a critical mass; and regardless how strong a demand for good governance they put up, they cannot do much without an alternative and autonomous elite that is able to take over from the corrupt one. As the recent South Korean case has proved, entrusting power at the top to former elites leads to an immediate return to former practices; however, in that case, the society had sufficiently evolved in the interval to defend itself.

In principle, donors can work with enlightened despots, attempt to socialize enlightened elites to some extent, and help civil society and “enlightened” citizens. But, in practice, this does not go so well. Donors seem by default to treat every corrupt government as though it were run by an enlightened despot, entrusting it with the ownership of anticorruption programs. These, of course, will never take off, not only because they are more often than not the wrong programs, but because implementing them would run counter to the main interests of these principals. Additionally, this approach is not sustainable: pro-Western elites are so scarce these days that checking their anticorruption credentials often becomes problematic. Take the tiny post-Soviet republic of Moldova, which could never afford to punish anyone from the Russian-organized crime syndicates that control part of its economy and even a breakaway province thriving on weapons smuggling. Due to international anticorruption efforts, a prime minister was jailed for eight years for “abuse of function” – actually for failing to prevent cybercrime – despite the fact that he held pro-EU policy goals. The better and less repressive approach – designing anticorruption interventions that include society actors as main stakeholders by default, not just working with governments – is rather exceptional, although such an approach might greatly enhance the effectiveness of aid programs in general.

The remaining option, building a critical mass from bottom up, is not easy either, as it basically means competing with patronage and client networks that have a lot to offer the average citizen. “Incentivizing,” another anticorruption-industry buzzword, is really a practical joke. No anticorruption incentive can compete with a diamond mine, a country’s oil income, or, indeed, its whole budget, including assistance funds. Despoilers generally control those rents and distribute them wisely to stay in control. Anticorruption is not a win-win game, it is a game played by societies against their despoilers, and when building accountability, not everybody wins. But if in contemporary times countries like Estonia, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Taiwan, Chile, Slovenia, Botswana, and even Georgia are edging over the threshold of good governance through their own agency, we must maintain hope that others can follow.

W e see all around the world that demand for good governance and participation in anticorruption protests have increased – just not sufficiently to change governance. Perhaps there was not enough middle-class growth in the last two decades for that: the Pew Research Center found that between 2001 and 2011, nearly seven hundred million people escaped poverty but did not travel far up enough to be labeled middle-class. 13 Fortunately, the development of smartphones with Internet access provides a great shortcut to fostering individual autonomy and achieving enlightened participation.

Any assistance in increasing the percentage of “enlightened citizens” armed with smartphones is helpful in creating grassroots demand for government transparency; this is why both Internet access and ownership of smartphones are strongly associated with control of corruption. 14 But for our transition strategy we need more: careful stakeholder analysis and coalition building. Brokers of corrupt acts and practitioners of favoritism are not hidden in corrupt societies. Losers are more difficult to find; today’s losers may be tomorrow’s clients. As a ground rule, however, whoever wishes to engage in fair, competitive practices – whether in business or politics – stands to lose in a particularistic society. He or she faces two options: to desert for a more meritocratic realm (hence the close correlation between corruption and brain drain) or to fight. These are our recruitment grounds. It is essential to understand who is invested in challenging the rules of the game and who is invested in defending them; in other words, who are the status quo losers and winners? Who, among the winners, would stay a winner even if more merit-based competition were allowed? Who among the losers would gain? These are the groups that must come together to empower merit and fair competition.

By now, enough evidence should exist to support a theory of change, which in turn informs our strategy. To understand when the status quo will change, we need a theory of why it would change, who would push for the desired evolution, and how donors can assist them to steer the country to a virtuous circle. The main theories informing intervention presently are very general: modernization theory (the theory that increases in education and economic development bring better governance) and state modernization (the belief that building state capacity will also resolve integrity problems). But as there is a very close negative correlation between rule of law and control of corruption, it is the case more often than not that rule of law is absent where corruption is high, so legal approaches to anticorruption (like anticorruption agencies or strong punitive campaigns) can hardly be expected to deliver. 15 The same goes for civil-service capacity building in countries where bureaucracy has never gained its autonomy from rulers. Good governance requires autonomous classes of magistrates and of bureaucrats. These cannot be delivered by capacity-building in the absence of domestic political agency or some major loss of power of ruling elites that could empower bureaucrats. 16 This is why the accountability tools that work in our statistical assessments are those associated with civil-society agency. Voluntary implementation of accountability tools by interested groups (businesses who lose public tenders, for instance, or journalists seeking an audience) works better than implementation by government, which is always found wanting by donors.

In our recent work, my colleagues and I tested a broad panel of anticorruption tools and good governance policies from the World Bank’s Public Accountability Mechanism database. The panel includes nearly all instruments that are either frequently used in practice or specified in the UNCAC: anticorruption agencies, ombudsmen, freedom of information laws (FOIs), immunity protection limitations, conflict of interest legislation, financial disclosures, audit infrastructure improvements, budgetary transparency, party finance restrictions, whistleblower protections, and dedicated legislation. 17 The evidence so far shows that countries that adopt autonomous anticorruption agencies, restrictive party finance legislation, or whistleblower protection acts make no more progress on corruption than countries that do not. 18 The comprehensiveness of anticorruption regulation does not seem to matter either: in fact, the cleanest countries have moderate regulation and excessive regulation is actually associated with more corruption; what matters are the legal arrangements used to generate privileges and rents. In other words, it may well be that a country’s specific anticorruption legislation matters far less in ensuring good control of corruption than its overall “regulatory quality,” which might result precisely from a long process of controlled rent creation and profiteering. 19

Actually, as I have already argued, the empirical evidence suggests corruption control is best described as an equilibrium between opportunities (or resources) for corruption, such as natural resources, unconditional aid, lack of government transparency, administrative discretion, and obstacles to trade, and constraints on corruption, whether legal (an autonomous judiciary and audit) or normative (by the media and civil society). 20 Not only is each element highly influential on corruption, but statistical relationships between resources and constraints are highly significant. Examples include the inverse relationship between red tape and the independence of the judiciary and between transparency in any form (fiscal transparency, existence of an FOI, or financial disclosures) and the direct relationship between civil society activism and press freedom. Using this model, my colleagues and I designed an elegant composite index for public integrity for 109 countries based on policy determinants of control of corruption (which should be seen as the starting point of any diagnosis, since it shows at a first glance where the balance between opportunities and constraints goes wrong). While even evidence-based comparative measures can be criticized for ignoring cross-border corrupt behavior (like hiding corrupt income offshore), from a policy perspective, it still makes the most sense to keep national jurisdiction as the main comparison unit. Basically every anticorruption measure that would limit international resources for corruption is in the power of some national government.

Let’s take the well-known example of Tunisia, whose revolution was catalyzed in late 2010 by an unlicensed street vendor who immolated himself to protest against harassment by local police. Corruption – as inequity of social allocation induced and perpetuated by the government – was one of the main causes of protests. Has the fall of President Ben Ali and his cronies made Tunisians happy? No, because there are as many unemployed youths as before, equally lacking in jobs and hope, and the maze of obstructive regulation and rent seekers who profit by it are the same. If we check Tunisia against countries in its region and income group on the Index of Public Integrity, we see that the revolution has only brought significant progress on press freedom and trade openness. On items such as administrative burden, fiscal transparency, and quality of regulation, the country still has much to do to bring the economy out of the shadows and restore a social contract between society and the state (see Table 2). To get there, policies are needed both to bring the street vendors into the licensed, tax-paying world and to reduce the discretion of policemen.

Examples of specific, successful legislative initiatives exist in the handful of achievers we identified through our measurement index: Uruguay and Georgia, for instance, which have implemented soft formalization policies, tax simplification, and police reform. This is the correct path to follow to control corruption successfully. In a context of generalized lawbreaking fostered by unrealistic legislation, selective enforcement becomes inevitable, and then even anticorruption laws can generate new rents and protect existing ones, reproducing rather than changing the rules of the game. One cannot expect isolated anticorruption measures to work unless opportunities and constraints are brought into balance. For instance, one cannot ask Nigeria to create a register for foreign-owned businesses in order to trace beneficial ownership (as is the standard procedure for anticorruption consultants) without formalizing and registering (hopefully electronically) all property in Nigeria, a long-standing development goal with important implications for corruption. It is quite important, therefore, that we understand and act on both sides of this balance. Working on just one side only creates more distance between formal and informal institutions, which is already a serious problem in corrupt countries.

Figure 2 Control of Corruption as Interaction between Resources and Constraints

Figure 2

Source: Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Ramin Dadasov, “Measuring Control of Corruption by a New Index of Public Integrity,” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 22 (3) (2016).

Table 2 Tunisia’s Public Integrity Framework

Note: On the Index of Public Integrity, Tunisia scores 6.40 on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 as the best, and ranks 59th out of 109 countries. Source: Index of Public Integrity, 2015, http://www.integrity-index.org .

The sixth step on the road map is for international donors to get together to implement a strategy to fix this imbalance. In the same way the Millennium Development goals required coordination and multiyear planning, making the majority of transactions clean rather than corrupt requires long-term strategic planning. The goals are not just to reduce corruption with isolated interventions, but to build public integrity in many countries – a clear development goal – and to refrain from punishing deviation. The joint planners of such efforts should begin by sponsoring a diagnostic effort using objective indicators and subsequently launch coordinated efforts to reduce resources and increase constraints. This collaboration-based approach also allows donors to diversify their efforts, as some may have strengths in building civil society, others in market development reforms, and others still in increasing Internet access. Freedom of the press receives insufficient support, and seldom the kind it needs (what media needs in corrupt countries is clean media investment, not training for investigative journalists).

Finally, international donors must set the example. They should publicize what they fund and how they structure the process of aid allocation itself. Those at the apex of the donor-coordination strategy ought to agree upon aid-related good-governance conditions and enforce them across the board. Aid recipients – including particular governments, subnational government units or agencies, and aid intermediaries – should qualify for receiving aid transfers only if they publish in advance all their calls for tenders and their awards, which would allow monitoring the percentage of transparent and competitive bids out of the total procurement budget. Why not make the full transparency of all recipients the main condition for selection? Such indicators could also be useful to trace evolution (or lack thereof) from one year to another. On top of this, using social accountability more decisively, for instance by involving pro-change local groups in planning and audits of aid projects, would also empower these groups and set an example for how local stakeholders should monitor public spending. These gestures of transparency and inclusiveness toward the societies that donors claim to help – and not just their rulers – would bring real benefits for both sides and enhance the reputation of development aid.

1 Count based on the Worldwide Governance Indicator Control of Corruption recoded on a scale of 1 to 10, with the best performer rated 10.

2 Ramin Dadasov, “European Aid and Governance: Does the Source Matter?” The European Journal of Development Research 29 (2) (2017): 269–288.

3 Cited in Alena V. Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices that Shaped Post-Soviet Politics and Business (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006).

4 Arnaldo Momigliano, Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 8.

5 See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, A Quest for Good Governance: How Societies Develop Control of Corruption (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

6 See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Ramin Dadasov, “When Do Anticorruption Laws Matter? The Evidence on Public Integrity,” Crime, Law, and Social Change 68 (4) (2017): 1 – 16. I am grateful to Sweden’s Expert Group for Aid Studies (EBA) for funding this research and for helpful comments on an earlier version of this article. See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, Seven Steps to Evidence-Based Anticorruption: A Roadmap (Stockholm: Swedish Expert Group for Aid Studies, 2017), http://eba.se/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/2017_10_final-webb.pdf .

7 An ampler discussion of this issue can be found in Robert Klitgaard, Addressing Corruption Together (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2015), https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/publications/FINAL%20Addressing%20corruption%20together.pdf .

8 For the intellectual genealogy of these terms, see Mungiu-Pippidi, A Quest for Good Governance , chap. 1 – 2; and Talcott Parsons, Introduction to Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: The Free Press, 1997), 80–82.

9 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty (New York: Crown Business, 2012); Francis Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014); and Douglass C. North, John J. Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

10 A fuller argument roughly compatible with mine appears in North, Wallis, and Weingast, Violence and Social Orders .

11 For evidence, see Mungiu-Pippidi, A Quest for Good Governance , chap. 2; and Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadasov, “When Do Anticorruption Laws Matter?”

12 For a more extensive argument, see Robert Rotberg, “Good Governance Means Performance and Results,” Governance 27 (3) (2014): 511 – 518; and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, “For a New Generation of Objective Indicators in Governance and Corruption Studies,” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 22 (3) (2016): 363–367.

13 Rakesh Kochhar, A Global Middle Class Is More Promise than Reality (Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center, 2015), http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/07/08/a-global-middle-class-is-more-promise-than-reality/ .

14 See Niklas Kossow and Roberto M. B. Kukutschka, “Civil Society and Online Connectivity: Controlling Corruption on the Net?” Crime, Law and Social Change 68 (4) (2017): 1–18.

15 Lant Pritchett and Michael Woolcock, “Solutions when the Solution is the Problem: Arraying the Disarray in Development,” World Development 32 (2) (2004): 191–212.

16 Robert Rotberg makes a similar point in “Good Governance Means Performance and Results.”

17 See Mungiu-Pippidi and Dadasov, “When Do Anticorruption Laws Matter?”

19 See updated evidence in Mihaly Fazekas, “Red Tape, Bribery and Government Favouritism: Evidence from Europe,” Crime, Law & Social Change 68 (4) (2017): 403–429.

20 For the full models, see Mungiu-Pippidi, A Quest for Good Governance , chap. 4; and Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Ramin Dadasov, “Measuring Control of Corruption by a New Index of Public Integrity,” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 22 (3) (2016): 415–438.

  • Development Policy Centre
  • Australian Aid Tracker
  • Aid Profiles
  • PNG Databases
  • Publications

Devpolicy Blog from the Development Policy Centre

An update on the “good governance coup”: political will and corruption in Fiji

FICAC sign in Nadi, Fiji (Michael Coghlan-Flickr)

In 2006 Fiji’s current prime minister, Frank Bainimarama, seized power from a government that had been elected only seven months earlier. Named the “good governance coup”, the takeover was justified by concerns about corruption as well as racism. 16 years later, Fiji is about to go to the polls for the third time since Bainimarama took power. One question voters may well ask is: has the good governance coup delivered on its promise to address corruption?

In this article we argue that, while there have been some gains, political will towards anti-corruption efforts in Fiji appears to be running out of steam.

While the phrase “good governance coup” is an oxymoron, there are signs that the government’s subsequent anti-corruption efforts have borne fruit. The Worldwide Governance Indicators find that Fiji’s Control of Corruption percentile ranking has improved, from 60 in 2007 to 67.3 in 2021. This is better than Papua New Guinea (25) but lower than Micronesia (70) and Tuvalu (73). In 2021 the country scored 55 out of 100 (with a score of 100 equating to clean and 0 very corrupt) and ranked 45 out of 180 countries on its first appearance in over a decade on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index . On this index Fiji ranks better than neighbours Solomon Islands (score: 43/100), Vanuatu (45/100) and PNG (31/100). Fiji’s score was slightly better than the east African island nation Mauritius (which scored 54/100).

Fiji’s citizens are concerned about corruption. In a recent Global Corruption Barometer survey , 68% of respondents across the country said that corruption is a big problem in government; 61% said it was a big problem in the private sector. However, the same survey found that bribery rates are low – 5% of respondents said they paid a bribe to get a service in the previous 12 months, compared to 64% of respondents from Kiribati.

Still, our analysis suggests these relatively positive results could be undermined by dwindling political will towards key anti-corruption organisations. To understand the level of political will towards anti-corruption efforts, we calculate the relative amount of funding for key state-based anti-corruption organisations (we’ve written more about this approach in relation to PNG and Solomon Islands ). To do so, we draw on over a decade of publicly available budget documents.

In 2007, the Bainimarama regime established the Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption, known as FICAC, which became a key symbol of the good governance coup. FICAC has been accused of being politically motivated; in the lead up to the 2022 election the agency questioned the leader of the People’s Alliance (PA) party , Sitiveni Rabuka, and charged PA deputy leaders Lynda Tabuya and Dan Lobendahn with vote buying and breach of campaign rules. If it wins the election, the PA party has recently pledged to phase out FICAC within 100 days of forming office.

While complaints to FICAC have significantly increased since it was established, it only responds to a small fraction .

Though budgeted to receive an increase of F$2.2 million in real terms in the 2022-23 budget, our analysis shows that the government’s actual spending on FICAC has been declining. In 2010 the government spent 0.5% of its budget on FICAC, which had halved by 2020-21. (It is budgeted to bounce back slightly in 2022-23, rising to 0.28%.) In real terms, spending on FICAC dropped by F$2.6 million between 2010 and 2020-21.

Similarly, spending on the Attorney-General’s Chambers reduced from 0.26% of the budget in 2010 to 0.12% in 2020-21 (in real terms, spending reduced by F$1.7 million). It is budgeted to receive 0.14% by 2022-23, but given a history of underspending it is likely this agency will receive less than what has been promised.

On a somewhat brighter note, the Office of the Auditor-General received a slightly higher proportion of the budget over the past decade: the government spent 0.15% of the budget on this agency in 2010 and 0.16% in 2020-21 (an increase of F$1.8 million in real terms). This is set to dip back down to 0.15% by 2022-23. Despite not losing financial ground, as one of us (Neelesh) argues, Fiji’s Auditor-General faces questions about the office’s independence and impact .

Diminishing political will towards key state-based anti-corruption organisations is also evidenced by what is not in the budget. Despite the 2013 constitution providing for the establishment of an Accountability and Transparency Commission – which is supported by civil society groups – the government has not provided the funding required to establish this agency. (In the 2022-23 budget it provides a paltry F$20,000 for this agency, which pales in comparison to the F$10.5 million budgeted for FICAC.) In February 2021, Attorney-General Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum explained that the budgetary allocation for the Accountability and Transparency Commission would not be forthcoming as a bill outlining its responsibilities had not been approved by parliament. This is still the case.

The government has increased financial support to the country’s police force. Spending on the police increased from 4.9% in the 2010 budget to 5.7% in 2020-21 – an increase of F$78 million in real terms. In comparison, in its 2020 budget the Papua New Guinean government spent just over 2% on its police force, and this is budgeted to fall to 1.6% by 2022. Fiji’s police, however, have their own problems with corruption. The Global Corruption Barometer survey found that, compared to other institutions, more people thought the police, along with members of parliament, were involved with corruption . Cuts to key anti-corruption organisations may exacerbate this.

Further reforms are clearly needed. Beyond being well funded and staffed, anti-corruption agencies need to be independent and publicly accountable, which suggests the need for multi-stakeholder oversight involving politicians, the business community and civil society. This could mean reforming – through greater oversight and the involvement of independent stakeholders – rather than abolishing FICAC. Establishing and funding an independent Accountability and Transparency Commission to investigate permanent secretaries and others holding public office could also help.

Whatever the outcome of the 14 December election, the next government will need to quickly establish (or re-establish) its anti-corruption credentials if Fiji is to build on any gains it has already made in the fight against corruption.

See our budgetary analysis of Fiji’s key anti-corruption organisations .

image_pdf

This research was supported by the  Pacific Research Program , with funding from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. The views are those of the authors only.

Related posts:

  • Fiji’s 1987 coup: from trauma to cohesion
  • Fiji’s choice
  • The future of the University of the South Pacific
  • Brij Lal’s final interview
  • FAST or slow? Integrity and anti-corruption in Samoa

corruption kills good governance essay

Grant Walton

Grant Walton is an associate professor at the Development Policy Centre and the author of Anti-Corruption and its Discontents: Local, National and International Perspectives on Corruption in Papua New Guinea .

corruption kills good governance essay

Husnia Hushang

Husnia Hushang is Senior School Administrator at the ANU Research School of Economics, and a research assistant at the Development Policy Centre. She has a Masters of Public Policy and a Graduate Diploma of Public Administration from the ANU, and a Bachelor of Law and Political Science from Kabul University.

corruption kills good governance essay

Neelesh Gounder

Neelesh Gounder is Senior Lecturer in economics and Deputy Head of School (Research), School of Accounting Finance and Economics at the University of the South Pacific, Suva. He is also a centre associate with the Development Policy Centre.

IMAGES

  1. Corruption Essay

    corruption kills good governance essay

  2. Essay on Corruption: Causes & its Effects

    corruption kills good governance essay

  3. Essay on Corruption for all Class in 100 to 500 Words in English

    corruption kills good governance essay

  4. Essay on Corruption with Quotations 200 & 500 WORDS

    corruption kills good governance essay

  5. Good Governance and Anti Corruption

    corruption kills good governance essay

  6. Good Governance and Anti Corruption

    corruption kills good governance essay

COMMENTS

  1. The way out of poverty and corruption is paved with good governance

    In this five-part series I will discuss what the World Bank Group is doing and what we are planning to do in key areas that are critical for ending poverty by 2030: good governance, gender equality, conflict and fragility, creating jobs, and, finally, preventing and adapting to climate change.

  2. Against Corruption: a collection of essays

    Against Corruption: a collection of essays Published 12 May 2016 1. Foreword by David Cameron, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom Corruption is the cancer at the heart of so many of our...

  3. Good Governance and the Fight against Corruption

    World Bank President Dr. Jim Yong Kim recently wrote an inspiring blog on LinkedIn about the critical importance of good governance for all countries, arguing that "when [good governance] doesn't exist, many governments fail to deliver public services effectively; health and education services are often substandard; corruption persists in rich and poor countries alike, choking opportunity ...

  4. Anti-Corruption Module 2 Key Issues: Corruption and bad Governance

    There is a large body of literature that reveals the negative consequences of bad governance, primarily in the form of corruption and lack of property rights, for areas such as population health and people's access to safe water (Swaroop and Rajkumar, 2002; Holmberg and Rothstein, 2011).

  5. Social impacts of corruption upon community resilience and poverty

    Résumé Corruption , existing at all levels of all societies in varying degrees, is a behavioural consequence of power and greed in contexts of inadequate governance.

  6. Anti-Corruption Module 2 Key Issues: What is good Governance?

    For a related discussion on how corruption affects the SDGs, see the Appendix of Module 1 of the E4J University Module Series on Anti-Corruption. Principles of good governance. Good governance is tightly linked to the fight against corruption. Accordingly, some of the core principles of good governance are also principles of anti-corruption.

  7. PDF Let us be clear. Corruption kills. The money stolen through corruption

    Corruption kills. The money stolen through corruption every year is enough to feed the world's hungry 80 times over. Nearly 870 million people go to bed hungry every night, many of them children; corruption denies them their right to food, and, in some cases, their right to life.

  8. Corruption and Good Governance

    Corruption and good governance are two crucial issues for sustainable development and human rights. This webpage from the UN Rule of Law website provides an overview of the UN's efforts to combat ...

  9. The influence of corruption and governance in the delivery of frontline

    Corruption and lack of good governance in these countries undermine the delivery of quality essential health care services in an equitable manner, make it costly for the poor and disadvantaged, and results in poor health outcomes. ... Fraisse F, Roger A, Carme B, Nacher M. Corruption kills: estimating the global impact of corruption on children ...

  10. PDF Mimes for Good Governance: The Importance of Culture and Morality in

    Despite violent opposition to corruption in both 2005 and 2010, good governance was not evident in Kyrgyzstan due to a lack of anti-corruption culture and disregard for law.xxiii The violent discrimination against ethnic Uzbeks, and lawlessness that pervaded in Kyrgyzstan's

  11. PDF Module 2 Corruption and Good Governance

    The present Module focuses on the concept of good governance. It explores the different definitions of good governance and approaches to measuring it. The discussion starts by conceptualizing "governance" and "good governance", and their relationship with the global sustainable development 2 4

  12. Good Governance and Corruption

    The first measure to be initiated was: immediately prevent, through greater transparency and accountability, the present unprecedented large scale fraud, corruption, bribery and earning of commissions as well as the wastage of public funds; take action according to law to deal with abuses that have been committed."

  13. Combating Corruption and Promoting Good Governance

    Corruption is one of the most pervasive types of crime: it fuels transnational crime, wastes public resources, destabilizes countries, and impedes good governance. Authoritarian countries and those veering towards authoritarianism increasingly weaponize corruption to perpetuate power at home and undermine democracy around the world. While no country is immune to this threat and the United […]

  14. Free 'good Governance' And Eradication Of Corruption Essay Examples

    Good Example Of Essay On 'good Governance' And Eradication Of Corruption Type of paper: Essay Topic: Government, Governance, Economics, Corruption, Social Issues, Development, Crime, Growth Pages: 4 Words: 1100 Published: 01/02/2021 ORDER PAPER LIKE THIS 'Good Governance' and Eradication of Corruption Introduction

  15. Fighting corruption is key to addressing the world's most pressing

    This Friday, International Anti-Corruption Day is a time to recognise that corruption is at the centre of many of the world's most pressing problems. Economic, political, social, and environmental challenges can only be solved with good governance. The World Economic Forum's Partnering Against Corruption Initiative (PACI) serves as the ...

  16. Corruption and Good Governance: The Case of Bangladesh

    This paper highlights the view that corruption can be combated if good governance can be put into practice, i.e. 'good governance' has been viewed as a key strategy to curb corruption.

  17. Corruption

    This paper is a part of a broader study undertaken on corruption. It addresses issues related to corruption and good governance in the South African (National) Public Service. To articulate and analyse the challenges confronting the country, issues regarding coordination of anti-corruption agencies will be explored. Introduction.

  18. Seven Steps to Control of Corruption: The Road Map

    Dedicated aid to good-governance and corruption initiatives within multilateral aid packages has no sizable effect, whether on public-sector functionality or anticorruption. 2 Countries like Georgia, Vanuatu, Rwanda, Macedonia, Bhutan, and Uruguay, which have managed to evolve more than one point on a one-to-ten scale from 2002 to 2014, are ...

  19. Full article: The impact of corruption on economic growth in developing

    On the one hand, grand corruption involves high-ranking officials at the policy formulation end of politics. It pervades national governments' highest levels, leading to a broad erosion of confidence in good governance, the rule of law, and economic stability (Rose-Ackerman, Citation 2000). It refers not so much to the amount of money ...

  20. PDF FIGHT AGAINST CORRUPTION

    1. INTRODUCTION Corruption is a drag on economic growth. By diverting resources away from economically productive outcomes, it undermines the efficiency of public spending. Particularly when public resources are limited, corruption also undermines the sustainability of public budgets and reduces public funds for investment.

  21. Governance as an Interplay between Corruption and Polity ...

    This study examines the notion of governance while corruption and polity act in a negotiated approach. It adopts a theory synthesis approach to design the research paradigm and brings renewed attention to governance from a national perspective. This study argues that corruption and polity collectively define the state of governance in a particular country, which might offer some new insights ...

  22. An update on the "good governance coup": political will and corruption

    While the phrase "good governance coup" is an oxymoron, there are signs that the government's subsequent anti-corruption efforts have borne fruit. The Worldwide Governance Indicators find that Fiji's Control of Corruption percentile ranking has improved, from 60 in 2007 to 67.3 in 2021. This is better than Papua New Guinea (25) but ...

  23. Corruption, Democracy, and Good Governance in Africa: Essays on

    The Corruption of Democracy Human Rights and Development . 9: Some Pitfalls in Africas Quest for Democratic Rule and Good Governance . 31: A Function of the Crisis of Leadership . 49: ... and Good Governance in Africa: Essays on Accountability and Ethical Behaviour: Editors: Kwame Frimpong, Gloria Jacques: Publisher: Lightbooks, 1999: